Now showing items 1-8 of 8
Effects of taxes and subsidies on media services
(Discussion paper;44/14, Working paper, 2014-12)
We start out reviewing the justification for press subsidies. The social value of journalism can be larger than what the newspapers are able to extract because of knowledge externalities, public good characteristics of ...
Profit-shifting in two-sided markets
(Discussion paper2009:1, Working paper, 2009-04)
Newspapers and Advertising: The Effects of Ad-Valorem Taxation under Duopoly
(Discussion paper2007:5, Working paper, 2007-01)
Newspapers are two-sided platforms that sell their product both to readers and advertisers. Media firms in general, and newspapers in particular, are considered important providers of information, culture and language in ...
Media firm strategy and advertising taxes
(Discussion paper2011:3, Working paper, 2011-02)
On revenue and welfare dominance of ad valorem taxes in two-sided markets
(Discussion paper2009:9, Working paper, 2009-09)
A benchmark result in public economics is that it is possible to increase both tax revenue and welfare by making a monopoly subject to ad valorem taxes rather than unit taxes. We show that such revenue and welfare ...
Taxation in Two-Sided Markets
(Discussion paper2007:3, Working paper, 2007-01)
Two-sided platform firms serve distinct customer groups that are connected through interdependent demand, and include major businesses such as the media industry, banking, and the software industry. A well known textbook ...
Newspaper Differentiation and Investments in Journalism: The Role of Tax Policy
(Discussion paper;12/09, Working paper, 2009-11)
Newspapers are considered to be important providers of information, culture and language, and are taxed at a reduced VAT rate in most countries. This paper shows that such a policy may a¤ect newspaper differentiation and ...
Advertising and Newspaper Differentiation: On the Role of Readers’ Advertising Taste
(Discussion paper2007:4, Working paper, 2007-01)
Newspapers have an incentive to moderate their profile in order to gain a larger readership and thus higher advertising revenue. We show that this incentive is weakened both if readers are ad-haters and if they are ad-lovers.