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New Challenges for the Non-Proliferation Regime
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Introduction

The non-proliferation regime - comprising the legally established Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the non-legal Nuclear Supplier's Group (NSG), the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and the Australia Group - has been in a state of crisis over the past year or so. Though most (if not all) of the ills of the regime were blamed squarely on the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests in May 1998, the reality is a little less dramatic and far more complex. Here I shall argue that crisis in the NPT was evident even before the tests and continued even after the negative fallout of the events in South Asia had been contained. While the events in South Asia did not deliver a fatal blow to the tethering nuclear non-proliferation regime and did not lead to the prospect of rampant proliferation, they did not leave the NPT regime unscathed either. They raised some fundamental challenges to the regime, but in some aspects they may also have had a positive impact on the regime.

The impact of events in south Asia

The Indian tests conducted on 11 and 13 May in Pokhran and the Pakistani blasts at Ras Koh on 28 and 30 May 1999 raised three primary concerns. First, given the level of hostility between the two adversaries and the rudimentary nature of the nuclear arsenals, there was fear that the region may become the flash point (accidental or deliberate) for a nuclear exchange. Secondly, there was concern that the tests may lead other countries that have renounced either nuclear weapons or an overt nuclear posture both within and without the NPT to break out. Thirdly there was alarm that South Asia may have an adverse effect on other areas of regional tension, particularly the Middle East, if countries there were to acquire technology from either of the two new nuclear weapons states.

In retrospect, however, these concerns appear to have been overstated. As Gerry Segal aptly noted in a Newsweek article: "All sorts of terrible things were supposed to happen after last year's tests. None did". Although there was a noticeable rise in the tension along the line of control (LoC) in Kashmir, leading up to the Kargil intrusion this year, it did not lead to a full-fledged war. While the reasons behind the Kargil confrontation are far too intricate to go into here, it is important to note that both Islamabad and New Delhi learnt to manage the crisis and prevent a dangerous escalation (even though democracy in Pakistan may have become the hapless victim of this success). Similarly, while both India and Pakistan conducted missile tests to validate delivery systems for their nuclear weapons, it has not led to an open-ended arms race. Moreover, so far neither India nor Pakistan have manned, deployed or put their nuclear forces on hair-trigger alert and both are working on ways to develop a stable nuclear regime in the region.

Similarly, the concern that the Indian and Pakistani tests provided an incentive for other states to break out of the non-proliferation norm is also exaggerated. Indeed, so far no state either within or outside the NPT regime has used the events of May 1998 as an excuse to go overtly nuclear. While both Iran and General Alexander Lebed, the Governor of the Russian province of Krasnoyarsk, cited events in South Asia as a rationale for their own nuclear aspirations, this linkage is tenuous. Iran probably used the May events as a post-facto justification for the test-flight of the Shehab 3 missile in July 1998 while Governor Lebed's threat to declare his province a nuclear weapon state in the same month was probably aimed more at taunting Moscow rather than at the NPT regime. On the contrary Brazil, another potential breakout state, ratified both the NPT and the CTBT after the South Asian tests.

This is not to say that no state will break out of the regime in future. As we shall see a little later, there are several potential breakout states within the NPT system. Indeed, as the North Korean and Iraqi cases have shown, there will...
be states that feel compelled to opt out or defy the regime but this compulsion has not been and is unlikely to be determined by the tests in South Asia.

Finally, despite suspicion that nuclear weapons technology may spread from South Asia (particularly cash-strapped Pakistan) to other regions of tension, especially the Middle East under the convenient, if somewhat misleading label of the “Islamic Bomb”, there is little evidence to suggest that there has been any such transaction so far. Although the unprecedented visit of a senior member of the Saudi royal family to Pakistan’s enrichment facility caused serious concern, it does not seem to have led to any transfer of sensitive material or technology. On the contrary, there is some evidence to support the contention that sensitive nuclear and missile technology was being supplied by at least two members of the NPT to Pakistan. However, there is no evidence of India either receiving or supplying sensitive nuclear and missile technology from or to anyone.

This is not to say that the concerns following the tests were unfounded, but simply that for a number of reasons, including the concerted effort made by different actors at the national, regional and international level to manage the fallout of the nuclear tests in South Asia, these effects have been contained in the short-term. In reality, however, the potential negative impact of the tests may have been highlighted for a number of reasons. For instance, as we shall see later, the tests provided some of the notably errant Asian members of the NPT with the opportunity to distract attention from their own foibles.

On the other hand the tests also served as a wake-up call for proponents of nuclear disarmament. This was evident in the 9 June 1998 Joint Ministerial Declaration titled, “A Nuclear-Weapons-Free World: the need for a new agenda” issued by Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Slovenia, South Africa and Sweden. In the wake of the tests not only did the Fissile Material Cut off Treaty (FMCT) negotiations get off the ground, but also both India and Pakistan declared a unilateral moratorium on further tests and announced their intention to sign the CTBT. Interestingly, soon after its tests India also asked to be admitted into the NPT (albeit as a nuclear weapon state) curious behaviour for a country that has consistently challenged the discriminatory nature of the Treaty. India also readily agreed to provide negative security guarantees for proposed nuclear weapon free zones in its vicinity. But none of these moves were purely altruistic: they were aimed at acquiring de facto recognition of India as a nuclear weapon state.

In the long-term, however, there is no doubt that the eleven nuclear tests (according to Indian and Pakistani officials) in South Asia posed a fundamental challenge to the existing nuclear global order in two ways. First, they revealed the most obvious contradiction in the NPT: its inability to manage proliferation once it had occurred. Designed primarily to prevent proliferation among its members, the regime is ill equipped to deal with a situation when even one of its members proliferates, let alone when a non-member goes down the proliferation path. The tests in South Asia demonstrated that the NPT was unable or unwilling to recognise, accommodate or effectively deal with the new reality. Coupled with this the tests also highlighted another basic contradiction in the non-proliferation regime: does it confer legitimacy on the declared nuclear weapon possessors? Or does the definition of “nuclear-weapon State”, as Rebecca Johnson has argued, not “legitimise the possession of the weapons” but “impose particular obligations, including Article VI on nuclear disarmament”? Non-proliferation purists would argue that Article VI of the NPT, which stipulates “a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control”, is applicable to all members and not just the non-nuclear weapon states. Here is the crux of the dilemma. While the majority of the non-nuclear weapon members of the NPT are clear that there cannot be any de facto or de jure recognition of nuclear weapon states either within or outside the NPT, the situation is more
complicated as far as the five nuclear weapon states within the NPT regime are concerned. They realise that the only way not to legitimise the status of India and Pakistan as nuclear weapon states is to de-legitimise all nuclear weapons – a prospect that none of them is willing to embrace at the moment. This, ironically, puts India and Pakistan on the same track as the other nuclear weapon states - keen on retaining their nuclear arsenals for a variety of reasons. Therefore the dilemma before the other nuclear weapon states is how to deny India entry into the exclusive club while preserving their own status. These issues would have been difficult to address at any time but they were thrust upon the regime at a time of severe crisis, making their impact even greater.

The troubled non-proliferation regime

The crisis, which began after the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995, became apparent at the multilateral, bilateral and unilateral levels by early 1998. The second NPT Preparatory Committee meeting was deadlocked by the time of the tests. Worse, many NPT members not only expressed dissatisfaction but also threatened to withdraw if key concerns were not addressed before the NPT Review Conference in 2000. Similarly, the FMCT threatened to become a non-starter. With Iraq UNSCOM stumbling from crisis to crisis. Finally, the proliferation record of China, Iran and North Korea, all members of the NPT, was not above reproach in the months leading up to the tests. Even after the tests, several events raised serious questions about the ability of the regime to halt proliferation. These included the setback to the Middle East peace process; new revelations of North Korea’s nuclear weapons programme; the non-ratification of the CTBT by 18 of the 44 states stipulated in Article XIV of the treaty to enable its entry into force, including China, the United States and Russia; China’s unfettered qualitative and quantitative advancement of its nuclear weapons programme; the problem of “loose nukes” in Russia; and the United States’ decision to spend an additional $6.6 billion on a national missile defence programme, thus effectively undermining the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty. In sum the tests complicated the already difficult proliferation scenario in manifold ways.

Even before India crashed into this exclusive club in May 1998, there were rumblings of discontent among the non-nuclear members against the selective application of provisions of the NPT by the nuclear members. Many non-nuclear member states had agreed to the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995 on the condition that there would be visible progress on some issues during the course of the three preparatory committee meetings in the run-up to the year 2000 Review Conference. However, by the time of the Second PrepCom, which met from 27 April to 8 May 1998 in Geneva, the backtracking of the nuclear members over these issues disappointed key non-nuclear members. This became evident in the stalemate during the PrepCom, which failed to adopt a report. In the end, the participants in the PrepCom failed even to agree on the rules of procedure or background documentation for the 2000 Review Conference. This meeting collapsed because of two fundamental issues: first, the United States’ refusal to discuss the creation of a WMD free zone (weapons of mass destruction) in the Middle East; and secondly, the collective opposition of the five nuclear weapon states to the South African and Canadian proposals for creating mechanisms to facilitate the progress of nuclear disarmament.

This internal crisis was evident even after the nuclear tests. Although the Third PrepCom, which met from 10 to 21 May 1999 in New York, did produce a report, it failed to send recommendations on substance to the 2000 Review Conference. However, given last year’s experience there was relief that the PrepCom had at least produced a document. Again the major stumbling blocks were the Middle East resolution and disarmament. In the former the sticking point was Egypt’s demand that Israel be
specifically named while the US was unwilling to do so. As a compromise the US agreed to name Israel together with India, Pakistan and Cuba (all non-signatories to the NPT) in the call for universality but would not single out Israel in relation to the Middle East. Similarly although Britain, France, Russia and the US presented some report of their actions taken on article VI, they were not keen to discuss either present difficulties or future actions. Significantly, the US-led NATO action in Kosovo during the PrepCom was also seen by China, Russia and some non-aligned nations as adversely affecting the NPT. In fact, China publicly asked if NATO would have bombed Belgrade if Yugoslavia had nuclear weapons.5

Before the South Asian tests, the most serious challenge to the regime came from within when two non-nuclear member states, Iraq and North Korea attempted to “go nuclear”. In both these cases the regime was found wanting in enforcing compliance. The Iraqi case is particularly sobering. Despite the military subjugation of Iraq and despite having a clear mandate from the world community (backed by several UN Security Council resolutions), UNSCOM was unable to effectively disarm Iraq’s WMD programme, let alone enforce compliance. Ironically, in the last series of attacks by the United States and Britain on Iraq, although the bombs landed on Baghdad, they effectively destroyed UNSCOM. Since December 1998 UNSCOM has not carried out work in Iraq. It remains to be seen whether the inspectors will go back to Iraq. The UNSCOM experience also raises doubts about the future prospects of multilateral compliance regimes.

Another country whose nuclear weapon programme and proliferation record has been a cause of anxiety to both the NPT and India is China. Indeed some in India claim that the motive behind New Delhi’s weapon programme is China, which delivered a humiliating defeat to India in the 1962 border war, and still poses a direct and indirect threat to India. From New Delhi’s point of view, Beijing’s military build-up and its missiles reportedly located in Tibet present a clear and present danger. China has consistently denied the presence of missiles in Tibet. The lack of transparency, however, makes it difficult to ascertain either the veracity of China’s disclaimer or to accurately assess the extent of the threat India is faced with.

The indirect Chinese threat posed to India is also a direct threat to the NPT regime. It is based on China’s uninterrupted build-up and modernisation of its nuclear and missile arsenal; its supply of missile and nuclear technology to countries in India’s neighbourhood, such as Iran, Iraq, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia; and its technical assistance in the nuclear and missile-related area, particularly to Pakistan. The Sino-Pakistan nexus has also been acknowledged by the United States. In his testimony before the US Congress in 1993, the then-Director of the CIA, James Woolsey, noted:

*Beijing has consistently regarded a nuclear-armed Pakistan as a crucial regional ally and vital counterweight to India’s growing military capabilities. [...] Beijing, prior to joining the NPT in 1992, probably provided some nuclear weapons-related assistance to Islamabad.*6

Subsequent reports suggest that Beijing may have transferred an entire M-11 production plant to Pakistan, which is being built in the town of Fatehganj even after May 1992. In his testimony before a Senate Sub-Committee in April 1997, the U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Non-Proliferation, Robert Einhorn admitted that it was only in May 1996 that the United States was able to wrest an assurance from Beijing that it was indeed stopping supplies of critical technology for Pakistan’s nuclear and missile programmes. In return China demanded (and got) advanced nuclear and satellite technology from the United States, thereby further eroding the already battered non-proliferation regime. Even after Pakistan’s nuclear tests, China has not been held accountable for its role. Indeed, the tests have provided Beijing with an opportunity to whitewash its past proliferation record
and to present itself before the world as a zealous guardian of the non-proliferation regime.

Even if China did not contribute to the Pakistani programme, as Beijing vehemently claims, its own programme, however benign, has a direct bearing on the May 1998 events in South Asia. As Tariq Rauf has noted, the “dilemma in South Asia” is that “nuclear proliferation and nuclear security are inter-linked: Pakistan versus India, India versus China, China versus Russia, and Russia versus the United States.” This linkage is crucial because on the one hand it implies that as India’s capabilities grow, China may be compelled to respond. On the other hand, were China to enhance its nuclear capability to, say, counter the US ABM shield (as indeed they have threatened to do), then India may be forced to match the Chinese build-up. This in turn may lead Pakistan to increase its arsenal to counter a perceived Indian nuclear expansion. Therefore, the inverse linkage between non-compliance by NPT members and proliferation in South Asia is equally important.

If universality and compliance are the two major problems confronting the NPT, entry-into-force is the major problem confronting the CTBT. When the treaty was opened for signature in September 1996, it was hoped that it would be signed and ratified by the 44 states mentioned in article XIV (these states were chosen because they all operate nuclear reactors) and enter into force by September 1999. In this regard the nuclear tests of India and Pakistan actually paved the way for both of them to come on board the treaty, as both were able to validate their nuclear weapon capability. However, as noted earlier, by October 1999 only 26 of the 44 states, (excluding China, Russia, the US, India, Pakistan and North Korea) had signed and ratified the treaty. According to the provisions of the treaty, if it did not enter into force by the stipulated date, a conference would be called comprising “the states that have already deposited their instruments of ratification” to “decide by consensus what measures [...] may be undertaken to accelerate the ratification process in order to facilitate the early entry into force of this Treaty”. This conference was held in Vienna from 6 to 8 October 1999.

By all accounts the outcome of the conference was modest. Of the 154 states that had signed the CTBT only 92 attended. Four states that have not signed, including Pakistan, also attended. India and North Korea did not attend. With the intention of avoiding confrontation at the conference the deliberations were done weeks prior to the actual conference and the final statement was almost agreed to by the time of the conference. Instead of suggesting any radical steps or an alteration to the treaty that could be used by opponents to the treaty, the consensus final declaration, while calling for various actions to accelerate entry into force, did not name any country individually. Thus the declaration appealed to two non-signatory States [India and Pakistan] who had promised not to impede the Treaty and whose ratification was needed for the Treaty’s entry into force to sign and ratify as soon as possible and to “refrain from acts which would defeat” the object and purpose of the treaty. Similarly, the Conference also noted the ratification by two nuclear weapon states and called on the remaining three who have signed but not ratified [China, Russia, the US] and whose ratification is needed for its entry into force to “accelerate their ratification processes with a view to their early successful conclusion”.

Despite this polite appeal, the US Senate did not oblige and within days of the Conference it rejected ratification. The US rejection of the CTBT is particularly troubling, as it is one country that, clearly, has the wherewithal to sustain a credible and reliable nuclear arsenal even without testing. It is the one party that has the least to lose and the most to gain by ensuring entry-into-force of the CTBT. Moreover, the rejection was inexplicable to analysts who thought that the Clinton administration had pre-paid the price for ratification by setting up a well-funded Stockpile Stewardship programme and acquiescing to ballistic missile development. This rejection, if not reversed soon, would be
the fatal blow both to the Treaty and the US non-proliferation credentials. Although both Russia and China promised to put up the Treaty for ratification, it remains to be seen if they will follow through on their pledges. However, even if they do and India and Pakistan also oblige, the treaty is still unlikely to enter into force unless both the US and North Korea (which has not even declared its intention regarding the treaty) sign and ratify.

The FMCT (or FMT as some prefer to call it) began its precarious life as a resolution on the “Prohibition of the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices” in December 1993. In March 1995, just before the NPT Review and Extension Conference, the Conference on Disarmament (CD) adopted a report agreeing to establish an *ad hoc* Committee to negotiate the proposed fissile materials ban. Several delegations, particularly Pakistan, Iran, Egypt and Algeria pushed hard to include existing stocks (the product of past production). The nuclear weapon states and India rejected attempts to address stocks, arguing that the UN resolution was for a ban only on future production, i.e. a cut-off. In view of these fundamentally different demands and perspectives, it was decided to set up a committee with a core-negotiating mandate based on the text of the 1993 UN resolution, but with an understanding that other issues, including past production, could be raised in the context of the negotiations. But after the NPT Conference, it became impossible to convene the actual committee and start negotiations. From 1995 until now, the FMT issue has been blocked for two main causes: stocks and linkage with nuclear disarmament. Led by India, a number of non-aligned countries had been linking the commencement of FMT negotiations to concurrent negotiations on a timetable for nuclear disarmament. Led by India, a number of non-aligned countries had been linking the commencement of FMT negotiations to concurrent negotiations on a timetable for nuclear disarmament, which the five nuclear weapon states refused to take seriously. The nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan in May paradoxically opened up new opportunities to shift the political logjam. Under pressure to make concessions, India indicated that it would no longer insist on the linkage between a cut-off treaty and time-bound nuclear disarmament. Subsequently, after high level meetings with the United States, Pakistan announced to the CD on 30 July 1998 that it would agree to the establishment of a negotiating committee on the FMT. Although the negotiations are likely to be long drawn and complicated, their commencement was the direct result of the nuclear tests in South Asia.

The FMT pre-negotiation, ironically was the only silver lining in the otherwise dismal record of the CD for the past three years. According to the September 1999 issues of the official newsletter of the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs, the CD “never reached agreement on adoption of a programme of work for its 1999 session, and thus was not able to undertake substantive work.”

In one of the most telling instances, according to one observer, “there were talks about possible talks about talks on nuclear disarmament and re-establishment of an *ad hoc* committee on preventing arms race in outer space”, which came to nought. This was on account of the worsening relations between the US President and the Congress, leading Patricia Lewis, the Director of UNIDIR, to conclude that the “three-year deadlock in the CD owes as much to shifting goal posts in the US as it does to shifting sands in the Rajasthan desert”. While the multilateral track of the regime was, clearly, offline, the bilateral tracks did not fare any better, with START II being stalled and START III proving to be a non-starter. The second-tier nuclear weapon states roundly rejected suggestions to consider negotiations regarding their arsenals. They also expressed reservations about de-alerting.

While there was a setback to the non-proliferation and disarmament regimes, there was a reaffirmation of the centrality of nuclear weapons for defence by the nuclear weapon states and military alliances associated with them, thereby legitimising the possession of nuclear weapons. For instance, the Defence Reviews of both Britain and France, while supporting
smaller arsenals and making token gestures towards de-alerting, legitimise their possession of nuclear weapons and emphasise their own nuclear status. Similarly, by continuing and refining its first-use doctrine and linking it with other weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) the United States is not only justifying the retention of its arsenal but is embarking on a self-sustaining cycle of proliferation. The recent decision to build a national missile defence system is indicative of this trend. On the other hand, Russia reflects a cruel paradox: the greater its institutional and military weakness the greater is its dependence on nuclear weapons and its opposition to non-proliferation and disarmament. This is reflected in its new military doctrine, which also calls for greater reliance on nuclear weapons and jettisons its no first use commitment. While the signs are that Russia is growing weaker, its nuclear neighbour China is not only building up and modernising its strategic force but is also refining its tactical nuclear arsenal.

Not surprising the Tokyo Forum report issued in July 1999 warned that “the fabric of international security is showing signs of unravelling” and that “unless concerted action is taken, and taken soon, to reverse these dangerous trends, non-proliferation and disarmament treaties could become hollow instruments”. Given this bleak forecast, what does the road ahead look like?

The road ahead

At this juncture it is possible to envisage three likely scenarios. The first is the preservation and strengthening of the current non-proliferation regime with the eventual disarmament of all weapons of mass destruction as the logical corollary. This is the path of what Patricia Lewis calls “constructive engagement”. The second is the gradual emergence of a new nuclear order where the world would learn to accommodate and live with not five or even eight but possibly a dozen nuclear weapon states – recognised or otherwise. This is what Canada’s Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy calls the state of “new nuclear realpolitik”. The third possibility is the frightening prospect of global nuclear disorder and chaos.

Constructive Engagement

The report of the Tokyo Forum provides one of the best road maps for the path of constructive engagement. In an even handed approach it recognises the need for a “realistic dialogue” to “address underlying security concerns” and replacing both “outdated nuclear doctrines” and “artificial disarmament deadlines”. Among its key 17 recommendations are a call to create a permanent secretariat and consultative commission of the NPT to “deal with questions of compliance and to consider strengthening measures for the Treaty”; the need for a “progressive reduction and complete elimination of nuclear weapons”; the revolise START and expand scope of nuclear reductions to include China, France and Britain; zero nuclear weapons on hair-trigger alert; and to revitalise the CD by doing away with the consensus rule which was causing “perpetual deadlock”.

Clearly, the majority of the international community would be in favour of constructive engagement. However, to ensure the success of constructive engagement the present situation will have to be addressed in the short, medium and long term at the unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral levels simultaneously. In the short and medium term the objective would be to preserve nuclear peace, reduce the danger of nuclear war and ensure in the first instance compliance of the members to the non-proliferation regime. During this period, efforts should also be made to engage and accommodate non-NPT states, possibly through a parallel regime built around the CTBT, the FMCT and subsequently a nuclear weapon convention that calls for the elimination of all nuclear weapons.

Apart from moves to reduce the nuclear dangers directly, the international community must also remain engaged with the primary cause behind the quest for nuclear weapons – regional security considerations. In this context
special attention must be paid to Asia, particularly the Middle East, South Asia and Northeast Asia, which have emerged as the most significant area of proliferation concern. Only by directly addressing the regional security considerations will it be possible to move towards the long-term objective of global nuclear disarmament.

However the question of implementation is a crucial one as the recommendations call for a greater level of cooperation between the existing nuclear weapon, non-nuclear weapon and new nuclear weapon states than exists at the moment. For instance, how does one convince both nuclear and non-nuclear weapons states that are wedded to the current doctrines to take steps that de-legitimise or at least de-emphasise the role of nuclear weapons for their security? The Canadian-German proposal to consider a no-first use doctrine for NATO was one such attempt. Another way would be for one of the non-nuclear weapon states (preferably from within NATO) that is currently dependent on the US/NATO nuclear arsenal for its security (and may even retain US nuclear weapons on its soil) to voluntarily give up this umbrella.

New Nuclear Realpolitik

While the constructive engagement approach calls for the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons, the new nuclear realpolitik approach calls for ways to accommodate the new entrants with minimal changes in the existing global order. Here it is conceivable that the present nuclear weapon states may do a deal with the new nuclear weapon states using some components of the non-proliferation regime, such as the CTBT and the FMT, to accommodate them while preventing new entrants into the order by strengthening the regime. This may be one of the reasons why nuclear weapon states like the US have continued their engagement with both India and Pakistan on nuclear issues. While this may be unacceptable to the non-nuclear weapon states, there is very little they can do under the present set of nuclear and security doctrines. In such a scenario, the nuclear weapon holdings may stabilize at a lower level than at present but complete nuclear disarmament will remain a distant dream.

Disorder and Chaos

The worst case scenario is one where there is neither constructive engagement nor realpolitik accommodation and where every country or groups of countries pulls in different directions in an adversarial manner. Were the international community to waver in its commitment towards non-proliferation, arms-control and disarmament, either through denial or inadequate engagement of the key players at the bilateral, regional and global level, it would court nuclear disaster. Whether the world lives up to this onerous responsibility will become evident in the next few years.

Notes

2See also “Draft Text of a Resolution for the UN First Committee, 13 September 1999” at http://www.acronym.org.uk/unnac99.htm.
3During the late July meeting of foreign ministers of ASEAN, China announced that it had decided to sign the protocol to the SEANWFZ Treaty (Treaty of Bangkok). India too announced that it would ‘endorse’ the Treaty and was ready to sign the protocol but it was noted that according to Article 3 of that instrument this is open to signature only by the five recognized nuclear-weapon states. See “Non-Proliferation Developments”, PPNN Newsbrief number 47, 3rd Quarter 1999, p. 1.


ibid.

See Lewis op. cit. Lewis was one of the members of the high-profile Tokyo Forum.

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