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Introduction

The Scandinavian defence discussions of 1948-49 have roused the interest of researchers for a number of years. New sources of material have become accessible, new aspects and interpretations have been presented, and at the same time individual evidence has been published and contributed to the debate. However the maintenance of interest is perhaps primarily due to the fact that the result of the negotiations has been regarded as centrally important for Nordic security policy – in the whole postwar period and therefore in the present too. A common feature of the earlier research is that the emphasis has been either on a national or an international level and that the focus has been directed towards the actual negotiations and their preparations i.e. the year 1948-49; whereas a comparative Nordic angle of approach and a longer historical perspective have been lacking.

The point of departure of this article is that the result of the defence union negotiations cannot be explained by referring to the national or the international situation alone or a combination of both during these two years: I am more inclined to see the result as the consequence of a process of development that may be traced back to the thirties at least, in some respects even earlier. A discussion of what I shall call the Nordic problem of cooperation will help us to understand the outcome of the negotiations.

Most of the discussions and negotiations were conducted on an official level. As the Social Democrats formed the largest political party in Denmark, Norway and Sweden and were moreover the governing party during the greater part of this particular period, it seems natural to concentrate the account on central party relations and the inner group that made the decisions.
Nordic defence discussions in the thirties

When a Scandinavian defence union was presented as a security policy alternative in the spring of 1948, it was by no means a new idea. The matter had been of current interest in the thirties and during the Second World War to the Nordic foreign leaders, to the Nordic Labour movement and in public opinion, as traditional foreign policy was being reconsidered and a Nordic arrangement was seen as a possible security policy alternative.

That some kind of neutrality-based union of small states was then presented as feasible naturally depended primarily on certain mutual security interests and a wish to create a balance to external threats, but may also be explained by referring to similar views of the role of democratic small states in an international security system - an ideology for small states if one wishes - as a recognition of the superiority of the democratic parliamentary system and of what we usually call the traditional Nordic cultural heritage.

We may speak of generally growing aspirations towards increased Nordic cooperation from the beginning of the thirties. The defence discussions were part of this general development. The tendency towards Nordic integration was further strengthened in the early postwar years when several ideas about cooperation from the thirties were brought up again, leading to the establishment of a joint Nordic labour market, expanded Nordic legislation and social-political cooperation. At the same time studies were made of economic and parliamentary cooperation, and also the Scandinavian defence committee was established.²

In spite of the fact that all the Nordic countries professed themselves neutral in the thirties, their respective neutrality policies showed certain distinctive features, depending on more or less constant strategic factors, on their former experiences in foreign and defence policy, but also on the personal stamp the Foreign Ministers put on the policy.

Where Denmark was concerned, its constant dependence on the strongest continental power, in the thirties Germany, led to incessant attempts to create a counterbalance. This was expressed on the one hand in commitments to peace work in the League of Nations and in Nordic aspirations towards cooperation, and on the other hand in the efforts to engage the interest of the British navy. These attempts may be considered abandoned after the Danish non-agression pact with Germany in the spring of 1939.³

For all the countries the emphasis in foreign policy - more or less until spring...
1938 - was on collective security, but for Finland, as for Denmark, Nordic cooperation was a complement to the policy of neutrality, to a far higher degree than for Sweden.

Nordic cooperation played a limited role in Norway's neutrality policy. The so-called «implicit guarantee» - i.e. Norway's confidence that Britain would assist, in its own interest and without a formal agreement, if Norwegian territory were attacked - underlined the fact that Norway's relations with the west were of more importance than those with the east.4

Even within and between the Social Democratic parties there were differences in the view of how neutrality policy should be formed - differences which were significant even for the postwar period. The Norwegian Labour party was here in both respects in a unique position - unquestionably as a result of the party's ideological development.5

On the occasions when discussions on possible defence cooperation came under way the initiative was taken either by Denmark or Finland - the countries which may be said to lie on the fringe of the Nordic countries and which have been regarded as the most exposed. These discussions followed two lines: on the one hand those which touched on comprehensive collaboration in foreign and defence policy - a defence union between two or more of the Nordic countries; on the other hand functional military cooperation, concerning e.g. munitions, training, air reconnaissance etc.

This account will focus on cooperation in foreign and defence policy in the widest sense, although both lines may be followed up to 1949. The division was also found in the Scandinavian defence committee's directive and it is hardly very daring to contend that both functional military cooperation between Denmark and Sweden and between Norway and Sweden, and closer collaboration in security policy in one form or another between the three countries, have been a matter of common interest even after 1949.

Cooperation in the area of defence in the thirties may perhaps be said not to have achieved very much far-reaching result, but some bilateral partnership between Finland and Sweden and between Norway and Sweden had been established when the Second World War broke out.

The question of Nordic cooperation in defence and foreign policy had not reached the stage of proper negotiations but stopped at a sounding and exploring stage whose further development depended on the leading Social Democrats' views of cooperation.

On two occasions - in August 1937 and in March 1940 - the Nordic Cooperation Committee, i.e. the political and union leaders of the Nordic Social Democratic Labour movements, discussed the problems they had in common in defence
policy. On the first occasion, after Prime Minister Thorvald Stauning’s well-known speech in Lund and the consequent Danish and Swedish press debate, it was found necessary to clear the air and define their positions. On the other occasion - after Foreign Minister Väinö Tanner’s inquiry to Norway and Sweden in connection with the Finnish-Soviet Peace Treaty of March 1940 regarding a defence union - it was also a question of exploring and assessing the situation.

In August 1937, unlike March 1940, there was no real proposal to be considered, and therefore the discussion touched quite generally on the possibilities of establishing defence policy cooperation within separate defence areas. A defence union was initially dismissed as being utopian and little thought out, considering among other things the Labour movement’s generally negative attitude to defence.

Therefore a real discussion did not then take place but was postponed. An extension of defence cooperation in other areas was nevertheless considered: neutrality guard, food supplies and munitions production were mentioned, and likewise joint defence of certain limited areas. The last matter was dealt with by the Foreign Ministers at their meeting in May 1938. Even then the idea of a defence union was turned down, as we know.

The meeting in March 1940 took place at the request of the Finns. The result of the talks and of the official contacts are well-known, but some observations should be made seeing that the discussion touched on some of the essential problems of a Nordic defence union.

The purpose of a defence union should be to strengthen the Nordic countries’ - or rather Finland’s - military preparedness. And even if this was not directly emphasised, it cannot be interpreted in any other way than that the purpose of a defence union should first and foremost be preventive. The actual preventive effect should be regarded as being dependent on a strong defence. Undoubtedly the governing Social Democratic parties, particularly the Danish and Norwegian ones, would have had great difficulties in achieving unity in the Labour movements for a defence policy reorientation involving increased costs.

Apart from the domestic political problems, one wonders what would have happened if any of the countries had been attacked after all. To what degree was one prepared to defend any of the other countries’ territory and against whom? To take an example, it cannot be considered within the bounds of possibility that Danish forces should defend Finland or vice versa. Which areas of the Nordic countries should be defended jointly in a defence union is naturally a hypothetical question, but it was also related to another problem which both Gustav Møller and Per Albin Hansson took up: Where does the threat come from?

None of those present gave the same answer to that question. Nor did those
present agree that a defence union would provide adequate security. Therefore on
the one hand an alternative possibility was presented: the Nordic countries should
abandon neutrality and work for the principles of the League of Nations - a col­
clective security system being a better guarantee of security; on the other hand a
complementary possibility - a Nordic defence union should be strengthened
through the protection by the «western democracies» of the freedom and indepen­
dence of the Nordic countries. The former proposal came from Albert Forslund,
the Swedish member of the party committee, the latter from Martin Tranmæl.
Neither Forslund nor Tranmæl developed their thoughts further in this connec­
tion, but it is nevertheless symptomatic that the debate within the Labour move­
ment later, both during and after the war, would follow the lines indicated here: on
the one hand a Nordic/Scandinavian neutrality union in relation to other security
policy solutions; on the other hand the extent and purpose of a defence union. It is
worthy of note that a Nordic defence union was not a tempting alternative to
Hedtoft either on this occasion or earlier in the thirties, and this did not depend
merely on Denmark's existing relations to Germany.

Both in 1937 and 1940 a similar pattern appeared in the discussions in the
Cooperation Committee: great scepticism from all parties with the exception of a
couple of Norwegians who belonged to the group Örvik named «internationalists»
- represented here by Martin Tranmæl and in March 1940 also by Finn Moe - and,
in the latter case, naturally also the Finns.

In addition to the above-mentioned, Örvik also includes as internationalists
Carl Bonnevie, Ole Colbjørnssen, Jacob Friis, Olav Hindahl, Halvard M Lange
and Oscar Torp - all except for Lange formerly Tranmælites and belonging to the
former majority line in the party. Most of them may be described as radical intel­
lectuals. Haakon Lie also includes, in addition to himself, Trygve Bratteli, Lars
Evensen, Einar Gerhardsen, Aase Lionæs and Konrad Nordahl.

In foreign policy the internationalists supported a strengthening of the League
of Nations and collective security and - within the framework of the League of
Nations - closer cooperation with the other Nordic small states and the Soviet
Union. They thought a strong League of Nations would require a softening of
neutrality in order to make possible Norway's participation in any sanctions.
Lange was included in this particular grouping not because of his ideological
leaning - politically he had belonged to the Social Democrat minority - but purely
because of his personal circumstances. Lange's father, Christian Lange, devoted
his life to international peace work. He was secretary for the Nobel Institute in
Oslo until 1909, and after that general secretary for the Inter-Parliamentary
Union. This meant that Lange grew up in Europe in an international milieu cha­
acterised by an optimistic belief in the prospects of settling international conflicts
by peaceful means: by negotiations, settlements and the creation of international peace organisations.⁷

In several respects the internationalists' policy was directly contrary to Koht's isolationist neutrality policy, and at the party conference in 1936 the opposition made a determined attack in order to modify it. Koht threatened to resign if the conference did not approve his foreign policy line, but in spite of this the internationalists achieved a certain amount of success - the demand for Norwegian neutrality was struck off the programme.

The result of the discussion at the conference has been interpreted as a victory for Koht's policy. I would sooner regard it as a victory for Koht himself - a rival candidate for his post could scarcely be imagined - but a repudiation of Koht's policy. After all criticism came from the party leadership among others! Koht got support from e.g. Gustav Natvig-Pedersen and Magnus Nilsen, former Social Democrats and supporters of small state neutrality of the Danish and Swedish kind. Criticism also came from the extreme left, in this case represented by Håkon Meyer who adhered to the party's earlier sceptical outlook on the League of Nations and demanded Norway's resignation from the organisation and unconditional neutrality, as well as a general strike as weapon if war broke out.

The discussion at the conference showed that there were still great ideological differences within the party concerning foreign and defence policy. Olav Watnebryn confirmed this by saying: «There is nothing more likely to bring the conference to the boil».⁸

Amongst the other Nordic Social Democrats there were no corresponding foreign policy groupings. The international commitment which in the thirties may be said to have characterised the whole Norwegian Labour movement and which also still existed in the early postwar years was conspicuous by its absence in the sister parties. To a certain extent one can find similar attitudes in the Swedish trade union movement - especially among former syndicalists like Ragnar Casparsson, press agent for the Swedish Federation of Trade Unions, Charles Lindley, president of the Transport Workers’ Union and Emil Malmborg, the Graphic Workers’ Union. I am principally thinking of their actions in the question of boycotting the purchase of German goods in 1933.

In the Danish Labour movement however there were absolutely no malcontents where the country's foreign policy was concerned. This was a state of affairs which was primarily due to the demand for unity within the Labour movement, and indirectly to the parliamentary situation the party found itself in. Within the Nordic Cooperation Committee these differences of opinion between and within the Labour movements emerged clearly as different views concerning the Labour
movement's international commitment, and thus indirectly also regarding the individual country's foreign policy.

The next time the Nordic Labour movement met to discuss these matters was during the war - in March 1943. Before then however there had been a security policy debate in the Norwegian Labour movement; soundings concerning a Finnish- Swedish defence union had been made in the autumn of 1940 between the Finnish and Swedish foreign leaders; these soundings continued at the beginning of 1941 between the military leaders.
Postwar planning in wartime

The controversy over security policy within the Norwegian Labour party flared up again in 1941-43, but under other conditions than in the thirties. Norway belonged to the allies and had through the war alliance in 1940 - formally ratified in the military agreement with the British in 1941 - abandoned neutrality.

The discussions of 1941-43 concerned Norway’s future security policy and were conducted within and between the Norwegian government in London, the «Stockholm Group», and the Resistance Movement. The controversy actually began as early as November 1940 when Lie took over as Foreign Minister and declared his programme. But the difference of views became quite evident when the Norwegian government in London drew up «Main principles of Norwegian foreign policy» and the Resistance Movement and the «Stockholm group» - the latter with Tranmæl as the rallying figure - took a stand on this.

The common standpoint for all parties was that neutrality belonged to the past. The westward ties, with Britain, were of central importance for the Norwegian government in London. In Stockholm and in the Resistance Movement a new collective security system and relations with the other Northern countries and with the Soviet Union were given priority. In Stockholm Tranmæl was behind the formulation of the guidelines, in Norway, Lange. Neither the periodically heated discussion carried on between Tranmæl and above all Trygve Lie, nor the programmatic standpoint which was put forward from respective sides, gave any clear-cut answer to the question on how Norwegian foreign policy should be formed in order that the country’s security could be guaranteed. The government’s Atlantic policy was therefore largely left unchanged, but the discussion on security policy was by no means over - it was only postponed until a choice would have to be made which required a decision.

The internal Norwegian debate of the war years contained certain common or obvious standpoints which pointed towards possible security policy solutions - and thereby excluded others. Taking into account the foreign and defence policy of the thirties neutrality was therefore written off as a possible alternative. Instead they set their hopes on allied cooperation.

The relations between the great powers and the creation of a new strong world organisation - an organisation built up of regional units - were seen as the foundations for a lasting peace. For Tranmæl the Nordic countries formed such a regional bloc, but a Nordic isolated unit was not acceptable from the point of view of defence policy - for one thing with regard to Denmark’s strategic problems - except in conjunction with some kind of great power guarantee. At the same time
it was important that cooperation with first of all Britain and the USA should not occur at the expense of Nordic cooperation.

What Tranmål outlined, if we keep the 1948-49 discussions in mind, was a non-neutral Nordic defence union (Finland’s role however being unclear) guaranteed by the western powers and the Soviet Union. This differed from the alternative of the Norwegian government in London in that the regional cooperation that they planned emanated from the partnership between the North Atlantic states which the Nordic countries should join - in other words an Atlantic pact in which Denmark and Sweden were associated in addition to Britain, USA, Canada, Belgium, Holland, Iceland, France and Norway. In this case also the result would be the abandoning of neutrality.

These were not of course specific proposals but broad outlines of what was thought possible and desirable. How far they would come to be realised depended chiefly on international developments, but domestic politics would also be of significance and in that case not least the feelings within the Norwegian Labour party.

The fundamental difference between the two standpoints lay in the view of Norway’s relations with the western powers as against with the Nordic countries - primarily Denmark and Sweden. Thus it was not as regards how Norway should attain maximum security that the assessments differed, but rather in the interpretations of the regional bloc’s function. For Tranmål the creation of a Nordic bloc was a step on the road to European and international integration while the regional Atlantic policy of the Norwegian government in London had primarily a defence policy aim and was intended to function until there was an effective collective security system. The difference may appear marginal but is essential for an understanding of Tranmål’s attitude in 1948-49.

Even Lange agreed with the idea of a regional agreement for both defensive and economic reasons. The condition for such cooperation with Britain primarily was, however, that other small states should also be included - Sweden, Holland and Belgium were mentioned. Relations with Sweden and the remaining Northern countries were given high priority, but neither a Nordic partnership nor one with the allies was in any way made a condition. Nor was there any categorical repudiation of prewar policy, but rather an indication that parts of Koht’s foreign policy - the active bridge-building element - had survived. To the extent that Lange’s answer pointed forward it was towards security cooperation with Britain, in which Sweden particularly would be included. Sweden’s policy of neutrality was of course a hindrance, but a change of that policy was thought possible in due course.

Central in this statement was the insistence that the government must commit
themselves through binding military agreements, but that all doors should be kept open until after the war.9

During the last years of the war these groupings drew closer to a certain extent as the Norwegian government in London changed their priorities. An international world organisation and also the relationship to Sweden were given precedence over the Atlantic policy - a result of the common international tendency towards an optimistic belief in the prospects of universalism.

The formulation of «Main principles» was not merely an attempt to settle Norwegian policy but was just as much a matter of taking a stand in the security policy discussions then in progress between the allies as to the shape of Europe after the war. The possibilities of a corresponding discussion in the Nordic countries on Nordic security were limited by the circumstances of the war - to a certain extent this was also true for the prospects of an internal debate within the Labour movements.

In spite of this it became possible on two occasions, in January and in March 1943, for representatives of sections of the Nordic Labour movement to discuss informally the shaping of the Nordic partnership after the war. Already at the first meeting certain clear stands were taken about a partnership in the field of security policy by representatives for Finland, Norway and Sweden - Denmark did not take part. Tranmæl repeated in his contribution the conditions for a foreign and security policy partnership that I earlier accounted for - namely the unconditional connection between Nordic and European cooperation and hence an equally unconditional rejection of an isolated i.e. neutral North. Eero Vuori, president of the Finnish Federation of Trade Unions, for his part recommended «regional federative unions» - without taking a stand on how such a Nordic union would relate to the great powers or to neutrality. His contribution bore distinct traces of the divisions within the Finnish Labour movement regarding the course of Finland’s foreign policy. As before the collective security principle had its spokesmen too - in this case Gustav Møller who spoke for a Nordic partnership within a new League of Nations, a form of alliance of small states as a counterweight to the interests of the great powers.

Though a certain scepticism was aired at the meeting it was considered practical to investigate certain questions on cooperation for the following meeting. This was in fact done by Østen Undén in the form of a memo, which he then presented. Undén reviewed possible forms and different areas of cooperation, but I am here concerned solely with what was relevant for security policy.

Generally speaking, in order that all Nordic postwar cooperation should come into new tracks, Undén considered that two conditions must be fulfilled: that the Nordic countries were free and independent; and that a majority of the people
supported a reorientation. For a defence union Undén thought that there had to be additional political prerequisites - namely a common enemy and besides an integrated foreign policy. In 1943 the situation of the Nordic countries at war was illustrative of how diametrically different their respective threat perceptions appeared. It seems highly unlikely that they should have changed substantially by the end of the war. Seen against that background the possibilities of establishing a joint foreign policy seem equally improbable, since that would require one or more countries to relinquish their independence - like what Undén had been considering in relation to the question of a Finnish-Swedish defence union in the autumn of 1940.10

As far as Undén was concerned, the solution lay primarily in joint neutrality, but since that entailed a number of difficulties he envisaged incorporating a Nordic defence union into a collective security system as a regional alliance. In that way the traditional form of neutrality would be done away with. The Nordic countries’ military commitments would be limited to their own territory.

In principle Undén’s line of thought involved no deviation from the foreign policy that Sweden had pursued between the wars. The principal ingredients were still the same: collective security, neutrality and Nordic partnership. Nordic partnership emerged with a firmer structure than in the thirties, but without the Swedish foreign policy doctrine being changed.

Undén was the Social Democratic party’s international law expert and was generally regarded as the future Foreign Minister in the next Social Democratic government. It may be taken for granted that he had the party’s support for his views in this connection. His speech was not followed by any real discussion but by sporadic comments from Tranmæl, among others. Tranmæl again stressed the Norwegian will to cooperate on condition that the Nordic countries would not be isolated. With this reservation he supported Undén’s line of thought of a Nordic defence union within an international world organisation.

The Danish Social Democrats did not participate on this occasion, but internally within the Danish Labour movement in spring 1943 there was a debate which referred to the general broad outlines drawn up at the meeting; a debate which resulted in the assembled Danish Labour movement making a statement in June 1943 on its attitude to Nordic cooperation. In so doing the Danish Labour movement emerged as the driving force in Nordic partnership matters - a role that was associated to a great degree with Hans Hedtoft, but which also traditionally may be said to have rested upon the Danes. Hedtoft’s Nordic commitment was a result of his experiences in the war, and consequently security policy became central for the prospects of developing a partnership after the war. The Danish Labour movement’s line emerged as some form of joint Nordic foreign and
defence policy - as part of a general peace and security system - with, like Norway, a rejection of an isolated defence union. However, in contrast to the Norwegians western relations were not given high priority. Hedtoft saw the only possibility for the Nordic countries to retain their full independence in an extensive Nordic partnership. For a country to ally itself with any of the great powers, no matter which, would mean that sovereignty would be limited. Consequently Hedtoft had no illusions either about the prospects of neutrality being respected in the future, or about a guarantee from a great power as a solution to Denmark's security problems.

It may appear surprising that the Danish Labour movement categorically repudiated neutrality, considering its support of the traditional Danish foreign and defence policy, but this may be seen as a result of their opposition to Nordic cooperation if it conflicted with a wider international cooperation. (I am disregarding other causal connections.) During the thirties there had been lots of occasions when the international labour organisations decided on actions which conflicted with the neutrality policy of the Nordic countries.

Hedtoft, who was the Danish representative in the Labour Socialist International (LSI), had met this dilemma within the LSI, the Nordic Cooperation Committee and his own party organisation, and was highly critical of the fact that international collaboration did not function satisfactorily. The alternative, in order to effect a change, was either to reform the International's working methods or to give up neutrality. In the thirties, the former alternative was the only imaginable one; in 1943 the latter was also possible.

Within the «Stockholm group» too the discussions continued in the spring of 1943. They resulted in a broad analysis of the Labour movement and Nordic cooperation in which the security policy views presented earlier were summed up - and not unexpectedly they met opposition from the Norwegian government in London.

At least outwardly there was silence about security policy from the autumn of 1943 - i.e. after the Danish and Norwegian Labour movements' different groupings had stated their views. The end of the war was awaited. Only then would it be possible to have an open debate and only then would the international situation appear clearer.

1945: a balance sheet

If we make a rough summary of how the respective Labour movements' foreign and defence policy programmes appeared at the outset of the postwar period, they present pretty much the same picture. I am disregarding the Finnish Labour move-
ment, where the question of a Scandinavian orientation, for which Tanner and Karl-August Fagerholm among others expressed hopes, as well as the country’s general foreign policy orientation, had to be left for the future, as long as peace had not been concluded and the Control Commission was still in the country. Political observers agreed however that relations with the Soviet Union would come to dominate Finland’s foreign policy.

The new international security organisation, the United Nations, which took shape in the summer 1945, was the common basis. One imagined that the allied cooperation from the war years would be further developed within the world organisation and that international cooperation would be organised within this framework. The Nordic countries had also a given place and function here. In this way the Labour movements could see a connection with the policy of the thirties. Nordic security policy cooperation would also be settled within the UN. Where Sweden was concerned it meant that neutrality in relation to Denmark and Norway should not be a problem.

Although there was principal consensus in regard to the new world organisation, all security problems were not solved thereby, as the security system could not be expected to be fully constructed at once. The Norwegians had foreseen this and intended (until that time when a collective security system functioned) to put their own house in order through creating a strong defence and by developing relations with other states. In the Norwegian Labour party’s manifesto this meant the allied great powers. Nordic cooperation was simply not sufficient for Norway as far as security policy was concerned. This was clearly expressed in Haakon Lie’s and Arne Ording’s formulation in «The blue book» - the guidelines of the Norwegian Federation of Trade Unions for the postwar years. The Danish Labour movement’s attitude regarding Nordic cooperation was just as plain. Regardless whether a security system was established or not, the Danish Labour movement insisted on the demand for Nordic foreign and defence policy cooperation. A condition for the establishment of a Nordic partnership thus seemed to be that it was a stage in the development of international cooperation in the United Nations.

These guidelines for Nordic security policy built to a great degree on theoretical bases and expectations. It was not possible to have other than hypothetical ideas on how international and national affairs would develop after the war, nor was it therefore possible to stake out a fixed line of security policy. Presumably it would also take some time before new power groupings and structures would be established, and consequently it was possible that the view of security policy contained both a short-term and a long-term perspective, in anticipation of a reappraisal in the near future.

When the time came to take a stand, however, the experiences from the foreign
and defence policy of the thirties and from the war naturally came to be included in the collective assessment. And in certain respects these experiences presented essential differences as between the Danish, Norwegian and Swedish Labour movements. For one thing this applied to the fundamental attitude to neutrality and to Nordic partnership.

In relation to the former there was a marked swing within both the Danish and Norwegian Labour movements. Where the Norwegians were concerned this had begun in the thirties, when the internationalists had changed their view of neutrality, and was completed during the war, when a negative attitude to neutrality permeated the Norwegian Labour movement. Thus the Kohtian traditional Social Democratic line of neutrality was on the point of being replaced by the internationalists' solidarity line, in which solidarity primarily included the allies. In 1936 it was the left wing states in the League of Nations and in 1940 it was the «western democracies» that the internationalists considered they stood politically near. For the Danes the change also took place during the war, as stated not only by the Labour movement but above all by the resistance movement. In the Swedish attitude there was no apparent change.

In the latter case of Nordic partnership the Danish Labour movement alone at the end of the war gave high priority to Nordic cooperation - including security policy. Here too the lines go back to the thirties, when there was a general Danish interest in a Nordic partnership based i.a. on security policy. The Labour movement also had this interest, even though it did not appear in their programme until the war.

In the collective picture should also be included the experiences, very bitter in certain respects, that the members of the Norwegian government in London had of «Nordic cooperation», as well as the corresponding predominantly positive reaction to Danish and Norwegian relations with the British during the war.

It is often claimed that the Scandinavian defence discussions became a turning-point in the modern political history of the Nordic countries, and several researchers, looking at them from various angles, have asked themselves why the talks did not lead to a positive result when the prospects were so good. I will rather claim the opposite and thus share Gunnar Hägglöf's view: The fundamental requisites for a defence union were lacking. Seen against the background of the development of Nordic relations in the thirties, a more relevant if somewhat facetious question would therefore be why the defence union discussions took place at all rather than why they failed.

The varying security policy assessments both at government and party level originated in fundamental differences in the Nordic countries' situation and - where the Labour movements were concerned - also in divergencies in basic
ideological views. This meant that there were essential differences between the
countries in the officially declared neutrality policy as well as in the foreign policy
that was in fact pursued. This did not of course mean that the conditions for a
Nordic/Scandinavian foreign and defence policy partnership were not subject to
influence by other factors. I mentioned war experiences as important for the con ti-
nuing development; moreover dependence on the prevailing general security
policy situation was also, in varying degrees, important. I assume however that
the main trends in the security policies of the Scandinavian countries had not
changed, even if one may possibly speak of a strengthening or weakening of
former tendencies.

What did this actually mean for the formulation of the respective countries’
security policy and for Nordic cooperation in the early postwar years?
Bridge-building policy

In May 1945 the war in Europe ended. Many years would however elapse before social organisation again functioned normally without the specific measures that the war or its ending had enforced. In order to solve the most acute problems provisional governments were formed in Denmark and Norway, composed of both party politicians and representatives of the resistance movement. In Sweden the coalition government was dissolved and a Social Democratic ministry took office with P A Hansson as Prime Minister and Østen Undén as new Foreign Minister. After the elections in Denmark and Norway in the autum, in Denmark the Social Democrat Vilhelm Buhl was succeeded by Knut Kristensen, Liberal, and Christmas Møller by the diplomat Gustav Rasmussen; in Norway Einar Gerhardsen reconstructed his coalition government into a totally Social Democratic ministry. In January 1946 Halvard M Lange succeeded Trygve Lie as Foreign Minister when the latter became General Secretary of the UN.

The changes in domestic politics did not influence foreign policy. In the early postwar years bridge-building policy within the framework of the UN remained the expressed objective for the Scandinavian countries' security policy in which the central elements were membership of the UN and good relations to the great powers. Because of the exposed position the Nordic countries ended up in after the war the power groups' mutual relations within became of great importance. The ambition of counteracting the tensions among them became an aspect of bridge-building policy, and this was stressed especially by the Norwegians. This depended on their keeping out of any blocs that were formed and on having equally good relations with the east as with the west. Thus refusal to join a bloc became the dominating aspect in security policy - accompanied by neutrality declarations from the Swedes, while neutrality in Danish and Norwegian foreign policy was toned down as it was not considered compatible with UN regulations. In spite of this the similarities with neutrality policy in the interwar period were striking.

But even if external security policy had undergone small changes, the Nordic countries had gained new experiences in foreign and defence policy in the war. The change of policy that came about when Denmark joined NATO was affected to a great degree by this. In Finland there was a radical changeover of security policy - the Soviet Union, not the Nordic countries, became of primary security interest. As for Norway, certain tendencies in the policy of the thirties - Tranmæl's solidarity line and the implicit guarantee doctrine - were respectively strengthened and formalised. The Swedish foreign and defence policy doctrine
seemed unchanged, at least externally. In the course of the war the differences which already existed in the thirties in the Nordic countries' foreign policy became more obvious. This was reflected in relations with the western powers. The war relations had consequences afterwards from both a military and political point of view. The functional military Anglo-Danish and Anglo-Norwegian relations were further developed, which may be seen as fairly natural from a Danish and Norwegian point of view since a number of matters to do with liberation remained to be settled: for example, a number of British troops remained in Denmark, and to a limited extent in Norway, during part of 1946. On their departure from Norway the Ministry of Foreign Affairs recommended that British missions be attached to the respective armed services. Munitions were bought in the west, Danish and Norwegian members of the armed forces continued to be trained in Britain and decisions were made about Danish and Norwegian participation in the British occupation of Germany.

From a general point of view, matters that may be seen as completely military naturally gained a political dimension by marking a positive basic attitude to the western partnership. In addition there were close political contacts on the whole in matters relating to security policy.

Relations to the other great power, the Soviet Union, were more complicated because of Danish and Norwegian uncertainty over Soviet intentions regarding the Baltic - Bornholm - and Svalbard. Here too the Norwegians showed a will to maintain the positive wartime view of the Soviet Union and thus retain conflict-free relations. This resulted in a very careful policy in which the Norwegians avoided frictions as far as possible. Denmark had a worse starting-point. During the war Danish-Soviet relations had been strained. The Danish authorities' anti-communist measures had resulted in Soviet opposition to Denmark being recognised as an ally - it was not accepted until after the war. But the Danes were aware of the lack of balance in their foreign policy and strove to normalise their relations with the Soviet Union. Therefore great political importance was attached to the trade agreement established with the Soviet Union in July 1946.

**Foreign Ministers keep aloof**

Unlike the generally positive atmosphere that the Danish-Norwegian partnership with the west grew out of, Nordic cooperation was strained since the war. This was particularly obvious in Norwegian-Swedish relations. There was a widespread anti-Swedish mood in Norway which may have been a contributory cause to the Norwegian politicians pursuing a wait-and-see policy in Nordic co-
operation - an element which, as will be pointed out, could even be found in Kohl’s foreign policy.

Cooperation on an official level was also influenced by the fact that Finland did not consider it possible to participate. After the armistice Finnish-Soviet relations became the axis that Finnish policy revolved around. Finland’s dependence on the Soviet Union and its realisation that there was only one possible policy regarding the Soviet Union made relations with the remaining Northern countries of secondary interest. The solidly established Russian distrust of all forms of Nordic cooperation accentuated this. Apart from the communists it was nevertheless considered essential that the Nordic and, above all, the Finnish-Swedish contacts were maintained lest Finland be isolated from the west. The Finnish government also stressed the importance of the contacts.

In practice the consequence of balancing between the Soviet Union and the Nordic countries was that Finland on principle did not participate in any official Nordic partnership with political undertones and definitely not in the Nordic ministerial meetings. The traditional meetings for Foreign Ministers were resumed in March 1946 in spite of the fact that they provoked great irritation on the part of the Finns and that Finland could not attend.

Before then the nature of the ministerial meetings had been discussed between the parties affected and certain premises had been specified before continuing this collaboration, which was far from lacking controversial aspects. On several occasions after the war the matter had been of interest and in connection with the Nordic Cooperation Committee’s meeting in Copenhagen in January 1946 the Danish Foreign Minister, Gustav Rasmussen, took the initiative in meeting Trygve Lie and Østen Undén. On this occasion, as at a meeting in July 1945 between the three Prime Ministers, Lie, and Vuori - then also assembled on the occasion of a Nordic Cooperation Committee’s meeting - the Danes and Norwegians made some definite conditions and priorities, which pointed towards concrete non-political cooperation in practical matters. Deference to the Soviet Union was central here.

They were anxious that the surrounding world should not be able to interpret the cooperation as a stage in creating a bloc - implicitly anti-Soviet. Nor were the Norwegians prepared to let neutrality become the basis for cooperation since, as in the discussions during the war, neutrality was equated with isolationism - conceptions which were incompatible with the Norwegian view of bridge-building policy.

Lie did not only mark out the limits for cooperation but he also specified suitable areas of cooperation - viz. culture and economy - traditional matters involving little controversy. Undén wished to add a long-term trade partnership.
aimed at joint guidelines leading to a common trade policy, while Rasmussen and particularly Lie saw in a trade partnership an opportunity to limit their mutual competition on the world market.\textsuperscript{31} For the Norwegians this was an important aspect which was presented already during the war and which originated in the fear that the Swedes would exploit their superior economic situation by driving the Norwegians out of their former markets.\textsuperscript{32}

The opening discussions between the Foreign Ministers gives a relatively clear picture of how they regarded the partnership. That it should be resumed in its present form was considered natural and was not questioned - apart from the Finns - but at the same time the Norwegians had a wait-and-see attitude, sceptical in certain respects.

The Norwegians, like the Danes, defined the limits for cooperation - matters that could be considered political were in principle taboo. Directly related to the Danish and Norwegian security policy conditions was the need to remain independent of any great power groupings and at the same time to avoid isolation from the surrounding world. This may also be said to have been their general premises for Nordic cooperation. On Norway's part there was also an indication that Norway in some particular respects was associated more closely with other groupings of countries than with the Nordic countries.\textsuperscript{33}

In addition to political and economic motives as explanations for differences in attitude to Nordic cooperation, there was an irrational element which is elusive and difficult to explain but still very obvious: i.e. a competitive relationship between Norway and Sweden, both in reciprocal Nordic cooperation and in Nordic external relations; this manifested itself in a constantly present mutual suspicion of the other party's intentions.\textsuperscript{34} In connection with the defence union discussions, this became even more obvious and was definitely a handicap in their dealings. There was not anything like this in the Danish attitude to cooperation.

The guiding principles drawn up for cooperation in 1945 and 1946 implied that the thoughts and ideas which emerged during the war, particularly within the Norwegian and Swedish Labour movements, were further developed on a government level. The Swedes again stressed the pragmatic side of a partnership. Undén consequently spoke of how useful and necessary the Foreign Ministers' meetings would prove to be;\textsuperscript{35} and the priority for trade relations was a direct follow-up of the intentions in the Swedish Labour movement's economic postwar planning.\textsuperscript{36} The Danish view was, however, more in line with Peter Munch's foreign policy than with the Danish Labour movement's plans from wartime.

The first Foreign Ministers' meeting in March 1946, like the subsequent ones, was as planned devoted mainly to matters of practical cooperation: firstly matters concerning reciprocal cooperation in e.g. economy, trade, legislation, research
and education;\textsuperscript{37} and secondly matters concerning external Nordic standpoints - principally within the UN\textsuperscript{38} but also in what one may call European matters,\textsuperscript{39} such as the Marshall Plan. UN matters dominated, and among them affairs of procedure were predominant.

Apart from the defence union, which was on the agenda for the meeting in September 1948, during the forties one big cooperation project was discussed at one Nordic Foreign Ministers' meeting - the matter of a Nordic customs union. I shall touch on it to some extent seeing that the opening discussion sheds light upon the mechanisms of the partnership.

**Nordic economic cooperation?**

As mentioned previously, a Nordic economic partnership after the war was in line with the Labour movement's postwar planning. It resumed the cooperation that had begun in the interwar years through the so-called «neighbouring countries' committees». Already at the first discussion on the matter in January 1946 and up until the ministerial meeting in February 1948, when it was decided that a Nordic committee for economic cooperation should be appointed, the Foreign Ministers had different priorities.\textsuperscript{40} Norway was primarily interested in a Nordic division of labour. Extensive reconstruction work forced the Norwegians to limit industrial investments to certain sectors. If a Nordic division of labour could be effected, in which each country specialised in a certain type of products, it would help the recovery of Norwegian industry. Common tariffs or a Nordic customs union, on the other hand, as Denmark and Sweden preferred, were considered to result in too great competition, in which Norwegian industry would be knocked out. Danish and Swedish industry did not have the same great problems, and a more general partnership was the most advantageous from a Danish and Swedish point of view.

Precisely as in the defence union question there were thus two different approaches: the Norwegian one aimed at limited partial cooperation, in which it was of importance to consider other non-Nordic interests; and the Danish-Swedish one aimed at expansive more radical cooperation. The Nordic economic committee's report contained both these alternatives, but when this was formulated Lange said clearly that Norway could not commit itself to a common tariff policy. In spite of this an analysis was recommended. Even here there were similarities to the rotations round corresponding instructions for an analysis for the Scandinavian defence committee. Did this mean that security policy considerations also determined the Norwegian attitude to Nordic economic cooperation?
The question of the extent and content of Nordic cooperation meant a constant balancing between Nordic and international considerations - a feat involving various political aspects, including the security policy one, but where the recurrent concern was that Norway's interest was not limited to the Nordic countries but extended beyond Nordic cooperation. Cooperation in an international context, e.g. in the UN or in European matters, was desirable and was considered profitable, but on the other hand reciprocal cooperation which disregarded possible international connections generally lost Norwegian support.

Different starting-points and objectives had also other effects. Thus the repartition of roles between the delegations at the Foreign Ministers' meeting was always the same in principle: the Danes were alone in expressing a generally positive attitude to cooperation; the Swedes also took the initiative and tried to force the pace; the Norwegians were cautious and reserved. This applied mainly to the larger and more far-reaching projects, whereas the Norwegians might show a different attitude if the cooperation did not aim at extensive integration.

It is possible that the threat to national identity was interpreted differently in a Nordic context than in an international one, and that this may explain Norwegian opposition to the cooperation in general and to extensive cooperation plans in particular.

Apart from the deliberations proper and whatever result they had, the Foreign Ministers' meetings gave an opportunity for informal talks where the ministers informed one another on current security policy problems, but where they were also able to probe sensitive matters informally before bringing them up officially. In May 1947 Rasmusssen took up in this manner the question of formalising the Danish-Swedish military contacts that had occurred after the war. But before we pursue the continuing development in the security policy area I shall bring up another forum of cooperation - the Nordic Labour movement's Cooperation Committee. Were signals given even from that quarter concerning the direction of security policy and the mutual Nordic relations?

In connection with the Nordic Cooperation Committee's meeting in March 1943 a memorandum was drawn up - «Memo about possible tasks for a future Nordic cooperation policy». Udgaard and Wahlbäck have made use of it as if it were written around the time of the first Cooperation Committee's meeting after the war - in July 1945 - and accordingly mistakenly interpreted it as a Swedish manifesto. Some of the reasoning presented in 1943 was however irrelevant in 1945. The contents were in themselves an expression of the Nordic moods and hopes that flourished in Sweden during the war, but the practical realisation of which required different political conditions than those that prevailed after the war.
When the Nordic Labour movement once again assembled, for the first time after the war, security policy was indeed discussed but on other fundamental premises than in 1943. Uncertainty had then prevailed over international development on the whole and therefore over development in the Nordic countries too. At the same time the future was viewed with a certain degree of optimism and in that spirit Nordic cooperation in different fields was seen in a generally positive light. When the war was over and the leaders of the parties and trade unions met again there existed a need to discuss certain aspects of the policy that had been pursued but also a will to define the terms for the new cooperation.

For Foreign Minister Lie the new conditions were directly related to security policy. Prewar Nordic cooperation was written off. In its place a partnership should develop in close contact with other countries. The idea that neutrality policy of the pattern of the thirties belonged to the prewar period was shared by the Danes and the Finns. What had one imagined in its place? The Danish alternative to neutrality was a joint Nordic foreign and defence policy - a Nordic defence union; the Finnish one was a bridge-building policy between east and west, implying an active policy to promote mutual understanding between the great powers. Finally P A Hansson declared his belief in the traditional neutrality policy and a development of the partnership on the former basis.

These semi-new ways of thinking were based on the idea that the Nordic countries had slight prospects of keeping out of a future war. The European balance of power policy which was kept up in the interwar years and where the Nordic countries were on the fringes of the field of tension had been replaced after the war by a balance of power between the continents where the Nordic countries lay at the point of intersection. It therefore seemed sensible to adapt the security policy to the new circumstances even if the risk of war was not considered imminent.

The Danish and Norwegian points of view presented had been declared in various connections during the war and were well-known to the assembled company. The Norwegian line was also identical with Norwegian foreign policy. The Danish idea on the other hand conflicted with the Foreign Minister's official statement and seems to have been connected primarily with the Labour movement. Nor was the Finnish draft bound by official ties.

The discussion over the wording and contents of the communique showed that the Nordic Labour movement in the summer of 1945 contained different notions of security policy, and that the topic was controversial. In the final communique of the meeting there was no indication that security policy was discussed. The
The fact is that Per Albin Hansson had rejected those parts of respective delegations' drafts for the communiqué which in his opinion contained standpoints on security policy, including the Norwegian formulation thanking the allies for their war efforts.45

The programme for continuing cooperation, resulting from the Cooperation Committee's meeting, did not therefore contain anything that could be considered controversial. Priority was given to social, economic and cultural cooperation.46 Did this in fact mean that a defence policy partnership was written off? As a mutual line for the Nordic Labour movements - yes. However there is no reason to suppose that the Danes gave up their standpoint, which with some licence may be formulated as the utmost possible cooperation within as many areas as possible. The situation was rather that other fields than foreign and defence policy were to be given priority - fields where it was considered there were better chances of reaching a result.

On former occasions - in August 1937 and March 1940 - when the Cooperation Committee had discussed a defence policy partnership and the idea of a Nordic defence union had been dismissed, a functional military partnership had been presented as an alternative. Such a solution might be interpreted in different ways: either as a step on the road to a defence union, or as a purely military partnership with limited political implications. When on this occasion Per Albin Hansson introduced the question of a limited defence partnership, as opposed to the Danish idea of a defence union, uniform types of arms, joint training and staff cooperation were mentioned, but, as on previous occasions, he probably did not think that it could be developed further. But this form of military partnership did not gain the committee's support either. The attitude was the same as when Per Albin Hansson a year later, at the Cooperation Committee's meeting in July 1946, took up the matter again. Halvard Lange, as earlier Lie, laid down which areas of cooperation were possible and security policy did not belong there.47

No debate on mutual Nordic security problems was conducted at the Cooperation Committee's meeting in the years to come, although it became more and more obvious in 1946 and 1947 that differences in the allies' strategic and economic interests pointed towards a division into blocs that would make bridge-building policy more difficult. The items agreed to on the programme for continuing Nordic cooperation that was established in the summer of 1945 became the dominating matters. Above all economic problems both in the Nordic countries and internationally played a big role.48 The security policy aspects were however always included in general political assessments and there cannot have been any doubt in these circles as to how respective groups regarded their country's security policy and above all the mutual Nordic relations. The contours of the security
policy profiles that were noticeable in July 1945 certainly became more obvious in the following meetings and these positions were not changed until 1948 either.

Strictly speaking it was a question of two alternative opinions: the Norwegian Nordic/international perspective in which Nordic cooperation was seen as a part of a wider international cooperation - the Nordic countries as a halt on the road, not a terminus; and the Swedish Nordic/national perspective in which cooperation had primarily a functional pragmatic purpose but in which there was no unconditional connection to the international perspective. Thus the Norwegian and Swedish opinions were at opposite ends, while the Danes generally speaking could imagine supporting the alternative that at the time was considered best to further cooperation.

The difference between the Norwegian and Swedish opinions was a matter of principles, but had naturally practical consequences for how nearly all cooperation matters should be solved, meaning those in which the diverging opinions were relevant. The different opinions originated of course in differing security policy assessments, but central in the Norwegian approach was solidarity with the democracies (chiefly Britain, but also the USA - interpreted as the democratic forces in the USA) that built on moral evaluations. The idea runs through the discussions in the Cooperation Committee, expressed by Martin Tranmål, Haakon Lie and Einar Gerhardsen among others, and was also central in Lange’s discussions with Undén.49

That moral aspects could influence a country's security policy was for the Swedish party leadership then a totally alien idea, which undoubtedly contributed to make the Swedes uncertain about the meaning of the Norwegian security policy. The polarisation within the Cooperation Committee was particularly obvious in the discussion on Spain.

The Spanish dictatorship was reminiscent of the thirties to the Norwegians. In the same way that the Norwegian Labour movement had fought against fascism and nazism, it was considered obvious that action would be taken against Franco’s Spain after the war too. It was desirable to have Danish and Swedish support in this matter. At the Cooperation Committee meeting in January 1946 Konrad Nordahl, president of the Norwegian Federation of Trade Unions, put forward a concrete proposal: that the meeting should encourage the Scandinavian governments to contemplate breaking off connections with Spain.

Nordahl was supported in his proposal by his Foreign Minister, Trygve Lie, for one. After the discussion that followed Nordahl’s contribution, he stated, «This reminds me of discussions before the war that led to fifteen million killed and wounded, not to mention all the other devastation.»50

The similarities were in fact striking - not only in the reasoning but also in the
Labour movements' positions. Generally speaking the debate showed much the same pattern as that of ten years earlier: the Norwegians and Swedes were on opposite sides - Per Albin Hansson and Undén were categorically opposed, while a certain moderation was noticeable in the Swedish Federation of Trade Unions - and the Danes lay between these standpoints. What was new was that the Danish Social Democrats had changed: in the thirties they had in principle followed the Swedish party line, but now they had drawn nearer the Norwegian view of solidarity measures.

The differences in the view of the Danish, Norwegian and Swedish Labour movements of their function in an international context as well as the development of those views over time give cause for some reflections. The first is that the Norwegian solidarity line did not depend on whether the Labour party governed - the pattern appeared the same whether the party governed or not. A second is the significance of the party leader as regards the course chosen.

It is uncertain how great a scope the foreign policy opposition - the adherents of the solidarity line - had within the Norwegian Labour party in the thirties. It is highly probable that it was more extensive than it appeared to be at the party conference in 1936 - bearing in mind the ideological ties. The formulation of postwar Norwegian security policy with its emphasis on international cooperation and solidarity with other countries meant that the ideas of the solidarity line had become an important part of the Norwegian security policy doctrine. The shift of Foreign Ministers from Koht to Lie and Lange was a sign of this change. War experiences were a contributory cause here.

The Swedish Social Democrats' interpretation - constantly presented by P A Hansson among others - that the responsibility of governing resulted in limited opportunities for the Labour movement's international commitment was in other words irrelevant for the Norwegian line within the Cooperation Committee.

A corresponding change, if on a lesser scale and in this case in the Danish Social Democrat party leadership - from Thorvald Stauning to Hans Hedtoft - meant a softening of the former neutrality position, which to a great extent was tied to Stauning's person. The view of solidarity that Hedtoft represented in the late thirties therefore after the war became to a certain extent that of the party too. Probably experiences in the war influenced this development too.

In spite of certain shiftings of position between themselves in the Scandinavian Labour movements the main impression of continuity is still striking. This makes it very likely that the traditional ideological differences may serve as explanations for the diversity of attitudes to solidarity.

In principle Finnish contributions are missing from this as in other political discussions which turned directly or indirectly on security policy matters. Did this
in fact mean that even in this semi-official connection they took up a special position determined by politics? Indeed, just as in official cooperation at the Foreign Ministers’ level they wrote off all political cooperation even in the Cooperation Committee, rarely participated in the debate, and refrained from making political statements. They themselves established their affiliation to the «east zone»51, and the political considerations that were thereby seen as necessary caused the cooperation in many cases to become Scandinavian rather than Nordic. That Finland was included in the Russian sphere of interest was seen to imply military consequences in the long run. Finland was therefore written off not only by the Finns themselves but also by the remaining Nordic countries as a partner in cooperation.

I shall return to the question whether Finland was still indirectly of interest in connection with the Scandinavian defence union discussion.

When the matter of a Nordic partnership was discussed after the war in 1945 and 1946, both at the Foreign Minister level and in the Cooperation Committee, foreign and defence policy cooperation was excluded from the agenda. The basic conditions for effecting a comprehensive political partnership were lacking. This was also reflected in the possibilities for cooperating in related political matters. Obvious principal differences in the views of neutrality, of relations with the western world and of international cooperation were central here. At an early stage it was also clear in this connection that it was a question of a Scandinavian partnership and not a Nordic one.

Although this was understood, discussions nevertheless came to be conducted in the spring of 1948 on a possible Scandinavian defence policy partnership. In October of the same year these resulted in a Scandinavian defence committee being appointed. In December 1948 and in January 1949 defence union negotiations followed and, after that, in April Denmark and Norway joined NATO.
A functional military partnership?

Why was a discussion on a Scandinavian defence partnership initiated when there were strong arguments against it? I am taking it pretty well for granted that the question sooner or later would be brought up. A number of other Nordic partnership matters were examined in the early postwar years and therefore this side of the cooperation could not be ignored indefinitely either - even if defence cooperation had been of interest earlier the matter had not been thoroughly investigated. When the time was considered ripe, for domestic policy reasons, the Danish and Swedish Social Democrats would in any case have found it opportune to examine the possibilities of a defence policy partnership.52 Besides, in connection with the Danish and Norwegian building-up of the armed forces, there was every reason to examine the countries' partly mutual military interests.

However, international trade developments caused the whole problem of the Scandinavian countries' security policy to be brought to a head already in the spring of 1948.

I shall return to the military and political reasons which were then presented for a defence partnership.

Cooperation in defence had been under consideration already one year earlier - before the actual discussions started.53 In April 1947 the Danish Naval Chief Vedel had proposed to Rasmussen that the military Danish-Swedish contacts that existed since the end of the war should be politically sanctioned in order that they might then be further developed - hopefully to a «Nordic agreement within the framework of the UN». Vedel's proposal had been preceded by internal military contacts and approved by Defence Minister Harald Petersen.54 Rasmussen was in favour and in connection with the Foreign Ministers' meeting on 12 May 1947 he presented the idea to Lange and Undén. This resulted in the go-ahead being given for preparatory military discussions on cooperation in: salvaging of wrecked submarines; minelaying in a crisis; military research; and uniform types of arms.55

Compared to the existing cooperation, this proposal was a big step in the direction of a functional partnership. Cooperation at the defence staff level developed in the early postwar years regarding certain kinds of training, study tours - particularly of Swedes in Denmark and Norway to study German warfare among other things, as well as exchange of information on different aspects of defence organisation, its buildup, armaments, size of forces etc. Although these contacts appear to have been quite extensive, it seldom happened that cooperation matters were touched on which also had political implications.56

In 1945-47 the Danish high-ranking officers showed a marked interest in a
military Danish-Swedish partnership in munitions matters among other things, but as time passed the Anglo-Danish contacts that were already developed became more established, both politically and economically, and at the end of 1947 there was a swing in favour of an Anglo-Danish partnership.\textsuperscript{57}

There were a number of uncertain factors regarding the buildup of Danish defence. In the prevailing circumstances a new defence programme was being prepared, and there were large-scale deficiencies in the armed forces - the Danish military therefore found it difficult to take the initiative regarding the Swedes. In addition to aspects related to the organisation of the armed forces and the country's economy, there was also a psychological side to the matter: conditions that help to explain the leaning to the west that had developed in the Danish armed forces.

In the Norwegian armed forces, particularly among high-ranking officers in the army and coast artillery, there was also interest for a partnership with Sweden.\textsuperscript{58}

Sweden's military attaches in both Copenhagen and Oslo tried directly and indirectly to induce the Swedish defence staff to profit from this and take the initiative. This produced either no reaction, or concerning Norway a negative one.\textsuperscript{59} The Swedish Chief of Defence Helge Ljung did take the initiative in November 1946 by approaching the government about equipping the Danish and Norwegian armed forces. He recommended immediate measures to achieve uniform armament and pointed out the serious consequences for the Swedish defence if the Danish and Norwegian armed forces were equipped with British arms. In actual fact this would mean Denmark and Norway would join the western powers.\textsuperscript{60}

It is clear that the Swedish military leadership was uneasy over the development in the Danish and Norwegian armed services. On the other hand it does not seem as if the government was influenced by military thinking or by military proposals to facilitate Danish and Norwegian purchase of equipment in Sweden. On the contrary Undén and Erlander emphasised that any Danish and Norwegian orders should be dealt with in the usual way.\textsuperscript{61}

How then did the Swedish government react to the Danish military and political initiative, which Undén had preliminarily approved? The government's general view was that the Defence Ministers should discuss this further. The government was particularly doubtful about the matter of joint minelaying,\textsuperscript{62} i.e. the point at which any measures might conflict with Swedish neutrality policy.

The Norwegian and Swedish military authorities had already made contact\textsuperscript{63} in spite of the government's attitude, but with the approval of the Defence Ministers - Allan Voug and Jens Christian Hauge. In actual fact it was partly a question of political approval of informal contacts concerning e.g. salvage of submarines
which had gone on since at least the spring of 1946. Such contacts continued on the Foreign Minister level. At the end of June 1947 Lange was in Stockholm to confer with Undén among others about the invitation to the Paris meeting on the Marshall Plan. Before the visit, Hauge clarified the Norwegian attitude to possible military collaboration. In this the Norwegians gave priority to joint atomic energy research, about which there had already been informal contacts between the Norwegian and Swedish authorities concerned. He considered the remaining points also worth discussing, as well as mutual military policy problems on the whole. Danish and Swedish bilateral contacts were also made. After one meeting between Vougt and Petersen in Copenhagen at the beginning of August an inquiry was begun by the Swedish defence staff into the calibre question. The Swedes were also prepared to cooperate with the Danes on research.

Soundings about a defence partnership

In autumn 1947, then, bilateral contacts had been established, a discussion had got under way, and inquiries had begun into all the points except minelaying, where the Swedes had reservations for the time being. So when Lange and Rasmussen in February 1948 brought up the question of the prospects of a functional military partnership at the Foreign Ministers’ meeting they were continuing on the way they had set out on earlier. The new initiative taken and the fact that there was interest in buying military equipment in Sweden were a result of ever greater antagonism between the blocs, which it was feared could lead to a crisis with consequences for the Nordic countries too.

In January British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin had presented the idea of a western pact; the Czechoslovakian crisis occurred while the Nordic ministerial meeting was in progress; and ever since December 1947 there were indications that there was something brewing in Finnish-Soviet relations.

After the Foreign Ministers’ meeting only a few weeks elapsed before the international crisis spread to the remaining Nordic countries. Notice was received in Oslo that a proposal of a Russian pact was to be expected. On 9 March the Swedish ambassador in Oslo, Johan Beck-Friis, went to Stockholm at Lange’s request to notify Undén of the development of the situation and also of Lange’s inquiry of the British and American ambassadors about assistance to Norway in the event of a conflict. Undén attached great importance to the Norwegian application and this triggered off the Swedish initiative for more comprehensive cooperation than had been previously discussed. Until Undén’s journey to Oslo on 3 May 1948 the contacts however continued according to the earlier patterns.
The Foreign Ministers met again on 12 March in Copenhagen, on their way to the Paris meeting, and they then discussed the situation without coming to any decision. After the Paris visit, where Undén through talks with a number of European statesmen got an insight into how the general political situation was regarded and where he also explained the Swedish view, the next month saw a number of discussions and soundings among the Swedish authorities concerned.

These applied above all to the general direction of foreign policy, but a possible defence partnership with Denmark and Norway was also touched on - eg. in Undén’s talk with the Chief of Defence Helge Jung.

In addition to the internal Swedish discussions, contact was kept with the Danes. Hedtoft was in Stockholm a couple of times and had talks with Erlander as well as Undén. Hedtoft also participated in discussions between the government and the Federations of Trade Unions. Through these soundings Undén gained a general view of how the political and military leadership regarded the situation. He was given an assessment of the situation - although there was no question of a consideration of a possible defence partnership - and on 23 April he obtained the support of the Committee for Foreign Affairs for a non-binding initiative in relation to the Norwegians.

Undén could now go further. After contacting the Norwegian ambassador in Stockholm, Birger Bergersen, and making a telephone call to Lange, he went to Oslo. On 3 May he had exhaustive discussions with Lange alone, and with Lange, Hauge, Gerhardsen, and Oscar Torp - president of the Labour party’s parliamentary group. Were the Norwegians willing to discuss: the possibility of defence policy collaboration, possibly a defence union between Denmark, Norway, and Sweden which should aim at «keeping us out of any bloc and emphasise our intentions in the event of conflict to try to keep out of the war» - i.e. a Scandinavian defence union based on neutrality? That was the question Undén wanted the Norwegians to answer. The Norwegian answer, given i.a. by Lange, was that they were very positive, but it was not possible to base a discussion on a defence union on neutrality.

Lange’s answer can hardly have come as any surprise to Undén, and in this talk the concept of neutrality came to cause great problems. The result was that Undén did not insist that the word neutrality should be included, but nor was he prepared to see the issue studied without preconditions - allowing for inclusion of the alternative of a western alliance.

What did this mean? Was it merely a contention over words, where Undén in order to advance suggested alternative formulations with similar meanings, or was it his intention to give the concept of neutrality a broader interpretation than the usual one?
That both Undén and Erlander, in connection with the defence discussions, considered the term unfortunate emerged in several different contexts.\textsuperscript{76} The problem was partly that the concept neutrality was values-laden - positive for the Swedes and negative for the Norwegians - and that it was therefore difficult to use the concept from a new basis and with a partly new and different interpretation. «Freedom of alliance» and «independence» respectively were the alternatives that particularly Undén used during the actual negotiations. But nor does it seem improbable that Undén wished to have as wide a scope as possible at a preliminary stage so that conceivable solutions would not be ruled out because of a Swedish demand that «neutrality» be included.

To sum up, this meant that Undén could imagine giving up the concept of neutrality, partly because it was «loaded», and partly because it limited the scope for negotiating - which would have had further consequences for the formulation of a security policy. At all events Undén expressed himself in such a way that the Norwegians considered he was willing to agree with the Norwegian interpretation - an investigation with «no strings attached».\textsuperscript{77}

Both the ambassadors Bergersen and Beck-Friis had corresponding opinions of Undén's view of the bases of a discussion.\textsuperscript{78}

At the joint Scandinavian talks in Stockholm on 10 May the Swedish standpoint was changed, according to the Norwegians. There were in fact definite limitations relating to neutrality in the so-called «Stockholm memorandum». The preliminary proposal for a communiqué - the memorandum which was intended to be the official communiqué, as an introduction to negotiations - said,

«the ministerial meeting resolved, in agreement with the respective governments, to begin a study of the question of military cooperation between the three countries. The purpose of this cooperation should be to safeguard the independence and freedom of the three countries, to keep them out of every grouping of other powers and out of any war between the great powers»\textsuperscript{79}

If we assume that the Norwegians interpreted Undén correctly in Oslo, then this meant that in the political talks he had after the Oslo meeting Undén was told clearly that only neutrality was politically possible as a basis for a partnership in which Sweden would participate. This had been stressed earlier by several of the Cabinet Ministers including Ernst Wigforss the Finance Minister, Eije Mossberg - Minister of the Interior, Per Edvin Sköld - Minister of Agriculture, and Nils Quensel - Ecclesiastical Minister. But it was brought to a head after the Oslo meeting, when Sköld threatened to resign since he was not prepared to take political responsibility for the leaning to the west which he foresaw would be the result.\textsuperscript{80} The neutrality line was also evident in the discussions that Undén and
Erlander had with Rasmussen and Hedtoft on the days after they went to Oslo.81

The meeting on 10 May between Hedtoft, Rasmussen, Rasmus Hansen (the Danish Defence Minister, Gerhardsen, Erlander, Gustav Møller (the Swedish Minister of Social Affairs), Sköld, Wigforss and Vougt was therefore yet another example of the contrast between the Norwegian and Swedish views of security policy and of the Danes’ attempt to sit on the fence and at the same time have cooperation as a lodestar.

The initiator of the Stockholm meeting was Hedtoft, who saw an opportunity for joint discussions in connection with the Social Democratic party congress.82 However it came as a surprise to Gerhardsen, who was the only Norwegian representative, that the meeting would have such dimensions. He obviously felt disagreeably affected by the situation83 and, although he, along with Undén and Rasmussen, drew up the preliminary draft for the communique,84 we do well to consider that in such circumstances it would have been difficult for him to defend himself against a combined Danish-Swedish front and to gain a hearing for Norwegian views. So Gerhardsen returned to Oslo with a proposal for his government which he already in Stockholm realised would not be accepted. Consequently he did not force the question in the government either.85

That the Norwegian government turned down what was looked on as a Danish-Swedish neutrality alternative did not however mean that they were also prepared to give up the whole idea. On 13 May a Norwegian proposal was presented to the Danish and Swedish ambassadors in Oslo -

«The ministerial meeting in agreement with the respective governments has resolved to begin a study of military cooperation between the three countries in concordance with the principles in the UN Charter, Article 52. It is intended to ascertain to what extent such cooperation may contribute to the preservation of peace and security.»86

The draft also contained a more detailed proposal for a plan of what the study should examine and how it should be organised, and here the Norwegians returned to the functional military cooperation which they had previously considered and which should also be a part of the defence committee’s assignment. But the Norwegian counterproposal was turned down by Undén on 14 May after talks with some members of the government - Erlander, Torsten Nilsson (Minister of Communications and party secretary), Wigforss and Vougt. The Swedes could not accept by that the neutrality limitation was no longer included.87

Although the Norwegian proposal was rejected, the Norwegians were eager to try to reach a mutual starting-point. Even if the positions seemed to have locked they saw a chance to attack the problem from another direction - to enter into
negotiations on military-technical matters until the political questions were solved. Bergersen delivered this message to Undén on 20 May at the same time as he accounted for the Norwegian conditions for a defence union discussion. Undén found this course of action practicable, and this proposal did not give rise to any debate when Undén presented it at a cabinet meeting the following day.

However, when Undén and Bergersen had their next conversation on 27 May the situation had totally changed. Technical negotiations were out of the question - on the contrary Undén declared that Sweden was not going to take any initiative or make any concessions. The Swedish government was going to bide its time.

Why these new signals? What had happened in between the two conversations?

On 24 May, at the cabinet meeting, the government was notified about Ambassador Erik Boheman's talk in London with Sir Orme Sargent, Secretary General for Foreign Affairs, and Mr Robin Hankey, head of the Northern Department in the Foreign Office. Boheman had called on them to get information on what the British thought of the situation. The meetings developed into sharp attacks on Sweden’s «absurd» neutrality policy and on the Swedish attempt to get also Denmark and Norway to adopt that line. According to Sargent, 0 + 0 + 0 could never be more than 0. In the course of the talk it also emerged that the Foreign Office had been informed by the Norwegians of the course of the discussions between Norway and Sweden. The latter piece of information in particular evoked violent indignation among the Cabinet Ministers and it was agreed not to take any measures that could be interpreted as Swedish concessions to the Norwegians.

In addition to the discussions between Bergersen and Undén there were a number of informal contacts between the Cabinet Ministers in the weeks that followed the Swedish negative answer of 14 May. Erlander, Hedtoft, Lange and Rasmussen met in Copenhagen on 5 June in connection with the celebration of Denmark's Constitution Day. Erlander and Hedtoft had also met earlier - in Malmö on 27 May - and were in contact with each other on the telephone as well.

On 16 June, at an informal meeting with Undén - Lange and Rasmussen were in Stockholm on the occasion of Gustav V’s 90th birthday - it looked as if the Foreign Ministers could be united on a common basis for a study - the Swedish neutrality alternative. To Undén's direct question - after Lange had accounted for the Norwegian view of the security policy situation - Lange confirmed that the Norwegian government was prepared to accept the Swedish line on condition that this limitation on the study should not be made public. It was agreed that the question of a study should be further explored before the regular Foreign Ministers’ meeting in September, and that contact should be maintained during this time.

On 20 July, after discussions in the Swedish government, Undén wrote to Lange and Rasmussen. He recapitulated the talks of 16 June in Stockholm and
advised them the Swedish government was willing to participate in a study under these conditions: that the study was limited to the neutrality alternative; that the governments would endeavour to keep out of a war between the great powers; that this was not to be made public; and also that discussions should not be conducted with other states about defence cooperation as long as the Nordic negotiations were in progress.

Undén also added a proposal for a communique.95

On the whole Lange approved the draft, and at the Foreign Ministers’ meeting on 8-9 September a decision was accordingly made to institute an exploration of defence cooperation between Denmark, Norway and Sweden.96

From the middle of May, when the Norwegian government turned down the neutrality line as a starting-point for an inquiry, until the middle of June, when this was accepted, the Norwegians’ standpoint had been revised. Had their view on Norway’s relations to the west and to the Nordic countries respectively been changed? Was there reason for the careful optimism that Undén expressed - i.e. that the Norwegian attitude had come closer to that of the Swedes and that there were prospects of advancing?97

There were several reasons for the Norwegians finally submitting to the Swedish condition for a study. One was Sweden’s military significance for Norway: both the strength of the Swedish armed forces and the capacity of their military industry were important factors. A second was the concern about Norwegian public opinion, for which it was important that a Scandinavian solution was explored if the consensus on security policy was to be preserved. Lange had also certain hopes that the Swedish neutrality line could be moderated when the committee’s report was available - that the Swedish government would realise the limitations of a defence union.98

Norwegian complaisance made a committee investigation possible. But it was an error of judgement on the part of the Swedes that this was also a sign of a change in the Norwegian fundamental attitude to the problem. The Norwegian idea was still that a regional Scandinavian system based on neutrality would be inadequate and thereby unacceptable from the Norwegian security standpoint. In order for there to be a Scandinavian settlement it had to be related in some way to a greater security system. It was clearly evident in internal Norwegian discussions, in the contacts between the Foreign Ministers, and in the Swedish reports from Oslo that the Norwegians perceived such a combination as the most advantageous in all respects.99

What about the Swedish attitude? Was it a complete deadlock? - Where the main direction of policy was concerned - yes. But the fact that the Swedes accepted that a declaration of neutrality could not be trumpeted forth in the announce-
ment of the study shows that there was some room for manoeuvre - if rather limited. Within the government there were differing opinions about the extent of this. Both Undén, as mentioned, and Wigforss, at least until the beginning of June, considered accepting the Norwegian standpoint - an unbiased study - but Erlander opposed this just as he opposed a more flexible wording of the communique proposal in July.\textsuperscript{100}

Boheman shared the attitude that Undén and Wigforss represented in the spring, and thought that a deliberation should only be conditioned by the provision that agreements on defence cooperation should not be entered into with another country as long as the Scandinavian discussions were in progress.\textsuperscript{101} This was a standpoint that the government rejected. Boheman was on the whole critical of the Swedish handling of the defence union question and tried to influence the government towards «the greatest possible circumspection».\textsuperscript{102} Such criticism would recur, not only from Boheman but also from Ambassador Gunnar Hägglöf\textsuperscript{103} and hence presumably went unheeded.

Although there was a pronounced interest on the part of both the Norwegians and the Swedes in bringing about concrete defence union discussions it appears as if the Swedes drove the Norwegians before them: it was not a dialogue between two equal partners, but rather an attempt on the part of the Swedes to dictate the conditions from a power position that was self-evident, and even expressed.

For what reasons did Sweden give priority to a Scandinavian defence union? One pre-condition of Swedish neutrality policy was that Sweden’s military-political situation remained unchanged. The association of the Norwegians with the western bloc that was in the making was seen to lessen the chances of pursuing a neutral policy both in peacetime and in wartime. The Nordic countries would become involved in an east-west conflict and the international situation would thereby deteriorate. Bases on Norwegian territory, which Undén regarded as an inevitable demand from the western powers, would mean that the Nordic countries became more exposed. It thus lay in the interests of Sweden to prevent Norway joining the west. A Scandinavian defence union in which Sweden guaranteed the safety of Denmark and Norway was seen in that situation as a possible security policy alternative - on condition that the defence union was based on neutrality and that foreign policy was coordinated. It was also assumed that Denmark and Norway would carry out an extensive rearmament of their own armed forces so that Sweden’s security should not be endangered.

The idea of foreign bases in Norway was an important part of what Undén viewed as a threat. In conversation with for example Lange, Marshall and Bevin, when declaring his view of Sweden’s foreign policy and the international situation, he made countless assertions about bases. However his reasoning was based
on false premises, since none of the parties wished or demanded bases - as distinct from «facilities». Lange, for one, informed him of this but without having any effect on Undén.

The risks Sweden took in a defence union with Norway were considered small. An isolated Soviet attack on Norway without Sweden being affected was also regarded as unlikely. On the other hand, a Soviet attack against Denmark, which did not include Norway or Sweden, was more probable. Thus Danish participation entailed increased risks for Sweden. Attempts were nevertheless made to eliminate these by limiting military commitments in relation to Denmark, since it was not considered politically possible to leave Denmark out of a union.

Undén did not regard as a problem the fact that a Scandinavian defence union would mean changes in Swedish neutrality policy, as long as the set conditions were fulfilled. On the other hand he was not convinced that a Swedish guarantee of help would be thought adequate. 104

Norway’s significance for Swedish security policy had been demonstrated even earlier - in autumn 1946 in connection with the Norwegian-Soviet talks on Svalbard. A somewhat similar situation, with the risk of Norway taking a crucial step into one of the great power groupings, caused Undén even then to act from what he thought were legitimate Swedish security interests.

In autumn 1946 it appeared as if the Soviet Union intended to bring about a revision of the Svalbard treaty of the 1920’s: 105 a revision that could mean that Svalbard was converted from a demilitarised zone to a Soviet military base and that Norway thereby risked landing in the Soviet sphere of interest. From the point of view of Swedish security this was thought very serious, 106 and according to the information Undén got from Lange during the autumn - Lie had also kept Undén informed when he was Foreign Minister 107 - Undén gave Lange well-meaning advice by letter on how Norway should act. If it were not possible to maintain status quo, which was in Sweden’s interests, the Norwegian government should try to delay the matter by saying it should be settled within the UN. If this were not practicable, one could perhaps push the principle that matters of bases outside a country’s territory were generally to be left to the UN. 108

How Lange reacted to Undén’s advice is shrouded in mystery and is of little interest in this particular context. The Svalbard crisis was settled at the beginning of 1947, and there is nothing to indicate that further Norwegian-Swedish contacts were made. On the other hand this particular unsolicited move from Undén may be regarded in itself as remarkable and above all may be taken as an expression of Sweden’s interest that no bilateral Norwegian-Soviet treaty was made. Otherwise in such sensitive matters it was generally assumed in a Nordic connection that the initiative would have to come from the most closely affected party.
The Scandinavian defence committee

After the Norwegian-Swedish contacts in the summer of 1948 and the subsequent resolution taken at the ministerial meeting in September that a committee should be appointed, the Scandinavian defence committee was constituted on 16 October in Oslo. There were four members appointed from each country. The Swedish representatives were Governor Carl Hamilton, members of parliament Elon Andersson and Sven Andersson and Major-General Nils Swedlund - a number of civilian and military experts also came to participate as special advisors.109

On the day before the defence committee was appointed the Foreign Ministers had agreed on the guidelines for the investigation. In accordance with the agreement at the Foreign Ministers' meeting these were declared as being to examine «the possibilities and conditions for I. A defence union, II. A partial defence partnership». There were four requirements for the defence union alternative: that each country would resist by force of arms any attack; that they would act with joint solidarity in a potential attack; that they had no military commitments to third powers; and that they would fulfil their obligations under the UN Charter.

Which matters was the committee instructed to investigate? Were there differing opinions on the wording of the guidelines and were the previous contrasts between the Norwegian and Swedish opinions noticeable here too? Briefly it was the task of the committee to clarify: the total strength of their collective resources; the possibilities of preventing or resisting an attack using these resources; the need of the three countries for external armed assistance and supplies in case of attack; the consequences of establishing the partnership - both alternatives - in accordance with the sections of the UN charter relating to regional alliances. The directive included the requirement that no negotiations were to be conducted at the same time as the committee's work was in progress, and that the committee should be ready with its report before 1 February 1949. It would then be the business of the governments to come to a decision on the basis of the committee's work.110

Undén had made a couple of additions to the Swedish draft drawn up by Vougt: the point on the connection with the UN charter; and a proposal on limiting Sweden's solidarity commitments.111 The latter was delivered orally at a meeting on 15 October and referred primarily to Denmark's and Norway's «imperial possessions», Greenland and Svalbard,112 but it is obvious that Undén had also other areas in mind. The possibility of Sweden helping at all to defend even limited parts of Denmark was called in question by both politicians and the military, and the same was true in regard to North Norway.113 Both Hansen and Hauge accepted this particular reservation.
What caused problems was the constantly recurring question of the relations of the countries to third powers. The formulation which was finally accepted after ironing out their different points of view:

«that the three countries, which are agreed to try to keep out of a war, have not beforehand entered into military agreements with other powers»

- was according to Vougt what Hauge could accept. The wording was imprecise and could be interpreted in different ways. The Norwegian condition, presented constantly, that a Scandinavian partnership should not preclude cooperation with the west was certainly contained in this formulation. The formal side of cooperation with the west was controlled by this. However there was nothing to prevent a continuing development of Norway’s relations with the west on the existing basis, which meant that the ground could well be prepared to the extent that relations could be formalised on the outbreak of war. At all events it was an indication that the Norwegian principles for cooperation remained the same. Vougt was also aware of the shortcomings but thought that he had achieved the most possible.

The institution of an investigation was in itself an immense step and a sign that all the parties - irrespective of motive - attached great importance to a defence partnership. At the same time they realised the extent of the difficulties involved and therefore did not express any great optimism for the outcome.

There were no changes in the parties’ principal standpoints during the weeks up until the Prime Ministers’ meeting in Uddevalla. A wait-and-see policy was pursued until the result of the defence committee was ready. Unofficially however they continued to argue for their respective views. Did they then see no alternative solutions based on angles of approach other than Swedish neutrality policy or Norwegian association with the west?
A third way?

At least two alternatives, more or less clearly formulated, were outlined. The one, the Norwegian one, was an attempt on party level to find a common platform based on ideological assessments. The second one, the Danish one, was on the diplomatic plane: the idea was that the matter should be attacked so to speak from another direction - the western powers should be persuaded that a Scandinavian defence union lay in their interests. In both instances it was a conscious effort to avoid a deadlock.

At the Social Democratic Cooperation Committee's meetings in February and in October 1948 several of the Norwegian participants used the term «a third alternative». The expression contained two elements: on the one hand an ideological one - democratic socialism as an alternative between socialism and capitalism; on the other hand a security policy element - a dissociation from the polarisation between east and west. It is symptomatic that in that latter sense it was only the Norwegians who saw possibilities in a third course. This was developed by the party secretary Haakon Lie and Martin Tranmæl at the February meeting and in principle it was identical to the Norwegian solidarity line. Based on a discussion of the Marshall Plan they recommended close economic and political cooperation between the Scandinavian countries and Western Europe. Marshall Aid was taken as a basis for continued European economic cooperation and they thereby gave it political significance too - in contrast to Undén for example who argued that the aid had solely economic implications. Western Europe was regarded as a possible third power between the great powers Soviet and USA. Cooperation with Britain and the British Labour movement was considered crucial as was the fight against communism - both nationally and internationally.\(116\)

The Norwegian Labour party also acted in line with this. The Nordic Workers' Congress may be said to have been the first step. It was held in Oslo at the end of August 1947 and came about on the initiative of Trygve Bratteli, who at the Nordic Cooperation Committee meeting in January 1947, suggested that it would be appropriate to realise the old idea of a congress. The message of the congress, the prospects of democratic socialism and international cooperation, had both internal political - connected with the Labour party's 60th anniversary - and international aims. But on this occasion only Haakon Lie explicitly interpreted the solidarity line as a demand for cooperation with the western democracies.\(117\)

Another initiative envisaged a conference between the socialist parties that participated in the Marshall Plan. The original idea was that the invitation should be Scandinavian, but as both the Danish and Swedish parties declined it became
an Anglo-Norwegian one. There was certainly nothing new in the close relations between the Norwegian and British Labour movements. In November 1946 the British Labour movement, which was considered to be ideologically the nearest to the Norwegian Labour party, was internally declared the party's lodestar in international matters, as far as this was possible. Both ideological and security policy aspects were included in that assessment. On that occasion too, as later, it was Tranmæl and Haakon Lie - who in his anti-communism however was regarded as extreme - who defined the party line.

In 1948 there was a shift - an increase in the importance of the security policy factor at the expense of the ideological. This was related to developments in Europe where the chances of a third alternative in its current form steadily diminished. At the Cooperation Committee's meeting in October 1948 Gerhardsen developed a security policy alternative to the Nordic solutions which then seemed to contradict each other: an alliance with the western powers as against the possibility of being «written off» by the west.

According to him both these expedients involved great risks, and he was totally negative to the latter. Gerhardsen's third alternative, which he based on the reasoning of Lie and Tranmæl and which was also associated with close western cooperation, was a Scandinavian defence partnership attached to the UN as a regional pact. The relationship with the west was not specified, but it was evident that some kind of association with the west was aimed at.

The difficulty with this and similar discussions where Nordic politicians confronted each other was that because of generally imprecise wording they avoided the actual problem, and thus created the impression that they were more in agreement than they really were. An example of this was when Erlander in a summing-up that concluded the Cooperation Committee meeting in February 1948 used the expression «our third line», thus giving the impression that there was in fact a third course, and moreover one for the whole Nordic Labour movement. The communiqué from the meeting, with its general phrases about the committee's support of the Marshall Plan - excluding the Finnish representatives - and the rebuilding of Europe to promote a peaceful development leads in the same direction. As long as one did not define one's standpoints exactly there was room for interpretations supporting one's own attitudes - which meant that on each respective side there was constant uncertainty about how the other party's standpoint should be interpreted.

It was particularly obvious in Hedtoft's case that this was not just the reflection of a search for possible solutions but also part of a tactical game. He expressed it himself like this: «I take sides with the Swedes against the Norwegians when I am
with the Swedes, and with the Norwegians against the Swedes when I am with the Norwegians."¹²¹

The best he could attain in doing this was gaining time and thereby avoiding decisions being taken under pressure of time. The hope that a decision would be allowed to mature slowly - on the understanding that it would then be a better one - was expressed in different connections by all the parties.¹²²

An example of how Hedtoft adapted to circumstances was the way he handled his third alternative - the idea of a «diplomatic offensive». At the Cooperation Committee meeting in October 1948 Hedtoft proposed that a «diplomatic offensive» should be launched in Washington and London in order to create sympathy for an «alliance-free North» and to convince the Americans and British of their wish to defend themselves. Gerhardsen gave him his unreserved support. Even Erlander’s contribution may be interpreted thus. In connection with the meeting Hedtoft also had a private talk with Undén, who did not take part in the discussions, in which he picked up the threads of the argument again. An «alliance-free North» had then been replaced by a «Scandinavian neutrality bloc». From the Swedish point of view this, in my opinion deliberate, rewording might be supposed to make the proposal more attractive. But Undén was not prepared to make any commitment. His unwillingness originated in his great uncertainty of whether it would be politically possible to force a decision on defence partnership through parliament. He had first to wait for the result of the defence committee, and likewise the parliamentary resolution.¹²³ Hedtoft returned to the idea of a diplomatic initiative during the actual negotiations but his idea did not get any support then either. Undén’s negative answer however leads us to the question of Swedish opinion. Was Undén’s doubt justified? How much support was there for a Scandinavian defence union in parliament and above all in his own party?

Party opinion

The initiative for the preliminary defence union discussions in spring 1948 came at government level on the Swedish side - more precisely from Undén. Before contacting the Norwegians the matter had been discussed informally in the government, between Undén and Erlander and between Undén and Wigforss, as well as in government conference, and with the parliamentary parties in the Committee for Foreign Affairs.¹²⁴ The Social Democratic party organisation, including the parliamentary group, was however not informed.

Several of the Cabinet Ministers, as mentioned earlier, were doubtful about the proposal. Even Erlander entertained great doubts off and on about the whole
enterprise. On 26 May Erlander informed the parliamentary group of the contacts he had had with Hedtoft and Gerhardsen regarding a Scandinavian defence partnership. On 8 June and 19 July respectively Undén gave similar briefings. There was no debate on any of these occasions - the general outlines that were drawn up met with no objections. Nor was the matter of a Scandinavian defence union discussed by the Social Democratic party leadership in the spring. It was not on the agenda at all until in January 1949 in connection with the negotiations. However Undén made a foreign policy statement on 6 April, which in principle coincided with that made in parliament on 4 February. Any association with any of the blocs was then rejected, and likewise a Scandinavian defence union.

Within the parliamentary group a debate was first started in the autumn when the defence committee had begun its work. It then became clear that unity was not as great as it appeared to be. Presumably many had regarded the cooperation plans as hypothetical and therefore did not acquaint themselves with the problems - to the extent this had been possible. It is difficult to have any definite opinion on how detailed the information was that Erlander and Undén gave the group in the spring. There are indications that it was very general.

What was outlined was a possible Scandinavian defence partnership outside the blocs, based on Swedish neutrality policy and with the purpose of keeping the countries out of a great power war. It is doubtful whether one touched in detail on such concrete problems as the extent of Swedish solidarity under different war scenarios, the weaknesses in the Danish and Norwegian armed forces; or the differences between the Norwegian and Swedish security policy doctrines. The fact that a long time elapsed before a discussion got under way within the party I regard as due to - apart from lack of information - other matters which were not directly related to the point at issue, namely the division of power within the party concerning issues of foreign policy and the party's general lack of concern with international affairs.

I have already established that the government took the initiative based on their own foreign policy assessments - the military influence appears to have been limited. Nor did any wishes or demands from the party underlie Undén's lead. The government, or perhaps more correctly an inner circle within the government consisting of Erlander, Sköld, Undén and Wigforss, kept the initiative as the matter developed, while the parliamentary group functioned as a reference group. Thus the power in foreign policy matters lay with the government and parliament while the Social Democratic party organisation had a subordinate role. The situation was similar in Denmark. However the case was if anything the reverse in Norway, where the guidelines for foreign policy were drawn up within the party's
central organs and subsequently formally worked out by the government and parliament. This meant that both the Labour party and the trade union movement bore the stamp of international perspectives. Matters directly associated with foreign and defence policy were regularly dealt with at the central committee meetings, in principle during the whole of this postwar period. Foreign policy matters were not on the agenda for the Danish or Swedish Social Democrats until spring 1948, and even then it was a matter of information from above rather than a general debate on the policy course - for example Hedtoft gave the first foreign policy review after the war to the Danish party leadership on 14 June 1948.129

The discussion conducted in the Swedish Social Democrat parliamentary group on a couple of occasions in November 1948 and January 1949 cannot be traced in detail. It is possible to discern a number of critical voices but, since the matter was never brought to a head and thereby was not voted on either, it is not possible to express a definite opinion on the relations of strength between different factions at different times.

On 2 and 9 November Vougt and Undén respectively reviewed the development of the discussion on defence cooperation in the autumn: the defence committee's investigations, the political assessments underlying these, and what they thought the result of the inquiry might be. On both occasions the speeches were followed by a debate which was concluded by statements in favour of the Swedish neutrality line.130 This was obviously a way of gathering the troops and accentuating unity round the party's foreign policy line, after debates which revealed profound ignorance among the members of what was going on, and likewise «pronounced doubt» about the whole defence union idea.131 The sharpest criticism came from Georg Branting, David Hall, Albert Forslund, Karlsson from Munkedal, Axel Lindqvist and Paulsson from Arlöv. Erik Fast, Olsson from Mellerud and Oscar Olsson expressed support for the government's line while Harald Åkerberg leaned rather towards some form of western attachment.132

At the next group meeting on 11 January, after the Karlstad negotiations, Munkedal and even Branting repeated the criticism with which Fritz Persson also agreed. Even on this occasion Olsson from Mellerud supported the government line. So did Rolf Edberg, Elofsson, Harald Hallén and Rickard Lindström. However Lindström was ambivalent and Edberg, Elofsson and Hallén indicated preferences for a western attachment if that was a sine qua non.133

Before the Copenhagen meeting the group gathered once more on 20 January. The work of the defence committee was then completed. On the days before, the government and the Committee for Foreign Affairs had been informed of the result at presentations by the military. After that Erlander's general opinion of the situation in parliament was that the majority were sceptical because of the military
weakness of Denmark and Norway but that the government would get support for its line.\textsuperscript{134}

The meeting witnessed the same criticism as before, from Hall, Jacobsson from Vilhelmina, Lindström, Mellerud, Adolf Wallentheim and to an extent Branting too. Apart from the Cabinet Ministers Erlander, Sköld, Undén, Wigforss and Vougt, the following spoke for the government line: Fast, K J Olsson, Rickard Sandler, Frans Severin, Fritjof Thapper and Åkerberg, with the same perspective as formerly, while August Spångberg and Olov Andersson ended up among the undecided.\textsuperscript{135}

After a comprehensive debate the government got the group’s support. Obviously many people experienced great difficulty in taking a decision but the consensus among the Cabinet Ministers and likewise the Foreign Minister’s assurances that the Swedish neutrality line was and would remain unbroken certainly formed a base of support for the final result. Erlander also regarded his own attitude as influential for the outcome.\textsuperscript{136} For the government the discussion nevertheless provided an indication that the parliamentary group had gone as far as they possibly could while preserving unity within the party.

The group was gathered again on three additional occasions: on 25 January after the Copenhagen meeting; on 27 January before the Oslo meeting and after the party leaders’ meeting; and on 1 February after the Oslo meeting. Mårtensson from Uddevalla then joined the critics while Valter Åman joined the party line.\textsuperscript{137} The group had however made its decision on principle on 20 January, and as nothing was changed during the negotiations after the Copenhagen meeting the subsequent meetings only contained situation reports from Erlander and Undén and repetitions of previously declared standpoints. As the Copenhagen meeting did not produce anything new, the final result seemed obvious.

A considerable uncertainty about the matter among the Social Democrats had thus emerged both in the parliamentary group and in the Committee for Foreign Affairs. The troop of doubters also grew bigger the more information the members of parliament got and the nearer it came to a decision. What were the main points of criticism? To begin with, the span between the differing views was considerable. Furthest apart were on the one side the extreme supporters of neutrality and on the other side those with western leanings. Between them was a group that was very uncertain. But only the first of these three groups directly opposed the government’s policy. Their opposition, led by Georg Branting and David Hall among others, linked them with traditional social democratic currents in foreign and defence policy matters.

Principally the aims of security policy were seen as best fulfilled through traditional neutrality policy within the framework of collective security, supported by
a limited defence. A Scandinavian defence union was considered a departure from the old neutrality line - a view that in itself was in accordance with that of Undén, but which he, unlike Hall, gave a positive connotation since it meant that neutrality through a defence union would come to be extended to the whole Scandinavian area. However what Undén had in mind was simply the political aspects of neutrality; he was not prepared to change aspects relating to international law such as would involve the formulation of joint neutrality rules and a uniform policy both in theory and practice regarding neutrality infringements.

Generally, from the point of view of neutrality, Sweden's policy commitment in itself aroused great misgivings both among the critics of the government and among those who supported government policy, e.g. Fast and Åkerberg. This standpoint was fundamental and only indirectly related to e.g. military and economic affairs. Several of the Social Democrat members of the Committee for Foreign Affairs - including Fast and Åkerberg - also thought that there was widespread opposition among Social Democrats outside the government circle, both in the country in general and in parliament in particular. That observation appears to be correct at least where the members of parliament are concerned. This would imply that both within the Norwegian and Swedish Social Democratic party there was a tangible opposition to government policy that could not be disregarded. One cannot however speak of the opposition as a uniform group either where Norway or Sweden is concerned. Several lines were evident. Within the Norwegian opposition there were three groupings: the Scandinavian supporters of neutrality, (Olav Oksvik), those with an East European leaning, (Jacob Friis), and an anti-military pacifist grouping, (Gustav Natvig-Pedersen).

All those trends had clear ideological attachments and were also represented at the party conference in 1936. But the question of the Labour party's foreign policy was not decided then but more than ten years later when the Labour movement again had to make a choice of security policy: in this connection the Spanish question may be seen as a step on the way towards a settlement, with some of the same people amongst the opposition, e.g. Friis, Oksvik and Natvig-Pedersen. In the struggle between the proponents of a neutral small state policy in the spirit of Koht and the internationalists' solidarity policy, the internationalists were victorious. Assuredly there were common traits in Norwegian and Swedish public opinion; more remarkable, however, is the considerable difference in outlook on Nordic cooperation. Where the Norwegian opposition was concerned the Nordic aspect was an important ingredient in the policy they recommended. There was almost no trace of that argument among the Swedish Social Democrats. Only for Rolf Edberg among the members of parliament, and to a certain degree for Erlander and Möller among the Cabinet Ministers, was that a central motive. However
Edberg's western leaning meant that his opinion still did not coincide with that of the Norwegian opposition.

Those with western leanings formed a tiny minority in the central Swedish Social Democrat party organs, and since their primary goal was a defence union they were probably a support to the party rather than a handicap, even if Erlander questioned this at times. Those with western leanings in Swedish politics were otherwise to be found in the Liberal and the Conservative parties. Quite generally their approach to the problem of a defence union was developed from a more flexible view of neutrality to a demand for acquiescence from the west as a condition for a defence union. In the Agrarian party opinion was the same as in the Social Democratic party.\textsuperscript{143}

We know that the plans for a Scandinavian defence union aroused intense criticism in Norwegian and Swedish social democracy; also that Denmark officially, led by Hedtoft, went wholeheartedly in for a Scandinavian solution. Did this actually mean that opinion amongst Danish Social Democrats was unequivocal - like Hedtoft's message?

Those with a western leaning had their representatives even among the Danish Social Democrats but to them Denmark's association with the west was of primary importance and they thereby went a step further in their leaning to the west than any other group in Scandinavian social democracy. Already when the question was at a preliminary stage - before the Stockholm meeting in May 1948 - this emerged in an internal party discussion in which Frode Jacobsen, member of Denmark's wartime «Freedom Council» and a minister in Buhl's transitional government, supported by Holger Eriksen, editor of a party newspaper, advocated that view.\textsuperscript{144} Jacobsen represented the western orientation in Danish foreign policy which had developed during the war, not least in the resistance movement. He was also one of the initiators of the proclamation «Danmarks valg» («Denmark's choice») and was one of the men from the resistance who signed it. This was an appeal in favour of Denmark joining the Atlantic Pact, which was distributed to every Danish household in January 1949. Jacobsen seems however to have been pretty much alone in outwardly acting against the official party line.\textsuperscript{145}

The extent of the western oriented opposition within the party is uncertain. There is however nothing to indicate that there was an opposition comparable in strength to that of the Norwegians and Swedes. Presumably the dividing line in Danish security policy went between rather than through the political parties.

The demand from the non-socialist opposition, Liberal and Conservative, for information from the government concerning its standpoint on cooperation with the western powers was turned down for as long as the dialogue was in progress between Denmark, Norway and Sweden.\textsuperscript{146} The fact that neither Hedtoft nor
Rasmussen was prepared openly to declare the government’s standpoint was, at least on Hedtoft’s part, not primarily due to uncertainty about the policy but depended on tactics. To leave all the doors open was more or less a necessity in Hedtoft’s view of Nordic cooperation, and in his idea of his own and Denmark’s role as mediator between the Norwegian and Swedish standpoints. Besides in the Danish press this was a widely fostered idea which may however be questioned. When it became evident to the Danes that the prospects of realising the defence union idea were minimal, the message then was that if the Norwegians joined the western pact it would mean that Denmark was absolutely obliged to join too. There was no other alternative.

This covert message from Hedtoft, for one, can scarcely have surprised those who had close informal contact with him. In the autumn of 1948 Erlander noted that he thought Hedtoft had western leanings. But as early as the Cooperation Committee meeting in February 1948 Hedtoft established certain security policy theses that remained valid roughly until the end of February 1949. Briefly they amounted to - in the given order: that the sympathies of the Nordic countries lay with the western powers, followed by a hope that they would be on the right side if a war broke out; but they should not act in such a way that neutrality in the future became impossible; therefore there was no cause to declare any new policy at present; from a military point of view the Nordic countries intended keeping out of the great power blocs. Both the Norwegian and Swedish standpoints were contained here - neither joining the west nor neutrality was excluded, but at the same time solidarity with the west was stressed unequivocally.

It is possible that Hedtoft’s approach was also that of the party organs. This would be in line with the statement that the Danish Labour movement made in 1943 and would also help to explain the continuing support for the changing shapes of the party line - bridge-building policy - a Scandinavian defence union - joining NATO.

Hedtoft’s interest in effecting a Scandinavian defence union helped the actual deliberations to get under way in December 1948. But in these and the negotiations that followed the Norwegians and Swedes still had the leading roles.

The main features of the negotiations are known but there is nevertheless reason to look at them again in order to have the standpoints of the respective countries specified. How far were they prepared to go in seeking common ground? In that respect, did Erlander and Undén for example have different ideas concerning the terms of reference for an investigation? If so, did anything point towards a change in the actual security policy that Sweden intended pursuing?
The defence union negotiations

When the defence committee was appointed in October one condition was that work should be completed by 1 February at the latest. The negotiations on a western pact had then been in progress for some months and at the end of September both Denmark and Norway had been informed confidentially that they could expect a sounding about negotiations on joining the pact. Consequently time was short, and in the advent of the Uddevalla Town Jubilee Hedtoft took the initiative for informal talks between the three Prime Ministers.\(^{153}\)

The background to Hedtoft's action was the following: on 20 November Lange and Undén had a penetrating talk in Paris; before visiting the Secretary of State Mr Marshall, Lange wanted this meeting in order to hear Undén’s view both on the likelihood that a defence union would be realised and on the possibility of attaching such a union to the UN Charter. Undén was sceptical in both cases: in the first, because of opposition in parliament; in the second, because of uncertainty about how the pact would be interpreted if, for example, the Soviet Union resigned from the Security Council.\(^{151}\) The talk between Lange and Undén, and likewise a talk on 26 November between these two and Rasmussen\(^{152}\), presumably gave Hedtoft food for thought. The fact was that the Norwegian and Swedish standpoints lay just as far apart as at any previous time. Moreover the Americans had now given an answer in the matter of munitions, and the defence committee’s work had come so far that the result could be discerned.\(^{153}\) Thus there were certain more or less definite starting-points for a preliminary discussion. Besides Hedtoft considered it important that a joint Scandinavian initiative should be taken before the Americans had finally made up their minds and before the invitation to the pact negotiations arrived - and that day was drawing nearer and nearer.

In Uddevalla all the parties were extremely anxious to try to reach a compromise that could form the basis of continuing negotiations. Erlander and Gerhardsen also managed to produce a programme that both took into account the problem of the rearmament of the Danish and Norwegian armed forces and suggested a solution to the dilemma of neutrality versus joining the west. It was agreed to draw up a cost estimate for the rearmament of the Danish and Norwegian armed forces, with an analysis what the countries could produce themselves and what Sweden could contribute. The next step was to try to get the Swedish export of munitions accepted as part of the Marshall Plan and thereby paid for in dollars. They should also find out whether the UN could approve an agreement and «subsequently have its material contents guaranteed by each one of the member nations».\(^{154}\) The idea was that Sweden, via Marshall Aid, should assist according to its capacity in the
rearmament of Denmark and Norway and that the UN members should guarantee that the remainder of the munitions requirements was met. Such an agreement would - at least in theory - solve the matter without a direct dependency on the west being created and without neutrality being questioned. At the same time it would have required both Norway and Sweden to give up their principal demands in that respect, without however raising the thorny issue of the formulation of a joint foreign policy - having come a step nearer its solution.

With this proposal both Erlander and Gerhardsen had gone considerably further than their Foreign Ministers could have been expected to accept. This was also apparent at the Karlstad meeting on 5-6 January, where Undén and likewise Rasmussen presented a preliminary draft of an agreement. Undén had drawn up the Swedish draft at Erlander's request after his talk at Uddevalla, but it had not been discussed either in the government or with the Prime Minister alone. The Norwegians had also worked out a proposal, but did not present it formally except as a commentary to the Swedish one.

However in Karlstad the principal Norwegian and Swedish standpoints remained the same as before: the Norwegian one now formulated as a Scandinavian defence union with individual attachment to the Atlantic Pact; the Swedish one a Scandinavian defence union on the basis of neutrality, approved by the UN. When both the Danish and Norwegian ministers rejected the neutrality union which Undén outlined, and the Swedes for their part turned down a formal Danish and Norwegian attachment to the Atlantic Pact, the meeting joined in trying to find a compromise that the constitutional authorities could consider, as a basis for further discussion.

There were certain fundamental common views - the desirability of a defence union, the dependence on the USA concerning both the security of the countries and the supply of munitions - on which the soundings and proposals that followed were based. Undoubtedly the parties came closer together- the Swedes for example giving up their demand that an agreement should be preceded by Danish and Norwegian rearmament - but only the Norwegian delegation was prepared to relinquish their principal line. As a second best solution they would in fact accept renouncing the formal liaison with the west, on condition that the USA indirectly supported them - i.e. that an attack on any of the Scandinavian countries would lead to the United States going to war. This also became the Danish line, but with the reservation that an agreement should be drawn up first and that after that they should turn to the Americans. Such a mode of procedure neither the Norwegians nor the Swedes could accept - though for different reasons.

On the whole the Swedish position appears to have reached a deadlock. The Norwegians declared repeatedly that the reality of security and not its form was of
primary importance to them. This is also demonstrated in the negotiations where Hauge played a central part in trying to reach a result. However the form seems to have been most important to the Swedes. This may be partly ascribed to the difficulties in getting a hearing in public opinion for what was regarded as changes in neutrality policy. Erlander was however prepared to accept the last solution and plan that Hauge proposed - viz. a joint application to the United States, in which a defence union should be presented as feasible and desirable in military, political and psychological respects, and with an inquiry whether the USA acknowledged such a union in the sense that an attack on the Scandinavian countries would be casus belli, and whether the United States was willing to facilitate the supply of equipment. But Undén rejected the proposal although both Erlander and Lange did their best to persuade him that an attempt should be made with the Americans. 157

What Hauge outlined was a Scandinavian defence union without either a declaration of neutrality or an Atlantic pact agreement, but built on an implicit western guarantee: an informal liaison with the west that should also provide a possibility of building up the Danish and Norwegian armed forces. Erlander had previously, both during the negotiations and in other connections, given expression to this «idea of guarantee» - that the west’s own strategic interest should prevent the Soviet Union from establishing themselves on Scandinavian territory in a conflict.

In the Swedish defence doctrine too the idea of support from abroad was central. But in the Chief of Defence’s submission of March 1947 both east and west were seen as presumptive aggressors and supporters respectively. 158 Erlander’s opinion that the goodwill of the west was necessary for both a defence union and for Sweden itself coincided with that of the military leadership. 159 The conclusions of the Scandinavian defence committee were also unequivocal in this respect. An «implicit» guarantee from the west was the absolute minimum of understanding required in order that the defensive capacity of the union could be effective and help from abroad could be counted upon.

Moreover both the Swedish Chief of Defence and the defence committee - the Danish and Norwegian committee members with joint and more explicit wording - went a step further by pointing out the connections between effective help in war and the degree of preparation in peacetime. 160

The result of the negotiations in Karlstad gave those present a certain degree of hope that a solution was still possible. This was because the talks had focused on matters that united them and left various aspects of the heart of the matter unanswered. Thus relations to third powers were never discussed conclusively.

As a basis for further discussions the ministers came to the conclusion that a
binding defence union could be feasible that would constitute a regional agreement under the UN Charter; that would coordinate the military resources; and that would build on military solidarity concerning the home territories of the countries. The next step would have to be a joint inquiry of the American and British governments as to whether they were «interested in» an isolated regional union based on the Swedish premises that none of the countries joined an Atlantic Pact, and also whether they were willing to support such a union with munitions.\(^{161}\)

The result of the negotiations should first be reviewed by the relevant authorities of the respective countries, after which new talks would follow.

Undoubtedly the Norwegians had gone to considerable lengths in a spirit of compromise in this agreement. In the parliamentary debate on government policy on 19 January Lange however emphasised that the purpose of the Karlstad meeting had been to inquire whether by «mutual concessions» in the standpoints of the respective governments it was possible to arrive at a basis for further discussions. Thereby Lange implied that the Norwegians also expected Swedish concessions in the ensuing discussions - which was not very likely considering the development of the matter up until and including the Karlstad meeting.

The Swedish attitude was moderately criticised also in other internal Norwegian connections, where the Swedish line was characterised as being inflexible and rigidly fixed.\(^{162}\) As previously mentioned there were other critics: the Swedish diplomats Boheeman and Hägglöf saw with a certain degree of consternation what they regarded as the Swedish foreign leaders' lack of flexibility in relations with the Americans and the British when Swedish security policy was presented.

So far, during the whole of the period of negotiation from the first Swedish-Norwegian contacts in the spring of 1948 - with one small exception - and up until and including the Karlstad meeting Swedish neutrality was emphasised, and the Swedish view of neutrality was made a condition for a union. That condition was not negotiable and was accentuated more and more in the months when the discussions were in progress. Uncertainty about public opinion was a contributory cause - e.g. Erlander judged the situation in January as carrying a latent risk of a defence dispute in the party.\(^{163}\) But above all it was Undén's idea of neutrality that determined the formulation of Swedish policy. In order that an investigation and ensuing negotiations would take place, Norwegian concessions were insisted on. For the negotiations to lead to a positive result, it appears as if further Norwegian concessions would have been the only possibility.

At the continuing negotiations in Copenhagen on 22-24 January, where members of parliament participated in addition to Prime Ministers, Foreign Ministers and Defence Ministers, work continued on the basis of the result achieved in
Karlstad. At the meeting a proposal for guidelines for an application to USA and Britain was submitted, and also a statement about the implications of a defence union.\textsuperscript{164} In comparison with what was concluded in Karlstad, nothing substantially new came out of the Copenhagen debates. The discussion on the munitions problem and the possibilities of closing the exits from the Baltic Sea continued, but did not get any closer to a solution until the Swedish delegation was prepared to answer in plain language the crucial question: to what extent were American guarantees consistent with Swedish neutrality policy?\textsuperscript{165} There were several reasons for the unwillingness to provide a clarification. It would amount to an acknowledgement that it was not possible to reach a result, with all that that meant for Sweden’s security and for its relations with the west. The blame for the failure would fall on Sweden. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs had foreseen this, and when tactics were prepared for the negotiations it was emphasised that if a defence union could not be realised it was essential that some result was achieved - i.e. some sort of partial defence cooperation, and that Sweden was not saddled with the blame for a failure. The latter could be avoided by laying stress on the weakness of the Danish and Norwegian armed forces.\textsuperscript{166}

After Undén’s negative reply to a direct question from Hauge on the matter of a western guarantee, the prospects of an agreement appeared very small. When the Norwegian draft later reiterated the original demands from Karlstad, which the Norwegians in the spirit of compromise had left out of the final document, and the Swedish draft was likewise elaborated, it was obvious that the standpoints lay far apart. In spite of this negotiations continued for one more day in separate groups until Lange, Undén and Rasmussen summed up the standpoint of the respective delegations, whereupon the meeting was brought to a close.

At the conclusion those assembled were aware that there were hardly any chances of a result. Not even Hedtoft was optimistic. However a final decision would only be reached in Oslo after further consultations within the parties.\textsuperscript{167} On 29-30 January the delegations were assembled in Oslo. Even though the Norwegians had revised their former guidelines through other formulations, there was no real rapprochement between the Norwegian and Swedish line, and consequently all the parties were forced to accept that it was impossible to reach any solution.\textsuperscript{168}

In the wake of the negotiations followed the journey of the Norwegian delegation to Washington, and the Danish inquiry about the possibility of forming a Danish-Swedish defence union. There is no cause to discuss the former matter here; however it may be appropriate to comment on the Danish proposal and the motive behind it.

To both Hedtoft and Rasmussen a Scandinavian defence union appeared the best possible alternative for Danish security policy, if not to say the only one,
taking into account the current state of international relations. With different motives - respectively Nordic cooperation and neutrality - they were working for the same political objective which was also embraced by their respective parties. Hedtoft had put his heart and soul and his personal prestige into trying to realise a Scandinavian defence union. To fail would be a political handicap for himself and the Danish Labour movement. Nor was it altogether clear that the western leaning included in his basic conception was shared by the party. It was the case concerning the younger generation, but among the older ones it was possible that Thorvald Stauning’s view still dominated. The adhesion of Denmark to the Atlantic Pact could therefore cause problems within the party.

Thus a number of motives may have lain behind Hedtoft’s approach to Erlander, but it is more likely that this move should be seen as an outcome of his personal commitment rather than as a rationally thoughtout and deliberate move. Hedtoft was after all fully conversant with the Swedish view of Denmark’s defence problems. In actual fact the Swedish political and military authorities answered no. A Danish-Swedish defence union would mean that Sweden risked far too much for its security without being compensated by corresponding advantages. That put a stop to the prospects of forming any kind of Scandinavian defence union in the foreseeable future.

Bilateral alternatives

Hedtoft’s dream of realising what he saw as his generation’s greatest mission was not fulfilled. Did that failure also cause the other track of a Scandinavian defence partnership - that of functional military cooperation - to be written off? Did the fact that the Danes and Norwegians joined NATO mean that the Danish-Swedish and Norwegian-Swedish military cooperation which had been established henceforth lost its relevance?

Presumably there were still certain defence problems of mutual interest although the prerequisites had been changed. The question is whether the politicians, above all, but perhaps the military too, were prepared to proceed - although on another track. Some time after the defence union negotiations had broken down, the matter was brought up again. It was discussed in the Swedish Committee for Foreign Affairs on two occasions - 28 February and 9 September 1949. The discussion in February was initiated by the Liberal party leader Ohlin with his indirect request for an analysis of a limited Norwegian-Swedish military cooperation. The defence leaders had already examined how far Sweden could think of going in such a partnership. Consequently the problem was political rather than
military. Among the politicians there was agreement that great caution was necessary, with particular regard to Swedish-Soviet relations. Fast, who had been critical of the defence union plans, now repeated his warning about informal contacts with Norway, which he regarded as an indirect western commitment and a threat to neutrality.\(^\text{170}\)

The wait-and-see attitude of February was still to be found at the meeting of the Committee for Foreign Affairs in September, but in a more modulated form. Erlander was still very cautious. In a partial defence partnership he saw a risk that the credibility of neutrality could be questioned. His determined attitude - "I beg the committee not to press me with advice on going ahead with Scandinavian defence cooperation. I am not prepared to follow such advice." - was also due to the fact that he was worried that the sense of community with the west, expressed by Ohlin, the Conservative leader Domö and Ward, could be developed into demands that went further and thereby could become a security policy handicap. Erlander therefore wished to draw a clear line between what he regarded as purely technical cooperation and a military partnership that could also be interpreted as taking a political stand. However Erlander and the military leadership took a positive view of technical cooperation, and the committee recommended cooperation in matters of standardisation of munitions, intelligence and signals operations etc.\(^\text{171}\)

Several factors led Undén to return to the matter in September. Hauge, Undén and Vougt had discussed the matter at a meeting in Stockholm in June which the Committee was to be informed about. There was also discussion in the press about partial defence cooperation with Denmark and Norway. Undén was therefore anxious that there should be no uncertainty about the Swedish standpoint. The purpose of Hauge’s visit had been to discuss certain defence matters - including purchase of munitions. Besides, both Norway and Sweden needed to define exactly their views of defence cooperation in the new situation that had arisen after Denmark and Norway had joined NATO. Therefore that matter too was brought up for discussion. Norwegian relations with Sweden were determined as before by the great importance for Norway of the Swedish armed forces acting as a buffer between Norway and the Soviet Union. Norway’s primary interest therefore was to ensure that the Swedish armed forces could contribute to Norway’s defence, by keeping armament on a high level among other things. The Norwegians could help in this by making clear to the western powers the close connection between the defence of Norway and Swedish defence, and by removing any difficulties in Sweden’s defence relations with the west. That was the policy Norway pursued in relation to the United States.\(^\text{172}\)

The Swedish standpoint, as Undén presented it to Hauge and which he recapitulated in connection with the Foreign Ministers’ meeting in September, was that
cooperation should not come about «in such a way that Sweden de facto appeared allied with the other countries.»

This was a general attitude formulated according to principle, which meant that a concrete standpoint had to be taken every time the problem arose - as Undén also made clear. Cooperation within the specified framework was consequently possible but was, as Erlander stated to the party leadership, of less interest as long as the Danish and Norwegian armed forces lacked resources. To what extent military cooperation with Denmark and Norway did occur and whether in such cases the direction of Swedish neutrality policy was altered under the impact thereof, one cannot yet be certain. I can only verify that functional military cooperation continued even after Denmark and Norway had established defence partnership with the western powers. So the military were still interested, as also clearly expressed by both the Swedish defence leaders and - as before by the Norwegian army officers.
Summary and conclusion

The defence union negotiations produced no result. After trying to achieve a more comprehensive defence policy cooperation one was back at the starting point. What remained was the other line of cooperation - a functional military partnership - the line that had been developed parallel to the defence union discussions since the thirties.

A functional military partnership had grown because there existed a military need to solve certain mutual security problems, and it had been formed to some degree without political control.

The need remained, and continued cooperation along this line would also be made easier by the work of the Scandinavian defence committee.

The discussion on defence policy cooperation had begun because various forms of defence cooperation became of political interest. The reason they came to nothing may be and has been explained from a number of different perspectives.

A major aim of this essay has been to point out that the question of Scandinavian defence cooperation had a clear connection with security policy structures and party political processes which were developed in earlier decades. During the war and in the early postwar years these were further accentuated. When the defence discussions began in the spring of 1948 the main direction of Norwegian and Swedish security policy had therefore been determined. How it would come to be shaped in greater detail for Norway when affairs were stabilised after the war was not clear in principle until the close of the defence union negotiations.

However, the line the Norwegian foreign policy leaders and party leaders pursued in all connections was that there should be both association with the west, which did not necessarily need to be formal, and Nordic cooperation. It was therefore not a question of a choice between the Nordic countries or NATO until these elements appeared incompatible - i.e. at the end of January 1949. I have spoken here about the Norwegian foreign policy leaders and party leaders as a unit. The differences in the view of security policy that existed within this group were marginal and may partly be explained by the role the person in question had in the party or the foreign policy leadership. Erlander and Undén appear on the whole to have been further apart than Gerhardsen and Hauge - Lange. Beck-Friis’ reporting from Oslo however contributed to mistaken conceptions being prevalent on the part of the Swedes concerning both Norwegian security policy in general and likewise concerning divergencies in the Norwegian government and the Norwegian Labour movement.

Where the Norwegian Labour party was concerned, cooperation with the west
was an essential part of the party's solidarity line. That was also the case with Nordic cooperation, but this was of secondary importance to cooperation with the west. The solidarity line had been developed primarily during the 1930's threat to democracy, but gained further support during the war. After the war the strong position of the majority of the internationalists in the Labour party meant that the former minority line became the party's main line in foreign policy. The driving forces behind this change were chiefly Trannæl and Haakon Lie. When the policy line was about to be formalised, it became apparent however that there were groups within the party which held on to parts of the foreign policy outlook of the thirties - neutrality and a leaning to the east. Even though the Norwegian decision to join NATO meant that Norway's security policy was established, the tug-of-war within the Norwegian Labour movement over the forming of security policy did not cease. It was to continue even in the fifties and sixties.

Taking into account these preconditions the Norwegians were open to different security policy solutions. To a certain degree this applied to the Swedes too, but the conditioning factor for Sweden's security policy continued to be that of neutrality and therefore the alternatives were limited. Consequently these had been no change in relation to the interwar period. The neutrality policy of the war years was if anything seen as a confirmation that the foreign policy conducted by Sweden for many decades was not only right but also the only possible one.

There were in fact elements in the defence union discussions that pointed in another direction. I have in mind chiefly Erlander's «guarantee» idea: that a formalisation of Sweden's relations to the west was not necessary since it probably was in the west's own interests that an attack on Sweden should trigger off a world war. If the government had adopted that approach, this would have meant that the real content of neutrality policy would be changed: Sweden would have corresponding relations with the west as Norway had had with Britain - in principle since 1905. In 1948-49, however, Undén's view of neutrality was deeply rooted within the Social Democratic party.

In some senses this applied to Nordic cooperation too. Its function in the Swedish context corresponded to its function in Norwegian security policy: it was one of several means of achieving certain national aims. But even here it was of secondary importance, in this case in relation to neutrality, and it moreover lacked the ideological dimension.

Only for the Danes did cooperation function both as a goal in itself and as a means towards security policy. In contrast to the Norwegian and Swedish approach it was hence also regarded as more important than other aspects of security policy. In this respect there had been a change compared with the interwar years. Nordic cooperation was certainly of great importance in Danish foreign policy.
even in the thirties, but neutrality and relations with Germany were then of primary importance. During the war the idea of Nordic cooperation gained wide popular support. At the same time the Danish Labour movement adopted a programme for extended Nordic cooperation in a number of areas. After the war the Hedtoft government tried to realise parts of that programme. The Danes thus played an active part in order to set in motion a debate and also to materialise Nordic cooperation. When that preliminary phase was over, with the ministerial meeting in September 1948, the discussion became a largely Norwegian-Swedish dialogue in which the Danes naturally participated, but more as spectators than as mediators.

For the Danes, but above all for the Norwegians, Nordic cooperation was also seen from another aspect than as a means towards certain national aims: it also represented a threat. They feared Swedish psychological dominance, conditioned partly by economic and military factors but also by the competitive relationship - both mutual and in relation to other states - which I mentioned earlier and which emerged very clearly in Beck-Friis' reports from Oslo in the spring of 1949.¹⁷⁶

Even though the main explanation for the outcome of the defence union discussions should be sought in underlying structures and processes, I still think that Nordic cooperation, with both its rational and irrational elements, is of fundamental importance in understanding the development of Nordic relations after the war.

Let me in conclusion touch very briefly on some of the causal explanations that were in evidence in the 1948-49 discussions and which have also figured in later research, as they may shed more light on the problems of cooperation and the underlying structures of security policy. One concerns the significance of the negative attitude of the west to a defence union; another is the consideration for Finland and its importance for Sweden's standpoint.

Quite generally the prospects of a defence policy partnership for the Scandinavian countries were of course influenced by how the neighbouring great powers looked on such cooperation. It was up to each respective country how far it allowed itself to be influenced. Above all it was a question of which relations weighed most in the security policy perspective.

As mentioned previously a Nordic partnership was of secondary importance to other aspects of security policy for both the Norwegians and the Swedes. The main problem lay in the difficulties of coming to an agreement between themselves on a common attitude. The problem was not that a reciprocal standpoint had been formed but was impossible to realise because of opposition from the great powers. Hedtoft thought about starting at the other end: to begin by mentioning to the United States, even before the internal Scandinavian problems were solved, that a Scandinavian defence union would be formed - this in order to sound the
Americans' attitude. If that had happened, the right to make the decision would have been left to a third party - a course of action that the Norwegians and Swedes did not accept. On earlier occasions when some form of defence policy cooperation had been in question, the pattern described here had been similar. A common basis was never reached without other security policy considerations getting the upper hand.

Of the factors brought up in the discussion that militated against a defence union the majority were connected in one way or another to the Swedish neutrality policy. This was also true of the Finnish argument - i.e. that changes in Swedish neutrality policy would have consequences for Finnish-Soviet relations, resulting in increased pressure on Sweden.

Sweden's own situation would deteriorate considerably if Russian forces were moved into Finland. The possibilities of upholding neutrality would be lessened. Therefore the consideration for Finland was also governed by the concern about Swedish neutrality.

It is also symptomatic that the Finnish argument was presented almost exclusively in talks with the west, deliberately and successfully, and hardly at all in internal Swedish discussions. The interests of Sweden and the western powers coincided where Finland was concerned.

Notes

I should like to thank FHFS which has made it possible for me to write this article; and also Clara Lachmanns fond, Nordiska Forskarkurser, Nordiska Samarbetsfonden for internationell politik, including konflikt- og fredsforskning and Svensk-Norska samarbetsfonden, which helped to finance the article.

1. For earlier research see Den kolde krig og de nordiske lande. Rapporter til den XIX nordiske historikerkongres (Odense, 1984, Vol II, Petersen E L, ed., Odense University Studies in History and Social Sciences vol 86). It is evident from these reports that very little Swedish research has been done in the field of security policy, for the early postwar period. Moreover the work which touches on the Scandinavian defence union discussions is in parts less relevant now that new Swedish sources have become available. Thus for this article it has been possible for the first time to utilise material from both the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (UD) and the Defence Staff (Fst), in addition to the private archives that have previously been available for research. Also after the Odense report a thesis in political science has been published - Nissborg A, Danmark mellan Norden och väst (Uppsala, 1985) - which deals partly with the Scandinavian defence union negotiations. Unfortunately because of inadequate source analysis it is unreliable and has therefore not been taken into consideration in this account. Norwegian historians have approached the
defence union problems from two different perspectives, which may be said to be represented by Magne Skodvin and Geir Lundestad respectively. To the degree that the present study may be placed in either of these «schools», it is nearer the former.


3. For Denmark’s foreign policy in the thirties see inter alia Seymour S, *Anglo-Danish relations and Germany 1933-45* (Odense, 1982).


5. If nothing else is specified, the account of Nordic foreign and defence policy in the Nordic Labour movement in the thirties is based on Blidberg K, *Splittrad gemen­skap, Kontakter og samarbete inom nordisk socialdemokratisk arbetarrörelse 1931-1945* (Stockholm, 1984).


11. Memo by Ole Jødahl 26.2.45, HP 1 Af Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (UD) Stockholm; Helsinki 10.7.45, H Beck-Friis to von Post, HP 1 Af; Memo by C Günther 7.6.45, HP 1 Af; Helsinki 6.9.45, Nr 878, H Beck-Friis to O Undén.


13. Wahlbäck K, p 89.


16. Note by T Lie 26.11.45, Forsvarets Overkommando, Box 37, Riksarkivet, Oslo.

18. Aide-Memoire Oslo 22.11.45, Boks 37, Forsvarets Overkommando, Riksarkivet, Oslo; military attache reports from Copenhagen and Oslo 1945-46, Fst utrikesavd. Including letters, Krigsarkivet, Stockholm.


22. For Danish-Soviet relations in general see Dau M, Danmark og Sovjetunionen 1944-1949 (Copenhagen, 1969).

23. The theme throughout J Beck-Friis’ reports to Stockholm in the early postwar years.


25. Memo by Thorsing 7.2.46, HP 1 Af, UD’s archives, Stockholm.

26. Helsinki 23.3.46 Nr 102 Ditleff to Lange, 25. 3/12, UD’s archives, Oslo.


29. See note 28.


archives, Stockholm; Report from the Nordic Foreign Ministers’ meeting in Reykjavik 31 Aug. and 1 Sept. 1950, 25. 3/12, UD’s archives, Oslo.


40. See note 28 and 33; Memo on ministerial meeting in Copenhagen 9.7.47, HP 20 D, UD’s archives, Stockholm.

41. Memo of Ø Undén 12.5.47, HP 20 D, UD’s archives, Stockholm.

42. An explanation for several researchers dating the memo wrongly is that in the Swedish Labour Party, party leadership archives, Stockholm, it is bound with source material from 1945. Arbeiderbevegelsens Arkiv og Bibliotek in Oslo has obtained a copy of that memo and it has naturally been misplaced there too. The correct date is to be found in the Finnish minutes from the Nordic cooperative committee meeting in Stockholm 14.3.43 where the memo is dealt with. The minutes are in V Tanner’s file, Arbetarrörelsens arkiv, Helsinki and is included in a Swedish translation in Samråd i kristid, see note 44. For the memo see Blidberg K, p. 10-11, and p. 195 ff.

43. See Udgaard N M, p. 150 ff; Wahlbäck K, p. 15 f.


45. «Nordisk samarbeid», two Norwegian drafts, compiled by Gerhardsen, Lange and Tranmæl in June 1946; Memo. On views which, according to the Finnish Social Democrat Party, should be taken into consideration in the communique which may be published in connection with the meeting of the Nordic Cooperative Committee. by Ø Hiltunen, V Leskinen, Nordisk samarbeid korrespondanse, DNA’s archives, Arbeiderbevegelsens Arkiv, Oslo.

46. See note 44 p. 88 f.

47. See note 44 p. 332 ff.

48. The Nordic Cooperative Committee’s meeting in Oslo on 5 and 6 Jan. 1947; Minutes of the Nordic Cooperative Committee’s meeting in Stockholm on 7-8 Feb. 1948; Minutes taken at the Nordic Cooperative Committee meeting on 30-31 Oct. 1948, Nordisk samarbeid, correspondence, DNA’s archives, Arbeiderbevegelsens Arkiv, Oslo.


50. See note 44 p. 320.


52. Ø Undén’s lecture (main points) to Soc. Dem. Parliamentary group 9.11.48, HP 20 D, UD’s archives, Stockholm; Minutes taken at the Nordic Cooperative Committee meeting on 30-31 Oct. 1948, Nordisk samarbeid, correspondence, DNA’s archives, Arbeiderbevegelsens Arkiv, Oslo, A Ording’s diary notes 15.7.48, UB, Oslo.


55. See note 41.

56. Sec military/naval attache reports to Stockholm 1945-1948, Fst utrikesavd. including letters, Krigsarkivet, Stockholm.
57. Copenhagen 11.10.45 G Murray to C Kempff, Fst utrikesavd E I:5 vol 1, Krigsarkivet, Stockholm; Copenhagen 25.3.48 von Rosen to Fst, Fst utrikesavd E I:5 vol 4, Krigsarkivet, Stockholm.

58. Oslo 28.11.46 C G Broms to Fst ch, Fst utrikesavd E I:12 vol 1, Krigsarkivet, Stockholm.

59. Oslo 6.7.46 C G Broms to the Cabinet Minister and Head of the Ministry of Defence Fst utrikesavd E I:12 vol 1, Krigsarkivet, Stockholm; Oslo 10.2.47 C G Broms to G Tham, Fst utrikesavd E II:12 vol 2, Krigsarkivet, Stockholm (noted by G T «not suitable to invite H» (Helset)); Copenhagen 8.10.47 von Rosen to Fst ch, Fst utrikesavd E I:5 vol 2-3, Krigsarkivet, Stockholm.

60. Helge Jung to Konungen 9.11.46, HP 10 D, Riksarkivet, Stockholm.

61. Memo by K I Westman 2.3.46, HP 10 D, Riksarkivet, Stockholm; Memo by Ö Undén 15.1.47, HP 10 D, Riksarkivet, Stockholm.


64. Oslo 27.11.46 Storheill to naval attache at the Swedish Embassy Oslo, Fst. utrikesavd. E I:12 vol 1, Krigsarkivet, Stockholm, refers in the letter to a meeting in Stockholm 3.5.46 with Rear-admiral S H: son Ericsson.

65. Ö Undén’s diary notes 18.6.46,26.6.46, KB, Stockholm.


68. Memo by Ö Undén 1.3.48, HP 20 D, UD’s archives, Stockholm; Stenographic report of Spesialkomitens meeting 8.5.48, 38 3/3, UD’s archives, Oslo.

69. Ö Undén’s diary notes 9-10.3.48, KB, Stockholm.

70. Memo by Ö Undén Paris 15.3.48, HP 20 D, UD’s archives, Stockholm; Memo by Ö Undén Paris 16.3.48, HP 20 D, UD’s archives, Stockholm.

71. Minutes Swedish Labour Party party leadership 6.4.48, SAP’s archives, Arbetarrörelsens Arkiv, Stockholm; Memo re meeting with UN on 22 and 23 Apr. 1948, Copies of UN memorial protocol 1947-48, UD’s archives, Stockholm; Ö Undén’s diary notes 27.3.48 talk with E Wigforss, meeting in UN, 31.3.48 talk with Chief of Defence, KB, Stockholm.

72. T Erlander’s diary notes 17.4.48, F VIII:1, Erlander’s archives, Arbetarrörelsens arkiv, Stockholm; Memo by Ö Undén 17.4.48, HP 1 Ad, UD’s archives, Stockholm.

73. T Erlander’s almanac 18.3.48, T Erlander’s archives, C III:1, Arbetarrörelsens Arkiv, Stockholm.

74. Memo by Ö Undén 8.5.48, HP 20 D, UD’s archives, Stockholm; Stenographic report of Spesialkomitens meeting 8.5.48, 38 3/3, UD’s archives, Oslo; Note by P Anker 11.6.48, «Spørsmålet om nordisk samarbeid på det militære område», 38. 3/3, UD’s archives, Oslo.

75. F Domö’s notes 22.1.49, RA, Stockholm; Ö Undén’s diary notes 9.2.48, Undén’s archives, KB, Stockholm; A Ording’s diary notes 26.1.49, UB, Oslo.

76. See note 74-75 Note by P Anker.

77. A Ording’s diary notes 18.5.48, UB, Oslo.
100. T Erlander’s diary 8.6.48, F VIII:1, Erlander’s archives, Arbetarrörelsens Arkiv, Stockholm; Memo 14.7.48 - rough draft from meeting of Committee for Foreign Affairs on 14.7, HP 20 D, UD’s archives, Stockholm.


104. Memo by Ö Undén 2.4.48, HP 1 Ab, UD’s archives, Stockholm; Memo by S Åström 4.11.48, HP 20 D, UD’s archives, Stockholm; Memo by S Åström 21.11.48, HP 20 D, UD’s archives, Stockholm; re Undén’s view of bases for western powers in Norway see inter alia Memo by Ö Undén 16.3.48, HP 1 Ab, UD’s archives, Stockholm (talk with Bevin); Memo by Ö Undén 8.5.48, HP 20 D, UD’s archives, Stockholm (discussions in Oslo 3.5.48); Memo by Ö Undén 1.6.48, HP 20 D, UD’s archives, Stockholm (talk with the British Stockholm ambassador); Memo by Ö Undén 17.6.48, HP 20 D, UD’s archives, Stockholm (talk with Lange and Rasmusson); Memo by Ö Undén 14.10.48, HP 1 Ab, UD’s archives, Stockholm (talk with Marshall).


107. Ö Undén’s diary notes 2.9, 5.9.45, Undén’s archives, KB, Stockholm.


110. Talk to Cabinet Ministers, 38. 3/3, UD’s archives, Oslo.


114. See note 110, 112.

115. Ex. A Ording’s diary notes 29.11.48, UB, Oslo; T Erlander’s diary notes 12.12.48, F VIII:1, Erlander’s archives, Arbetarrörelsens Arkiv, Stockholm; Copenhagen 17.12.48, Almqvist to Ö Undén No 1197, HP 1 Ad, UD’s archives, Stockholm.


118. Misgeld K, Sozialdemokratie und Aussenpolitik in Schweden, Sozialistische Internationale, Europapolitik und die Deutschlandfrage 1945-1955 (Frankfurt/ Main, N.Y. 1984) p. 132 ff; Minutes from central leadership meeting 15.12.47,

119. A Ording’s diary notes 4.11.46, UB, Oslo; Minutes from central leadership meeting 4.11.46, DNA, Oslo.

120. For the Nordic Cooperative Committee meeting see also *Misgeld K*, p. 157 ff; *Eriksen K E*, p. 140 ff.


122. See note 52 Ö Undén; Minutes from the Nordic Cooperative Committee meeting on 30-31 Oct. 1948, Nordisk samarbeid, correspondence, DNA’s archives, Arbetarrörelsens Arkiv, Oslo.

123. Stockholm 8.11.48, Ö Undén to E Boheman, HP 20 D, UD’s archives, Stockholm; Re alternative solutions it should be pointed out that the so-called Hankey plan was not in question either in any Nordic connection or in internal Swedish discussions. The plan was mentioned in passing during the Karlstad negotiations but was not up for discussion.


125. T Erlander’s diary notes 16.5.48, 15.1.49, F VIII:1, Erlander’s archives, Arbetarrörelsens Arkiv, Stockholm.


127. Minutes SAP party leadership 6.4.48, 26.1.49, SAP’s archives, Arbetarrörelsens Arkiv, Stockholm.

128. Ö Undén’s diary notes 31.4.48 (talk Undén - Jung, the Chief of Defence dissuades - indications to the contrary are lacking in the material).


131. Ö Undén’s diary notes 9.11.48 (quote), Undén’s archives, KB, Stockholm; T Erlander’s diary notes 10.11.48, F VIII:1, Erlander’s archives, Arbetarrörelsens Arkiv, Stockholm.


139. Meeting of Committee for Foreign Affairs 10 Jan. 1949 by S Dahlman; Memo re Committee for Foreign Affairs 10 Jan. 1949, notes by Cabinet Secretary H Beck-Friis; Committee for Foreign Affairs 10 Jan. 1949 by S Åström, Copies of UN memorial minutes, UD’s archives, Stockholm.

140. Meeting of Committee for Foreign Affairs 27 Oct. 1948 by S Dahlman, Copies of UN memorial minutes, UD’s archives, Stockholm; See note 138, 139.

141. See note 139.


143. Memo re meeting with UN on 22 and 23 Apr. 1948, Copies of UN memorial minutes 1947-48, UD’s archives, Stockholm; see note 139; Meeting of Committee for Foreign Affairs 21 Jan. 1949 by S Dahlman, Memorial notes from meeting of Committee for Foreign Affairs 21 Jan. 1949 by S Åström; Committee for Foreign Affairs 27.1.49 notes by S Åström; UN 27.1.49 by s Dahlman, Copies of UN memorial minutes, UD’s archives, Stockholm.

144. Notes Kasse 19, Hedtoft’s archives, Arbejderbevægelsens Arkiv og Bibliotek, Copenhagen.

145. For Jacobsen’s opposition - A Ording’s diary notes 22.1.49, UB, Oslo; Copenhagen 19.2.49 Nr 167 v Dardel to Ø Undén, HP 1 Ad, UD’s archives, Stockholm.

146. Copenhagen 3.2.49 Nr 121 v Dardel to Ø Undén, HP 1 Ad, UD’s archives, Stockholm; Folketingets Forhandlinger 29.10.48, 2-5.11.48, Copenhagen 8.11.48 Nr 1077 Almqvist to Ø Undén, HP 1 Ad, UD’s archives, Stockholm.

147. T Erlander’s diary notes 31.10.48, F VIII:1, Erlander’s archives, Arbetarrörelsens Arkiv, Stockholm (Hedtoft); Ø Undén’s diary notes 10.9.48, Undén’s archives, KB, Stockholm.

148. Copenhagen 10.1.49 Nr 22 v Dardel to Ø Undén, HP 1 Ad, UD’s archives, Stockholm; Copenhagen 3.1.49 Nr 4 v Dardel to Ø Undén, HP 1 Ad, UD’s archives, Stockholm.

149. T Erlander’s diary notes 11.11.48, F VIII:1, Erlander’s archives, Arbetarrörelsens Arkiv, Stockholm.

150. Copenhagen 26.11.48, H Hedtoft to T Erlander, E II:7, Erlander's archives, Arbetarrörelsens Arkiv, Stockholm; for the meeting see also *Skadvin M*, p. 209 ff.

152. Memo by Ö Undén 26.11.48, HP 20 D, UD's archives, Stockholm; Copenhagen 8.12.48 Almqvist to H Beck-Friis, HP 1 Ad, UD's archives, Stockholm (Lange informed Rasmussen).


155. A preliminary draft, talk at the Karlstad meeting by Ö Undén 23.12.48, HP 20 D, Undén's archives, KB, Stockholm; Memo re the Scandinavian ministerial meeting in Karlstad on 5-6 Jan. 1949 by Ö Undén - 10.1.49, HP 20 D, UD's archives, Stockholm.

156. Ibid., A Vougt's notes 5-6.1.49, Vougt's archives, RA, Stockholm; A Ording's diary notes 7.1.49, UB, Oslo (conference at UD on the Karlstad meeting).

157. A Vougt's notes 5-6.1.49, Vougt's archives, RA, Stockholm.


159. Stockholm 21.1.49 H Jung to the Cabinet Minister and Head of Ministry of Defence, HP 20 D, UD's archives, Stockholm (commentary on the Scandinavian Defence Committee's report).


161. Memo re the Scandinavian ministerial meeting in Karlstad on 5-6 Jan. 1949, by Ö Undén, 10.1.49, HP 20 D, UD's archives, Stockholm.

162. London 18.6.48, P Prebensen to HM Lange, 38. 3/3, UD's archives, Oslo; A Ording's diary notes 21.6.48, UB, Oslo; Note by P Anker 11.6.48, The question of Nordic cooperation in the military field, 38. 3/3, UD's archives, Oslo.


164. Memo by S Aström 25.1.49, HP 20 D, UD's archives, Stockholm (register of documents from the Copenhagen meeting 22-24.1.49, the documents attached).


167. Guidelines for an inquiry to USA and Britain. 23.1.49; Swedish draft of guidelines 23.1.49, HP 20 D, UD's archives, Stockholm; see note 165.

169. Memo by S Åström 4.11.48, HP 20 D, UD's archives, Stockholm; Memo by Ö Undén 1.3.49, HP 1 Ad, UD's archives, Stockholm; UN 28.2.49, Copies of UN memorial protocol, UD's archives, Stockholm.


173. Ibid Memo by Ö Undén; Memo by Ö Undén 16.9.49, HP 20 D, UD's archives, Stockholm.

174. Minutes SAP party leadership 13.6.50, SAP's archives, Arbeiderbevegelsens Arkiv, Oslo.

175. UN 28.2.49. Copies of UN memorial protocol, UD's archives, Stockholm; T Erlander's diary notes 20.5.49, F VIII:1, Erlander's archives, Arbetarrörelsens Arkiv, Stockholm; Oslo 19.4.49 von Horn to G Tham, Fst utrikesavd, EII:12, KA, Stockholm. For defence cooperation with Denmark and Norway see in general military/marine attache reports 1950-1960, Fst utrikesavd, KA, Stockholm.

176. As an example HP 1 An, vol 204, Feb.-Mar. 1949, UD's archives, Stockholm.

177. UN 21.1.49. Copies of UN memorial protocol, UD's archives, Stockholm.