Now showing items 1-10 of 23
Crime and punishment: When tougher antitrust enforcement leads to higher overcharge
(Discussion paper;05/13, Working paper, 2013-05)
The economics of crime and punishment postulates that higher punishment leads to lower crime levels, or less severe crime. It is how- ever hard to get empirical support for this rather intuitive relationship. This paper ...
Teams and Tournaments in Relational Contracts
(Discussion paper;13/13, Working paper, 2013-12)
This paper analyses and compares optimal relational contracts be- tween a principal/firm and a set of agents when (a) only aggregate out- put can be observed, and (b) individual outputs can be observed. We show that the ...
Teams in Relational Contracts
(Discussion paper;23/16, Working paper, 2016-12-16)
We analyze relational contracting between a principal and a team of agents where only aggregate output is observable. We deduce optimal team incentive contracts under di¤erent set of assumptions, and show that the principal ...
Career concerns, multiple tasks, and short-term contracts
(Discussion paper2000:27, Working paper, 2000-12)
We study optimal incentive contracts when commitments are limited, and agents have multiple tasks and career concerns. The agent career concerns are determined by the outside market. We show that the optimal compensation ...
The tenuous relationship between effort and performance pay
(Discussion paper;2012:8, Working paper, 2012-06)
When a worker is offered performance related pay, the incentive effect is not only determined by the shape of the incentive contract, but also by the probability of contract enforcement. We show that weaker enforcement ...
Strategic regulation of a multi-national banking industry
(Discussion paper2002:30, Working paper, 2002-12)
This paper focuses on the consequences of cross-border banking and entry of multi-national bank (MNB) subsidiaries for banking supervision and regulation. When a MNB expands internationally with subsidiaries, the MNB ...
Spillovers and international competition for investments
(Discussion paper2001:23, Working paper, 2001-05)
Two jurisdictions compete to attract shares of the investment budget of a large multinational enterprise, whose investments confer positive spillovers on national firms. The firm has private information about its efficiency ...
The rise of individual performance pay
(Discussion paper2006:22, Working paper, 2006-07)
Why does individual performance pay seem to prevail in human-capital-intensive industries where teamwork is so common? We present a model that aims to explain this. In a repeated game model of relational contracting, we ...
Common agency with outside options : the case of international taxation of an MNE
(Discussion paper1999:2, Working paper, 1999)
Tournaments with prize-setting agents
(Discussion paper2008:23, Working paper, 2008-10)
In many tournaments it is the contestants themselves who determine reward allocation. Labor-union members bargain over wage distribution, and many firms allow self-managed teams to freely determine internal resource ...