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Tournaments with prize-setting agents
(Discussion paper2008:23, Working paper, 2008-10)
In many tournaments it is the contestants themselves who determine reward allocation. Labor-union members bargain over wage distribution, and many firms allow self-managed teams to freely determine internal resource ...
Relative performance evaluation, agent hold-up and firm organization
(Discussion paper2007:26, Working paper, 2007-07)
We analyze a situation where common noise makes compensation based on relative performance evaluation (RPE) desirable, but where the agents' ability to hold-up values ex post obstruct the implementation of optimal RPE ...
The rise of individual performance pay
(Discussion paper2006:22, Working paper, 2006-07)
Why does individual performance pay seem to prevail in human-capital-intensive industries where teamwork is so common? We present a model that aims to explain this. In a repeated game model of relational contracting, we ...
Incentive provision when contracting is costly
(Discussion paper2010:10, Working paper, 2010-08)
We analyze optimal incentive contracts in a model where the probability of court enforcement is determined by the costs spent on contracting. We show that contract costs matter for incentive provision, both in static spot ...
Multinationals, tax competition and outside options
(Discussion paper2010:13, Working paper, 2010-09)
We analyse tax competition when a multinational firm has invested in two countries but also has an outside option, e.g., towards a third country. An interesting finding is that more attractive outside options for firms may ...
Cooperation in knowledge-intensive firms
(Discussion paper2007:27, Working paper, 2007-07)
The extent to which a knowledge-intensive firm should induce cooperation between its employees is analyzed in a model of relational contracting between a firm (principal) and its employees (two agents). The agents can ...