Cooperation and between-group competition
Journal article, Peer reviewed
MetadataVis full innførsel
OriginalversjonHausken, K. (2000) Cooperation and between-group competition. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 42(3), pp. 417–425
Introducing competition between groups may induce cooperation to emerge in defection games despite considerable cost of cooperation. If the groups can confine themselves to a cooperative sector, either by providing incentives to raise the cooperation level in one group, or by providing disincentives so that the cooperation level in the other group gets lowered to match that of the first, maximum degrees of cooperation can be obtained. The cooperative sector broadens as the degrees of cooperation increase, or the cost of cooperation decreases, or the group benefits of cooperation increase.
This is an electronic copy of an article; from the Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. Copyright 2000, Elsevier, made available with permission. http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167268100000937