Now showing items 1-6 of 6
Price-dependent profit sharing as an escape from the Bertrand paradox
(Discussion paper2007:4, Working paper, 2007-01)
In this paper we show how an upstream firm can prevent destructive competition among downstream firms producing relatively close substitutes by implementing a price-dependent profit-sharing rule. The rule also ensures ...
Price-dependent profit-sharing as a channel coordination device
(Working paper2008:05, Working paper, 2008-03)
We show how an upstream firm by using a price-dependent profit-sharing rule can prevent destructive competition between downstream firms that produce relatively close substitutes. With this rule the upstream firm induces ...
Do incumbents have incentives to degrade interconnection quality in the internet?
(Working Paper2002:22, Working paper, 2002-04)
Do internet incumbents choose low interconnection quality?
(Working Paper2004:20, Working paper, 2004-06)
In this paper we analyze the interconnection incentives for two networks that differ with respect to size of their installed based. In the first part we prove that the smaller firm may be harmed in competition for new ...
On the choice of royalty rule to cover fixed costs in input joint ventures
(Working paper;16/13, Working paper, 2013-07)
In a model where two competing downstream firms establish an input joint venture (JV), we analyze how different royalty rules for covering fixed costs affect channel profits. Under running royalties (regardless of whether ...
Managerial incentives and access price regulation
(Working paper2004:46, Working paper, 2004-10)
Policy makers have identified the non-discrimination principle as a key instrument to regulate vertically integrated firms in control of upstream bottlenecks. Economists argue that the non-discrimination principle may ...