In the synaptic cleft: caught in the gap between neurotransmitter release and conscious experience in sport
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I’d like to say that in his article Visual Experience and Motor Action: Are the Bonds Too Tight?, Andy Clark (2001) writes an almost perfect introduction to what this thesis is all about. Here, Clark uses contemporary empirical findings to criticize views which hold the assumption that conscious visual experience guides or informs motor action (p. 495). In other words; Clark argues that motor theories of mind are hostage to empirical fortune. Motor theories of mind have been popular in the philosophy of sport. Philosophical and psychological works ranging from Dreyfus (1986), Gibson (1979), Merleau-Ponty (1962) and Polanyi (1962) have been welcomed and used to develop a philosophy of sport. What if the supposition of seeing the body as primary to intentionality, action and cognition is wrong? Based on the neuroscientific findings of Milner and Goodale (1995), Clark argues that conscious visual experience and vision for action is dissociable to such a degree that intuitions about the body and perception being the seat of cognition should be given up. Instead of understanding consciousness and cognition through motor movements, we should look to memory is Clark’s suggestion.Paper I: Birch, J. E. (2009). A Phenomenal Case for Sport. Sport, Ethics and Philosophy, 3(1), pp. 30- 48.Paper II: Birch, J. E. (Forthcoming 2010). The Inner Game of sport: is everything in the brain?. Sport, Ethics and Philosophy, 4(3), pp. 275-294.Paper III: Birch, J. E. Skills and Knowledge: nothing but memory?. Decisioned October 7th 2010 to minor revision in Sport, Ethics and Philosophy, due December 6th 2010Paper IV: Birch, J. E. Intentional and Skillful Mirrors. Submitted to Journal of the Philosophy of Sport on October 17th 2010
Avhandling (doktorgrad) – Norges idrettshøgskole, 2011.