Now showing items 1-10 of 10
The SMS bandwagon in Norway : what made the market?
(Working paper2004:21, Working paper, 2004-06)
Short Message Service (SMS) has been an overwhelming success in Europe, substantially larger than in the United States. In relative terms Norway represents one of the largest SMS markets in the world. The aim of the paper ...
Price-dependent profit-sharing as a channel coordination device
(Working paper2008:05, Working paper, 2008-03)
We show how an upstream firm by using a price-dependent profit-sharing rule can prevent destructive competition between downstream firms that produce relatively close substitutes. With this rule the upstream firm induces ...
Why is on-net traffic cheaper than off-net traffic?
(Working Paper2002:23, Working paper, 2002-04)
Received literature have shown that if competing Telecom networks are restricted to linear pricing and are unable to discriminate between on- and off-net calls, high access charges can be a device for facilitating collusion. ...
Do incumbents have incentives to degrade interconnection quality in the internet?
(Working Paper2002:22, Working paper, 2002-04)
Do internet incumbents choose low interconnection quality?
(Working Paper2004:20, Working paper, 2004-06)
In this paper we analyze the interconnection incentives for two networks that differ with respect to size of their installed based. In the first part we prove that the smaller firm may be harmed in competition for new ...
Access price regulation facilitates strategic transfer pricing
(Working Paper2005:60, Working paper, 2005-10)
Access price regulation is used in telecommunications to prevent that a vertically integrated firm, that controls an essential input, raises the rivals` costs. When the authorities remove the access price as a strategic ...
(Working paper2011:08, Working paper, 2011-03)
How many cartels are there? The answer is important in assessing the need for competition policy. We present a Hidden Markov Model that answers the question, taking into account that often we do not know whether a cartel ...
Contracting versus bypassing
(Working paper2003:48, Working paper, 2003-11)
One existing distributor controls the existing access to end users. There are one incumbent producer and one potential entrant, both with a potential for bypassing the distributor. We find that the distributor always signs ...
On the choice of royalty rule to cover fixed costs in input joint ventures
(Working paper;16/13, Working paper, 2013-07)
In a model where two competing downstream firms establish an input joint venture (JV), we analyze how different royalty rules for covering fixed costs affect channel profits. Under running royalties (regardless of whether ...
Managerial incentives and access price regulation
(Working paper2004:46, Working paper, 2004-10)
Policy makers have identified the non-discrimination principle as a key instrument to regulate vertically integrated firms in control of upstream bottlenecks. Economists argue that the non-discrimination principle may ...