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Peace and Security in Africa

Basic Structural Changes in the Governance of Peace and Security on the African Continent
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Introduction

Six years after Jane's Intelligence Review reported that there would be no bright dawn for the African continent, the “continent of conflict”, and that Africa would be in for some very hard times, The Economist wrote on its leader page: “In fits and starts, Africa is getting more peaceful.” The Economist concluded that while it would be a long time before Africa was truly stable, at least the continent was moving in the right direction. While on a visit to Africa in 2005, Paul Wolfowitz, the newly-elected President of the World Bank, said that he felt that Africa was on the move and that it was going to move a lot faster. He went on to say that there was now a new leadership in Africa that was taking responsibility and that Africa may be at a turning point with wealthy states showing more interest in helping to solve the continent’s problems. According to Wolfowitz, the international community was facing an “extraordinary moment in history” in terms of its support for Africa.

The fact that twenty African countries were scheduled to hold presidential, parliamentary or local government elections in 2005 and the fact that three long-serving Southern African leaders, namely the Malawian President Bakali Muluzi, the Namibian President Sam Nujoma and the Mozambican President Joaquim Chissano ceded power to designated successors after largely free and fair elections in 2004, are important indications that substantial progress is being made towards the development of democracy in Africa. Africa, which has long been synonymous with conflict, a lack of democracy, poor governance, human rights violations and underdevelopment, is beginning to take the first tentative steps towards transforming itself. Although this is a nascent and very fragile process, the outlook is nevertheless promising. This is because the process is underpinned by a new continental-governance architecture, the product of the will and determination of the so-called reformist group of countries to revive and renew the continent. Between 2000 and 2004, the combined efforts of these countries resulted in the adoption

1 Economist, 8 January 2005: 11-12.
5 “The Times, They are A' changing”, 16 January 2005, Mail & Guardian [online].
6 In 2003 the African Union (AU) identified 11 ongoing conflicts in Africa.
7 This group includes South Africa, Nigeria, Egypt, Algeria, Senegal, Uganda, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania and Ghana.
and launch of four major initiatives to overhaul and restructure the governance of the continent. They are the Constitutive Act of the African Union (CAAU), the Protocol relating to the establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (Nepad), and the Memorandum of Understanding on Security, Stability, Development and Co-operation in Africa (CSSDCA).

These initiatives are comprised of two legal instruments and two special programmes and they are all predicated on the notion that peace, security, democracy and political governance are essential preconditions for social and economic development. In terms of these initiatives, therefore, peace and security is placed at the heart of the new endeavour to transform the way that Africa is governed. Together these initiatives constitute the four pillars of Africa’s new continental peace and security architecture. Collectively, in an overlapping but complementary fashion, they provide the values, norms, principles, institutions, mechanisms, procedures and performance indicators of the new continental security framework, which is the basis for a collective security system in Africa.

These new developments in Africa coincide with a reprioritisation by the West of African issues. Following the United States’ withdrawal from Somalia in 1993 and the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, the West began to de-prioritise African issues. However, since the terrorist attacks of 9 September 2001, Africa has been accorded an increasing strategic significance by the West. Accordingly, in what should be seen as an emerging security relationship between Africa and the West, the West has been increasingly supporting the process of creating a new African peace and security structure.

This study examines both the basic structural changes in the governance of peace and security on the African continent and also the approach of the West to these positive developments. The study outlines the key political changes and processes that have motivated the development of these initiatives as well as the conceptual notions that underpin them. The study then examines the role that each of these initiatives will play in relation to peace and security on the continent and it assesses whether these initiatives have the institutional potential to constitute a viable basis for dealing with conflict on the continent. The processes and challenges of establishing the Peace and Security Council (PSC), the key operational structure of the new peace and security architecture, are examined with a view to determining the most urgent and important capability requirements of the PSC and the most likely avenues for addressing these.

With regard to the West, the study examines the Western security orientation towards Africa and what has been done to support the development of African peace and security initiatives. It analyses the basis of the emerging security relationship between Africa and the West and assesses the state of the relationship and the prospects for the future of this relationship.

A false dawn

In 1960 the British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan delivered his famous “Winds of change” speech to the South African Parliament; he characterised the African colonies’ independence struggles as a “wind of change” that was beginning to blow across the continent.

The end of colonialism did not, however, bring about any bright dawn for Africa. African independence coincided with both the Cold War and the Apartheid eras. Independence turned into dependence as Africa was once again carved up into client states. The rival superpowers were prepared to support and prop up whatever leader or regime would do their bidding, regardless of how undemocratic, oppressive and corrupt they were. Most newly-independent African states were characterised by an absence of democracy and human rights,
massive failures of governance, endemic corruption, an absence of technical skills and a lack of finance. Furthermore, the borders of these newly independent states, created by agreements between colonial powers, are mostly inappropriate to their social environment. Meanwhile, Apartheid South Africa proceeded to destabilise the subcontinent. During this time Africa went backwards and, indeed, the only thing that developed was underdevelopment. By the end of the Cold War and the end of Apartheid, Africa had already become synonymous with conflict, underdevelopment and human suffering. After the end of the Cold War, with the exception of a handful of countries, the international community deprioritised African issues and to all intents and purposes abandoned the continent to its own fate.

**African solutions to African problems**

The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) was established in 1963 to promote co-operation among the newly independent nations of Africa. Its main objectives included: ridding the continent of colonialism and apartheid, promoting unity and solidarity among African States, safeguarding the sovereignty and territorial integrity of member states and promoting international co-operation within the framework of the United Nations. The OAU's greatest success was the creation of an African and international consensus in support of the struggle to liberate the continent from colonialism and apartheid. Its greatest failure pertains to the area of peace and security, where it suffered from a number of inherent weaknesses.

The OAU was created to protect the independence of its members - not only against encroachment by former colonial powers, but also against threats from other member states. Rather than collective security, the OAU charter prioritised sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference in the internal affairs of member states, and purposely limited the powers of the organisation's Secretary General. As a result, the OAU's dispute resolution structures were largely undeveloped and unused.

Starting as a light breeze in the early 1990s and with a steadily gathering strength over the last decade and a half, the "winds of change" began once again to blow across the African continent. In the early 1990s African leaders began to realise that in order to avoid the further marginalisation of their continent and to improve its socio-economic performance they would have to respond to the changes that were brought about by the end of the Cold War. They realised that the continent would have to be politically, socially and economically transformed and that armed conflict was the single most important factor preventing the achievement of these objectives. This growing determination to transform the continent and for this purpose make conflict
resolution the number one priority, is reflected in the "Declaration on the Political and Socio-Economic Situation in Africa and the Fundamental Changes Taking Place in the World" adopted by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in Addis Ababa in 1990. This Declaration states that, in order for the OAU to deal constructively with the problems of the continent, it would have to become involved in conflict management. The declaration initiated the process of developing new conflict management institutions and mechanisms for the OAU.

These ideas were developed further in the "Kampala Document", which was the final report of the conference that the OAU and the United Nations (UN) Economic Commission for Africa jointly sponsored in Kampala in 1991 under the aegis of the African Leadership Forum. This report proposed the establishment of a permanent Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Co-operation and the establishment of a continental peacekeeping machinery. These proposals had a major influence on the decision by the OAU to establish a Mechanism for Conflict, Prevention, Management and Resolution (the Mechanism) in Cairo in June 1993.

The primary objective of the Mechanism was conflict prevention. However, the Mechanism did also provide the framework for authorising and implementing election monitoring activities and a number of small-scale peacekeeping operations, namely:

- The deployment of military observers with the UN in the territorial dispute between Ethiopia and Eritrea in 1998.

Although the Mechanism improved the OAU's institutional capacity to handle conflicts, it was a "weak instrument" and a "small step towards security cooperation".

The reasons why the Mechanism was a weak instrument and a qualified step forward were the same reasons why the OAU, before the adoption of the Mechanism, had become notorious for its non-intervention. Article 3 of the OAU Charter stressed the sovereign equality and territorial integrity of all member states and non-interference in the internal affairs of other states. It thus made no provision for intervention in the internal affairs of a member state. The Mechanism did only engage in domestic conflicts with the consent of the parties concerned. Because the OAU was bound by the principle, albeit informal, of consensus in decision-making, it became predisposed to inaction and paralysis. There was a lack of political will amongst member states to prioritise peace and security issues, and there was also a shortage of financial resources with which to develop peacekeeping capabilities and to implement peacekeeping operations. The reasons for the OAU's failure in the area of peace and security constitute an important checklist for assessing the viability of the new peace and security architecture, in particular the CAAU and the PSC.

The adoption of the Mechanism was not the end of the road for the process initiated by the Kampala document. Beginning in 1993, a number of significant positive and negative developments combined to add a powerful impetus to the movement to comprehensively restructure, reform and re-invent the peace and security architecture of

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12 The Charter of the OAU provided for a Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration, but it was never operationalised. (Fernanda Faria, "Crisis Management in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Role of the European Union", Occasional Paper, no. 51, April 2004 (Paris: Institute of Security Studies, European Union); 13).

13 The OAU depended on ad hoc committees to mediate in conflicts between African States. (Espegren, "The Organisation of African Unity..."; 26).

14 Espegren, "The Organisation of African Unity..."; 27.

15 Van Nieuwkerk, "The Role of the AU and Nepad ...", pp. 43–44.

16 Espegren, "The Organisation of African Unity...": 67, 65, 63.

17 According to Van Nieuwkerk, prior to the adoption of the Mechanism the OAU had only been involved in two of Africa's conflicts (Van Nieuwkerk, "The Role of the AU and Nepad ...", p. 42).
the continent. These were:

- South Africa's peaceful transition from Apartheid to constitutional democracy
- South African President Thabo Mbeki's African Renaissance Project
- The reluctance of the international community to become engaged in African conflicts after the United States withdrew from Somalia in 1993, which was further underlined by the failure of the international community to prevent and/or halt the genocide in Rwanda in 1994
- The war in the DRC from 1996 and the continuation of existing and proliferation of new mainly intra-state conflicts across the continent
- The end of military dictatorship in Nigeria and the return to civilian rule under President Obasanjo
- The deepening political and socio-economic marginalisation of the continent
- The increasing human suffering caused by conflict, poor governance and disease, in particular HIV-Aids and malaria.

The South African dimension

On 8 May 1996, in his address on behalf of the African National Congress (ANC) on the occasion of the adoption by the Constitutional Assembly of South Africa's new and final Constitution - in the same Parliament in Cape Town where, 46 years earlier, Harold Macmillan had delivered his speech - the then Deputy President of South Africa Thabo Mbeki declared:

On an occasion as this, we should, perhaps, start from the beginning. So let me begin. I am an African.

In this speech, Mbeki conflated the emerging new post-Apartheid South African identity with that of African-ness. Throughout the speech he returned, as a refrain, to the words, "I am an African."

...I am an African. I am born of the peoples of the continent of Africa. The pain of the violent conflicts that the peoples of Liberia, Somalia, the Sudan, Burundi and Algeria bear is also a pain I bear; The dismal shame of poverty, suffering and human degradation of my continent is a blight that we share. The blight on our happiness that derives from this and from our drift to the periphery of the ordering of human affairs leaves us in a persistent shadow of despair. This savage road to which nobody should be condemned. This thing that we have done today, in this small corner of a great continent that has contributed so decisively to the evolution of humanity says that Africa reaffirms that she is continuing her rise from the ashes. Whatever the setbacks of the moment, nothing can stop us now! Whatever the difficulties, Africa shall be at peace! However improbable it may sound to the sceptics, Africa will prosper! Whoever we may be, whatever our immediate interest, however much we carry baggage from our past, however much we have been caught by the fashion of cynicism and loss of faith in the capacity of the people, let us here today say - nothing can stop us now!

With this speech Mbeki laid the cornerstone of his and South Africa's commitment to the concept of an 'African Renaissance', which he went on to launch in April 1997. Chris Alden and Garth Le Pere, in their paper on South Africa's foreign policy, state that "Mbeki's speech set the stage for a
new mythic charter, conceptual narrative and normative agenda for what was needed to impel the continent's revival". Mbeki is not the author of the notion of an 'African Renaissance', as the concept has been around in African political discourse since the colonial period. It was first used by the Senegalese intellectual Cheikh anta Diop in the struggle against colonial rule, with the intention of capturing the dreams and aspirations of the people of Africa in their quest for self-determination. At an OAU meeting in June 1994 Nelson Mandela called upon Africa to bring about an 'African Renaissance' – "We must say that there is no obstacle big enough to stop us from bringing about an African Renaissance."20

Mbeki's concept of an 'African Renaissance' is underpinned by a core idea which was originally articulated by the celebrated Kenyan professor Ali Mazrui, namely that Africa should cease looking outside for help and should instead uplift itself.21 This idea of an African Renaissance has become an important pillar of Mbeki's foreign policy and a key orientation of his administration.22 Mbeki sees the objective of continental renewal and South Africa's own internal transformation and reconstruction as mutually reinforcing objectives:

It is very directly in the interest of South Africa that there should be direct development in the rest of the continent... I don't think you can have sustainable successful development in this country if the rest of the continent is in flames.23

South Africa under Apartheid was a major cause of the conflict and underdevelopment in most of the subcontinent. Having transformed itself, South Africa began harnessing the inspiration and dynamism of its own internal transformation project for the renewal of the continent as a whole.24 This was noted by observers and other governments. For instance, Norway's then outgoing Ambassador to South Africa, John Bech, made the following comment about South Africa's role in Africa:

I'm still an optimist regarding Africa's future. I will remain so as long South Africa continues to take a leading role, both economically, politically and diplomatically.25

Africa seen from a Western security perspective

In October 2004 the British International Development Minister Hilary Benn, when describing the work of the British government's Africa Commission said, "there is a moral imperative to do this."26 There is indeed a moral imperative for the international community and in particular the West to re-engage meaningfully with Africa. But, in addition to the profound moral issues, there are also compelling strategic reasons why Africa is getting back on the Western security agenda. Benn described them as follows:

If you don't tackle poverty, injustice

24 South Africa is very conscious of the need to not behave as or be perceived as a hegemon, imperialist or bully, but rather a country that acts collectively and multilaterally. South Africa has the biggest economy in Africa. If one takes the rest of South Africa out of the equation, Guangxi, South Africa's smallest but richest province, would be the second-biggest economy in Africa after Egypt.


26 The UK's Africa Commission aims to "since 2005 as an opportunity to make a difference for Africa," using the coincidence of the UK chairpersonship of both the Group of 8 (G8) and the European Union. Andrew Cawthorne and Andrew Hammond, Business Day, 4 October 2004, p. 6.
and inequality around the world, then we are never going to have a safe and secure world in which to live...”

According to foreign and security policy analysts Herbst and Mills, development in Africa is “almost universally recognised” as one of the major problems confronting the world in the 21st century. The events of 11 September 2001 highlighted the importance of development and security in Africa:

There is a global consensus that Africa’s failure to develop threatens not only the future of hundreds of millions of people on the continent itself, but also that it is an international problem. The region’s continued impoverishment may provide a reservoir for HIV/AIDS and a sanctuary for terrorists...

Africa, with its numerous failed states and ongoing conflicts, meets all of the criteria that have been used by Western security communities to develop frameworks for analysing important new security threats. The EU, NATO and the United States understand that failed states, poverty and conflict, as found in Africa, can contribute to the rise of terrorism or the creation of safe havens for foreign terrorists. In the context of Africa this is by no means an academic notion. It is well known that Sudan was Osama Bin Laden’s redoubt from 1991 to 1996 and that two of Al Qaeda’s first high-profile attacks took place on African soil, namely the attacks on the United States’ embassies in Nairobi and Dar-Es-Salaam. The former US Deputy Secretary of State for African Affairs, Susan Rice, in her testimony to the US Congress in November 2001, described Africa as “the world’s soft underbelly for global terrorism.”

The US National Security Strategy released on 19 September 2002 recognises the danger posed by poverty and weak states:

...Poverty does not make poor people into terrorists and murderers. Yet, poverty, weak institutions and corruption can make weak states vulnerable to terrorist networks and drug cartels within their borders...

This strategy also proposed that the above-mentioned situation could be remedied by supporting ‘key allies’, including in Africa, Kenya, Ethiopia, Nigeria and South Africa. In December 2004, Major General Samuel Helland, the head of the combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) said that terrorist groups including Al Qaeda were exploiting the lawless areas in the ungoverned spaces of the Horn of Africa to hide, recruit and train members and possibly to plan operations in other parts of the world. CJTF-HOA was established in 2002 to deter, pre-empt and disable terrorist threats emanating principally from Somalia, Kenya and Yemen.

The then US permanent representative to the UN, Ambassador John C. Danforth, stated at a meeting of the UN Security Council in Nairobi on 4 November 2004:

The United States believes that the African Union is a critical—perhaps the critical—component to peace and security in Africa. The recent deployment of the African Union mission to Sudan and the AU sponsored peace talks among the Darfur parties in Nigeria attest to the significant, multi-faceted nature of the contribution that the AU makes to stability in the...
The NATO approach is more circumscribed. While it accepts that geography will no longer act “as our shield”, it simultaneously confines its regional analysis of areas from which stability will “spill over” to northern Africa.”

Nevertheless, in 2005 NATO began assisting the AU mission in Darfur, Sudan with strategic airlift and training. At the G8 Summit in Kananaskis in 2002, the G8 adopted an Africa Action Plan (AAP) which was a response to the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). In addition to commitments to promote the strengthening of institutions and governance and to foster trade, economic growth and sustainable development, the AAP contains commitments to promote peace and security. Since Kananaskis the G8 has made progress with regard to the peace and security commitments in the AAP – at Sea Island in 2004 the G8 committed itself to train and, where necessary, equip some 75,000 AU troops by 2010, and at the Gleneagles Summit in 2005 the G8 undertook to train up to 25,000 extra peacekeepers and to provide assistance to the African Standby Force (ASF).

The European Security Strategy of the EU adopted on 15 December 2003 identifies regional conflicts and state failure, both of which are prevalent in Africa, as key threats to Europe. This strategy identifies the African Union as a regional organisation that can make an important contribution to a “more orderly world,” and goes on to describe Europe’s relationships with “our partners in Africa” as an important asset on which to build. In what has been described as a “groundbreaking” development, the EU decided on 11 December 2003 to spend 250 million euros from the European Development Fund (EDF) to support African peacekeeping operations through the African Peace Facility. Furthermore, Operation Artemis in Bunia in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) was also groundbreaking because it was the first autonomous military operation initiated by the EU; it was also the first EU operation outside Europe and the first EU operation conducted under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter.

Africa, in the words of Jonathan Stevenson has, “renewed strategic resonance.” A new security relationship between Africa and the West is emerging. There is nothing inherently incompatible between African security objectives and Western security objectives. Accordingly, with Africa requesting Western assistance for its security challenges and the West seeking to address the security challenges that have emerged in the post 9/11 context, this emerging relationship has the potential to be a win-win situation.

One of the keys to the success or failure of this relationship will be the degree to which development and conflict resolution processes are treated as opposite sides of the same coin. The United States National Security Strategy, the European Security Strategy of the EU and the AAP of the G8 all recognise the importance of development for effective conflict resolution, and indeed, at the 2005 Gleneagles Summit the G8 decided to commit greater attention and resources to reconstruction and reconciliation in post-conflict countries by providing, where necessary, rapid and flexible multilateral and bilateral debt relief for post-conflict countries and allocating grant financing for reconstruction, disarmament, demobilisation and the reintegration into civilian society.

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34 “Securing the Peace: The NATO Vision,” the Secretary General, Lord Robertson’s speech at the NATO Public Diplomacy Conference, Brussels, 16 October 2003.
35 “NATO’s assistance to the African Union for Darfur – How did it evolve”, Topica (NATO [online 10 Jan 2006]).
37 Ibid.: 508.
former combatants.  

Although there is broad agreement between the United States and the European Union about what is required in Africa, namely peace, security, democracy, good governance and development, there is in practice a distinct difference in the approach that each takes on the issue. So, despite the EU and the United States agreeing on the threats posed by failing states and terrorism in Africa, there is a risk that the lack of uniformity in approach and emphasis will confuse and indeed endanger the success of conflict resolution endeavours in Africa. There is also a risk that Africa may once again become some contemporary form of surrogate battleground for the war on terror. Further, there is the potential for Africa to become a terrain on which the emerging diplomatic rivalry between the United States and the EU is played out. In this regard the utility of operation Artemis, as a European team-building exercise after the fall-out over the war in Iraq, raises a number of important questions. In addition, the United States has made clear the importance it attaches to Africa's oil resources. Nobody can afford another 'scramble for Africa.'

The African Union replaces the OAU

The decision to establish the AU was taken at the Sirte Extraordinary Session of the OAU in 1999. The Lomé Summit of the OAU in 2000 adopted the Constitutive Act of the Union and the Lusaka Summit of the OAU in 2001 agreed on the road map for the implementation of the AU. The Durban Summit of the OAU in 2002 launched the AU and convened the 1st Assembly of the Heads of States of the AU.

The aim is a functional pan-Africanism which would produce the political stability that can underpin economic growth. If liberating Africa was the guiding ideology of the OAU, the AU's vision is building institutions - a legislature, judiciary and a commission - that can reinforce national development strategies and reduce Africa's dependence on Western economies.

The AU has 53 member states. South Africa, Nigeria, Senegal, Algeria and Egypt are regarded as some of the most influential member states. A key component of the vision of the AU is that it should focus on the promotion of peace, security and stability on the continent as a prerequisite for the implementation of the development and integration agenda of the Union. Accordingly, one of the AU's objectives is the promotion of peace, security and stability on the continent.

The Constitutive Act of the African Union

The Constitutive Act of the African Union (CAAU) was adopted by the Assembly of the Heads of States and Governments (AAHSG) of the OAU in Lomé on 11 July 2000. The CAAU formally entered into force on 26 May 2001. The CAAU is the overarching and enabling instrument of the AU.

The CAAU lays the foundations for an effective collective security system in Africa by linking peace and security with the protection of human rights. Article 3(b), which deals with the defence of sovereignty, territorial integrity and the independence of member states, is counterbalanced by Article 3(f), 3(g) and 3(h) which deal with the promotion of peace, security and stability, the promotion of democratic principles, popular participation and good governance, and the promotion and protection of human rights.

Article 4 of the CAAU contains the
principles that will govern the functioning of the Union. Article 4(g) and Article 4(h) and the relationship between these two articles represents, in peace and security terms, a major departure from the OAU.

Article 4(g) which upholds the principle of non-interference, and Article 4(h) which gives the Union the right to intervene in a member state, are apparently contradictory. However, the AU non-interference principle in Article 4(g) only restricts any member state from interference in the internal affairs of another. Unlike Article 2(7) of the UN Charter, which states that “nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorise the UN to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state”, and Article 3 of the OAU Charter, Article 4(g) does not in and of itself restrain the AU as an institution from interfering in the internal affairs of member states.\(^{42}\)

Article 4(h), on the other hand, gives the AU a right to intervene in members’ conflicts. Under Article 4(h) the AU has a right to intervene in member states. This right to intervene must be exercised entirely at the discretion of the Assembly and consequently the consent of the concerned state is immaterial. Further, this being a right, no individual state, including those in whose territories the conflict is taking place, may prevent the AU from coming into its territory. Unless the Assembly decides not to intervene, a state can only avoid mandatory intervention by renouncing its membership of the AU and withdrawing from the organisation as provided for in Article 31.\(^{43}\)

By ratifying the AU Act, member states have agreed that the AU can intervene in their affairs. Accordingly, in empowering the AU to that effect under Article 4(h), member states must be deemed to have conceded a quantum of their legal and political sovereignty to the Union; and once a state has given its consent it cannot go back, except as permitted by the Act itself.\(^{44}\)

Article 31 deals with cessation of membership. Article 31.1 provides that any state wishing to renounce its membership shall provide written notification, and that at the end of one year from the date of such notification, the Act will cease to apply to the renouncing state, which will accordingly cease to belong to the Union. However, Article 31.2 provides that during the one year referred to above, the member state wishing to withdraw must comply with the provisions of the Act and is bound to discharge its obligations under the Act up to the date of its withdrawal.

Article 6 states that the Assembly shall be the supreme organ of the Union and Article 9.1(a) gives the Assembly the sole power to make policies. This raises questions about oversight and accountability because all of the other organs of the Union, including the Court of Justice and the Pan-African Parliament, will be subordinate to the Assembly.\(^{45}\)

Under Article 7 the decisions of the Assembly will be by consensus, failing which by a two-thirds majority of the member states. Procedural matters, including the question of whether a matter is one of procedure or not, will be decided by simple majority. This is a very important provision because it prevents the re-occurrence of the OAU situation whereby the need for consensus could cause paralysis and inaction. Article 9.2 empowers the Assembly to delegate any of its powers and functions to any organ of the Union (this includes the Peace and Security Council).

Article 30 provides for the suspension from the activities of the Union of governments that come to power through unconstitutional means. The importance of this Article in the African context speaks for itself. The co-operation between South Africa, Zimbabwe and Equatorial Guinea has given its consent it cannot go back, except as permitted by the Act itself.\(^{44}\)


43 Ibid.: 13–16.

44 Ibid.: 19.

in foiling the mercenary-led coup attempt in Equatorial Guinea in 2004, and the use by South Africa of its new anti-mercenary legislation, provide an indication of the changed political sentiment and will which should have a positive impact on the implementation of this Article.

The CAAU takes a fundamentally different approach to the maintenance of peace and security from that taken by the OAU. Article 4(h), which gives the Union the right to intervene, has substantially weakened the principle of non-interference, to the extent that it may no longer be an effective shield behind which the perpetrators of conflict and human rights violations can hide. The AU is empowered in a way that the OAU never was, even after the adoption of the Mechanism. The AU is not the continuation of the OAU by another name—for example, in July 2004, the AU agreed to send peacekeepers to Darfur and in 2005 the AU intervened to block Faure Gnassingbe from taking over the presidency in Togo on the death of his father, without facing an election. The AU and ECOWAS, the regional West African organisation, forced him to back down and hold elections.

The key issues with regard to the CAAU will be its operationalisation and implementation. This will be a function of political will, commitment and the availability of the necessary material resources. In this regard, the AU's interventions such as in Darfur and Togo and the enhanced commitment of the international donor community to finance African initiatives, in particular the G8 at the 2005 Gleneagles Summit, are positive indications for the future.

The protocol relating to the establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union

The Protocol relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union was adopted at the inaugural summit of the AU in Durban in July 2002, and entered into force on 26 December 2003. The Protocol replaces the Cairo Declaration and supersedes the resolutions and decisions of the OAU relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution in Africa, which are in conflict with the present Protocol.

Article 2.1 of the Protocol establishes the Peace and Security Council (PSC) as a standing decision-making body for the “prevention, management and resolution of conflict.” It states further that “the Peace and Security Council shall be a collective security and early warning arrangement to facilitate timely and efficient response to conflict and crises in Africa.” The PSC is the key operational structure of the peace and security architecture and as such it will play a pivotal role. It contributes the institutions, the structures, the mechanisms and procedures of the architecture.

Article 2.2 states that the PSC is to be supported by the Commission, a Panel of the Wise, a Continental Early Warning System, an African Standby Force and a Special Fund.

The objectives for which the PSC is established are contained in Article 3. These include: the promotion of peace, security and stability; the anticipation and prevention of conflicts and, where conflicts have occurred, the undertaking of peace-making and peace-building functions; the promotion and implementation of peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction; the co-ordination of continental efforts in the prevention and combating of international terrorism; the development of a common defence policy for the Union; and the promotion and encouragement of democratic practices, good governance, the rule of law and the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms.

Article 4 contains the principles that will guide the PSC. The Article states that “the PSC shall be guided by the principles enshrined in the CAAU, the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.” It goes on to say that the PSC shall, in particular, be
guided by 11 Principles, dealing inter alia with the following; the peaceful settlement of disputes and conflicts; early responses to contain crisis situations; respect for the rule of law and fundamental rights and freedoms and respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of member states.

Article 4(f), which states that the PSC shall be guided by the principles of “non-interference by any member state in the internal affairs of another”, is exactly the same as Article 4(g) of the CAAU. Article 4(j) of the PSC refers to Article 4(h) of the CAAU and is identical to that Article. The issue of non-interference versus the right to intervene, as discussed above with regard to the CAAU, will also apply to the PSC.

Article 5.1 deals with the membership of the Council. Ten members are elected for a term of two years and five members for a term of three years. Article 5.2 sets eligibility criteria for membership of the PSC. These include: the commitment to uphold the principles of the Union; contribution to the promotion and maintenance of peace and security and participation in conflict resolution, peace-making and peace-building on the continent; capacity and commitment to shoulder the responsibilities of membership; contribution to the Peace Fund and commitment to honour financial obligations to the Union; and respect for constitutional governance, the rule of law and human rights.

Article 5.4 provides for periodic review by the Assembly of the extent to which members of the PSC continue to meet the requirements of Article 5.2. The rigorous criteria outlined in Article 5.2 should, if applied faithfully, reduce the possibility of the PSC being undermined by states with inappropriate bona fides and/or insufficient will and capacity. It should also discourage so-called 'spoilers'.

Article 6 outlines the functions that the PSC is mandated to perform. In terms of this Article the PSC is mandated to perform a wide variety of peace and security functions, ranging from mediation and early warning to peace support operations and post-conflict reconstruction. Further, Article 6(f) assigns the function of humanitarian action and disaster management to the PSC. Under Article 4(g), the PSC may be tasked with “any other functions decided by the Assembly.”

In terms of Article 7.1, the PSC shall exercise its functions in conjunction with the Chairperson of the Commission. Article 7.1 contains a comprehensive list of 18 peace and security tasks that the PSC is empowered to undertake. The PSC can, inter alia, undertake peace-making and peace-building functions to resolve conflicts; authorise the mounting and deployment of peace support operations; approve the modalities for intervention by the Union in a member state and institute sanctions whenever an unconstitutional change of government takes place in a member state.

The above-mentioned powers would seem to indicate that a fairly substantial degree of autonomy and discretion have been vested in the PSC. However, Article 7.1 (e) states that the PSC has the power to “recommend to the Assembly,” pursuant to Article 4(h) of the CAAU, intervention, on behalf of the Union in a member state in respect of war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity. The words “recommend to the Assembly” are not found in any of the other sub-sections of Article 7.1. This would seem to imply that the other 17 powers all fall short of actual intervention in a member state of the Union, unless it is facilitated by an earlier mandate of the Assembly. This is consistent with Article 4(j), which deals with the principles that are to guide the operation of the PSC, and also Article 4(h) of the CAAU. Both of these articles clearly state that only the Assembly has the discretion to exercise the right of the Union to intervene in a member state. The impression that the PSC has the discretion to intervene in a member state without the approval of the Assembly or the consent of the affected state is clearly a misleading one, which appears to have been occasioned by poor drafting.
Article 7.2, 3 and 4 establish the authority of the PSC vis-à-vis member states. Article 8 deals, inter alia, with voting and in this regard Article 8.13 states that “while decisions of the PSC shall generally be guided by the principle of consensus, in cases where consensus cannot be reached, the PSC shall adopt its decisions on procedural matters by simple majority and decisions on all other matters by a two-thirds majority”. This is in line with the approach to decision-making followed in the CAAU.

Article 9 deals with the “entry points” and “modalities” for action. Article 9.1 empowers the PSC to take such initiatives and action it deems appropriate with regard to situations of potential conflict as well as actual conflicts and to that end, Article 9.2 states that the PSC “shall use its discretion to effect entry, whether through the collective intervention of the Council itself, or through its Chairperson and or the Chairperson of the Commission, the Panel of the Wise, and or in collaboration with the regional mechanisms”. Again, these powers are not as wide as they appear to be because, as in the case of the powers outlined in Article 7.1 above, they would only be operable once the Assembly has decided to intervene in a member state.

Article 11 deals with the Panel of the Wise, whose function it is to support the efforts of the PSC and the Chairperson of the Commission, particularly with respect to conflict prevention. The Panel of the Wise will be composed of “five highly respected African personalities from various segments of society who have made an outstanding contribution to the cause of peace, security and development on the continent.” The role of the Panel is to advise the PSC and the Chairperson of the Commission on all issues pertaining to the promotion, and maintenance of peace, security and stability in Africa.”

Defence analyst Laurie Nathan argues, correctly, that the AU has not paid any serious institutional attention to mediation as a peacemaking strategy. He proposes that the PSC establish an “expert mediation unit” and that the Panel of the Wise, “be constituted as this unit”. He says that if the Panel of the Wise is not constituted as the AU’s mediation unit, the AU should nevertheless establish, de novo, an expert mediation unit and subordinate it to the Chair of the Commission. In practice, the AU has been calling upon South Africa and in particular President Mbeki to act as mediator in the conflicts in the DRC, Burundi, Cote D’Ivoire and Sudan.

Article 12 deals with the establishment of the Continental Early Warning System and Article 13 the establishment of an African Standby Force (ASF). Article 13.1 states that an African Standby Force shall be established to enable the PSC to perform its responsibilities with respect to the deployment of peace support missions and intervention. According to the Article, “Such Force shall be composed of standby multi-disciplinary contingents, with civilian and military components in their countries’ of origin and ready for rapid deployment at appropriate notice”. Article 13.2 requires member states to take steps to establish contingents for participation in peace support missions. Article 13.8 makes provision for the establishment of a military staff committee to advise and assist the PSC on “all questions relating to military and security requirements for the promotion and maintenance of peace and security in Africa”.

Article 14 deals with peace-building and outlines the role and functions of the PSC in this regard. Article 15 gives the PSC an active role in co-ordinating and conducting humanitarian actions. The Article requires that the PSC develop its own capacity to undertake humanitarian actions and that the ASF should be “adequately equipped” to undertake humanitarian activities.

Article 16 deals with the relationship

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between the PSC and the regional security mechanisms. Article 16.1 states that the Regional Mechanisms are “part of the overall security architecture of the Union, which has the primary responsibility for promoting peace, security and stability in Africa.” Article 16 requires the PSC and the Chairperson of the Commission to “harmonise and co-ordinate” the activities of Regional Mechanisms to ensure that these activities are “consistent with the objectives and the principles of the Union” and to “work closely with Regional Mechanisms, to ensure effective partnership between them and the Peace and Security Council.” The Article also makes provision for the conclusion of a “Memorandum of Understanding on Co-operation between the Commission and the Regional Mechanisms”.

What the Protocol refers to as “Regional Mechanisms” are actually the continent’s sub-regional bodies. Although these bodies fall outside the scope of this study, it is nevertheless important to point out that the regions are seen as “crucial building-blocs”48 not only in the area of peace, security and stability on the continent but also with regard to the socio-economic development of the continent. Article 16, which provides for a formal relationship between the PSC and the regional bodies, reflects a realisation on the part of the AU that it will have to rely on the conflict management activities of the continent’s sub-regional bodies.49 In this regard the key question will be to what extent the regional organisations are able to carry the burden of peacekeeping and peacemaking.50

The PSC has proposed five regions, i.e. North, South, East, West and Central. This is logical, given that the AU recognises five regional economic organisations. Although the exact boundaries of the five regions have not yet been established, it already appears that the boundaries of the regions proposed by the PSC will not correlate directly with the boundaries of the regions recognised by the AU. The issue of regions and sub-regions is already a complex and tricky one for continental governance with much overlapping, duplication, redundancy and ambiguity — in short, confusion. The PSC must be careful not to further complicate this issue.

Article 17 deals with the PSC’s relationship with the United Nations and other international organisations. With regard to the UN, the Article states that the PSC shall “co-operate and work closely with the United Nations Security Council” and that when necessary “recourse will be made to the United Nations to provide the necessary financial, logistical and military support” for the AU’s peace and security activities.

Article 21 deals with funding and provides for the establishment of a Peace Fund to provide financial resources for operational activities related to peace and security. In 2002, the UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, estimated that it would cost a minimum of US$ 24 million to establish a 500 person force and the full peace and security agenda of the AU would cost approximately US$ 120 million over the first three years.51 This is discussed in more detail in the section dealing with the operationalisation of the PSC.

The PSC has been equipped with both the powers and the institutional mechanisms to perform its crucial role as the key operational structure of the peace and security architecture. Besides the operationalisation of the Protocol, which is dealt with in the next section, the effective operation of the PSC will be subject to two major challenges. The first relates to the relationship between the PSC and the Regional Mechanisms. Because

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49 The Abuja Treaty of 1991 that established the African Economic Community (AEC) formalised and regulated the relationships between the OAU and its five regional economic organisations.
the PSC will have to rely on the conflict management activities and capabilities of the continent’s sub-regional bodies, and because the PSC’s forces and capabilities are essentially the forces and capabilities which are drawn from the Regional Mechanisms, the relationship between the PSC and the Regional Mechanisms will need to be streamlined in order to remove duplication and overlaps. Unless this happens, there will be no rational distribution of tasks, functions and capabilities between the continental body and the regional bodies.

The next challenge relates to the overarching issue mentioned above, namely the political will and commitment of the member states to make it work.

The operationalisation of the PSC

The operationalisation of the Protocol is a tremendous task that will not be accomplished in the short term. There are significant challenges to be overcome especially with regard to capacity, coordination, the acquisition of the necessary capabilities and funding.

Although the operationalisation of the PSC is still in its very early stages, the PSC has already begun conducting peace and security interventions. In order to find a solution to the conflict in Darfur, the PSC has been facilitating the “Intersudanese Peace Talks in Abuja. In August 2004 the PSC deployed a mission to Darfur Sudan (AMIS). Between July and August 2005 NATO transported approximately 2,000 AU troops, including 49 members of the civilian police force, to Darfur. In October 2005 residents of the Riyad refugee camp in Darfur reported that the AU forces monitoring the ceasefire in the region had not been doing enough to stop the violence against the approximately 15,000 refugees at the camp – militias were reported to have been beating residents and raping women with apparent impunity. Residents of the camp reported that AU troops had merely been “writing reports” and not protecting them. There appears to be an urgent need to disarm the Janjaweed, who have been attacking both residents and aid workers in the area. The British Minister for Africa David Triesman who visited Darfur in early October 2005, said that there was little evidence that any of the militias had been disarmed and that disarming all sides was essential to stopping the violence. Despite considerable logistical and financial support from the international community, the Darfur crisis has stretched the AU’s capacity.

The Darfur crisis is an important test case for the AU. According to Suliman Baldo, the Director of the Africa Program for the International Crisis Group, the AU should focus on succeeding in the Darfur test case before it embarks on any new peacekeeping mission.

African Standby Force (ASF)

The Standby Force will be composed of a rapid deployment/early entry capability that can respond quickly in order to prevent mass killings or genocide while the mandate is prepared and approved for the follow-on peacekeeping forces that make up the bulk of the standby brigade. The need for a rapid deployment and early entry capability has been amply demonstrated by the slow reaction time of the United Nations to previous security crises in Africa, in particular the genocide in Rwanda.

The ASF will mainly be responsible for the following types of peace support operations: preventative diplomacy/peacemaking, humanitarian intervention, peacekeeping, peace enforcement and peace building. It will also be able to conduct rapid response disaster and humanitarian relief operations. The idea is that the Standby Force should preferably be deployed in its own region but that it can

53 Reuters website, 8 October 2005
deploy outside of it too.\(^{56}\)

In terms of the force design concept the five economic regions of Africa, the north, west, east, central and south, will each develop a balanced standby brigade for the ASF and maintain that brigade at agreed levels of readiness. As indicated above, the boundaries of most of the regions have not yet been finalised. The ‘working’ outline of the boundaries is broadly based on the five major economic groupings that include the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The countries in each of these regions will form a combined planning staff and a core regional brigade headquarters to prepare contingency plans, develop interoperability, undertake co-ordination and control deployment.\(^{57}\) While the main headquarters and the central early warning centre will be in Addis Ababa, each region will also establish an early warning centre to monitor security developments and the possible need for humanitarian intervention. The combined planning staff and core regional brigade headquarters will, in liaison with the regional early warning centre, monitor security developments in the region.

Each of the five brigades will comprise a number of units earmarked by the countries of the region for deployment with the brigades. Furthermore, each region will identify sufficient units and a balanced mix of units to allow its brigade to deploy in a form tailored to the demands of various types of missions. The brigade headquarters will establish a standby roster to ensure that they have a clear understanding of which units will be available at any given time. This will mean that countries will be expected to earmark sufficient units to allow for training and stand-down rotations. The emphasis will be on light, mobile and sustained forces with an effective command and control capability.\(^ {58}\)

The Africa Standby Force (ASF) will be developed in two phases. In Phase 1 (by 30 June 2005), the AU will develop a full time capacity for simpler missions and a standby system comprised of a skeleton mission HQ and standby rosters. The five regions will begin to consider their standby force elements. Decisions on support will need to be taken and the AU/regional doctrine and hierarchy of documents/procedures will be put in place and aligned with the UN. By the end of Phase 2 (by 30 June 2010) the ASF will be composed of five regional brigades and be capable of complex missions. Jackie Cilliers of the South African Institute for Security Studies believes that the proposal to establish five regional brigades is completely unrealistic: “If the AU thinks it is going to raise the funds for five standby brigades, it must think again.”\(^ {59}\)

The ECOWAS brigade is based on the force groupings that were previously employed in the Ecomog operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone. With extensive operational experience in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea and Cote D’Ivoire, this sub-region is generally regarded as having an advantage over the other regions with respect to the creation of its standby force.\(^ {60}\)

The countries of ECOWAS, SADC and East Africa are currently involved in planning their standby force elements. According to Brigadier-General Les Rudman, the South African Development Community (SADC) met the deadline of June 30 for the first phase of preparations. An interim planning core for the SADC Brigade is in place and they were preparing to hand over to a permanent structure by December 2005. Member countries have pledged over 6,000 troops and peace support doctrine has been completed. A logistical support system for the Brigade has been approved

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56 Presentation to the Portfolio Committee on Defence and Joint Standing Committee on Defence, the South African Department of Defence, 3 February 2004.
and a financial management system has been
designed. A memorandum of understanding
for member states has been finalised and the
region has held its first combined military
exercise. Rudman said that by the end of
2005 preparations should be sufficiently
advanced for the Brigade to start stipulating
its requirements to donors. 61

**Capacity requirements**

Over the past decade African forces have
received peacekeeping training, or financial
support for peacekeeping training, from
a variety of sources including the G8, the
United States, the United Kingdom, France,
Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Finland,
Canada, Belgium, Germany, Italy, Japan,
The Netherlands and Portugal. Given
such a multiplicity of sources for either
peacekeeping training or support for
peacekeeping training, there is an urgent
need to standardise this training. This will
have a direct impact on the interoperability
of ASF forces.

South African peacekeeping experience
in the DRC has identified an urgent need
to develop the capability for post-conflict
reconstruction or so-called developmental
peacekeeping. Furthermore, Cheryl
Hendricks of the Centre for Conflict
Resolution at the University of Cape
Town has suggested that there should be
a “conscious attempt to train women as
peacekeepers and peace-makers.”62

Developing interoperability both with
regard to communications and logistics
is a key priority. The short-term focus is
on communications at the tactical and
operational levels.63 Secure communications
between the regional headquarters and
the deploying countries’ headquarters will
also need to be developed. With regard to
the area of logistics, research needs to be
undertaken to develop optimum levels of
inter-operability with regard to fuel types,
aircraft fuelling systems, spares, technical
support systems etc.64

The absence of an appropriate strategic
and tactical airlift capability is a major
weakness. Most of the inter-theatre and
intra-theatre deployment and supply of
forces will have to be by air. This is not
only because of the requirement for an
early entry capability but also because the
distances in Africa are vast and the overland
transport infrastructure is generally very
poor and in some cases non-existent.65 The
recent decision by South Africa to acquire
between eight and fourteen Airbus A-400
M strategic/tactical transport aircraft will,
when they are delivered between 2010 and
2014, go a long way to reducing if not
completely eliminating Africa’s reliance
on the major powers and charter aircraft
for airlift support. In the medium to long­
term there will be a requirement for air­
transportable equipment for the standby
brigades including combat and logistical
vehicles, field engineering vehicles and
medical facilities. The development of a
sealift capacity for littoral operations may
also become necessary in the medium to
long term.66

The capacity of the continental early
warning system, the regional early warning
systems and the capacity for planning
and implementing peace missions will
be greatly enhanced by the acquisition
of advanced resources and procedures
for collecting, assessing and distributing
intelligence. Recent multi-national peace
and security operations have demonstrated
that these types of intelligence collection
capabilities are necessary where there
are fluid political and complex military
situations. “Intelligence on the military
power and disposition of forces, the location
of minefields, the level of violence and
other features in a deployment area are
essential for planning and conducting peace

61 SADC on Track with Peacekeeping Brigade”, Cape
Times, 21 September 2005: 5.
62 Interview with Cheryl Hendricks 18 October 2004.
and Defence Catalogue ...
64 Ibid.: 19.
65 Helmoed-Römer Heiman, “S Africa to buy A400M”,
and Defence Catalogue ... 19.
missions. In this regard the progressive acquisition of an airborne surveillance capability – beginning with the tactical level in the short-term and advancing to the regional level in the medium-term and then onto the continental level in the much longer term – will provide a major boost to the intelligence collection capabilities of the ASF. This could be achieved by a combination of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and conventional aircraft.

In operationalising the PSC and building the ASF, South Africa is “expected to play a role commensurate with its strength as the major economic power south of the Sahara”. President Thabo Mbeki’s energetic mediation efforts on the continent have given South Africa a key role in almost every African peace agreement signed over the past five years, including those of Côte d’Ivoire, Sudan, Burundi, the DRC, Rwanda and The Comores. The South African National Defence Force is now the largest contributor of peacekeeping troops in Africa. There are 3,000 South African troops deployed under UN and AU operations in the DRC (MONUC III), Burundi, (AMIS/ONUB), Ethiopia (UNMEE), Eritrea (OLMEE), Sudan (AMIS), Liberia (UNMIL) and Uganda. The South African White Paper on Defence and the Defence Review is the subject of an ‘update’ process before the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Defence, which should be completed in 2007. The main thrust of this process is to align the SANDF’s force design, force structure and capabilities with its new obligations under the AU and SADC. Once this process is complete, South Africa can be expected to play an even greater role. In this regard South Africa’s advanced defence-industry sector can play a significant role in satisfying the future equipment needs of the ASF. Nigeria has been playing a very significant role in Ecomog and, as a long-standing advocate of the new continental peace and security architecture, it can be expected to play an even greater role in future. However, in the medium term, the AU, even with a commensurate commitment from South Africa and Nigeria, will not be able to develop the necessary peacekeeping capabilities and fund the necessary peacekeeping operations without western support.

The Role of the West and the international community

Since the United States’ withdrawal from Somalia and particularly since the genocide in Rwanda there has been a proliferation of mainly Western initiatives aimed at supporting African efforts in the area of peacekeeping. In 1996 the United States established the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) to build a peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance capacity in Africa. Before being replaced by the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance Programme (ACOTA) in July 2002, ACRI had trained more than 8,600 soldiers from African militaries in peacekeeping tactics. ACOTA is intended to bolster Africa’s indigenous peacekeeping capability by providing training and equipment. The administration’s Financial

68 South Africa already manufactures and deploys a tactical UAV, “Seeker II” and is in the process of developing a second generation Predator-class Medium Altitude Long Endurance (MALE) UAV, “Bateleur”. If the ASF deploys South Africa’s current UAV surveillance system, the “Seeker 2” it will be possible for the ASF to achieve this capability in the short term. Regional airborne surveillance capability could, in the medium term, be developed by combining the South African Bateleur UAV with a deployable C4I system. This would provide the ASF with a more cost effective version of Brazil’s Amazon Basin Surveillance System (SIVAM), Helmoed-Römer Heiman, “The Embraer approach to Aerial Surveillance”, World Air News (June 2004): 20.
70 Vines, "War and Peace...": 64.
Year 2003 budget request to Congress for US$ 10 million reflects a low prioritisation of this programme and the spiralling cost of the war in Iraq will probably mean that African peace and security issues will not be a budget priority of the Pentagon for the foreseeable future. The attractiveness of the ACOTA programme is not enhanced by the US request for access to rudimentary bases – “co-operative security locations” – in Africa for training and possible use for operations during crises. 72

On the other hand, the US launched the East African counter-terrorism initiative with a budget of US$ 100 million to increase the regional counter-terrorism capacities of Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. 73 In 2003, the United States’ deployment of marines to Liberia helped lead to the resignation of President Taylor and the establishment of the UN peacekeeping force to supervise the transition.

The United Kingdom has been operating British Military Advisory and Training Teams (BMATTS) in African countries under the UK’s African Peacekeeping Training Support Programme. The Programme aims to provide peacekeeping training to officers from African countries. The budget for the financial years 2001 to 2003 was about US$ 100 million per year. 74

In 1996 France established Recamp – the reinforcement of African military capabilities for peacekeeping programme. This programme provided, inter alia, for the creation of a training centre in the Ivory Coast and the pre-positioning of equipment for peacekeeping battalions. The Recamp budget has been reasonably stable, with 3 million Euros being allocated in 2000. 75

There have been a number of other bilateral initiatives which focus on the following: supporting the UN, regional and sub regional missions in Africa; direct financial assistance to African regional and sub regional organisations; supporting or assisting in peacekeeping training for African forces; financial, logistics or equipment support to peacekeeping training exercises in Africa; mediation; and conflict prevention initiatives by African civil society organisations. 76 Numerous countries have been involved in these types of initiatives including Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Canada, The Netherlands, Germany, Italy, Belgium and Japan. Norway is financing a five-year training project for peace in Southern Africa, aimed at building capacity for conflict management and peacekeeping. The project focuses on the civilian and political aspect of peacekeeping, civil-military relations and specialised training for civilian police. Denmark has, inter alia, built peacekeeping training facilities and provided courses on defence management for southern African forces. With regard to mediation, Norway has been active in the Sudan peace process. 77

In December 2003 the EU established the Peace Facility For Africa to support African led operations and build the long-term capacity of African institutions to carry out such operations. The proposed budget for 2004 was 250 million Euros. Further, the EU launched operation Artemis in Bunia in the DRC in 2003. 78

NATO

As mentioned above, the UN Secretary General and the AU asked NATO to assist the AU with its operation in Darfur. NATO provided support to AMIS in the form of strategic airlift and training. During 2003 NATO airlifted over 2,800 AU troops and provided staff capacity-building workshops for African Union officers engaged in the Darfur operation. The training covered

74 Malan, New Tools in the Box...”: 203.
75 Ibid.: 203.
command and control procedures, reporting systems, battle rhythm, intelligence collection and analysis, force generation, situational awareness, and task force and headquarters standard operating procedures refinement. More than 100 AU officers completed the NATO training workshops.9

NATO also provided 14 officers in support of a training exercise organised by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations for the AMIS force headquarters in El Fasher, Sudan. In this regard NATO provided exercise and operations-plan writers, as well as tactical-level controllers. The object of the exercise was to enhance the AU’s ability to operate in the dynamic humanitarian scenario in Darfur. At this stage, there is no agreement between NATO and the AU to provide ongoing support for AU operations.80

There are three main areas of criticism of Western initiatives to develop African peacekeeping capabilities. The first criticism deals with the issue of co-ordination. The OAU expressed concern that the uncoordinated nature of the various programmes could detract from the ability of the member states and the OAU Mechanism to undertake effective peacekeeping operations.81 This criticism still holds true today. The second criticism deals with the linkage between capacity building and capacity utilisation; namely that it is not clear whether the training and/or the equipment makes African recipients more willing or able to undertake peacekeeping operations on the continent. In other words, training should not be conducted for its own sake, and the equipment that is provided should be standardised and should match the real needs of the recipient countries.82 The next criticism relates to funding, as regards both quantum and duration. The EU’s Peace Facility for Africa appears to be a very significant step in the right direction. The important questions will be how it is spent, for how long it is provided and whether or not other countries are prepared to increase their donor assistance to the development of African peacekeeping capabilities.

How the West goes about assisting the African Union to acquire the necessary capabilities and to conduct peace support operations will determine the course of the emerging security relationship between Africa and the West. For this relationship to succeed it will need to be a true strategic partnership based on mutually-agreed modalities including objectives, co-ordinated assistance, appropriate and sustainable funding and accountability.

The G8

As mentioned before, ever since the Kananaskis Summit in 2002 the G8 has been actively supporting African efforts to achieve and consolidate peace and security throughout Africa. At the G8 Gleneagles Summit in 2005 the G8 agreed to provide extra resources to Africa’s peacekeeping forces. In terms of this, the G8 would help Africa to raise up to 25,000 extra trained peacekeeping troops. This is in addition to the 75,000 AU troops by 2010 that the G8, at Sea Island in 2004, committed itself to training and, where appropriate, equipping. At the Gleneagles Summit, the G8 also committed itself to providing, inter alia, the following assistance to the AU for conflict resolution, peacekeeping, post conflict reconstruction and anti-terrorism activities:

- Co-ordinated technical assistance to the ASF in helping to establish planning elements at the AU headquarters and its regional brigades
- Developing the AU’s ability to deploy unarmed military observer missions, civilian policing operations and Gendarmeri/Carabinieri-like forces as part of its stabilisation and peace support operations
- Support, including flexible funding for African peacekeeping operations

79 "NATO continues to offer Logistical Support to African Union", Shape News, 6 October 2005 (NATO [online 23 Jan 2006]).
80 Ibid.
81 Malan, "New Tools in a Box..."; 207.
82 Ibid.: 208.
covering transport, logistics and financial management capacity

• Countering terrorism in Africa including co-operation with the AU's anti-terrorism centre in Algiers

• Resources for the AU and its sub-regional organisations to develop the planned continental early warning system, implement the Panel of the Wise and conflict mediation

• Enhancing the capabilities of the AU and sub-regional organisations by promoting more effective and flexible crisis response mechanisms and promoting faster and more comprehensive and co-ordinated partner responses between G8 countries, the UN, key regional organisations and other partners

• Improving the ability of the AU to collect and destroy illicit small arms

• Reconstruction and reconciliation in post-conflict countries by providing, where appropriate, rapid and flexible multilateral and bilateral debt relief for post-conflict countries and allocating grant financing for reconstruction, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration into civilian life for former combatants

• The urgent improvement of timelines and the predictability, effectiveness and availability of humanitarian assistance. 83

The United Nations

The UN is currently involved in six peacekeeping operations in Africa, namely:

• Western Sahara / MINURSO
• DRC – MONUC
• Burundi – ONUB
• Sierra Leone – NUAMSIL
• Côte d’Ivoire – UNOCI
• Ethiopia and Eritrea – UNMEE

Out of its total (record-breaking) peacekeeping budget of $3,180,743,200 for 2005–2006, the UN is spending $1,445,152,200, or 45%, on its African peacekeeping operations. 84

New partnership for Africa’s development (NEPAD)

To give substance to the African Renaissance vision, President Mbeki developed a detailed aid plan called the Millennium Africa Recovery Plan (MAP). Soon after the MAP was released, the President of Senegal Abdoulaye Wade launched the Omega plan. These two plans were merged and synthesised into the New African Initiative (NAI), which after consultations with Nigeria, Egypt and Algeria evolved into the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). NEPAD was adopted by the OAU in July 2001 and it was subsequently mandated as the key development programme of the OAU.

NEPAD provides both the opportunity and the framework for the renewal of the relationship between African states and their development partners in the industrial world. It does so by establishing principles and mechanisms to facilitate the following: support for countries who reform; the co-ordination of donor activities; the performance monitoring of donor practices; the complementariness of aid, trade, debt relief and investment; and mutual accountability. NEPAD was presented to the G8 Leaders at the Kananaskis Summit in 2002 where it was well received. The G8’s Africa Action Plan (AAP) which was adopted at the Kananaskis Summit is the G8’s initial response to NEPAD and is designed to encourage the “imaginative effort that underlies the NEPAD and to lay a solid foundation for future co-operation”. 85

NEPAD identifies peace, security, democracy, political governance, economic and corporate governance, and regional cooperation and integration as preconditions

83 Africa. Glencalges 2005 Summit Documents (2005), pp. 2–5, G8 Glencalges 2003 (G8 Presidency [online 10 Jan 2006]).
84 “UN Peacekeeping Operations. Background Note October 2005” (United Nations [online 23 Jan 2006]).
states had signed up for scrutiny. In 2005 Ghana and Rwanda completed their review processes and Mauritius, Kenya and South Africa commenced their review processes.

The conference on security, stability, development and co-operation in Africa (CSSDCA)

The CSSDCA, historically a Nigerian initiative, is heavily influenced by the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). As indicated above, the OAU and the UN Economic Commission for Africa jointly sponsored a conference in Kampala in 1991 under the framework of the African Leadership Forum. The final report of this conference, the “The Kampala Document”, proposed the establishment of a permanent Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Co-operation. This document called, inter alia, for the establishment of a continental peacekeeping machinery. This theme was to have a major influence on the establishment of the OAU conflict management mechanism in 1993. In July 2000 the OAU adopted the declaration on the Ministerial Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Co-operation in Africa. In July 2002 the inaugural summit of the AU adopted the Memorandum of Understanding on Security, Stability, Development and Co-operation in Africa. In terms of this memorandum the CSSDCA became part of the work programme of the AU. The AU currently characterises it as “a policy development process created to function within the framework of the African Union”. Like Nepad, the CSSDCA is a Special Programme of the AU.

The preamble to the above-mentioned memorandum emphasises the interdependence of security and stability on one hand and development and co-operation on the other. In terms of this memorandum,

87 Ibid. p. 18.
90 “Special Programs”/“CSSDCA”, African Union website (online 10 Jan 2006).
member states have committed themselves to subscribe to 24 core values and a detailed and comprehensive list of commitments to give effect to the core values. Core values include: the sovereignty of every African state; the centrality of peace and security to the development of both individuals and the state; good governance, including accountability, transparency and the rule of law.

Two of the most important commitments are the development of a collective continental architecture for promoting security and inter-African relations and the adoption of a comprehensive response for the prevention and resolution of conflicts.

Section III of the memorandum contains the key performance indicators for evaluating compliance with the above-mentioned commitments. Part A of this section contains the key performance indicators for security which include: the establishment of a common definition of security based on the concept of human security and establishing the mechanisms for implementing the provisions of Articles 4(h) and 4(j) of the CAAU.


Like Nepad, the CSSDCA is premised on the comprehensive interlinkage of security, development, human rights and democracy. There is a significant convergence and overlap between the core values and commitments of the CSSDCA and the principles and objectives of the CAAU, the PSC and Nepad. Like Nepad, the CSSDCA has its own unit but it is unclear to what degree this unit has been integrated with the administration of the AU. The main difference between the CSSDCA, the CAAU, the PSC and Nepad is that its key performance indicators specify strict deadlines and/or targets which continental institutions, regional institutions and member states have to meet in order to be in compliance with the commitments that they have undertaken under the memorandum of understanding. As with Nepad, the AU also intends in future to fully incorporate and integrate the CSSDCA processes into AU structures and processes.

Conclusion

The CAAU, the PSC, Nepad and the CSSDCA are the four pillars of Africa's new continental peace and security architecture. Collectively, these instruments and programmes provide the values, norms, principles, objectives, institutions, mechanisms, procedures and performance indicators of the new continental security framework, which is the basis for a collective security system in Africa. These instruments and programmes are all predicated on the acknowledgement that peace, security, democracy and political governance are essential preconditions for social and economic development. This is a fundamentally different approach to that taken by the OAU, especially over the first 30 years of its existence.

The AU and the PSC have appropriated the powers that the OAU and its Mechanism lacked, most critically the right to intervene in a member state. This right has weakened the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of a member state and to that extent it has qualified sovereignty.

The relationship between the AU and the Regional Mechanisms is a very complex one. In this regard it is entirely appropriate for Article 16 of the PSC to stress harmonisation, co-ordination and effective partnerships. An important part of this will be the degree to which the AU and the Regional Mechanisms agree to a rational and streamlined distribution of tasks and functions between the continental and regional levels.

The relationship between the CAAU and the PSC on one hand and Nepad and the CSSDCA on the other will eventually need to be settled. This is not an urgent issue because the relationships between the instruments and the programmes is a
complementary one and the overlapping and duplication occurs in the area of values, principles, norms, objectives and policies and not on the institutional and enforcement terrain. It is intended that Nepad and the CSSDCA will eventually be fully incorporated into and integrated with the AU. In the meantime, the relative non-incorporation of these programmes might be an asset because they could function as oversight nodes for monitoring the integrity and performance of the PSC in particular and the AU in general. This ‘oversight’ function could also serve as a qualified and somewhat informal antidote to the lack of accountability of the Assembly.

Nepad and the CSSDCA, with their human security approach, are predicated on a more comprehensive approach to security than the collective security approach of the AU.\(^{91}\) When the norms and values of Nepad and the CSSDCA become embedded in the AU it will be interesting to observe whether this results in the AU developing a more comprehensive approach to security that includes the notion of human security.

Between the adoption by the AU of the Declaration on the Political and Socio-Economic Situation in Africa and the Fundamental Changes Taking Place in the World on 11 July 1990 and the entering into force of the Protocol relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union on 26 December 2003, African leaders have developed, adopted and begun implementing a new continental governance regime. At the heart of this lies the management of peace and security on the continent. In this regard, a fundamental shift has taken place because African leaders have empowered the AU to play the kind of role that the OAU was never empowered to play.

Donor assistance is a \textit{sine qua non} for the operationalisation of the PSC. In this regard quite significant funds are already available. Additional, predictable and sustainable levels of funding will be required. However, it is equally important for donor assistance to be co-ordinated both between donors themselves and between donors and the African Union. This should ensure that the appropriate level of funding is made available to the appropriate programme at the correct time and in such a way that it produces the desired outcome and contributes to the overall development of African peacekeeping capabilities and the implementation of African peacekeeping operations.

In the relatively short period of time between 2002 and 2005 African and Western leaders have taken significant strides towards the development of a true strategic partnership which, if properly managed, nurtured and developed, can and indeed should over the medium to long term produce a win-win relationship. Since 2002 Africans have instituted and begun to operationalise the AU, PSC and Nepad. These developments demonstrate substantial political will and commitment by African leaders to adopt and to implement a new continental peace and security regime. In the same timeframe, Western leaders in response to these African developments and in particular Nepad, have instituted, \textit{inter alia}, the G8's Africa Action Plan at Kananaskis in 2002 and the EU's Peace Facility for Africa in 2003. In addition to this, they have also committed extra resources to peace and security and development in Africa at the G8 Gleneagles Summit in 2005. These are some of the key indications that, while it is as yet early days, the emerging security relationship between Africa and the West is moving steadily and quite rapidly in the right direction.

Edward Shalala

Peace and Security in Africa

Basic Structural Changes in the Governance of Peace and Security on the African Continent