Now showing items 1-6 of 6
Teams in Relational Contracts
(Discussion paper;23/16, Working paper, 2016-12-16)
We analyze relational contracting between a principal and a team of agents where only aggregate output is observable. We deduce optimal team incentive contracts under di¤erent set of assumptions, and show that the principal ...
Incentive provision when contracting is costly
(Discussion paper2010:10, Working paper, 2010-08)
We analyze optimal incentive contracts in a model where the probability of court enforcement is determined by the costs spent on contracting. We show that contract costs matter for incentive provision, both in static spot ...
The tenuous relationship between effort and performance pay
(Discussion paper;2012:8, Working paper, 2012-06)
When a worker is offered performance related pay, the incentive effect is not only determined by the shape of the incentive contract, but also by the probability of contract enforcement. We show that weaker enforcement ...
Multinationals, tax competition and outside options
(Discussion paper2010:13, Working paper, 2010-09)
We analyse tax competition when a multinational firm has invested in two countries but also has an outside option, e.g., towards a third country. An interesting finding is that more attractive outside options for firms may ...
Teams and Tournaments in Relational Contracts
(Discussion paper;13/13, Working paper, 2013-12)
This paper analyses and compares optimal relational contracts be- tween a principal/firm and a set of agents when (a) only aggregate out- put can be observed, and (b) individual outputs can be observed. We show that the ...
Crime and punishment: When tougher antitrust enforcement leads to higher overcharge
(Discussion paper;05/13, Working paper, 2013-05)
The economics of crime and punishment postulates that higher punishment leads to lower crime levels, or less severe crime. It is how- ever hard to get empirical support for this rather intuitive relationship. This paper ...