• English
    • norsk
  • English 
    • English
    • norsk
  • Login
View Item 
  •   All institutions
  • Norges Handelshøyskole
  • Department of Economics
  • Discussion papers (SAM)
  • View Item
  •   All institutions
  • Norges Handelshøyskole
  • Department of Economics
  • Discussion papers (SAM)
  • View Item
JavaScript is disabled for your browser. Some features of this site may not work without it.

Corruption and competition for resources

Bjorvatn, Kjetil; Søreide, Tina
Working paper
Thumbnail
View/Open
SAM1812.pdf (247.5Kb)
Permanent link
http://hdl.handle.net/11250/163442
Issue date
2012-09
Share
Metadata
Show full item record
Collections
  • Discussion papers (SAM) [506]
Abstract
An increasing share of world FDI is carried out by multinationals

from developing countries. These investors may have objectives and

constraints that differ from their developed country counterparts. In

this paper we focus on differences in attitudes to corruption, and how

these may shape the competition for the right to extract resources in a

developing country context. We show how differences in the investors

level of technology and differences in the host country government's

trade-off between bribes and taxes determine who wins the competition for the resource and the winning price. We find that the entry of

a corrupt investor may induce the honest investor to offer bribes instead of taxes. Surprisingly, however, our analysis also demonstrates

that under some conditions, the entry of a corrupt investor may in fact induce the honest investor to increase its tax payments.
Publisher
Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Economics
Series
Discussion paper;18/2012

Contact Us

Search NORA
Powered by DSpace software

Service from BIBSYS
 

 

Browse this CollectionIssue DateAuthorsTitlesSubjectsDocument TypesJournalsBrowse all ArchivesArchives & CollectionsIssue DateAuthorsTitlesSubjectsDocument TypesJournals

My Account

Login

Statistics

Google Analytics StatisticsView Usage Statistics

Contact Us

Search NORA
Powered by DSpace software

Service from BIBSYS