Strategisk tenkning? Norsk maktbruk i Afghanistan
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- Militære studier 
From 2001 until 2014, Norway has participated in NATO-led operations in Afghanistan. This study examines the scope of strategic thought underlying the Norwegian engagement. Is there a clear Norwegian national strategy when it comes to the military engagement? In other words, are political ends consistent with military means? To investigate these questions, the study scrutinises statements from Norwegian governments and ministers in office (2001–2013) justifying the national contributions to Afghanistan. The arguments for Norway’s engagement are arranged in three categories: Military and security-related goals; Afghan development and reconstruction; alliance obligations and reciprocal consideration. Key findings suggest that ends, ways and means within the first two categories appear as less explicit, whereas they are more explicit when it comes to alliance obligations and reciprocal considerations. Horizontal consistency between ends, ways and means in the same category or level of strategy appears to be of average extent, while the vertical consistency between levels appears less obvious. With the exception of statements on alliance obligations, political arguments for Norway’s military contributions in Afghanistan during more than ten years thus indicate only little to moderate signs of an overall strategic thought. Hence, there seems to be a lack of consistency between Norwegian political and military strategies.