Person-affecting paretian egalitarianism with variable population size
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- Discussion papers (SAM) 
Where there is a fixed population (i.e., who exists does not depend on what choice an agent makes), the deontic version of anonymous Paretian egalitarianism holds that an option is just if and only if (1) it is anonymously Pareto optimal (i.e. , no feasible alternative has a permutation that is Pareto superior), and (2) it is no less equal than any other anonymously Pareto optimal option. We shall develop and discuss a version of this approach for the variable population case (i.e., where who exists does depend on what choice an agent makes). More specifically, we shall develop and discuss it in the context of a person -affecting framework—in which an option is just if and only if it wrongs no one according to certain plausible conditions on wrongi.
PublisherNorwegian School of Economics and Business Administration. Department of Economics