Now showing items 1-10 of 25
Relational Incentive Contracts and Performance Measurement
(Discussion paper;6/18, Working paper, 2018-04-30)
This paper analyzes relational contracts under moral hazard. We first show that if the available information (signal) about effort satisfies a generalized monotone likelihood ratio property, then irrespective of whether ...
Relational Contracting, Negotiation, and External Enforcement
(Discussion paper;8/18, Working paper, 2018-05-18)
We study relational contracting and renegotiation in environments with external enforcement of long-term contractual arrangements. An external, long-term contract governs the stage games the contracting parties will play ...
Teams in Relational Contracts
(Discussion paper;23/16, Working paper, 2016-12-16)
We analyze relational contracting between a principal and a team of agents where only aggregate output is observable. We deduce optimal team incentive contracts under di¤erent set of assumptions, and show that the principal ...
International competition for R&D investments
(Discussion paper2000:4, Working paper, 2000-02)
Two jurisdictions compete to attract shares of the R&D investment budget of a large multinational enterprise, whose investments potentially confer positive spillovers on national firms. The firm contributes to local welfare ...
Tournaments with prize-setting agents
(Discussion paper2008:23, Working paper, 2008-10)
In many tournaments it is the contestants themselves who determine reward allocation. Labor-union members bargain over wage distribution, and many firms allow self-managed teams to freely determine internal resource ...
Endogenous verifiability in relational contracting
(Discussion paper2004:20, Working paper, 2004-11)
We analyze a repeated principal-agent trust game where the principal makes a specific investment by paying the agent up-front, expecting an agreed upon quality level in return. The verifiability of the agent’s action is ...
Common agency with outside options : the case of international taxation of an MNE
(Discussion paper1999:2, Working paper, 1999)
Team incentives in relational employment contracts
(Discussion paper2005:7, Working paper, 2005-08)
The paper analyzes conditions for implementing incentive schemes based on, respectively joint, relative and independent performance, in a relational contract between a principal and a team of two agents. A main result is ...
Sharing of endogenous risk in construction
(Discussion paper2003:18, Working paper, 2003-07)
In risk management of complex procurement projects in construction, the buyer has two principal instruments at his disposal: 1) the choice of time and resources put into engineering and design (project specification), thus ...
Career concerns, monetary incentives and job design
(Discussion paper2003:20, Working paper, 2003-12)
We study optimal incentive contracts when commitments are limited, and agents have multiple tasks and career concerns. The agent career concerns are determined by the outside market. We show that the principal might want ...