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The American Effort to Transform Europe's Armed Forces
About the author

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Introduction
This study is about the United States and Europe. It aims to examine the American effort to transform Europe into a more efficient military actor, along U.S. imperatives. Over the past decade, this has become a continuously recurring theme, stirring new initiatives, reforms and emotions on both sides of the Atlantic. To cast new light over the discrepancy between U.S. and European armament, this study will explore the strategic fundamentals for the United States’ effort to get European forces “up and go”. The case used to illustrate the American effort is the Clinton Administration’s Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI), launched at NATO’s Washington Summit in 1999. The case may also illustrate the more fundamental aspects of the relationship: How does the United States perceive the European defence effort today, and how may the European approach be adjusted to U.S. preferences? Exploring the logic and intent behind the DCI may also provide us with more knowledge regarding the transatlantic tension that has been aroused since “9.11”.

Three questions will structure our analysis. First, the basic question, what was the U.S. rationale for launching the DCI? Second, how does the United States want European NATO members to transform their military forces; and third, what is, from a U.S. perspective, the expectation of the European transformation? The questions allow us to explore the U.S. policy in two broad issues. First, with respect to political processes in NATO, and the fact that the United States uses the DCI as a means of influencing European politics. Secondly, in terms of increased Atlantic integration, by means of military transformation.

Three lines of arguments that relate to the questions above will be presented. First, it will be argued that the U.S. wants to maintain influence in Europe through NATO, and that a more efficient Alliance can take part in projecting global stability through non-Article V peace support missions. Secondly, I will argue that in order to ensure NATO relevancy, the United States wants Europe to spend scarce defence resources more effectively. Joint, common and multinational funding of key capabilities is encouraged to get European forces off their own Continent. Thirdly, the U.S. objective is the creation of multinational European expeditionary forces that are closely integrated and interoperable with U.S. forces.

What is the U.S. Rationale for Transforming the European Armed Forces?
Why did United States’ Secretary of Defense, William S. Cohen introduce the idea of focused improvement of defence capabilities to his NATO counterparts in June 1998? After all, the State Department had since 1992 pursued a strategy of “change is better” towards Europe, pushing the ‘Old Continent’ towards
increased engagement out-of-area (OOA). It should not come as a surprise that the Secretary's observations at the time relied heavily on NATO's Implementation Force (IFOR) and Stabilisation Force (SFOR) experiences in Bosnia. Between 1995 and 1998, the Alliance had experienced grave operational deficiencies in fields such as strategic mobility, effective and secure communication, as well as operational sustainability. Little European experience in timely and swift power projection that could be sustained over time became unacceptable impediments to mission success. As Senior Policy Advisor John Lis at the House International Relations Committee pointed out, "This was even so when operations took place on Europe's own Continent, just outside their territorial borders". It was therefore acknowledged, both in Washington and in Europe, that future conflicts on the Continent most likely would place a premium on the ability to deploy troops and equipment to crises rapidly. This would also, more often than not, be outside NATO territory. But more importantly, the operations would also be pursued with little or no pre-existing host nation support.

This lesson was also consistent with the United States' leading intellectual guideline, Joint Vision 2010: "Power projection, enabled by overseas presence, will likely remain the strategic fundamental strategic concept of our future". The ability to react swiftly on short notice, before the enemy dispersed or reorganised into looser formations that were hard to locate and attack, became paramount to mission success.

This acknowledgement was again emphasised when Secretary Cohen hosted more than 60 NATO representatives to a NATO Transformation Conference in Norfolk, Virginia, five months later:

> our experience in Bosnia [...] revealed that NATO's transformation from a fixed, positional defense to a flexible, mobile defense is incomplete. Indeed, IFOR and SFOR suggest that should we be forced to operate outside Alliance territory in the future, we should expect to do so without pre-existing communication, logistics, headquarters, or other infrastructure.

The U.S. rationale to stimulate a European capability improvement for operations outside NATO territory became even more evident the year after. As NATO's air campaign Operation Allied Force was launched in Kosovo in March 1999, serious deficiencies among the European forces were exposed. The reason, as most Americans saw it, was due to the fact that the operations were launched outside their partner's prearranged theatres. As new challenges emerged, NATO's first war thereby demonstrated the need to improve the European Allies' military capabilities. Secretary Cohen and Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs, General Henry H. Shelton, urgently pointed out before the Senate Armed Services Committee the requirement for major capability improvements in Europe:

> Disparities in capabilities will seriously affect our ability to operate as an effective Alliance over the long term. If the Alliance is to meet the future military challenges effectively, it must successfully implement the Defense Capabilities Initiative which we introduced to our Alliance counterpart.

The Assistant Secretary of Defense, Franklin D. Kramer, also confirmed the necessity for a European boost of their defence efforts. In his testimony to the Senate Foreign Relation Committee, Kramer pointed out that "while our Nato partners contributed significantly to the military capabilities employed in Operation
ALLIED FORCE, the operation highlighted a number of disparities between U.S. capabilities and those of our Allies. The gaps, particularly in mobility, precision strike, command, control and communications capabilities were real, and they had the effect of "impeding our ability to operate at optimal effectiveness with our Nato Allies". Moreover, as the U.S. Department of Defense claimed in their strategy Strengthening Transatlantic Security, a European lack of air mobility severely slowed the build-up of the Kosovo Implementation Force (KFOR), which was led by NATO after the air campaign ended.

According to Senior Advisor at The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Michele A. Flournoy, getting Europe to acquire the right capabilities would therefore substantiate the United States' strategic vision for a post-Cold War Alliance: To keep NATO as relevant as possible by providing military teeth and strategic punch. This was also echoed from the State Department officials:

> even though there is some discrepancy between Pentagon and State Department of how Europe should respond to the new threats, we would both appreciate European allies that could deal with the new threats in a more comprehensive manner.

This would again provide the United States with an Alliance willing and able to address the challenges of the 21st Century, in particular the nexus between international terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and rogue states.

However, the division of labour that the United States experienced in Operation Allied Force may at the time have been militarily necessary, but politically unhealthy to the transatlantic relationship. Without more European military punch, the Alliance would most likely become a looser security. Both professor Richard L. Kugler and professor Hans Binnendijk, two of the main architects behind the DCI and the NATO Response Force, claimed that "such a weakened alliance will not interest the United States." On the contrary, as Chairman of the United States Senate Foreign Relation Committee Senator Richard G. Lugar puts it, "the legacy of Kosovo has reinforced the concern that NATO is not up to the job of fighting a modern war". This call seems to be a bipartisan issue. Former Director on NATO Policy at the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) between 2000 and 2002, Leo Michel, argued that in the past, the U.S. had been willing to cover Alliance capability shortfalls unilaterally. This could be less true in the future. Eventually, the capabilities gap could call into question the underlying cohesion of the Alliance.

Similar sentiments were also echoed from the Senate. Senior policy advisor to Senator Joseph R. Biden, Michael Holtzel claimed that "since we share the same values and wishes, we should also share the burden. If there is no reciprocity, the Alliance will gradually wither". The Pentagon therefore claimed that a greater European military capabilities will make the Alliance stronger, lift some of the burden the United States now has to carry in every crisis, and make the U.S.-European relationship a more balanced partnership.

We may therefore argue that the lessons learned from Kosovo in 1999 validated the capability improvements sought by the United States from 1998. As Pentagon's strategy Strengthening Transatlantic Security pointed out: "The need for effective implementation of the DCI was
underscored by NATO's experience in Operation Allied Force, which was underway during the Washington Summit". The difficulties for Europeans to generate and sustain forces on their own continent may as such have provided the United States and Europe with a stronger incentive to take action to improve European capabilities in the five core areas: deployability and mobility; sustainability and logistics; command, control and communication (C3); effective engagement; and survivability of forces and infrastructure.

To what extent was this rationale for transformation shared across the Atlantic? As former Assistant Secretary of State Ronald D. Asmus points out, the will to transform European forces should not be exaggerated: "Every time we went to Europe to talk about new missions for NATO, in particular 'out-of-area', you were always in the cautious corner - probably out of fear that Article V would be less valued". This was particularly so for the smaller members, and those on the Southern and Northern flank. Well into the 1990s, they were still chilled by the fact that collective security commitments, as enshrined in Article V of the Washington Treaty, would be impaired, and that U.S. focus would turn elsewhere. In other words, force requirements for out-of-area operations were assessed through the prisms of the different nations.

To ensure that NATO remained relevant in a new era, and thus maintain momentum in the emerging European transformation process, a focal point for the Pentagon and State Department was to manifest Article IV operations as much as Article V operations in the New Strategic Concept from 1999. To convince pro-Atlantic members in Europe, a "Small Country Strategy" towards Norway, Denmark and the Netherlands was therefore launched from the State Department. The aim was to convince them that Article V would be sustained, even though NATO took on a bigger role outside their OOA. Europe's larger states, in particular France and Germany were harder to persuade, "by size and culture, they were too sovereign, and tended to act more independently in the transformation process towards Article IV operations".

In the end therefore, the DCI became a programmatic expression of the New Strategic Concept - a compromise between the United States and her sceptical Allies in Europe. Force projection could take place, but not too far out; only in and around Europe. In the U.S. State Department, the slogan "Let's do Kosovo again, but better next time" finally convinced many Europeans, among them Norway, that force transformation for operations on the European continent was the right way to go.

What was so fundamentally wrong with the European force structure? According to professor Richard L. Kugler at the National Defense University (NDU), the European capabilities were primarily designed for border defence. In total, the European NATO members held more ground divisions and strike aircraft than possessed by the United States. However, they only possessed ten per cent of the U.S. capacity to swiftly project military power to long distances for strike operations. This was also confirmed within NATO's military headquarters at SHAPE; Europe had only 11 pieces of strategic airlift while the U.S. had 240. Also, the retention of large conscript armies made the European Armed Forces unable to deploy rapidly in highly specialised operations that the U.S.
utilised in her modern warfare concepts.\textsuperscript{30} The notorious decline in most European defence budgets made these challenges more precarious.

Senior U.S. officials in the last Clinton Administration also confirm this, recognizing the strained transatlantic processes after Kosovo. As former Assistant Secretary of Defense Franklin D. Kramer put it: “Both we and our European Allies recognize that one of the lessons of Kosovo is that NATO’s European pillar needs to do a better job in acquiring and maintaining the type of capabilities \textit{Operation Allied Force} required”.\textsuperscript{31} If NATO was to continue as a prosperous organisation in the 21\textsuperscript{st} century, the European force structure had to get “up and go”.\textsuperscript{32} One of the key elements in the last Clinton Administration’s defence strategy therefore became “to prepare now for an uncertain future through focused modernization efforts”.\textsuperscript{33}

It may clearly be argued that this imperative became more conspicuous with the inauguration of a new Administration, and with the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. As \textit{The National Security Strategy of the United States} vigorously points out,

\begin{quote}
The attacks of September 11 were also an attack on NATO [...] NATO must build a capability to field at short notice, highly mobile, specially trained forces whenever they are needed to respond to a threat against any member of the alliance.\textsuperscript{34}
\end{quote}

As such, NATO’s response, by invoking Article V, opened up a Pandora’s box. Most European Allies came to support in principle the U.S.-led transformation and the new conceptual requirements. To Europe, this implied a renewed U.S. emphasis on the Alliance’ ability to transform towards international terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, and their proliferators and harbours.\textsuperscript{35}

\textbf{On Force Transformation: How Should Europe Proceed?}

In 1999, the European Allies possessed over 1.4 million troops, but were hard pressed to maintain about 50,000 of them in the Balkans.\textsuperscript{36} As SHAPE pointed out, only 250,000 of the 1.4 million European troops were deployable.\textsuperscript{37} According to U.S. officials, both in the Pentagon and the State Department, this would imply less interoperability across the Atlantic. This would again provide Europe with less leverage on decisions and decision-making processes (i.e. targeting procedures), and ultimately fewer obstacles towards a U.S. unilateral approach.\textsuperscript{38} The key towards modernisation was to spend scarce resources in new ways. This was particularly emphasised by force planners in the Pentagon. According to the Pentagon’s strategy for transatlantic security, a disappointingly small number of Force Goals had been implemented.\textsuperscript{39} As Clinton’s last Administration pointed out, many Allies were heading in the wrong direction, “either seriously considering or carrying out real reductions in defence spending. This trend will have to be reversed”.\textsuperscript{40} The U.S. disappointment with the European armed forces seems to have been bipartisan, regardless of the administration’s political flavour. As the republican Bush Administration entered office in 2001, Douglas J. Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy expressed:

\begin{quote}
We heard encouraging rhetoric at the 1999 Washington Summit, but by-and-large have seen meagre results. [...] As we encourage allies to spend more on defense, it is even more important that we get them to “spend smarter.”
\end{quote}
Similar sentiments were also echoed from the Congress. All of the political bodies emphasised the European unwillingness to spend their resources more generously, and more efficiently. As the United States did not turn to NATO when Operation Enduring Freedom was launched in October 2001, Chairman of the United States Senate Foreign Relation Committee, Senator Richard G. Lugar, explained that

Some Americans have lost confidence in the Alliance. Years of cuts in defense spending and failure to meet pledge after pledge to improve European military capabilities has left some Americans with doubt as to what our allies could realistically contribute. [...] The U.S. did have confidence in a selected group of individual allies. But it did not have confidence in the institution that is NATO.

Similar sentiments were also echoed from NATO’s Secretary General Lord Robertson: “For all the political energy expended in NATO to implement the Defence Capabilities Initiative, [...] the truth is that mighty Europe remains a military pygmy”. As we have already noted, this was evident during NATO’s Operation Allied Force in Kosovo in 1999. Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan in October 2001, may have been the culminating point: this was the first time since the end of the Cold War that U.S. forces conducted a major military operation that directly affected Europe’s safety, without NATO or any European country playing a major role. As Hans Binnendijk pointed out, the United States declined help from NATO because Europe was unable to contribute to the kind of hi-tech, intelligence-based war that was ultimately fought. This is also confirmed among staffers in the Congress: “Our European NATO allies offered no option to fight in Afghanistan – they could not help U.S. forces on the ground”.

We may add that many Europeans may fall further behind as the United States added another 48 billion U.S. dollars to her defence budget in 2003, with more to follow. This amount alone constitutes 150 per cent of the total defence spending of the United Kingdom or France, the largest NATO member states defence budgets after the United States. However, as Senior Research Fellow at the NDU, Jeffrey Simon pointed out, that may nonetheless increase the pressure on Europe to re-examine their defence resources and what they are spent on. In that context, NATO’s Secretary General Lord Robertson has urgently pointed out that

American critics of non-American military incapability are right. If Europe is to play its proper part in NATO, [...] all European countries must show a new willingness to develop effective crisis management capabilities.

How then, should Europe live up to the standard of the United States in terms of efficient spending? Following Kramer’s testimony to the Senate Foreign Relation Committee, it may be argued that a successful transformation of European Armed Forces relied upon both a provision of sufficient resources, and more effective spending:

Allies need to show leadership in making the necessary investments to field a 21st century force. Defense budgets will always be a function of national priorities, but they must also be a function of both international challenges and the capabilities needed to address those challenges as an Alliance. [...] While Allies acknowledge their capability shortfalls, few have made concrete efforts towards their amelioration by increasing their defense budgets and relocating funds. In fact, defense spending has been cut by several key Allies.
Acknowledging the fact that several Allies were less willing to increase their defence budgets, aspects of affordability became a primary incentive to convince hesitant Europeans. For instance, resources for out-of-area operations could be found through restructuring and making reductions in military personnel, in particular among those states that still maintained a large conscript system. Capabilities related to logistics and mobility could be met by commercially available assets and off-the-shelf technology, “for example, by harnessing commercial transport assets in an emergency for military airlift or sealift support”.[5] As one of the architects behind the DCI, Professor Richard L. Kugler bluntly put it, “as a matter of fact, ‘doing more with less’ was the main criteria in the DCI process to get Europe moving”.[52] In that way, the European NATO members could use the DCI as a means to configure and transform a portion of their forces. By following the American advice, Europe could be guided towards new concepts, including swift power projection and hi-tech strike operations together with U.S. forces.

Making the procurement of defence equipment faster, cheaper and better, a closer integration across national borders is required. Wise investments could thereby take advantage of NATO’s multinational structures to produce and field equipment that is genuinely interoperable.

The prescription of ‘doing more with less’ as a way to transform static European forces may thus have been a vital issue for Lord George Robertson as he was appointed NATO’s tenth Secretary General in October 1999. In his remarks to the Parliamentary Assembly in Amsterdam the next month, he stated that

[][52] the European members of NATO spend almost two-thirds of the United States’ defence budget—but Kosovo made it clear that they have nothing like two-thirds of the real capability of the US. In other words, it is not simply a question of spending more though some of us will have to—it is about spending more wisely.53

It may therefore be claimed that the idea of spending resources more wisely is consistent with leading Pentagon officials, both at the political and at the official working level. Everyone endorsed an even closer specialisation and differentiation among the European Allies. As Principal Director Jim J. Townsend at the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) points out, too many European governments wasted what they spend on capabilities that contribute nothing to their own security, the security of Europe or wider collective interests.54 If the imbalance between the United States and Europe should be rectified, the burden of dealing with European security crises should therefore, from a U.S. viewpoint, not fall disproportionately on the shoulders of the US.

From a U.S. perspective therefore, it may clearly be argued that through increased emphasis on niche capabilities, a more balanced Alliance with a stronger European contribution could be facilitated. Following Kramer’s testimony to the Senate Foreign Relation Committee:

Nations need not respond to the lessons of the Balkans in the same way—there is no “one size fits for all” solution to increasing national and Alliance capabilities. While not all Allies must develop equal capabilities, the collective goal should be compatible capabilities.55

A European refocusing of defence efforts would therefore only provide substance if the Allies tuned down the territorial
imperative in their defence planning. Following Lord Robertson, "In today's world, we need fewer unusable conscripts. Smaller heavy metal armies. Fewer static bases. And fewer static headquarters". Instead, more focus should be on multinational, joint and common funding of key capabilities. A European pooling of resources, by establishing a number of multinational consortia aimed at acquiring key capabilities, would allow NATO to operate more quickly and flexibly wherever needed. In particular, strategic sea and airlift, air-to-air refuelling, precision guided munitions (PGMs), and advanced communications would be of critical importance if Europe should be "up and go" according to U.S. standards. As the Pentagon's strategy Strengthening Transatlantic Security points out, "[j]oint procurement of certain defence equipment and technology by a group of Allies is [a] promising approach, which the United States will continue to support". These requirements, it could be claimed, would again stimulate the European NATO Allies' demand for a more focused, efficient and coordinated use of increasingly scarce resources. These sentiments were also echoed in the Senate. As Senior Foreign Policy Advisor Michael Haltzel pointed out, "the states in Eastern Europe are smart; they're trying to specialize in what others don't have. Lithuania has state-of-the-art in underwater demolition – we need that!" In particular, professor Kugler explicitly formulated the argument that Europe did not have the right focus, and was too deeply stuck into national priorities:

Today's European militaries are larger and stronger than is commonly realised, with 1.4 million active-duty troops and 160 billion dollars in defence spending. But because they still focus on defending their borders, they lack the capacity to project power to long distances, where the new threats reside. In trying to influence Europeans to spend money on new capabilities that are consistent with U.S. preferences, NATO stands forth as the primary U.S. instrument. As the Head of the European Section of Intelligence in State Department Bowman Miller put it, "the United States will lead the response in the security arena, but it cannot carry the weight alone. A more efficient and rational use of European defence resources through NATO is thus required". From such a perspective, European Armed Forces need to concentrate on a few capabilities such as sensors, secure data links, all-weather precision strikes and improved logistics. However, this task requires a concerted effort of the sort not yet launched.

Pentagon officials, both in the last Clinton Administration and in the present Bush Administration, agreed to these statements, noting that "the problem is not how much is spent, but what it is spent on". According to Kramer, complaints from Europe that the DCI was far too costly were therefore dismissed. After all, it was only a matter of reorganising existing resources. However, this required political will, dedication and leadership: "We never expected Norway to have a full spectrum capacity – only a few". This view was also echoed in the U.S. Department of Defense. In Strengthening Transatlantic Security, the last Clinton Administration stated that

Our goal is not to develop similar capabilities for every NATO member, since not every member needs or can afford the newest or the best fighter aircraft, long-range tanker or surveillance systems. Rather,
our goal is to provide NATO forces with compatible and complementary capabilities that meet our collective requirements.64

As not every member had to possess or buy the newest or best equipment of all types, a U.S. argument would be that Europe should instead look into radically restructuring existing forces. We could also add that emphasis should be put on those segments within the Armed Forces where any substantial contribution to the Alliance could be made, as NATO gradually moved beyond its own territory. As professor Hans Bennendijk at the NDU pointed out, “European militaries need to concentrate on a few key capabilities such as sensors, PGM and improved logistics”.65 In that respect, it has been argued that it is not only imperative that nations maintain sufficient defence spending, but also that they realise the full potential of the resources they already spend. Following Kramer, “any different approach would mean an unnecessary duplication, if not competition, and would be wasteful at best and divisive at worst”.66 As Senior Advisor to U.S. Congressman Jerry Lewis, Carl M. Kime put it, “[the Europeans] have a choice to spend more effectively – in the end, it boils down to the political will of maintaining their own security”.67

Force Transformation and its Conceptual Implications – What are the U.S. Expectations?
Having used the Balkan and the Afghanistan experience as a contextual background, what are the United States’ expectations for a militarily more potent Europe? How can a gap in military capabilities be bridged if a transatlantic political division is to be avoided? In other words, what military concept does the United States envisage for her European Allies, as threats arise less from conquering states than from failing ones, often far off ‘the Old Continent’?

The U.S. military performance in Kosovo and Afghanistan, and the subsequent disappointment over Europe, gave new impetus to U.S. policy makers: To forge a European expeditionary force structure sooner than later.68 Even though the notion “expeditionary” for years had made many Europeans wary, in particular those without a colonial past, the two conflicts accelerated and matured the expeditionary force concept in Europe, thus making the U.S. arguments more valid. In particular, we may claim that President George W. Bush’s September 2001 call to arms against terrorism, and NATO’s unprecedented Article 5 declaration, made the U.S. expectations more explicit: Europe had to field expeditionary units that could respond effectively together with the U.S. in austere areas far beyond NATO territory.69 This was again reiterated as the President visited the German Bundestag in May 2002:

Dangers originating far from Europe can now strike at Europe’s heart – so NATO must be able and willing to act whenever threats emerge. This will require all the assets of modern defense – mobile and deployable forces, sophisticated special operations, the ability to fight under the threat of chemical and biological weapons.”

Pressure towards a more global role for European countries was also evident in The National Security Strategy of the United States, which was released one year after the terrorist attacks: “The alliance must be able to act wherever our interests are threatened”.71 As Captain Sam J. Tangredi at the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) at the NDU described it,
after September 11, the European allies suddenly found themselves in a "come-as-you-are" war, in which only the most capable, interoperable forces—a few units from the United Kingdom—were able to contribute. These tendencies were also evident in Kosovo in 1999, but accelerated dramatically after the spectacular terrorist attacks on the United States. Subsequently, NATO defence ministers issued three communiqués in June 2002, calling for improved military capabilities for new missions, including exacting operations outside Europe. In the United States however, many Americans still complained that the Europeans were perpetual free riders; if NATO were to prosper in the 21st century, U.S. requirements would have to be met. However, what would the U.S. expect from Europe?

Two of the architects behind the DCI, Professor Hans Binnendijk and Professor Richard L. Kugler at the NDU in Washington, claimed that the European allies needed a real power projection capability to get off the Continent. This should primarily be designed for globally "forced entry missions"—that is the higher end of the conflict spectre. The EU would anyway emphasise the lower end, the so-called St. Petersberg tasks. An expeditionary force concept would, according to the two, also provide Europe with what they most needed: A U.S. leadership role for a more focused transformation towards out-of-area operations. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States and her NATO Allies had pursued divergent attitudes towards purchasing key capabilities. This was particularly so in the application of innovative information technology, a development that in the United States was seen as a major part of a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). Most allies were unable to contribute with sophisticated capabilities outside their national borders. As professor Roy W. Stafford at the National War College pointed out, the Europeans had chosen to forgo investment in modern technologies and systems in favour of reduced spending and continued reliance on aging border-defence systems. Therefore, from a U.S. viewpoint, the United States had to play a more active role if European conceptual thinking should pay due regard to more mobile and deployable forces. According to Professor Binnendijk, "if the U.S. stood back and waited for Europe to make it themselves, the results would not have met U.S. requirements". If not, the European allies would continue to hook up untrained multinational forces rather than draw upon an integrated and flexible force that already existed.

To address the new security environment adequately, future operations would be joint, dispersed, simultaneous, high tempo and deep-striking, employing modern platforms and smart munitions. From a U.S. perspective, European forces should therefore be expected to field a standing expeditionary hi-tech force consisting of the following DCI-related components:

- **Ground Forces:** A reinforced brigade-sized task force; a Special Operation group of about 200 personnel; Attack helicopter task forces; Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Target Acquisition Company; Engineer Company; Chemical Detachment; Logistics; Military Police Company; Communication Unit; Medical Company;
- **Air Forces:** A reinforced composite tactical fighter wing, including tankers; Suppression of Enemy Air Defence; Air Ground Surveillance; AWACS and
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles for reconnaissance, surveillance and targeting acquisition;

Naval Forces: A flotilla of six to eight combat ships with precision cruise missiles firing submarines; One underway replenishment group; Mine Countermeasure Capability (approximately three ships).

In this context, the European NATO members would have to reallocate about two per cent of their total defence spending, or increase spending by two per cent, in order to develop and maintain a deployable force. We may argue that U.S. expectations were high on behalf of her European allies, mostly because the conceptual expectation was affordable. As Binnendijk and Kugler pointed out, the Europeans do not need large forces, as most conflicts would require only “small-to-medium sized strike packages. The Europeans need only enough new-era forces to provide credible participation in crises”. Professor Stuart E. Johnson at the NDU also reiterated these rather moderate ambitions: “If Europe is to field new-era forces into an expeditionary force structure, it has to be made at an affordable cost”. The forces should be assembled primarily from national units in NATO High Readiness Force (HRF). In that respect, a number of NATO countries already possess key platforms in their inventory, or in their procurement programs. As professor Binnendijk pointed out, these would be more than adequate for America’s renewed expectations. What the United States therefore expects is a more focused investment on crucial enablers and force multipliers, primarily through a reconciled force planning on expeditionary capabilities like those in the DCI.

Operation Enduring Freedom energized U.S. expectations. The United States went to war in Afghanistan and left NATO behind because the European allies were unable to provide relevant forces at short notice to distant theatres. A DCI-related program that forged a realistic first step towards a small European expeditionary force structure should therefore he initiated. Too large a force could dilute the focus of the expectations and thus fail. Following Professor Stuart E. Johnson at the NDU, “our expeditionary initiative should be closely affiliated to existing U.S. concepts. It will have to include some U.S. participation because it cannot be seen as a de-Americanisation of NATO”. At the same time, however, most of the capability commitments would have to be assigned by a European “lead nation” – a dedicated member responsible for keeping momentum and focus on the specific project. This could be strategic sea-lift, air refuelling or secure communication.

However, what would the United States expect in terms of national versus multinational funding? Following professor Johnson, some enabling equipment would best be provided by multinational consortia of NATO nations, or by common NATO funding. This could be AWACS, Air Ground Surveillance (AGS) Systems, strategic air transport or different configurations within communication and information systems. More importantly however, some key capabilities would depend on a transfer of U.S. technology, particularly within airborne ground surveillance, precision munitions and secure information sharing. This would have to be dealt with in the current
National Security Council technology transfer policy review.66

The U.S. initiative was finally called the Nato Response Force (NRF). Based upon recommendations from the INSS/NDU, the Pentagon officially presented its new initiative to the European Allies at the NATO Summit in Prague in November 2002. According to U.S. Ambassador R. Nicholas Burns, the concept was expeditionary in character and design, and would be able to "deploy quickly wherever required to participate in the full spectrum of NATO missions".77 According to General James L. Jones, SACEUR, it was one of the most significant events in NATO since coming into existence in 1949.88 The expeditionary force concept would build upon a more focused DCI called the Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC). The PCC, also named "son of DCI", would be more focused and emphasise performance outputs through integrating various capabilities into a standing force structure.89

This would not only play a role in bridging the transatlantic capability gap. The capability commitments could also contribute to a stronger European voice in alliance deliberations. By integrating European capabilities to form a cohesive expeditionary team, European leverage would be more prominent, instead of contributing with small, fragmented capabilities to U.S.-led operations.90 Hence, creating a small but potent pool of forces that could perform new missions outside the continent would require substantial European force integration: "Europe [could] not show up on the day of a conflict and expect to plug into U.S. battlefield operations".91

On the contrary, the NRF would have to consist of a fully operational command structure with fully manned units that possessed necessary cohesiveness. From a U.S. perspective, only that way would NATO maintain its relevance in a new transatlantic partnership.

Conclusion
Which conclusions may be drawn regarding the United States' vision for a militarily more efficient Europe?

Our first conclusion is that the DCI, like other U.S. initiatives such as the PCC, the European Security and Defence Initiative (ESDI) and the Partnership for Peace (PfP), was aimed at controlling the scope and direction of the political and military development in Europe. More specifically, it can be claimed that through NATO, the United States affects Europe in a collective and legitimate way. While Europe binds her patron into a multilateral and institutional framework, the United States presents initiatives that received accommodation and sympathy. In sum, the U.S. transformation proposals affect the direction, tempo and outcome of Europe's military transformation. Asked if the DCI and the PCC could be seen as a U.S. instrument to promote national interests, Professor Kugler replied, "Of course, that is the underlying intent with the DCI - and by the way, it is also our duty!"92 Former Assistant Secretary of Defense, Franklin D. Kramer, confirmed Professor Kugler's blunt remark, claiming that the DCI, despite its imperfection, was designed to promote the U.S. interest of a militarily strong and relevant Europe. Only that way could the United States, by means of NATO, prevent a renationalisation of Europe's Armed Forces.93 The validity of this conclusion is also enhanced by the overall assessment presented in the Pentagon's strategy Strengthening Transatlantic Security: "The
United States has a permanent and vital national interest in preserving the security of our European and Canadian Allies”. By codifying an extensive list of capability criteria set forth in the DCI and agreed upon by the Heads of State at the NATO Summit in 1999, the United States defined decisive premises for Europe’s transformation of Armed Forces.

However, is it enough to suggest that U.S. initiatives on transformation, such as the DCI and the PCC, are a mere instrument for pursuing myopic self-interest? May the U.S. proposals towards her partners in NATO also be regarded as friendly gestures, to help Europe? According to Senator Joseph R. Biden’s (D) Senior Foreign Policy Advisor Michael Holtzel, U.S. initiatives on military transformation, such as the DCI and the PCC, should definitively be regarded in that way – as a friendly means to provide Europe with obstetric aid. After all, the United States’ European Allies struggled with a territorial-bound legacy that was quite different from the United States’. Apart from the terror attacks in 2001, the United States had not been at war on her own Continent since 1824 when the Royal Navy shelled Washington. Hence, as Senior Policy Advisor for the House International Committee John Lis claimed, by “helping Europe to help themselves”, the United States would have a more confident partner, but also substantial influence on that partner’s armed forces. Professor Geir Lundestad at the Norwegian Nobel Institute may best describe this dualism: “Somehow Europe was to be both independent of and dependent on the United States at the same time”. Furthermore, even though the ability to affect the European transformation through the DCI gradually lost momentum, we may nevertheless conclude that a new spirit of influence arose as the dust from the terrorist attacks in September 2001 subsided. The fact that fighting international terrorism was perceived as a state of perpetual war may have validated U.S. capability efforts. In that context, U.S. leverage may have accelerated more comprehensively after “9.11.”, despite the gradual insignificance of the DCI. Hence, in the context of a clarified threat perception from terrorism and WMD proliferators, influence from the DCI was refined into a more dedicated and specific U.S. initiative, the Prague Capability Commitment.

Our second conclusion may substantiate the first one, claiming that U.S. leverage on European transformation is based upon the exportation of experiences and processes at home. As Captain Sam J. Tangredi pointed out, the DCI is a blueprint of the United States’ leading intellectual manual for military transformation, the Joint Vision 2010 (JV 2010) and Joint Vision 2020 (JV 2020). As both documents clarify the importance of dominant manoeuvre, precision engagement, focused logistics, and full dimensional protection, NATO’s Heads of States concluded that similar principles should guide the Alliance as a means to strengthen European defence capabilities. This should, according to the Summit Communiqué, be accomplished by emphasising the same characteristics as in JV 2010 and JV 2020 – although in a less militaristic expression, more in accordance with European preferences: improved deployability and mobility, better logistics, more effective engagement, and increased survivability among Allied forces. The similarity between JV 2010 and JV 2020 and the DCI thereby leads us to conclude that U.S. leverage is achieved by affecting
NATO members to adopt equivalent processes of military transformation. This is what Geir Lundestad calls "Empire by integration”, in the way that Europe should become more efficient, which again could reduce the American burden in Europe.102

The impression that U.S. processes at home are projected to Europe through NATO may be even more validated as we move into the period after the '9.11'. The U.S. push towards a more deployable and expeditionary force structure has strong resemblances with the defence strategy, as laid out in the latest Quadrennial Defense Report from the Pentagon in September 2001. Capabilities aimed to fight international terrorism and WMD proliferators needed to be more flexible and responsive to the new global challenges. As a consequence, the QDR 2001 shifted emphasis from waging two regional wars in the Persian Gulf and on Korean Peninsula respectively, towards a flexible structure that may be deployed anywhere at any time. This was deemed an operational necessity if action against terrorists and WMD proliferators should be successfully implemented.103 We may argue that these sentiments have clear resonance to the NRF, which aims to meet the new threats from global terrorism.

Our finding is neither controversial nor exceptional. Historically, the United States has always enjoyed great influence on how Europe should design her Armed Forces. NATO's strategy of Massive Retaliation back in the 1950s was first formulated in the National Security Council document number 162/2 in October 1953. Thereafter, the concept became evident in NATO's Military Committee document number 48 from December 1954.104 As the Soviet Union gradually appeared as a credible nuclear power in the late 1950s, the Americans pushed Europe to change towards Flexible Response, which finally was adopted by the North Atlantic Council in 1967 by MC 14/3.105 The present military transformation in Europe is as such a piece of continuity; the United States sets the agenda, Europe follows on.
Notes

1 Interview with former Assistant Secretary of State, Ronald D. Asmus at the German Marshall Fund of the United States, Washington D.C., July 24, 2003.


4 See also Lessons from Bosnia: The IFOR Experience (DoD Command and Control Research Program/NDU, 1998).


7 Joint Statement on the Kosovo After Action Review, presented by Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen and Gen. Henry H. Shelton, Chairman Chief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, before the Senate Armed Services Committee, October 14, 1999, p. 11.


10 Strengthening Transatlantic Security, p. 15–16. This is also confirmed in interview with former Assistant Secretary of Defense Franklin D. Kramer, Washington D.C., June 20, 2003.


12 Interview with Bowman Miller, Director of Analysis for Europe and Canada/Intelligence and Research, United States State Department, Washington D.C., August 6, 2003.


16 Interview with Leo Michel, Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), at the National Defense University (NDU), Washington D.C., April 30, 2003.


19 Ibid., p. 15.


21 Interview with Asmus, July 24, 2003.

22 Ibid.

23 Ibid.


26 Ibid.


28 E-mail correspondence with Professor Richard L. Kugler September 8, 2003.

30 Interview with Professor Hans Bennendijk, Director of the Center for Technology and National Security Policy at the National Defense University, Washington D.C., November 18, 2002.
31 Interview with Kramer, June 20, 2003.
32 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
38 Interviews with Robert Simmons, Senior Advisor for NATO Bureau for European Affairs in the U.S. State Department, Washington D.C., July 1, 2003, and Jim J. Towsend, Principal Director of European and NATO Policy at the Office of Secretary of Defence (OSD), the Pentagon, Washington D.C., July 2, 2003.
39 Force Goals are part of NATO's longstanding defence planning process. They represent an agreement by the member states to provide forces and capabilities requested by NATO's Strategic Commands.
40 Strengthening Transatlantic Security, p. 17.
44 Speech by Robertson at the First Magazine Dinner.
46 Interview with Bennendijk, November 18, 2002.
47 Interview with Lis, July 29, 2003.
49 Speech by Robertson at the First Magazine Dinner.
50 Testimony of Kramer, p. 6.
51 Strengthening Transatlantic Security, p. 17.
52 Interview with Kugler, June 6, 2003.
53 Speech by NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson at the Annual Session of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Amsterdam, November 15, 1999.
54 Interview with Townsend, July 2, 2003.
55 Testimony of Kramer, p. 7.
56 Speech by Robertson at the First Magazine Dinner.
57 Strengthening Transatlantic Security, p. 17.
58 Interview with Haltzel, August 5, 2003.
60 Interview with Miller, August 6, 2003.
61 Ibid.
63 Interview with Kramer, June 20, 2003.
64 Strengthening Transatlantic Security, p. 16.
65 Interview with Bennendijk, November 18, 2002.
66 Testimony of Kramer, p. 9. This statement was also confirmed through an interview with Michel, April 30, 2003.
68 Confirmed through interviews with Kramer, June 20; Simmons, July 1, 2003; Towsend, July 2, 2003; Asmus July 24, 2003. Here, an expeditionary force structure is defined as a military force designed to operate abroad; that is outside a prearranged theatre where existing infrastructure enables you to enjoy strategic, operational and tactical advantages.
70 Remarks by the President to a special Session of


72 Interview with Captain Sam J. Tangredi, Senior Military Fellow at INSS/NDU, Washington D.C., October 12, 2002.


74 The St. Petersberg tasks include humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crises management, including peace making (Cologne European Council, Annex III of the Presidential Conclusions June 3 and 4, 1999; available at http://www.ue.eu.int/pesc/military/en/cologne.htm).


76 Interview with Stafford, August 11, 2003. This statement is also confirmed in interviews with staffers in Senate and Congress: Interviews with Lis, July 29, 2003 and Haltzel, August 5, 2003.

77 Interview with Bennendijk, November 18, 2002.

78 Ibid.


80 Interview with Professor Stuart E. Johnson, Center for Technology and National Security Policy at the NDU, June 6, 2003.


82 Interview with Johnson, June 6, 2003.

83 Interview with Bennendijk, November 18, 2002.

84 Interview with Johnson, June 6, 2003.

85 Ibid.

86 Ibid.

87 Statement by Ambassador R. Nicholas Burns at the inauguration of NATO Response Force at AFNORTH Headquarters in Brunssum, the Netherlands, 15 October, 2003. The statement is available at http://www.nato.int/usa/ambassador/
Tormod Heier

The American Effort to Transform Europe's Armed Forces