Denmark and NATO
1949–1987

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Contents

I. INTRODUCTION .................................................. 5

II. ALLIANCE, ADVERSARY AND OTHER GAMES ........... 7

III. THE DECISION TO ALLY (1948–49) ....................... 11

IV. POLICIES OF ADAPTATION 1949–61 ....................... 14

   Denmark and Nato Integration 1949–61 .................. 15
   The Creation of Nato 1949–51 ............................ 15
   The Greenland Base Agreement 1951 ...................... 17
   The Creation of the BALTAP Command 1957–61 .......... 18

   Defence Policies 1949–60 .................................. 21

   Base and Nuclear Weapons Policy 1952–60 .............. 23
   The Evolution of Danish Base Policy 1952–53 .......... 24
   Danish Nuclear Weapons Policy 1957–60 ................ 27

V. THE POLITICS OF CONSOLIDATION 1962–78 .......... 29

   Alliance and Detente Policy ............................... 29

   Defence Policy 1960–78 ..................................... 31

VI. THE POLITICS OF STRIFE 1979–87 ....................... 33

   Security Policy and the Domestic Policy Game .......... 33

   Factors of Change in Danish Security Policy .......... 35

   Alliance and Detente Policy in the 1980’s ............. 37

   Defence Policy in the 1980’s ............................. 40

VII. Conclusions .................................................... 43

   Notes and References ...................................... 46
I. Introduction

Robert Keohane has suggested that small powers may play three different roles in the politics of a military alliance, that of a "loyal" ally, that of a "super-loyal" ally, and that of a "moderately independent" ally.1 The loyal ally of the United States tends to support American policies by word and deed, and when its policies diverge from those of the leading power, it attempts to mute the difference and to avoid embarrassing the United States. While the loyal ally faces the risk of being ignored by the alliance leader, the super-loyal ally will seek to acquire bargaining power in the alliance through a policy of unquestioning and high-profiled support for the alliance leader, e.g. through a policy of being "holier than the Pope". Alternatively, a policy of moderate independence may also give influence in the alliance and with its leader through a discrete flirtation with neutralism. This "threat" must be a subtle one, however, in order to avoid the risk of being written off by the alliance partners.

Robert Keohane, writing in the early 1970's, mentions Denmark and Norway as examples of loyal allies,2 and in an article written in the winter of 1979–80 the present author came to about the same conclusion:

«At times they (i.e. Denmark and Norway) may slow down the speed of the boat, but they have never rocked it the way France has. In an alliance where any disagreement has the tendency to be viewed as a symptom of crisis or malaise, it is surely important to have at least some members who do not question its central tenets and features.»3

Since then Denmark (now followed by Norway under the new Labour government) has become a so-called "footnote member" of NATO, which has indicated her disagreement with the NATO mainstream and especially US policies on a number of occasions and so become a target of criticism of her major allies, particularly the United States. The epithet of the loyal ally may therefore not apply any longer. Anyhow, it seems appropriate now to have a second look at the evolution of Denmark's NATO policies over nearly 40 years in order to judge whether the recent trend towards increasing independence in alliance politics represents a rupture of traditional alliance policy, which is what the bourgeois political parties in Denmark argue, or whether there is an
important element of continuity between the NATO policy of the 1980's and those of the preceding decades; this is what the Social Democratic party which has spearheaded the changes maintains.

To analyse the recurrent patterns and (potential) new departures in Danish NATO policy a number of key decisions or key decision sequencies over the 1945–1987 period will be discussed within a broad theoretical framework which focuses on the interrelationship between domestic policy, alliance policy and policies towards the «adversary», *in casu* the Soviet Union. These key decisions fall within four distinct chronological periods, each with their own characteristics, i.e. 1945–49, when the decision was taken to join the Atlantic Alliance; 1949–61 when the basic adaptation to alliance membership took place; 1962–78 when Danish NATO policy was consolidated, and finally the period after 1979 when domestic consensus over security policy has been severely strained and when Denmark has taken on a kind of opposition role in NATO, especially with respect to nuclear weapons policy.
II. Alliance, Adversary and other Games

In a recent article Glenn Snyder discusses the interplay between national strategies in what he terms the «alliance game» and the «adversary game».

The alliance game refers to politics within an alliance, i.e. in the present case to Danish policies towards intra-alliance problems such as NATO's organization, its decisional structure, the balance between the United States and Western Europe, burden sharing and political solidarity in the alliance, etc. The Adversary game is concerned with politics between opposing alliances and nations; in the present case it relates to Danish policies towards the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact countries, as well as to NATO's policies and strategies towards the East in general.

In both games, two main strategies can be chosen: a «C» strategy (for «cooperation») and a «D» strategy (for «defection»). In the alliance game a «C» strategy implies strong political support for the alliance and the allied nations, a credible commitment to their defence and firm adherence to the alliance «mainstream» in political and strategic questions; this is a policy close to Keohane’s definition of the loyal ally. Conversely, a «D» strategy implies conditional support for the alliance, a weak and ambiguous defence commitment and a tendency to adopt independent policy postures in the alliance; this is close to what Keohane terms moderate independence. In the adversary game a «C» strategy stands for a conciliatory, non-provocative, detente-oriented policy, while a «D» strategy represents a posture of firmness, resistance and deterrence.

Alliance and adversary strategies are obviously linked in a number of ways. Alliances are usually chosen in order to gain protection from an adversary which is seen to threaten national security. Furthermore, certain strategies in the two games naturally «go together», e.g. a «C» strategy in the alliance game with a «D» strategy in the adversary game and vice versa. Finally, strategy choices in one game effects the pros and cons (or «goods» and «bads» as Snyder rather inelegantly calls them) of strategies in the other game.

In the alliance game the principal «bads», i.e. outcomes to be avoided, are «abandonment» (being deserted by the alliance) on one
side, and «entrapment» (losing freedom of manoeuvre to the allies) on the other side, while the principal «goods» are security (being protected and guaranteed by the allies) and influence, e.g. the ability to restrain or influence allies. In the adversary game the corresponding «bads» are provocation and increased tension on one side and encouragement of the adversary (i.e. appeasement) on the other, while the principal «goods» are deterrence (or defeat) of the adversary and conflict resolution or reduction, respectively.

To complicate things, the goods and bads of either game tend to be mutually exclusive. In an alliance, it is normally not possible for a nation to have both a perfect alliance guarantee and perfect freedom of action, just as it is difficult simultaneously to reduce both the risks of abandonment and entrapment. Normally a nation will have to choose between maximising security and accepting the risk of a degree of entrapment or, alternatively, maximising freedom of action with the concomitant risk of being abandoned or at least less securely protected by its allies, when the chips are down.

In the adversary game, a similar dilemma arises between a strategy of deterrence and defence with its attending risk of increasing tension and conflict on one side and a strategy which aims at tension-reduction while accepting the risk of some appeasement of the adversary on the other.

This «composite security dilemma» can be summed up in the following table from Snyder's article, which illustrates the most probable combinations of alliance and adversary strategies and their probable positive and negative consequences.5

To sum up, Snyder postulates two alternative alliance strategies, one of which could be termed loyalty and the other one moderate independence, and also two adversary strategies, one of deterrence and defence and another one of detente. He furthermore suggests, that a policy of alliance loyalty tends to go together with a deterrent posture vis-à-vis the adversary, while a detente policy will often go together with an independent role in intra-alliance policy. Obviously this logical ordering of things represents a simplification — also an over-simplification — of a highly complex reality, which is characterized by nations' manifest desire to have their cake and eat it, i.e. to have all the «goods» of both games and to avoid all the «bads». Examples of national attempts to evade the dilemmas are legio. But also within the NATO alliance attempts are made to have the best of both worlds vis-à-vis the Soviet
Table 1. The Composite Security Dilemma in a Multipolar System

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategies</th>
<th>Alliance game</th>
<th>Adversary game</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>«Goods»</td>
<td>«Goods»</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td></td>
<td>1. Deter, or prevail over, adversary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. Reassure ally, reduce risk of abandonment</td>
<td>2. Enhance reputation for resolve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance C:</td>
<td>2. Enhance reputation for loyalty</td>
<td>«Bads»</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support,</td>
<td>«Bads»</td>
<td>1. Provide adversary; increase tension; insecurity spiral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>strengthen</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>commitment</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adversary D:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stand firm.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>«Goods»</td>
<td>«Goods»</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td></td>
<td>1. Resolve conflict; reduce tension</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance D:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Withhold support,</td>
<td></td>
<td>«Bads»</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>weaken commitment</td>
<td></td>
<td>1. Encourage adversary to stand firmer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adversary C:</td>
<td></td>
<td>2. Reduce reputation for resolve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conciliate</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>«Bads»</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1. Increase risk of abandonment</td>
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<td></td>
<td>2. Reduce reputation for loyalty</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Union, most notably in the Harmel formula of 1967 which defines NATO's over-all policy as one of both deterrence, defence and detente.

But the dilemmas of alliance policy stem not only from the intricate interplay of the alliance and adversary games. There is a third game as well, the domestic politics game, which adds to the complexity. A government cannot formulate its alliance and adversary policies in a void; it has to have domestic support for its policies both from the public and the parties in parliament. Typically, a government will want to have a broad security policy consensus because this increases its credibility vis-à-vis both allies and adversaries; therefore the politics of domestic consensus-building becomes an important aspect of national security policy.

The Danish reaction to the dilemmas of the alliance and adversary games has typically been one of wanting to have the best of both worlds and to pursue a strategy in the alliance game which combines a credible alliance guarantee with a measure of freedom of action both within and outside the alliance and a strategy in the adversary game which is very close to the Harmel formula, i.e. a mixture of deterrence, defence and detente. But accents have varied over the decades, depending both on changes in the international environment and in Danish domestic politics.
Ill. The Decision to Ally (1948–49)

In the wake of World War II Danish governments (Knud Kristensen (Lib) 1945–47 and Hans Hedtoft (Soc.Dem.) 1947–50) sought to steer a course of reliance on the U.N. and of «bridge-building» between East and West – a policy which, though phrased in terms of international solidarity etc., soon became rather indistinguishable from old-time neutrality. Despite attempts to equivocate between the budding great-power blocs, the Soviet Union was clearly viewed as the potential adversary, but the policy chosen was one of the conciliation and rapprochement, e.g. through a trade agreement concluded in 1946. At the same time, although the Western powers and still more her Nordic neighbours were seen as natural allies in an emergency, the prevailing attitude was one of the opposition to alliances and blocs. As late as January 30, 1948, Prime Minister Hedtoft warned against placing Denmark in any bloc. Until 1948, therefore, Denmark refused to play the alliance game, and in the (hardly recognized) adversary game she chose to adopt a co-operative «C» strategy.

But soon the need for security and the fear of abandonment came to dominate Danish security policy. During the «Easter crisis» of March 1948 the Hedtoft government started its search for external guarantees and weapons deliveries to offset what in a glimpse it had come to see as the critical vulnerability of Denmark to a Soviet coup-de-main. Danish government officials from now on saw their country as potentially the most vulnerable in Western Europe, and this perception persisted long after Denmark had been included under the protective shield of NATO. In its search the Hedtoft government came to concentrate on the option of a Scandinavian defence union and to prefer a union based on non-alignment between East and West (which the Swedes demanded) rather than on limited alignment with the West, which was the Norweigan pre-condition. In this perspective, the Danish decision to sign the North Atlantic Treaty represented only the third-best option on its scale of preferences.

Fear of entrapment played a major role in ordering these Danish priorities. This particular problem was absent with respect to a Nordic alliance, while it was feared that association with the United States –
still a relatively unknown quantity in international affairs – might involve Denmark against its will in faraway conflicts. It was only after receiving assurances that in some circumstances (e.g. an attack on Alaska) «it would be preferable for some parties not to declare war ... but to take other appropriate measures» and after appreciating the vagueness of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, that this fear was stilled – if only partially.

Perhaps paradoxically, also need for security/fear of abandonment pointed in the Scandinavian direction, at least in the prevailing view. Obsessed with the fear of a surprise attack à la April 9, 1940, and initially not very well versed in the novel and arcane concept of deterrence, Danish politicians were particularly focused upon the possibilities of receiving prompt assistance in place if an attack should occur. The Western Powers could not conceivable promise such assistance, but the nearby Swedes – at the time a major military power – might be able and willing to do so. The Scandinavian Pact aborted for other reasons, and so the Danish government was spared the realization that it had greatly exaggerated Sweden’s capability and will to assist, but its fears of abandonment and need for security persisted even after she had learned about and begun to internalize the basic, war-preventing strategy on which the Atlantic Alliance was originally built. Especially, the government continued to fret about the country’s vulnerability to a sudden Soviet attack and about the inability of the Alliance to intervene with reinforcements in time to repel it.

This problem was exacerbated by considerations stemming from the adversary game. While a Scandinavian Pact was seen as a tension-reducing device, the Atlantic Pact could be viewed as potentially increasing international tensions. Especially it was feared that Danish adherence to it might provoke the Soviet Union to attack Denmark before the Pact’s defenses had been built up and its guarantee become credible. Before entering the Pact, the Danish government therefore sought specific reassurances – which she got – that its aim was war-prevention and defence, and that the United States was not contemplating military bases in Denmark.

The decisive factor for Denmark’s entry was, however, that she did not have much choice. Joining the alliance was by far preferable to standing alone in isolated neutrality, and complete guarantees were not to be had, as Prime Minister Hedtoft told the parliamentary foreign relations committee. Assurances received during the final negotiation
phase helped to still the original fears of abandonment, entrapment and provocation of the Soviet Union and to make the alliance guarantee more credible, but large problems persisted. Temperamentally Danish politicians, and especially Social Democratic politicians, were unprepared for playing both the alliance and the adversary games, and entering the alliance was therefore the beginning of a major learning process. In this perspective, the 1950’s had the character of a period of basic adaptation to these games which was not completed until the early 1960’s when a combination of international detente and the build-up of West German forces helped to relieve the Danish vulnerability syndrome.
IV. Policies of Adaptation
1949–61

Danish security policy in the 1950’s and early 1960’s can most adequately be conceived of in terms of adaptation, both to working within a multilateral alliance and – in a wider sense – to participating in great power politics, although, of course, in a minor role. Both contexts were new to Danish politicians, and adaptation to them took place only gradually and differentially.

During the alliance negotiations of 1948-49 significant differences had cropped up between the political parties. The dominant Social Democratic party had been the primary spokesman for a Scandinavian defence union – preferably of the non-aligned variety – but had swung into a cautious support for joining the North Atlantic Treaty, when Nordic possibilities petered out in the beginning of 1949. This turnabout was welcomed by the Liberal and Conservative opposition parties who had argued for a Western alliance all along, even if they preferred a Nordic setting for it, and these three parties, the Social Democrats, the Liberals and the Conservatives voted through the new alliance orientation in Parliament in March 1949. Opposed to the Pact were the Radical party, social-liberal, but neutralist and anti-militaristic, and the Communists, while another minor party, the Justice Party, was divided.

This remained the overall constellation in the domestic game during most of the 1950’s. But differences within the dominant security policy alliance were never totally eradicated. Under a Liberal-Conservative coalition government from 1950 to 1953 cracks in the Atlantic coalition started to appear, as the Social Democrats grew increasingly critical of certain aspects of its foreign and defence policy, and after 1953 the Radicals began to play a role in security policy as the parliamentary ally of successive Social Democratic governments and – from 1957 – as a member of a coalition government partner also meant that the Radicals had to underwrite the basic security policy line of 1949, i.e. NATO membership and a certain defence effort. By the early 1960’s the Radicals had therefore joined the broad security policy consensus which at that time counted as many as 164 out of the 175 members of the Folketing. Only the new People’s Socialist Party which had arisen in the late
1950's from the ashes of the Communist party were now in basic opposition to the official security policy line.

As discussed earlier the alliance and adversary games are closely interconnected, and both are also intertwined in the domestic game. Any attempt to isolate these games would therefore be rather misleading. On the other hand, some issues tend to be treated more in the context of one game than others. Of the three main issue-areas in Danish alliance policy in the 1950's one, the area of military and political integration in NATO, was treated almost entirely in terms of the alliance game; another, defence policy proper, was primarily decided within the domestic game, though with some inclusion of the alliance game, while a third main area, base and nuclear weapons policy, was primarily decided in terms of the adversary game.

**Denmark and NATO Integration 1949–61**

**The Creation of NATO 1949–51**

As a consequence of the way Denmark entered the Atlantic Alliance, her politicians were even less prepared than their colleagues in other countries for the political and military developments which in less than 18 months transformed it into a highly integrated military organization. The American proposals of September 1950 for an integrated military force in Europe took the Danish government by surprise and, in addition, presented it with several difficult problems. First, by reducing the vagueness inherent in Article V it raised the fundamental problem of further entrapment and reduced the freedom of manoeuvre in a crisis. Secondly, the German problem – a century-long trauma in Danish politics – was activated through the proposal to include a German contribution in the integrated force. Combined with the parliamentary weakness of the Hedtoft government (it resigned a few weeks later) these problems were enough for Denmark to call for a recess of the North Atlantic Council meeting in New York, but not – as could be expected – to reject the proposed scheme. In the resumed Council meeting on September 26, 1950, Denmark accepted the American proposal on certain understandings, among them that the purpose of the integrated force would be to defend the whole of Western Europe, including Denmark,
that the NATO defence line should be moved as far to the east as possible in Germany, and that the basically civilian structure of the alliance should be maintained with the Council as its supreme body of authority.9

This decision to acquiesce in the American proposal was mainly predicated on two considerations. First, freedom of action was naturally limited in a question which went to the root of the alliance's performance, and in which the United States and most other member countries had invested considerable prestige. As Foreign Minister Gustav Rasmussen told party representatives: Denmark had a veto power in the Council, but it was formal and not real.10 But the decisive consideration was one of security and fear of abandonment. As mentioned above the government had been sceptical in 1948–49 as to the ability of the Western powers to defend Denmark's vulnerable «underbelly» in the Baltic and Schleswig-Holstein. Danish efforts during 1949–50 to secure the stationing of Allied forces in Schleswig-Holstein had proved of little avail, and with the realization that Denmark was lying way in front of the Pact's main defence line on the Rhine, acute fears of abandonment and even second-thoughts about the wisdom of joining the alliance had gripped leading politicians like Prime Minister Hedtoft. «Denmark wants to be defended, not liberated», as he complained to U.S. Ambassador Anderson. The possibility that the establishment of a joint, integrated force in Europe might contribute to a solution of Denmark's delicate security situation was probably the single most important factor in the Danish decision to accept the American proposal. As Social Democratic spokesman Poul Hansen told the Folketing in October, Denmark's geographical position was so exposed that hardly any country could have such an interest in the joint force. Besides strengthening the alliance in a general way and hence NATO's deterrence of the Soviet Union, the plan offered the prospect of increasing the protection of Denmark by moving the defence line eastward from the Rhine.11 This, it was realised, presupposed the rear­mament of Western Germany, and for this reason the security policy majority acquiesced in the prospect of seeing a German military power south of the border once more.

The domestic and adversary games hardly played a direct role in the Danish decision. The government did not feel strong enough to make a decision without consulting the opposition parties, but the final acceptance was made by the NATO majority without taking heed of protests
from the anti-NATO parties. Similarly, evaluations of the potential effects of the decision on East-West relations or Denmark’s relationship with the Soviet Union were largely absent, apart from the hope that NATO integration would increase the alliance protection of Denmark towards Soviet aggression.

The Greenland Base Agreement 1951

Denmark’s possession of Greenland was a major reason for the American interest in having Denmark included in the alliance in the first place. Denmark proper was generally considered indefensible and a military liability, rather than an asset. On the other hand, bases in Greenland had proved useful to the United States during World War II, and after the War Greenland was considered one of the most important strategic base areas outside the American continent together with Iceland and the Azores. During Danish-American negotiations in 1947–48 about the future of the 1941 base agreement, the U.S. wish to retain its base rights was very clearly stated, and in the spring of 1948 the Danish government had to give up – at least for the time being – its efforts to have the 1941 agreement abrogated and Greenland cleared of American troops. Before Denmark entered NATO the Greenland problem was often cited as an important reason for joining, because the alliance was seen as a more suitable, multilateral framework for securing the defence of Greenland than a bilateral Danish-American arrangement.

Little is known about the actual negotiations which produced the new base agreement of April 27, 1951. The agreement was concluded for the duration of the North Atlantic Treaty and construed as “in implementation of” the Treaty, but actually it was a bilateral arrangement. The Danish government had also hoped for a reduced or even token American presence in peacetime, but such hopes foundered on the American demand for a sizeable peacetime defence of Greenland which Denmark could obviously not deliver and for a broad freedom of action in Greenland. These American demands were now prompted less by views of Greenland as a useful “stepping-stone” on the way to Western Europe, which was how Greenland was referred to in the Atlantic Pact negotiations, than by the new polar perspective of nuclear strategy. The construction in 1951–52 of Thule Air Base in Northern
Greenland was a telling testimony of the increasing American interest in Greenland in the early 1950’s. Under such circumstances, where major U.S. security interests were involved, the Danish freedom of action was extremely limited, and the Danish role in the defence of her northern province (which Greenland became in 1953) has remained rather marginal ever since.

The Creation of the BALTAP Command (1957–61)

Because of the fall of the European Defence Community (EDC) in 1954, the rearmament of the Federal Republic could only commence when a new framework – NATO membership – had been created in 1955, and even then it was not until 1957–58 that German troops could start to make any significant contribution to the defence of NATO Europe. In the meantime the southern approaches to Denmark remained practically unguarded, especially after 1953 when the Norwegian brigade in Schleswig-Holstein was withdrawn. The Americans and the British refused to fill the void, and in Denmark an agreement could not be reached between the bourgeois government at the time and the Social Democrats to fill it through an increase of the Danish Army and its re-deployment to the south. The hopes of protection which had been the main motivation for Denmark’s acceptance of the integrated NATO force in 1950 was therefore a long time in being realised and especially among the Social Democrats a distinct feeling of abandonment was felt, or at least voiced. However, when German naval vessels started to operate in the Baltic in the late 1950’s and military units began being put up in Schleswig-Holstein, an old security problem promised to start being solved, even though the German Army contribution proved to be smaller than originally expected.

Instead another vexing problem showed up, namely the format and extent of Danish-German military cooperation. The coordination problem was exacerbated by the fact, that initially the German Navy had been placed under the Central Region, while the land forces in Schleswig-Holstein – now including German units – continued to be under the Northern Region in Oslo. Danish interests were inevitable mixed: On one side, the retention of Schleswig-Holstein as a Danish defence glacis and the inclusion of the German Baltic navy under the Northern Region were evidently in the national defence interest; on the
other side, there was considerable reluctance at the idea of day-to-day cooperation with the new Bundeswehr, both among Danish politicians and in the services, i.e. a fear of being entrapped in a close relationship with the erstwhile enemy who might — by sheer numbers — come to dominate it.

On the German side an important consideration was to have all German forces under one NATO command, i.e. the Central Region. This interest was voiced by the Bundestag in 1954 and revived by Defence Minister Franz-Josef Strauss in 1958 with the added preference for Denmark to be equally included in the Central Region.

Discussions of the command structure on the borderline between the two regions were initiated in 1957. The Germans proposed a joint German-Danish arrangement under the Northern Region covering all services, while the Danes preferred to limit it to the naval forces in the Baltic. However, these discussions were broken off by the Danish government in 1958 after Mr. Strauss' remarks which were anathema to all Danish politicians. The idea of joining the Central Region immediately conjured up fears of entrapment and of loss of control, e.g. over national base and nuclear weapons policies. Another difficult issue was the German demand for military depots in Denmark, if German forces in Schleswig-Holstein were to be oriented towards the North, rather than the West logistically. This problem was solved in 1960 by giving the depots in question NATO-status, i.e. by multilateralizing the solution.

When negotiations over the region's organizational structure were resumed in 1960, it quickly became clear that Denmark's possibilities of stalling a new arrangement would be limited to matters of detail, especially as SACEUR began to exert a discreet pressure on the Danish Government in support of the German demand for a comprehensive three-service command structure for Denmark and Schleswig-Holstein. Very soon, the choice was narrowed down to a choice between this option or a withdrawal of the regional border from the Elbe to the Danish-German border.

In the end, Denmark's limited freedom of manoeuvre in a question where important Allied and NATO interests were at stake and her evident interest in tying the Bundeswehr and the Bundesmarine to the defence of Denmark's southern approaches once more overruled fears of entrapment and close contact with German military forces. In the final negotiating phase in 1961 Danish decision-makers therefore con-
centrated on sweetening the pill; first, by getting the best possible deal with respect to command posts in the new arrangement, and secondly by diluting its bilateral character by including officers of other nationalities in its various staffs. The government succeeded in both these ends: Denmark got an unproportionate number of command posts, including that of COMBALTAP, and Allied officers were to make up a third of the staffs.

In December 1961 the Danish Folketing ratified the establishment of the BALTAP (Baltic Approaches) Command, which started operating from the beginning in 1962 from its headquarters in Karup, Jutland. Since then, it has been a major Danish security policy goal to preserve the status quo within the arrangement, which has functioned almost frictionless over the years. One salient characteristic of this has been the willingness to get entrapped in BALTAP, e.g. by planning for the deployment of the Jutland land forces to Holstein and the Hamburg area in an emergency. This willingness neatly illustrates the symbiotic relationship between the need for security and the willingness to get entrapped. Originally (i.e. around 1960) this concept had been motivated by the failure of the Bundeswehr and NATO to put up as strong a covering force for Schleswig-Holstein as expected. This commitment is still mainly motivated by Danish defence calculations, Schleswig-Holstein being the best place to defend Jutland, but in addition it has acquired a symbolic aspect as a token of Denmark’s continued commitment to multilateral defence.

The decision to accept BALTAP was not without domestic drama, as part of the Radical rank-and-file rebelled against the inclination of the party leadership to accept BALTAP along with previous concessions to the official policy line as a price to be paid for continued participation in the government coalition. In the end, the party leadership narrowly carried the day, and BALTAP therefore was included in the broad security policy consensus which crystallised in the early 1960’s.

As in 1950 considerations pertaining to the adversary game played only a minor role in the decision-making process. In a diplomatic note of August 31, 1961, the Soviet government warned that the proposed joint command would seriously worsen the situation in the Baltic and Nordic area and that «the creation of such a situation would directly affect the security of the Soviet Union». The Soviet Union also attempted to gain leverage through pressure upon Finland. On October 30, 1961, the Soviet government initiated the so-called «note crisis» by
demanding military consultations with Finland according to the 1948 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Assistance, i.a. by referring to the rise of German military influence in Northern Europe through the planned BALTAP command and otherwise. Finally, both the Soviet Union and Poland delivered official protests after the Folketing had ratified the BALTAP agreement in December.16

Despite such pressures, the Danish government did not waver. Both in October and in December the Danish response centered on two themes: a denial of the allegedly threatening character of the new arrangement and a pointed reference to Denmark’s inalienable right to judge for herself how best to take care of her own security. The defensive character of NATO, Denmark’s wish to contribute to European detente as well as the peaceful nature of the new German democracy were also stressed.

As will be noted, the Danish policy on this issue was «tougher» and more in terms of a «Dr» strategy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union than her policy on bases and nuclear weapons which will be discussed below. This probably reflected a negative reaction to heavy-handed Soviet pressure, much of which was probably a reflection of the simultaneous Berlin crisis, but primarily it showed the limited freedom of action which Denmark had in the alliance game in conjunction with her own security interests.

Defence Policies 1949–60

While Denmark’s freedom of action has always been rather restricted with respect to the organizational framework of her alliance policy, there has always been a somewhat larger room for manoeuvre when it comes to formulating the actual contents of this policy. Defence policies, for instance, have always been characterized by a sizeable influence for domestic factors, reflecting the fact that defence policy has traditionally been one of the most heavily contested policy areas in Danish domestic policy. Especially in the 1950’s defence policy remained highly politicized.

Since 1949 the Conservatives and the Liberals have been proponents of a relatively strong defence posture. While not in practice ready to accept NATO force goals such as the Lisbon goals of 1952 or the MC-
70 of 1957 as national goals, they consistently argue that Denmark should take alliance force goals as points of departure in national force planning. This reflects a notion that Denmark should be prepared to pay its due share in NATO, and that the willingness of the Allies to honour their security guarantee is also dependent on Denmark's own defence efforts. The Social Democrats have been more circumspect. Having transformed itself during and after World War II from an antimilitaristic position to one of support for a real defence effort, the party still had to take into account lingering doubts in its rank-and-file as well as the continued defence scepticism of the Radicals, their parliamentary support party for most of the post-war period. As a consequence, the Social Democrats have usually argued that Denmark shall make a fair contribution to NATO, but that defence efforts must not be allowed to undermine the welfare state and in doing so the public's support for NATO.

During 1950-51 the basic Danish defence structure was laid down in a process which reflected domestic preoccupations about the size of the defence budget and the length of conscription as well as participation in NATO's force-planning process. The precise interplay between the domestic and alliance games is not very well documented. However, the outcome can probably best be described as a compromise. Denmark established, almost from scratch, a defence force, which to a large extent was modelled on Allied organizational and doctrinal experiences and which was heavily dependent on U.S. and Canadian military assistance. Until the mid-1960's practically all major weapons systems for the services were received under the MDAP and similar programmes. The total amount received during this period was nearly 4.5 billion d.kr., corresponding to about one-third of the Danish defence budgets in those years. When military assistance petered out in the 1960's the renewal of this initial stock of armaments became a major problem, which has continued to plague Danish defence planning to this very day.

The Danish defence contribution therefore was mainly in personnel and operating budgets. In terms of the over-all defence budget, the contribution remained fairly modest, i.a. in order not to undermine public support for the new security policy. During the building phase (1950-53) the government and parliament responded to NATO planning directives by increasing both budgets and the conscription period considerably. The conscription period was raised from 12 to 18 months.
in 1953 so as to increase the covering force of trained personnel, and defence budgets trebled from 210 mill. d.kr. in FY 1949 to 927 mill. d.kr. in FY 1954. But increases and the absolute level of expenditure were considerably less than called for in NATO plans, and after 1953 the build-up of the defence forces levelled off again: conscription was reduced to 16 months in 1954 and defence budgets declined somewhat in real terms from their peak in FY 1954. By 1960 the defence budget amounted to some 2.4 percent of GDP.

This trend reflects, of course, the general weakening of NATO’s force build-up after 1953, but also domestic considerations. In 1953 the Social Democrats returned to power with the Radical party playing a pivotal role as its parliamentary support. In combination with a generally weak economy which did not really take off until after 1958, this largely explains the moderate expansion of the Danish defence forces in the 1950’s. On the other hand, the increasing role of the Radicals, e.g. as a government partner of the Social Democrats 1957–64, was predicated on their acceptance of the official security policy line and paved the way for a historic defence compromise in 1960 between the government parties and the Conservatives and Liberals. The defence agreement involved a modest increase in the defence budget— but not so as to even approach the NATO force goals, which at that time were one-third above the actual Danish contribution. The real importance of the agreement lay in the fact that it created a broad defence policy consensus among the so-called «old» parties and therefore took defence policy off the domestic political agenda as long as it lasted (i.e. to about 1968). One mechanism for this was the agreement to index the personnel and operating accounts of the defence budget to the 1960 level in real terms. The defence compromise was almost entirely predicated on domestic politics. SACEUR voiced his disappointment with the modest level of defence efforts which the agreement had landed upon, but was unable to change it.

**Base and Nuclear Weapons Policy 1952–60**

Neither in questions concerning alliance organization or the Danish defence contribution did considerations pertaining to the adversary game play a significant role. Policies in both issues were, of course,
motivated by a general need to bolster the alliance guarantee against the 
Soviet Union and by an acute – and probably exaggerated – awareness 
of a Soviet capability both to launch a land thrust against Jutland via 
Schleswig-Holstein and a seaborne invasion across the Baltic against 
the eastern islands.

Such threat perceptions which essentially foresaw a repetition of the 
German surprise attack of April 9, 1940, were especially pronounced in 
the early 1950’s, i.e. during the peak of the Cold War. From 1953 such 
fears resided somewhat with the reduction of international tension, and 
strategies in the adversary game other than deterrence and defence were 
given wider scope. The evolution of Danish base policy is a case in 
point.

The Evolution of Danish Policy 1952-53

Before signing the North Atlantic Treaty Foreign Minister Gustav Ras-
mussen had received American reassurances that the United States 
were not contemplating bases in Denmark; this was in perfect accord-
ance with the prevailing pessimism in Washington over the possibility 
of holding Denmark in a war situation. However, the question cropped 
up again during NATO’s defence planning in the early 1950’s, out of 
which grew a NATO proposal to station some 150 U.S. tactical aircraft 
on Danish air bases as part of a broader effort to increase the defence of 
Denmark.

This initiative activated both the domestic, the alliance and the 
adversary games. When the issue came up in 1952, the Liberal-
Conservative government was locked in a growing domestic strife with 
the Social Democrats, which gradually started to spill over into foreign 
and security policy. The government ran into severe trouble for its 
support for a NATO resolution on Indochina and in early 1953 it failed 
to get through a proposed increase of the Danish forces in Schleswig-
Holstein, which was intended to cushion the effect of the announced 
withdrawal of the Norwegian brigade (4000 men) from the region.

Though in principle positive to foreign stationing in Denmark, the 
government’s main consideration was that the issue might split the 
1949 coalition; it therefore chose to play a very cautious hand. An 
additional reason for this was the government’s wish to carry through a 
long-prepared revision of the constitution which required maximum
political agreement among the four old parties. In May 1953 the government went as far as giving the Radicals, who were determinedly against the stationing, a written assurance that nothing important would be decided without their concurrence until the new constitution had been ratified.20 The government duly got its signatures under the constitution only to be defeated in the ensuing parliamentary elections and to be succeeded by a Social Democratic minority government. Domestic consideration also played a major role for the new government party, which had to consider both the opposition of the Radicals, and critical attitudes within the party itself and in public opinion. In August 1953 (after the Social Democrats has decided against stationing) 54% of the public were against foreign bases, only 20% for.21

On the other hand, the Social Democrats agreed with the Liberals and Conservatives that the stationing of U.S. aircraft would be entirely consonant with Danish NATO policy. In the view of the latter parties it would strengthen the defence of Denmark and increase the credibility of the alliance guarantee, and the Social Democrats agreed, at least initially. Their leader, Hans Hedtoft, saw a clear linkage between stationing, the U.S. willingness to assist Denmark, NATO’s credibility as a war-preventing organization and the public’s belief in official policy. Hence a basic agreement that the need for security pointed towards the acceptance of the proposal.22

But gradually doubts came to play a larger role. Both the bourgeois parties and the Social Democrats emphasized the need to act together with Norway, which had already decided in 1949 not to accept foreign bases as long as Norway was not attacked or threatened. Especially the Social Democrats made a determined, though unsuccessful effort to change the Norwegian policy, presumably both to reduce domestic criticism and the feeling of entrapment which might arise if Denmark went further than Norway on this issue. The failure to change the Norwegian base policy in combination with a clear Norwegian preference for bases in Denmark was instrumental in cooling the Danish interest in stationing.

Another stumbling block was the still unsolved problems around the defence of the southern border. As mentioned, the Social Democrats refused in early 1953 to strengthen the Danish contribution to the defence of Schleswig-Holstein – on the premise that this was really a joint NATO responsibility. In the aftermath this question was linked with the base issue, so that an adequate land coverage of Denmark from
the south became a Social Democratic pre-condition for accepting stationing in Denmark. The basic reasoning seems to have been the same which inspired the Danish rejection in 1951 of General Eisenhower’s idea to make Denmark a heavily armed «hedgehog» from where to defend the central front. The Social Democrats seemed to think that a strengthening of Danish defence through stationing would be less effective if the approaches were not similarly strengthened. Another consideration was that a concentration of military power in Denmark might somehow be viewed as provocative by the adversary, i.e. the Soviet Union.

The theme of non-provocation has a long tradition in Danish security policy and, as we have seen, played a role in the alliance discussions of 1948–49. During the 1950’s it gradually became a more prominent feature of official policy in conjunction with the relaxation of East-West tension. As an example, Foreign Minister Ole Bjørn Kraft (Cons.) warned the NATO Council meeting in Ottawa September, 1951, against the increased risks of war which would follow an exaggerated rearmament effort. «Although appeasement is to be shunned, there are serious dangers in preparing too vigorously for war.» And in early 1953 Mr. Kraft responded to a Soviet memo on the stationing question which had also touched upon the alleged special status of Bornholm by indicating that Denmark would always be aware of the special considerations called for by Bornholm’s geographic position in the middle of the Baltic. (In practice, this has led to Bornholm being closed to Allied military units, e.g. also in connection with NATO exercises; Denmark also restricts its participation in NATO exercises in the Eastern Baltic).

With Stalin’s death in March 1953 and the ensuing «thaw» in international politics, non-provocation and detente became even more important motivations to the Social Democrats. In a speech to the party congress in June Hans Hedtoft argued that the possibilities for detente and a peaceful solution of East-West conflicts should be tried out «before taking new steps» and wound up concluding that the Social Democrats had decided not to accept the offer of permanent stationing «in the present situation». A few months later the party was back in government and the no stationing became official policy. The decision was subsequently acquiesced in by the Liberals and the Conservatives and rapidly ceased to be controversial. NATO also accepted the decision gracefully. To explain this, the limitations on the ban should be...
noticed. It applied and applies to «present conditions» only, i.e. in practice to peacetime conditions, and only to Denmark proper. Furthermore, it does not apply to Allied participation in exercises in Denmark or to various preparations for the introduction of Allied reinforcements in a crisis or in wartime. In fact, from the early 1950's the defence of Denmark has continued to be predicated on the rapid introduction of such reinforcements if needed.

Danish Nuclear Weapons Policy 1957–60

A few years after the base decision, similar motivations produced a ban on the stationing of nuclear weapons in Denmark «under prevailing circumstances». Since 1949 Denmark had tacitly accepted the U.S. nuclear deterrence as NATO's backbone, and in 1954 she went along with the NATO Council decision to base the defence of NATO Europe upon the immediate use of nuclear weapons, including the new tactical nuclear weapons with the US Army in Germany. But the Danish attitude was always very cautious and low-profiled, so when the question arose in 1957 whether nuclear weapons should be stationed on Danish soil, the security policy consensus once more threatened to crack. The Liberals and Conservatives as well as the military leaders pleaded for the introduction of nuclear weapons in the Danish defence forces along with most other NATO countries, while the Social Democrats were against. During the election campaign in the spring of 1957 (at a time when Denmark had only been offered conventional versions of Nike and Honest John missiles) Prime Minister H.C. Hansen indicated his opposition to nuclear weapons in Denmark, and after the election he formed a coalition government with the Radicals and the Justice Party which in its official government declaration stated that an offer of nuclear weapons would be declined «under present conditions».

This official, but still rather hypothetical no to nuclear weapons was strengthened in December 1957 when the deployment of medium-range missiles in Europe and the delivery of nuclear weapons to NATO armies under the dual-key arrangement came up for decision in the NATO Council. During the meeting the Danish and Norwegian governments were in close contact, and Denmark supported the Norwegian proposal to postpone the deployment decision on medium-range missiles. Both countries also stated their unwillingness to receive
nuclear weapons on their soil under prevailing conditions, arguing mainly on the need to improve the international climate and to promote disarmament and detente. A month later H.C. Hansen explained the government's stand in greater detail in the Folketing:

«Our no must be seen on the background of Denmark’s geographical position. Considering the range of modern weapons it is difficult to say, which countries will be most exposed in case of war in the future, but it is a historical fact that plans for defence measures in the area which Denmark belongs to, have – during the NATO’s life-time – attracted the attention of the eastern countries to a special degree and called forth strong reactions. It must, therefore, be of importance, that we – in our area – refrain from measures, which – even unjustly – might be construed as a provocation and hence impede detente. ...»

In 1960 the no to nuclear weapons was further consolidated when the opposition parties «regretfully recognized» that the defence agreement of that year would not include the introduction of nuclear weapons, and from the early 1960’s this policy reached the status of a de facto immutable cornerstone of Danish alliance policy. The Liberals and Conservatives conceded this when they ceased to argue for nuclear weapons a few years later (1964).

The decision to ban nuclear weapons from Danish soil was taken mainly for domestic reasons and as part of «C» (i.e. «cooperative») strategy in the adversary game. Non-provocation and international detente were probably the main motivations for the decision. Considerations of alliance solidarity seemingly played a secondary role, but the decision also was part of the alliance game. For one thing, the external pressure upon Denmark was slight, as the United States and other NATO allies readily accepted the Danish reservations and apparently never have tried to contest them. If this is so, it is probably because NATO sees little military need for nuclear weapons in Denmark, but also because the conditional nature of the reservation, especially its limitation to peacetime. Furthermore, at least until recently, Denmark has always accepted NATO’s general defence posture and its implicit dependence on the use of nuclear weapons if necessary for defence purposes.
V. The Politics of Consolidation 1962–78

By the early 1960's the major features of Denmark's alliance policy had been laid out. The organizational framework had been perfected with the establishment of BALTAP which proved to function smoothly and satisfactorily. A certain modest defence effort had been agreed upon and was maintained through the new indexing procedure; furthermore, the broad defence settlement of 1960 had established a model for future defence agreements. A base policy had been formulated and acquired broad domestic support, and the corresponding no to nuclear weapons policy was gradually being accepted by its erstwhile domestic opponents. Vis-à-vis the Soviet Union a mixed policy of deterrence and defence on one side and reassurance and non-provocation on the other had been formulated since about 1953.

During the next two decades this general pattern was maintained and further consolidated. Despite occasional friction between the major parties to the consensus and the defection of the Radicals in the mid-1970's the basic domestic consensus between Social Democrats, Liberals and Conservatives held at least until 1979. In relation to NATO, only few problems arose, and in general the evolution of NATO policies and strategies was consonant with Danish preferences. And vis-à-vis the Soviet Union the early tentative efforts at a detente-oriented policy was given wider scope when detente became part of NATO's basic policy stance with the Harmel formula of 1967.

Alliance and Detente Policy

In the mid-1960's Foreign Minister Per Hækkerup (1962–66, Soc. Dem.) tried to stake out a more independent Danish profile in East-West relations by taking up contacts with the Soviet Union and especially with the smaller East European countries, both on a bilateral basis and within the so-called Group of Nine. He also supported at an early date the idea of a European security conference, which was broached by the Soviet Union at the time. In 1966 the Danish government offici-
ally suggested to the NATO Council that the initiative should be considered in a positive spirit only to receive a rather frosty reaction. However, the threatening divergence between Danish detente policy and the official NATO policy towards the East was covered over when NATO in 1967 adopted the Harmel formula and when the alliance’s detente policy got off the following year with the so-called Reykjavik Signal.

This development was instrumental in quelling a certain malaise about the alliance which had been spreading on the left wing of the security policy consensus after the mid-1960’s, not only over the problems of detente, but also over the war in Indochina. The Radicals started venting the idea of a referendum to decide about continued NATO membership after 1969, and there were widespread expectations of a forthcoming «grand debate» during 1965–66. But the Harmel Report quieted criticism of NATO, and the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 did the rest. The matter was laid completely at rest in 1970, when an expert committee which had been set up in 1968 by a new coalition of Radicals, Liberals and Conservatives (1968–71) concluded that Denmark had no viable alternative to continued alliance membership."

Another relevant development in the early 1970’s was Denmark’s membership in the European Communities (EC) as from 1973. This also gave her access to the EPC, the budding European Political Cooperation which came to play a significant role in developing the Western positions at the Conference on Cooperation and Security in Europe (CSCE) from 1973 to 1975. In this context, Denmark played an active role, especially within the area of human relations («basket no. 3»).

The problems of NATO’s nuclear weapons policy also found a fairly satisfactory solution in this period as seen from a Danish perspective. Denmark did not participate in the periodic European compliants in the 1950’s and 1960’s about the credibility of the American nuclear guarantee to Europe, nor in the European critique of the new flexible response strategy which was designed to beef up its credibility. Successive Danish governments were generally content with the U.S. nuclear monopoly and the way it was administered, and were opposed to efforts to increase European participation in the actual management of NATO’s nuclear deterrent. In the 1960’s Denmark opposed the MLF proposal, both because the government saw no political or strategic rationale for it, and because it might threaten the Danish ban on nuclear weapons on her soil. The Danish government made it clear (as did
Norway) that though it would not go as far as vetoing the force, MLF would not get access to Danish waters and harbours. Denmark therefore also welcomed the alternative to MLF, when the latter was scuttled, i.e. the creation of the Nuclear Defence Affairs Committee (NDAC) and the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) in NATO. From the late 1960’s Denmark was a permanent, though not very active participant in NPG and came to appreciate the increased knowledge of nuclear affairs and the marginal influence upon alliance planning which participation gave her. Until the INF issue became politicized in 1979, this participation in NPG was domestically uncontroversial and little noticed.

Defence Policy 1960–78

Although a broad consensus over defence policy was the main characteristic of the period, certain cracks appeared. From the mid-1970’s the Radicals lapsed back into general defence policy opposition, and in 1968 its demand for a (minor) cut in the defence budget as part of the building of a government coalition with the Conservatives and the Liberals gave rise to a major crisis for the broad consensus when the Social Democrats chose to officially annul its adherence to the current defence agreement. In 1970 the party (now in opposition) presented a new defence proposal which in certain respects broke with the existing defence structure, i.a. by calling for a thorough professionalization of the defence forces and for a break with the concept of forward defence, at least as far as defence in the Baltic was concerned. After the Social Democrats returned to power in 1971, consensus was gradually restored, and in 1973 a new defence settlement once more united the parties to the settlement of 1960, i.e. Social Democrats, Radicals, Liberals, and Conservatives. The major feature of the new defence structure was a decisive increase in the number of professionals in the services and a corresponding deemphasis on conscription. Another important feature was that the entire defence budget, including material procurement, was now indexed against inflation in prices and wages. This shielded to some extent the defence budget against cuts when the economy took a general downward turn after 1973, but it also made it quite difficult for the government to participate in the attempts of the Carter
period to increase European defence efforts in real terms. The govern-
ment (at the time a Social Democratic minority government led by
Anker Jørgensen) subscribed in 1978 to the Long-Term Defence Pro-
gramme in NATO, including an annual three percent rise in real terms,
but also had to point out that increases would be impossible during the
current agreement (1977–81), and that future increase would be subject
to political negotiations.
VI. The Politics of Strife
1979–87

Until the late 1970's Denmark's alliance policy remained largely uncontroversial. In the wake of economic prosperity and international detente a certain balance had been found between policies in the domestic, alliance and adversary games. But all of a sudden this balance and the domestic consensus behind it threatened to break down, and since 1979 almost all aspects of official security policy have become heavily contested between the Social Democrats on one side and the bourgeois parties on the other.

It began in the Autumn of 1979, when a newly-formed Social Democratic government led by Anker Jørgensen had to tackle the difficult issues connected with NATO's dual-track decision. Its handling of it gave rise to internal dissatisfaction in the governing party as well as to bitter recriminations between government and opposition. During the following years other issues have surfaced to strain the traditional security policy consensus between the Social Democratic and the bourgeois parties, such as defence policy and the proposed nuclear weapon-free zone in Scandinavia. After September 1982, when a bourgeois government coalition led by Paul Schlüter (Cons.) took over after the Jørgensen government, conflicts over security policy have escalated further, and since then security policy has been part and parcel of the domestic policy game.

Security Policy and the Domestic Policy Game

To understand the complexities of this game the parliamentary situation of the present government should be taken into consideration.

The Schlüter government is a minority coalition of four bourgeois parties, the Conservatives, the Liberals, the Center Democrats and the Christian People's Party, which between them command a total of 78 mandates out of 179 in the present Folketing (1984–). In most domestic
the government is supported by the Radical party whose 10 seats are enough to give it a working majority vis-à-vis the Social Democrats, the Socialist People’s Party and the Left Socialists who between them command 82 mandates. In certain policy areas the support of the Radical party is withdrawn, however, most notably in security policy, where the party does support the basic policy of NATO membership, but is opposed to most specific policies, such as defence policy and nuclear weapons policy. To command a majority in security policy questions the government parties are therefore dependent upon the traditional security policy alliance with the Social Democrats. This alliance still survives on some issues like defence policy but has broken down over others, most notably nuclear weapons policy.

As a consequence, there has been since late 1982 three different security policy majorities in the Danish Folketing in addition to the basic working majority of the government: 1) a broad coalition consisting of the government parties, the Progress Party, the Social Democrats and the Radicals which supports NATO membership in general; 2) a coalition of the same parties minus the Radicals which also underwrites defence policy, and 3) a new majority coalition consisting of Social Democrats, Radicals and the two left-wing parties which has largely determined Danish nuclear weapons policy since late 1982.

This so-called «alternative majority» has mainly manifested itself through the adoption of parliamentary resolutions. Since late 1982 about twenty such resolutions, which — by expressing the sense of the Folketing — are eo ipso part of official security policy, have been passed, most of them against the votes of the government parties; on a few resolutions the government parties have abstained — and only one has been passed with their votes.

Nevertheless, the government has decided to «live with» and acquiesce in these resolutions in order to stay in power and to salvage its domestic programme of budgetary retrenchment and economic reconstruction. As a result the contours of official Danish security policy have been blurred, to say the least. The government is constitutionally obliged to follow and respect the resolutions of the Folketing, whether it has voted for them or not. In practice, this has forced it to insist on a number of reservations to recent NATO decisions and communiques; together with Greece, Denmark has become — to the acute discomfort of the government — a «footnote member» of NATO. On the other hand, the government feels free to voice their own views on the disputed issues in
NATO meetings and elsewhere and to interpret the parliamentary resolutions more or less as they see fit. The government can have this latitude of interpretation in the knowledge that the alternative majority cannot agree on toppling it, and that the coalition because of disagreement on security and other policy issues cannot form the basis of an alternative government. The alternative majority is powerful, but only as opposition.

Factors of Change in Danish Security Policy

To explain the breakdown of domestic consensus it is important to note that the polarization of views between the bourgeois government parties on the one hand and the Social Democratic opposition party on the other is not a specific Danish phenomenon, but has taken place in most North European countries during the last few years.

An explanation must therefore include other than domestic factors. Basically, it can be seen as resulting from broad, interrelated forces of change in the Western world, which have affected international as well as domestic politics since the late 1970’s and exerted strong pressures upon the participation of the Social Democratic parties in the NATO «mainstream».

First, the gradual erosion of detente and the onset of the «second cold war» squashed their hopes for a continued relaxation of international tension and increasing cooperation between East and West in Europe and instead stepped up demands and pressures for alliance solidarity and increased defence budgets. Secondly, and related to this trend, a conservative tendency set in in many NATO countries, most notably the United States, emboldening bourgeois parties to take on more conservative positions, both in domestic and foreign policy. Polarization between Social Democratic and bourgeois parties increased further, as bourgeois parties gradually took over power in Northern Europe in the 1979–82 period, relegating former influential Social Democratic parties to ineffective opposition.

In the case of the Danish Social Democrats, going into opposition has had a significant impact on the evolution of its security policy. The transition into opposition has been temperamentally difficult for the party after having been for two generations the «natural» government
party in Denmark. Furthermore, in Denmark – as distinct from other countries where a similar transfer of power took place – the transfer was not total, as it turned up that, by allying with the Radicals and the left-wing parties or, alternatively, with the government parties, the Social Democrats were able to remain the umpire of security policymaking.

But transition into opposition accelerated rather than initiated changes in the party’s security policy position. As the preceding analysis shows these changes are broadly within the security policy «tradition» of the party. As early as 1978 Anker Jørgensen, party leader and Prime Minister, began to express his concerns over the nuclear arms race and NATO’s dependence on nuclear deterrence, often in a highly emotional way. And after the October 1979 elections a vocal faction of about one-fourth of the party’s parliamentary group started to express highly critical attitudes towards several aspects of official security policy. Since then, the party’s policy line has been determined by the interplay of this group (which has had to some extent the sympathy of Anker Jørgensen) with a somewhat smaller fraction of defence-minded M.P.s and a majority group of pragmatically oriented M.P.s with no great interest in security policy as such. This process was, of course, stimulated by factors inside as well as outside the party. From the winter of 1979–80 party activists started to voice critical attitudes towards the traditional party line and to make security policy a delicate issue at party conferences. As a consequence, the party leadership has had to accept several revisions of the party programme, especially on nuclear weapons. These pressures were further reinforced by the new peace movement which sprang up in 1980, and the left-wing parties, all of which singled out the Social Democratic party as the prime target for their campaign to radicalize official security policy.

Finally, a potent external factor for change should be mentioned, namely the influence of Scandilux, a cooperation forum between the Social Democratic parties of the North European NATO countries. Since its inception in 1981 Scandilux has been an important input into the security policy deliberations of the Danish Social Democrats, especially in the INF issue where a close interrelation between the trend of discussion in Scandilux and the policy positions of the Danish party can be demonstrated. While the course of Social Democratic security policy has received wide journalistic and analytical attention, the evolution of the govern-
ment's policies are much less analyzed. While the leading government party, the Conservatives, traditionally a champion of NATO solidarity and a strong defence, has proven itself quite pragmatic as a government party, the second largest coalition party, the Liberals, has moved in the opposite direction and tries to give itself a high, ideological profile on foreign and security policy. Another small coalition partner, the Center Democrats, is also highly pro-NATO, pro-US and pro-defence. With the Liberal foreign minister, Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, as the prime architect of its security policy, the government as a whole takes a more hawkish and ideological position than its constituent parties have usually done. Its willingness, nevertheless, to accept having its policy dictated by the alternative majority, gives its policy a certain taint of insincerity.

Alliance and Detente Policy in the 1980’s

For all the domestic conflict over security policy neither the alliance membership nor Denmark’s military integration in NATO are very much in dispute. As a matter of fact, public support for NATO membership peaked with 69 per cent in the summer of 1983 when the debate over the highly unpopular NATO INF missiles was equally at its peak. Moreover, an interesting development is taking place among the left-wing parties to whom the termination of NATO membership has always been a central security policy goal. During 1985 and 1986 influential figures in both the Socialist People’s Party and the Left Socialists have started arguing that membership in the alliance and even participation in NATO integration could be acceptable as a platform for increased influence on the contents of Danish security policy as well as the strategies and policies of the alliance. Similarly, the BALTAP arrangement is largely uncontroversial in Danish politics.

As a matter of fact, the defence of Denmark has become steadily more integrated with that of the alliance during the last decade. First, cooperation with German forces within BALTAP plays an increasing role, both in preparation of the actual defence of Denmark and in the planning of the Danish defence contribution to NATO. Secondly, the role of Allied reinforcements in defence planning for the BALTAP area
has increased. The arrival of Allied reinforcements in an emergency has always been an important premise of Danish defence planning, but this premise has been considerably clarified and strengthened since the early 1970's. In the 1973 defence agreement it was stated that preparation for the reception of reinforcements was an important element of national security policy (and in accordance with the general ban on stationing); in 1976 Denmark signed the first explicit reinforcement agreement with the United States under the COB-programme; and in 1982 Denmark accepted SACEUR's Rapid Reinforcement Plan which includes Allied reinforcements for Denmark, primarily U.S. and British aircraft (some 7 squadrons) and a British infantry brigade. As a consequence, a number of bilateral agreements have been concluded with the «donor» countries, and a certain amount of prepositioning has taken place, primarily of munitions, fuel etc., but not heavy materiel.

This development has been rather controversial. The left-wing parties as well as the Radical party have criticized the new reinforcement policy for increasing Denmark's integration in NATO and hence also the risks of being entrapped and having the national freedom of manoeuvre curtailed in a crisis. Furthermore, it is being argued that the new reinforcement concept is provocative to the Warsaw Pact and that the vulnerability of the country has been increased as a result. Such fears of entrapment and provocation have exerted a certain influence in the Social Democratic party as well. In 1981–82 its left-wing voiced very serious concerns about the possibility of prepositioning heavy materiel, e.g. for U.S. Marines in Denmark, and this was probably an important reason why SACEUR did not include this particular feature in the RRP as far as Denmark was concerned. On the other hand, this was probably also the reason why the plan makes fewer and less secure reinforcement commitments to Denmark than to Norway. These commitments seemed to look even less secure, when it became known in early 1987 that the British reinforcement brigade might be either abolished/reduced or redirected to Germany as part of British defence cuts.

While cooperation in BALTAP and the formalization of NATO's reinforcement policy has led to an increasing integration of the defence of Denmark with the alliance defence in general, another – more conspicuous – trend has led to increasing estrangement and alienation, namely the evolution of NATO's nuclear weapons policy. As mentioned, Denmark's membership in the NPG from the late 1960's was
uncontroversial as long as participation primarily meant listening in on strategic discussions between the United States and her European allies. But when the NPG was made the forum in the late 1970's for the actual planning of new intermediate missiles (INF) for NATO, and when the NATO Council became the designated decision-making unit for their deployment, Denmark was given a larger and much more direct role in nuclear decision-making than she had previously played, and — as it turned out — a larger role than she was able to play. While the present bourgeois government parties have supported INF deployment from the beginning, and while the Radicals and the socialist parties have been strongly opposed, the Social Democrats moved from hesitant support in 1979 to outright opposition in 1983. In 1979 the Social Democratic government concluded its internal discussions by proposing a 6 months' delay of the dual-track decision (in order to test the Soviet willingness to negotiate), but acquiesced in the decision when this proposal was turned down — much as its predecessor had done in 1957. But gradually opposition mounted in the party, and after going into opposition it dissociated itself from the deployment part of the decision. Using the alternative majority it has forced the government since 1983 to footnote NATO communiques in support of INF deployment and also to stop Danish contributions to NATO's infrastructure programme as far as INF installations are concerned. Since 1983 opposition to NATO's nuclear policies have widened. A parliamentary resolution of 1985 opposed the modernization of NATO's tactical nuclear weapons according to the Montebello programme of 1983 and another resolution is opposed to SDI; as a consequence the government had to insist on another footnote to the communique from the NATO defence ministers' meeting in Brussels in May 1986.

Aside from the obvious domestic aspects of this policy change, it is also motivated by external considerations. One is a growing fear of the implications of the nuclear arms race. Threat perceptions on the left wing are now less linked to the risk of a deliberate aggression from the Warsaw Pact than to the destabilizing aspects of the arms race. The threat has become more structural, where it used to be concrete and actor-oriented. Such perspectives lead to a negative attitude to the role of nuclear weapons in alliance strategy and to support for a pronounced detente policy aimed at defusing the inherent risks of East-West confrontation. This nexus of attitudes is responsible for another change in the Social Democratic nuclear weapons policy, namely with respect to
the idea of a nuclear weapon-free zone in Scandinavia. From being highly sceptical in the 1960's and 1970's the party has become increasingly positive to the idea over the last few years and has sponsored it in several parliamentary resolutions. At present, the zone proposal is at the center of the nuclear weapons policy of the Social Democratic party.

The zone concept is considered an ideal instrument both to reduce further the potential role of nuclear weapons in Denmark's defence and to contribute to international detente. In fact, the peacetime implications of a Nordic zone as a confidence-building measure are being increasingly stressed, while the potential wartime consequences are downplayed. Detente policy is another field where the parliamentary majority has parted ways with the general trend in NATO, and especially U.S. policy. In the early 1980's the Social Democratic government strongly emphasized the negotiation part of the dual-track decision, and in general argued for the resumption of the detente of the 1970's. At present, the alternative majority is characterized by a deeply suspicious attitude to the policies of the Reagan Administration both vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and the Third World. The present government parties prefer to take a low profile, but would certainly welcome a return to a general Western detente policy.

**Defence Policy in the 1980's**

While many aspects of alliance politics turned confrontational during the 1980's defence policy proper has remained - at least formally - a consensus area and continued to be regulated by broad defence settlements between Social Democrats and bourgeois parties. Since 1979 two major defence agreements have been negotiated covering the 1981–84 and 1985–87 periods respectively.

But agreement has been more difficult to arrive at and has involved a higher degree of mutual and unilateral concessions than before. In 1980–81 negotiations dragged on for about 18 months, mainly on the budget question with the bourgeois parties insisting on a three percent increase according to NATO's LTDP programme, while the Social Democrats argued for a zero solution. In the end a compromise was struck on a modest increase of some 0.7 percent - which was later
eliminated, however, in a deal between the new bourgeois government and the Social Democrats a year later.

In contrast, negotiations in 1984 for a new agreement were swift and undramatic, even though they started in an atmosphere of violent clashes between government and opposition over INF. The two situations — confrontation over INF and compromise over defence — were, however, intimately linked in the policies of both the Social Democratic party and the government parties.

In the case of the Social Democratic party linkage was provided by the claim that its new nuclear weapons policy did not affect the party’s basic pro-NATO and pro-defence posture. Its willingness to conclude a new defence settlement was therefore meant as a signal to friend and foe of the limits to its volatility in security policy. On the part of the government parties the traditional defence policy consensus with the Social Democrats has always been highly important, and historically they have been willing to pay for it by accepting less than satisfactory defence agreements. Under the parliamentary circumstances prevailing in 1984 where the defence budget might have become a target for the alternative majority if the Social Democrats were not tied down by a new settlement, such considerations acquired added weight.

Therefore, even if both parts were motivated to reach an agreement, the government parties were, on balance, willing to concede most, and on a number of issues the Social Democrats had their way, e.g. with respect to their demands for a zero solution for the defence budget and for some limitation to its indexation.

Another important concession to the Social Democrats involved the beginning phase-out of larger units (frigates and submarines) from the Navy. This trend reflects the party’s scepticism as to the possibility and advisability of a forward defence posture in the Baltic and its preference for a close-range coastal defence with smaller units.

The issue of forward defence was raised once more in 1986, when the Social Democratic party published a new defence proposal in preparation for a new agreement after 1987. This proposal marks a further step away from forward defence by also questioning the present Danish contribution to the forward defence of Schleswig-Holstein and Jutland, and by linking this scepticism with the support for defensive defence, «a non-threatening defensive defence structure, which is a defence system, which by its composition demonstrates peaceful, non-offensive intentions, but which at the same time is able — in cooperation
with other nations – to inflict such losses on an aggressor in and from its own area of sovereignty, that an aggression cannot be assumed on beforehand to lead to a successful result for the aggressor».

Both forward defence and defensive defence (where the Social Democratic model is much more conventional than the «pure» models discussed by peace researchers and others) are likely to become heatedly discussed principles during the next year or so – and both have obvious implications for Denmark’s role in NATO’s defence strategy.
In this paper two interrelated themes have been pursued. One bears upon Denmark’s basic relationship to the Atlantic Alliance and her role in it; the other one concerns the specific interrelationship of Danish policies in three «games», the alliance game, the adversary game and the domestic game.

Until around 1980 it was still possible to classify Denmark as a loyal ally despite her reservations with respect to foreign bases and nuclear weapons on her own territory and notwithstanding her modest defence effort, for these features were counterbalanced by the fact that Denmark seldom questioned official NATO strategies and policies. In judging the present Danish alliance policy the current fragmentation of the official policy-making process poses a problem. The Schlüter government evidently wants to pursue a «loyal» NATO policy and would probably prefer a more NATO-oriented course than the one followed by successive Danish governments up to 1979 - if it were allowed to do so. But due to the parliamentary constellation since 1982, the government does not control the making of alliance policy, only its implementation, and as a consequence a blurred image of official Danish NATO policy emerges. As far as the line pursued by the alternative parliamentary majority is concerned, Denmark is no longer a «loyal» ally, but a rather independent one. Central aspects of alliance policy – INF deployment, TNW modernization, the flexible response strategy including first-use – are being opposed or questioned; the alliance leader is being severely criticized for its policies over a wide range of issues, such as arms control, SDI and Central America; and a number of policies and strategies are being propagated which seem incompatible with an unchanged participation in NATO, e.g. a Nordic nuclear weapon-free zone and defensive defence. Even though the government in its implementation of these policies has succeeded in blunting their impact, the official alliance policy can hardly be termed «loyal» any longer.

If this is so, it is a reflection of the increasing importance of the domestic game in deciding the security policy of the country. As we have seen, domestic concerns have played a major role in determining alliance policy since the late 1940’s but their role has increased perceptibly since the traditional consensus coalition started to crack in the
early 1980's. Consequently considerations concerning the alliance and adversary games play a diminishing role in deciding Denmark's policies within the Alliance.

In the alliance game proper, Denmark has traditionally pursued a mixture of «C» (cooperation) and «D» (defection) strategies. «C» strategies with respect to alliance organization, its political balance between the United States and others, and its basic strategies and policies. But a moderate «D» strategy with respect to the application of these policies to Denmark's own security policy posture. The reservations concerning bases and nuclear weapons are the best examples of this feature. Since around 1980, this traditional balance has tipped away from «C» strategies, even though cooperation in the strictly military field has actually increased over the last decade. What has changed is the traditional acceptance (not always enthusiastic) of the alliance «mainstream», and the adoption of independent positions on a number of issues which are central to alliance cohesion.

In the adversary game a similar shift of balance has occurred from a mixture of «D» and «C» strategies to a strategy dominated by cooperative elements. Danish security policy basically rests upon a «D» strategy of deterrence and defence towards the Soviet Union, but conciliatory «C» strategies (whose temperamental roots can be found in the Danish neutrality tradition) began to assert themselves as soon as the Cold War had peaked, e.g. in the 1953 ban on foreign bases. During the 1960's and 1970's a high-profiled detente policy was pursued, but without questioning the basic notion of an adversary relationship with the Soviet Union.

In the 1980's the adversary relationship is less pronounced. Threat perceptions are changing away from the traditional notion of the Soviet Union as the chief threat to peace and security in Europe, and instead the arms race or the U.S.-Soviet confrontation as such are seen as the main threat. Furthermore, the idea of «common security», i.e. that security cannot be found in confrontation with, but only in cooperation with the adversary, is gaining ground and has become the official security policy doctrine of the Social Democratic party. Similar attitudes are reflected in the opposition to forward defence, which some argue is provocative, and in support for the principle of defensive defence. In such a context, «D» strategies towards the adversary tend to become played down, while «C» strategies are being emphasized.

In short, what seems to be happening is that the traditional mixture of
«C» and «D» strategies in the alliance and adversary game is being replaced with alliance strategies with preponderance of «D» elements and an adversary strategy heavily based on «C» elements. As the analysis of Danish policies before the 1980's shows, these trends are not novel; what is new, is the balance between them. To what extent these trends will permanently determine Danish alliance policy is unclear at the present moment, however. As mentioned, they are contrary to the policy of alliance loyalty which the government would like to pursue, and it is no foregone conclusion that they would be allowed to dominate totally in the alliance policy of a future Social Democratic-led government. Most likely it would steer a course somewhere in between the traditional alliance policy and the one it tries to force through in opposition, i.e. play the role of a moderately independent ally.
Notes and references

This is a revised version of a study presented at the Oslo International Symposium, «Perspectives on NATO and the Northern Flank», in August 1986.

2. Ibid., p. 167.
5. Ibid., p. 469.
14. The establishment of BALTAP is not yet properly researched. For an (official) overview, see Udenrigsministeriet, *Dansk sikkerhedspolitik 1948–1966*, vol. 1, ch. IX (pp. 99–112).

46
16. Ibid., pp. 335, 337.
20. Bertel Dahlgard, Kamp og samarbejde. Nærbilleder af politik og politikere gennem 40 år, Copenhagen: Fremad, 1964, p. 120.
22. Ibid., p. 30.
23. See «Notes on a Meeting at the White House, January 31, 1951» (where General Eisenhower explained his strategic conception, i.a. to President Truman), FRUS 1951, v. III, p. 450.
24. Ibid., p. 655.


