America's Post-Cold War Commitment to Norway

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Introduction

The purpose of this paper is to describe the likely implications of the new U.S. National Security Strategy for Norway. The intent is to reduce the uncertainty regarding the future of Norway’s ongoing Atlantic relationship as Norway wrestles with the difficult task of redefining relations with Europe. At first glance, security concerns appear to be tangential to Norway’s decision to seek or reject membership in the European Community (EC). Increasingly, however, Norway is viewing security in broad terms as the sum total of opportunities presented by political, economic and military ties to international institutions. Consequently, the EC membership issue is in fact closely linked to security.

Nevertheless, the growing Norwegian emphasis on broad international ties has failed to erase Norway’s historic wariness of larger, potentially domineering partners. For this reason, one would expect Norway to accept ties to other nations as in the manner of the past -- only to the degree absolutely necessary to achieve essential objectives, and only if the terms are likely to minimize the risks of domination. In the past, Norwegian security policy balanced the risks of dominating influence via a triangular relationship with America and Europe. If Norway wishes to maintain a balanced relationship, Norway must ascertain where its corners are. To the extent possible, this paper attempts to peg down the American corner.

One of the most difficult variables to peg down is the extent to which American commitment to Europe might decline after the collapse of the East Bloc and Soviet Union. Between the unlikely extremes of business as usual and wholesale disengagement, how much future strategic emphasis on Europe are Americans willing to buy? In particular, can Norway continue to depend on the availability of American reinforcements in a crisis situation? Or will it be necessary to seek a strengthened American tie (at the risk of greater U.S. influence) or,
alternatively, full-fledged ties (and obligations) to the EC and Western European Union (WEU)?

This paper asserts that fears of declining American commitment are overblown. Too narrow a focus on American *Military Strategy* has lead to the erroneous conclusion that U.S. commitment to Norway is dependent on Norway’s utility to American strategies to maintain Superpower balance. The paper concludes, to the contrary, that the strength of America’s ongoing commitment to Norway comes from broader political goals contained in the national *Grand Strategy*. Many of these goals preceded the Cold War and will outlive it, given *Grand Strategy’s* increasing emphasis on collective security, coalition-building and economic integration.

*Grand Strategy* sits at the top of a hierarchical arrangement of American strategy — above Military Strategy, contingency planning and military operations. While each level of the strategic hierarchy has unique significance for the U.S.-Norwegian security relationship, only the highest level establishes the logical link between ongoing American interests and U.S. readiness to reinforce Norway militarily. Since the formulation of *Grand Strategy* is subject to democratic process, it bears legitimacy and maintains civilian direction of military efforts over the long term.

Specifically, this paper asserts that the emergence of isolationistic American policy is an unrealistic prospect. The *Grand Strategy*, as outlined in the *National Security Strategy of the United States*, stresses engagement; although, engagement will rely more heavily on collective action when intervention is necessary. The *Grand Strategy* strongly reaffirms the vital importance of Europe to ongoing U.S. national interests. As a tangible sign of resolve, the *Grand Strategy* endorses a force structure which demonstrates both the intent and the capability to remain engagement and to fulfill European commitments. Moreover, the *Grand Strategy* has emerged from the political process largely-supported by Congress. The evolving European
force structures, by contrast, do not reflect political resolve to take on commitments at the far corners of the globe.

There is, to be sure, disagreement over the exact size of the Base Force. Yet, the central debate is not over commitment but over the correct characterization of risks facing U.S. interests. From this debate, it is nonetheless possible to identify the likely range of future U.S. force levels and forward deployments and to assert that, even at the lowest level, Norway can continue to depend on U.S. reinforcements as a reliable deterrent. By contrast, the fast-declining capabilities of European forces leave much to question. Given U.S. intent to retain the capability to respond to challenges to U.S. interests alone, if necessary, one might assert that U.S. reinforcements represent the only reliable deterrent available to Norway.

The paper concludes that Norwegian defense will remain an American interest in spite of a marginal decline in Norway’s geographic importance to the task of maintaining strategic balance.

The conclusion that even the lower force level will be sufficient to maintain U.S. commitments and demonstrate commensurate with risk, does not settle the uncertainties about the future of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). While the U.S. intends its forward deployments to demonstrate full and continuing support for NATO, it is not certain that all NATO members will interpret them as such. Nor is it certain that some European efforts to strengthen the Western European Union (WEU) will not inadvertently (or intentionally) undermine NATO’s security primacy in the future. A more balanced partnership will undoubtedly test a new style of U.S. leadership.

If Europeans, nonetheless, signal their preference to go it alone, it is difficult to imagine that the U.S. could sustain the will to fund a serious, forward-based contribution to European
defense. Should NATO be thus undermined, it is difficult to imagine that Norway would choose to base security on a solely bilateral relationship with the United States. Thus, knowing that the U.S. will stand by its European commitments as long as the U.S. presence is desired does not necessarily simplify Norway's choices.
The Situation in Norway
Rethinking Security

One of the last hold-outs among the so-called "reluctant Europeans" -- the Nordic countries which have resisted the magnetic convergence toward the European Community (EC) -- is Norway. Historically isolationist, Norway has carefully managed its formal ties to Europe and America in order to avoid small-state entanglement in large-power politics. To many Norwegians, becoming reliant on the decisions of larger states is to risk loss of sovereignty, a risk that looms as real as any military threat to national security. Therefore, prior to World War II, Norway relied heavily on a policy of neutrality to achieve security. The decision in 1949 to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) meant overcoming past preferences for isolationism. However, the lessons of World War II and the proximity of overwhelming Soviet force made it clear that Norway could not achieve adequate security

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1 The other is sparsely populated Iceland which has decided not to seek membership in the European Community.


3 On the other hand, one might argue that Norway's contribution to third world aid -- one of the highest per capita in the world -- or Norway's energetic involvement in UN peace-keeping operations demonstrate proactivity in world affairs. Yet, this involvement actually highlights Norway's philosophical and moral reservations toward power-political European relations. Instead, Norway's actions underscore the Norwegian belief that relations among nations ought to be based on the rule of law and on high morale principles. Not coincidentally, Norway supports international organizations which stand for the rights of the nation-state regardless of its size. Norway's charitable involvement in the third world does not challenge large power interests and it actually reinforces Norwegian sovereignty by underlining the responsibilities states bear toward each other. Norway's participation in activities which promote international law contributes to Norwegian security by strengthening recognition of the rights of small states.
through solely national means and would have to accept deeper involvement in international politics.

For Norway, achieving adequate security during the Cold War meant ensuring the credibility of an Allied military response to deter Soviet aggression. NATO membership, a single entangling alliance, redressed the imbalance between national means and the demands of national security. Potential gains from more demanding ties to Europe or America were not worth the risk of losing more freedom of maneuver or worth surrendering more sovereignty. However, as the Cold War ended and accelerating Western European integration began to dominate European relations, Norway began to question the standing premises of national security. A new consensus began to emerge that task of achieving national security will assume new dimensions at least as important as the past’s rather one-dimensional focus on the availability of credible military responses.

In the debate over the direction of future security policy, Norway -- like the rest of Europe and America -- is struggling to establish a new set of facts and assumptions that accurately describe Europe’s new security environment. This is a historic moment in which Norway’s eventual conclusions will contribute to shaping the mental map of the European security environment; they will affect the nature of future bilateral security relations with the U.S.; and they will influence Norway’s decisions about force restructuring and European Community membership.

Enduring Realities

Norway recognizes that in spite of revolutionary changes to the general European security environment, four long-standing security realities -- specific to the "High North" -- remain the same: First, while the likelihood of Russian aggression against Norwegian territory is for the moment remote, solely Nor-
wegian resources will never be adequate to establish credible defenses should Russia again become threatening or should Russia see coercive use of force as an expedient to obtaining regional objectives. That Russia will remain pacific is far from sure, given political and economic conditions there.

Unlike Europe’s central region, where the Warsaw Pact collapse and the agreement on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) have ended both the bipolar stand-off and the fear of coercion, Norway still faces daunting Russian force levels on the Kola Peninsula, even though these forces are not necessarily directed at Norway.\(^4\) The existence of these regionally preponderate forces preserves local, bipolar-like conditions and unique Nordic risk factors, including:

- The possible coercive use of force as economic blackmail, as an expedient to political crisis, or as leverage in a territorial dispute.
- The resurgence of Russia’s historic aspirations in the region -- the least of which would be to insure ice-free access to the Atlantic.
- Russian over-sensitivity to the regional balance of power, given the need to guarantee the security of strategic military assets based on Kola.

Second, while the Cold War’s end marks increasing effectiveness of the United Nations, the world still lacks international authority capable of guaranteeing the sanctity and security of nations through the rule of law. Norway cannot merely hope that Russian intentions will remain benevolent; Norway must be able to rely on real capability to enforce Norwegian

\(^4\) For an assessment of the increasing relative importance of conventional force on the Kola Peninsula versus the Central Region, see Tomas Ries in Tønne Huitfeldt, Tomas Ries and John Kristen Skogan, "Sovjet i nord etter CFE," IFS Info (Institutt for forsvarsstudier: Oslo, No 5-1991), chap. 2.
sovereignty and to respond in time of crisis. Real backing, not rhetoric, will be a prerequisite to maintaining Norwegian resolve should Russian military intimidation become actual.

Third, while the absolute requirements for maintaining deterrence are declining, credible deterrence is still necessary. Deterrence requires that the Alliance still demonstrates its military responsiveness -- especially in the North where Russian force levels remain high and forward presence is low.\(^5\)

Fourth, from the Norwegian point of view, the requirements for insuring tractability in U.S.-Norwegian security relations remain the same - Norway must maintain ties to both the U.S. and Europe if Norway is to have ties to either. The U.S. guarantee to the Alliance remains the essential counterweight to Russian power; only the U.S. possesses the wherewithal to control the sea lanes which would determine Norway's fate in war. Yet, Norway continues to believe that purely bilateral dependence on the U.S. would pose unacceptable risk to Norwegian freedom of maneuver. Norway remains fearful of becoming locked into sole reliance on U.S. support to balance the threat of adverse developments across the Russian border. Especially now, as the rest of Europe loses its preoccupation with the Soviet threat, Norway fears the loss of a voice among NATO equals in dealing with the United States.

Emerging Assumptions

While the enduring realities argue for continuation of Norway's past security policies, a changing security environment is forcing reassessment. One emerging planning assumption is

that NATO will be less capable of responding to Norwegian national defense needs in the future because factors now on the decline -- American presence, NATO force levels, and the sense of urgency over NATO's defensive mission, -- will undermine Allied capabilities and decrease NATO's reliability in reinforcing Norway. As Chief of Defense Admiral Toralf Rein notes,

Concurrent [with reductions in Norwegian capabilities], our Allies are undergoing significant reductions in their forces. Consequently, the likelihood of obtaining the Allied help we need in a crisis situation is also declining.6

A second assumption is that Norway will become increasingly exposed and vulnerable to Russia power and instability. In the absence of a large, clearly defined threat to Europe and America; economic, environmental and social problems rather than defense will command Europe's attention and national resources. At home and abroad, public support and legislative backing for defense budgets of Cold War proportion will collapse. As an institution, NATO will lose its primacy owing to the effects of defense apathy and the rising importance of other institutions, notably the EC. Meanwhile, forces facing Norway directly across the border on the Kola Peninsula will remain at roughly their Cold War levels.

A third assumption is that Norway will lose influence within NATO and, consequently, a voice in European affairs. This will result from not only NATO's institutional decline but from the decrease in the value of Norway's geographic position on the strategically important Northern Flank of the Alliance. The resulting loss of importance will exacerbate Norwegian isolation.

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6 Forward to Forsvarsstudien (The Defense Study), February 1992, p. 3. (author's translation)
A fourth assumption is that the definition of security will assume dimensions broader than the past focus on military threats and balance. According to Foreign Minister Stoltenberg,

Norwegian foreign and security policy must be tailored to a new reality in which the focus of our security efforts is in the process of being extended from military considerations to encompass ecological and economic factors as well. Poverty, environmental degradation and mass migration are forcing countries to work together in the knowledge that our future security must be forged together.  

Modern limitations to achieving national objectives through use of force will reduce the significance of the military component of national power. Meanwhile ties to economically powerful and politically influential international institutions will take on greater importance as guarantees against insecurity and instability. On the one hand, this is a welcome development, because economic and political strategies will begin to replace military strategies as the primary means to reducing risks from Russia. On the other hand, Norway’s historic isolationism -- a factor in Norway’s reluctance to join the EC and accepting demanding economic and political ties with Europe -- is hampering efforts to achieve the broader definition of security.

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7 Statement to the Storting on foreign policy, 10 February 1992, Utenriksdepartement Informasjon, Nr. 6, 11. February 1992, p. 4.

8 Note for example Foreign Minister Thorvald Stoltenberg’s address to the Leangkollen Conference on 3 February 1992: The “adversary” is less often to be found on the other side of the border; both the “adversary” and the possibilities are now more likely to transcend national borders.
The Norwegian Security Triangle

In the past, Norway has maintained a balanced relationship with partners, America and Europe, who have provided the strategic balance to deter the Soviets. Norway’s intention has been to optimize security while maximizing freedom of maneuver. The triangular relationship provided Norway with credible defenses on Norwegian terms and secured the essential American commitment. Yet, the institutional framework shielded Norway from (perceived) susceptibility to domineering U.S. influence. Norway believes that perpetuating this triangular relationship is a desirable and suitable means for dealing with the new European security environment; however, the new security assumptions, as noted above, make the task problematic.¹⁰

Norwegian membership in the EC would maintain the integrity of the triangular security relationship by strengthening Norway’s European tie -- now threatened by the decline of NATO’s primacy. Membership in the EC would also represent a security-enhancing tie to an influential international organization and enlarge the set of available security options

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⁹ Norway permits no basing of foreign troops, no storage of nuclear weapons and no Allied exercises in Finnmark, the county bordering Russia.

¹⁰ Defense Minister Holst describes this triangular relationship as "double anchoring." See "Utenriksdebatten i Stortinget 13.2.1992," UD Informasjon, Nr. 8, 14 February 1992. Summarizing the original and ongoing impetus for a triangular relationship, Holst observes, "We needed a tie which could similarly engender cooperation and prevent Norway from being squeezed between the superpowers such that the military dispositions in our immediate area would be mainly derived from the competition-cooperation relationship between the two superpowers. The tie to Europe contributed to securing Norwegian freedom of maneuver and equality. This conclusion seems still valid, but the European anchor point is under transformation." Speech to the Norwegian Atlantic Committee as reproduced in FD Informasjon, February 1992, p. 3. (author’s translation)
for Norwegian security policy. Without a strong European tie, Norway could become more fully dependent on a bilateral relationship with the U.S. Should U.S. commitment prove to be on the wane, as some Norwegians suggest, Norway could end up alone facing "local neighbor-state relations between a continental great power and a small, peripheral state."  

11 Because NATO's European members sometimes establish consensus in the WEU forum prior to addressing issues in NATO, Norway has already missed opportunities to influence security decisions. Officially, the U.S. expresses no preference regarding Norwegian membership in the EC, but privately many American officials point to the advantages that Norwegian membership in the WEU would have toward strengthening the "Atlanticist Wing" which includes the UK, Netherlands and Portugal.  

The Norwegian Identity Crisis

The ongoing EC membership debate has fundamental significance for the Norwegian security debate. Though, in terms of public attention and media emphasis, the economic and political aspects of the Norwegian EC debate overshadow the security issues. The prevalent use of demonstratives like "exposed," "marginalized," and "isolated" by Norway’s leaders convey concern over the adequacy of Norway’s security ties to Europe. All this is leading to an identity crisis. Events argue in favor of broader, deeper ties to Europe; while tradition advises steering clear. The identity crisis is prompting a careful reevaluation of the suitability of the institutional framework through which Norway defines (and limits) its European involvement and achieves its national security.

Norway’s identity crisis stems from: a sense of exclusion from the main trends in Europe, an anticipated decline in the importance of NATO, a sense of exposure to Russian power, and an anticipated decline in U.S. commitment and a possible swing back toward isolationism.

Euro-Exclusion

Ironically, Norway is at once wary of European involvement and fearful of European exclusion. A history of unpleasant relationships with larger powers created a Norwegian perspective of the world that suggested Norway would be best served by steering clear of European affairs.\(^\text{13}\) However, the reality of

\(^\text{13}\) See for example Olav Riste, "The Historical Determinants of Norwegian Foreign Policy," in J.J. Holst (ed.) *Norwegian Foreign Policy in the 1980s* (Oslo 1985). The Experience in the shadow of Russian power and under the rule of Denmark and later Sweden produced the following fundamental tenets of Norwegian security:
limited national resources makes it clear that economic and defense self-sufficiency are beyond Norway's means. Thus, Norway came to accept the necessity of certain ties to the international community. As the EC and the WEU assume greater importance relative to NATO and EFTA, Norway is losing confidence that she is maintaining the correct ties.

Norway's limited participation in the mainstream of European convergence is producing a risk of marginalization. While the EC members are progressing toward political and economic union, EFTA is fading from existence as its members seek entry into the EC. To Norwegians, the decreasing relative importance of Norway's ties to Europe through NATO and EFTA serve only to highlight the significance of the EC's progress. Efforts by members like France, who wish to see the WEU take on a dramatically expanded role, threaten to further weaken NATO's role.

Domestically, the question of Norway's membership in the EC is highly divisive. Widespread resistance to membership is deeply rooted in social, economic and historic grounds. Northern communities based on agriculture and traditional economies are highly dependent on various forms of government subsidy which oil revenues have made possible. "District policy" distributes resources to sparsely populated regions based on equity rather than economic rationality. A common perception is that these communities will be extremely hard hit by exposure to EC competition and by the loss of

- Links to war-prone powers would result in unnecessary entanglement in their disputes.
- Foreign ventures by Norway would attract the undesired attention of larger powers to the otherwise uninteresting European periphery.
- A natural security mechanism in the form of great power balancing behavior would protect Norway in the absence of formal ties.
government support. Thus, joining the EC in the near-term is problematic. Yet, marginalization and isolation seem to loom as near-term risks.

Decline of NATO and Norway's "Valued-Role"

At this decision point in Norway's relations with Europe, how Norway chooses to define future relations depends in part on perceptions of whether or not America and Europe will continue to support NATO. Although American and European commitment of specific national forces to Norwegian defense is largely a matter of bilateral relations, the pledge to come to Norway's defense lies in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.14 NATO, in turn, forms the centerpiece of Norway's security policy and provides Norway's most important link to the U.S. and Western Europe.

Naturally, Norway associates the reliability of the Alliance commitment with the health and viability of the institution itself. Yet more significantly, Norwegians have a strong tendency to see the reliability of the commitment as contingent upon Norway's continuing value to the Alliance members. This assumption -- with which this paper takes issue -- is a product of Norwegian historical experience and the Norwegian analytical perspective which emphasizes geopolitics and Realpolitik.

NATO, the post-war centerpiece of Norwegian security policy, appears to be under attack from different directions: First, the

14 "The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they ... will assist the Party or Parties so attacked...including the use of force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area." The North Atlantic Treaty as reproduced in The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Facts and Figures (NATO Information Service: Brussels, 1989), p. 377.
end of the Cold War and the declining significance of strategic balance in the North seem to undermine Norway’s geographic value to the U.S., in particular, and Europe, in general. Second, the rise of "European pillar" presents an institutional challenge to NATO at a time when NATO’s traditional raison d’être is in question. Add the Norwegian outlook that Russian power will continue to pose an ongoing risk for Norway, and an important source of Norway’s insecurity today becomes clear; Norway’s perceived need for outside assistance remains strong, but the opportunities for securing commitment are disappearing.

While the NATO and EC summits in December 1991 have temporarily reaffirmed NATO’s primacy in security matters (thereby easing the pressure on Norway to consider radical policy change immediately) it is clear that two fundamental transformations have begun: the measure of state power is shifting away from military means, and the institutional locus of power is shifting away from NATO. The former transformation is beyond the influence of individual states. However, the extent of the latter will depend on diplomacy, commitment and the willingness to see NATO evolve. For example, the outcome of the NATO and EC summits could have been very different in the absence of strong U.S. and British pressure to maintain NATO’s primacy for security.

How durable and successful will be such pressure to preserve NATO in the future is of central importance to Norway. NATO has enabled Norway to satisfy unique security needs while lending weight to Norway’s voice in European affairs. However, Norway’s option to maintain its current line of security policy is only as viable as the NATO institution itself. In turn, NATO’s viability is as dependent on the continuing loyalty of its European members as it is on the durability of American support. A crisis in confidence on either side of the Atlantic can have as much impact on shaping or limiting future security options as advances toward European unity or the disintegration of the East Bloc.
Until the German invasion of April 1940, Norwegians viewed geographic remoneness as a natural security asset which helped compensate for limited defensive capability. Norway believed it unlikely that aggressive European powers would identify compelling interests in their remote region of the European periphery, especially if Norway retained a low, nonaligned profile. Demonstrated Norwegian vulnerability discredited the belief that geographic remoteness and neutrality policy could provide adequate security. Yet, the apparent corollary -- that geographic remoteness offers few incentives for allied commitment -- seemed to represent an inescapable handicap in efforts to satisfy the newly-acknowledged need for outside assistance.

With little to offer compared to larger states that broker power and resources in order to attract allies and insure tractability, Norway seemed condemned to bargain from a position of weakness. Yet, historic aversion to accepting either dictated terms or an overly dependent position compels Norway to seek a valued role. Like states with small, open economies competing for a niche markets, Norway identifies unique strengths relative to security options and capitalizes on them.

\[15\] Reinforcing this perspective was the argument that in the unlikely event an outside power were tempted to pursue its interests in Norway, aggressive intervention would trigger balancing behavior on the part of Great Britain. Since Norway believed the defense of Norway to be in Britain’s interest, Norway assumed the existence of an "implicit guarantee." Riste, pp. 13-14.

\[16\] The idea that self-interested balancing behavior of great powers would provide an implicit guarantee lost much -- but not all -- of its credibility when Britain failed to stave off the German invasion. What remained was the idea that Norway would have to attract the self-interest of stronger powers to the task of Norwegian defense. What had changed was the estimation of what it would take to bind allies to the task. As a minimum, Norway believed she would have to increase her value in the eyes of potential allies to spur their recognition of self-interest and to establish a position of equality within the relationship.
One may observe the tendency to establish and exploit a valued role in each of the institutions to which Norway sought membership since the end of the Second World War. For example, Norway sought the role of "bridge-builder" between East and West within the nascent UN. In 1948, while Norway was conducting negotiations with Sweden and Denmark concerning a Scandinavian Defense Pact, Foreign Minister Halvard Lange sought to establish ties with the U.S. which would make Norway a conduit for American arms to the potential Nordic Security Alliance. Later, Norway embraced the key role as NATO's strategically important Northern Flank. Forward-thinking analysts, who see Norway's importance to NATO declining, envision supplying oil and gas as the new valued role within the EC. Understanding the Norwegian mindset -- a preference for isolation, tempered by recognition of the need to seek external assistance, yet only after establishing a valued role to guarantee terms approaching equality -- explains in part why NATO has so uniquely suited Norway's requirements.

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<th>INSTITUTION</th>
<th>&quot;VALUED ROLE&quot;</th>
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<td>Nordic Alliance</td>
<td>&quot;Arms Conduit&quot;</td>
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<td>United Nations</td>
<td>&quot;Bridge-builder&quot;</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>Northern Flank</td>
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<td>EEA/EC</td>
<td>Source of oil and gas</td>
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NATO also redresses Norway's most pressing need -- the lack of resources to establish credible deterrence -- on terms amenable to Norway's special historical and geographic


situation. The provisions of Norway's participation in NATO provide a low-tension solution to the dilemma of proximate Russian power.\textsuperscript{19} It is a sensitive task to establish defenses strong enough to deter yet not threaten.\textsuperscript{20} NATO solves that dilemma for Norway, and the collective nature of the security system helps to allay Norway's historic wariness of bilateral relationships which permit allies to become bullies.

NATO's unique suitability explains why Norway placed virtually all of her foreign policy eggs in a single security basket. Norway's geographic position anchored the Northern Flank and played a key role in the U.S.-Soviet strategic balance. Norway's special value to the Alliance insured that Norway would enjoy a position of equality. Norway sees others motivated by self-interest and sees herself as lacking the power to impact those interests. Yet by providing special value, she can redress the imbalance to a certain extent. Norway perceives her Alliance involvement as a mutually beneficial relationship; Norway provides an essential watchful eye and anchor for the Northern Flank. In return, Norway enjoys a voice in mainstream European affairs out of proportion to Norway's size and power. By comparison, Norway's

\textsuperscript{19} In order to avoid high tensions and possible escalation of forces along the border with neighboring Russia, Norway prohibits permanent stationing of foreign units in Norway. In order to redress the absence of robust forward defenses, NATO earmarks forces for rapid reinforcement of Norway. While the absence of extensive forward defenses in Norway detracted from the credibility of the defense, the reality of alliance solidarity lessened the likelihood that either superpower would risk a bloc confrontation for relatively modest gains in one region.

\textsuperscript{20} For an overview of Norway's Deterrence and Reassurance policy see, John Kristen Skogan, "Virkemidler, begrensninger og forutsetninger i norsk sikkerhetspolitikk," \textit{NUPI notat}, (Norwegian Institute for International Affairs: Oslo, Nr. 192, October 1980), pp. 3-14.
voice in the UN is diminuative, and the benefits of EFTA membership are tangential.\textsuperscript{21}

But now, as the West adjusts national and collective security policies to the post-Cold War world, Norway anxiously confronts the possibility that she has unwisely placed all her security eggs in one basket, NATO, under the now out-dated premise that unique geographic position would guarantee the centrality of Norwegian security interests among the other members of the Alliance.

Exposure to Russian Power

In most western security assessments, a set of lesser risks have replaced the Cold War threat of Soviet invasion. The collapse of communist domination of Eastern Europe has uncorked ethnic strife and created a risk of conflict spill-over or escalation. The disintegration of the Soviet Union has undermined central command and posed the risk of desperate groups gaining control nuclear weapons. Worsening material deprivation in the East has increased the prospects of massive migrations of economic refugees to the West. Nevertheless, the magnitude of these risks does not compare to the Cold War’s threat of a third world war centered on Europe.

Consequently, the mood in Western Europe is one of an increasing sense of security. The long-standing threat of short-notice Soviet invasion, which hung like a foreboding cloud over Western Europe, has dissipated. The common man

\textsuperscript{21} The prospect of participation in the European mainstream evokes mixed emotions in Norway. From a security perspective, Norwegians once viewed their geographic position on the periphery of Europe as an asset, because they believed that aggressive European powers would have no compelling interest to exploit the remote region. The German invasion dispelled the myth that aggressors might intervene, but did little to change the belief that allies would require compelling reason to defend the region.
believes that the threat has vanished and now expects a peace dividend. Politicians face the more welcome challenge of building a new Europe -- rather than the daunting task of forestalling its destruction. Increasing cooperation in European organizations and the United Nations is creating a feeling that concerted action and cohesion will reduce or at least contain risks. In sum, guarded optimism predominates in Western Europe.

This is not necessarily the case in Norway. Here, a growing sense of insecurity is taking hold -- not because Norway is skeptical toward concerted action or cooperation -- but because Norway is recognizing that Western European attention is no longer fixed on the Russia forces which kept NATO on center stage and which still loom as a threat to Norway. As a result, Norway is feeling more and more isolated from the central concerns of Europe.

Disconcerting to Norway is that while the still ominous force levels on Kola confirm Russia's ability to dominate the northern region, post-CFE Europe has consigned the Soviet threat to the history books. Norway's continuing focus on Kola contrasts sharply with Denmark, for example. Denmark no longer sees a military threat in the East and believes that the most important task armed forces can now perform is to promote integration and prevent the renationalization of German forces. Meanwhile, some Norwegians interpreted the recent reorganization of the NATO command structure as a concrete example of Norway's isolation in NATO. Thus, Norwegian and Central European security concerns seem to be diverging, and European attention is starting to shift away from NATO toward organizations in which Norway has no voice, the EC and WEU.

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Conclusions

Norway is anxious over the future of the Atlantic security relationship. Partially excluded from the process of convergence in the European Community, Norway senses that its links to Europe through NATO and EFTA will prove inadequate to prevent Norway’s gradual marginalization. Exacerbating a growing sense of insecurity is the realization that the treaty for reductions of Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) has not only failed to reduce the Soviet force preponderance in the North but has made the Kola Peninsula a haven for forces formerly deployed in the central region. Now some Norwegian analysts are suggesting that the Cold War’s denouement presages the decline of Norway’s strategic importance to U.S. security interests. This suggestion adds to Norway’s growing sense of isolation and fuels long-standing anxiety about the strength and durability of the U.S. commitment to Norwegian defense.

Anxiety over ties to America stems from two main causes. First is the general tendency to interpret U.S. motives from a predominantly Realpolitik perspective. Second, Norwegian historical experience has made Norway wary of too strong a dependence on alliance partners. Norwegians tend to see American interest in Norway as a function of Norway’s utility to U.S. military strategies and operational plans which focus on the regional superpower balance. Consequently, Norwegians often fail to appreciate that the source of U.S. commitment arises not from strategic concepts or operational requirements but from the set of long-term national security objectives.

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23 This conclusion stems from the Norwegian realpolitik perspective that American commitment in the North has been ultimately contingent on Norway’s geographical value to the execution of America’s Cold War military strategies. See for example Rolf Tamnes’ conclusion to The United States and the Cold War in the High North (Ad Notam: Oslo, 1991), p. 297.
which are established at the highest level of the U.S. policy-making process and which result from democratic process. The Realpolitik perspective tends to dismiss as altruistic ideology the U.S. assertion that U.S. foreign policy goals reflect at once broad compatibility between U.S. self-interest and world interests.

Norway’s fear of alliances comes from a self-image framed by historic experience: Five hundred years under Danish and Swedish rule demonstrate the ease with which small nation relationships with other powers can become synonymous with subjugation. The historical lesson teaches that Norway should avoid over reliance on strong partners. Yet, the World War II experience teaches a contradictory lesson. Isolation was a myth; Norway, in fact, lies geographically exposed and strategically desirable. Neutrality failed to stave off invasion. The lesson drawn is that Norway must secure the willingness of the Western powers -- specifically the U.S. -- to come to Norway’s defense.

Yet, this last lesson rests uncomfortably on the Norwegian psyche. First, there is the lingering fear of dominating alliance partners. Second is the problem of how to reconcile the self-interest of the U.S. with Norway’s self-interest. The dilemma becomes how to avoid domination while generating automatic commitment from a partner who will risk much and receive little. From the Norwegian perspective, Norway’s geographic utility to American military strategies provides the key to the dilemma. As long as Norway holds an important place in U.S. strategy, Norway can count on aid in time of need. The unsettling side to this perspective is that there appears to be no continuity to U.S. strategy.

American scholars, such as John Gaddis, trace continuity in American security policy during the Cold War by linking U.S. military strategy and operations to the central theme of containment. But containment is really a buzz word for grand strategy, the over-arching national plan encompassing eco-
nomic, political and defense strategies intended to achieve long-standing American objectives: democratic Europe, global free trade, deterrence of aggression, etc. By placing grand strategy and supporting strategies in proper perspective, it becomes evident that seeming changes in U.S. security policy have not reflected discontinuity or deviations from long-standing objectives but rather changing means -- the development of new technological capabilities and the evolutionary assessment of what activities are best suited to containing communism or maintaining deterrence -- and changing threats.

Norwegians have explained U.S. security policy toward Norway in terms of American execution of geopolitically-inspired strategies such as the Continental Strategy, the Maritime Strategy, and the Nuclear Strategy. The conclusions suggest that Norwegians gauge the strength of the American commitment to Norway based on the intensity of military operations and the strength of the U.S. physical presence in the North. Norwegians see the physical presence -- be it troop exercises, prepositioned equipment, aircraft carrier patrols, etc. -- as a direct reflection of the importance that Americans place on the region. Thus, the Norwegian outlook is that their country has been "relegated to a object" of varying value in international politics.

Combined with the demands of the two pillars of Norwegian security policy, the above Norwegian outlook creates a sense of national insecurity and a set of difficult defense challenges. The first pillar of Norwegian security policy -- "credible deterrence based on a strong defense" -- poses the challenge of securing U.S. commitment to the defense of Norway when American interest in the North seems to vacillate with the geopolitical strategy in vogue. Norway's tendency to correlate U.S. presence with U.S. commitment inclines Norway to seek physical mechanisms such as prepositioning and earmarking in order to guarantee U.S. embroilment in Norway's defense. Yet, the second pillar of Norwegian security policy -- reassuring the Soviets of defensive intent -- works against
Norway's impulse to redress its insecurity with physical signs of U.S. commitment.

Now in the aftermath of major changes in the world security situation -- the end of Cold War, conventional and nuclear arms reductions and Soviet fragmentation -- Norway's self-perception as an object of fluctuating value suggests to Norwegians that U.S. interest in the North will deteriorate and possibly leave Norway exposed to a still dangerous neighbor. Thus, Norway faces choices: Should Norway try to revitalize the U.S. guarantee? Should Norway turn to the emerging European Pillar? Should Norway attempt both or, failing a domestic consensus, must Norway fall back to a quasi-neutralist position of neutrality, a not inconceivable possibility, given Norway's tradition of isolationism.

The response may be an incrementalist approach -- moderate, evolutionary change which attempts to preserve the triangular balance of the past. Eventual Community membership is compatible with this approach. However, in the less likely event that crisis precipitates fundamental change in Norwegian security policy -- for example, an unexpected collapse of European or American support for NATO -- Norway could conceivably seek stronger bilateral ties with the U.S. or, conversely, resort to quasi-isolationism.

Yet, is it actually necessary for Norway to revitalize the U.S. guarantee? If so, what needs to be done? To this American observer, the Norwegian perception of a strong conditional linkage between Norway's geopolitical utility and U.S. commitment is exaggerated: Geopolitical utility is important to specific operations and to limited aspects of military strategy; but at the level of grand strategy, where America codifies its commitments, geopolitical utility is tangential.
U.S. Post-Cold War Security Strategy
Assessing Commitment

If Norway is to continue basing its security policy on a balanced triangular relationship with Europe and America, Norway must accurately assess the current and likely future status of U.S. commitment to Norway. This paper contends that understanding the relation of military strategy, force structure, and contingency planning to grand strategy provides the best picture of what Norway can expect the U.S. to do for Norway in the U.S. national interest.

Part II describes the relationship among the components of American strategy -- grand strategy, military strategy and contingency planning; the relation between strategy and force structure and the relation between strategy and commitment. The intent is to show that while each component plays a unique role within a hierarchical relationship, together, the components of the strategy hierarchy shape the nature of U.S. security relations with other states; including: the intensity of the peacetime presence, the quantity of security assistance, and the plans for crisis response. Yet only one component, grand strategy, directly reflects U.S. commitment in the sense of legitimizing the obligation to assist or translating national resolve into the ability to act. The other components affect the relationship but do not provide a direct reflection of the strength of U.S. commitment.

Armed forces exist to make war or, by their potential to make war, to deter it. In a democratic nation like the U.S., the decision to create armed forces and commit them to the defense of other countries results from political process. The process takes place at the highest level of government because the nation's security and treasure are at stake. One important goal of the process is to establish broad national consensus; therefore, the process is open, and the terms of debate are fundamental if not simplistic. There is, for example, no
mention of Norway in the *National Security Strategy of the United States*. Yet, this grand strategy document, more than any other, encapsules American commitment to Norway and Europe, and provides both the rationale and the authority for maintaining a force structure to back the commitment.

The conclusion that the President’s Grand Strategy provides the best reflection of U.S. commitment rests on the document’s creation of a logical link between the national interest and national goals, the legitimacy of its democratic formulation process, and the authority of its agenda. Nonetheless, Grand Strategy exercises the least influence on the specific nature of security relations because it provides only broad, overarching guidance. Rather, the framers of military strategy and the operational planners exercise greater practical influence on the specific nature of security relations. Yet, these lower levels, while under the guidance of grand strategy, are themselves influenced by factors do not necessarily reflect the strength of U.S. commitment: varied interpretations of guidance, organization-specific goals, bureaucratic competition, etc..
Three Levels of American Strategy

Although used in many contexts, the term strategy, stripped of modifiers, has only general meaning. Hedley Bull provides a representative definition of strategy as the art or science of shaping means so as to promote ends in any field of conflict. Although the body of literature which treats the subject is rich with strategy genre, there is a conspicuous paucity of literature showing the relationship among strategy types.

One helpful way to conceptualize America strategy is to think in terms of a strategic hierarchy with: (1) a policy-making echelon on top that focuses on political ends and exercises legitimate democratic power over the hierarchy, (2) a mid-level that divides its focus between understanding the political ends and shaping the means, namely, military doctrine and the force structure, and (3) bottom level that plans for the application of military means under specific situations called regional contingencies.

Grand Strategy

Overarching at the top is Grand Strategy, the President’s high policy guidance which outlines how the United States will balance means and ends in three realms -- politics, economics and defense -- for the purpose of achieving national security. U.S. Grand Strategy (1) identifies and prioritizes national interests, (2) establishes national objectives, (3) assesses threats and trends impacting on the national interests, and (4) outlines a policy agenda aimed at attaining goals in each of the three dimensions.

The Administration articulates Grand Strategy through White House documents such as *The National Security Strategy of the United States*, through key addresses by high officials, and by the Administration's response to international events and crises. The National Security Strategy is a fundamental foreign policy document. That portion of The National Security Strategy addressing the "Defense Agenda" is the basis for the National Defense Strategy which the Secretary of Defense amplifies in his classified *Defense Planning Guidance* and his *Annual Report to the President and Congress*. Together, these are the fundamental defense policy documents.

Military Strategy - Principles, Force Structure and Doctrine

At the next level, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), in their roles as service heads and in consultation with the commanders of the Unified and Specified Commands

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26 Issued once every two years to military leaders and civilian Defense Department officials, *The Defense Planning Guidance* is a classified policy document internal to the Pentagon and not provided routinely to Congress. The document provides guidance on formulation of strategy, budgeting and force structuring. Although the Pentagon's undersecretary for policy supervises the drafting of the paper, the President, National Security Council and senior security advisors provide input.

27 While the chain of command runs from the President through the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Unified and Specified Commands, the Joint Chiefs exercise no command authority over the Unified and Specified Commands. The "Unified
establish national military objectives which support the grand strategy, (2) recommend a budget and force structure to fulfill U.S. commitments and achieve military objectives, and (3) formulate strategic principles for the employment of the armed forces. Thus, the Joint Chiefs are responsible for ensuring that both current and future force structures can attain political goals.

The Joint Chiefs and the 400 officers of the Joint Staff receive outside assistance, solicited and unsolicited, in formulating strategic principles. Civilian strategists, especially those concerned with nuclear forces, have played a central role in shaping strategic thought. Civilian efforts take place both on behalf of the military -- as in the case of the RAND Corporation -- and as independent efforts to provide alternative views.\(^\text{28}\)

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Command Plan" (UCP), a flexible agreement among the JCS, designates command areas of responsibility based largely on geography, as in the case of the multi-service unified commands, or on functional considerations, as in the case of the normally single-service specified commands. The Modern US War Machine (Crown Publishers: New York, 1987), p. 31.

\(^\text{28}\) As Fred Kaplan observes, the origins of the RAND Corporation stem from the emergence of civilian operational research during World War II when the growing technological complexity of weapons, their effects and employment called for systematic assessment of military operations in order to improve results. Air Force Project RAND was the outcome of the desire of General Henry (Hap) Arnold and others to perpetuate civilian scientific participation in war planning. The Wizards of Armageddon, (Simon and Schuster: New York, 1983) pp. 52-59. RAND’s involvement in the technical aspects of employing the Air Force’s nuclear-capable bombers led naturally to interest in using the weapons both to deter aggression and to win wars. Thus RAND assumed a central role in the development of nuclear doctrine through the works of Albert Wohlstetter, Bernard Brodie, and others. See Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, (St Martin’s Press: New York, 1989) pp. 135-136. RAND’s focus on finding ways to exploit the benefits of nuclear weapons -- even as the reality of strategic stalemate became clear -- associates RAND perhaps most closely with the concept of deterrence by denial and, consequently, with
Additionally, in their roles as heads of the military services, the Chiefs of Staff are responsible for the formulation of warfighting doctrine in the individual Military Departments. Thus, doctrine is largely service-specific; although, extensive planning and coordination for operations occurs at the joint (multi-service) and combined (alliance) levels. Doctrine links strategy to force structure and guides training of the forces. The Army's current warfighting doctrine, for example, is called AirLand Battle.  

Operations and Contingency Plans

At the third level, the Unified and Specified Commands use the guidance from the Joint Chiefs to plan and conduct peacetime operations and to plan for contingencies in their nuclear warfighting strategies; while other groups of civilian strategists -- of which Robert Jervis is representative -- stress the relevance of deterrence by punishment and the futility of nuclear warfighting strategies. See Robert Jervis, The Ilogic of American Nuclear Strategy, (Cornell University Press: Ithaca, NY, 1984) and The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution, (Cornell University Press: Ithaca, NY, 1989).

Dating from 1982, the focus of Airland Battle doctrine (U.S. Army Field Manual 100-5, Operations) is the aggressive employment of smaller, yet highly capable, forces to defeat a larger Soviet-style attack. The doctrine, used in Operation Desert Storm to defeat Iraq, emphasizes four tenets -- initiative, depth, agility and synchronization -- to fight three concurrent battles -- Deep Battle, Close-in Battle and Rear Battle. The Modern US War Machine, pp. 62-63. Currently in revision to incorporate the new strategic emphasis on projecting power from the U.S., the updated doctrine will be called AirLand Operation doctrine. The United States Army Posture Statement FY93, p. 37.
areas of responsibility. Operational planners think mainly in terms of the geographic region or the theater which is the responsibility of their command, and they focus on the employment of forces in being, both those organic to the command and those likely to be assigned to the command under a given contingency.


31 For example, planning and operations involving Norway and Norwegian waters fall within the larger areas of responsibility of both the Commander-in-Chief of the Atlantic, who is also Commander of the Atlantic Fleet, and Commander in Chief of Europe, who is also Supreme Allied Commander Europe.
The Strategic Hierarchy

Moving down the strategic hierarchy one observes a gradual transition in emphasis from political goals to military objectives, from making deterrence succeed to what to do if deterrence fails, from encouraging allies and discouraging enemies to defending allies and defeating enemies. The transition parallels the transition in responsibilities of the strategic levels. The political leadership is responsible for establishing adequate deterrence so that productive peacetime economic and political interactions can occur. Resorting to the application of force is the least desirable means of achieving political goals.

The JCS are responsible for allocating their resources so that the forces are capable of serving political purposes during peacetime -- deterring enemies and encouraging allies -- but they are also responsible for winning in the event of war. At the level of military strategy, the basic considerations are the Principles of War\(^2\) not the rules of diplomacy. The JCS are not responsible for balancing economic, political and defense agendas. They compete against these agendas with the outlook that the more resources devoted to defense the better.

The Top of the Hierarchy

At the top, the key actors of the administration are politicized. Party loyalty is a prerequisite to their being elected or appointed. The political significance of their advice is a foremost consideration. However, at the level of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, professional military competence is the most important criterion for gaining appointment. Any concerted

attempt by the administration to politicize these positions would meet opposition from Congress and the military services. As Richard K. Betts concludes from a study of the selection of the Joint Chiefs,

Most candidates for appointment have been determined by a thirty year process of interservice selection, not by a history of partisan identification. The executive has some freedom of choice among the candidates but usually only in a prophylactic sense by ensuring that the chief is not an enemy of administration policy or strategy. Even this degree of discretion is not always possible, particularly in administrations that make strategic changes affecting the missions of the services ....

The Bottom of the Hierarchy

Below the Joint Chiefs, an officer's professional expertise earns him a role in strategic planning. Knowledge of international political relations is important, but technical military expertise takes precedence. Expressions of political loyalty are inappropriate. In fact, the American officer corps prides itself on its apolitical character and its adherence to policy guidance from elected leaders.

Yet, while they adhere to policy, lower levels of the hierarchy experience decreasing public scrutiny and an increasing need to interpret broad political guidance. Schooled in the Principles of War -- not the principles of economics, politics or diplomacy -- military strategists will choose to err on the side of caution where the Principle of Mass suggests that more is better: more bases, more presence, more allies, etc.. But

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because lower levels of strategy are not subject to close public scrutiny, their penchant for more is not necessarily backed by the same legitimacy that Grand Strategy bears.

America's commitment to Europe, a main focus of the national Grand Strategy, is guaranteed in a agreement ratified by the U.S. Senate. This commitment remains in the public consciousness, and the President and Congress routinely revisit and reaffirm America's support for NATO. Conversely, extended deterrence, flexible response and forward defense, the main concepts behind U.S. Cold War military strategy in Europe, are well understood by only small segments of the educated American public. Detailed understanding of the strategic concepts behind exercises such as Teamwork and REFORGER, which rehearse reinforcement of Europe through prepositioning, is virtually nonexistent.

Until recently the most important U.S. warplan called for the reinforcement of the European central region's forward defenses, which included four U.S. divisions, with six additional U.S. heavy divisions within 10 days. The plan called for stateside, active duty troops to fly to airports near European storage sites where they would draw prepositioned equipment, deploy and counterattack to stop Warsaw Pact breakthroughs. While the security community has debated in detail the strengths and weaknesses of the plan in open source literature, the American public has little interest in understanding details of the plan. Thus, when strategists change the plan or alter the exercise which test it (such as the recent decision to conduct Teamwork once every three years), the public does not notice, and there is no legitimate change in commitment.

Legitimacy

While the process of formulating Grand Strategy brings out inherent tension between the President and the Congress --
who share Constitutional powers but not necessarily common views of national priorities\(^{34}\) -- the formulation process demands compromise and consensus-building at the highest level of government. Thus, the formulation process serves three important functions: it endows the national security strategy with democratic legitimacy; it insures the subordination of military objectives to political goals; and it provides broad guidance to the lower levels of government.

In theory, the President uses the National Security Council (NSC)\(^{35}\) to hammer out a coherent national security strategy which he empowers by virtue of his Executive authority.\(^{36}\) However, the President and the NSC do not have the final word as far as Congress is concerned.

\(^{34}\) The balance between Presidential and Congressional powers (the crux of the interminable confrontation between Hamiltonians and Madisonians) fluctuates over time. The Legislative branch was dominant until the 1930s when President Roosevelt assumed new powers to fight the Great Depression and tipped the power balance in favor of the Executive branch. Now, according to Howard E. Shuman, "[w]hat modern Presidents and their entourages seek is to exercise in relatively tranquil periods the powers that Lincoln and Franklin Roosevelt exercised during dire emergencies." "National Security -- Shared and Divided Power," in The Constitution and National Security, Walter R. Thomas and Howard E. Shuman, eds. (National Defense University Press: Washington, D.C., 1990.) pp. 58-59. Nonetheless, Congressional initiatives -- such as the War Powers Resolution (1973), the Hughes-Ryan Amendment (1974), and the Intelligence Oversight Act (1980) -- represent significant, ongoing attempts to decrease executive power and increase accountability.

\(^{35}\) The National Security Council consists of the President, Vice-President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Assistant for National Security Affairs who heads the National Security Council Staff.

Intense governmental interest and public scrutiny accompany the formulation of Grand Strategy; therefore, one may liken the process to a national exercise in consensus-building. When the process succeeds, Grand Strategy acquires democratic legitimacy conveying the public will.

Notwithstanding the tradition of executive primacy in foreign policy\(^\text{37}\) -- which acquiesces to the President the task of articulating Grand Strategy -- the formulation of Grand Strategy requires the participation and support of disparate players in the Executive bureaucracy, the Departments, the Congress and the U.S. public. While the President devotes fully one-half of his time to national security,

\[\text{No President can dominate American government, as a Prime Minister may speak for the whole of government in a parliamentary system. In Washington there are many competing institutions concerned with national security, each linked with subgovernments in international affairs and often differing in the advice they offer to the White House.}^{38}\]

Consensus-building must begin during the initial stages -- the identification of national interests and the designation of national objectives. These must conform to the Constitution,


and their basis in common ground is necessary to encourage Congressional magnanimity and discourage contentious public debate.\(^9\) Failure to generate consensus at this ground-laying stage would leave Grand Strategy open to attacks at fundamental levels and doom it a dearth of support during later attempts at implementation.

During the next stage of the process -- namely, identifying and assessing threats to U.S. interests -- the need to maintain consensus continues to constrain Presidential flexibility. Ultimately the President must obtain Congressional budget approval. Yet, even earlier, the natural formation of mainstream consensus within key groups -- the security community, the staff of the NSC, academia and the Congress -- confronts the President with practical boundaries. Even if the President wishes to buck the consensus, there are limits to how much political capital he can afford to expend persuading the various actors to support incremental changes at the margins.

James J. Tritten, who was one of the first to identify the President Bush's August 2, 1990 speech at the Aspen Institute as a fundamental development in American Grand Strategy, attributes Bush's initiative to the likelihood that early-on the President accepted the consensus of his intelligence community that the Soviet Union would need "at least one to two years or longer to regenerate the capability for a European theater-wide offensive or a global conflict."\(^40\)

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\(^40\) *Tritten*, p. 2.
Moreover, Tritten asserts that the source of the delay between the early announcement of the new strategy and its later appearance as policy was due to the time needed to conduct consensus-forming debate within administration staffs -- a process which apparently must take place even in cases where the President himself is behind a strategic initiative.41

Because the process of Grand Strategy formulation must run a high-level, high-visibility gauntlet of consensus-building, Grand Strategy emerges as a national product, endowed with considerable democratic legitimacy.

Civil Control

Grand Strategy represents civilian control of the military and the subordination of military ends to political goals. This is true because the civilian leadership formulates Grand Strategy and the military leadership defers to the policy guidance contained in the Grand Strategy. For example, in determining the required capabilities of the U.S. Armed Forces, the Joint Chiefs are careful to establish clear links between military strategy and Grand Strategy.

They take as their starting point: the national security interests and objectives and the assessment of threats to U.S. interests as outlined in the President's National Security Strategy.42 Then the Joint Chiefs designate national military objectives which follow directly from the objectives in the Grand Strategy.43 Finally, the Joint Chiefs demonstrate how the

41 Tritten, p. 10.

42 See the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1991 Joint Military Net Assessment (JMNA), March 1991, pp. iii and 1.2 - 1.4.

43 1991 JMNA, pp. 2.1-2.3.
national defense policy agenda serves as the rationale for the central military strategic concepts.\textsuperscript{44}

For the defense agenda, the National Security Strategy presents force capabilities guidance for achieving five goals: nuclear deterrence, forward presence, crisis response, reconstitution, and restructuring of the armed forces. For example, to restructure the armed forces, the guidance lists general requirements for mission types and broad capabilities. Thus, Grand Strategy provides the framework for defense planning, but does not provide details.

For a variety of reasons -- not least of which is the need to maintain consensus during the formulation of Grand Strategy -- the high policy guidance contained in Grand Strategy assumes a broad and general nature. Because Grand Strategy provides only broad guidance, subordinate levels must interpret the guidance and provide detail based upon technical military expertise. This process introduces elements which do not face the same intense public scrutiny as Grand Strategy. Thus, in spite of the subordination of Military Strategy to Grand Strategy, Military Strategy lacks the democratic legitimacy necessary to be a true reflection of the strength of U.S. commitment.

\textsuperscript{44} JMNA, pp. 2.3-2.6:
The Relationship between Strategy and Force Structure

Inasmuch as strategy is concerned with shaping means to achieve ends in a field of conflict, force structure represents the means. Where forces cannot achieve objectives, strategy is hollow rhetoric. Consequently, each level of the strategic hierarchy seeks a force structure that will accomplish its objectives. While differences in the responsibilities of each level can create differences of opinion over the size, capabilities and employment of the force structure, subordination in the hierarchy means that the objectives are largely in-sync and mutually reinforcing.

The Executive seeks forces sized to achieve the policy objectives of the Defense Agenda -- deterrence of enemies, reassurance of allies, protection of American interests, etc. - - but the Executive cannot afford forces that are over-sized. Defense is only one of three security agendas competing for limited resources.\(^45\) Obtaining limited resources in a democracy means balancing priorities, expending political capital in Congress and generating popular support for bearing burdens. Consequently, the Executive must decide at some point to cap the size of the force.

\(^{45}\) At the level of Grand Strategy, sizing the force structure depends not only on the relative allocation of resources among Defense, Political and Economic Agendas, but on the weight the Executive assigns to the various objectives in the Defense Agenda itself. For example, regarding reassurance of allies, Lawrence Freedman notes, "From the start the force structure of NATO was assessed as much in terms of what it told the Europeans about the strength and extent of the US commitment to their defence and what it told the Americans about the seriousness of the Europeans in helping themselves, than than of what it told the Soviet Union about the likely consequences of aggression." *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy* (St. Martin’s Press: New York, 1989) p. 74.
The decision to limit the force size means assuming the risk of being unable to respond to simultaneously-occurring contingencies. Subordinate levels, which are directly responsible for the performance of the force structure, would rather eliminate this sort of risk-taking by hedging against uncertainty with extra forces. However, throughout the post-war period, administrations have been confronted with political and economic constraints which forced them to cap the size of the force structure.

After the Korean War, for example, President Eisenhower decided against the apparent confirmation of NSC-68's logic for large, standing conventional forces and relied more heavily on less-expensive nuclear weapons to maintain deterrence. By the early 1960's, the Kennedy Administration recognized that the growth of Soviet nuclear capabilities posed risks which undermined the credibility of Massive Retaliation, and relying on conventional forces for maintaining deterrence regained emphasis. Nonetheless, the US and its Allies never backed the Flexible Response strategy with the full contingent of conventional forces sized according to the military's assessment of threats.

The 1962 General Purpose Force Study showed that 55 divisions would be necessary to cover eleven planning contingencies. However, The Kennedy Administration rejected this force structure as unrealistic and substituted a "two and one-half war" strategic concept as the likely worst-case of simultaneously-occurring contingencies. Nevertheless, neither the Kennedy nor the Johnson Administrations ever realized even the 28 divisions called for by this down-sized strategic

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46 The National Security Council under Eisenhower combined the desire to constrain defense spending for the "long haul" and the wish to exploit the deterrent potential of America's preponderant nuclear forces in the Basic National Security Policy (NSC-162/2) or the "New Look Strategy." Ibid., pp. 78, 81-85.
concept. Eventually, the Nixon Administration further reduced the concept to a "one and one-half war" scenario.47

Given the political and economic constraints to maintaining conventional forces large enough to cover all contingencies simultaneously, each administration has had to accept risk. However, each also attempted to reduce risks, either by incorporating force multipliers into their strategies or by relying more heavily on nuclear deterrence.

Today, the trend continues. On 17 February 1992, The New York Times reported the existence of Pentagon planning for seven regional contingencies.48 The implication of the report to some is that the Pentagon uses such scenarios to justify a force structure capable of responding to these contingencies simultaneously. Such a force would require dozens of divisions. Yet, the Pentagon does not use this type of contingency planning to justify unattainable force structures. As the 1991 Joint Military Net Assessment (JMNA) shows,49 the Pentagon's recommendation of force size balances the probability of a given contingency's occurring with the consequences of the U.S. failing to respond adequately to the crisis. This methodology presents a clearer picture of risk.

Like its predecessors, the Bush Administration has had to decide what level of risk to accept regarding the possibility of contingencies occurring simultaneously. He judges the Pentagon's assessment of risk in light of America's political and economic constraints. In parallel with past Grand Strategies,


48 The report was based on leaked excerpts of the classified Defense Planning Guidance. The leaked scenarios were in fact a slightly more elaborate version of the five contingencies outlined in the 1991 Joint Military Net Assessment, pp. 1.5-1.8.

49 JMNA, p. 1.8.
President Bush's National Security Strategy attempts to reduce risks inherent to a smaller force structure by placing emphasis on elements which mitigate the need for larger conventional forces:

- Enhanced nuclear deterrence through modernization, strategic defenses, and arms control.
- Enhancement of conventional deterrence through alliances, collective security and cooperation with Russia.
- Force generation capability through Reconstitution and reserve force structure.
- Intervention via coalition action and with the support of the UN.
- Enhancement of force projection through Contingency Forces, strategic lift and prepositioning agreements.

The National Security Strategy outlines the rationale for the force structure but only in broad terms. By providing guidance -- identifying and prioritizing national interests and objectives, reaffirming national commitments, and establishing a defense agenda that serves as the conceptual foundation for national defense -- Grand Strategy provides a mandate to force planners; but it does not provide the detailed strategic principles which address in detail the type of forces and capabilities needed to respond to regional contingencies.
Parallels between elements of past Grand Strategies intended to compensate for conventional force structures too small to cover all contingencies simultaneously:

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<tr>
<td>Maintain commitments/ Burden-sharing</td>
<td>Maintain Collective Security</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Force Generation</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Minimize Congress budget cuts</td>
<td>Force Packages/ Reconstitution</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Intervention</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Deliberate unpredictability</td>
<td>Coalition Action</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Force Projection</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Tactical escalation</td>
<td>Crisis Response/ Strategic Mobility</td>
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The National Security Strategy outlines the rationale for the force structure but only in broad terms. By providing guidance -- identifying and prioritizing national interests and objectives, reaffirming national commitments, and establishing a defense agenda that serves as the conceptual foundation for national defense -- Grand Strategy provides a mandate to force planners; but it does not provide the detailed strategic principles which address in detail the type of forces and capabilities needed to respond to regional contingencies.
The JCS flesh out the foundations of the "Defense Agenda" of *The National Security Strategy* with the Strategic Principles and Force Planning and Employment Guidance in *National Military Strategy*. The Force Planning and Employment Guidance specifies the nature of forces required to implement the National Military Strategy (the Base Force) and how the Base Force is to be employed (the planning framework for the Unified and Specified Commands).

For example, the assessment of an uncertain security environment in the National Security Strategy leads to the identification of *Crisis Response* as a broad capability requirement. The JCS then outline a posture of strategic *Readiness* to support Crisis Response, and designate a multi-*Regional Focus* to replace the Cold War focus on the Soviet threat in the Central Region. Thus, instead of a Cold War force structure geared toward forward defense and reinforcement, the new force emphasizes power projection capabilities -- mobilization, deployment and sustainment.

**JOINT CHIEFS -**  
The National Military Strategy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Force Planning and Strategic Principles</th>
<th>Force Planning and Employment Guidance</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Readiness</td>
<td>- Regional Focus</td>
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<td>- Collective Security</td>
<td>- Adaptive Options</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Arms Control</td>
<td>- Nuclear Targeting</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Maritime &amp; Aerospace Superiority</td>
<td>- Forward Presence Operations</td>
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<td>- Strategic Agility</td>
<td>- Conflict Resolution</td>
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<td>- Power Projection</td>
<td>- Global Conflict</td>
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<td>- Technological Superiority</td>
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<td>- Decisive Force</td>
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52
The Planning and Employment Guidance organizes and deploys conventional forces according to regional and functional force packages: Atlantic Forces, Pacific Forces, and Contingency Forces. The JCS size and match the force packages to the regional requirements for Forward Presence and the potential for crisis response.

Conventional Packages of the 1995 Base Force (active):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PACIFIC</th>
<th>CONTINGENCY</th>
<th>ATLANTIC</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Korea:</td>
<td>U.S. based:</td>
<td>Europe:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-1 HVY DIV</td>
<td>-2 LT DIV</td>
<td>-2 HVY DIV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-1 TFW</td>
<td>-1 AASLT</td>
<td>-3 TFW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-2 HVY DIV</td>
<td>-7 TFW</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Japan:</td>
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<tr>
<td>-2 TFW</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>-1 CVBG</td>
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</table>

Hawaii/Alaska
- 1 LT DIV

Hawaii/Okinawa:
-1 MEF

U.S. Based:
-5 CVBG
-1 MEF

SUM
- Army: 2 DIV 5 DIV 5 DIV
- Navy: 6 CVBG 6 CVBG
- Marines: 2 MEF 1 MEF
- Air Force: 3 TFW 7 TFW 5 TFW

TOTALS
Army: 12 Divisions (3 Light, 1 Air Assault, 8 Heavy)
Navy: 12 Carrier Battle Groups (450 ships)
Marines: 3 Marine Expeditionary Forces (approx. 150,000)
Air Force: 15 Tactical Fighter Wings
For the first time, the development of new strategy in NATO has affected changes in U.S. strategy rather than the other way around. As Gen (Ret.) John R. Galvin, former SACEUR, notes

[The new national military strategy] is meant to dovetail into the NATO strategy. We worked the NATO strategy from the U.S. side with the rest of the Alliance members, and after that we adjusted our own strategy to come into line with it in many ways.50

As a result, NATO’s strategic concept51 for force characteristics closely mirrors U.S. force planning:

- Smaller force with reduced forward presence
- Highly-ready, multinational Reaction Forces for crisis response
- Mobility
- Flexibility
- Main Defense Forces in multinational corps
- Force expansion capability with National Augmentation Forces
- Less reliance on nuclear weapons

The Relationship between Grand Strategy and Commitment

_U.S. commitment_ is the extension of an expectation to provide defenses normally reserved for national territory. While the incentive to defend national territory is inherent, the incentive to defend abroad is far less compelling, if not nonexistent, in the absence of a clear connection between national interest and foreign involvement. Not surprisingly, U.S. allies occasion-

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51 NATO force concepts as presented by the U.S. Mission to NATO.
ally question America's resolve to honor commitments. American's can, in turn, point to quantifiable military capabilities, but popular will and political resolve are quantities which defy measurement.

Grand Strategy draws a logical connection between the national interests and foreign engagement and thereby helps to focus popular will and political resolve prior to crises. As Lawrence Freedman observes,

*The comparatively swift American Response [to the North Korean Attack of June 1950] was helped by the intellectual ground that had been prepared by... NSC-68.*

In formulating a national plan of action, Grand Strategy nurtures domestic consensus and strengthens national resolve. By focusing political will prior to crisis, Grand Strategy makes possible a steady investment in a force structure that is capable of deterring potential aggressors. By identifying interests which the U.S. intends to defend, the U.S. discourages challenges and reassures friends and allies, thereby increasing stability and decreasing the chances that commitments will in fact be put to the test.

The extension of an expectation to defend may reflect vital long-term, national interests and result in a formal treaty obligation, or it may reflect less important interests and result in the temporary deployment of power projection assets. Even

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52 Freedman, p. 74.

53 In addition to informal, bilateral security relations which have the effect of producing varying expectations of commitment, the U.S. has entered into seven formal defense alliances and treaties with over 40 countries: The Rio Treaty (including most of Latin America), NATO, the Manila Pact (Australia, France, New Zealand, Philippines, Thailand, and the UK), U.S.- Japan, U.S.- Republic of Korea, U.S.- Philippines (now expiring), and ANZUS (Australia and New Zealand).
in the absence of any explicit promise, an expectation of assistance can result when it becomes fairly clear to other nations that U.S. interests are at stake. In all cases, though, one may trace American resolve to maintain foreign security back to U.S. national interests laid out in the Grand Strategy.

A well-known example of U.S. Grand Strategy is the high-policy guidance issued in April 1950 as NSC-68. NSC-68 provided the rationale for enlarging the conventional force structure to contain Soviet expansionism. The North Atlantic Treaty, which had come into effect a year prior to NSC-68, cemented U.S. political commitment to Europe but failed to specify the extent or type of military commitment. In the U.S., the treaty created no sense of obligation to station troops in peacetime. During the Treaty’s ratification, the U.S. Senate not only envisioned no peace-time stationing of troops, they assumed that the U.S. response to attack would consist of aerial bombardment and protection of sea lanes.54 In fact, the U.S. possessed no capability to commit significant forces in 1950 even if the Soviets had attacked. The administration’s purpose in drafting a grand strategic plan, NSC-68, was to redress Europe’s vulnerability to conventional attack.

Sources of U.S. Commitment

American leaders signal U.S. resolve to assist in another country’s defense when the consensus of opinion over the country’s value to U.S. national interests and the perception of the country’s vulnerability to external threat are high enough to overcome the inertia to do nothing. Owing to both the counterweight of domestic concerns that compete for resources and America’s historic wariness of entanglement, this inertial threshold is high.

54 Freedman, pp. 69-75.
The measure of a country's value in American eyes can be the sum of diverse -- in fact, immeasurable -- factors: ranging from moralistic motives (such as support for human rights) to clearly self-interested objectives (access to oil) to quasi-idealistic purposes (propagation of democracy and the American way) to the practical (securing access to free trade). These motives are difficult to measure effectively. However, it is clear that the perceived value of a country to U.S. interests increases when the U.S. formalizes the commitment in the form of a treaty and thereby adds American credibility to the sum of interests; America's credibility to uphold its treaty pledges is itself an element of power which reinforces U.S. security and requires management.

In contrast to assessing a country's value, determining its vulnerability seems more straightforward, a process of gathering hard facts about a potential aggressor's relative military capabilities. Yet ascertaining the presence or absence of aggressive intentions makes vulnerability assessment problematic as well.

Gauging the strength of American commitment is difficult not only because the value-setting mechanism is vague, but because the executive bureaucracy's signals are not always consistent with the actual strength of the commitment. There are several explanations for this ambiguity: inadequate public scrutiny, incorrectly interpreted guidance, poor diplomacy, lack of clear consensus, political resistance in the other country toward U.S. influence, etc.. For example, there was a strong basis of commitment to Kuwait prior to the Iraqi invasion, but it was inadequately signaled. Additionally, the U.S. underestimated Saddam Hussein's intentions and consequently misread the extent of Kuwait's vulnerability. Another example of ambiguity is the extent of U.S. commitment to Israel. Based on today's signals what is the strength of commitment? The U.S. deliberately avoids strong signals of commitment to avoid Israeli recalcitrance over a Palestinian peace settlement.
What does the U.S. presence around Norway signal to Norwegians? Much of the U.S. activity in the seas off Norway has had less to do with American commitment to Norwegian defense than with the maintenance of strategic balance and the monitoring of Russian power on the Kola Peninsula. Nonetheless, many Norwegians interpret this U.S. presence as a signal of the strength of the U.S. commitment to Norway. Now, as the decline of the Cold War threat permits a smaller presence, some Norwegians are overestimating the decline in U.S. commitment to Norway.

U.S. forward presence will decline to reflect reassessments of Russian intentions and declining Norwegian vulnerability. Norway’s tangential value as a listening post may become less significant as Russian strategic forces become less threatening and time proves the durability of improved intentions. Nonetheless, Norway’s value to ongoing national interests and grand strategic objectives will remain strong and unchanged.

The Value-Setting Mechanism

Obviously, there is no list in the State Department of the world’s countries rank-ordered by a systematic value-setting mechanism. Still, the U.S. is willing to fight on some foreign soils and not others. What is the combination of interests which tilt the balance in favor of fighting for a particular country and not another? In the war to liberate Kuwait, a combination of five factors proved compelling: aggression against a friend, access to oil, the feared emergence of Iraq’s capability (and apparent willingness) to use weapons of mass destruction, the absence of risk to American shores, and a broad international consensus. But would the U.S. have been willing to fight if Kuwait had no oil?

One may chose to characterize the value-setting mechanism according to either of two broad philosophies, American idealism or European Realpolitik. Americans idealism asserts
that the U.S. assigns value to other countries based on high principles. This philosophical outlook places high value on perpetuation of the American system. Thus, democratic countries with free markets deserve U.S. commitment because they mirror the American model. Extension of commitment is altruistic because the requirement is for other countries simply "to be like us." Cultural, linguistic and religious ties to Europe in particular reinforce a sense of self-identification which strengthens commitment.

From the European perspective, self-interest rather than altruism, motivates the U.S. The U.S. objective is to increase national power relative to others. Thus, the Realpolitik perspective asserts that countries take on value in American eyes as they contribute, for example, to a favorable military balance or to America’s economic prosperity. Commitment, then, is contingent upon the ability to provide utility.

One may square the circle by observing that the so-called "altruistic" interests -- world democracy, global economic development, etc. -- have consistently coincided with America’s national security objectives. For example, in contrast to America’s experience with dictatorships, democracies have never threatened U.S. security. As a rule of thumb, democracies do not fight each other. Global economic development presents the greatest opportunity to acquire markets for American products. Free trade as a national interest is compatible with long-term world interests. Thus, the U.S. is in fact acting in rational, self-interest.

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55 Seyom Brown observes that, "In the main, U.S. foreign policy leadership since the Second World War has been fortunate in the large measure of coincidence between the nation’s self-interest and the nations altruistic ideals." The Faces of Power: Constancy and Change in United States Foreign Policy from Truman to Reagan (Columbia University Press: New York, 1983), p. 16.
# American Grand Strategy

## IDEALISTIC "AMERICAN" PERSPECTIVE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interests &amp; Objectives</th>
<th>Threats</th>
<th>Relating Means to Ends</th>
<th>Extending Commitment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Europe</td>
<td>Economic deprivation</td>
<td>Provide economic assistance contingent upon behavior</td>
<td>Altruism: countries &quot;like us&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integrated economies</td>
<td>Political chaos</td>
<td>Defensive alliance</td>
<td>Vulnerable states</td>
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<tr>
<td>Free trade</td>
<td>Communist ideology</td>
<td>Forward presence</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Soviet military power</td>
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## REALPOLITIK "EUROPEAN" PERSPECTIVE

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interests &amp; Objectives</th>
<th>Threats</th>
<th>Relating Means to Ends</th>
<th>Extending Commitment</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S. power and wealth</td>
<td>Renationalised European forces</td>
<td>Create economic and military dependance</td>
<td>Opportunism: useful countries</td>
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<tr>
<td>Soviet impotence</td>
<td>Soviet military power</td>
<td>Attain basing rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>Obedient allies</td>
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Allies like Norway become skeptical of continuing U.S. commitment because they find it difficult to believe that our stated interests are genuine. For example, Americans claim that European democracy is a vital interest, while European realists assert that U.S. power is the true American interest. From this alternate perspective, European countries are valuable only as long as they contribute means to America's ends. With the dissipation of the Soviet threat, allies infer that they have less utility to American military strategy and, therefore, less chance of maintaining American commitment. Yet, the decline of America's relative economic strength and the increasing grand strategic emphasis on collective security and coalition-building, indicate that the value allies contribute through their political and material support of common goals will grow.

The Vulnerability Assessment

Assessment of vulnerability goes beyond an appraisal of a country's ability to defend its borders against potential aggressors; it includes an assessment of the country's susceptibility to armed suasion, "the psychological and political uses of force short of war."56 Because of the high costs of modern warfare -- economic disruption, international sanction, high lethality of weapons, and the risk of escalation -- aggressors prefer to press their objectives through subtle threats and coercion. The U.S. sees a state's inability to resist such coercive pressure as vulnerability.

That the U.S. will reassure its friends and allies by reducing their vulnerability to military coercion is a fundamental

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56 As Edward Luttwak postulates, "Any instrument of military power that can be used to inflict damage upon an adversary...may also affect his conduct...even if force is never actually used." The Theory of Suasion (John Hopkins University Press: Baltimore, 1974), p. 6.
objective of the National Security Strategy.\textsuperscript{57} Norway's situation -- a small, rich state on the border of powerful, yet impoverished, Russia; geographically juxtaposed to ice-free North Sea lanes between the Barents Sea and the North Atlantic; and a history of economic and territorial disputes with Russia\textsuperscript{58} -- is a classic example of potential vulnerability to the application of coercive armed suasion to gain concessions at the negotiating table. Recently restricted Russian access to Baltic Sea ports will likely increase the importance that Russia assigns to Murmansk and the ice-free Norwegian waters. Norway's fears of marginalization and isolation reflect clear recognition of the risks of armed suasion.

The Unique Importance of Credibility

By formalizing commitment, the strength of American commitment actually increases because of the extremely high

\textsuperscript{57} National Security Strategy of the United States, p. 4.

\textsuperscript{58} Areas of potential confrontation between Russia and Norway include:

- Delineation of a sector line and economic zone for the disputed "grey zone," the continental shelf waters of the Barents Sea which lie off the coast of Finnmark. Future petroleum exploration hinges on the delineation of this line.

- Fishing quotas.

- Control of the Svalbard Archipelago in the Barents Sea where Russian mining, oil and security interests have constrained Norway's ability to exercise full sovereignty granted Norway by the Svalbard Treaty of 1920.

importance U.S. leaders assign to credibility. Credibility -- how other states perceive U.S. resolve to respond to and fulfill commitments -- is an element of national power; therefore, its preservation is a matter of national interest. It has become commonplace, for example, to assert that America's interest in maintaining credibility figured larger than other interests motivating the intervention of U.S. forces in both Korea and Vietnam. The strength of a formal U.S. commitment, then, is the product of the original interests which inspired it and the value that policy makers place on America's ongoing credibility.

The argument is that a potential aggressor's perception of a lack of U.S. resolve will encourage challenges to U.S. interests. Frequent challenges present the possibility of a number of undesirable consequences: the exhaustive cost of responding; loss of credibility in choosing not to respond; the risk that simultaneously-occurring challenges will become unmanageable; and the risk that a conflict could escalate to nuclear war. Fulfilling commitments when challenges do occur enhances credibility and deters future challengers, thereby allowing the U.S. to attain its objectives without exhausting its resources.59 Likewise, credibility plays a role in reassuring

59 Robert J. McMahon observes, "Throughout the post-World War II period, American leaders have explained, defended, and justified a wide range of diplomatic and military decisions by invoking the hallowed principle of credibility. They have argued with remarkable consistency, privately as well as publicly, that demonstrating the credibility of American power and American commitments ranked among the most critical of all U.S. foreign policy objectives." "Credibility and World Power: Exploring the Psychological Dimension in Postwar American Diplomacy," Diplomatic History (Vol. 15, No. 4, Fall 1991), p. 455. As Thomas C. Schelling points out, the difficulty in establishing nuclear deterrence is "to make otherwise incredible threats sound credible." Arms and Influence (Yale University Press: New Haven, 1966), pp. vii-viii. Robert Jervis observes, that since states are rarely willing enter into war, what determines political outcomes is not the actual military balance of power but the perceived balance of resolve. The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon (Cornell University Press: Ithaca, 1989), pp. 42-45.
allies equally important as its role in deterring enemies. Maintaining credibility is, therefore, essential retaining the ability to lead and to influence.

Competing Domestic Concerns

One thinks of domestic concerns and military commitments competing in the context of yearly budget debates. Even though domestic and foreign agendas are two sides of one coin -- both promote national interests -- the government must prioritize finite resources. Determining priorities means striking a balance between foreign and domestic efforts.

Now, as it becomes increasingly clear that "strong macroeconomic performance on the part of the United States is not only an economic objective but a prerequisite for maintaining a position of global political leadership,"60 Grand Strategy provides the pattern for striking the balance. By making available the resources to implement the Grand Strategy, i.e., funding for the force structure called for by the National Security Strategy, the Congress confirms U.S. commitments with a tangible measure of U.S. political resolve and popular will.

But Congress never rubber stamps the Administration's budget requests. One perennial concern of Congress is the Allies' burden sharing. Congress cannot justify short-changing the U.S. domestic agenda if allies are not contributing a fair share to European security.61 And the perception is that the NATO


61 Note, for example, Senator Kent Conrad, Democrat-North Dakota, "We are spending over $100 billion a year to pay the military bills for Europe and Japan when we cannot pay our own bills. Why do we continue to subsidize...our major competitors?" as quoted in, "Allies' Burden-Sharing Issue Ranksles Congress," Defense News, February 10, 1992.
Allies are not bearing an appropriate share of the burden.\textsuperscript{2} The frustrated reactions of some members of Congress who threaten massive decreases in U.S. security assistance or forward deployments strikes many Europeans as a sign of impending isolationism.

American Isolationism?

One may trace the roots of an American isolationist tradition back to the nation's founding, when avoiding "entangling alliances" with the Old World, guided George Washington's conduct of external relations. Although American interests lay in balancing the expansion of German power, it was not until direct provocations against American lives and possessions that public opinion overcame the inertia to stay clear of both World Wars. America's post-World War II engagement -- leadership of a vast alliance system designed to contain communism, the assumption of world-wide commitments and the maintenance of a large military-industrial apparatus -- represents an unprecedented reversal of America's traditional non-involvement in the global balance of power.

\textsuperscript{2} One opinion of why NATO Allies would shirk defense burdens which are in the European as well as U.S. interest is given by a former Legislative Assistant for National Security Affairs to Senator Sam Nunn, Jeffery Record, who asserts, "The history of NATO has in fact been a history of heavy reliance on nuclear weapons, driven in part by a congenital reluctance of NATO's European members to fund anything other than the minimal conventional force improvements believed necessary to keep the American's happy. Since the early 1960s, the United States has sought conventional forces in Europe that would be capable, in the event of war, of shifting the onus of escalation onto Moscow, or at least raising the nuclear threshold. The Europeans, in contrast, have resisted acquiring a strong conventional defense, in part, for fear that it would serve to decouple the U.S. strategic deterrent from Europe's defense by eliminating equitable nuclear risk-sharing among alliance members." Jeffery Record and David B. Rivkin, Jr., "Defending Post-INF Europe," \textit{Foreign Affairs} (Spring 1988), p. 736.
This reversal stems from what Secretary of State Baker identifies as the principal lesson of World War II -- European security and American security are fundamentally linked. President Bush echoes this assertion when he affirms America's interest in remaining militarily engaged in post-Cold War Europe. Yet, in spite of American leaders' affirmations of continuing commitment, on the political right, Patrick Buchanan has made an appeal to reestablish priorities, namely, "America First -- and Second, and Third." On the political left, Pat Schroeder wonders why so many U.S. soldiers are still in Europe. Even non-isolationists, such as Zbigniew Brzezinski, warn of the impending loss of America's ability to execute global commitments without a vigorous domestic renewal.

In a final message to the nation, President Eisenhower warned that maintaining a large military-industrial apparatus would beggar the nation and create an unwarranted influence. Thirty years later, unparalleled debt does threaten to beggar the nation, largely as a result of military spending against the Soviet threat to Europe. But now a defunct Soviet Union poses no immediate threat to Europe. Aside from nuclear weapons, it cannot threaten American shores. Is it time to heed Eisenhower's advice and dismantle the large military-industrial apparatus? If America and its closest allies face no serious security threat, why not return to America's traditional focus on America?

Obviously, the processes of global economic integration and technological advancement have erased the possibility of returning to 1920's isolationism with prosperity. Isolationists generally do not suggest rolling back these processes. As a national objective, promoting economic integration, both to prevent the return of dangerous pre-World War II conditions

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and to invigorate trade, pre-dates Containment. The U.S. is now too dependent on foreign markets to risk the trade wars which would result from erecting the barriers of isolationism. Therefore, economic engagement must remain a key objective. But aside from economic engagement, there is still leeway for a wide range of military involvement bounded by over-extension, on the one hand, and by disengagement from Containment-era commitments on the other. One question is whether over-extension has already exhausted America’s ability to uphold its commitments.

Many Europeans expect neo-isolationism to emerge in America from the recognition that military over-extension has undermined the domestic economy. Accordingly, the anticipated sign of a swing toward isolationism is Congress’ redirection of resources away from commitments, troops, bases and procurement over to the rejuvenation of the domestic economy. However, the assumption that a gloomy domestic economy will force Congress to pull the plug on military spending, does not take into account the positive effects that military spending has on stimulating economic growth. Moreover, congressmen do not want to close local military bases; they do not wish to cut funding to weapons plants in their districts; nor do they desire to contribute to unemployment or exacerbate the recession. In his efforts to rationalize military spending, Secretary of Defense Cheney has actually met stiff resistance from Congress to his choices of base closings and program cuts.64 Thus, the economic incentives for dismantling the military are in fact limited. They are of insufficient weight to trigger a swing toward neo-isolationism.

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64 For example, Congress blocked Administration attempts to cut spending on the Seawolf Submarine, equipment for the Reserve Component, upgrades to the M1A1 Main Battle Tank, modifications for the Navy’s F-14 fighter, and funding for the Standoff Land Attack Missile, Defense News (May 11-17, 1992) p. 6.
What is perhaps most salient in the eyes of Congress after the Gulf War, is the economic impetus in favor of maintaining ready, mobile military forces. Although President Bush drew an emotional analogy between the disastrous appeasement Adolf Hitler and the consequences of failing to halt Saddam Hussein's aggression, America's economic interest in insuring access to oil stood as a clear, if not decisive, economic incentive to action. Even though Democratic Representative Les Aspin, Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, has led an attack against the Base Force structure, he affirms that the U.S. must maintain forces capable of protecting U.S. interests alone if necessary, including repeating contingencies on the scale of the Gulf War.\(^6\)

Some Europeans see the reduction of U.S. forward presence as evidence of emerging isolationism and an indication of America's impending disengagement from European commitments. (Ironically, when the U.S. abandoned New Look strategy and increased force levels during the transition to Flexible Response, many Europeans asserted that America's reluctance to rely mainly on nuclear deterrence indicated waiving U.S. commitment.) However, in adopting Flexible Response, U.S. and NATO Allies agreed that robust conventional forces in forward defenses were essential to establishing a credible deterrent against Soviet attack. This strategy meant that the U.S. and its Allies would size forces according to the size of the opposing conventional threat and thereby establish

\(^6\) During a televised interview in which Rep. Les Aspin, (D) Wisconsin, outlined his concept of sizing U.S. armed forces to respond to threats to American interests, he asserted that the U.S. needs to "maintain the ability to repeat Desert Storm," including 500 thousand troops on the ground, whether it occurs in the Middle East, Europe or elsewhere. In responding to contingencies which threaten U.S. interests, "we do not know who our allies will be or even if indeed we will have allies. What that says is that we need a force where we could do it pretty well on our own. The point is to involve allies where it is in our interest and in their interest but not to be dependent on allies if we want to go it alone." MacNeil-Lehr Report, 24 March 1992.
the realistic prospect of denying the enemy his objectives. Today this threat has largely collapsed. Therefore, it is not logical to maintain excessive forward presence.
Responding to a Changing Threat

A sign that the U.S. is responding to a change in the threat rather than simply disengaging from commitments is that the U.S. is re-tailoring the force structure to the new security environment. As the U.S. reduces its forward presence, it is maintaining the high readiness of active forces and increasing strategic mobility and rapid-reinforcement capabilities. There should little doubt of U.S. intention to fulfill its commitments to Europe by intervention or reinforcement as necessary, given the following force structure initiatives:

- Increases in defense spending for strategic lift capability, including: roll-on/roll-off (RORO) ships and procurement of a new class of strategic transport aircraft, the C-117.66
- Continuing storage in Europe of more than six divisions worth of prepositioned equipment.67

66 The Air Force will procure 120 C-117s, with the first squadron coming on line in 1994, Jane's Defense Weekly (9 May, 1992) p. 790. While the C-117 will have a slightly shorter range than the C-141, it will increase cargo capacity by one-third to about 60 tons and add the capability to land on unpaved landing strips.

The Pentagon's 1993 budget request included $3.1 billion in new funding to the National Defense Sealift Fund for 22 additional sealift ships to be built over the next decade, Defense News (March 2, 1992) p. 20.

67 U.S. prepositioning for Norwegian defense consists of Four programs:

I. In accordance with a Memorandum of Understanding between the governments of Norway and the United States signed 16 January 1981, the U.S. has prepositioned the equipment and supplies for a Norway Air Landed Marine Expeditionary Brigade (NALMEB) from the Second Marine Expeditionary Force (II MEF) in Central Norway (Troendelag). Using prepositioning, a NALMEB can begin reinforcing Norway within hours of a decision from the National Command Authority because of the speed with which troops can be air-lifted
- Maintenance of highly trained, highly mobile Contingency Forces in the Base Force.\textsuperscript{68}
- Implementation of a Reconstitution strategy which will preserve the defense technological and industrial base even as the overall defense establishment shrinks.\textsuperscript{69}

In particular, one should note that during a period of decreasing defense spending, the U.S. has actually strengthened aspects of its commitment to Norway, first, by conducting \textit{Battle Griffin '91} in the midst of the Gulf Crisis and, second, by earmarking a new artillery battalion for reinforcement of

to the storage areas. This program, which resembles U.S. Army's program of Prepositioned Equipment Configured to Unit Sets (POMCUS) in Central Europe, is the only program of its type for the U.S. Marine Corps.

II. The Collocated Operating Bases (COB) agreements between the U.S. and Norway provide for the prepositioned support, notably dug-in shelter, for U.S. Air Force planes at nine Norwegian airfields -- Andøya, Bardufoss, Bodø, Flesland, Gardemoen, Ørland, Rygge, Sola, and Værnes.

III. The Invictus Program, a 1980 bi-lateral agreement between the U.S. and Norway allows for the prepositioning of two fleet hospitals, spare parts, fuel and ammunition for U.S. Navy ships and carrier-based aircraft.

IV. An as-of-yet unresolved agreement on the prepositioning of one U.S. artillery brigade to serve alongside Norwegian, Canadian and German elements of the NATO Composite Force (NCF).

\textsuperscript{68} All active U.S. units will maintain full strength and readiness for deployment to worldwide contingency missions. Additionally, forces stationed in Germany are now preparing for deployment to worldwide contingencies.

\textsuperscript{69} Reconstitution strategy, outlined in the National Security Strategy is getting closer to actual implementation. On 29 January 1992 Deputy Secretary of Defense Donald Atwood unveiled a new DoD procurement strategy, and on 12 February Representative Les Aspin presented a plan for selective upgrades and procurement. The intent is to produce high-tech systems in small numbers in order to develop know-how but without the large outlays for full-scale production. \textit{Defense News} (February 17, 1992) p. 42.
Norway. The participation of U.S. Marines in *Battle Griffin* went forward, in spite of U.S. Gulf War, for the purpose of reassuring Norway that the U.S. has the capability of responding to a crisis in Norway even during involvement in a simultaneously-occurring, major contingency elsewhere. Similary, Admiral Leon Edney, Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic (SACLANT), coordinated the unscheduled withdrawal of the aircraft carrier, USS *Eisenhower*, from Gulf duty to participate in *Teamwork '92*.

The ear-marking of a U.S. Army artillery battalion for reinforcement of Norway -- a tangible sign of continuing U.S. commitment -- has become a source of frustration to American officials who wish to respond to Norway's anxiety over potential exposure to Russian power. Pre-positioning of the battalion's equipment stalled because Norway refused to set a precedent by agreeing to pay the maintenance costs of storing the equipment in Norway. In this instance of U.S. willingness to commit trained American soldiers and their equipment to

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70 According to the Office of Defense Cooperation, U.S. Embassy, Oslo, the original inclination of U.S. officials was not to participate in *Battle Griffin* due to the Gulf War demands on troops and transportation. After the U.S. Ambassador communicated concern that the Norwegian government might interpret non-participation as a sign of weakening commitment, the decision was made to go ahead with the exercise.


72 After Canada withdrew its commitment to Norway, the U.S. provided this U.S. Army artillery battalion as a component of the NATO Composite Force (NCF) organized to replace the Canadian Air/Sea Transportable (CAST) Brigade as NATO's Ready Alert Force to North Norway.

73 The U.S. pays the storage costs for the pre-positioned equipment of the NALMB in Trondelag. These U.S. payments cover the cost of security and maintenance of the equipment which is carried out by Norwegian military and civilian workers. Negotiation on prepositioning the U.S. NCF contribution has been ongoing for more than one year and is viewed in the U.S. as a burden-sharing issue.
Norwegian defense, Norway’s reluctance to share the comparatively small burden of assuming the maintenance costs of storage causes Americans to wonder whether U.S. commitment is in fact desired by Norway.\(^74\)

Elsewhere in Europe

Predictions of growing U.S. isolationism and impending withdrawal from commitments lose credibility when one compares the erosion of capabilities and readiness in the restructured European armies to the preservation of capabilities and readiness in the restructured U.S. Base Force. Most European armies claim to be reorganizing to improve mobility, flexibility and out-of-area potential. In reality, most European forces are assuming the character of mobilization armies, while the political leadership has begun to assess the utility of armed forces more in terms of their ability to promote political integration rather than in terms of their ability to provide defense. To many European governments, either the possibility of German forces re-nationalizing or the failure of European political union pose greater immediate risks than, say, the remnants of the Red Army.

In spite of extensive reorganization, European armies demonstrate continuing limitations in their ability to either project

\(^74\) In contrast to Norway’s declination to assume maintenance costs of prepositioned U.S. equipment, Kuwait recently agreed to pay the bulk of the cost of prepositioning a reinforced U.S. armor battalion - $215 million, plus an additional $90 million annually. Representative Patricia Schroeder asserted that the "Kuwaitis should be doing more," because actual costs of the U.S. commitment were even higher. She added that, "We should be aggressively pushing for burden-sharing from wealthy allies in the gulf...who proved during the war that they can bear a substantial share of gulf security." Quoted in Defense News, June 15-21, 1992, p. 26. Information concerning the U.S. contribution to the NCF was obtained through interviews at the U.S. Mission to NATO, Brussels Belgium, and the Office of Defense Cooperation, U.S. Embassy, Oslo, Norway.
power or respond rapidly to crises out of area, as the following review shows:

**France.** With the elimination of I Corps and the ongoing deactivation of II Corps, the French hope to reduce the number of slow-to-mobilize, 50-60% strength units. The reorganization will mean a reduction from 13 divisions to 9 divisions\(^7\) resulting in the following, simplified organization:

- One Maneuver Corps, consisting of three armored divisions and one mechanized division.
- The Rapid Action Force (FAR), consisting of: an air mobile division, a light armored division, a marine infantry division, a paratrooper division and an Alpine division.
- One armored division dedicated to the Franco-German Euro-Corps.

Notably, however, France cannot send draftees to fight outside France unless they volunteer. 75% of the French army will continue to be draftees serving one year. Consequently, French units must conduct an extensive reorganization before they can deploy. To help reduce the reorganization time experienced prior to participating in Operation Desert Storm, the French are increasing the ratio of professionals in their power projection component, the FAR, to 45%. In spite of these improvements, however, the French continue to face barriers to responding rapidly out of area:

- A standing professional force of 45% still requires extensive last-minute reorganization of crews and teams, thereby precluding the establishment of habitual training relationships which are standard in U.S. units.

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\(^7\) French divisions are approximately half the size of U.S. divisions. An American Armored division, for example, has 17,000 troops and 348 tanks while a French Armored division has 9,000 troops and 190 tanks. *Militærbalansen 1991-1992*, p. 8.
Grossly inadequate strategic lift.\textsuperscript{76}

- No organic armor in the FAR. Thus, given an opponent with heavy forces, France will have to form units on the fly by stripping professional tankers and armor from the Maneuver Corps.

Britain. On the one hand, Britain's professional army and non-commissioned officer corps betoken higher potential readiness. On the other hand, the British army has no standard measures of readiness by which to determine if a unit is combat effective. Rather, individual commanders simply make a judgement call.\textsuperscript{77} More significant is that Britain's shrinking army is smaller than the U.S. Marine Corps, making Britain

\textsuperscript{76} France has only 12 C-130s available as transport, \textit{Militärbalansen 1991-1992} (International Institute for Strategic Studies and the Norwegian Atlantic Committee: Oslo, 1991) p. 66. The C-130 has an average range of 4,600 km, a 34 ton cargo capacity and no in-flight refueling capability. By comparison, the C-141, which the French do not have, has half again the range and cargo capacity of the C-130 plus in-flight refueling capability. It takes, for example, approximately 60 C-141 sorties to move the vehicles and equipment of a non-armored U.S. battalion. See \textit{How to Make War: A Comprehensive Guide to Modern Warfare} (Quill: New York, 1988) pp. 549-553. General John Galvin, the previous Supreme Allied Commander Europe, points out that recent French deployment to Zaire took place in American aircraft earmarked for NATO in, "A New Age for NATO," \textit{The Retired Officer Magazine}, June 1992, p. 37.

\textsuperscript{77} All U.S. forces -- from individual soldier up to the largest tactical fighting units maintain established standards of training readiness. Annually, soldiers must demonstrate proficiency in both Army-wide common task testing (CTT) -- such as assuming protective posture against chemical attack -- and in skill qualification tests (SQT) related to their particular military occupational specialty -- tank gunner, for instance. Under the Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP) units of all sizes train to established standards for mission-related tasks, such as "movement to contact" or "hasty defense." Experts from outside the unit evaluate performance during annual ARTEP exercises under stressful, combat-like conditions at large dedicated training facilities, notably the National Training Center in the Mojave Desert. Additionally, combat arms units must attain standards for speed and accuracy during semi-annual crew and unit gunnery. Parallel evaluation systems exist for maintenance readiness and availability of equipment.
barely a regional power, let alone a power capable of significant power projection.

The current white paper, "Options for Change," which outlines the British draw-down, will reduce the army to 116 thousand, a two division force. To employ both of these divisions simultaneously would, in effect, require a British decision to commit its strategic reserve.

Germany. Currently, the question of deploying German forces outside the country is not simply problematic; it is a political impossibility. There is no public support -- nor army support -- for changes to the German constitution which would permit deployment beyond national borders. Even participation in UN peacekeeping operations is controversial.

Aside from the problem of political will, Germany has no strategic lift or logistic structure to support operations outside Germany. Given the German budget crunch and the lack of political resolve, it is unlikely that Germany will make available resources for the development of new, undesired capabilities.

Denmark. Because Denmark never considered the threat to be as serious as other Allies, Denmark in effect took its peace dividend during the 1970s and 80s. The current force structure is bare bones, and further, significant reductions -- other than the retirement of two air force Draken squadrons -- are not likely. The army is a mobilization army with virtually no standing units ready to fight. The current, 18 thousand man, 5 mechanized brigade structure (3 bdes in the Jutland Division and 2 separate brigades in Sealand) has four functions: to train 9,000 conscripts, to exercise the staffs of the professional cadre, to refresh reserves and to serve as a mobilization shell. In a crisis situation, a mirror-image mobilization army of 72 thousand would form on the existing professional cadre. Training units would not fight as they stand unless by chance they were near the end of their 11 month training period.
Only a handful of forces are ready to participate in support of NATO Reaction Forces, including: some military police companies, medical detachments and a company of Jagers or long-range reconnaissance forces. One infantry battalion serves with the United Nations. Some armor companies maintain slightly more than a cadre shell. Headquarters, as a rule, run at one-third strength, and signal units run at two-thirds strength. The four F-16 squadrons are ready to go but, like the army, lack logistical support for operations outside Denmark. The commander of the Jutland Division recently stated that he would need support to within 100 km of his logistic tail.

The most recent development since the reorganization of AFCENT (to include all of Germany, Denmark and the Baltic approaches) has been Denmark's consideration for the first time of potential missions outside Denmark -- southeast of Schleswig-Holstein, for example -- as part of the German-Danish LANDJUT Corps. The motivation is Denmark's desire to be a good ally, maintain influence and insure German integration. However, Denmark, like Germany, is a long way from establishing mobility. Denmark's army is accustomed both to sitting on its logistic support (maintenance support comes from local shops and logistic support via civilian assets) and planning for set-piece defenses. Thus, the transition will require not only the creation of mobile logistic assets but the re-schooling of staffs in faster-paced doctrine. Yet, as budgets decline and training funds become more scarce, it becomes less and less likely that complicated command relationships found in the LANDJUT Corps, for example, will be adequately exercised. The result will be a force integrated on paper only.

The Netherlands. Together with Britain and Norway, the Netherlands is one of the staunchest supporters of NATO primacy. The Dutch accept the new NATO strategy and rationale for force restructuring which emphasizes flexible and
mobile, multi-national forces. The Dutch see continuing multinational force integration as a hedge against possible German militarism or re-nationalization of forces. Moreover, the country wants to be an international player and is willing and increasingly able to participate in out of area missions regardless whether they fall under UN, WEU or NATO auspices. Two marine Amphibious Combat Groups are already trained and ready to deploy. Participation in the NL-UK Bde earmarked for Norway will continue. One infantry battalion is ready for deployment to UN peacekeeping missions.

The Dutch intend their force restructuring plans to complement their out of area capabilities. Restructuring reflects recognition of future requirements for: cost savings, operations outside NATO borders, and the integration of multi-national forces. While the Dutch cut 25% of the 64 thousand man army, they intend to create new capabilities in the areas of logistics, transportation and mobility. The Dutch military has planned the following restructuring programs:

- The transformation of a mech-infantry brigade into an airmobile brigade which will form part of NATO's Multi-National Airmobile Division, a component of the ACE Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC).
- The creation of an Air Transportation Brigade.
- The devolution of logistic capabilities down to brigade level.

However, the Dutch parliament is creating stumbling blocks to the completion of the airmobile brigade. They are reluctant to use conscripts to fill the ranks of the potentially externally-deployed brigade. Since two-thirds of the Dutch army is conscripted, a decision not to use conscripts will make it virtually impossible to fill out the brigade.

Parliament is also hesitating to provide funds for 20 interim attack helicopters and 40 new models necessary to complete the brigade. The Dutch must also resolve funding for transport
helicopters. The Army failed to furnish its transport requirements in hopes of avoiding payment for helicopters which will belong to the Air Force. No decision has yet been made on models for either the attack or transport helicopters. Thus, the Dutch have a long way to go before these new brigades become reality.

Belgium. As in the Netherlands, Belgian defense strategy remains bound to the Alliance and the new NATO strategy which emphasizes mobile, multinational forces. Thus, while Belgium's corps sector defensive mission in NORTHAG is winding down, the Belgian commitment to the ARRC is gearing up. The Belgians also support the development of out of area capabilities. In fact, recent Belgian intervention in Zaire and Rwanda shows that Belgium is on the way to developing the type of capabilities now envisioned by NATO.

Starting with the Charlier I Plan for down-sizing the force structure and for withdrawing forces from Germany, Belgian restructuring began prior to the fall of communism in Eastern Europe. Implementation of the Charlier IIB Plan, now in progress, includes the following changes:

- **The return of forces to Belgium,** the 1st Belgian Corps, from its defensive sector in NORTHAG. Deactivated forces equal 30% of peacetime strength. ARRC-earmarked forces (the 17 Ar Bde minus) will redeploy in Germany.

- **Deactivation of 1st and 16th Division headquarters and elimination of both the 10th Reserve Motorized Brigade and the RECCE Brigade.** As a result, the 1st, 7th and 4th Mechanized Brigades, the 17th Armored Brigade, and the 12th Reserve Motorized Brigade now fall directly under the 1st Belgian Corps.

- **Reorganization of the joint staff in order to eliminate the redundant level between the joint staff and the services.**

- **Force modernization to include:** a modestly-paced Leopard I upgrade to thermal integrated sighting system (50 per year through 1996), Belgian conversion of M113s
to TOW vehicles, fielding of Mistral air defense system, purchase of attack helicopters, F-16 mid-life upgrade program, and U.S. AIM-9M and AMRAAM purchases.

- Decentralization of the training of draftees, and implementation of an eight month conscription period.
- Based on Gulf War experience, cancellation of plans to retire the four ship frigate fleet.

The above reorganization shows that, with the exception of the ARRC-earmarked 17th Armor Brigade, the bulk of Belgian forces will now fall into the NATO category, Main Defense Forces, which are not ready for immediate deployment because they require partial mobilization and training time. The decrease in the period of conscription and the delegation of basic training responsibilities to the units will also lower the readiness the Main Defense Forces. The mobility of the Leopard I-equipped 17 Armor Brigade will be limited because its heavy equipment is not air transportable.

Notably, the Belgian deployment to Zaire took place in U.S. strategic airlift dedicated to NATO.78 This demonstrates the limited mobility of Belgium to project even relatively small forces to areas where Belgium has important, historic interests.

Spain. Political purposes more than defense needs motivated Spain's NATO membership. Limited involvement of Spanish forces in the Alliance reflects this fact. At the bottom line, there is little popular support in Spain either for contributing troops to NATO or for defense efforts outside national territory. Thus, one must suspect that the government's declared support for NATO's Rapid Reaction Force is, to a certain extent, political posturing.

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In order to create standing, ready reaction units, most European countries have had to rationalize their forces. A sign that Spain is not fully committed to rationalizing its armed forces is the decision to maintain its 15 brigade, five division, army structure (thereby preserving officer positions) even while simultaneously executing a rapid, two-year troop draw down from 215,000 to 150,000 and a reduction in compulsory service from 12 months to nine. Combined with inadequate training funds, the result of the plan will be hollow active duty units.

Problematic training methods exacerbate the low-readiness situation. The absence of centralized basic training means that line battalions receive company-sized contingents of trainees four times (soon three times) per year. Therefore, units never reach a state of high readiness. Instead, each company in any given battalion is at a different stage in the training cycle. Another barrier to effective training and readiness is the absence of a professional NCO corps. Fear of the professional military due to its support of coup attempts in the early 1980s, prompted the Spanish government to place restrictive barriers to further service at the eight year and 15 year marks. As a result, a given line company has on average only four NCOs. The average battalion has only three or four NCOs with more than 15 years service.

The notable exceptions to the above training norm are the four regiments of the Foreign Legion whose units consist of conscripts who volunteer for eighteen month duty with the Foreign Legion. The Legion also receives greater training resources than normal units. The disposition of the Foreign Legion is as follows:

- 1 regiment in the Canary Islands
- 2 regiments in the North African enclaves (Ceuta and Melilla)
- 1 regiment in Southern Spain
Troops of the Foreign Legion will fill air assault roles in Spain's new Rapid Action Force (FAR) which will consist of an airborne brigade, an air assault brigade, and up to two regiments from the Legion. Other power projection assets include a carrier battle group, consisting of a small carrier (Harrier, SH-60 and SH-3 equipped) and frigates, plus assets from the centralized aviation (FAMET).

Though the Spanish Foreign Legion is more ready than the army at large, NATO should not count heavily on its availability for rapid reaction missions. The deployment of the Foreign Legion corresponds to its raison d'être, the protection of Spanish possessions and reaction to a perceived North African threat -- not participation in NATO's Rapid Reaction Corps. Spain announced its intention to create the FAR back in 1988 -- long before the formulation of a new NATO strategy -- but it has not yet established the FAR's headquarters nor programmed the resources to make the FAR operational before 1997. The FAMET will not have enough utility helicopters prior to 1997, and there is no money budgeted for the purchase of attack helicopters. The frigate-building plan may be scuttled due to the $1 billion budget cut announced in October 1991.  

It seems apparent that any substantial Spanish support of NATO missions will be limited to Spain's natural sphere of influence. Spain has consistently sought responsibility for areas to the southwest of Spain as its NATO contribution. Yet, these areas are of interest mainly to Spain. Spain has also lobbied the Alliance to create a Western Command and has used NATO's refusal to establish the command as an excuse for limited participation.

**Portugal.** Portugal adheres to the group of strong Atlanticists who throw their full political weight behind NATO. Yet,

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limited resources severely limit Portugal’s ability to throw military weight behind NATO’s Reaction Forces. U.S. security assistance to Portugal -- around $150 million per year -- accounts for about 35% of the Portuguese defense budget. Yet, Congress has already decided to draw down this assistance. Personnel costs of the top-heavy armed forces absorb between 60-70% of the defense budget. (The Portuguese Navy, for example, has more admirals than the U.S. Navy.)

Less than one-third of the 33 thousand man Portuguese Army consists of professionals, a cadre of equal numbers of officers and NCOs. The bulk of the army is conscripts (23 thousand). Conscription lasts only four months; although, troops may volunteer for up to two years service. Budget cuts will have a major impact on force size. The Army will shrink from 33,000 to 16,000 personnel. Reorganization will result in a three-brigade structure consisting of:

- The NATO Brigade stationed Santa Maria. After receiving additional M113s and M60A3s to replace on-hand M48 tanks, the brigade will reorganize as 1 Armor Bn, 2 Mech Bn, 1 Recon Bn.
- The Special Forces Brigade headquartered at Lisbon. It will absorb the current Commando Bde HQ and the Para Bde HQ and become an air-transportable brigade consisting of an elite Commando Regt and an Infantry Bn. They are to be capable of airborne or air assault operations.
- A Light Intervention Brigade headquartered in the central region. It will consist of truck-transportable, light infantry.

Obviously, a force this small does not represent a substantial power projection capability. The Air Force has only six C-130 transport planes. Helicopter lift is inadequate to move the Special Forces Brigade; although, procurement is high on the MOD’s priority list.
Rapid Reaction in Practice

In the 35-nation, million-man Gulf War coalition, the U.S. fielded 500 thousand troops, and 1900 tanks.\textsuperscript{80} The two most significant deployments of European forces fighting beside the U.S. were French and British. What was actually significant about these deployments was that they were the largest forces these countries could muster for out of area operations on mid-term notice. The British contributed 35 thousand troops and 163 tanks.\textsuperscript{81} One American observer noted, "After the BAOR finished cannibalizing vehicles, all they left in the motorpools in Germany was the [forest green] paint jobs."

At the time of the Gulf crisis, the French army numbered 280 thousand. When one subtracts the 75\% of the army which is conscripted and the non-applicable or partitioned forces, such as nuclear units, the total number of professionals remaining is about 50 thousand. Of this 50 thousand, 16 thousand are slotted against France’s overseas commitments and 18 thousand are assigned to either the two school divisions or as instructors. This leaves 16 thousand professionals, the number France sent to the Gulf War. These troops fought under the guidence of the 6th Light Armor Division, but they were actually pulled from a variety of units and assembled for the mission. Thus, the French units were not the cohesive, long-standing teams found in U.S. active forces. Rather, they were piece-meal groupings of professional cadre and volunteers stripped from the mainly conscripted ranks.

Such hastily-organized combat units, had they been American, would not have been permitted to fight without first demonstrating Army Testing and Evaluation Program (ARTEP) standards of combat effectiveness during rigorous maneuvers at the National Training Center (NTC) in California. All active

\textsuperscript{80} IISS, \textit{1990-91 Strategic Survey} (London: Brassey’s/IISS, 1991)

\textsuperscript{81} \textit{International Herald Tribune}, 3 January 1991.
American units maintain these standards of combat effectiveness year-round and, therefore, are ready for deployment to contingencies immediately -- as opposed to the weeks or months required by the so-called active units of some other countries. In fact, combat units of the National Guard were not permitted to deploy to the Gulf because they had not previously demonstrated combat effectiveness. Instead, they spent the Gulf War in the Mojave Desert training toward those standards.

Conclusions

All of the European armies are talking about establishing highly ready, highly mobile reaction forces. In reality, these armies are transitioning more and more to mobilization forces as their budgets shrink and popular support of conscription declines. Denmark's complete transition to a mobilization force differs perhaps only in that the Danish forces made the transition earlier. One might hazard a guess that Denmark's system represents the evolutionary direction for the others.

Because of the no basing policy, Norway is completely dependent in time of crisis on reinforcement via force projection. Only the U.S. has and will retain substantial, ready-to-go force projection capabilities. Only the U.S. has the capability to respond to simultaneously-occurring contingencies. Prepositioning of equipment facilitates reinforcement. Only the U.S. is willing to dedicate substantial quantities of equipment in Norway. The WEU promises Norway a tie to Europe, but it cannot back the promise with tangible commitment.

Political aspirations rather than military threats are driving the integration of multinational forces in Europe. These multinational arrangements are more complicated and therefore require more training to make them work. But now there is less money for training than ever, and the training will likely go unfunded. The outcome will be units integrated on paper but not
in practice. Yet, this outcome may be enough to satisfy the goals of Europe’s politicians given the ongoing presence of real forces from the U.S. and given the absence of a clear threat to European security.
Evolution of the New National Security Strategy

The changes in the international environment since 1989 are well known. In the U.S., the administration, the military and the analysts interpret these developments as victory in the Cold War. In effect, the U.S. now faces no direct threat to national security; although, risks to U.S. interests have perhaps increased. Consequently the "one and one-half war" concept (as opposed to unbounded contingency planning) which provided practical force-sizing parameters since the end of the Vietnam War is no longer applicable.

"Crisis response," rather than the short-warning, major war in Central Europe, has become the number one planning scenario. The major, Central European war scenario which once represented the vital threat to U.S. security, is now largely subsumed under the concept of "Reconstitution." Even before serious debate shifted to how many and what types of simultaneously-occurring contingencies the U.S. should be prepared to respond to, President Bush began outlining the New World Order Strategy which endorsed the Base Force Structure, first unveiled in the spring of 1990.

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82 A mainstream characterization of the Cold War bipolarity runs as follows: Although extremely dangerous, the bipolar stand-off between the U.S. and the Soviet Union was extremely stable. Deter the sponsor state and you have done much to deter the client states. The Superpowers, not willing to risk embroilment or escalation to nuclear war, tended to restrain both their own actions and the actions of the states within their sphere of influence. Theoretically, the collapse of Soviet influence unleashes the potential for previously-restrained states to pursue aggressive regional ambitions. The potential for greater regional instability increases the likelihood of challenges to U.S. interests. See either of John J. Mearsheimer’s, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War," International Security (Summer, 1990) or "Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War," The Atlantic Monthly (August 1990).

83 Haffa, p. 43.
Continuity and Change

The changing nature of threats and constantly improving technology and doctrine, rather than changing national interest, best explain the evolution of American strategy. Tracing American policymaking and strategy formulation from the end of World War II to the present day, one notes that the identification of fundamental national interests varies little. What has changed is the assessment of threats to those interests and the means suited to countering threats. Changing assessments of enemy capabilities and intentions have often triggered realignment of means to ends. Improvements in technology and in warfighting doctrine have also provided opportunities to realign means to ends.

The identification of threats underwent dramatic change between 1945 and 1948, as the Soviet Union went -- in U.S. assessment -- from an ally, to an ideological threat, and then to a military threat. As a result, matching means to ends underwent radical change. The evolution of nuclear technology and doctrine impacted greatly what means U.S. leaders thought were appropriate.

Interests and Objectives

Entering World War II compelled the U.S. to acknowledge its vital interest is European security. Before the end of the war and before the Soviet threat became apparent, the U.S. had already identified interests and objectives which would guide the U.S. role in post-war Europe. Many of these interests persist to this day, notably: democratic institutions, economic integration and free trade.

Enhancing democracy has dual origins in American society, one ideological and one practical. The moral dilemmas created by the former have done much to discredit and complicate the
pursuit of this important national interest. For example, in the name of democracy, the U.S. spent treasure and blood in Vietnam. The U.S. supported dictators because they were cooperative suppliers of resources (Iran and Panama) but failed to aid democratic movements because of the risks involved (Yugoslavia and Lithuania). Nonetheless, while America’s sense of moral obligation to rescue troubled democracies has waned, enhancing democracy continues to serve U.S. self-interest from a purely practical standpoint.

As noted, democracies tend not to fight each other. While this rule is no security guarantee, no democracy has rallied resources to threaten U.S. security. By correlation or by chance, democracies have been America’s friends, showing far more inclination toward cooperate than aggression.

World War II confirmed two mistakes of the interwar period: the isolation of Germany and the disengagement of the U.S. from European security affairs. American assessment of what caused Germany to become a threat to Europe led to the identification of integrated national economies as a key American objective. World War II taught the U.S. that European and American security are inextricably linked. Consequently, one must add to America’s "irreducible interests" Europe security as a vital national interest.

Threats

In the immediate post-war environment, the U.S. did not identify a military threat from the Soviet Union. Instead, the U.S. believed that economic deprivation and political chaos made Europe vulnerable to ideological-political threat from
The origins of containment lie in efforts to counter this threat. The Marshall Plan became the means to that end. Only later, when the Soviets failed to demobilize (as the U.S. had) and used force to secure the installation of dictatorial regimes, did the U.S. begin to perceive the threat in military terms characteristic of NSC-68.

Today the U.S. views Russia as neither an ideological threat nor a conventional military threat. President Bush’s 22 November 1991 initiative to unilaterally reduce U.S. nuclear forces and readiness levels reveals a significant turning point in the traditional American assessment of Russia’s nuclear threat as well. The initiative indicates a shift in focus from capabilities to intentions, because only intentions have changed significantly. With the dissipation of the long-standing threat, one would therefore expect to see a major reassessment of means and ends of Grand Strategy; containment has run its course.

But a change in the threat does not mean that the U.S. has abandoned its basic interests regarding Europe. To the contrary, one should expect to see continuity; interests exist regardless of whether a threat arises to put those interests in jeopardy.

A New American Purpose?

It is has become commonplace to assert that the end of Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet threat compels the U.S. to acknowledge the outmoding of the "American purpose" and to find a new one. It is as though the articulation of a foreign policy with a clear, central purpose (such as containment) is

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elemental for defining the national interest. In "Defining Our National Interest," Irving Kristol, publisher of *The National Interest*, asserts,

*It is very difficult for a great power -- a world power -- to articulate a foreign policy in the absence of an enemy worthy of the name. It is, after all, one's enemies that help one define one's "national interest," in whatever form that definition might take. Without such enemies, one flounders amidst a plentitude of rather trivial, or at least marginal, options. That ... is the condition of the United States today as we enter the post-Cold War era.*

Those who assert that the U.S. must clarify its new national purpose, have presented a variety of possibilities to assume the new role of paramount trend affecting our security. Candidates range from problems originating at home -- economic decline, drug abuse, stagnating diplomatic skills, collapse of societal values, etc. -- to dangerous regional trends abroad -- nationalism, racism, fragmentation, proliferation, etc. Others suggest that the Cold War victory represents the end of serious threats to America, the fulfillment of the American purpose and perhaps "end of history." Consequently, possible choices for the new American purpose range from shifting emphasis to regional threats abroad to disengaging and solving the challenges at home.

This sort of rational is flawed, however, because American policymaking does not start with a search for enemies; it begins with the identification or reaffirmation of national interests. Enemies do not define our national interests; they threaten our national interests. A "purpose" such as containing communism may be correctly said to be *in* the national interest, but containment was not itself the national interest. Containment was a conceptual framework or strategy for relating means to ends.
Rather, the ends reflect the national interest. What reason lay behind opposing communism and containing Soviet power? What did communism threaten that U.S. popular will and political resolve bore unparalleled peacetime defense spending over a period of 40 years? The answer is enduring national interests such as democracy in Europe, regional stability and access to global free trade. Indeed, these objectives were clearly articulated before the Cold War began, and, in fact lay behind America’s intervention in both World Wars.

These interests are not likely to fade simply because communism has collapsed. The difference now is that these interests are no longer immediately threatened. Therefore, the current task is not to establish a new purpose but to realign means to ends.
Cornerstones of the New National Security Strategy

Collective Engagement

Grand Strategy coordinates a national effort to enhance, structure and apply U.S. economic, political and military power on a global scale. One key to understanding U.S. Grand Strategy is recognizing the unprecedented degree to which the U.S. identifies its national security with international security. This association of international security and national security results from: the lesson of World War II which discredited isolationism, the global reach of American interests, and the interdependent nature of the world economy. Consequently, U.S. Grand Strategy emphasizes leadership, involvement and cooperation in order to “replace the dangerous period of the Cold War with a democratic peace.” Secretary of State Baker calls this “Leading Collective Engagement.”

Baker’s emphasis on leadership is significant. In the past, Western Europe’s economic and military dependence on the U.S. permitted the U.S. to pursue its objectives in quasi-hegemonic fashion. Now, both the emergence of a more balanced partnership in NATO and the growth of European economic power have eroded its dependency on America.

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85 The Secretary of State has, on numerous occasions, emphasized that the great lesson of World War II is the failure of U.S. isolationism of the interwar period. “The disasters of the 1930s grew from the mistakes of the 1920s: the illusion of isolationism and the delusion of protectionism. When at last Americans understood that a protectionist America could never be a prosperous America and that an isolationist America could never be a secure America, we had to redeem those mistakes with a depression and with a war.” From Baker’s perspective, World War II was an avoidable outcome of failed U.S. responsibility, which postwar engagement rectified. The principal challenge, which the National Security Strategy is intended to prevent, is a return to the “drift” of the interwar period. See Baker’s “Remarks to the Chicago Council,” as reproduced in the United States Information Service Wireless File, 21 April 1992, pp. 8-15.
Exercising American influence in the future must come through a new style of leadership; otherwise, U.S. friends and allies will refuse to follow. The new style will require invigorated diplomacy, emphasis on commonality of interests and increased consultation. Whether the U.S. will succeed in leading a balanced partnership is not certain, but the conduct of the Gulf War and the coordination of U.S. and NATO military strategies (as opposed to the imposition of U.S. concepts) point to the affirmative.

While the Bush Administration exercised some high-level political pressure on allies who were reluctant to contribute to the Gulf effort, the salient feature of U.S. coalition leadership was not heavy-handedness but painstaking coordination carried out by mid-level State Department and military professionals already working in the countries whose assistance the U.S. sought. These professionals were not in position to use carrots and sticks. Rather, they hammered out thousands of on-the-spot agreements using their contacts from long working relationships and their personal professional expertise.

The National Security Strategy's Political, Economic and Defense Agendas which serve as the bases for more specific national political, economic and defense strategies all reveal the American focus on leading collective engagement:

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86 The mass movement of troops and equipment to the Persian Gulf and the ongoing logistical effort to support them may not have been possible in the absence of a pre-existing network of bilateral and NATO relationships. This meant that the U.S. already had teams of experts forward on the ground in embassies, offices of defense cooperation, host nation coordination cells, etc. Yet, in spite of an existing network, these experts established new agreements and sought assistance via request according to the guidelines of their hosts. Notable achievements included the flow of traffic through the airfields of normally aloof Spain and the participation of French combat units.
The National Political Strategy seeks to ... 

- strengthen alliances, coalitions and the United Nations as a first priority\(^7\)
- nature peace, democracy and market principles abroad through the spread of ideas and the application of economic and security assistance
- enhance global security through arms control and anti-proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons
- cooperate with other nations to: obtain intelligence on regions of uncertainty, stem the international traffic of illicit drugs, and improve the international refugee situation.

The National Economic Strategy seeks to ... 

- insure "strong macroeconomic performance [as] ... a prerequisite for maintaining a position of global political leadership."\(^8\)
- promote global economic recovery and growth to create a favorable economic and trade environment
- restore financial health to international debtors
- work to eliminate international trade barriers and reduce the barriers to the trade of technology to no-longer-threatening countries
- secure global oil supplies
- cooperate to protect the global environment

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\(^7\) "Our first priority in foreign policy remains solidarity with our allies and friends. The stable foundation of our security will continue to be a common effort with peoples with whom we share fundamental moral and political values and security interests. Those nations with whom we are bound by alliances will continue to be our closest partners in building a new world order." To promote cooperation with nations with whom the U.S. does not have mature relations, the U.S. will work to "strengthen the role of international organizations such as the United Nations." *National Security Strategy of the United States*, the White House, August 1991, p. 13.

\(^8\) *National Security Strategy*, p. 19.
The National Defense Strategy seeks to ... 

- enhance and maintain nuclear deterrence through arms reductions, modernization, and development of missile defenses
- demonstrate U.S. engagement and back U.S. commitments through forward presence
- maintain the capability to project power in response to crises involving U.S. interests
- maintain the technological and industrial base to reconstitute forces as a hedge against resurgent threats
- restructure and downsize the forces commensurate with current threats.

U.S. actions already demonstrate success at leading collective engagement:

- Continuing U.S. global military engagement -- at sustainable levels
- Creation of a world coalition -- led by the U.S., legitimized by the UN, supported by Russia and prepared to maintain global stability
- Increasing efforts toward denuclearization, anti-proliferation and ballistic defense
- Persistent efforts to level the international economic playing field
- Assimilation of the Confederation of Independent States into the world community

89 "Certain regions -- like Europe and East Asia -- represent such compelling interests to the United States that they will demand the permanent deployment of some U.S. forces as long as they are needed and welcomed by our allies as part of a common effort. But even in these regions the size of our forward deployments can be smaller as the threat diminishes and the defense capabilities of our neighbors improve." The National Security Strategy, p. 27.
In November 1991, President Bush's unilateral initiative to reduce nuclear forces and readiness levels represented an important shift away from the assessment of Soviet capability to the assessment of intent. The fact that formidable capability remains intact in the Russian Republic underscores the importance Bush assigns to assimilating the Confederation and to making Russia a partner in Bush's vision of a world coalition.

The assumptions of the new Grand Strategy demonstrate both continuity and a break with the past that are not due entirely to the demise of the Soviet threat. The following elements represent continuity with the old Grand Strategy: high value assigned to safeguarding democracy abroad, expectation of U.S. global engagement, and acceptance of a leadership role. The following represent new elements: a sense of over-extended resources, declining economic capabilities relative to allies, need to rejuvenate both domestic society and the economy, and expectation of collective solutions, especially under the UN aegis.

**Coalition-Building**

President Bush's January 1992 State of the Union Address confirms that he is altering his Grand Strategy to reflect a second wave of changes to the global security situation brought about by the death of communism. One observes the following new assumptions at work:

- The U.S. occupies a position of global leadership as the lone superpower but will be economically unable to either maintain the current level of engagement or to assume the role of "world policeman."
- Post-Cold War world security will demand a lower level of U.S. engagement, but the risk of regional conflicts will persist and "much good can come from the prudent use of power."
The Gulf War will serve as a model for concerted action and coalition building through the involvement and approval of the United Nations. Russian opposition would have jeopardized the whole undertaking.

While the collapse of the Soviet Union thrusts the U.S. forward as the sole superpower, the relative power of the U.S. is in fact shrinking. It is true that no group of countries can match the U.S. ability to project and sustain military power. However military power does not accord the U.S. unfettered influence on the global scene. Today, the relevance of military power in the daily relations among states, especially among friends and allies, is certainly limited. The U.S. is in the business of deterring the coercive threat of force, not practicing it. And as European allies grow less fearful of external threats, they become less dependent on the U.S. security guarantee and less obliged, in general, to defer to the American way of thinking.

As the influence of military power declines, the relevance of economic power grows. Here the power of the U.S. has declined dramatically in relation to Europe and Japan. The U.S. economy suffers from the after effects of overextension during the Cold War and from systemic weaknesses. In order to maintain its competitiveness and living standard, the U.S. must divert greater effort toward economic rejuvenation.

Coalition-building presents a solution to the dilemma of fulfilling both the demands of engagement and the demands of renewing the economy, and it helps to bridge the gap between the responsibility of global leadership and the risks of overextending limited resources. For the first time since the Concert of Europe, the post-bipolar world situation favors cooperative efforts by the world's leading powers to enforce system stability through coalition action.

Since the end of the Cold War, many factors argue in favor of coalition-building as a means of enforcing common inter-
ests, namely: the end of bipolarity, the shared ideology of democracy, and the uniqueness of U.S. leadership as a non-threatening global power. The National Security Strategy asserts that, "America's role is rooted not only in power, but also in trust," as evidenced by the expectations of King Fahd of Saudi Arabia for U.S. participation conduct in the Gulf War:

I trust the United States of America. I know that when you say you will be committed, you are, in fact, committed. I know that you will stay as long as necessary to do what has to be done, and I know you will leave when you are asked to leave at the end, and that you will have no anterior motives.\textsuperscript{90}

Bush noted in his State of the Union message,

Much good can come from the prudent use of power. And much good can come of this: A world once divided into two armed camps now recognizes one sole and pre-eminent power: the United States of America. And they regard this with no dread. For the world trusts us with power -- and the world is right.\textsuperscript{91}

Concerted action offers key advantages over independent American action: It is cheaper. It permits specialization and enhances deterrence. It permits non-military solutions such as economic sanctions. It avoids the pitfalls of collective security regimes which require unanimity, because participation is voluntary and requires less than full consensus. Concerted action incorporates the lessons of Vietnam, namely: the

\textsuperscript{90} National Security Strategy of the United States, August 1991, p. 2.

importance of world opinion and the risks of acting alone. Moreover, concerted action worked well in the Gulf War and reduced costs to the U.S..

The imperative for coalition-building explains in part America's continuing strong support of NATO, a forum for coalition-building. It also helps explain why the U.S. chose to recognize a change in Russian intentions while large military capabilities persist; Russian opposition would make every coalition venture a gamble against escalation.

Retaining the Ability to go it Alone

Yet, implicit in the capabilities of the Base Force structure is the ability for the U.S. to intervene in simultaneously-occurring contingencies alone. As noted, even Congressman Les Aspin, an opponent of the Base Force as planned, acknowledges that the U.S. must be prepared to wage war on the scale of Operation Desert Storm alone. There are simply no guarantees that the U.S. can successfully form a coalition in time to safeguard vital interests. The recently retracted "Sole Superpower strategy" of the Pentagon reflects this same concern that the U.S. must preserve the ability to enforce its interests alone.
The Battle over the Base Force

If there is agreement that the U.S. must maintain independent intervention capabilities as a hedge against the failure to build a coalition, why is there disagreement over the size of the Base Force structure? The answer lies in the rapid, two-phase evolution of the new Grand Strategy, which reacted, first, to progress in CFE negotiations and the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and, second, to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Cold War victory. Restructuring toward the planned Base Force, some charge, takes in to account only the first grand strategic change.

Grand Strategy Outstripping Force Planning?

President Bush's effort to reconcile U.S. foreign and security policy with changes in the former Soviet Union altered the original planning considerations that went into the 1995 force structure goal for the Base Force. The Base Force structure, its planned 25% cut in forces, and the over-arching National Security Strategy of August 1991 represented the first phase of U.S. attempts to adjust to the changing political and military situation in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

President Bush's reactions to the August 1991 coup attempt and, second, the dissolution of the Soviet Union herald a second phase of even more fundamental readjustment in which the Confederation of Independent States is viewed as neither threat nor enemy but as potential partner in an international

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92 In addition to the conventional force packages outlined above, the Base Force, as outlined in the August 1991 National Security Strategy of the United States would contain a strategic force package consisting of: 18 Trident submarines with new D-2 missiles, 550 Minuteman III/MX missiles, 96 B-52 bombers, 97 B-1 bombers, 75 B-2 bombers, and GPALSD development.
coalition of the New World Order. Now, intention replaces capability as the yardstick of threat assessment. The Pentagon, which billed the Base Force as a minimum essential force, is losing credibility with Congress, which points to new planning considerations while presenting an alternate version of a revamped force structure.

Phase I. Four assumptions (first outlined in Bush's "Aspen speech" on 2 AUG 90) served as the rationale for the Base Force restructuring:

- Nuclear deterrence -- Deterring Soviet nuclear attack would remain the first defense priority.
- Forward presence -- Reduced levels (2 divisions/150,000 men in Europe) would be adequate given the demise of the Warsaw Pact threat to the Central Region.
- Crisis response -- Readiness to respond to regional contingencies with light, mobile forces would take on greater importance and receive more emphasis.
- Reconstitution -- Two years warning would serve as the planning horizon for reconstituting U.S. forces against Soviet resurgence. Meanwhile, a 25% reduction in forces by 1995 would still provide a prudent hedge against the residual threat.

What led to the assumptions was the evidence since 1989 that the Soviet Union would be less and less able to mount a short notice attack in the Central Region. The dual causes were breakthrough progress in CFE negotiations and the crumbling of the Warsaw Pact. The Base Force reflected a dual response: a drawdown of forces which would shadow the Soviet drawdown and -- as a consequence of the drawdowns -- a shift in focus away from the European-centered Soviet threat. Nonetheless, the planners continued to view Soviet military power as an enduring reality and the major threat against which the U.S. must continue to balance.
Phase II. Since the completion of the Base Force concept, the August 1991 coup attempt virtually eliminated the possibility of hard-line, right wing resurgence in the Soviet Union. When on 27 September, Bush responded by unilaterally reducing nuclear force levels, downgrading strategic readiness and cancelling modernization programs, he signaled (as Rep. Les Aspin pointed out to the Atlantic Council on 6 JAN 92) a fundamental shift from assessing Soviet threat capabilities to assessing intentions. To the opponents of the Base Force, this development undermined the rationale of hedging against residual Soviet capability.

Additionally, through various types of monetary aid, technical assistance, and high-level political support, the U.S. has thrown its weight behind a world effort to alleviate economic distress in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Previously, the U.S. withheld such assistance contingent upon a fundamental alteration of threatening defense policy. On 22 JAN 92, CIA Director Robert Gates announced that major reductions in CIS weapons production meant that the CIS posed virtually no future threat to the United States. The post-Cold War response to the needs of the CIS is reminiscent of U.S. post-war aid to Germany and Japan.

Bush's response to changes in the former Soviet Union reflects fundamental alterations in Grand Strategy. His political signals indicate that the CIS is not an enemy. His assertion that Russia must be brought into the "coalition" indicates that Bush places greater value on continuing Russian support of his New World Order vision than he places on hedging against residual military capabilities.

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93 On 22 January 1992 Bush opened the international Conference on Private Sector Assistance to the CIS by affirming the enormity of U.S. stake in the successful transition of the CIS to democracy and a free market. He made a plea for massive assistance to the CIS and pledged $645 million in new assistance -- pending Congressional approval -- to the $5 billion U.S. total. USIA Wireless File, 01/22/92.
Base Force Already Outdated?

This latest direction of Grand Strategy undermines some fundamental assumptions first included in the Base Force concept, namely, that the types of conventional forces be geared toward a resurgent Soviet threat and that the U.S. be prepared to reconstitution heavy forces on a two year planning horizon.

Unlike previous force structuring which justified force size in terms of threat capability, the Base Force tied force size to no specific threat yet hedged against Soviet resurgence. Such resurgence is now considered unlikely. Yet, with the exception of the elimination of some heavy divisions, Aspin charges that force types remain geared toward fighting a Soviet threat.\(^4\) Thus, the Base Force is coming under attack as inappropriate in terms of force types and unjustified in terms of a specific threat.

Boris Yeltsin's announcement after the Soviet collapse of willingness to change threatening nuclear targeting doctrine is but one in a series of developments that is changing our assumptions about the demands of nuclear deterrence as well. Already the U.S. has increased spending and shifted the emphasis of the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO) from work on a space-based shield to Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS).\(^5\) The President cut


\(^5\) While the original goal of SDI was to establish an impenetrable, space-based defense against Soviet nuclear attack, GPALS envisions a less comprehensive defense against third-power attacks. GPALS presupposes Russian cooperation, both to permit GPALS deployment through amendment of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and to preclude escalatory procurement of offensive systems to overwhelm GPALS. It appears the Russia and the U.S. may even cooperate in developing GPALS. Jane's Defense Weekly, 15 February
strategic bomber requirements and curtailed modernization programs. During the 28 January 1992 State of the Union Address, Bush offered to slash the number of MIRVed warheads and to reduce the size of the strategic bomber fleet in exchange for elimination of Russian land-based systems.

Les Aspin took the opportunity presented by an improved security environment to unveil a comprehensive plan to revamp the force structure based on a new set of strategic assumptions. Meanwhile as elections approach, President Bush announced new, unfunded domestic programs. These developments placed increasing pressure the Department of Defense to rethink the Base Force structure and consider the possibility of face cuts larger than the originally-planned 25% by the mid-90s.

A principal justification for the Base Force was "hedging" against Soviet capabilities. Hedging is nothing new; it is simply the prudent practice of providing extra forces at the margins where uncertainty prevents precise determination of the force size. What was new was to justify the bulk of the force structure on what amounted to hedging.

As conditions in the Soviet Union deteriorated between the announcement of the Base Force in 1990 to the end of 1991,


96 To date, the administration has constrained the strategic force as follows:
- B-2 bomber production will end at 20 units.
- The small ICBM program is terminated.
- The new Trident missile is cancelled.
- The new Peacekeeper missile is cancelled.
- There will be no new cruise missile.

97 Multiple Independently-targetable Reentry Vehicle. Theoretically, MIRVs are destabilizing because their multiple warheads provide strong incentive to attack them before they can be launched.
a "bolt from the blue" attack on Central Europe became unlikely and then impossible. Nonetheless, the Soviet Union retained formidable capabilities with the potential for rejuvenation. The rationale of hedging against rejuvenation held water with Congress until after the August coup. Since the collapse in December 1991, President Bush turned the focus of threat assessment from capabilities to intentions, and the CIA backed the no-threat conclusion. The 25% force cut based on the "prudence" argument came under increasing fire as Les Aspin called for a complete restructuring of the force in order to reestablish the link between size, capability and threat.

Whether or not Congress will insist on restructuring the planned Base Force is not certain. The Senate approval of the fiscal year 1993 budget as requested by President Bush suggests that significant further cuts from the planned drawdown are unlikely. Responding to Aspin's charges, Army Chief of Staff, Gen. Gordon R. Sullivan asserts that, "The Army we are building is not a smaller version of the Cold War Army, but a different Army." He bases this assertion on changes to the military strategy which implement the new National Security Strategy and establish "a capabilities-based Army, not a threat-based Army." Aside from the issue of the force structure's suitability to the post-Cold War security environment is Congress' fear of further damaging the economy and increasing unemployment.

However, should Aspin succeed in attaining a steeper drawdown, his proposed force structure would contain nine active Army divisions, 10 active Air Force tactical fighter wings, nine carrier battle groups (360 Navy ships) and 1.4 million troops. This size force structure would still permit global

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58 On 10 April, the Senate approved the full $281 billion that Bush submitted. The House version was $6 billion less, and compromises will resolve the difference. USIS Wireless File, 13 April 1992.

59 U.S. Army Posture Statement, FY93.
peacetime engagement, the ability to repeat the Gulf War effort, plus a simultaneous-occurring Panama invasion-sized contingency without drawing on forward deployed forces in South Korea.
Conclusion - Future U.S. Commitment

The Second World War taught Norway and the U.S. complementary lessons: The U.S. recognized that American security is inextricably linked to European security, and Norway recognized that outside assistance would be necessary to establish credible defenses. Both countries learned these lessons prior to the emergence of the post-war Soviet threat. Today, these lessons either hold true -- in spite the Soviet collapse -- or the U.S. and Norway must admit that they are willing to risk re-learning them.

For both countries, the lessons of the Second World War pointed the way toward NATO membership, even if the Soviet threat provided the immediate impetus for the unprecedented peacetime alliance system. Today, U.S. Grand Strategy underscores the ongoing need to maintain U.S. influence in Europe and to guarantee a stable European security environment. Therefore, the U.S. still needs NATO.

Because of the increasing emphasis that the new National Security Strategy places on collective security and coalition action, one cannot overstate the U.S. dependence on NATO (contrary to the habit of among burden-sharing-conscious Congressmen to assert the opposite). Decreasingly can the U.S. afford to "go it alone," in spite of intentions to retain such a capability for dire crises. The U.S. ability to deter and to reassure -- and thereby avoid draining challenges by force of arms -- is directly linked to NATO's institutional strength and to America's ability to lead within that institutional framework.

Consequently, subordinate levels of the U.S. strategic hierarchy have aligned with the new direction of national policy and have coordinated closely with an evolving NATO to formulate military strategy which (1) keeps the U.S. decisively engaged but at lower force levels and (2) envisions wider NATO
involvement in new geographic regions and in peacekeeping. Meanwhile, Congress continues to provide resources which serve as both backing for the National Security Strategy and as a tangible sign of America's continuing resolve and commitment.

As this paper outlines, only the U.S. is retaining substantial power projection assets. Norwegian security will continue to depend on rapid reinforcement of this type because solely Norwegian resources will remain inadequate to resist military coercion or reemerging threats and because Norway permits no basing of Allied forces. Thus, Norway still needs the U.S. Yet, because Norway has not been willing to surrender its freedom of maneuver to the constraints of a strictly bilateral relationship, Norway still needs NATO to institutionalize the American connection.

Since both Norway and the U.S. still depend on NATO, now, during this period of institutional jeopardy, more than ever, is the time that the two countries must cooperate to preserve NATO and promote its evolution within the changing security environment. Additionally, Norway can, by joining sides with the Atlanticist bloc of states in the WEU, contribute to a complementary rather than contradictory development of the European Security Pillar as envisioned and endorsed by the U.S. National Security Policy.

Recalling that the U.S. responds both to the need to reassure allies as well as deter enemies, Norway can, by its actions as well as its rhetoric, influence the intensity of the U.S. presence by signalling the continuing desirability of the U.S. presence. More than ever, in the eyes of Congress, this means demonstrating willingness to shoulder a fair share of defense burdens. By contrast, the signal sent over the issue of prepositioning the American contribution to the NATO Composite Force (NCF), though small in monetary terms, was large in adverse political effect.
It is not logical to postulate the decline of U.S. commitment to Norway while the U.S. is fighting simultaneously to keep NATO the primary security organ in Europe. The U.S. commitment to Norway is symbolic of the U.S. commitment to NATO. The two concepts are inseparable. An armed challenge of U.S. commitment tests U.S. credibility equally in any part of the Alliance. Failing to meet the challenge would mean the loss of the U.S. voice in shaping European security and consequently a lost opportunity to ensure U.S. security.

Nor is it logical that the U.S. should maintain a peacetime, forward presence commensurate with a vanished Cold War threat. A single, robust (and highly ready) corps, V Corps, consisting of two heavy divisions, supported by three Tactical Fighter Wings and the Sixth Fleet (approximately 150,000 stationed in Europe) represents a serious force that can fight in defense of NATO or deploy elsewhere in the Allied interest. This force demonstrates U.S. resolve and commitment. It is compatible with the idea of a more balanced partnership between the U.S. and Europe. And it is arguable -- given the extent of U.S. prepositioning in Europe and the readiness of Contingency Forces based in the U.S. -- that even a 100,000-man corps forward can accomplish most of the same purposes.

The components of U.S. forward presence in Norway -- prepositioned equipment for the NALMEB, the INVICTUS Program, COB Program, Teamwork Exercises and Battle Griffin Exercises -- all remain in force. They have been bolstered by the ear-marking of a U.S. NCF component, support for Battle Griffin during the Gulf War, and confirmation of continuing, though less frequent, exercises to reflect changes in Russia. Even though the overall manpower of the Marine Corps will shrink by about 25%, its commitment to the Norwegian reinforcement mission will continue.

It is not logical to view variations in the intensity of U.S. surveillance of Russian strategic capabilities in Arctic waters
or on the Kola Peninsula as reflective of U.S. commitment to Norway. The Navy will likely conduct SSBN patrols of Russia's Northern Fleet in the Barents Sea as long as the second most powerful navy in the world possesses a stockpile of nuclear weapons capable of destroying the United States and its Allies. Norway, by virtue of geographic location, cannot help but hold strategic value with regards to specific military operations. But if the forces in and around Kola were to vanish tomorrow, and the U.S. Navy ceased operations there entirely, the U.S. commitment to Norway through NATO would continue. Politically, Norway's solidarity with the European collective security organ would still figure prominently in the scheme of U.S. Grand Strategy.