Clive Archer

Security Options for Denmark
**Introduction**

The strategic changes that have taken place in Europe since the summer of 1989 are momentous. Following the opening of the Berlin Wall, Germany became unified: the Federal Republic swallowed the German Democratic Republic. All these European events have produced a major strategic change for Denmark - and therefore in the country's significance for the United Kingdom. Furthermore, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent war has enveloped European countries in a major conflict. The United Kingdom has been an important participant in the multinational effort to thwart the designs of Saddam Hussein of Iraq. The crisis has also brought a response from Denmark. The country attended as an observer at the August Ministerial Council of the Western European Union and decided to send a corvette to participate in the multilateral naval blockade. This may seem a small contribution but for a country with no history of 'out-of-area' defence involvement, with little capability for such a role, and with a tradition of political opposition to the extension of military activity, this move represents a major shift in Danish understanding of its security. Danish forces have participated in UN peacekeeping operations, but these fulfil a policing role for agreed settlements or ceasefires.

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Clive Archer is Deputy Director of the Centre for Defence Studies, University of Aberdeen. He specialises in resource and security issues in Northern Waters and in Nordic defence questions.
and have been under United Nations' control. The 1990 Gulf operation, though sanctioned by Security Council Resolutions, is one of enforcement and does not operate under the order of any organ of the UN.

This study will consider the debate in Denmark about the future of its security in the light of the new situation in Europe and - to a lesser extent (because the ramifications are not so clear) - of the Kuwaiti War.

The first point to note is that the debate in Denmark, especially when the nature of external changes and their implications for Denmark are born in mind, has been limited. In 1988 an all-party Defence Commission was established to examine the basis for Danish defence and security into the 1990s. The Commission produced its report in early 1989 and this caused some controversy and discussion within the Danish defence-political community. However, the level and breadth of agreement was the notable factor, rather than the disharmony that had characterised the defence debate of the 1982-88 period.

The second point is that the momentous events seem, if anything, to have stifled political discussion within Denmark. This is partly a realisation that Denmark has a very limited ability to affect the turn of events in Europe, let alone those in the Middle East. It is
also perhaps a reflection of the satisfaction by the broad spectrum of political life with the consensus represented by the Defence Commission's Report and with a number of developments within NATO since the beginning of 1990.

Thirdly, the political reshaping of Europe could be expected to offer - almost for the first time in forty years - a number of alternative security policies for small central European states. While these have perhaps made some impression on the fringe of Danish politics, they have not been taken up by the mainstream as alternatives to current Danish security policy. Some of the ideas may be seen as possibly supplementing the existing line rather than displacing it.

What alternatives are on offer in the current Danish security debate? Where might they take Danish defence in the coming decade and what support might they have?

Consideration will be given to two strands of thinking that emerged with the Defence Commission's Report, but were soon overtaken by events. The view of the minority report from the Commission will also be examined as it represents a small, but vocal, opinion in the defence debate. However, the main answer to the question 'which way forward for Danish security?' can be found not so much in any Danish document but more in the Declaration from the London NATO Summit of
July 1990. Elements therein addressing the Danish debate will be outlined. Finally, alternative views will be examined. In looking at the options for Danish defence, some estimation will be made of the political support for the various views and of their possible consequences for the United Kingdom defence relationship with Denmark.

In summary, the eight sets of answers, that are sketched out below, to the 'which way forward?' question involve three (i)-(iii), that resulted from the Defence Commission’s considerations, one mainstream answer based on the London Declaration (iv), and four alternative scenarios, (v)-(viii), some of which could be seen as supplementing (iv) at one stage or another. The eight 'options' - which, it should be stressed, are not necessarily mutually incompatible - are typified by the following nomenclatures:

(i) the status-quo minus: a continuation of the present situation but with CFE cuts;
(ii) 'just-in-case': an emphasis placed on the need to cope with uncertainty;
(iii) the Alternative European Security System: moving to a nuclear-free, bloc-free Europe that is less dependent on Atlantic links;
(iv) the London Declaration European Security System: managing a move from NATO’s collective defence to a new all-Europe system that still has a strong Atlantic link and the nuclear deterrent;
(v) a European collective security system: moving from NATO collective security to all-European collective defence;
(vi) armed neutrality: an alternative in the absence of a wider European solution;
(vii) no military defence: a near-pacifist answer;
(viii) seeking environmental security: redefining the problem.
These will now be considered in turn.

(i) The option Status quo minus is fairly well reflected in the recommendations of the Defence Commission (1). The scenario is one where there is still a significant conventional - and other - threat from the Soviet Union, though one where the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) agreement means cuts in the numbers of troops, tanks and fighter aircraft. This would mean a broadly unaltered structure for the Danish armed forces, with the expectation of a 10-15% reduction in certain weapons and systems as the CFE agreement was implemented in the 1990s. Allied reinforcement would still be needed, though as the threat of surprise attack was tackled by the successor to CFE, rapid reinforcement would become less of a military necessity. Also heavily armed formations would be affected by CFE cuts and more lightly-armed formations such as the UKMF could increase in utility. The Danish Air Force would be rationalised, though reduced in size, and Denmark would still depend on Allied air forces - including the RAF - to maintain control of its airspace and give ground support in a war.

This scenario has been overtaken by events, most noticeably the rapid economic and political unification of Germany and the collapse of Communist governments in the East European members of the Warsaw Pact. The new governments of Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland have taken a negative approach towards the Warsaw Pact, helping further to diminish the credibility among Western public opinion of
threat scenarios that still involve a massive attack by the Warsaw Treaty Organisation on NATO. At the same time, this solution did not address many of the rising security concerns - unrest in East European states, ethnic violence in Europe, the possible disintegration of the Soviet Union, out-of-area disputes that impinge on Europe - that could affect states such as Denmark. Thus, just taking the benefits of the CFE agreement is seen as an unsatisfactory formula for the future security of Denmark. It neither assuages those with a thirst for a 'peace dividend' nor offers all-round security in a post-Cold War world. This option by itself has therefore attracted little political support.

(ii) The 'just-in-case' option is also a basically cautious one and again can be seen in the majority report of the Defence Commission (2). Here, the enemy is not so much the Warsaw Pact but uncertainty itself. Events may develop satisfactorily: the two Superpowers may agree on further arms control; the level of armament in Europe may be reduced and its 'offensive' nature tempered; the unification of Germany may progress without a hitch; reform may continue in the Soviet Union. On the other hand, everything could unravel: the CFE and START process may falter (even at the stage of ratification - and not necessarily in the US Senate); and the Soviet Union could either revert to neo-Stalinism or descend into chaos. The important point here is not the likelihood of any of these outcomes but the uncertainty as to where along the continuum Europe might be in five or ten years, or indeed the nature of the continuum.
The argument is then made that the NATO countries should maintain at least the greater part of their present armed forces (CFE apart), just in case the Soviet Union does not carry out unilateral cuts and withdrawals already announced; and in case unforeseen threats to the West suddenly arise. This view differs from the 'status quo-minus' approach insofar as it accepts that, at least for the near future, the nature of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation has changed and that the traditional view of the main threat to NATO is no longer valid. However, the current response should stress the contingent and place emphasis on flexibility of forces. NATO forces should be restructured in order to wean them away from expecting a massive Warsaw Pact attack and to lead them more towards either meeting a number of smaller yet unspecified threats or being able to reconstruct themselves should the traditional 'Soviet threat' (or something like it) re-emerge.

In this scenario, Denmark - and its Allies - should no longer be planning for the 'Battle of Jutland and Schleswig-Holstein' but should be participating in the reconstruction of NATO's strategy and operations. These would have to take account of CFE cuts and the willingness of NATO members to reduce troop levels below such CFE figures. It would have to recognise the new political - and military - situation in Germany. It would also accept the public demand for a 'peace dividend', though would warn that this may be smaller and later than expected. This viewpoint would try to
balance the cuts brought about by CFE with those consequent on budgetary squeezes, yet still provide NATO with a rounded capability to meet a number of possible threats.

The ability of the RAF to operate over Danish airspace - and to use hardened shelters in Denmark - would still make sense in terms of defending the United Kingdom home base as well as contributing to a NATO force able to meet a number of challenges. However, the UKMF's reinforcement of the Baltic Approaches, especially Jutland and Schleswig-Holstein, would have to be seen in a new context. One suggestion that takes into account many of the changes and pressures mentioned above is contained in the recent work of Greenwood and Canby, which deals primarily with the situation in Germany. These authors suggest that future military dispositions must incorporate:

A. Forward-deployed territorial defence formations (with air support) to police borders and conduct surveillance in peacetime and to provide the initial response against aggression. These would be based in Eastern Germany and would be supplemented by ground-based air defence and airborne warning, surveillance and control.

B. Back-up mobilisable "shield" brigades, situated to the west of the 'A'-type units and ready to augment them. These ground troops (with the necessary tactical air power) would be armed and trained for 'screen and parry actions' and for 'opportunistic counter-attacks'. They could include a number of multi-national contributions.
C. "Sword" brigades of mobile operational reserves, with air assets, to counter-attack or deliver decisive counter-strokes.

D. Logistic and support units austerely configured in peacetime but ready for transformation into 'a more robust set-up' in a crisis or war.(3)

Such a configuration of forces would transform the defence not only of Germany, but of the Schleswig-Holstein-Jutland area, so intimately tied to that defence. Perhaps a permanently deployed 'UKMF', with a self-contained brigade structure, together with active or mobilised Danish and German brigades, could provide one of the "shield" formations for use more or less in the area where the force currently operates. It either has or could acquire many of the requirements for participation in such a multinational formation and could act as a model for part of the continuing British contribution to a NATO defence of Germany 'just-in-case' a threat emerges in Europe.

This outcome provides an answer to the question 'whither Danish defence?' (indeed to the wider question about NATO defence) that makes some military sense and takes into account the wider subject of political change in Europe. However, it is primarily a military solution and, as such, may only partly address certain political sensitivities.
For example, such an approach may find political support slipping away from it, as it appears that a threat from the East will not re-emerge. Public opinion may increasingly find military scenarios unrealistic and prefer a cut in defence expenditure to caution. There is one possible element that could make the Danish public - contrary to that of other NATO states - not so eager to reject the 'just-in-case' stance. From the 1840s to 1945, a strong Germany to the south of Denmark has created problems for Danish security. It might be seen as judicious not only to keep the newly-unified Germany in an active NATO structure but also to contribute to the division of Alliance labour - along with other non-German allies - so that the defence burden in Central Europe and the surrounding seas does not fall exclusively on German shoulders. Danish and British forces would continue to reinforce Germany, with the result that the two countries would have a voice in the disposition of security in the area and the traditional adversaries of Germany (such as Poland and the Soviet Union) would be more reassured that German defence forces are well and truly tied into the NATO framework.

Secondly, the above solution would need to have a political framework within which questions such as command structures and reinforcement would be solved. These are two vital elements in Danish defence. The Baltic Approaches Command has played - and continues to play - an important role in the Danish contribution to
NATO. Should BALTAP disappear under any new plans, NATO would be deprived of its one prime example of active multilateral, military co-operation; the framework for the Danish reinforcement of Northern Germany would be dismantled, perhaps placing at risk Danish public support for having such troops available; and there would be a gap between the Central Front (benefiting from CFE cuts) and a Norway still concerned about the maritime strength of the Soviet Union to its north.

At first sight, this option provides the context for Allied reinforcement of Denmark and prestocking of materiel there. Indeed, the move to a multinational formation of forces throughout NATO's central area could mean increased prestocking in Denmark and a reconsideration of Denmark's rejection of the permanent presence of foreign troops on Danish soil. But for this to obtain public and political acceptance, a perception of the wider security future of Europe is needed.

Thirdly, the changes in the military dispositions in and around Danish frontiers consequent to this option, only attempt to deal with threats within Europe. They do not address out-of-area conflicts (such as that in the Gulf) which, it could be argued, might be NATO countries' main concern during the 1990s. The stress on flexible forces may help to contribute to a response, but a political agreement is needed on what NATO states should do - and how - when threatened by out-of-area crises.
Because this option does not provide a political framework for a future defence policy, it has not, by itself, attracted substantial support from the Danish political spectrum. However, it has provided the military backdrop for the London Declaration option (see (iv) below).

(iii) The Alternative European Security System was outlined by Pelle Voigt of the Socialist Peoples Party in his minority report in the Defence Commission's Report. In this, he criticised the assumptions that NATO membership was a valid prerequisite for the coming twenty years, that other NATO members would be willing to take up tasks from Danish defence under the guise of role specialisation, that 'rationalisation' was not aimed at moving to more appropriate forms of defence, and that a Nordic nuclear-weapon-free was not a problem to be dealt with in a serious fashion.(4)

Voigt advanced the concept of a new European security system built on mutual security at a low level of armaments, which would replace the existing blocs. This could be achieved in phases, first by an alteration of the blocs' most aggressive strategies and doctrines, the adoption of a unilateral rejection of first-use of nuclear weapons, and a reforming of forces into a completely defensive direction; then a gradual loosening of bloc-ties such as the integrated command structure and BALTAP Command; finally a unilateral or bilateral dissolution of the blocs as part of natural
process. He foresaw a greater emphasis by Denmark on regional groupings such as those in the Nordic region and the Baltic, and less reliance on the Atlantic link.(5)

In his remarks on Denmark’s relations with NATO, Voigt pointed out that reinforcement policy - as Danish nuclear policy - depended on the decision-makers taking action in a crisis that could lead to the introduction of reinforcements and, eventually, nuclear weapons into the country. Instead he recommended making Denmark a permanent nuclear-free area, within a Nordic zone, and adopting a military structure that broke with reinforcement and military integration in NATO. Furthermore, Voigt considered that as the only form of military operation in which Denmark might participate in the near future would be UN peacekeeping, emphasis should be away from heavy and offensive weaponry and more on close air defence, and on land-based defence rather than on aircraft and expensive surface vessels. The issues still to be addressed from the Socialist Peoples Party viewpoint were: the new form of co-operative structures in Europe to replace the blocs; the move from a military to a political organisation for NATO; the reduction of Danish defence and the move to alternative security aims; the change to a defensive direction for Danish defence with duties for civil society and UN peacekeeping; and making defence 'disarmament capable'.(6)
The outcome of this option for the United Kingdom's relationship with Denmark would be drastic, especially as Voigt recommended breaking with reinforcement and NATO military integration. No need would be seen for the UKMF or, presumably, air reinforcements and the nuclear-free policy would preclude visits by Royal Navy ships if the policy of neither confirming nor denying the presence or nuclear weapons on board these vessels was maintained by the United Kingdom government. The option anyhow has little, if any, support in the main political parties outside the Socialist Peoples Party.

(v) The London Declaration Security System speaks to many Danish needs.

The aim of the NATO leaders, meeting in London in July 1990, was to move toward a new European security system that could guarantee a peaceful and secure Europe at a lower level of armament than at present. The Atlantic link and the strength of the European Communities were stressed, but the Ministerial Declaration also looked to the eventual prominence of CSCE in setting the standards of free societies, which would be overseen by Pan-European institutions (7). Meanwhile, a joint NATO-Warsaw Treaty Organisation declaration that they were no longer adversaries was suggested (#6) and taken up at the CSCE Paris Summit in November 1990. Emphasis was placed on the success of the CFE and CSBM negotiations - with further talks on manpower limitations (#12) - to
limit the offensive capability of conventional armed force in Europe and to prevent any nation from maintaining disproportionate military power there (#13). NATO ministers were willing to contemplate the restructuring of their forces but wished to see these

'highly mobile and versatile so that Allied leaders will have maximum flexibility in deciding how to respond to a crisis. It will rely increasingly on multinational corps made up of national units.' (#14 - emphasis added)

They wanted to maintain 'an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces, based in Europe... kept up to date where possible' (#15), though NATO 'will never be the first to use force' (#5) and the Allies aimed to reduce their reliance on nuclear weapons (#17 & #20). NATO intended to propose the elimination of nuclear artillery shells from and the reduction of short-range nuclear forces in Europe (#16 & #17).

Danish representatives were very supportive of the London Declaration as it contained a number of positive elements for them. First, it was strongly transatlantic, confirming the American commitment to the defence of Europe. Secondly, it not only promised the continuation of NATO, but talked about those aspects of the Alliance - its defensive nature, the promise never to use force first, and its developing political component - particularly attractive to Denmark. Thirdly, the Declaration placed less emphasis on nuclear forces in Europe. Finally, there was a promise
of future reliance on 'multinational corps made up of national units' (#14), for which the Danes - together with the West Germans - felt they had provided the model in COMBALTAP.

What might be the consequences of the implementation of the London Declaration for Danish defence and the British contribution? The Declaration promised a new allied strategy

'moving away from "forward defence" where appropriate, towards a reduced forward presence and modifying "flexible response" to reflect a reduced reliance on nuclear weapons... NATO will elaborate new force plans...''

There is a strong argument that the move away from "forward defence" 'where appropriate' directly affects the land defence of Denmark. The country is no longer a 'front-line' state and the set-piece battle for Jutland and Schleswig-Holstein, in which much of the Danish army and the UKMF was to be involved, is no longer a likely scenario for these forces. The revised NATO view - representing a political compromise - has elements in common with the 'just-in-case' outlook, such as the stress on the Alliance having mobile and flexible forces to respond to a crisis and on the ability to build up 'large forces if and when needed' (#14). The major difference between the two viewpoints is that the London Declaration outlines a wider concept of European security and the steps to be taken to achieve it.
Meanwhile those forces - including British and Danish ones - currently involved in the defence of West Germany are to be reduced and configured more defensively. It would make sense for the Danish forces - and those from Germany - to bear a large share of the proposed CFE reduction of tanks. Furthermore, there could be an increasing reliance in the area west of what used to be NATO's front-line on national units in multinational corps (#14). The Greenwood-Canby suggestion could fit the bill, with some of the Danish, German and British forces already utilised in BALTAP Command acting as a precursor for their "shield" formations.

The current danger is that national decisions will be made about forces in Europe which will then have 'knock-on' effects in other NATO capitals. For example, the repatriation of US units may cause the German government to decide to reallocate its Sixth Division closer to the old Inner-German Border. This, together with the likely withdrawal of the UKMF's services, would seriously jeopardise the continuation of the Baltic Command, perhaps the best functioning example of NATO multinational forces thought so desirable by the London Declaration. The role of German, Danish, British, American and other forces in Germany and Denmark could be better examined in the light of the move to multinationalism, but this would suppose member states entering a bargaining round in NATO on such matters. As yet, no such willingness has been publicly expressed. Furthermore, there may seem little point in such discussions until
NATO's national forces have recovered from their duties in the conflict against Iraq.

One subsidiary aspect of the London Declaration that may get more attention is its positive reference to the European Communities (EC), and in particular to the move towards political union 'including the development of a European identity in the domain of security'. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait brought into play both the European Political Co-operation of the EC states and the Western European (WEU). While the Danish government has been content to see the role of European Political Co-operation be developed in the EC's diplomatic dealings with, for example, Middle East problems, there seems little enthusiasm in Denmark (or in other European states) for this institution to be involved in the operative aspects of security policy, let alone in purely defence questions. Some West European countries have looked to the WEU to co-ordinate their operations out of the NATO area, for example in the Gulf naval patrols at the end of the Iran-Iraq War. In August 1990 a WEU Ministerial Meeting dealt with the military response of its members to Iraq's attack on Kuwait, and Denmark - for the first time - attended this gathering as an observer. This may be the sort of impetus needed for Denmark to consider WEU membership seriously, especially if countries such as Norway and Turkey were to join. For membership to be acceptable, the WEU would have to remain auxillary to NATO and not become a European rival, and its action would increasingly have to be seen in the context of a pan-European security regime.
The European collective security option is one that could grow out of the NATO London Declaration, which stated: 'the security of every state [in the new Europe] is inseperably linked to the security of its neighbours.' Collective security defines the nature of that link: it means that every state must come to the assistance of a state that is the victim of aggression and therefore every state could expect the support of the international community if it were ever attacked by an aggressor. This 'one for all and all for one' is advanced as a deterrent against aggression as well as an effective form of defence. It contrasts with NATO's collective defence which in reality has been directed against the Warsaw Pact and not against any aggressor, as in the case of a collective security system.

Some commentators have suggested that the NATO collective defence arrangement should now be changed to a regional collective security system as the raison d'être for the Alliance has disappeared. Furthermore, a number of East European states have already adopted the economic and political values of the West which would suggest that they are also ripe for a new security relationship with their Western counterparts.

What consequences would such a move have for the defence of Denmark and for the United Kingdom? Danish defence would no longer be seen within the context of NATO but within a wider European collective
security grouping, presumably based on a development of the CSCE. Though NATO might still exist as a political organisation, it would not have military significance for states such as Denmark which would not be part of a unified military structure. The European collective security organ may require to know from Denmark what contribution it would make when called upon to defend any member of the group against an aggressor. Denmark might provide a small volunteer army (also serving as a Danish contribution to UN peacekeeping), minimal air cover for the troops, and a specialist effort in an area of Danish comparative advantage, mine-laying and mine-sweeping. This would demand little from the United Kingdom, especially as Denmark - if attacked - would expect support from all members of the collective security system. However, the United Kingdom and Denmark might agree that the former extending its air defences out over Danish airspace could have mutual advantages.

Whilst there are those in the Danish Radical Party and on the left of Danish politics who may consider a European collective security system (and a contribution to UN peacekeeping) as the ultimate aim of Danish defence, most recognise that, even given the comparatively favourable situation in Europe today, such a development is unlikely to occur in the near future. However, should a CSCE system emerge in the next decade and should NATO turn itself into a more political organisation, and should arms control, disarmament and confidence-and security-building continue apace, then this model for Danish
defence may become more attractive. As such it is not necessarily a rival 'security future' to that laid out in the London Declaration.

(vi) Another option is one of armed neutrality. Should NATO disappear (possibly because of the lack of a perceived threat), yet no alternative pan-European structure emerge, it may then be up to a small European state to arrange for its own security. Denmark might copy the Swedish and Finnish models, although it has not the geo-strategic position of either. The aim would be to make an invasion of Danish territory not worth while in terms of gains versus losses. This can be done either by making the cost of the original invasion high in terms of losses of men and materiel, probably a difficult task for such a vulnerable state as Denmark, or by making the cost of occupation unacceptably high. That might be achieved by stressing the territorial defence aspects of the Danish armed forces and by training the population in guerilla warfare. Such a policy would be expensive and would be unlikely to attract the necessary public support in a prolonged period of peace.

(vii) A further alternative would be for the Danes to take a positive decision to eschew military defence completely. The reasoning is not just that the traditional adversary is no longer perceived as a threat to the country and that no other state has taken its place. It would also involve a calculation by a Danish government that whatever military threat might arise in the future
is incalculable now and thus cannot be prepared for in peacetime. Should a threat arise to Denmark, other states may well find it in their own interest to counter it (though not necessarily just on Denmark's behalf). In the meantime, the Danes would try to protect the core values of their society by social solidarity and political and economic means, as they did during the Second World War. The adoption of this alternative would mean the cutting of existing Danish military links with allies such as the British, though the United Kingdom might want to monitor closely the security situation of Denmark, as this could reflect adversely on its own defence. This option would have the support of pacifists and possibly some members of parties, such as the Radicals, traditionally hostile to military defence.

Some of the above options might become more attractive if linked to a more positive concept, that of defining security in non-military terms, especially if the emphasis was placed on environmental security. The reasoning here would be that the greatest threat to the Danish quality of life is an environmental one that, unlike its military counterpart, the Danes can do something about. Conscription might be maintained but for Danish citizens - male and female - to undertake social action within their own country (similar to that already undertaken by present-day conscientious objectors), or to form environmentally active brigades (perhaps giving a new meaning to 'Green Berets') to serve in Denmark.
or the Third World or Eastern Europe. The Social Democrat leader, Svend Auken, gave a hint of such ideas in a speech in August 1990 in which he foresaw a greater role for the armed forces in non-military activity such as dealing with environmental catastrophes.\(^{(12)}\)

The effect on the United Kingdom would be the same as any absence of a Danish military defence effort, but with one added complication. The Danish example might become attractive to an increasingly 'green' electorate within Britain and the transference of what resources were remaining for defence to the support of 'environmental security' might become a vote-winning platform. This would indeed be ironic: the end of the post-War security relationship between the two countries studied here would be a further diminution of the United Kingdom military defence effort through the triumph of ideas 'made in Denmark'.

Conclusions

Which of the above scenarios is most likely to emerge as the choice of a substantial section of Danish political life? The reliance of Danish security policy on outside factors as well as on domestic elements is self-evident. Currently, the main Danish concern must be that of an appropriate response to its new strategic situation. It is no longer a NATO "front-line" state; the traditional adversary
- the Warsaw Pact - is fast disappearing, although the Soviet Union remains powerfully armed and politically unstable; and a unified Germany has appeared on Denmark's southern border. The problem for Danish decision-makers is that they are faced with a mixture of the continuation of familiar threats (or, at least, ones that have the potential to threaten), an almost total lack of threats, and a number of possible new threats (increased terrorism, crises and war in the Middle East, ethnic unrest and refugees in Europe, even the demands of a unified Germany). They clearly do not have the resources - or the willingness - to cover all eventualities. However, they might be able to move toward a more-or-less optimal outcome.

Of the eight scenarios mentioned above, the status-quo minus no longer appears either to address the new situation of Denmark or to attract significant political support. The 'just-in-case' option may seem prudent in a period of great uncertainty, but it lacks vision and political support as a medium term strategy for dealing with Denmark's security problems.

Whether any of the versions of a European security system was on offer would mainly depend on other states, though the Danish government can feed its preference into the international discussion. Of the three, the London Declaration Security System is already on the agenda - placed there by the NATO Ministers - and
could muster considerable political support in Denmark ranging from those who would otherwise veer towards a 'just-in-case' solution to those that might prefer the Alternative European Security System. This latter choice is available within the Danish debate - it has been proposed by the Socialist Peoples Party - but will only become a serious contender within Denmark if it is strongly advocated, in preference to the London Declaration version, by the German Social Democrats. The European collective security model remains just that - a model for future consideration.

The last three choices - armed neutrality, no military defence or environmental security - might be open to serious consideration in Denmark should no European system arise, and elements of the last mentioned may anyhow be seen more prominently on the political agenda in the 1990s.

In summary, some form of European security system would help a small country such as Denmark maximise its security position in a period of uncertainty. Of the choices available, the London Declaration is the one most likely to be pursued currently by other European states and which could attract the greatest constituency within Denmark.

What does this mean in defence terms for Denmark? In reality it must mean a recognition that, even more than before, Germany is the key for the defence of Denmark. It is difficult to perceive Denmark
being defended against any serious outside military threat that may arise without the assistance and participation of Germany. Likewise, if Germany itself is not to be seen as a threat to small states such as Denmark, it is essential that a unified Germany remains democratic and part of the panoply of European institutions - such as the EC, WEU, NATO and the CSCE - that help to maintain democracy and economic success, as well as reassure other European states about the future of Germany.

This does not mean that Danish armed forces should become an appendage of those of the united Germany. The London Declaration provides at least a framework for a more multinational approach to security in the area of and around Germany. A suggestion has been made as to how this might be filled out. The consequences for Danish forces would be that their dispositions would be similar to those at present. They might fall in number and lose some tanks and fighter aircraft. The main difference would be that the ground forces and air cover would be part of a wider NATO configuration aimed at the security of Germany and Denmark, which would still include a contribution by the United Kingdom. Part of this could be the use of United Kingdom, Danish and German forces as a mobilisable shielding formation along a second line of defence. As both a trusted ally and a contributor to Danish and German defence, the United Kingdom is in a good position to sponsor a feasibility study of such ideas.
Such a security system has the virtue that it can be "cranked up" should a threat emerge but it can also be run down should Europe truly become a 'security-community' within which there is no expectation of the use of force in relations between states. Under those conditions, the defence structure can be changed to suit one of the other models which, at the moment, do not seem realistic choices.
Notes

1. Elements of this fairly conservative estimation (as it now seems) can be seen in Forsvaret i 90erne. Beretning fra Forsvarsommissionen af 1988, Copenhagen, Ministry of Defence, 1989, especially pp.40-3, pp.70-1, throughout Part II and even in the annex entitled 'Defence Year 2010' ('Forsvaret år 2010') by Major J.J. Graabaek (see Bilag 21, pp.10-13). However, the Report does warn of the quickening tempo of change and the resulting difficulty in projecting forward any political planning (in Forsvaret..., p.37).

2. Ibid, p.320


5. Ibid, p.320.

6. Ibid, pp.322-30

7. 'Transforming the Western alliance', The Independent, 7 July 1990, p.10 Paragraph references are given in brackets (#).

8. For a recent informed Danish account of the WEU, though not one that was able to cover the events of late 1989 and 1990 in Europe or the response to the Kuwaiti Crisis, see Frede P. Jensen WEU Den vesteuropæiske Union, Copenhagen, SNU, 1989.


