• Active vs. passive defense against a strategic attacker 

      Hausken, Kjell; Levitin, Gregory (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2011)
      The article analyzes how a defender determines a balance between protecting an object (passive defense) and striking preventively against an attacker seeking to destroy the object (active defense). The attacker analogously ...
    • A strategic analysis of information sharing among cyber hackers 

      Hausken, Kjell (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2015-08)
      We build a game theory model where the market design is such that one firm invests in security to defend against cyber attacks by two hackers. The firm has an asset, which is allocated between the three market participants ...
    • Choosing what to protect when attacker resources and asset valuations are uncertain 

      Hausken, Kjell (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2014-07)
      The situation has been modelled where the attacker’s resources are unknown to the defender. Protecting assets presupposes that the defender has some information on the attacker’s resource capabilities. An attacker targets ...
    • Cooperation and between-group competition 

      Hausken, Kjell (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2000-07)
      Introducing competition between groups may induce cooperation to emerge in defection games despite considerable cost of cooperation. If the groups can confine themselves to a cooperative sector, either by providing incentives ...
    • Defending against a stockpiling terrorist 

      Hausken, Kjell; Zhuang, Jun (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2011)
      A government defends against a terrorist who attacks repeatedly and stockpiles its resources over time. The government defends an asset and attacks the terrorist’s resources. The terrorist defends its resources and attacks ...
    • Exchange, raiding, and the shadow of the future 

      Hausken, Kjell (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2008-04)
      A two-period exchange model is developed where production decisions in the first period determine the amount of resources available in the second period. Each agent allocates resources to defend its production and attack ...
    • Four categories of patient participation in treatment and their linkage to decision-making in a structure of 81 models 

      Hausken, Kjell; Heggland, Liv-Helen (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2015-01)
      We clarify patient participation by developing a systematic structure of 34=81 models spanned out by three subcategories for each of four categories. Choosing a qualitative descriptive research design, and applying purposive ...
    • Game theoretic analysis of two-period-dependent degraded multistate reliability systems 

      Hausken, Kjell (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2011)
      A system of two components is analyzed as a two-period game. After period 1 the system can be fully operational, in two states of intermediate degradation, or fail. Analogously to changing failure rates in dependent systems ...
    • Government Protection against Terrorists Funded by Benefactors and Crime: An Economic Model 

      Hausken, Kjell (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2017)
      We model a game involving a terrorist, the terrorist’s benefactor, and a government protecting against terrorism. The terrorist generates terrorism effort using its own resources, funding from a benefactor, and crime. Crime ...
    • Governments' and terrorists' defense and attack in a T-period game 

      Hausken, Kjell; Zhuang, Jun (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2011-01)
      We analyze how a government allocates its resources between attacking to downgrade a terrorist’s resources and defending against a terrorist attack. Analogously, the terrorist allocates its resources between attacking a ...
    • Income, interdependence, and substitution effects affecting incentives for security investment 

      Hausken, Kjell (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2006)
      Firms in cyber war compete with external intruders such as hackers over their assets. Each firm invests in security technology when the required rate of return from security investment exceeds the average attack level, or ...
    • Information sharing among firms and cyber attacks 

      Hausken, Kjell (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2007)
      As the Sarbanes-Oxley Act strengthens internal controls, and the government encourages information sharing, accounting gains significance through secure representation, storage, and transfer of information, and by laying ...
    • Jack Hirshleifer: a Nobel prize left unbestowed 

      Hausken, Kjell (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2006)
      Jack Hirshleifer (1925–2005) contributed to investment theory, information economics, conflict, and bioeconomics, clarified the foundations of investment and capital theory in the spirit of Fisher, and made basic contributions ...
    • Migration and intergroup conflict 

      Hausken, Kjell (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2000-12)
      Two groups in conflict produce and appropriate internally generated consumable output in a two-stage game assuming equal within-group sharing and endogenous group sizes. It is shown how agents leave groups with high ...
    • En nytteforventningsanalyse av kriminalitet og straff 

      Hausken, Kjell (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2007)
      Kriminell atferd bør analyseres ut fra motiv om forventet fordel veid opp mot forventet kostnad i form av straff. I Norge har kriminaliteten økt med en faktor 9 fra 1956-2002 mens fengsling har økt med faktor 1,3. ...
    • On the impossibility of deterrence in sequential Colonel Blotto games 

      Hausken, Kjell (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2012-06)
      A sequential Colonel Blotto and rent seeking game with fixed and variable resources is analyzed. With fixed resources, which is the assumption in Colonel Blotto games, we show for the common ratio form contest success ...
    • Policy Makers, the International Community and the Population in the Prevention and Treatment of Diseases: Case Study on HIV/AIDS 

      Hausken, Kjell; Ncube, Mthuli (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2017-01)
      A four-period game is developed between a policy maker, the international community, and the population. This research supplements, through implementing strategic interaction, earlier research analyzing "one player at a ...
    • Production, safety, exchange, and risk 

      Hausken, Kjell (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2011)
      Two agents convert resources into safety investment and production while exchanging goods voluntarily. Safety investment ensures reduction of costly risk. High unit cost of safety effort reduces both productive effort ...
    • Production, safety, fighting, and risk 

      Hausken, Kjell (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2011)
      Two agents make a trade off between production and safety investment, fighting for joint production. Ceteris paribus, if agent 1 has a higher unit cost of production, lower emphasis on safety causes more fighting and higher ...
    • Production and conflict models versus rent-seeking models 

      Hausken, Kjell (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2005-04)
      Aproduction and conflict (P&C) model and a rent-seeking (RS) model are compared for one group, two groups and K groups. Adding a newagent enlarges the pie in the P&C model, but causes the fixed size pie to be allocated ...