• Capital taxation and imperfect competition : ACE vs. CBIT 

      Brekke, Kurt R.; Pires, Armando José Garcia; Schindler, Dirk; Schjelderup, Guttorm (Discussion paper;32/14, Working paper, 2014-11)
      This paper studies the market and welfare effects of two main tax reforms – the Corporate Business Income Tax (CBIT) and the Allowance for Corporate Equity tax (ACE). Using an imperfect-competition model for a small open ...
    • Centralized vs. de-centralized multinationals and taxes 

      Nielsen, Søren Bo; Raimondos-Møller, Pascalis; Schjelderup, Guttorm (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2005-03)
      The paper examines how country tax differences affect a multinational enterprise’s choice to centralize or de-centralize its decision structure. Within a simple model that emphasizes the multiple conflicting roles of ...
    • Company tax reform in Europe and its effect on collusive behavior 

      Schindler, Dirk; Schjelderup, Guttorm (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2006-05)
      We study how harmonization of corporate tax systems affects the stability of international cartels. We show that tax base harmonization reinforces collusive agreements, while harmonization of corporate tax rates may ...
    • The comparison between ad valorem and specific taxation under two-part tariffs 

      Schjelderup, Guttorm; Jensen, Sissel (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2009-06)
      In this paper, we compare ad valorem and specific taxation under heterogeneous demand when a monopolist offers a menu of two-part tariffs. An increase in either tax rate leads to a higher usage fee for all consumers, whereas ...
    • Competing for capital in a "lumpy" world 

      Kind, Hans Jarle; Midelfart, Karen Helene; Schjelderup, Guttorm (Discussion paper, Working paper, 1999-04)
    • Corporate tax systems, multinational enterprises, and economic integration 

      Kind, Hans Jarle; Midelfart, Karen Helene; Schjelderup, Guttorm (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2004-07)
      Multinational firms are known to shift profits and countries are known to compete over shifty profits. Two major principles for corporate taxation are Separate Accounting (SA) and Formula Apportionment (FA). These two ...
    • Corporate tax systems and cross country profit shifting : formula apportionment vs. separate accounting 

      Schjelderup, Guttorm; Eggert, Wolfgang (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2004-09)
      This paper shows in a symmetric tax competition model that a formula apportionment system can attain the first best welfare optimum without any political pre-agreed harmonization or coordination of tax bases and tax ...
    • Do consumers buy less of a taxed good? 

      Kind, Hans Jarle; Koethenbuerger, Marko; Schjelderup, Guttorm (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2006-01)
      This paper shows that consumers may buy more of a taxed good if it is sold by a two-sided platform firm. Two-sided platform industries serve distinct customer groups that are connected through interdependent demand, and ...
    • Economic integration and redistributive taxation 

      Haufler, Andreas; Klemm, Alexander; Schjelderup, Guttorm (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2006-04)
      We set up a simple political economy model where economic integration raises the profitability of multinational firms. In this setting redistributive taxation may rise following economic integration, if the effects of ...
    • Formula apportionment and transfer pricing under oligopolistic competition 

      Nielsen, Søren Bo; Raimondos-Møller, Pascalis; Schjelderup, Guttorm (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2001-05)
      This paper demonstrates that under conditions of imperfect (oligopolistic) competition, a transition from separate accounting (SA) to formula apportionment (FA) does not eliminate the problem of profit shifting via ...
    • Globalisation and the mix of wage and profit taxes 

      Haufler, Andreas; Klemm, Alexander; Schjelderup, Guttorm (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2006-02)
      This paper analyses the development of the ratio of corporate taxes to wage taxes using a simple political economy model with internationally mobile and immobile firms. Among other results, our model predicts that countries ...
    • Industrial agglomeration and capital taxation 

      Kind, Hans Jarle; Midelfart, Karen Helene; Schjelderup, Guttorm (Discussion paper, Working paper, 1998-07)
      Models with imperfect competition and intra-industry trade have become widely accepted as appropriate frameworks within which to analyze the impact of trade liberalization on industrial agglomeration. This paper makes ...
    • International capital mobility and the taxation of portfolio investments 

      Schjelderup, Guttorm (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2002-06)
      This paper provides an overview of problems related to the taxation of portfolio investments in an open economy. It starts by outlining empirical results on how taxation affects household portfolio structure and proceeds ...
    • Newspaper Differentiation and Investments in Journalism: The Role of Tax Policy 

      Kind, Hans Jarle; Schjelderup, Guttorm; Stähler, Frank (Discussion Papers;16/2011, Working paper, 2011-09)
      Many countries levy reduced-rate indirect taxes on newspapers, with proclaimed policy goals of stimulating investment in journalism and ensuring low newspaper prices. However, by taking into account the fact that the ...
    • Newspapers and advertising : the effects of ad-valorem taxation under duopoly 

      Kind, Hans Jarle; Schjelderup, Guttorm; Stähler, Frank (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2006-12)
      Newspapers are two-sided platforms that sell their product both to readers and advertisers. Media firms in general, and newspapers in particular, are considered important providers of information, culture and language ...
    • Symmetric tax competition under formula apportionment 

      Eggert, Wolfgang; Schjelderup, Guttorm (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2003-01)
      This paper compares property taxation to a corporate income tax based on formula apportionment in a model where identical countries compete to attract capital. We find that if countries can pair a residence-based capital ...
    • Tacit collusion and international commodity taxation 

      Haufler, Andreas; Schjelderup, Guttorm (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2003-01)
      The paper employs a model of dynamic price competition to study how international commodity taxation affects the stability of collusive agreements when producers in an international duopoly agree not to export into ...
    • Tax responses in platform industries 

      Kind, Hans Jarle; Koethenbuerger, Marko; Schjelderup, Guttorm (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2009-07)
      Two-sided platform firms serve distinct customer groups that are connected through interdependent demand, and include major businesses such as the media industry, banking, and the software industry. A well known result ...
    • Tax spillovers under separate accounting and formula apportionment 

      Nielsen, Søren Bo; Raimondos-Møller, Pascalis; Schjelderup, Guttorm (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2001-05)
      It is observed in the real world that taxes matter for location decisions and that multinationals shift profits by transfer pricing. The US and Canada use Formula Apportionment (FA) to tax corporate income, and the EU ...
    • To invest or not to invest : a real options approach to FDIs and tax competition 

      Panteghini, Paolo M.; Schjelderup, Guttorm (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2006-01)