Hilde Eliassen Restad

U.S. foreign policy traditions

Multilateralism vs. unilateralism since 1776
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Multilateralism vs. unilateralism since 1776

In this study I take issue with several conventional assumptions employed by scholars of U.S. foreign policy. First and foremost, I argue that the “turn-around” thesis – which states that the United States turned away from isolationism and toward multilateralism during the Second World War – is overstated. In contrast, I offer an argument where I discard the term “isolationism” altogether and frame the discussion as whether the United States has mainly exhibited a unilateral or multilateral internationalist foreign policy. Here, I take the position that the United States has mainly pursued unilateral internationalism. By “unilateral internationalism” I mean seeking to retain one’s freedom of action while engaging with other countries. This has been achieved either through lax formal obligations or overwhelming control of the decision-making bodies governing the rules of the interaction. Thus, I argue that contrary to the conventional wisdom, the United States sufficiently safeguarded its unilateral maneuverability when constructing the second postwar order in the 1940s. Therefore, rather than the Second World War and the international institutions inaugurated in 1945 signifying a “turn-around” to Wilsonian multilateralism, the postwar order built by Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman in fact accommodated the historic U.S. foreign policy tradition of unilateral internationalism.

Keywords: U.S. foreign policy, unilateralism, multilateralism, isolationism, League of Nations, United Nations, hegemony, unipolarity.
Introduction

One of the most common assumptions in the study of American foreign policy is that "the events of the Second World War brought about a revolution in American attitudes."\(^1\) The revolution is said to consist of the United States turning away from an aloof past (previously labeled "isolationism") and accepting an international commitment. Political scientists, economists, and historians generally agree that the United States failed to shape international politics in the interwar period because of its rejection of membership in the League of Nations, but that the United States fundamentally changed with World War II, discarding its earlier tradition of aloofness in favor of multilateral internationalism.\(^2\)

This is the basis for contemporary critiques of U.S. unilateralism: the United States needs to return to its multilateral foreign policy tradition as unilateralism is not really what the United States is supposed to stand for.\(^3\) As such, observers agree that there is a genuine U.S. foreign policy tradition that consists of commitment to multilateral institutions, and that this tradition was cemented by the "turn-around" during the Second World War.

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2 This is a conventional assumption found in textbooks and scholarly accounts. Textbooks will usually divide up U.S. foreign policy history into pre- and post-1941 or 1945. See for example, Michael J. Hogan, ed., *Paths to Power: The Historiography of American Foreign Relations to 1941* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000); or the *Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations* series, particularly Akira Iriye, *Vol. III: The Globalizing of America, 1913–1945*. That the United States underwent a fundamental turn-around with the Second World War is a common assumption in political science, agreed upon by realists, liberal, and constructivist theorists alike, albeit for different reasons. The general exception to this assumption is found among revisionist historians who argue for an overall continuity in U.S. foreign policy in terms of expansionism, and commercial empire. See, for example, Michael Hunt, *The American Ascendancy: How the United States gained and wielded global dominance* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2007).

3 G. John Ikenberry, "Is American Multilateralism in Decline?" *Perspectives on Politics* 1, no. 3 (September 2003).
The “turn-around” thesis, however, is based on several assumptions about the nature of U.S. foreign policy that are open to questioning. The first questionable assumption is that what the United States turned away from was an earlier foreign policy tradition of aloofness (the older “isolationism” has been discredited by historians of U.S. foreign relations, but is still in use among political scientists and some historians). The second assumption is that the United States has historically vacillated between its urge to be aloof from world politics and an urge to participate (as exemplified by its leadership role in the League of Nations negotiations in Paris in 1919 and subsequent rejection of the Treaty of Versailles). The third and final assumption is that it took the Second World War to finally settle this internal dispute between aloofness and internationalism, and that the institutional order building that took place under U.S. auspices in the 1940s signaled a profound domestic turn-around in U.S. foreign policy towards a new tradition of multilateral internationalism.

In this study, I take issue with these conventional assumptions employed by scholars of U.S. foreign policy. I argue that this foreign policy dichotomy (aloofness/internationalism) is mostly incorrect, and that rather than experiencing “cycles” of internationalism and aloofness, the United States has exhibited one dominant foreign policy posture: unilateral internationalism. By “unilateral internationalism” I mean that the United States has maintained as much maneuverability as possible while always engaging with other countries, meaning it has been constantly internationalist. This internationalism has been characterized by unilateralism – in other words, seeking to retain one’s freedom of action. This has been achieved either through lax formal obligations or overwhelming control of the decision-making bodies governing the rules of the interaction. Furthermore, I argue that contrary to the conventional wisdom of a turn-around to multilateralism, the United States sufficiently safeguarded its unilateral maneuverability

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when constructing the second postwar order in the 1940s. Thus, rather than the Second World War and the international institutions inaugurated in 1945 signifying a “turn-around” to Wilsonian multilateralism, the postwar order built by Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman in fact accommodated the historic U.S. foreign policy tradition of unilateral internationalism.

This thesis goes against the assumption underlying most political science scholarship on U.S. foreign policy, which argues that the United States displayed historic vacillation between aloofness and internationalism, before it permanently turned toward multilateral internationalism with the Second World War. The general U.S. foreign policy literature’s reliance on this foreign policy dichotomy (aloofness/internationalism) in fact stems from outdated scholarship in history and will be explicitly challenged. I aim to reconfigure our current understanding of this dichotomy and its relationship to twentieth-century U.S. foreign policy, ultimately helping to solve one of the most persistent “puzzles” of American foreign policy: what exactly happened between 1919 and 1945, and what did the U.S. “turn-around” to multilateral internationalism really entail? Furthermore, I hope that taking the important unilateral tradition in U.S. foreign policy history seriously will enable a more frank discussion of what, exactly, future U.S. foreign policy is likely to consist of: unilateral internationalism or multilateral internationalism.

Outline of study

The first chapter investigates the first two assumptions listed above by presenting the literature on the foreign policy dichotomy and tracing its development in the field of history. 5 We shall see that the assumption of a fundamental “turn-around” in U.S. foreign policy associated with the Second World War (and the basis for today’s assumption by scholars and practitioners alike that the United States is a country

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5 The foreign policy dichotomy is connected to an identity dichotomy which cannot be explored here because of issues of space. The identity dichotomy – which in fact underlies the foreign policy dichotomy – presents this vacillation between aloofness and internationalism as stemming from a Janus-faced American identity: on the one hand an exemplary identity (illustrated by John Winthrop’s “City Upon a Hill”), on the other, a missionary identity (exemplified by Manifest Destiny or Wilsonianism, for example). The history of U.S. foreign policy is thus most commonly told by two interrelated dichotomies: a foreign policy dichotomy (aloof/internationalist) linked to an identity dichotomy (exemplary/missionary). This is a topic I explore at length elsewhere. See Hilde E. Restad, “Identity and Foreign Policy: The Case of American Exceptionalism and Unilateralism” (PhD diss., University of Virginia, 2010).
deeply committed to multilateralism) in fact hinges on an outdated assumption about “isolationism” in earlier U.S. history – an assumption no longer employed by historians of U.S. foreign relations.

The second chapter presents the first of two case studies (namely, the First and Second World Wars) that aims to invalidate the third assumption presented above. In the second chapter, I shall argue that the Senate’s rejection of the League of Nations in 1919 and 1920 did not signal a retreat to an “aloof” tradition in U.S. foreign policy, nor did it confirm a new tradition of interwar isolationism; rather, the United States continued to pursue its dominant foreign policy tradition, characterized as unilateral internationalism. During the interwar period, the United States maintained a high level of involvement in international politics – including European power politics. Some of the foreign policy behavior can be characterized as unilateral, such as rejecting the League Covenant and passing the Neutrality Acts of the 1930s; others can be characterized as multilateral, such as the Washington naval treaties. To be sure, there existed staunchly nationalist pockets in the American political and voting classes, but these elements cannot be defined as “isolationist” without the term losing its essential meaning.6 Despite the general consensus in American diplomatic history that the term “isolationism” should be abandoned for early U.S. foreign policy, the 1930s holds out as the last possible isolationist bastion.7

Notwithstanding the Neutrality Acts, I argue that the term “isolationism” is unhelpful in the American case and our understanding is enhanced by using the terms unilateral and multilateral internationalism instead of isolationism versus internationalism. The United States conducted active multilateral diplomatic efforts in the interwar period aimed at arms control (in terms of naval disarmament) and used economic policy as a tool of security policy. It also behaved in unilateral ways. The rejection of the League of Nation and the Neutrality Acts have received too much attention, however, and are simply not the best measurement of American foreign policy posture in the interwar period. There was a majority in favor of ratification of the League Covenant, and the Neutrality Acts were devised by “isolationists” as

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6 This will be discussed later in the chapter. By “nationalist” I mean protectionist economic legislation and unilateral security policy. See for example, Legro, Rethinking the World, 71.

7 George C. Herring, From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations since 1776 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 486, 502. Herring writes that the internationalism that had competed with more traditional attitudes during the 1920s was “replaced by a new isolationism” with the Great Depression.
well as by internationalists. This is not to say there were no important differences between the 1930s and the 1940s – obviously there were. The general argument in favor of a turn-around from a long-standing tradition of aloofness, however, has been exaggerated.

Because our understanding of U.S. foreign policy and its history is enhanced by using the terms unilateral and multilateral, rather than “isolationist” and “internationalist,” I must present a discussion of how to properly define “multilateral.” The third chapter will thus provide a short interlude between chapter 2 (presenting World War I) and chapter 4 (World War II) in order to discuss what, exactly, is meant by the term “multilateral,” a term at the center of any argument concerning the U.S. “turn-around” to multilateralism with the Second World War.

In the fourth chapter, I will present the second case study, which will argue that the U.S. tradition of unilateral internationalism continued longer than commonly thought after World War II despite international order building. Notwithstanding the flurry of multilateral activity at the international level during and after the Second World War, the American domestic level foreign policy revolution has been exaggerated. The turn-around thesis in fact entails making an argument about both the increased level of multilateral cooperation at the international level as well as a domestic foreign policy transformation on the part of the United States. Unquestionably, there were important differences in U.S. behavior between the 1930s and 1940s, especially in terms of formal U.S. security commitments.

The main argument of this study, however, is that the turn-around thesis exaggerates the U.S. commitment to multilateralism while it understates the fundamental commitment to unilateralism. The study will end with a conclusion that reviews U.S. foreign policy after the end of the Cold War, as the decade of the 1990s provided a unique opportunity for the United States to pursue its preferred foreign policy strategy in a unipolar international system.

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Chapter 1

The isolationist/internationalist dichotomy

Introduction: old and new paradigms

For quite some time, the reigning paradigm in the study of American foreign policy was that the United States was founded as a country that sought to isolate itself from the world, cutting off any ties to potential corrupting influences emanating from the Old World.\(^9\) As the famous revolutionary Thomas Paine wrote, the American colonies “ought form no partial connection with any part of [Europe]. It is the true interest of America to steer clear of European contentions.”\(^10\)

The classic paradigm of early U.S. foreign policy thus characterizes the United States as an isolated and isolating country that really only emerged onto the international scene in the late nineteenth century. Only in 1898, when the United States suddenly and forcefully expelled the Spanish empire from the U.S. sphere of influence in the Spanish–American War, did the United States begin to free itself from its historic “isolationism.” Curiously, however, the United States also somehow acquired colonies in Asia (the Philippines, among others) – a rather puzzling series of events for an “isolationist” country. This imperial “aberration” – as historian Samuel Flagg Bemis called it\(^11\) – marked the transition from isolationism to internationalism in U.S. foreign policy according the old paradigm, and this tradition was

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finally cemented with Woodrow Wilson’s quest to make the world “safe for democracy.” This was, in short, the old isolationist/internationalist dichotomous paradigm of diplomatic history, one that was also utilized by political scientists writing about U.S. foreign policy.

But there were some tensions in this classic story of the United States. How does a country simply stumble onto a continental (and subsequently, an overseas) empire and, eventually, world power status? Was the continental expansion in the nineteenth century perhaps of significance not just for those studying “domestic” frontier history, but also to those studying U.S. diplomatic history? Indeed, much of the scholarship depicting early U.S. foreign policy as isolationist became outdated, albeit while remaining influential, between 1960 and 1990, especially in textbooks and fields other than diplomatic history, such as political science.

From the mid-twentieth century, the so-called revisionist historians of the Wisconsin School, led by William Appleman Williams, would challenge the classic story of isolationism. Turning the classic paradigm on its head, the revisionist historians argued that the United States was actively participating in international affairs from its inception, and that it never aimed to isolate itself from the world. Rather, the United States had always been “expansionist” and much

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12 “By popular theory,” Edward McNall Burns wrote in 1957, “the history of the foreign policy of the United States falls into two periods – a period of isolation from 1776 to 1898 and a period of intervention in world affairs from 1898 to the present.” Burns, America’s Sense of Mission. Concepts of National Purpose and Destiny (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1957), 277. Some historians would argue that the United States in fact had cycled between internationalism and isolationism throughout its history, whereas others argued the United States was first isolationist, then internationalist (a periodic description).


14 Contemporary authors who explicitly reject the term “isolationism” are, among others, Walter A. McDougall, Promised land, Crusader State: The American encounter with the world since 1776 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1997); Robert Kagan, Dangerous Nation (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006); and Rajan Menon, The End of Alliances (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007); Herring, From Colony to Superpower. Legro, in his book Rethinking the World, rejects the term “isolationism” but still uses the term “separateness,” which serves much the same function in terms of breaking up U.S. foreign policy history into a dichotomy.
less innocent than previously assumed. The continental expansion during the nineteenth century and the ideology behind it – formerly falling in under western or settler/frontier history – was in fact the United States building an empire, and today this history is incorporated into the new paradigm as acts of foreign, not domestic, policy. It is now commonplace for historians of U.S. foreign relations to connect the issue of continental expansion and expansionism in the nineteenth century to an overall U.S. foreign policy tradition, linking early U.S. foreign policy to its twentieth century foreign policy. What emerges, then, is a picture of U.S. foreign policy as expansionist and internationalist since the very founding of the country. This is the new paradigm.

But what does this new paradigm mean? What exactly does an “internationalist” foreign policy entail? Can we divide U.S. foreign policy history into different periods and categories of internationalism? And has the paradigm successfully been updated in the works of historians, political scientists, and textbook writers? Finally, what are the implications of the new paradigm for the assumptions theorists employ about twentieth century U.S. foreign policy?

This chapter will briefly review the old isolationist/internationalist dichotomy, and then trace its current process of reconfiguration within the field of history. We shall see that the new paradigm is still struggling to supplant the old one, as the old trope of isolationism is enjoying a rather long goodbye in history and political science alike. I

will argue that replacement terms such as “aloof” are in fact ill suited to this new understanding of American foreign policy. Rather, the term “unilateral internationalism” fittingly customizes the general term “internationalism” to the American historical foreign policy record, encompassing terms and policies such as “nonentanglement,” the Monroe Doctrine, and the ideologically informed quest on the part of the United States to lead — rather than follow — in international relations. Unilateral internationalism was not isolationism, nor separatism — rather, U.S. policymakers sought to prevent outside influence from reaching the American continent, so as to be able to keep the American continent and U.S. foreign policy under U.S. direction. In short, this term better describes the broad historical trends of American foreign policy, and makes us better able to understand the seminal events in American foreign policy in the twentieth century, which is the topic of the next chapters.

The classic isolationist/internationalist dichotomy

Classic diplomatic historians writing in the mid-twentieth century, such as Dexter Perkins, argued that the Declaration of Independence and the Revolution constituted “an act of isolation, a cutting of the ties with the Old World, the deed of a society which felt itself different from those which existed on the other side of the Atlantic…. ” In fact, Edward McNall Burns argued, the isolationism of the Founding Fathers was probably more deeply embedded than had been acknowledged, because they thought, expressed in the words of one of the Founding Fathers, George Mason, that “nature having separated us, by an immense ocean, from the European nations, the less we have to do with their quarrels or politics, the better.” Ernest Lee Tuveson wrote

18 The reason for the U.S. quest for expansion and influence lies, I argue, elsewhere, in American exceptionalism. The kind of Great Power the United States developed into is intimately connected to this national identity. Unfortunately, the limited nature of this study does not allow me to elaborate on my investigation of the link between American exceptionalism and foreign policy. My focus on the ideational impetus behind U.S. foreign policy distinguishes mine from a realist interpretation of U.S. foreign policy, however, which looks to material causes of state actions. See ch. 2 for my critique of realist theories of U.S. foreign policy.

19 Perkins, The American Approach to Foreign Policy, 2; 136–155.

20 Burns, America’s Sense of Mission, 277.
of Thomas Jefferson and those who, like him, thought the “young republic should be a haven of goodness” were “the most isolationist.”

The old paradigm of isolationism can, in short, be said to have stated that (1) the Founding Fathers (meaning the supporters of the Revolution and the authors of the Constitution) advocated a policy of isolation from Europe; (2) the United States was able to continue this policy and stay isolated from great power politics due to the era of “free security” the United States enjoyed at the turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries; and (3) that nineteenth-century continental expansion was a part of this isolationism.

**Defining isolationism**

According to Manfred Jonas the first known application of the word “isolationist” to U.S. foreign policy was by Edward Price Bell, the London correspondent of the *Chicago Daily News* in 1922. Bell noted the United States was moving from “isolation into partnership,” citing the U.S. entry into World War I. The term “isolationist” became widely used only as late as post-World War I, and then mostly as a slur by pro-Leaguers against those who did not favor U.S. membership of the League of Nations. The term was not used much until Albert K. Weinberg’s book *Manifest Destiny* of 1935. Significantly, American policy during the interwar years would come to be described as isolationist and anomalous, requiring explanation and analysis, something that became a common endeavor after the Second World War.
According to Selig Adler, however, the term can in fact be traced back as early as the 1850s, when American proponents of Europe’s democratic revolutions dubbed their opponents “isolationists.”26 The political implication of the term was given new emphasis when, in 1896, Canadian Prime Minister Sir Wilfred Laurier referred to England’s “splendid isolation.” This phrase, shortened to “isolationism,” then became a designation for the twin policies of neutrality and non-intervention.

In Adler’s opinion, the Founding Fathers and their heirs regarded isolationism as a “positive policy designed to insure American freedom of action, to prevent foreign subversion, and to enable us to take advantage of Europe’s distress in order to round out our own boundaries,” underscoring that American isolationism was not social, cultural, or economic, but rather distinctly one of political isolationism.27 Weinberg, on the other hand, equated isolationism with non-entanglement, thus defining it more as a negative policy.28 To Weinberg, the non-entanglement of the Founding Fathers expressed a theory of the national interest according to which “all vital interests, and especially peace, flourish best when detached, in so far as possible through maintaining freedom of action, from the fate of the interests of the others.”29

**The Founders as isolationists**

In this classic paradigm of isolationism, first president George Washington’s Farewell Address to the nation upon his retirement in 1796, and third president Thomas Jefferson’s First Inaugural Speech in 1801 were seen to comprise the definitive formulation of early American thinking on foreign policy. This would later be updated to a nineteenth-century context with the Monroe Doctrine – President James Monroe and Secretary of State John Quincy Adams’ statement in 1823 that made the American hemisphere a U.S. sphere of influence.30 Notwithstanding the initial military alliance with France to gain independence during the Revolutionary War, “isolationism” was

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27 Ibid.
29 Ibid., 542.
30 Adler, *The Isolationist Impulse*, 11–12. Adler writes that James Monroe “freshened and restated” the “theory of isolationism” with the Monroe Doctrine, while at the same time arguing that it became, in the course of time, “an object of exaggerated isolationist veneration.”
said to be the strategy of choice of a new and idealistic republic, rejecting "traditional diplomacy and power politics," as Felix Gilbert wrote. As is typical of classic scholarship on this issue, however, what Gilbert meant was political isolation from Europe.

The United States could be isolationist because, as C. Vann Woodward wrote, it enjoyed “free security” and free land, enabling the national myth of “America as an innocent nation in a wicked world” able to obtain freely and innocently that which other nations sought by the sword. The idea of “free security” naturally went along with an assumption of the United States as an isolated and isolating, as opposed to an expanding and expansionist, nation.

*Westward expansionism as isolationism*

The isolationist paradigm contained an inherent contradiction, however. The United States had expanded dramatically during the nineteenth century yet – at the same time – adhered to isolationism. Only by assuming nineteenth-century continental expansion was somehow part of domestic history, as opposed to acts of foreign policy, could U.S. foreign policy be characterized as isolationist until the 1890s, when the United States suddenly experienced a brief period of imperial “aberration” with the Spanish–American War. The isolationist paradigm thus had important caveats – caveats which hold the key to the paradigm’s ultimate academic death. As Adler explained, “our isolationist barricade only had one wall.” Americans only shut the eastern door, “for Americans marched out of their house in other directions.” He concluded that isolationism accelerated rather than inhibited continental expansionism. Essentially, the old thesis of expansionism as isolationism rested on a Eurocentric view of American foreign policy, a

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31 Gilbert, *To the Farewell Address*, 89.
32 Ibid., 135.
34 For authors rejecting the thesis of “free security” and showing how the United States was, rather, embroiled in international affairs and great power rivalries, see for example, J. C. A. Stagg, *Mr. Madison’s war: politics, diplomacy, and warfare in the early American republic, 1783–1830* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1983); Peter Onuf & Nicholas Onuf, *Federal union, modern world: the law of nations in an age of revolutions, 1776–1814*, 1st ed. (Madison: Madison House, 1993); J. C. A. Stagg, *Borderlines in borderlands: James Madison and the Spanish-American frontier, 1776–1821* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009). Providing an example of the belated updating of historiographical consensus within political science, Ruggie’s article “The Past as Prologue” from 1997 repeats the argument that the United States was “removed from the continuous jostling of European power politics,” protected by the oceans on either side, and surrounded by weak neighbors. See Ruggie, “The Past as Prologue”: 89.
perspective that viewed U.S. international relations as primarily faced toward the Atlantic Ocean. Anything else did not count.

By assuming westward expansion as a natural development for the United States these earlier historians internalized the myth of manifest destiny. The United States was always meant to expand from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean by God’s own will. The scholarly result of such an acceptance of manifest destiny, rather than an academic investigation of this myth, can be seen in the classic literature where manifest destiny and continental expansion were described as an organic process of “natural events” that were “blameless” from the American side.36 Morning Star editor John O’Sullivan, originator of the term “manifest destiny” in 1845, argued Texas had been “absorbed” into the Union in an “inevitable fulfillment of the general law which is rolling our population westward.”37 These “natural events” were “blameless” because “America’s incorporation of all adjacent lands was the virtually inevitable fulfillment of a moral mission delegated to the nation by Providence itself,” as manifest destiny holds.38 Indeed, Dexter Perkins described continental expansion as a “biological” process “carried on with less violence than often goes on with such activities” as there “were no resentful minorities, in important numbers.”39 In summary, the string of territorial acquisitions up till the Spanish–American War could only be characterized as a “domestic” matter (thus validating an “isolationist” thesis) by believing that large swaths of territory in North America and the Caribbean were “naturally” (future) parts of America, given to it by God.

Granted, one could argue that any “isolationism” was purely directed at the European Great Powers. In other words, only Atlantic foreign policy counted as foreign policy.40 But this logic contains two tensions. First, it does not take into account the fact that these very same Great Powers had colonial possessions in the Americas and the Caribbean and thus coveting these territories was, in fact, a way

36 Emily Rosenberg, “A Call to Revolution: A roundtable on early U.S. foreign relations,” Diplomatic History 22, issue 1 (winter 1998). Rosenberg critiques Bradford Perkins’s contribution to the four-volume Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations, for example, for ignoring diplomacy with any nations that were not European, discussing America’s western boundaries almost completely as a byproduct of diplomacy with Europe.

37 Stephanson, Manifest Destiny, 44. John O’Sullivan proclaimed that it was the manifest destiny of the United States “to overspread the continent allotted by Providence for the free development of our yearly multiplying millions.” Weinberg, Manifest Destiny, 122.

38 Ibid., 2.


40 As Lawrence Kaplan did to modify his thesis of isolationism.
of meddling in European affairs. France controlled the St. Lawrence River region through eastern Canada and down the Great Lakes to the Mississippi River. Spain also controlled Florida and the Caribbean, as well as the Southwest and California (until Mexican independence) and the Louisiana territory (until the 1800 Treaty of San Ildefonso with France).

Second, such an argument would then have to incorporate expansion and expansionism into a narrative about an “isolated” country and people not seeking imperial possessions in the manner of the European powers. Never mind the awkward fit this makes for cases such as the ethnic cleansing of Native Americans, the Mexican–American War, and the continued obsession with Cuba and Canada.

In fact, nineteenth-century continental expansion and expansionism was intimately connected with the building of Great Power status – as current literature points out – and should thus not be seen in isolation from the United States’ later imperial adventures. When seen in the light of the steady expansion and strong expansionist ideology espoused by Americans and their leaders since the Founding Fathers, one is loath to view the Spanish–American War of 1898 as merely an “imperial aberration.”

The dichotomy and its cycles

The common descriptions of isolationism in the literature also had to contend with another internal contradiction in its logic: the numerous instances of interventions and diplomatic interactions conducted by the young American republic. The foreign policy tradition of isolationism was thus linked to its opposite; that of internationalism, in either a cyclical or periodic fashion. Scholars either wrote that the United States had of course first been solidly isolationist, but then started vacillating between isolationism and internationalism in its foreign policy (cyclical thesis), or they wrote that the United States had been isolationist up to the Spanish–American War and then became internationalist (the periodic thesis). Stanley Hoffmann wrote of “the Wilsonian syndrome,” characterized by “oscillation from quietism to activism,” making for a “hectic-static approach to international

41 After the Seven Years’ War, France ceded most of the Louisiana Territory east of the Mississippi River to Great Britain, and that west of the River to Spain. France retained the area around New Orleans.
Henry Kissinger argued in *Diplomacy* for a dualism between isolationism and globalism in U.S. foreign policy. Frank L. Klingberg argued that American foreign policy would cycle between “extroversion” and “introversion” as a result of generational mood traits.

The new paradigm of U.S. foreign relations

The inherent tensions of the old paradigm have made the way for a new paradigm in the study of U.S. foreign relations. It generally argues that (1) the Founding Fathers were not isolationists but were aiming rather to prevent foreign influence in the Americas, not preventing U.S. influence around the world. In other words, they were advocating unilateralism, not isolationism; (2) the Farewell Address was thus not a timeless political testament counseling isolationism; rather, it was the result of a policy fight between the pro-British Federalist Party (favored by George Washington and Alexander Hamilton) and the pro-French Democratic-Republican Party (favored by Thomas Jefferson and James Madison), proving the new Republic’s early embroilment in world affairs; and (3) the continental and overseas empire acquired during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries are proof of the inherent internationalist orientation on the part of the United States.

Today, the consensus among historians of U.S. foreign relations is that the term isolationism is unhelpful and should be discarded. But the paradigmatic shift has yet to be consolidated, as the new paradigm is struggling to replace the old one. Some contemporary authors still validate the thesis of isolationism. Indeed, Lawrence Kaplan wrote in 1987 that Jefferson’s phrase “entangling alliance” from his First Inaugural Speech and a very famous phrase in U.S. foreign policy,

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42 Stanley Hoffmann in *Gulliver’s Troubles*, quoted in Claude, “The Credibility of Institutions, Policies and Leadership,” 3. It should be said, however, that “quietism” is not necessarily isolationism, although it does serve to dichotomize U.S. foreign policy.


44 Klingberg, *Cyclical Trends*, 8. He argues the U.S. was introvert from 1776–1798; 1824–1844; 1871–1891; and 1918–1940, while being extrovert in between. “Extroversion” is defined as “a nation’s willingness to bring its influence to bear upon other nations, to exert direct positive measures (specially military or diplomatic); “introversion” as “an unwillingness to exert much direct pressure upon other nations, and a desire to concentrate upon internal problems, while conducting normal economic, diplomatic, and cultural relations.”

counseled isolationism as a strategy. Bradford Perkins argued in The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations – which was published as late as 1993 – that the Founding Fathers were devoted to isolationism from the outset despite certain compromises, such as the initial military alliance with France. In 1998, political scientist Fareed Zakaria based his well-known book on U.S. foreign policy on the assumption – and to him, the puzzle – that the United States “hewed to a relatively isolationist line” after the Civil War, arguing the United States underperformed as a great power.

What is interesting is that even those authors who explicitly reject the term isolationism publish works that reproduce the dichotomy in U.S. foreign policy as isolationist/internationalist, by substituting “separateness” or “aloofness” for isolationism. For example, in 1998, H. W. Brands wrote that U.S. foreign policy comes in either an “exemplarist” (meaning aloof) or an interventionist version.

U.S. internationalism: A new paradigm for the ages

The new paradigm holds that, “[r]evolutionary Americans did not aspire to isolation,” as Peter and Nicholas Onuf write, “but rather to closer integration in the European world.” Indeed, one of the more important consequences of the Declaration of Independence was to enable the thirteen American colonies to enter into alliances as a sovereign power, which is the very antithesis of isolationism. There was of course an important element of Realpolitik to this alliance. The revolutionaries had to make the European balance of power work to their advantage since they were so weak compared to the British Empire. James Madison was certainly aware of this: It is to the principle of the rivalry between France and England, Madison said, that “we owe perhaps our liberty.” The American Revolution had a profound impact

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47 Fareed Zakaria, From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America’s World Role (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998), 5. This assumption no doubt owes to views such as Adler’s; who argued that isolationism actually enjoyed “increased vitality during the interlude of comparative tranquility between the downfall of Emperor Napoleon I and the war against Emperor William II of Germany.” See Adler, The Isolationist Impulse, 12. My italics.
49 Onuf & Onuf, Federal Union, Modern World, 98; Onuf, Jefferson’s Empire, 60.
50 Gilbert, Farewell Address, 89; Onuf & Onuf, Federal Union, Modern World, 117. The Treaty of Alliance of 1778 promised islands in the West Indies to France, and the Floridas to its ally, Spain. The United States also had to pledge to remain France’s partner “forever.” See LaFeber, American Age, 22–23.
on the international system. The revolutionaries did not seek to isolate themselves from Europe, nor were they eager to participate – “without powerful allies and on radically unequal terms – in the anarchic struggle of all against all that was supposed to be the natural state of nations,” Onuf writes. In fact, today the Founding Fathers are seen more often as advocates of an American empire than of isolationism.

The Farewell Address and its legacy

The Farewell Address is seen as the first and therefore very important expression of early U.S. foreign policy. As the United States emerged as a world power, historians began debating whether the republic’s first president, George Washington, was mainly addressing domestic politics or international politics upon stepping down from his office. Was he addressing his contemporaries or later generations, and was he articulating a limited or a broad policy for the nation? Whereas his admonition against the United States engaging in “permanent alliances” used to be taken as an argument for isolationism, the current general consensus is that Washington was instructing the new nation to avoid international intercourse on radically unequal terms.

The document is a more complex work than the phrase it is remembered for – “entangling alliances” – a phrase which Washington never uttered (it was, in fact, Jefferson’s). Published in newspapers on September 19, 1796, it was most likely a reaction to the frayed domestic unity resulting from the French Revolution and the Jay Treaty with Britain, which had developed into a partisan battle between the emerging Federalists – Washington and Hamilton’s party – generally sympathetic to England, and the pro-French Democratic Republicans, represented by Jefferson and Madison. Washington’s warning against permanent alliances and “inveterate antipathy” toward other nations was arguably a warning against a permanent alliance with France (the

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53 That Washington’s Farewell Address was a statement of independence rather than isolationism remains the accepted interpretation in most works on the Federalist era,” writes Burton Ira Kaufman, Washington’s Farewell Address: The View from the 20th Century (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1969), 111.
54 Indeed, John G. Ruggie – by no means the only political scientist guilty of this – assumes Washington warned against “entangling alliances” as opposed to “permanent alliances.” See “The Past as Prologue”: 90.
55 Hamilton advocated a pro-British policy because he thought this was the best way of fostering U.S. trade and fiscal interests. See DeConde, *Entangling Alliance*. I also thank Martin Öhman for helpful comments.
only country the United States had an alliance with) and counseling people to abandon their antipathy towards Britain. And so, he stated, “[i]t is our true policy to steer clear of any permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world, as far, I mean, as we are now at liberty to do it.”

This was not isolationism, but unilateral internationalism. Neither Washington nor Jefferson regarded themselves as advocates of a policy of isolation. Both men actually sought to “increase American contacts with the outside world.” Hamilton advocated steering clear of European affairs so the United States could achieve hegemony on its own continent, “to aim at an ascendant in the system of American affairs,” as he wrote in the essay Federalist 11, a sentiment he also expressed in the Farewell Address Hamilton in fact wrote for Washington. Gilbert argues this sentiment was weaker and more subtle in the Farewell Address because “Washington hardly would have liked this open announcement of an aggressive imperialist program” in his address.

The ardent internationalist foreign policy of the Revolution, coupled with Washington’s allowance for the necessity of “temporary alliances in extraordinary emergency” makes it plausible that the Founding Fathers did not oppose alliances as a matter of principle. Indeed, in July 1787 William Grayson proposed forming an alliance with European powers “to maintain a permanent naval force that would guard the Mediterranean for peaceful shipping.” What we see, rather, is an unwillingness to be a junior partner, an aversion to the risk of losing sovereignty – safeguarding freedom of action above all else.

This point of view was echoed by John Quincy Adams and William H. Seward (perhaps the nineteenth century’s most prominent U.S. secretaries of state), as well as in biographies of Washington written by Woodrow Wilson and Henry Cabot Lodge at the end of the century (both in the vanguard of the growing expansionist movement of the 1890s, and both portraying Washington as an expansionist). In fact,

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56 See Washington’s Farewell Address, <online>.
57 Jonas, “Isolationism,” 338. See also Herring, From Colony to Superpower, 1.
58 Gilbert, To the Farewell Address, 133. See also Federalist 11, <online>.
60 LaFeber, The American Age, 48. My italics. This is not to deny the presence of a strain of thought idealizing isolation – Thomas Paine, for example, did argue for isolation and international peace founded on commerce.
61 Ibid., 32.
Burton Ira Kaufman argues, the Farewell Address was a statement of empire, made by an “apostle of empire,” but was for a long time misrepresented as advocating isolationism.  

**No entangling alliances**

So what, then, does the phrase “entangling alliances” mean? It was, of course, Jefferson – and not Washington – who formulated the famous phrase. Building upon Paine’s *Common Sense* and Washington’s Farewell Address, Jefferson counseled the Founding Fathers’ foreign policy consensus: avoid alliances now (bound to be detrimental to a relatively weak United States) and grow stronger so as to be able to dictate the terms of international intercourse in the future. Indeed, Jefferson had rather lofty aspirations for the American republic. Writing to his Secretary of State, James Madison, in 1801, he envisioned virtually unlimited American expansion:

> However our present situation may restrain us within our own limits, it is impossible not to look forward to distant times, when our rapid multiplication will expand itself beyond those limits, and cover the whole northern, if not southern continent…. 

Upon leaving office in 1809, he told Madison – his successor – that with the Louisiana Purchase of 1803 from Napoleon and with the future acquisitions of the Floridas, Cuba, and, of course, Canada, the United States would be “such an empire for liberty as [the world] has never surveyed since the creation…. ” Nor were Jefferson’s impressive plans for America limited to the Western Hemisphere. In the early 1800s, when American shipping was under siege by the Barbary Pirates, he proposed building a naval squadron to be on permanent station in the Mediterranean as well as the creation of an international

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64 For a discussion on Jefferson’s “empire for liberty” see Onuf, *Jefferson’s Empire*, 2, 7. Quoted in LaFeber, *The American Age*, 57–58. Jefferson’s successor also dutifully organized a coup in West Florida upon which the plotters “asked” for U.S. annexation (formally becoming a part of the Union in 1811); and upon the failed attempt to gain East Florida, Madison and Congress declared that henceforth no transfers of New World territory between foreign powers would be tolerated. This “nontransfer principle” later became part of the Monroe Doctrine. See LaFeber, *The American Age*, 59–60.
league for the permanent policing of the Mediterranean, with the United States playing a lead role.\textsuperscript{65}

The Founders’ views on alliances and internationalism, then, seem rather more concerned with preserving U.S. unilateral maneuverability and future influence over the American continent, than with an ideological attachment to isolationism. Indeed, in 1823 Jefferson’s advice to President Monroe was to accept British Foreign Secretary George Canning’s invitation to joint action with Great Britain against the threat posed to Latin America by the Holy Alliance (Russia, Austria, and Prussia), on the grounds that it would favorably affect the European balance of power. Arguing that if “we can affect a division in the body of European powers, and draw over to our side its most powerful member, surely we should do it.”\textsuperscript{66} John Quincy Adams, on the other hand, counseled against it – not on the grounds of isolationism, but on the grounds that it would prevent the United States from extending its own sphere of influence in the future (over such coveted areas as Texas and Cuba, for instance).\textsuperscript{67}

\textbf{Nineteenth century: from isolationism to expansionism}

As early as 1935, Weinberg sought to explain how the United States had developed from an “infant republic occupying the seaboard of a little known continent to a vast world power with overseas possessions.” Weinberg’s answer was that this expansion had been accompanied by an expansionist ideology, expressing a “dogma of supreme self-assurance and ambition – that America’s incorporation of all adjacent lands was the virtually inevitable fulfillment of a moral mission delegated to the nation by Providence itself.”\textsuperscript{68} The “revisionist” diplomatic historians who emerged in the 1960s – William A. Williams, Walter LaFeber, and Lloyd Gardner, among others – would pick up

\textsuperscript{65} Kagan, \textit{Dangerous Nation}, 98. In 1801 Jefferson sent a squadron of three frigates and a schooner to Tripoli as the beginning of a four-year long naval campaign. The military campaign was accompanied by a very proactive diplomatic effort.

\textsuperscript{66} Jonas, “Isolationism,” 339.

\textsuperscript{67} Weeks, \textit{Building the Continental Empire}, 56.

\textsuperscript{68} Weinberg, \textit{Manifest Destiny}, 1–3. Weinberg would explicitly disagree with his later revisionist colleagues, arguing that “No one fact, either economic, or social, or even political, can account for [American expansion]. Perhaps a national idealism – call it manifest destiny or what you will – has had more to do with this expansion movement than anything else.” James A. Field criticizes revisionist historians for exaggerating American imperialism at the end of the nineteenth century, arguing it was less a consolidated movement and intentional policy that haphazard reactions and events. Field also critiques the line of argument attempted by for instance Thomas Hietala and Ernest Paolino in connecting pre-Civil War expansion with 1890s imperialism. See Field, “American Imperialism: The Worst Chapter in Almost Any Book,” \textit{American Historical Review} 83, no. 3 (June 1978).
on Weinberg’s theme of expansion and expansionism, albeit giving it a more explicit economic perspective. These authors stressed the primacy of domestic social and economic structures in explaining the American rise to power.\(^6\) Rather than seeing distinct periods or cycles, Williams argued that the near obsession with the thesis of “isolationism” as a description of the interwar period had served to obscure the overall consistent nature of U.S. foreign policy: expansion and growth toward great-power status. Whereas the nineteenth-century continental expansion used to be seen as “manifest destiny” and essentially a domestic matter, expansionism would increasingly come to be questioned as a domestic issue by diplomatic historians.

Indeed, one of the big changes in the field of frontier history with direct implications for those studying the history of U.S. foreign policy has been the “reckoning with the fact that that what we called, for so long, ‘westward expansion,’ could also fit in the categories of colonialism and imperialism,” Western historian Patricia Nelson Limerick writes. Limerick admits to not having known about Williams’ work when she did her own work in Western American history, because, as she says, “I was a Western American historian and Williams was a diplomatic historian….\(^7\) One of the central weaknesses of the old paradigm of Western history and diplomatic history occurred from a failure to question the assumption, subscribed to by many American historians and certainly by textbook writers, that the United States took up the practice of imperialism only in the 1890s, after having stayed remarkably innocent of the practices of dominance found among European nations.\(^8\) The curious notion – that expansion across contiguous land somehow “didn’t count” and that a nation had to extend its powers across an ocean before the terms “colonialism” or “imperialism” could come into play – “governed the periodization, the very definition, of American involvement in Empire.”\(^9\)

Today, the theme of expanding U.S. power is the narrative motif of most textbooks currently used in courses on U.S. foreign relations.\(^10\) Although they usually begin with the imperial surge in Asia and the Pacific at the end of the nineteenth century, it is now quite common

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\(^8\) Ibid.: 295.

\(^9\) Ibid.: 296.

to tie late nineteenth century overseas expansion to early nineteenth century territorial expansion, rejecting the thesis of Bemis that U.S. imperialism was an “aberration” in American history.\textsuperscript{74} Nineteenth century continental expansionism is categorized as inherently part of U.S. foreign policy for several reasons.

First, territorial acquisition was a diplomatic act (either between Native tribes and the United States or other states and the United States). The treaty-making power accorded to the President and the Senate at the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia in 1787 was not simply meant for overseas countries, it was also meant to govern relations with American-Indian tribes, as the tribes were usually considered separate nations by the whites.\textsuperscript{75} The settlers did not encounter a vacant east coast lacking in “resentful minorities” as classic diplomatic historians wrote. They did not move across an empty continent. Rather, “a central theme of American diplomatic history must be the clash between the European settlers and the Native Americans between 1620 and 1890,” a clash that nearly exterminated the Indian tribes, counting between 8.5 and 10 million in 1492.\textsuperscript{76} And, indeed, recent scholarship deals more explicitly with this fact.\textsuperscript{77}

Second, the animating ideology behind expansion – manifest destiny, “Anglo-Saxon civilizing mission,” or, simply “missionary” – whichever term one wants to use, was internationalist at its core.\textsuperscript{78} The settlers and colonists were spreading English civilization, in active competition with the efforts of the French and the Spanish imperialists.

\textbf{Continuities}

Whereas it is tempting to treat the Civil War as a break between two distinct periods of U.S. foreign policy (which it was, in terms of the expansion of slavery), Thomas Hietala argues that the real long-range significance of the 1840s transcends the sectionalism of 1848–77.\textsuperscript{79


\textsuperscript{75} Lafferber, \textit{The American Age}, 32; Herring, \textit{From Colony to Superpower}, 41–45.

\textsuperscript{76} Lafferber, 10.

\textsuperscript{77} Walter Russell Mead argues this historic neglect of the United States’ relations with Native American peoples has been due to both a “general historical amnesia and a Eurocentric view of U.S. foreign policy.” Furthermore, this neglect impinges our understanding of how Americans would deal with the rest of the world, as their approach to the outside world first appeared in their dealings with the native peoples of North America. See “A Hegemon’s Coming of Age,” Foreign Affairs (July/August 2009).

\textsuperscript{78} The term “Anglo-Saxon civilizing mission” is Kagan’s in \textit{Dangerous Nation}, 12.

\textsuperscript{79} Hietala, \textit{Manifest Design}, 209.
Rather than only presenting the 1840s as the first major step toward secession and war, historians could also couple the expansionists of the late Jacksonian period (named after U.S. president Andrew Jackson) with the expansionists of the 1890s. In fact, he argues, the expansionists of the 1840s would have viewed the acquisition of an overseas empire in 1898 as a more likely outcome of their own efforts than the Civil War of 1861–65.  

William Henry Seward had the specific misfortune of being Secretary of State during the Civil War. “How sadly domestic disturbances of ours demoralize the National ambition,” he wrote to John Bigelow in 1865. This “National ambition” was for Seward to recast the territorial U.S. empire into a “commercial, yet destinarian, vision.” Inspired by Adams, Seward advocated that the United States become the future great commercial power on earth, fueled by oceanic trade (the only kind of empire that was “incorruptible”). Commerce would take the place of war, New York would become the center of finance in the world, and Asia would have to be fought over with the other great powers.

In other words, when policymakers such as William McKinley (president during the Spanish–American War), John Hay, and Theodore Roosevelt moved beyond continentalism and sought a global empire for the United States around the turn of the twentieth century, the transition was not as dramatic as the old paradigm assumed. In retrospect, the objectives of the expansionists of the 1890s closely resembled those of their predecessors in the 1840s: each group “had hoped to diffuse a domestic malaise through expansionism and war; each sought to enhance the country’s commercial position, especially in Asia; and each set out to show the European powers that the United States could and would employ force to secure its interests.” In other words, had the sectional crisis, the Civil War, and Reconstruction not directed American attention inward so extensively in 1848–77, it is not unlikely that the Mexican–American War (1846–48) rather than

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80 Ibid. 210. There certainly were some rather striking similarities between these two expansionist decades. President John Tyler dispatched House representative from Massachusetts, Caleb Cushing, to China to “stick an American foot into what would be termed the Open Door fifty years later.” In the 1840s, Tyler, President James K. Polk, and others advocated for a more robust naval policy due to the growing U.S. international trade, as would Alfred Thayer Mahan and Henry Cabot Lodge in the 1890s. President Polk also decided that Cuba should be added to the American domain, but Spain spurned all overtures to buy it.


82 Ibid.
the Spanish–American War of 1898 would be acknowledged as the point of origin of the United States as a Great Power.\textsuperscript{83}

**Building an American empire?**

Referring to U.S. expansion in the nineteenth century as an exercise in empire building is the trend currently found in many writings by scholars of early American foreign relations.\textsuperscript{84}

The territorial settlement toward the Pacific Ocean (manifest destiny) was the United States’ “first empire,” completed just after 1850.\textsuperscript{85} The subsequent offshore acquisitions across the Pacific and in Asia can be said to have made up the “second empire,” ranging from the acquisition of the midway islands and other smaller Pacific islands to the acquisition of Hawaii, the Philippines, Puerto Rico, and the Panama Canal Zone. This was the time when Secretary of State William Henry Seward’s ideas finally came to fruition, fulfilled in the later “Large Policy” advocated by Teddy Roosevelt and Senator Henry Cabot Lodge around the turn of the twentieth century, which aimed at possessing a large navy, owning and controlling a canal between the Atlantic and the Pacific Ocean (today’s Panama Canal), holding naval bases in the Caribbean and the Pacific, and being a contender for naval and commercial superiority of the Pacific Ocean and the Far East.\textsuperscript{86} The United States thus built a transcontinental territorial empire in less than half a century, achieving supremacy in the Western Hemisphere, and laying

\textsuperscript{83} Hietala, *Manifest Design*, 212.
\textsuperscript{84} Nugent, *Habits of Empire*, xiv.
For a discussion of what empire entails, see Charles S. Maier, *Among Empires: American Ascendancy and Its Predecessors* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), 63. Although Maier hedges on whether or not the United States can be categorized as an empire as of yet, he argues that the distinction between hegemon and imperial power is a fragile one: “At best, hegemony seems potential empire, not just a high-minded renunciation of intervention.” For a discussion of what hegemony entails, see Bruce Cronin, “The Paradox of Hegemony: America’s Ambiguous Relationship with the United Nations,” *European Journal of International Relations* 7, no. 1 (2001): 103–130. Michael H. Hunt argues the United States has been an empire for a long time and in several guises, beginning as a continental empire (a form of settler colonialism already at the time of national independence); turning to formal overseas empire at the end of the nineteenth century; thereafter practicing informal empire in large areas of Central America and the Caribbean, maritime East Asia, western Asia, and arguably even western Europe in the early Cold War. See “Empire, Hegemony, and the U.S. Policy Mess,” (May 21, 2007) *History News Network*.
\textsuperscript{85} Nugent, *Habits of Empire*, xiv. Historical debates on a U.S. empire usually start with the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, which was significant because it created the Northwest Territory as the first organized territory of the United States, and established the precedent by which the United States would expand westward across North America by admitting new states, rather than existing states expanding west. As early as the 1781 Articles of Confederation, however, the future aspirations were clear: the Articles reserved a place for Canada in the new state.
\textsuperscript{86} Seward, *The Foundations of the American Empire*, 211.
the foundations for a twentieth century empire – the third, and current, U.S. empire.87

This perspective of continuity challenges the perspective of an isolationist U.S. foreign policy up till the Spanish–American War of 1898, where the war is seen as the start of an American “empire” rather than its culmination. In fact, the contemporary empire literature argues there is little reason to categorize 1898 as a “break” in the history of U.S. foreign policy at all. Indeed, Henry Cabot Lodge might agree. As he noted in the debate over what to do about the Philippines during the Spanish–American War, empire was nothing new to the United States – it had been practicing it for over one hundred years.

It is important to keep in mind, however, that at the time of the American Revolution the connotations of “empire” were not as ominous as they often are today. The revolutionaries had themselves revolted against defective imperial governance – “a corrupt and grasping administration that was determined to enrich the metropolis while beggaring its distant provinces” – embracing an “improved, republicanized version of the imperial ideal in projecting the prosperity and freedom of their expanding union of states.”88 Any negative associations with “empire” had thus been purged through the Revolution and the breaking of ties with the British corrupt version of it. By vindicating their independence, then, the revolutionaries would vindicate the “imperial idea, the great legacy of antiquity and the great hope of progressive and enlightened peoples everywhere.”89 There was, in this sense of the word, a widespread consciousness among the Founding Fathers that they were the architects of a great empire.90

In this new paradigm, the founding of the United States of America was not an act of isolation, then, but rather the inauguration of a Novus ordo Seclorum – a new order for the ages (the motto on the reverse side of the United States Great Seal). In 1774, Royal American Magazine wrote that Americans found it plausible that one day “the knee of empires and splendid kingdoms” would “bow to” America’s “greatness”; “the spirit of freedom” exemplified by the colonies would spread from “pole to pole” and then America would “be the glory and the
astonishment of the whole earth." As Burns puts it, it would scarcely be an exaggeration to say “America became an empire before she became a state.” Thus, from the inception of the Republic, American leaders expressed lofty visions for this future empire of the Americas. Expansionism was an integral part of the building of this empire, and, as previously mentioned, is intimately connected to the rejection of an isolationist/internationalist dichotomy. The fact that the Americans did not see themselves as invaders, aggressors, or occupiers does not invalidate this thesis, since most expansive people – such as the Greeks and the Romans, for instance – tend not to do so.

As mentioned above, the new paradigm is still competing with the old one, however. Prominent historian Walter Russell Mead states that there are two basic views among students of U.S. foreign policy today. One school sees a distinct break between an early American tradition of reticence and modesty on the international stage and a later and more “problematic” era of assertiveness and expansionism (with the year 1898 seen as dividing the two ages). The other school connects important features of twentieth-century U.S. foreign policy (expansionism, assertiveness, imperial ambition) in American history dating back to the colonial era. Indeed, current scholarship still straddles the expansionism–isolationism issue rather uncomfortably, and, as always, political science is rather slow in absorbing the latest insights from history. Political scientist Patrick Stewart argues, for example, that for most of the nineteenth century, “the dominant strain in U.S. security policy remained isolationism with a unilateral thrust.” As a rule, he argues, the United States kept political engagement with other nations to a minimum, but, “closer to home, the United States moved first toward continental domination – creating Jefferson’s ‘empire of liberty’ – and then regional hegemony.” Here, Patrick is arguing that hegemony in the Western Hemisphere is compatible with isolationism, an argument that seems more than a little Eurocentric. The argument of “isolationist expansion” only holds if we assume that the acquisition of new territory, previously not belonging to one’s country, somehow falls within the realm of domestic, as opposed to foreign, policy.

92 Burns, America’s Mission, 259. William Earl Weeks even argues the federal union was set up in order to create an empire (along with ensuring the security of the states). See Building the Continental Empire, ix.
93 Mead, “Review: Habits of Empire.”
95 Ibid.
Thus, whereas the concept of isolationism has been discarded, the foreign policy dichotomy separating an early tradition of “reticence” or “modesty” from a later tradition of assertive internationalism is still employed.

**Unilateral internationalism**

Discarding the “isolationist” paradigm and accepting the “internationalist” still leaves us with questions. One might still argue that there was a significant break in the execution of U.S. internationalism after the Spanish–American War, or the First World War, or the Second World War, perhaps to such a degree that one should speak of different kinds of internationalism. As we shall see in chapter 4, many authors separate a unilateral from a multilateral period in U.S. foreign policy. In contrast, I argue that the United States has been pursuing unilateral internationalism since the very beginning of the Republic, and that it did not abandon this overarching strategy after either of the two world wars.

**Internationalism prior to 1898**

Whereas the Civil War did turn attention inward for the United States, it quickly regained its post-bellum foothold on the international scene. Indeed, the Spanish–American War, rather than being the “great aberration” in U.S. foreign policy, should be characterized as the “great culmination,” Ernest Paolino has argued. 96 Notably, the U.S. naval build-up preceded the Spanish–American War. At the time of the Samoan controversy 1889–90, the U.S. Navy was the sixth largest in the world (122,000 tons). 97 In 1907 the United States was in second place, but was surpassed again by Germany in 1911. 98 There was no cyclical withdrawal from the world after the imperial adventure in the Caribbean and the Pacific. The Spanish–American war was followed by the enunciation of the Open Door policy aimed at the European empires to gain access to China; participation in the First International Peace Conference at The Hague in 1899 (and the establishment of the

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97 After Great Britain (802,000), France (515,000), Russia (246,000), Italy (203,000), and Germany (188,000). See Duroselle, *From Wilson to Roosevelt: Foreign Policy of the United States, 1913–1945* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1963), 10–11.
98 Ibid. The 1907–1909 voyage of the U.S. Fleet to the Pacific was ordered by Theodore Roosevelt after consulting with Mahan, and Roosevelt also advised his senators and representatives in an official message to read Mahan’s works.
To be clear, “anti-intervention” arguments have been voiced at various points in American history – for instance by the anti-imperialists in the 1890s. However, such voices have consistently been drowned out and have lost out in the political realm, meaning that while present they have not been very influential. It is perfectly fair to acknowledge anti-interventionist sentiments in American history, but to craft a long-standing “isolationist” or simply “reticent” foreign policy tradition out of this is, I argue, wholly incorrect.

The tendency to divide American foreign policy into two periods – before and after the Spanish–American War – is perhaps understandable, but it is misleading. It creates the impression of a break with the past, of a new United States of America after the Spanish–American War, ready to take on the mantle of a Great Power. As this chapter has shown, in no way was the United States “isolationist,” aloof, or separate in its foreign policy up to this point.

The nation was, quite simply, in its early years, “neither isolated nor isolationist,” which sums up the current academic paradigm.101 Some new scholarship seems to have merely substituted “separateness” for “isolationism,” however, and still endorses the view of American foreign policy history as dichotomous: “isolationist” or “separate” before the Spanish–American War, or the World Wars, definitively “internationalist” or “integrationist” after the Second World War. But not only is there a serious lag in matching the term (separate) with the

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new historiographic consensus (the United States was never isolationist), the term isolationism itself refuses to die. Indeed, in the 1990s there was again a debate over whether the United States would return to “isolationism” due to the lack of any perceived external threat to national security after the end of the Cold War. Isolationism lives on both in scholarly works and vividly as accepted common wisdom.\textsuperscript{102} Even if we can acknowledge that isolationism is not a historic tradition, the United States still definitively turned “internationalist” in 1945, the argument goes, which only attests to the short-sighted and twentieth-century-centric perspective on American foreign policy, particularly within political science.

The United States, as seen in this chapter, did not wait for its Great Power status to “aim at an ascendant in the system of American affairs,” as Alexander Hamilton once advocated. Rather, it wasted no time in promptly stretching across a vast continent as well as across the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.\textsuperscript{103} “Taming the frontier,” pursuing manifest destiny, promoting commerce, advancing the Anglo-Saxon Protestant civilization, picking up the “White Man’s Burden,” pursuing the “liberation and salvation of the world,” making the world “safe for democracy,” and, finally, leading the “Free World” were all acts of unilateral internationalism.


\textsuperscript{103} Hamilton quoted in Gilbert, \textit{Farewell Address}, 133; see also Federalist 11.
It is often said that when the United States committed to the United Nations in 1945, it vindicated Woodrow Wilson’s failed quest to get a U.S. membership of the League of Nations in 1919. Realizing its earlier mistake of refusing membership of the League, the United States now turned its back on “isolationism” and permanently committed itself to multilateral internationalism. Such an analysis rests on the assumption that the League of Nations and the United Nations were comparable organizations (especially in terms of their demands upon U.S. sovereignty), which the two case study chapters here presented will argue they were not. Nor is it an obvious statement that rejecting the League of Nations amounted to “isolationism.” This chapter will present case studies of the “League fight” and the interwar period in order to assess the plausibility of my argument, which is that the rejection of the League of Nations did not amount to the validation of a tradition of “isolationism” in U.S. foreign policy. I will end by challenging the argument – intimately connected to the turn-around thesis – that it was the exogenous shock of Pearl Harbor that finally ended “isolationism” and pushed the United States toward internationalism.

The First World War and the “League fight”

Wilson and Lodge: internationalism on a continuum
The legendary rise and fall of Woodrow Wilson and his mission to “make the world safe for democracy” is one of the most evocative examples of the gripping fight for the soul of American foreign policy, casting the foreign policy traditions discussed earlier in dramatic roles.
Wilson’s failed quest for world leadership did not, however, vindicate a foreign policy tradition of aloofness; rather the Wilson–Lodge dispute is evidence of the strong unilateral internationalist tradition in American foreign policy.

**Wilson**

Woodrow Wilson may have been labeled an “idealist” by later realists, but he in fact applied a nationalist perspective to America’s new world role. Specifically, he argued that the United States and its system offered the world its best hope for enduring peace. Indeed, the reason for Wilson’s initial favoring of U.S. neutrality and for its entry into the war were much the same: Making sure the United States would be the main arbiter of the peace negotiations, in other words ensuring U.S. supervision of the postwar order, meant to herald an era of American reformation of European balance-of-power politics. The League, Wilson believed, would “enable the American nation to provide worldwide leadership largely through its moral influence over public opinion, and thus fulfill its God-given destiny.”

President Wilson set out on no less than a mission to reform the Old World, pointing back to America’s original purpose: “It was of this we dreamed at our birth. America shall in truth show the way.” The League was not simply to be an instrument of international law; it also promised a new morality. The fact that Wilson came to believe the

104 The historiography of Wilson and the League has gone through several stages. The early works focused on Wilson’s mental state, such as Alexander L. and Juliette L. George, *Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House: A Personality Study* (New York: Dover, 1956) and Sigmund Freud and William C. Bullitt, *Thomas Woodrow Wilson: A Psychological Study* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1966). Arthur S. Link, drew upon physiological facts to counter the psychological analysis, arguing that Wilson’s strokes contributed to his stubbornness and inability to compromise with Lodge, as opposed to his psychological relationship with his father. John Milton Cooper, Link’s student, also focuses on the health aspect, in addition to the political differences between Lodge and Wilson. See Cooper *Breaking the Heart of the World*. Lloyd E. Ambrosius, on the other hand, argues that Wilson was consistently stubborn and unwilling to compromise with Lodge both before and after his stroke in the fall of 1919. See Ambrosius, *Woodrow Wilson and the Treaty Fight in Perspective* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987); Ambrosius, *Wilsonianism: Woodrow Wilson and his Legacy in American Foreign Relations* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 141. Ambrosius as well as William Widener rightly point to the failure of the previously cited works in acknowledging the real political differences between the positions represented by Wilson and Lodge.


106 Cooper, *Breaking the Heart of the World*, 422.

United States could still play the role of neutral arbiter despite having entered the war on the side of the Triple Entente (England, France, and Russia) simply shows the extent of his faith in the special leadership role he envisioned for the United States.

Just as Franklin Delano Roosevelt would two decades later, Wilson set out to organize the postwar world before the United States was officially involved in the war. In other words, there was no single, exogenous shock that prompted Wilson to “turn” internationalist. After several aborted attempts to get the belligerents to let the United States negotiate a peace, Wilson and his advisors decided in January 1917 to send a message to the U.S. Senate proclaiming that the United States would negotiate a “peace without victory.”108 This would be founded on principles like freedom of the seas and self-determination, which were “American principles,” said Wilson, but not simply American principles. They were also “the principles and policies of forward looking men and women everywhere, of every modern nation, of every enlightened community. They are the principles of mankind and must prevail.”109 Thus, whether neutral or belligerent, the United States would shape the new world order.

Most important for our purposes, Wilson held the belief that the League would be a vehicle for American leadership in the world. It would allow the United States to participate in international affairs “without entangling itself in Europe’s wars. It would combine American unilateralism with a new multilateralism.”110 Thus, Wilson-scholar Lloyd E. Ambrosius concludes, it would permit the United States to reform European international politics while preserving its own independence. In fact, Wilson was convinced the League would indirectly allow for American hegemony, although he never used that word.111 Multilateral cooperation would be utilized to implement America’s universal principles, but without sacrificing its unilateral decision-making.112 What Wilson could not do, was convince Henry Cabot Lodge of this important fact. This was a fatal error, as Lodge by virtue of his position as Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations

108 Duroselle, From Wilson to Roosevelt, 53. This would be founded on the right of peoples to rule themselves, freedom of the seas, disarmament, and a League of Nations to oversee all this.
111 Ibid.
112 Ibid., 228.
Committee was in charge of shepherding the Treaty of Versailles through the Senate for ratification.

Lodge
While not as exuberantly moralistic as Wilson, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, was “subject to attacks of national euphoria,” Lodge-scholar William Widenor writes, and in those times “he thought America capable of influencing the course of world history.” Lodge had long advocated a “vigorous” foreign policy, favoring American power through building up the navy, as well as continental dominance, the *sine qua non* of which was the Monroe Doctrine.

Lodge’s primary ideological objection to the League has nothing to do with isolationism, then, but rather with the possibility of ceding too much American sovereignty. One fundamental point separated Lodge and Wilson on the League: Wilson thought it would allow for American leadership, Lodge did not. That did not mean he was negative toward the idea of a league. In fact, the idea of an international organization to enforce peace had its American roots with Lodge’s close friend, Theodore Roosevelt, who, in his Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech in 1910, urged the great powers to form a “League of Peace.” In the spring of 1915, Lodge, in a commencement address at Union College in Schenectady, NY, argued for unity among the great powers to resist aggression and deny states the option of going to war, “and they can only say that effectively when the country desiring war knows that the force which the *united nations* place behind peace is irresistible.” In this speech, it seems Lodge coined the name of the future peacekeeping world body.

The second important point to remember is that Lodge did not endorse the *same* kind of League in 1915 that Wilson would later advocate. Lodge endorsed American participation in a “league of victors,”

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114 Ibid., 70, 105.


116 Cooper, *Breaking the Heart of the World*, 12. My italics. In the summer of 1915, the League to Enforce Peace was established with former Republican president William Howard Taft as its president. This organization became the strongest advocate for American membership in a League.
but not necessarily a general league, as he conceived of the league as a means of getting the United States to stand with the Entente (in particular, Britain). Thus, Lodge had a fairly consistent internationalist, but pro-Allied stance, not necessarily a general pro-League stance. Upon Wilson’s peace initiative in December 1918, Lodge publicly accused Wilson of being partial towards Germany and privately lamented ever having been “mixed up with” the League to Enforce Peace (an American pro-League organization). He endorsed Senator Philander Knox’s “New American Doctrine,” which declared the domination of Europe by an aggressive military power to be a menace to American national security, and he argued that should such a situation arise in the future, the United States would join again with the Allies.

Implications

The “League fight” was not a fight pitting internationalism against “isolationism”/aloofness, then, but rather one pitting various versions of American internationalism against each other. The unilateral internationalism of Henry Cabot Lodge fought against the “liberal internationalism” of Woodrow Wilson, with both camps disagreeing with the “Irreconcilables” led by senators William Borah and Hiram Johnson.

Wilson faced opposition both on the right and the left. By the summer of 1919, after liberals perceived their ideals badly betrayed by the final Versailles Treaty (which was seen as conceding too much on Wilson’s principles to placate the European Great Powers who were seeking revenge over Germany), The New Republic and its editors, Walter Lippman and Herbert Croly, turned against the League.

117 Widenor, Henry Cabot Lodge, 228–29. The Republican platform of 1916 did endorse “pacific settlements of international disputes and … the establishment of a world court,” but it did not include a plank endorsing the League to Enforce Peace (LEP) program, reportedly due to Lodge’s urgings. See Cooper, Breaking the Heart of the World, 17. Wilson’s “Peace without Victory” speech was met mostly with Republican derision (although party elders Elihu Root and Charles Evans Hughes remained silent), with the most formidable opposition coming from Lodge himself.

118 Ibid., 20.

119 Ibid., 304.

120 The Irreconcilables were those senators opposed to U.S. membership in any kind of League of Nations. After the 1918 midterm elections, the make-up of the Senate was 47 Democrats to 49 Republicans.

Within the Democratic party, there were four Irreconcilables; within the Republican party, fourteen Irreconcilables (called “the Battalion of Death”), with William Borah serving as their leader. There were also twelve to fourteen “mild reservationists” led by future Secretary of State Frank Kellogg (MN); twenty to twenty-five “strong reservationists” led by future president Warren G. Harding (OH) and Lodge. In that one needed a two-thirds vote in favor of a treaty, the “inescapable conclusion was that a two-thirds majority could not be obtained without giving in to some amendments, more or less substantial.” The Senate Foreign Relations Committee, now led by Lodge, had four Irreconcilables (out of seventeen members), obviously a much greater proportion than in the Senate as a whole. See Duroselle, From Wilson to Roosevelt, 111–113.
Progressive Republican from California, Hiram Johnson, described the settlement and possible U.S. membership of the League as “the halting and betrayal of New World liberalism, the triumph of cynical Old World diplomacy, the humiliation and end of American idealism.”

Despite such resistance, the irony in the Senate’s failure to ratify the Covenant of the League of Nations is found in the simple fact that there was a majority in favor of U.S. membership in the League. In April 1919, *Literary Digest* published the results of a vast poll: 718 newspapers representing 9,886,449 readers were favorable to the League; 181 newspapers representing 4,326,882 readers were hostile; 478 newspapers representing 6,792,461 readers were favorable under certain conditions. Despite the fact that a majority of senators and the public were in favor of American leadership in European affairs, the Irreconcilables won by default.

The immediate reason the Irreconcilables won was because Wilson and Lodge could not agree on the issue of reservations, preventing a majority for ratification to emerge in the Senate. The philosophical reason, however, was that they could not agree on what American membership of the League meant for American leadership in international affairs. Thus, Wilson and the Republican moderates all wished for American leadership and involvement in European affairs – in fact, Republican leaders such as William Howard Taft, Elihu Root, and Lodge himself were all in favor of an alliance involving France and Great Britain. In their view, however, the League of Nations promised to treat the United States a little too much as “a nation among nations” rather than a leader among nations. This was thus about unilateralism, not isolationism.

The single fact of rejecting membership in the League has nonetheless come to symbolize American “isolationism” or aloofness in the “interwar period.” Rejection of the League is a poor indicator of the level of “internationalism” in American interwar policies, however. In fact, the election of 1920 was not the “referendum for isolation” that Senator Borah thought it was. The first decade of the interwar period

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121 Senator Johnson, June 2, 1919, quoted in Dueck, *Reluctant Crusaders*, 73. Thomas Knock’s argument is that Wilson partly lost the League fight not because of the opposition from the right, but because he allowed his progressive coalition of 1916 to unravel. See *To End All Wars*, 268.


entailed a high level of U.S. political, economic, and security activity in Europe. The voters were registering their dissatisfaction with the Wilson administration, as well as the problems brought on by the war and its aftermath, but a vote for Warren G. Harding – Republican presidential candidate and winner of the 1920 election – was not a vote against the League.\footnote{Robert Divine, \textit{Second Chance: The Triumph of Internationalism in America During the Second World War} (New York: Atheneum, 1967), 10.} In fact, the “Statement of Thirty-One” – a document released to the press on October 15, 1920 by a group of impressive Republican pro-Leaguers (including Root, Taft, Henry Stimson, and Herbert Hoover) stated that voters could “most effectively advance the cause of international co-operation to promote peace by supporting Mr. Harding for election to the Presidency.” The effort was designed to prevent electoral defection of pro-League voters to the Democratic candidate, James Cox.\footnote{The immediate cause of this effort on the part of the Republican Party elders was to counteract the perceived malicious influence exercised by Senators Borah and Johnson over Harding. See Cooper, \textit{Breaking the Heart of the World}, 394.} Thus, these Republican luminaries all favored American participation in the League (albeit with reservations) and they thought this was a winning electoral strategy.

In conclusion, the United States would only have become a member of the League had the Treaty of Versailles been passed with Lodge’s reservations, making allowance for U.S. freedom of action within the organization – in other words, facilitate unilateral internationalism.\footnote{Widenor concludes that Lodge sincerely favored ratification of the Treaty of Versailles, but \textit{with} reservations. See \textit{Henry Cabot Lodge}, 333.}

\section*{The interwar period}

The “interwar period” has generally been portrayed as a failure of U.S. foreign policy, which has been blamed on “isolationist” or aloof sentiment. Political scientist Jeffrey Frieden, for instance, has argued that the “inconsistent” American interwar policies were the result of competing “internationalist” and “isolationist” economic and political interests within the U.S. government.\footnote{Jeffry A. Frieden, “Sectoral Conflicts and U.S. Foreign Economic Policy: 1914–1940,” \textit{International Organization} 42, no.1 (winter 1988); see also Melvyn P. Leffler, “Political Isolationism, Economic Expansionism, or Diplomatic Realism: American Policy toward Western Europe 1921–1933,” \textit{Perspectives in American History}, 8 (1974); Ikenberry, \textit{After Victory}; and E.H. Carr, \textit{The Twenty Years’ Crisis} (1939).} One cannot subsume the years from 1919 to 1941 under one category, however. First, the 1920s were generally thought of as a foreign policy success. Second, the United States employed both unilateral and multilateral internationalist
foreign policy strategies during this period, rather than stay aloof. The 1930s are of course universally condemned as a foreign policy failure, but this is not a characteristic unique to the United States, and furthermore it overlooks the changes that commenced with Franklin D. Roosevelt’s second administration in 1936.

**1921–29: Republican internationalism**

That the Republican Party took an active approach to international politics in the 1920s is currently accepted in the literature. The prominent Republican Secretaries of State – Charles Evans Hughes and Henry Stimson – engaged in “resourceful, creative diplomacy that contributed greatly to international order and stability.” Not only did Hughes persuade President Harding that the United States should join the World Court, he sought to foster a transatlantic community of “ideals, interests and purposes” in 1923–24. In 1923, Senator Lodge argued for a strong international judiciary to serve as an alternative to war, and Senator William Borah was one of the Republicans who spearheaded the movement for naval disarmament. Institutionalizing naval disarmament as advocated by Senator Borah; making the Open Door Policy towards China universal policy among the signatories; and breaking up the Anglo–Japanese alliance was, at that moment anyway, proof of very successful American leadership in international politics. In fact, whereas the Irreconcilables may have been opposed to the League, they seemed to be highly internationalist (albeit in a selective manner) as they advocated their own schemes for what they believed to be a “stabler, juster world order.” Thus, whereas the Republicans rejected the Versailles system, they did not reject the Lodgian goal of interfering in European politics. As the protracted

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129 Ibid. Elihu Root had been one of the authors of the statute for a permanent court of international justice. The problem was that the Court was the League’s Court. The text did not pass Senate muster until 1926, at which point it contained so many reservations that the members of the League of Nations refused to accept it. See Cooper, *Breaking the Heart of the World*, 399; Duroselle, *From Wilson to Roosevelt*, 146–47.

130 Arms limitation was an American policy objective during the Republican ascendancy, but this was not isolationism or unrealistic politics. Rather, “government officials and their business supporters tried to formulate and implement disarmament proposals in a pragmatic and hardheaded way that would leave American defenses unimpaired,” argues Leffler, in “Political Isolationism”: 436.

131 In fact, despite failures and antagonisms between the United States, Britain, and Japan, this effort remained the only successful arms reductions until the 1980s.

"Versailles crisis" unfolded 1920–23 the Republican policymakers focused on the economic stabilization of Europe instead of what they deemed to have been Wilsonian "idealism."133

The one person who was not taking initiatives in foreign policy, however, was the president himself, Warren G. Harding. Having straddled the issues of the League and international engagement rather skillfully during the election, it was anybody’s guess where he would come down after the election victory. Lodge held out hope for “some new treaty or agreement with our Allies” (since Wilson had made a potential security alliance with France and Great Britain dependent on the ratification of the Treaty of Versailles by the Senate), but such initiatives never came from Harding.134

The initial American postwar strategy was thus somewhat bifurcated: trust in continued prosperity, advocated by the president and Secretary of Commerce Herbert C. Hoover, versus increased U.S. involvement in European politics, advocated by Secretary of State Hughes. The former strategy was grounded in the belief that prosperity would lubricate Versailles treaty revision, end the appeal of Bolshevism, ease the burden of debts, and enable European recovery without much American sacrifice.135 But Hughes’ strategy was more ambitious, and historian Patrick Cohrs credits Hughes with a reorientation of U.S. foreign policy toward Europe in the wake of deteriorating Franco-German relations after 1922. In fact, Cohrs argues that the “new and improved” Anglo-American cooperation fostered by Hughes and British Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald paved the way for the first “real” peace settlement after World War I: the London reparations settlement of 1924.136 Negotiated between the western powers and Germany, it laid the foundations for the Dawes war debt regime and Europe’s “economic peace” of the mid-1920s. Furthermore, this “Pax Anglo-Americana” could not have endured without the political security settlement, the Locarno pact of 1925. This was, in effect, a

133 Patrick Cohrs, The Unfinished Peace, 81–83. This economic stabilization was modeled on the earlier U.S. policy of “Open Door” economic policy, promoting a non-discriminatory system of bilateral trade agreements, as opposed to a "closed system" of high tariffs, cartels, and other trade-restrictive means. This still meant there was a strong pro-American bias to this policy, in terms of containing strong protectionist components beneficial to the world’s leading exporter of capital and goods.

134 Dueck, Reluctant Crusaders, 78; Widenor, Henry Cabot Lodge, 347.

135 Leffler, “Political Isolationism”: 422.

136 Cohrs, The Unfinished Peace, 9, 85. Cohrs labels this the “Hughes doctrine,” which essentially was an internationalized Monroe Doctrine, promoting the United States as the benign hegemonic power within the Western Hemisphere, and pursuing informal influence outside of it.
western-oriented concert of Europe – one that incorporated Germany. Cohrs thus argues against the thesis that the diplomacy of the 1920s was inherently flawed and bound to fail (by failing to prevent the Great Depression or the rise of Nazism).

The United States certainly had a strong hand when dealing with Europe: it was able to shape European events through its economic, cultural, and political predominance. American power was acutely felt, and even when pressure was not directly exerted, European statesmen always had to consider how American capital would react to their initiatives and actions. Essentially foreshadowing post-World War II American “multilateralism,” a British financier sighed: “No country is independent except the United States, which secures independence through its dominion over all others.” \(^\text{137}\) In fact, Republican internationalists such as Stimson and Felix Frankfurter believed they were maximizing their influence in European affairs by staying outside of the League of Nations and withholding a security commitment from France.\(^\text{138}\)

In the fall of 1929 it seemed reasonable to expect U.S. involvement in European affairs would only deepen. Not only was it a commercial power that could not overlook the importance of order and stability in the international arena,\(^\text{139}\) but the United States had also taken a deep interest in the political situation of the European powers. Prospects for the post-Versailles order seemed promising. Indeed, in the late 1920s, “military studies concluded that the international environment was calm and that there was no need for immediate military preparations for war.”\(^\text{140}\)

**1929–39: nationalism, not isolationism**

As is well known, the American strategy of influencing international politics mainly through economic policies proved unworkable in the face of the Great Depression.\(^\text{141}\) Whereas one might criticize the London and Locarno settlements for not weathering the deterioration in international relations, it is also clear that the Great Depression


\(^\text{138}\) Leffler, “Political Isolationism”, 443.

\(^\text{139}\) Adler, *The Isolationist Impulse*.

\(^\text{140}\) Leffler, “Political Isolationism”, 435.

\(^\text{141}\) Costigliola, *Awkward Dominion*. 
was a crisis of unprecedented proportions. The bursting of the stock market bubble in October 1929 set in motion events that temporarily destroyed the international community. Selig Adler, in his classic account, stressed that this caused a “new isolationism,” a thesis George C. Herring reiterates in his latest book.

Adler’s definition of isolationism was that the “new isolationists” were “hemispherists, rather than continentalists,” and that they were also economic isolationists in addition to political isolationists. Two factors brought about this “new isolationism” (which Adler contrasted with the “superficial detachment of the previous decade”): the Depression and the subsequent wave of aggression that ultimately destroyed Versailles. The optimistic view on future prosperity in the 1920s, Adler argued, led to the problem of “entanglements arising from a policy of nonentanglement.” Herring argues the “passionate 1930s quest to insulate the nation from foreign entanglements fully merits the label isolationist.”

But non-entanglement was not isolationism, and Adler’s and Herring’s definitions of isolationism are thus problematic. Senator Borah for example – previous leader of the Irreconcilables – was not only instrumental in convening the Washington Naval Conference of 1921–22, he in fact did more than any other man to bring about the approval of the Kellogg–Briand Pact in the Senate in 1929. As such, Borah was against “entanglements” yet favored an “active” foreign policy.

The fallacies of the term “isolationism” have been duly covered by historians, but nevertheless interwar isolationism – especially for the

142 Cohrs, The Unfinished Peace, 614. Leffler argues U.S. diplomacy in the 1920s became “complacent and overly decentralized,” the prosperity generated ironically producing a feeling that there was “plenty of time to grapple with potential problems.” See “Expansionist Impulses and Domestic Constraints,” 255–56.
143 Adler, The Isolationist Impulse, 239; Herring, From Colony to Superpower, 485.
144 Adler, The Isolationist Impulse, 240.
145 Ibid., 243.
146 Herring, From Colony to Superpower, 502. And there certainly were virulent anti-involvement groups. The Nye Committee in the Senate, headed by Gerald P. Nye (R-ND), met between 1934 and 1936 to study the causes of United States’ involvement in World War I. John Milton Cooper argues that newspaper headlines on the sinister machinations of the munitions industry in pushing the United States into the war contributed to a retrospective shift of public opinion against intervention and Wilson, and contributed to the Neutrality Acts. Cooper, Breaking the Heart of the World, 402.
147 Manfred Jonas, Isolationism in America, 1935–1941 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1966), 49. Whereas one can easily criticize the Kellogg–Briand Pact for being unrealistic, it fit into the larger scheme of Republican interwar internationalism, where “American officials hoped that the slow evolution of arms limitations treaties, judicial processes, arbitration agreements, and antiwar pacts would gradually turn men’s energy and attention from military preparations to economic undertakings.” See Leffler, “Expansionism, Domestic Constraints,” 239.
1930s – has stubbornly persisted in academe and popular history alike, thus making the “turn-around” thesis seem plausible.\textsuperscript{148} Certainly there existed a small group of congressmen and voters who could plausibly be labeled “isolationists” if one defined the term rather broadly. But a “broad” definition is precisely the problem. The definition is so broad, in fact, one would have to agree that the isolationists were actually expansionists, as Franz Schurmann argued: “the true heirs of ‘manifest destiny.’”\textsuperscript{149} They saw “a glorious future” beyond America’s borders, but they saw it more so in East Asia and Latin America than in Europe or Africa.\textsuperscript{150} As such, isolationism was not really isolationism at all, but rather geographically specific internationalism. There was nothing isolationist about advocating hemispheric dominance and Asian market penetration.

Reinhold Niebuhr said it best when he warned in 1930 that Americans were “awkward imperialists” – attempting to manage their wealth and the world with the same economic, informal methods which had created the wealth in the first place.\textsuperscript{151} Niebuhr’s “awkward imperialists,” Jonas’ “isolationists”\textsuperscript{152} and Adler’s and Herring’s “new isolationists” were, in conclusion, unilateralists and nationalists, not isolationists.

With the international order of the 1920s giving way to the anarchy of the 1930s, the United States did, however, temporarily resort to economic and political nationalism.\textsuperscript{153} Whereas open door capitalism remained important to U.S. foreign policy in this era, these foreign policies “remained of distinctly secondary importance to domestic concerns and to prevailing practices of privatism and independent internationalism.”\textsuperscript{154} It was the domestic market that was the primary

\textsuperscript{148} Akira Iriye writes that “Roosevelt’s first administration echoed the isolationist sentiment of the public and emphasized avoidance of trouble,” and that there was “American isolationism” during the 1930s. See Akira Iriye, The Globalizing of America Vol. III, Warren Cohen, ed., The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations (New York, Cambridge University Press, 1993), 146. See also Weinberg, “The Historical Meaning of the Doctrine of Isolation”: 539–547; Adler, The Isolationist Impulse; Duroselle, From Wilson to Roosevelt; Tucker, A New Isolationism; Manfred Jonas, “Isolationism.”

\textsuperscript{149} Franz Schurmann, The Logic of World Power (New York: Pantheon Books, 1974), 57.

\textsuperscript{150} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{152} See Isolationism in America, 35 for Jonas’ categorization of five different isolationist groupings.

\textsuperscript{153} Meaning economic protectionism and unilateralism in political and security affairs. Examples include the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, and Roosevelt’s rejection of the recommendations of the London Economic Conference in 1933.

\textsuperscript{154} Leffler “Expansionist Impulses and Domestic Constraints, 1921–1932,” 227, 258. Leffler points out that when the depression emerged, there was not yet a threat from a totalitarian power, which allowed most policymakers to agree on the primacy of domestic issues.
focus of the Hoover administration in the wake of the crash in 1929, and would continue to be so in Franklin Roosevelt’s first term as president. In 1933, FDR chose the nationalist option over the internationalist one on each of his decisions on disarmament, trade, debt, and the currency question.

Nationalism did not mean isolationism, however. In fact, with Japan’s invasion of Manchuria in 1931 (violating the League Covenant, Hughes’ Washington Treaties (in which Japan had pledged to respect China’s borders), and the Kellogg–Briand Pact), the Hoover administration “set an all-time record for close cooperation with the League,” although the president refused to permit any American actions that might risk war. The League did not stand up for Manchuria, and disappointed Americans who believed in collective action.

While clearly focused on domestic issues such as economic recovery, this does not mean there were no diplomatic initiatives in these early years. Franklin Roosevelt’s decision to recognize the Soviet Union in November 1933 “did not yield immediate results but was pregnant with important implications for international relations,” Akira Iriye writes. FDR’s Latin America policy, named the Good Neighbor policy, was initiated with greater fanfare, and well-received in Latin America. There was also the 1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreement – a reaction to the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930 – which allowed Roosevelt to negotiate the lowering of tariffs on a bilateral basis – and some of its provisions would later be used as a prototype for the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). These agreements were made with Latin American countries, indicating a move toward greater regionalism, as opposed to globalism, which is why Iriye argues that the Good Neighbor policy and the Reciprocal Trade Agreement were aspects of “American isolationism.” This analysis only holds,

155 Legro argues FDR was an “ardent nationalist” in his first term who clearly gave priority to the domestic economic recovery rather than to international events. See Rethinking the World, 71.
156 Leffler, The Elusive Quest, 367.
157 Adler, The Isolationist Impulse, 245.
158 Akira Iriye, The Globalizing of America, 146.
159 Ibid., 147–148. See also Michael J. Hogan, “Partisan Politics and the End of the Cold War,” in The End of the Cold War: Its Meaning and Implications, 10th ed., ed. Hogan (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), who argues changes in the industrial structure (the emergence of large, capital intensive firms started rivaling small, labor intensive business for their political influence) made the New Deal coalition possible, which paved the way for internationalism in the form of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934. Whereas the “nationalist bloc,” as Hogan calls them, was still strong within the Republican party and was able to obstruct many internationalist attempts by the Democrats, the shift towards internationalism was “unmistakable” even in the early 1930s.
however, if greater engagement within the Western Hemisphere can be labeled "isolationism," which seems illogical. The Reciprocal Trade Agreements in fact solidified the quasi-colonial relationship the United States had with the Central American countries, strengthening the dominant U.S. role in hemispheric commerce.¹⁶⁰

Early attempts at a forceful foreign policy met with mixed results. In 1935, FDR made the calculation that the Senate would finally approve U.S. admission to the World Court, as a careful poll had found that more than two-thirds of the senators were in favor. He thus saw little risk in submitting it for approval on January 16, 1935. The request, however, caught the eye of Father Charles Coughlin, the populist and xenophobic Detroit radio priest, along with the Hearst press.¹⁶¹ Their rabid reaction in the media inspired a ten-senator opposition to grow to thirty-six, and the vote fell seven senators short of approval.¹⁶² In early 1936, however, Roosevelt’s support for a cooperative international monetary system was displayed in the Tripartite Monetary Agreement, specifically aimed at propping up the Western European democracies against German and Italian economic nationalism.¹⁶³ This directly reversed the position the United States had taken at the disastrous 1933 London Economic Conference, which is why Warren Kimball labels this later agreement the official renouncement of the economic nationalism of the early 1930s.¹⁶⁴

It seems clear that after he won his first reelection in the fall of 1936, Roosevelt began taking more assertive action in foreign policy, exemplified by his "quarantine speech" in October 1937 (where he called for a quarantine against the aggressor nations).¹⁶⁵ When the League of Nations proposed a conference to discuss the Sino–Japanese War, FDR and Secretary of State Cordell Hull supported it, and the United States attended the conference.¹⁶⁶ Following the Panay incident

¹⁶⁰ Herring, From Colony to Superpower, 501.
¹⁶² Ibid., 96.
¹⁶³ Warren F. Kimball, The Juggler, 188–189; Alfred E. Eckes, Jr., A Search for Solvency: Bretton Woods and the International Monetary System, 1941–1971 (Austin: University of Texas press, 1975), 26–27. According to Eckes, this agreement was a “giant stride toward Bretton Woods” by which the United States acquired the dominant position in international monetary relations it would hold until August 1971, when Richard Nixon suspended the convertibility of dollars and gold.
¹⁶⁵ See Miller Center of Public Affairs <online> for transcript and audio of the speech.
¹⁶⁶ Iriye, The Globalizing of America, 158.
– where Japanese military sank a U.S. gunboat on the Yangtze River China in December 1937, killing three Americans – FDR sent Chief of the U.S. Navy’s Intelligence, Captain Royal Ingersoll, to London for secret talks with his British counterpart on a possible joint strategy against Japan.167

The Neutrality Acts passed in the Senate between 1935 and 1939 – seen as the epitome of isolationism168 – had a very mixed group of proponents. Some members of Congress were seeking noninvolvement, yes, but others wanted to use economic embargo as a weapon against aggression.169 Some were seeking to weaken the president to ensure he could not lead the United States into another war; another group wanted to strengthen the president’s ability to sanction aggressors: “Both groups confusingly used the neutrality legislation for this,” Bear Braumoeller argues. In fact, a House minority report on the Neutrality Act of 1937, objected to the Act on the grounds that it could be used as a weapon by the President to take the United States to war, thereby robbing Congress of its ability to declare war.170 At the end of 1937, Roosevelt also decided to sell military aircraft to France and Britain. This was not a violation of the neutrality acts, as there was no war in Europe, but it was an indication of the intention on the part of the United States to throw its hat in the ring.

Neutrality legislation, the traditional barometer of U.S. isolationism, did not in fact illustrate aloofness from the world; rather, the neutrality legislation was a result of the perceived low threat level to the United States. Whereas Americans realized Adolf Hitler was pursuing horrible policies, they believed American intervention was unnecessary because German weakness meant the democratic states of Europe were in no immediate danger of losing a potential war. In fact, Jonas noted this in his influential 1966 book on isolationism.171

167 Ibid., 159. FDR did, however, refrain from taking more forceful steps.
170 Ibid. In Robert Osgood’s opinion, the neutrality laws were designed to “prevent the nation from committing the mistakes which were presumed to have led it into World War I.” See Cooper, Breaking the Heart of the World, 367.
Public opinion and Pearl Harbor: their significance for U.S. internationalism

What is undeniable about the early 1930s, however, is that the American people – along with their president – focused primarily on domestic issues, as evidenced by nationalist economic legislation and unilateral security policies. It is absolutely true that the concern was first and foremost American economic recovery – not international peace and stability.

Yet the tide against nationalism turned prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. Before that, both public opinion and public actions within the United States supported increased involvement with the war. Not only did Roosevelt take actions that would eventually make it impossible for the United States to stay out of the war, but as we shall see, there was a public opinion majority in support of these actions. Furthermore, the United States committed to a postwar political order in the form of the Atlantic Charter before it was a formal party to the war.

The following discussion aims to show that the significance of “isolationism” in the late 1930s has been overplayed in the literature; and, related, that the “exogenous shock” of Pearl Harbor was not a necessary condition for U.S. involvement in world affairs.

Public opinion

Public opinion polls from the 1930s have been utilized to show that the American public was highly “isolationist” in its attitudes to European events during this time. The widely cited statistics from 1935 and 1936 showing that ninety-nine Americans out of a hundred would “regard as an imbecile anyone who might suggest that, in the event of another European war, the United States should again participate


174 For instance, Geir Lundestad cites this statistic as evidence of pervasive isolationism in the 1950s. See The United States and Western Europe Since 1945, 23.
in it,” has been taken as straightforward evidence of such isolationist sentiment.\textsuperscript{175} But two issues must be kept in mind when utilizing statistics from this time period: threat perception and question wording.

\textbf{Threat perception}

It has been commonplace to argue that “what ended isolationism was the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor,”\textsuperscript{176} but public opinion polls at the time do not bear this thesis out. The evolving public opinion in the United States after the Nazi invasion of Poland shows that the public was in favor of intervention prior to Pearl Harbor, the most significant event in this timeframe being the fall of France.\textsuperscript{177}

The statistics cited above from 1935 and 1936 reflected not only a general abhorrence of war, but more importantly, as Manfred Jonas has pointed out, such anti-interventionist opinion was based on the clear assumption that the coming struggle involved “no vital interests of the United States and could be settled in Europe and Asia.”\textsuperscript{178} Indeed, the infamous 1939 issue of \textit{Time} magazine that made Hitler “Man of the Year,” also asserted that British control of the seas was superior and that the French Army was regarded as incomparable.\textsuperscript{179} Thus, the statistic saying that 95 percent of Americans thought the United States should keep out of war reflected the belief that France and England would successfully stand up to Germany.\textsuperscript{180} In other words, the statistics on public “isolationism” must be seen in the context of an evolving threat perception.\textsuperscript{181}

It seems unlikely that an ideological “isolationism” would be the cause of this low threat assessment in the 1930s, as Great Britain was guilty of the same underestimation of the Nazi threat. Perhaps reflecting their different geographical locations, Great Britain would revise this threat estimation after the Nazi invasion of Czechoslovakia, extending unilateral security guarantees to Poland together with

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176 Stewart, \textit{The Best Laid Plans}, 50; the specific quote is from Lundestad, \textit{The United States and Western Europe}, 25.

177 Herring, \textit{From Colony to Superpower}, 520.

178 Jonas, \textit{Isolationism in America}, 1. Italics mine.

179 \textit{Time} January 2, 1939.

180 A poll conducted by the American Institute of Public Opinion in 1936 estimated it to be 95 percent. Jonas, \textit{Isolationism in America}, 1–2.

181 On threat and balancing against perceived threats as opposed to material capabilities, see Stephen M. Walt, \textit{Origins of Alliances} (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987). Walt argues states balance against threats, not power, where threat level is determined by geographic proximity, offensive capabilities, and aggressive intentions.
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For the United States, the revision of the threat assessment happened later, after the fall of France in the summer of 1940.

What this means is that opposition to intervention should only be coded as “isolationism” after the fall of France, which is when Nazi Germany became a credible threat to the United States. Whereas there were certain groups such as the “America First Committee” and members of Congress, such as senators Gerald P. Nye and William Borah, that did continue to ardently oppose any intervention in Europe after the fateful summer of 1940 – and thus can rightly be categorized as isolationists – a majority adjusted their views toward intervention in accordance with the rising threat.

Roosevelt began talking of global dangers in 1937 and 1938, the most prominent example of which was his “quarantine speech” of October 5, 1937, which was met with more supportive press reaction than the president himself had expected. He met strong resistance in Congress, however, emanating from a bipartisan coalition that had formed in reaction to his New Deal program and his “dictatorial” presidential tendencies. As late as mid-1939 Roosevelt was still unwilling to test the cohesion of this coalition, partly because events did not demand such action yet. Furthermore, his New Deal coalition contained members staunchly opposed to intervention in European affairs. In any case, as David Reynolds points out, “war scares in Europe had

182 I thank Allen Lynch for pointing this out.
184 Not only is there a debate over whether or not the American public was “isolationist” in the 1930s, there is also a debate over whether Franklin Roosevelt can be said to have fallen into this political category during his first or even first two terms. Whereas some authors accept the term “isolationism” as a general term for the 1930s, such as Stoler, “The Roosevelt Foreign Policy: Flawed, but Superior to the Competition,” in Debating Franklin D. Roosevelt's Foreign Policies, 1933–1945, Doenecke and Stoler, 120–122; and Iriye, The Globalizing of America Vol. III, 146–47; and Lawrence S. Kaplan, NATO 1948: The Birth of the Transatlantic Alliance (New York: Rowman Littlefield Publishers, 2007). Others argue isolationism is largely incorrect, and that better terms are unilateralism and nationalist economic sentiments. See Kimball, The Juggler, 84–98; Jeffrey W. Legro, “Whence American Internationalism,” International Organization 54, no. 2 (2000). Robert Dallek does not think Roosevelt’s policies in the early 1930s can be attributed to an “isolationist impulse” on the part of Roosevelt himself, but was rather a response to the perceived public constraints and primacy of domestic issues. See Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932–1945, 330.
186 Stoler, “The Roosevelt Foreign Policy: Flawed, but Superior to the Competition,” 117.
come and gone. There seemed to be no clear and immediate danger to the United States.”

Examining public opinion polls in the late 1930s shows a steady erosion of the feeling of insularity and security in the Western Hemisphere. Polls taken 1936–39 by George Gallup’s American Institute of Public Opinion (AIPO) using variations on the question, “Will America be drawn into a European war?” show a steadily rising “yes” percentage: from 44 percent in April 1936 to 76 percent in September 1939. An ethical distinction was also being made between the warring parties. In October 1939, an AIPO poll showed clear partisanship in favor of Great Britain in relation to the arms embargo repeal: Asked if they favored a repeal of the embargo if it helped Germany, only 4 percent answered yes, 91 percent answered no, and 5 percent had no opinion. Asked if they favored the repeal if it helped Britain and France, 58 said yes, 34 percent said no, and 8 percent had no opinion. Michael Leigh concludes that by 1939, the public was not only making an ethical distinction between the warring parties, but the “credibility of American insularity” was also waning. Even so, the public still clung to hopes of (military) noninvolvement.

Hoping for noninvolvement and being against any involvement is not the same thing, however. As early as January 1939, before the war, 69 percent of Americans favored all aid to Britain short of war. By the end of 1939 most Americans were convinced that the European conflict entailed moral issues that made the cause of the European democracies an American cause. Indeed, speaking after the Nazi invasion of Poland, Roosevelt told his countrymen he could not ask them to be neutral in their hearts, as Woodrow Wilson had done twenty-five years earlier.

188 This would automatically weaken the argument made by anti-interventionists, who argued that the Western Hemisphere — properly defended — was impregnable. See Justus Doenecke, “American Isolationism, 1939–1941,” Journal of Libertarian Studies VI, nos. 3–4 (summer/fall 1982): 205.
189 Leigh, Mobilizing Consent, 42.
190 Ibid., 44.
191 Ibid., 46.
192 Reynolds, From Munich to Pearl Harbor, 173.
Historians debate whether FDR was too concerned with public opinion — worried he would get too far “ahead” of it, like Woodrow Wilson ultimately had, or whether he used public opinion as an excuse to delay American intervention in the war. Warren Kimball argues for the latter point of view in The Juggler, whereas Robert Dallek, in Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, argues FDR was constrained by his perception of public opinion. See Dallek, 530.
The success of the German *blitzkrieg* in the spring of 1940 greatly undermined the American feeling of security. After September 1940, the number of Americans who preferred aiding Britain and France to avoiding war with Germany never dropped below 50 percent.¹⁹³ In fact, by January 2, 1941, almost a year before Pearl Harbor, AIPO found that 68 percent of Americans favored all-out aid to Britain even at the risk of war, a figure that remained constant for the rest of the year.¹⁹⁴

**Question wording**

It also is important to consider question wording when using poll numbers as evidence for “isolationism.” When asked whether the United States should enter the war immediately, the proportion in favor never exceeded 30 percent in the period 1940–41. When asked if the United States should enter the war *if there were no other way to defeat Germany*, however, the affirmatives were high: 72 percent in September 1940, 68 percent in April 1941, and 70 percent in November 1941.¹⁹⁵

More specifically, in May 1941, AIPO conducted a survey on the controversial issue of interventionism. In that survey, 62 percent of the respondents said they would rather see the United States go to war than see Britain surrender to Germany (26 percent would rather see Britain surrender, 12 percent had no opinion). Furthermore, 59 percent answered in the affirmative when asked whether the U.S. Navy should be used to guard ships carrying war material to Britain (39 percent said no, and 7 percent had no opinion). The respondents were under no illusions what this might entail: To the question of whether U.S. Navy ships carrying war material to Britain would get the United States involved in the war, 74 percent answered yes, 16 percent thought it would not mean war, whereas 10 percent had no opinion. Indeed, 76 percent thought that even if the United States helping England would mean a German declaration of war on the United States, the United States should still help England (21 percent said no, and 3 percent had no opinion).¹⁹⁶

In fact, when asked in the spring of 1941 whether Roosevelt had gone too far in helping England, 53 percent answered that his policy was about right; 18 percent thought he had not gone far enough,
and 19 percent thought he had gone too far.\textsuperscript{197} Shortly after this, on May 27, 1941, FDR gave a radio address where he proclaimed “an unlimited national emergency” and pledged full-scale support for Britain. And indeed, public reaction to this speech was immediate and overwhelmingly favorable. Despite this, Roosevelt backed down and told the press that he envisaged neither convoys nor an attempt to repeal the neutrality legislation. The subsequent delay from May to September on these policies cannot be explained by “isolationist” public opinion. In fact, according to Leigh, since a majority of Americans already favored convoys to protect Atlantic shipping, they must have “wondered why convoying, which the president deemed to be vital, had not begun.”\textsuperscript{198} Finally, polls taken in November 1941 – in the days immediately prior to Pearl Harbor – showed only 2 percent of Americans agreeing with the notion that the most important task facing the United States was to “keep out of war.”\textsuperscript{199}

\textit{The role of Congress}

The twenty-seven months between the German invasion of Poland and Japan’s attack on the U.S. naval base at Pearl Harbor was not really a period of “Great Debate” between Roosevelt and the internationalists on the one hand, and the “isolationists” on the other hand, then.\textsuperscript{200} If it were, what should one make of poll results such as AIPO’s, with one taken as early as September 1939 showing a \textit{majority} in favor of the United States joining an international security organization?\textsuperscript{201} The probable answer is that while the general public was relatively

\textsuperscript{197} Ibid., 76. Hadley Cantril of the Office of Public Opinion Research at Princeton argued that should the president favor convoys or specific aid, he would continue to enjoy this high level of support.

\textsuperscript{198} Ibid., 77.

\textsuperscript{199} Braumoeller “Myth of American Isolationism”: 364.

\textsuperscript{200} Wayne S. Cole used this term to denote the debate between internationalists and isolationists. He would later also use it as a description of the debate between historians after Pearl Harbor and beyond. See “American Entry into World War II: A Historiographical Appraisal,” \textit{Mississippi Valley Historical Review} 43, no. 4 (March 1957): 595–617.

\textsuperscript{201} Leigh, \textit{Mobilizing Consent} 79–80. AIPO asked, “Would you like to see the United States join in a movement to establish an international police force to maintain world peace?” to which a majority – 53 percent – said yes.
malleable and receptive to internationalist attitudes, an important segment of Congress was not.\textsuperscript{202}

Roosevelt’s approach to Congress was careful, as he was loath to ask for anything he was not sure of getting. Nonetheless, Roosevelt managed to get all his interventionist policies approved – once he asked for them (which had not been the case between 1933 and 1937). Three days after his declaration of neutrality on September 5, 1939, FDR announced his decision to seek the repeal of the arms embargo in the neutrality acts, which Congress granted him on November 4.\textsuperscript{203} In fact, Roosevelt was able to get all of his major foreign policy initiatives and proposals passed by Congress in 1940 and 1941.\textsuperscript{204} What is significant here is that Congress dismantled the neutrality structure before Pearl Harbor: repealing the arms embargo in 1939; passing the first peacetime selective service act in American history in September 1940,\textsuperscript{205} and passing Lend-Lease in March 1941.\textsuperscript{206} Rather than restrict trade with belligerents, the United States made seven billion dollars’ worth of American goods available to Britain and her allies as a ”virtual gift.”\textsuperscript{207} America had made itself, in Roosevelt’s phrase, “the arsenal of democracy.”\textsuperscript{208}

\textbf{The Atlantic Charter}

Roosevelt was very much involved in planning the postwar world before the United States was a party to the conflict, just as Woodrow

\textsuperscript{202} Jonas, \textit{Isolationism in America}, 206. Indeed, according to Winston Churchill’s account to his war cabinet, FDR had told Churchill at Placentia Bay in August 1941 that he did not regard congressional skepticism toward involvement as truly representative of the country. See also Dallek, \textit{Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy}, 285; and Doenecke, \textit{American Isolationism, 1939–1941}: 209–210. Michael Leigh makes the specific argument that Roosevelt was too cautionary because of his misreading of public opinion through Congressional attitudes, which were more anti-interventionist than was the general public.

\textsuperscript{203} On November 4 the Neutrality Act of 1939 was passed, allowing for arms trade with belligerent nations on a cash and carry basis, thus in effect ending the arms embargo. The end of neutrality policy came with the Lend-Lease Act of March 1941, which allowed the United States to sell, lend or give war materials to allied nations.

\textsuperscript{204} Chalberg \textit{Isolationism}, 136–37. This does not mean Roosevelt felt confident that he would – as seen for instance in his conducting the Destroyers-for-Bases Agreement in 1940 by executive agreement, and not by treaty.

\textsuperscript{205} Although the selective service act passed with one vote and was restricted to service in the Western Hemisphere, it is also noteworthy that FDR did not openly back this legislation in the beginning. In the summer of 1940, however, public opinion was in favor of it, and on August 2 he declared himself ”distinctly in favor of a selective training bill.” See Dallek, \textit{Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy}, 248.

\textsuperscript{206} Warren Kimball calls the Lend-Lease Act “undeclared economic warfare.” See Kimball, \textit{The Juggler}, 12.

\textsuperscript{207} Jonas, \textit{Isolationism in America}, 207.

\textsuperscript{208} Roosevelt said this in a fireside chat on December 29, 1940. Robert Osgood called it ”the most extreme statement of the American mission, in terms of a tangible commitment, ever suggested by anyone charged with the conduct of America’s foreign affairs.” Reynolds, \textit{From Munich to Pearl Harbor}, 107.
Wilson had been. It was FDR, in fact, who first suggested the idea of agreeing upon common war aims at the meeting in Placentia Bay on August 9, 1941, between him and Winston Churchill. Roosevelt was “anxious” to tie Churchill to American goals, so as not to fall into the Wilsonian trap of being accused of allying with European imperialists and anti-democrats. Indeed, Roosevelt had cabled Churchill on July 15 to ask, rather brazenly, that Britain “make no secret commitments to any of its Allies” without “the agreement of the United States.” Reynolds writes Roosevelt had been “disturbed” to receive no reply. Furthermore, the United States had wanted British agreement to a Lend-Lease “consideration” taking the form of British commitments to a liberalized regime of international trade, something British Treasury Representative John Maynard Keynes was opposed to. In Assistant Secretary of State Sumner Welles’ draft of common war aims presented to Churchill, Welles also insisted upon Britain conveying dominion status on India. Churchill’s reaction was not enthusiastic.

The eight point document known as the Atlantic Charter was distinctly American. The second article rejected territorial changes that did not “accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned”; the fourth contained a pledge that both governments would try to promote access by all states “on equal terms” to the world’s trade and raw materials; and there were references to other Rooseveltian ideas such as “freedom from want” and “freedom from fear.” Whereas Churchill argued that the Charter should only apply to Europe, FDR would state, after Pearl Harbor, that it applied to the entire world.

Like Woodrow Wilson, then, “Franklin Roosevelt wished to define the terms of an American peace,” and he wished to do so before the United States was a formal party to the war. The Four Freedoms as presented by Roosevelt in his State of the Union Address in January 1941 were “to apply everywhere in the world,” expressing what Reynolds

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210 Reynolds, *From Munich to Pearl Harbor*, 146; Dallek, *Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy*, 282.
211 Ibid., 147
213 Ibid., 148.
dubs “a globalist American ideology.” Against “hemispherism” FDR asserted that the age of airborne warfare invited the world to threaten America. These two issues were interconnected: The president argued that “only in a world in which American values reigned supreme could the United States feel secure.” Whereas authors have criticized FDR for not having a coherent vision of the postwar world, he did exhibit a global perspective on international events that was “distinctively Rooseveltian.” Warren Kimball characterizes FDR’s approach to the world as “Americanism” – that “city-on-a-hill/an-example-for-all-the-world-to-follow” perspective that sometimes necessitated force to get its point across.

**December 1941: Pearl Harbor and its significance**

George Kennan – and many others – have argued that the war was a conflict from which the United States had stayed aloof as long as it could, but was ultimately forced into by Pearl Harbor. Senator Arthur Vandenberg’s diary entry, stating that the attack on Pearl Harbor “ended isolationism for any realist,” is usually taken as evidence that Pearl Harbor was the event that vanquished isolationism.

After the fall of France in the summer of 1940, however, American involvement moved rapidly from benevolent neutrality to armed and active belligerency. Although measured, the destroyers-for-bases deal of September 1940 was a milestone in U.S. policy, Reynolds argues. It signaled a new commitment to Britain as America’s front line, and British resistance and egalitarian sacrifice during the Blitz “confirmed the impression [Roosevelt] wanted to convey of the country’s ideological compatibility with the values of Americanism.” This,
Robert Divine argues, was what marked the end of American neutrality, because from this time forward, “the United States was a nonbelligerent, not yet at war with Germany, but clearly aligned with Britain in the struggle against Hitler.” Anti-interventionists may have balked, but public opinion polls showed 70 percent support for the destroyers-for-bases deal.222

The Lend-Lease Act of March 1941 entailed the lending of munitions to those countries (Great Britain and China) whose survival was deemed to be in the U.S. national interest. During the spring and summer of 1941 Roosevelt extended U.S. naval operations in the Atlantic. On March 15, 1941, during the Battle of the Atlantic, the U.S. Atlantic Fleet was ordered to return to port and prepare for active duty. On April 20, Roosevelt outlined plans for four task forces to patrol the Atlantic in order to track U-boats and broadcast their locations to the British.223 From September 1941 FDR authorized the “shoot-on-sight” policy, conducting undeclared naval warfare in the Atlantic, making the United States in effect a cobelligerent.224 The U.S. Navy was helping escort British and Canadian convoys across most of the Atlantic, and in November Roosevelt secured a repeal of the key provisions of the Neutrality Act, including those that banned U.S. vessels from entering British ports.

In conclusion, arguments that have pointed solely to Pearl Harbor have exaggerated its significance. Placing it in its appropriate historical context shows that it was simply not the watershed event it was made out to be: American commitment to fighting the war (if necessary) solidified nearly a year and a half before Pearl Harbor.225 American military actions in the fall of 1941 constituted undeclared warfare. Of course, events were not simply a reflection of American actions. Hitler’s
unwillingness to provoke the United States also kept the United States from a formal – and premature – involvement in the war.\textsuperscript{226}

Here we shall suspend the historical narrative for a moment while discussing the issue of how to define “multilateralism” so as to be able to take us into the Second World War case study.

\textsuperscript{226} Doenecke, like Divine, criticizes the president for always leaving the initiative to the Axis – for “waiting to be pushed into the situation” as FDR told treasury secretary Henry Morgenthau Jr. See “The Roosevelt Foreign Policy: The Ambiguous Legacy,” 38.
Assessing the plausibility of the argument that the United States turned away from isolationism or unilateralism toward multilateral internationalism necessitates a discussion of what is meant by “multilateral.” As the previous chapters have argued, the debate over the legitimacy of a “turn-around” thesis of U.S. foreign policy hinges not on whether the United States turned from isolationism to internationalism – since the term “isolationism” is no longer used by historians of U.S. foreign relations – but rather on whether the United States turned from unilateral internationalism to multilateral internationalism. As my literature review will show, there is in fact much conceptual confusion surrounding this term, which is why this chapter will discuss what is meant by “multilateral” before we can proceed to the Second World War case study in the next chapter.

**Definitions**

“What is distinctive about multilateralism is not merely that it coordinates national policies in groups of three or more states,” argues political scientist John G. Ruggie, because this would mean mere nominal multilateralism. Rather, substantive multilateralism coordinates national policies “on the basis of certain principles of ordering relations
Indivisibility among the members of a collectivity refers to the range of behavior in question. Material things (such as railway lines) and immaterial things (such as peace) can be indivisible. Generalized rules of conduct simply mean that agreed upon rules apply to all members. This can be contrasted with interactions based on ad hoc bargaining or straightforward power politics. Thus, multilateralism entails some reduction in policy autonomy, since the choices and actions of the participating states are constrained by the agreed-upon rules and principles. Diffuse reciprocity refers to the expectation that members will receive roughly equal benefits over time (as opposed to immediate quid pro quo). Based on these principles, it is clear that — as Ruggie himself points out — “multilateralism is a highly demanding institutional form” and should be differentiated from bilateralism and imperialism. Imperialism is also an institution that organizes relations among three or more states, but it does so by “denying the sovereignty of the subject states.”

Building on this, fellow political scientist G. John Ikenberry argues multilateralism can be categorized based on what level of international order it operates on: system multilateralism, ordering or foundational multilateralism, and contract multilateralism:

**System multilateralism**
The Westphalian state system dating back to 1648 is multilateral at its most basic level, Ikenberry states, because it organizes the units (states) according to norms of sovereignty, formal equality, and legal-diplomatic practice. At this level there has been constant system multilateralism in international relations since the seventeenth century.
**Ordering multilateralism**

Multilateralism can also refer to the political-economic organization of regional or international orders. For instance, Ruggie names three institutional domains of interstate relations that can be multilateral: (1) international orders (such as an economic order or a security order); (2) international regimes (typically applying to a sector of an order); (3) international organizations (the physical or institutional manifestation of orders and regimes).\(^{232}\)

David Skidmore has a two-part definition of multilateralist foreign policies that would presumably apply to this level. A multilateralist foreign policy involves two crucial commitments on the part of cooperating states: (1) to invest in the creation and maintenance of international institutions that serve to facilitate coordination. This has to do with the inputs necessary to sustain international institutions. Institutional investment can take three principal forms: participating in the negotiations to establish multilateral procedures; provision of resources (contributions of money, soldiers, information, expertise etc.); and rhetorical support (public backing of the norms, principals, and goals of particular institutions).\(^{233}\) (2) To comply with the rules, norms, principles, and decision-making processes of these institutions on an equal basis with other states. This dimension of multilateralism has to do with institutional outputs—how institutions affect state behavior. Compliance involves not only the narrow question of whether a state is in violation of specific commitments but also whether a state seeks waivers, exemptions, veto or weighted voting privileges, or other prerogatives that allow it to more easily evade actual multilateral constraints. Thus, Skidmore argues, a state that subjects itself more fully to constraint is more genuinely multilateralist than one that consistently takes advantage of loopholes.

Skidmore’s definition is interesting because it gets to the principles associated with multilateral behavior rather than simply describing nominal multilateralism, which is not a “demanding institutional form.” As Ruggie himself argues, there is a difference between a “nominal” and a “qualitative” definition of multilateralism: a nominal

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definition would connote multinational cooperation, whereas a qualitative definition would connote multilateral cooperation.\textsuperscript{234}

**Contract multilateralism**

Multilateralism also refers to specific intergovernmental treaties and agreements, i.e. “contracts” among states. Ikenberry argues that the George W. Bush administration’s challenge to multilateralism mainly existed on this level because of its rejection of treaties (particularly in the areas of arms control and proliferation of nuclear weapons). Thus, while the Bush administration’s challenge to multilateralism was regrettable in the eyes of its allies, it was not a fundamental challenge to the concept of multilateralism, Ikenberry argues.

At the contract level, it should be fairly straightforward to determine whether a state is multilateral or not: did the state, after committing to a treaty, ratify and comply with it? If yes, then its behavior was multilateral on the contract level.

**Multilateralism across issue areas**

The issue of multilateralism is further complicated, however, when one standard definition is applied across issue areas. Multilateralism is perhaps easiest to define in economic affairs, where one can look at the rules agreed upon at Bretton Woods. As codified in the International Monetary Fund’s Articles of Agreement, monetary multilateralism traditionally has meant “the convertibility of national currencies on a non-discriminatory basis and rejection of the currency blocs and competitive devaluations that characterized the interwar period.”\textsuperscript{235} As stated in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), trade multilateralism has meant “application of the most-favored-nation principle on a non-discriminatory basis.”\textsuperscript{236}

In the political sphere, multilateralism is embodied in the universally accepted obligations contained in the UN Charter, the provisions of international treaties, and customary international law. Given the somewhat schizophrenic character of the Charter’s attitude toward the state, however, unilateralism is both absolutely prohibited (Article 25: obligation to carry out the decisions of the Security Council) and

\textsuperscript{234} Ruggie, “Multilateralism: Anatomy of an Institution,” 6. This corresponds to what William Diebold calls “formal” versus “substantive” multilateralism.


\textsuperscript{236} Ibid.
absolutely protected (Article 51: inherent right to self-defense; Article 2: sovereign equality and sanctity of domestic jurisdiction).  

Sarah Kreps argues that whereas multilateralism can be straightforwardly defined in economics or areas such as human rights treaties, there is in fact no good definition of multilateral military intervention. For instance, while Ruggie’s qualitative definition of multilateralism improves upon Robert Keohane’s nominal definition (“multilateralism entails the coordination of practices among three or more states”), it is, in fact, overly restrictive in the security realm, because it concedes too much power to formal institutional frameworks such as the United Nations in deciding what counts as multilateral or not. During the Cold War, for example, the United States (or any of the permanent members) would often avoid the UN Security Council because the UNSC might not decide in its favor. This caused states to seek legitimacy for their military interventions through other International Organizations (IOs) in order to obtain the stamp of “procedural” multilateralism, or to amass a robust coalition in order to obtain the stamp of “operational” multilateralism. Whereas these interventions would not be legal according to the UN Charter (unless, presumably, they were in accordance with Article 51), they might still be considered legitimately multilateral by the international community.  

This is the basis for her two-level definition of military multilateralism, which combines measures of procedural and operational multilateralism. First, Kreps codes an intervention as multilateral or unilateral on the procedural level (where a UN authorization would be the highest attainable IO sanction, but sanction from a regional organization could also be legitimate); and second, Kreps codes the intervention as multilateral or unilateral on the operational level. Was it truly a multilateral coalition or was the IO sanction merely cover for a largely unilateral operation? Using this combined measurement, Kreps finds that of the eighteen U.S. military interventions undertaken since 1945, half of them (nine cases) were completely unilateral (Lebanon 1958; Dominican Republic 1965; Vietnam 1965; Grenada 1983; Libya 1986; Panama 1989; Afghanistan/Sudan 1998; Iraq 1998; Iraq 2003); four instances were completely multilateral (Iraq

237 Ibid.  
239 Ibid.: 579.  
240 Ibid.: 586. An example of such an instance would be NATO’s Operation Allied Force against Yugoslavia in 1999.
1990–91; Bosnia 1993–95; Kosovo 1999; Haiti 2004); another four instances were procedurally multilateral (Korea 1950; Somalia 1992–93; Haiti 1994; Afghanistan 2001); and one instance was operationally multilateral (Lebanon 1982–84).

Ikenberry’s own codification of a multilateral scale of consultation among states in the event of a military intervention confirms Kreps’ argument that the lack of a standard definition of multilateral military interventions makes consistent scholarship difficult. Detailing the four ways in which the United States could potentially undertake military action, Ikenberry argues (1) that it could go it alone, without consulting others; (2) it could consult others, but then go it alone; (3) it could consult and take action with others, not on the basis of agreed-upon rules and principles that define the terms of its relationship with those others, but rather on the basis of the current situation’s needs; or (4) it could take action with others, on the basis of agreed-upon rules and principles. The first option is “clearly unilateral.” Then, Ikenberry argues, the second and third options “can be coded as multilateral.” However, would not the decision to invade Iraq in March 2003 be coded as a “3”? Would we classify this as a “multilateral” operation? Not according to Kreps, who, based on her two-level definition, codes the Iraq intervention as completely unilateral, despite its multinational coalition.

Multilateralism, the American way

Ruggie argues that in the American context, multilateralism can be understood as “an international order in which the United States seeks to institute and live by certain mildly communitarian organizing principles,” whereas unilateralism is “[an order] in which it avoids entanglement in any serious institutionalized commitments.” This seems to present a somewhat simplistic picture, especially since the United States was largely able to set the parameters for its own institutional commitments and define the organizing principles of this

241 Ibid. Notice that the 1999 Kosovo intervention is deemed to be fully multilateral despite the lack of a UNSC resolution.
242 Ikenberry, “Is American Multilateralism in Decline?” 547.
244 John Gerard Ruggie, Winning the Peace: America and World Order in the New Era (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 4–8. See also David M. Malone & Yuen Foong Khong, eds. Unilateralism and U.S. Foreign Policy, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), who define unilateralism as “a tendency to opt out of a multilateral framework (whether existing or proposed) or to act alone in addressing a particular global or regional challenge rather than choosing to participate in collective action.”
international order. Thus, one could say, the United States, while not avoiding international institutions in the 1940s, did manage to avoid significant entanglements in them. This is not to argue that the United States conspired to set up international institutions as tools in a plot to rule the world; nor do I argue that there were not commitments associated with this order, but rather that the United States set out to reform the world along its own ideational lines – economically and politically – while ensuring minimal (yet still existent) constraints for itself.

In cooperation with the Soviet Union and Great Britain, the United States set up an international order that was a concert of power at the great power level, and multilateral at the intermediate and small power levels. Ruggie is correct in pointing out how the exact principles that make up this order must in the end define the commitment of the participating states. The smaller participating states were not coerced or “duped” into this postwar order – as realist theories might argue – rather, the postwar order contained important benefits for the medium and small states, such as open markets guaranteed by a liberal hegemon; political representation in world forums; and – later in the process – security commitments for those who joined NATO.

I argue in the next chapter that the international order the United States helped create – although nominally multilateral and unquestionably beneficial to its adherents – failed to live up to the principles Ruggie and Ikenberry list as a necessary condition for substantive multilateralism. Thus, I argue, U.S. challenges to multilateralism are not only present at the contract level, as Ikenberry argues, but also at the foundational or ordering level. The U.S.-led postwar order was not communitarian. Had it been, the United States itself would probably not have joined, like in 1919. Rather, the postwar order was a multilateral order enacted by a hegemon – in other words, it was a mixed system.

Ikenberry’s distinction between “new” and old multilateralism highlights the tension inherent in his definition of “multilateral” and exemplifies my point. Ikenberry differentiates between “old multilateralism” – that of the 1940s – and “new multilateralism” – meaning embodying the principle of generalized rules of conduct – i.e. universalism. Indeed, this is his explanation for the post-Cold War struggle over the International Criminal Court. It was the ICC’s universal design that produced such skepticism in the administration of President Bill Clinton. While the treaty was being negotiated, the Clinton
administration lobbied for a UN Security Council veto-right on what cases were to be brought before the Court, seeking, in Ikenberry’s words, “to adopt the traditional postwar approach for multilateral agreements,” meaning the major powers should receive special opt-out and veto rights that make the binding obligations more contingent and subject to state review.245 Because the ICC did not afford such special treatment for the United States, it is an example of “new multilateralism,” defined by Ikenberry as offering “fewer opportunities for the United States to exercise political control over others and fewer ways to escape the binding obligations of the agreements.”246 So, whereas the United States was comfortable with “old” multilateralism of escape clauses, weighted voting, opt-out agreements and veto rights, it balked at the “new” multilateralism where the principle of “generalized rules of conduct” actually applies to all members, great power or not.

One might point to the post-World War II period as evidence that multilateralism has precedent in U.S. foreign policy (the objective argument) and that such an approach leads to positive results (the normative argument). Yet, as Ikenberry’s definitions exemplify, this exaggerates the degree to which U.S. foreign policy during this era was genuinely multilateralist in either theory or practice. In the wake of World War II, the United States took seriously the first of the two multilateralist commitments cited above (“input” multilateralism), but not the second (“output” multilateralism). In other words, the United States invested in the creation of international institutions, but postwar administrations were only loosely constrained by institutional rules and procedures.247 Thus, the U.S.-sponsored institutional order was designed to bind the behavior of other states, but not that of the United States itself, an approach to international order-building that is hegemonic rather than multilateral.248

Hegemony is a type of authority in which the privileged position of the leading state rests not upon coercion alone, but also upon the institutionalized consent of other states. As Bruce Cronin puts it, “hegemony is a form of leadership, not domination.”249 Rather than a

245 Ikenberry, “Is American Multilateralism in Decline?” 534. (My italics.)
246 Ibid.: 534.
247 But see Thomas Risse-Kappen, Cooperation among Democracies: The European Influence on U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), who argues that the United States did defer to its allies sometimes owing in part to a desire to keep the institutions going.
248 Skidmore, “Understanding the Unilateralist Turn in U.S. Foreign Policy”: 209.
traditional imperial power, the hegemon oversees relations between “consenting adults.” What it does not entail, is sovereign equality. One state is clearly more sovereign than all others, in that hegemony allows for a “broad and subtle penetration of economic and cultural practices and products across entire regions.” U.S. relative power capabilities in the 1940s unquestionably allowed for a wide action radius when designing the postwar order.

Historian Michael Hunt argues hegemony’s lack of coercion, diffuse sources of support, and amorphous territorial range distinguishes it from empire. Although fellow historian Charles Maier hedges on whether or not the United States can be categorized as an empire as of yet, he makes the valuable point that the distinction between hegemon and imperial power is a fragile one: “At best, hegemony seems potential empire, not just a high-minded renunciation of intervention.”

The fine line between hegemony and imperial power highlights the tensions in arguments about American multilateralism. The postwar institutions themselves allowed the United States a set of unique privileges (as well as obligations), meaning the rules governing the institutions had built-in legal asymmetry. While multilateralism arguably does not have to entail the equality of all states in terms of indivisibility, generalized rules of conduct, and diffuse reciprocity, this I contend not only violates the spirit of the definition of multilateralism utilized by scholars such as Ruggie and Ikenberry, it is also what

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250 Kennedy, “What Would Wilson Do?”
251 See Hunt, “Empire, Hegemony, and the U.S. Policy Mess.”
252 This is also acknowledged by Ikenberry, see for instance “Rethinking the Origins of American Hegemony,” Political Science Quarterly 104, no. 3 (Autumn, 1989): 375–400.
253 Maier, Among Empires, 63. Hunt argues for a distinction because of the lack of focused exercise of political and military power; of specific subordinate colonial or client regimes; and the presence of legitimacy. Geir Lundestad has argued that the United States did function as an “empire,” but that this only lasted approximately 30 years. In the 1970s, the U.S. lead over other powers had declined both militarily and, particularly important, economically, which resulted in a recalibration of multilateralism. See “Empire by Invitation? The United States and Western Europe, 1945–1952,” Journal of Peace Research 23, no. 3 (1986): 263–277. See also Christopher Layne, The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006) for a discussion of U.S. postwar hegemony from a neoclassical realist perspective.
underlies the critique of U.S. unilateralism which has been voiced ever since the postwar order was established.\textsuperscript{254}

Hegemony is more compatible with unilateralism than with multilateralism. Thus the United States became a member of the United Nations, which was not a purely multilateral organization. Rather, it was conceived as a power concert (the Security Council) placed atop a collective security organization.\textsuperscript{255}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{255} This is also something Ruggie has pointed out, yet does not seem to tease out the consequences of. See “Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution,” \textit{International Organization} 46, no. 3 (summer 1992): 587.
\end{itemize}
Chapter 4

Hegemony and multilateralism in the 1940s

When the United States government, prominently led by President Franklin D. Roosevelt, took it upon itself to re-organize the international order in the 1940s, the United States was necessarily undergoing a fundamental change. It was turning away from its previous history as isolationist or aloof, and accepting a new role in international politics as a multilateral team player. Regardless of how this turn-around came about (some argue it was because of the Soviet threat, others argue it was due to a change in American identity), the consensus in the history and political science literature is that the turn-around happened.

Contrary to this common assumption, I argue: (1) that the international order created by the United States during the war was compatible with unilateralism, not multilateralism, because it constructed a system based on hegemony; and (2) that the United States thus exhibited more continuity than change in its foreign policy posture in the first half of the twentieth century, explicitly rejecting a sharp turn-around in U.S. foreign policy.

This argument is slightly complex, as it involves a two-level analysis: on the domestic level, the American unilateral posture towards international relations changed less than has previously been argued; but on the international level a multilateral post-war order was constructed. Can both things be true? Yes, if we appreciate the extent to which

256 For the realist argument about the effects of the Soviet threat, see Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., “Unilateralism in Historical Perspective,” in Understanding Unilateralism in American Foreign Relations, Prins, ed., 23. For the constructivist argument about a change in identity, see Ruggie, “The Past as Prologue”, and Legro, Rethinking the World.

257 One of the classic examples of the turn-around thesis is provided by Divine, Second Chance. An updated and different take on this turn-around (focusing on international law and human rights) is Borgwardt, A New Deal for the World.
the United States was the hegemon presiding over a multilateral structure, as opposed to a country joining a multilateral framework (which would mean subjecting itself to the same rules as all other members). Whereas the United States created numerous international institutions, subsequent U.S. administrations were not constrained by these institutional rules and procedures to the same extent as other member states. In other words, the U.S.-sponsored institutional order was designed to bind the behavior of other states, but not that of the United States itself. It is important to point out that this does not mean ignoring the clear and important changes occurring in U.S. foreign policy from the 1930s to the 1940s. But focusing only on the difference between the Neutrality Acts of the 1930s and the commitment to international security that was made in 1940 presents a distorted picture of the foreign policy tradition that preceded the 1930s, as well as that which succeeded it.

I will now investigate the U.S. wartime planning for the postwar international order, examining the two main areas of multilateral institutions set up during the war: political multilateralism in the form of the United Nations, and economic multilateralism in the form of Bretton Woods. My conclusion is that these institutions, while reforming international politics, did not reform the United States fundamental skepticism of substantive multilateralism. Indeed, the United States only became a member of the United Nations because all of the objections and reservations Henry Cabot Lodge had voiced in 1919 had been addressed.

The second post-war order: hegemony versus multilateralism

Henry Luce, in an editorial for Life Magazine urging the United States to enter World War II, predicted the twentieth century would become known as the “American century.” The United States, apart from the duty to oppose Hitler, needed to take advantage of its “natural right” to order international affairs, Luce wrote. Indeed Americans had to accept “wholeheartedly our duty and our opportunity as the most powerful

258 Skidmore, “Understanding the Unilateralist Turn in US Foreign Policy”: 209.
259 A discussion of the postwar security cooperation set up in the form of NATO is not included here, due to issues of space.
and vital nation in the world,” he argued, “and in consequence to exert upon the world the full impact of our influence, for such purposes as we see fit and by such means as we see fit.” 260 Luce would not be disappointed. During the war the State Department, under the leadership of Secretary of State Cordell Hull, commenced strategic planning for the postwar order, producing drafts of the organizations the United States was to lead. Indeed, by 1945, Senator Alexander Wiley, Republican from Wisconsin, suggested that the United Nations was merely another experiment “in a long line of great American experiments.” 261

The second postwar order was indeed an American experiment, but not in the way other authors argue. The second postwar order was a reaffirmation of Lodgian internationalism, not a belated turn-around to Wilsonianism. In stark contrast to the League of Nations, the United Nations was anchored in America. Rather than mere formalities, the fact that the organization was located in the United States, relied on U.S. financing, and accepted U.S. direction sent a clear message: this was an American-led international order, not another League of Nations based out of Geneva. The reservations Lodge had demanded in 1919 in order to ratify the Treaty of Versailles were in place in 1945. 262

In brief, the United States sought, and got, to safeguard its unilateral tradition through the following general mechanisms: a veto over potential actions (through the veto in the Security Council or its share of votes in the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank); extensive assurances that the Senate (as opposed to the U.S. Ambassador to the UN, for example) would be able to veto or sanction U.S. actions in these institutions; the opportunity to exempt itself from jurisdiction (both in the case of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and from the UN Charter in general); or through non-participation all together (as with the International Trade Organization or human rights treaties such as the Convention to prevent Genocide, which the Senate rejected). This will be more fully explained in the case studies below.

The reason the United States was able to construct favorable conditions for itself in the institutional order was, in short, its status as hegemon. Due to the war’s heavy toll on the European allies, the United States would go from being one of the great powers to being

the greatest power. But hegemony is not merely a reflection of a country’s relative material power. It does not entail physical conquest, as with empires, but rather acknowledgement of hegemonic authority. Hegemonic leadership can only develop within a social environment with the consent of the broader community. Such a community provides permissive conditions in which hegemony can evolve – as happened during and immediately after the Second World War. More specifically, Ernst Haas defines hegemony as the “national capability to advance long-range views of world order … for the success of institutions charged with that task.”

This does not mean the United States endured no limits to its sovereignty, but rather that those specific limitations that were unacceptable to U.S. policymakers in 1919 were removed in 1945. Because of its position, the United States was afforded an opportunity to which it had aspired for quite some time: to re-organize international politics (and particularly European politics) according to American principles of leadership.

The second political postwar order: the United Nations and the International Court of Justice

The United Nations was, in a specific sense, shaped by the influence of American planning and leadership. The primacy of the United States in the postwar planning derived in part from America’s disproportionate military and economic power. It also derived in part from the worldwide prestige of America’s wartime President, Franklin D. Roosevelt, “whose ideological leadership of the drive to win the war and build a just and peaceful world order brought him recognition as the spiritual

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263 See Leffler, A Preponderance of Power, 1–3 for details on the comparative toll the war took on the Allies.
264 Cronin, “The Paradox of Hegemony.” See also Ikenberry “Rethinking the Origins of American Hegemony”: 375–400; Maier, Among Empires; Layne, The Peace of Illusions for a discussion of U.S. postwar hegemony from a neoclassical realist perspective. For a discussion of whether the United States was constituted an empire, see Lundestad, “Empire by Invitation?” and Michael Hunt, “Empire, Hegemony, and the U.S. Policy Mess.”
265 An example of such “permissive environment” would be Geir Lundestad’s “empire by invitation” argument, whereby the Western European states “invited” the United States into a dominant role due to fears of a resurgent Germany, a future threatening Soviet Union, and possible American abandonment.
267 Hegemony, as Ikenberry uses the term, does not exclude the possibility of the hegemon sometimes being constrained by the international institutions it sets up – it endures short-term losses for the sake of long-term gains. For example, Lodge was willing to join the League if Article 10 was eliminated; a League without Article 10 would still have constrained the United States to some extent.
father of the United Nations.”268 Perhaps most important, however, was the ever-present threat of a Senate veto. The U.S. position in these negotiations was complex; its troubled history with the League gave it more leverage over specific details of the new organization. The American proposals were a mix of national interests and principles of international organizations, aimed in part at preventing internal dissent – in other words, a Senate veto on U.S. membership. This created a situation where the foreign negotiators had to give weight not only to their own national interests, but also to the overarching interest of all parties present: that of ensuring American membership. It was this combination of factors which in Inis Claude’s opinion brought about the adoption of a Charter that was “fundamentally based upon principles advocated by the United States.”269 The threat of a Senate veto combined with the practical matter that the proposals worked out by the State Department during the war became the working draft of the preparatory Dumbarton Oaks Conference – and, by extension, the final San Francisco Conference – left a remarkable American stamp on the United Nations Organization.270

Early American preparation and the Dumbarton Oaks Conference

The early and detailed U.S. preparation for the Big Three conference at Dumbarton Oaks in 1944 and the general conference in San Francisco in 1945 would facilitate a deep U.S. influence over the subsequent international organization. In this process, the United States and its policymakers were careful not to sacrifice real sovereignty, unilateral maneuverability, and American leadership.

The United States started preparing for the postwar order earlier than Britain or the Soviet Union, beginning, as mentioned previously, before the United States was even party to the war. From December 27, 1939, when Secretary of State Cordell Hull created the Advisory Committee on Problems of Foreign Relations, designed to deal with all problems posed by the coming of peace, and until the U.S. delegation

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269 Ibid., 62.
left for San Francisco in the spring of 1945, the State Department went through innumerable committees and drafts on the postwar order. 271

By the end of April 1944 a “possible Plan for a General International Organization” had been completed by the United States. At this point, the British had only recently begun planning for the postwar world, and the Soviets seemed not to have given much thought to a postwar organization. 272 The American plan called for the creation of a universal organization with four principal organs: a General Assembly, an Executive Council, an International Court of Justice, and a General Secretariat. With some important modifications, this plan formed the basis of the draft charter that the State Department eventually presented at Dumbarton Oaks. 273

On April 25, 1944 Hull began a series of consultative meetings with selected senators, meeting four times over the next month. A possible contention over supplying troops to a future peacekeeping mission was muted by Hull’s assurance that any U.S. commitment would be submitted in advance for Senate approval. 274 Senator Arthur Vandenberg (R-MI) was worried about the possibility – seen from the vantage point of twenty years earlier – that the early creation of an organization would imply its use to maintain a “bad peace.” Senators Vandenberg and Robert La Follette (P-WI) – worried about the election year – refused to endorse the plan without the reservation that its ultimate acceptability depended upon the justness of the terms of the peace. 275

The “Big Three” met in Washington D.C. in August 1944 intent upon not creating another League of Nations. Common lessons learnt from the failure of the League were that the powerful nations, namely

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272 Indeed, British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden had remarked to Churchill that if Britain failed to develop its own framework for the postwar world, the consequence would be that “the United States makes a policy and we follow, which I do not regard as a satisfactory role for the British Empire.” British ideas on postwar organization only began to take shape during 1943, and Hilderbrand argues it does seem certain that no working plan or proposals had been formulated in the Kremlin by the end of 1943, either. See Dumbarton Oaks, 39, 44. Schlesinger writes that neither the Chinese, Russians nor the British seemed to take the preparatory work very seriously, but notes the British did prepare notations titled “Future World Organization.” See Act of Creation, 47.


274 Hilderbrand, Dumbarton Oaks, 57.

275 Ibid., 58; Vandenberg, Private Papers, 95–96, 101–107. Vandenberg was, however, impressed with how “conservative” this new organization was, “from a nationalist standpoint,” as the organization was “based virtually on a four-power alliance.”
United States and the Soviet Union, had to participate, (which at the San Francisco conference would give these two countries a veto power over the negotiations themselves).276

Difficult issues at Dumbarton included voting and veto rights in the Security Council (with the Soviets insisting on an absolute veto on all issues), disarmament, the creation of regional security organizations, and the requisition of bases for peacekeeping purposes. The U.S. delegates wanted to have it both ways on regional organizations: to make sure they were subordinate to the Security Council in principle, while in reality not allowing the Council to interfere in specific Western Hemisphere affairs. They also wanted to have it both ways on postwar bases and territorial trusteeships. The U.S. delegation was looking to use the authority of the new world organization to permit the U.S. military to take over strategic islands in the Pacific.277 The British found this hypocritical – the United States, in their opinion, was seeking to avoid the taint of imperialism, all the while taking on an imperial role in the Pacific.278

The issue of voting and vetoing in the Security Council was also complicated. The Soviets insisted on an absolute veto, but, as Secretary of State Cordell Hull wrote in his memoirs, “We were no less resolute than the Russians in aiming to secure a veto on any possible enforcement action.”279 The Big Three part of Dumbarton Oaks ended without agreement on the veto issue (along with certain other issues).280 The Dumbarton Oaks plan was released as scheduled on October 9, 1944, with an accompanying communiqué that revealed little of the tension among the delegates. It said only that the attached plan indicated a framework of basic agreement among the Big Four (United States, Britain, Soviet Union, and China) to be followed by more complete proposals to serve as a basis of discussion at a full United Nations

276 Hilderbrand, Dumbarton Oaks, 2.
277 Ibid., 170
278 Ibid., 171.
279 Quoted in Stewart, The Best Laid Plans, 75.
280 The next part of the conference would involve the Chinese and not the Soviets, who had refused a meeting including them.
conference in San Francisco. The remaining issues were supposed to be settled at the Big Three summit at Yalta in February 1945.

**San Francisco**

Although the U.S. draft of the world organization underwent considerable changes at Dumbarton and San Francisco, “the substance of the provisions finally written into the Charter in many cases reflected the conclusions reached at much earlier stages by the United States Government.”

That Senate ratification, rather than general public appeal, was the main concern of the U.S. delegation in San Francisco is supported by the fact that there were several instances where positions worked out by the State Department (and agreed upon at Dumbarton) were changed by the U.S. delegation to San Francisco with the specific aim of facilitating Senate ratification of the treaty. In fact, writing to his wife after Senate confirmation of the United Nations Charter in July 1945, Senator Vandenberg noted that “the things we did at Frisco to remove potential Senate opposition have paid rich dividends.”

The International Court of Justice (ICJ) provides a good example. Whereas the State Department originally had agreed to give the ICJ “compulsory jurisdiction” over questions that might otherwise be considered “domestic,” the experienced congressional members on the U.S. delegation quickly squashed this. The Senate had already rejected the World Court in the 1930s; it would not hesitate to do so again. In fact, whereas the State Department originally had drafted a version of an “updated” League World Court (which was adopted by the Committee of Jurists meeting before San Francisco as their working

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282 The fiercest battle was over the veto and the so-called “x-matter” (the name Stettinius gave to Ambassador Andrei Gromyko’s idea that sixteen Soviet republics be admitted as individual members to the United Nations). They finally decided that the permanent members of the Security Council could not veto the discussion of a dispute to which they were a party, or veto recommendations of peaceful settlement to such a dispute. No actual enforcement could be undertaken without the concurrence of all permanent members, however. Only White Russia (Belarus) and the Ukraine would be admitted as individual members. See Russell, *A History of the United Nations Charter*, 533; Hilderbrand, *Dumbarton Oaks*, 253.
284 Members of the U.S. delegation to San Francisco were: Senator Arthur Vandenberg (exemplifying the Wilsonian lesson of not excluding the Republicans from the negotiations) and Senator Connally, along with Dean Virginia Gildersleeve of Barnard College (a link to women’s groups and the educational community); Naval Lt. Commander Harold Stassen; Congressman Sol Bloom (D) of the Foreign Affairs Committee; Congressman Charles Eaton (R) and a member of the delegation but not present due to ill health: Cordell Hull, replaced by Edward Stettinius as Secretary of State in November 1944.
paper), the U.S. delegation objected to keeping the League’s Court at all. It was thought that establishing a new Court would facilitate Senate acceptance, which is also what happened – testifying to the power of the silent threat of a Senate veto.\textsuperscript{286}

Despite the numerous committees at the conference – and mimicking Dumbarton Oaks – the real center of gravity at San Francisco was Secretary of State Edward Stettinius’ penthouse suite at the Fairmont Hotel. Here the heads of the Big Four delegations met each evening to discuss what changes they would permit in the blueprint agreed upon at Dumbarton Oaks.\textsuperscript{287} The main balancing act for the U.S. delegation at San Francisco was trying to satisfy calls for “internationalism as well as for nationalism.”\textsuperscript{288} In general, Washington sided with Moscow more than with the smaller member states during the negotiations. The most serious as well as dramatic controversy at San Francisco occurred over the Yalta voting provisions giving the permanent members a veto. In the end, in order to get it through the conference, the great powers had to state quite frankly that unless the Yalta formula – as interpreted by them – was accepted, there would be no world organization. This was accompanied by a less open controversy among the (now) Big Five (adding France) over the interpretation of the Yalta voting compromise.\textsuperscript{289} This was resolved only by the other powers refusing to accept the Soviet position (which sought to make the veto absolute, applicable even to the initial discussion of a case by the Security Council).\textsuperscript{290} Senator Vandenberg opposed having a veto on pacific-settlement issues, but he himself recognized that the stronger the veto, the better chance of a Senate ratification.\textsuperscript{291}

The San Francisco conference ended in late June 1945, two months after it started. Virtually all decisions had gone in favor of the position of the U.S. delegation: a Security Council controlled by the five allies, a weaker General Assembly, a malleable Secretariat and military commission (soon immobilized by the Cold War). To the regret of many states present, the majority voted to establish a new court with a new

\textsuperscript{287} Vandenberg, \textit{The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg}, 175; Schlesinger, \textit{Act of Creation}, 114.
\textsuperscript{288} Ostrower, \textit{The UN and the US}, 30; Thomas M. Campbell, “Nationalism in America’s UN Policy, 1944–1945,” \textit{International Organization} 27, no. 1 (winter, 1973)
\textsuperscript{289} France would join the Big Four in May 1945, making the group the Big Five.
\textsuperscript{291} Vandenberg, \textit{The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg}, 200. The veto controversy was in the end resolved in favor of Vandenberg’s position, who had labored hard to prevent a veto on discussion of conflicts (but not enforcement). See also Schlesinger, \textit{Act of Creation}, 121.
name (International Court of Justice), and it was voted that the Court should have optional, as opposed to compulsory, jurisdiction over international disputes. On regional organizations, the U.S. delegation (or rather, the congressional and military members of the delegation) had succeeded in safeguarding the inter-American system and the Monroe Doctrine. 292 Whereas State Department planner Leo Pasvolsky pointed to the difficulty of granting autonomy to regional blocs (how could the United States protect its bloc interests in the Western Hemisphere without granting the Soviets the same role in Europe?), the Anglo-American proposal at San Francisco whereby nations in concert would have the right to take collective defensive actions without having to get prior approval by the Security Council had a rather successful fate: it was written into the UN Charter as Article 51. 293

In the security realm, neither the United States nor the Soviet Union had any intention of subjecting national policy, especially in the event of some future dispute, to the collective control of either small countries or of other major powers. 294 In essence, “armed with the veto, the Americans never relinquished real authority.” 295 The Security Council membership and veto ensured full control over the organization and its possible security actions. Indeed, the absence of a veto in the Security Council would probably have prevented Senate approval of the charter. As John Morton Blum notes, the Republicans had consistently “demanded the retention of national sovereignty, an objective to which many Democrats also subscribed, as did most of the American people.” 296

Thomas Campbell has argued that it was because of pressure from U.S. military spokesmen that the end result of San Francisco entailed a stronger emphasis on national sovereignty. Campbell argues this is evident in the veto; the opening for large nations to take security measures through regional organizations without having to obtain prior Security Council approval; and a significant dilution of the trusteeship system. It seems likely, however, that the strong voice and involvement of the congressional members on the U.S. delegation successfully

292 Campbell, “Nationalism in America’s UN Policy, 1944–1945”: 37.
293 Ibid., 40–42.
296 John Morton Blum, V was for Victory, 313–314.
safeguarded any national sovereignty on the part of the United States, as opposed to solely a military influence.297

Senate ratification

President Harry Truman personally delivered the Charter to the presiding officer of the Senate on July 2, 1945 hoping for ratification before he went to the Potsdam Conference in mid-July. He made the following clear to the Senate, with an eye to its ratification history: “The choice before the Senate is now clear. The choice is not between this Charter and something else. It is between this Charter and no Charter at all.”298 The Committee on Foreign Relations began hearings on July 9. Former Secretary of State Stettinius (he resigned on June 27) opened the hearings by submitting his lengthy official report, and Republican adviser John Foster Dulles closed the hearings, emphasizing the bipartisan character of support for the United Nations. All witnesses stressed the need to ratify without reservations.299

The most significant aspect of the report from the Committee on Foreign Relations was its underlining of the freedom of action left the United States under the Charter.300 Specifically, several issues that had featured prominently in Senator Lodge’s reservations more than twenty years earlier were explicitly cared for: the right of withdrawal; the jurisdiction of the organization; the Monroe Doctrine; and of course, the issue of collective security as stated in the Covenant’s Article 10. Each will be considered in turn.

Lodge’s first reservation had related to Article 1, paragraph 3, of the Covenant, which provided for withdrawal after two years’ notice and after fulfillment of certain obligations. Lodge’s reservation would have excluded any jurisdiction by the League and established the United States as the sole judge of whether its obligations to the League had been fulfilled.301 The UN Charter, on the other hand, contained no regulations with respect to withdrawal. The right to withdraw was explained to be absolute at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings in 1945, with the only possible effect being “adverse public

297 Campbell, “Nationalism in America’s UN Policy, 1944–1945”: 28.
300 Schlesinger, Act of Creation, 272.
opinion” in Senator Vandenberg’s perspective. The right to withdrawal was thus fully in line with Lodge’s first reservation, and in fact went beyond it. First, the Charter did not make withdrawal contingent upon fulfillment of a member’s obligations, and second, there was no time interval stated.302

The fourth reservation of Senator Lodge referred to Article 15, paragraph 8, of the League Covenant. Its purpose was to reserve to the United States “exclusively, the right to decide what questions are within its domestic jurisdiction.” In contrast, Article 2, paragraph 7, of the UN Charter contained a sweeping reservation, embracing the whole field of action by the UN, ensuring that it would be up to each member state whether to submit a case for consideration or arbitration by the UN.303 Whereas the Covenant attempted to strike a balance between state sovereignty and collective security, the UN Charter’s Article 2, paragraph 7, safeguarded the discretionary elements of sovereignty at the expense of collective security. Here, “the Charter may be said to be fully in line with the principle of Senator Lodge’s fourth Reservation.”304

The fifth Lodge reservation had related to Article 21 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, which was intended to safeguard the validity of regional understandings such as the Monroe Doctrine. Whereas this article had been inserted at the request of Woodrow Wilson, Lodge construed it to mean that Wilson had submitted the Monroe Doctrine to the jurisdic tion of the League, and his reservation was intended to remove this danger.305 In 1945, however, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee declared that “both the Monroe Doctrine and the inter-American system are effectively safeguarded under the Charter” and indeed that “the basic purposes of both will be strengthened by the establishment of the organization.”306 No explicit reference to the Monroe Doctrine had been included in the Charter, but both Connally and Dulles said at the hearings that the Monroe Doctrine survived the

302 Ibid.: 545.
304 Ibid.: 543. The UN’s Article 2, paragraph 7 stated: “Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.” Chapter VII concerned “Action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression.” See Charter of the United Nations, online.
Charter intact. As with so many other issues, however, the Security Council veto would ultimately enable complete U.S. control of the interpretation and execution of the Monroe Doctrine.307

Lodge’s most controversial reservation pertained to the Covenant’s Article 10, the “cornerstone” of the League.308 Article 10 entailed the negative duty to respect, and the positive duty to protect, the territorial integrity and the political independence of member states. Senator Lodge raised no objection to the first part, but the second part was immediately controversial in Congress, with some seeing it as an automatic duty to assist victims of aggression, others seeing it as defense of the territorial status quo.309 The UN Charter in fact contained no single provision comparable to the Covenant’s Article 10. Article 10’s first negative duty was implicit in the Charter’s Article 2, but efforts aimed at including a specific statement on the respect for member’s territorial integrity and political independence failed at the San Francisco conference.310

The late Senator Lodge’s overall objective with his reservations twenty-five years earlier had been to make the League “safe” for the United States to join. This was exactly what the Roosevelt administration had attempted to do, and the Truman administration succeeded in doing. As John Foster Dulles expressed in hearings to the Foreign Relations Committee, “the document before you charts a path with which we can pursue joyfully and without fear. Under it, we remain the masters of our own destiny.”311 Whereas in 1919, the Senate Committee had recommended ratification of the Covenant of the League of Nations after recommending a long series of amendments and reservations, this time, by a vote of 21–1, the Committee recommended unqualified ratification.312 After a week of debate, the Senate voted on July 28 to ratify the Charter 89-2. It seems fair to conclude that the fact that so much in the way of specific commitments was

308 For a discussion on Lodge’s reservations in general and article 10 in particular, see Ambrosius, Woodrow Wilson and the American Diplomatic Tradition, esp. ch. 6, “The question of control at home and abroad,” and Thomas Knock, To End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson and a Quest for a New World Order (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), esp. ch. 12, “A Practical Document and a Humane Document.” Ambrosius is generally more favorable toward Lodge, whereas Knock is more favorable toward Wilson.
310 Ibid.: 548.
311 Ibid.: 532.
312 Senator Hiram Johnson (R-CA) provided the dissenting vote. He would become hospitalized later, and was unable to attend the general Senate vote. Schlesinger, Act of Creation, 272.
either left to the future (as the military agreements), or surrounded by the safeguard of reservations (such as in the cases of domestic and compulsory jurisdiction), or dependent on specific United States concurrence (as with the veto in the Security Council) contributed to obtaining strong Senate support. As stated by Dulles before the Foreign Relations Committee, the Charter “engages our Nation to honorable cooperation for peace and justice and, at the same time, protects those precious American traditions of which the Senate is our principal custodian.” Dulles thus correctly indicated the reasons for why the Senate approved the Charter without reservations and almost without dissent: unilateral internationalism had been preserved. 313

Results: another “Great American Experiment”

“At its inception, American leaders viewed the institution both as the custodian for maintaining a favorable postwar order and as an important tool for exercising U.S. leadership,” Bruce Cronin argues. 314 State Department planners viewed the organization as being at the heart of its program to institutionalize American leadership and political values in the new postwar order.

The United States became a member of the United Nations because it was a “non-coercive” organization 315 Whereas the League could be classified as a “coercive” type of international security organization (because Articles 10 and 16 were intended to impose upon its members the obligation to employ force in certain cases), Senator Lodge’s reservations would have transformed the League into a “non-coercive” or “intermediate” type organization. A “non-coercive” organization would entail no such obligations and an “intermediate” type organization would entail the obligation to consult, with possible result of sanctions. 316 The UN in general conforms to an intermediate type organization, but with one important exception: that of its permanent members. The consultation required by the Charter and the principle of unanimity in the Security Council precludes any action taken against a permanent member, such as the United States.

316 Ibid.
The second economic postwar order

The story of economic multilateralism is usually assumed, rather than explicated: the United States set up rules and institutions explicitly limiting national sovereignty in economic issue areas – how could it not be a prime example of the multilateral turn-around? As usual, this misses the extent to which the United States, as the originator of these rules and institutions, set the parameters of cooperation and non-cooperation. The conventional puzzle is usually presented in the following manner: why, if the United States shunned away from organizing the international political economy in the 1930s, would the United States do it after World War II? Apart from the puzzle’s somewhat biased nature (the United States certainly attempted to organize the international political economy in the 1920s, but not in the early 1930s), G. John Ikenberry provides the answer: “As the world’s dominant state, the United States championed GATT and the Bretton Woods institutions as a way of locking other countries into an open world economy that would ensure massive economic gains for itself.”

There was never any doubt, in Washington or abroad, that the Bretton Woods system was designed to serve the long-term interests of the United States. In general, the foreign leaders accepted the theory that what was good for America would be good for the world; “that the world would benefit from the responsible and generous position to which the United States had committed itself,” which is, of course, how hegemony works. The economic postwar order was a fortuitous combination of the U.S. national interest coinciding with the general interest of the world, as American (and indeed foreign) policymakers saw it. For instance, while Secretary Hull’s quest for a British pledge to abandon restrictive trade practices would open the British Empire to American exports, it would also end artificial impediments to peaceful commercial competition (which Hull believed would supplant aggressive competition between nations). The most interesting aspect of

317 This is the puzzle posed by Legro to realist theorists.
320 Eckes, A Search for Solvency, 39.
the U.S. postwar economic planning process, however, was perhaps the changing of the guard of the two economic hegemons – the United States subtly and sometimes not so subtly wrestling away the City of London’s imperial status as overseer of the world economy.\footnote{Ruggie has dubbed the postwar economic order one of “embedded liberalism”: the reconciliation of markets with the values of social community and domestic welfare. See John Gerard Ruggie, “Embedded liberalism and the postwar economic regimes,” in Constructing the World Polity. See also Abdelal, Capital Rules, 7.}

**Changing of the guard**

The preliminary discussions on the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (the World Bank) between the United States and Great Britain were dominated by the Americans, and much resented by the British. The Americans would dominate the ensuing process of accommodation, as the United States would emerge from the war with huge accumulations of gold and credits, and with undamaged industrial facilities of demonstrated productivity.\footnote{Blum, V was for Victory, 307.} Dean Acheson, then Assistant Secretary of State, thought “there is a rather pathetic feeling on the part of the British that we really are going to write the ticket, and all they want is a chance to go over it with us, pointing out their views, and to be allowed to come in on the formulation from the start.” In other words, they wanted the appearance of being treated as equals, and that was all they got.\footnote{Eckes, A Search for Solvency, 61. See also Blum, V was for Victory, 307; James Chace, Acheson: The Secretary of State who Created the American World (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1998), 89.}

At the Atlantic Conference in August 1941, the Americans insisted on a broad postwar commitment from the British to grant the United States commercial access to the Empire, regardless of the Imperial Preference System.\footnote{Kimball, The Juggler, 189.} This was a continuation of the Lend-Lease Agreement, which stated in its Article VII that if Britain ended its Imperial Preference System, it would not have to repay its Lend-Lease goods. Upon being presented with Article VII, John Maynard Keynes had lambasted it as “the lunatic proposals of Mr. Hull.”\footnote{Chace, Acheson, 90.} Ironically, while negotiating with Britain in an effort to get the old hegemon to relinquish its imperial preference system, the new hegemon was negotiating “the equivalent of imperial preference arrangements with the Philippines and Cuba.”\footnote{Borgwardt, A New Deal for the World, 254.}
This is not to say that the economic postwar order was a pernicious plan on the part of the Americans, but rather to note the reality of relative power.

The American negotiators, in short, led by Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau and Secretary of State Cordell Hull, looked forward to American leadership in the Fund and the Bank, to a consequent diminution of the British voice and share in world trade, and to the continuing position, achieved during the war, of New York as the capital city of world finance.\(^{327}\)

The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank

On the whole the new hegemon’s plans always prevailed: The charter for the International Monetary Fund aggrandized the role of the dollar among currencies, which was the intention of the United States Treasury and Congress. In fact, in joining the Fund, members would not give up sovereignty to the Fund but rather to the United States, “for this country would have a veto over exchange-rate variations and access to international reserves.”\(^ {328}\) American proposals, resources, and influence dominated the World Bank as well. The World Bank design appeared to subordinate Anglo-American arrangements to multilateral co-operation in postwar economic affairs, but the “internationalism associated with the multilateral emphasis was superficial.”\(^ {329}\)

Morgenthau was the president of the Bretton Woods Conference, held in July 1944 at a mountain resort in New Hampshire. The recommendations serving as the base for the conference had been worked out by the U.S. Treasury weeks earlier.\(^ {330}\) The conference structure, while “nominally democratic,” ensured that no plan for currency stabilization and reconstruction assistance would work without support from the United States delegation.\(^ {331}\)

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\(^{327}\) Hull was a well-known classical liberalist, convinced that “unhampered trade dovetailed with peace; high tariffs, trade barriers, and unfair economic competition, with war.” Morgenthau was more of a traditional New Deal liberal, and their views were not always overlapping. In fact, they engaged in a degree of inter-departmental competition for control over the economic postwar planning. Whereas the State Department took the lead in commercial policy, formulating policies that would culminate in the Charter for the International Trade Organization (ITO) and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), Treasury took the initiative in international monetary policy, which culminated in the IMF and the WTO. Hull quoted in Eckes, *A Search for Solvency*, 34; 57; see also Stewart, *The Best Laid Plans*, 110.

\(^{328}\) Eckes, *A Search for Solvency*, 49; see also Blum, *V was for Victory*, 308.

\(^{329}\) The idea of the World Bank was essentially developed by Morgenthau’s assistant, Harry Dexter White. Quote from Blum, *V was for Victory*, 308.

\(^{330}\) Eckes, *A Search for Solvency*, 137. Keynes’ involvement was also keenly felt; he and Morgenthau’s assistant, Harry Dexter White, had authored the joint statement of principles on the fund, which had paved the way for final consideration of the bank.

\(^{331}\) Ibid., 138.
As with the negotiations at San Francisco a year later, the U.S. delegation at Bretton Woods kept a keen eye on the future Senate ratification process. When Keynes, in an effort to “secure at least a semblance of parity for Britain in the postwar economic structure” argued that at least one of the two institutions should have its headquarters in London, the American delegation refused to yield because it “seemed likely to spark a controversy in Congress.”\footnote{Ibid., 146.} Indeed, Congress would eventually defeat the idea agreed upon at Bretton Woods for a comparable international institution for trade (the later proposed International Trade Organization (ITO)) – “the cornerstone” of Truman’s global commercial multilateralism. The ITO Charter, while repeatedly submitted to Congress, was never approved.\footnote{This despite the fact that Truman submitted it after the election in November 1948, returning Democrats to a majority in both houses, and that he submitted it as a joint resolution – only requiring a majority to pass – as opposed to a treaty. Stewart, The Best Laid Plans, 250.} Conservative economic nationalists, such as Senator Robert Taft (R-OH), Senator Eugene Millikin (R-CO), and Speaker of the House Joseph Martin (R-MA) argued against it based on the fear that the ITO would have jurisdiction over domestic economic issues. The U.S. private sector, on the other hand, argued against it because the final agreement negotiated at Havana had allowed for the possibility of discriminating against U.S. goods and investment.\footnote{Ibid., 256–257.} Finally, on December 6, 1950, President Truman announced that he would no longer seek Congressional approval of the ITO Charter. The ITO was replaced by GATT (which had been negotiated as a temporary means of liberalizing trade while the ITO was being developed) which meant that a “bilateral-multilateral” approach, as opposed to a straightforward multilateral approach, would be the solution to postwar economic cooperation. The fact that GATT was an informal arrangement among contracting parties, as opposed to a supranational organization, made it more palatable to Congress.\footnote{Ibid., 256–257.}

While on the surface the Bretton Woods institutions remained independent of its members, the manner in which the IMF and the World Bank were to be financed by those members made them highly susceptible to U.S. influence, because of its relative wealth. The United States had just over a third of the voting power in each institution in

\footnote{Ibid., 258, 260. It is also important to note that ITO/GATT happened much later, after the war had ended, and after the Cold War had started. Stewart argues that the Marshall Plan and GATT became elements of a strategy of “economic security,” as contrasted with Hull’s earlier vision of global peace facilitated by open trade.}
1945, giving it not the power of a majority, but rather that of a veto-proof share of votes.\textsuperscript{336} Whereas the funding structure of the World Bank is different from the Fund, the same principle applies: the United States’ contributions provide it with a veto-secure share of votes.\textsuperscript{337}

This is not to say the IMF and the World Bank are “controlled” by the United States. Because of the manner in which their financial structure was set up at Bretton Woods, U.S. influence over these institutions is indirect. In essence, the important share of votes held by the United States since the beginning has allowed for significant behind-the-scenes influence. And U.S. influence has been keenly felt not only through the financial structure, but also in the way the institutions are staffed and managed. Senior managers in both institutions would almost never present to the board a proposal that risked U.S. disapproval. In fact, these managers would never have been appointed in the first place had the United States disapproved.\textsuperscript{338}

But this is not simply an argument about material self-interest advanced through the benefits of power asymmetries in institutional structures.\textsuperscript{339} No one would be surprised that the most powerful country attempts to secure benefits for itself. The way in which the United States built its new “constitutional order” (as Ikenberry calls it) reflected its wish to lead, but in a unilateral manner, not in a multilateral one, as Ruggie and Ikenberry argue. From the Open Door to the Bretton Woods regime, the United States pushed for its own style of capitalism to be adopted by other countries, not due to sinister motives but rather because it desired “to replicate its own understanding of macroeconomic theory and its normative preferences with regard to the international economy,” thinking it was offering the world the best economic system. That U.S. dominance has served to shift the agendas

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{337} The World Bank does not rely on direct contributions from its member governments, but the United States contributes 16.98 percent of the capital stock which the Bank uses as a basis for raising money in financial markets. As Woods writes, the “annual subscriptions of members account for less than 5 percent of the Bank’s funds, of which the U.S. subscription grants it 16.52 percent of votes on the Bank’s Board and a veto over policy decisions requiring 85 percent majority, as with the IMF. Furthermore, like the IMF, the World Bank has become susceptible to more direct US influence as its activities and resources have expanded.” See ibid., 100–101.
\item \textsuperscript{338} Ibid., 113.
\item \textsuperscript{339} For a classic statement of this realist logic, see John J. Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” \textit{International Security} 19, no. 3 (winter, 1994–1995): 5–49.
\end{itemize}
of international financial and development institutions toward economic neo-liberalism should come as no surprise.340

The economic international engagement of the United States after World War II was then, because of its economic superiority and the rules it created, destined to be rather beneficial to it. As the twentieth century progressed, the economic superiority of the United States would gradually decrease relative to its competitors. Not surprisingly, when the American economy was experiencing great difficulty during the Vietnam War, President Richard Nixon unilaterally and without consultation with the other members of the international monetary system canceled the Bretton Woods system in 1971 and stopped the direct convertibility of the United States dollar to gold, making this act known as the “Nixon shock.” The “economic Pax Americana” that Bretton Woods had initiated seemed to be over.341

Conclusion and re-statement of the argument

the point of the case study above has been to argue that the United States changed less than what is commonly argued when it built the international order during the Second World War.

In repudiating the turn-around thesis, I point out the following: the thesis boils down to an assumption that in 1919 the United States spurned international organizations, whereas in 1945 it joined them. While obviously true, this simplifies the story to a degree where it distorts it, because 1945 was significantly different from 1919.342 Wilson failed to convince a critical mass of his fellow politicians that he, in fact, had obtained sufficient unilateral maneuverability for his country. In contrast, the Roosevelt administration had taken care to “keep from the Charter all the important matters to which the majority of the Senate, in voting on the Covenant with the Lodge Reservations

340 Foot et al. eds., US Hegemony, 18. See also Borgwardt, A New Deal for the World, 256. But see Ruggie, International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order,” International Organization 36, issue 2, International Regimes (spring, 1982): 379–415. Ruggie argues that the United States allowed more social democracy in Europe than it practiced itself because Europeans insisted on it – in other words, it was constrained by demands coming from its allies. But this is exactly my point: the main concern for the United States was to preserve its own sovereignty and maneuverability, which is why Congress defeated the Charter of International Trade Organization.

341 Eckes’ term. See A Search for Solvency, 284.

342 This is not to say actual membership was not very meaningful to U.S. allies, who in the 1940s got commitments from the most powerful nation in the international system. But this change in outcome does not correspond to a change in the U.S. domestic level foreign policy tradition.
on March 19, 1920, had taken exception.”343 The United States was reaffirming Lodgian unilateral internationalism, while repudiating Wilsonian multilateralism.344 We should thus move away from the black-and-white depiction of the United States as “unilateral” and “aloof” before World War II and “multilateral” after it.

The turn-around thesis often describes both the increased level of multilateral cooperation at the international level as well as a domestic foreign policy transformation on the part of the United States. Unquestionably, there were important differences on both the domestic and the international level between the 1930s and the 1940s, especially in terms of formal American security commitments. Perhaps conflating somewhat the new developments in the international system with domestic developments in American foreign policy, political scientists such as Ikenberry, John G. Ruggie, and Jeffrey Legro exaggerate the American commitment to multilateralism.345 I argue it is problematic to equate an international multilateral order with an American-led hierarchical order. Essentially, the thesis of an American foreign policy turn-around overplays both the historic aloofness prior to the 1940s as well as the multilateral commitment made during those years.

As I have also tried to show, the analysis of the two world war case studies is complicated by conceptual confusion, partly because authors use internationalism and multilateralism interchangeably, partly because “multilateral” is poorly defined. For example, the point is not, as Jeffrey Legro argues, that there was a conversion from unilateralism to internationalism during the Second World War, as these are not contradictory categories of foreign policy behavior.346 Indeed, the term “internationalism” is, at best, confusing, in this story, because the United States was always internationalist. Ikenberry argues that the United States would concede to postwar restraints on sovereignty because it “operates” in a “loose” multilateral order. Herein lies the fundamental challenge I pose to Ikenberry, Ruggie, Legro and other scholars who argue for the “great multilateral turn-around of 1945.” The United States created a nominally multilateral order with itself as hegemon in 1945. This order consisted of a plethora of institutions and rules – this

345 Ikenberry, ibid.; Ruggie, ibid.; Legro, Rethinking the World.
346 Ibid.
is indisputable. What is also indisputable is that this order was not meant to restrict the United States to any significant degree – it was hegemonic, hierarchical, and “loose” as Ikenberry points out. States did not coordinate their policies on the basis of equality, but rather on the basis of the benefits the United States provided. Allied states sanctioned special prerogatives for the United States within the postwar institutional matrix in return for a stable, hegemonic system. In some cases, the very design of international institutions specified and legitimated special American rights and exceptional privileges. In other cases, the United States simply bypassed normal institutional channels or intentionally weakened the authority of various international institutions to avoid challenges to American freedom of action.

Thus, whereas there clearly were large-scale changes in international organization and U.S. commitments to its allies during the 1940s, then, there was no need for a wholesale transformation of the fundamental strategy of American foreign policy, as the emerging institutional order comportted with an American design and limited U.S. sovereignty only to a pre-determined and acceptable degree. When this international order overstepped the boundaries set up by its creator, the United States would distance itself from it, as seen during the Cold War and beyond.

I argue that the United States allowed itself to partake in an international order the second time round not because of a turn-around to multilateralism, but rather; because the objections Henry Cabot Lodge had presented against the League in 1919 were all accounted for with the United Nations in 1945, thus making American leadership compatible with the historic tradition of unilateralism. The turn-around then – such as it was – becomes a limited thesis of U.S. commitment to specific international institutions, rather than a positing of fundamental change in the American outlook on how to engage with the world.

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347 Ikenberry makes the point that the institutionalization of U.S. power is what made the order “safe” for the smaller states to join in. But the smaller states were not concerned with domination, they were concerned with abandonment, as Ikenberry himself states. This seems to open Ikenberry’s argument up to some logical challenges.

Chapter 5

Conclusion: change versus continuity

America stands alone as the world’s indispensable nation.

Bill Clinton.349

Ours is the cause of human dignity; freedom guided by conscience and guarded by peace. This ideal of America is the hope of all mankind.

George W. Bush.350

In 1948, George Kennan wrote to Secretary of State George C. Marshall that “[w]e have about 50% of the world’s wealth but only 6.3% of its population…. Our real task in the coming period is to devise a pattern of relationships which will permit us to maintain this position of disparity without positive detriment to our national security.”351 Because the United States was indispensable in bringing about victory in World War II, it could extract postwar concessions while still calling the shots. In Warren Cohen’s words, “the United States perceived itself – and was perceived by much of the world – as the great liberator. Its leaders were prepared to be generous, but they expected deference, acceptance of American principles for the reorganization of the

351 Cited in Ikenberry, After Victory, 169.
world. “In other words, the international order the United States set up in the 1940s was based on U.S. hegemony.

The United States was in much the same position when the Cold War ended. The American principles that Cohen writes of were seen as vindicated by the way the Cold War ended. Like the French Revolution in 1789, the Communist crumbling from 1989 to 1991 was proof that the American political model was indeed riding the wave of the future. It signaled, in the words of Francis Fukuyama, the “end of history.” What now? Had the assumption about a strong historical tradition of isolationism in U.S. foreign policy been correct, one might have expected a return to this tradition in the 1990s. Absent clear foreign threats, the United States should have retreated back into a modern isolationism or aloofness.

The end of the Cold War did not herald a new isolationism, despite some predictions however. Indeed, in 1992, the Defense Department Planning Guidance authored by then Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Paul Wolfowitz, advocated maintaining U.S. hegemony in a post-Cold War world. In these “modern interwar years,” the United States went about universalizing its Western order, militarily intervening eight times around the globe between 1989 and 1999, and – as had been advocated by Wolfowitz – maintaining its hegemony. The post-Cold War presidents – operating in a

353 Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?” The National Interest (Summer 1989). Fukuyama’s article, of course, had a question mark after it. Nonetheless, Fukuyama predicted the end of history in terms of the ideological victory of economic and political liberalism over any other ideological competitors.
354 There was much speculation on whether the United States would retreat back into ‘isolationism’ after the end of the Cold War. John Lewis Gaddis, for example, speculated whether the very success of the United States in ending the Cold War would push it back into a “kind of pre-Cold War isolationism.” See Gaddis, “The Cold War, the Long Peace, and the Future,” in Michael J. Hogan, ed. The End of the Cold War: Its meanings and implications (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 37. Patrick J. Buchanan, of course, advocated for exactly this kind of strategy in A Republic, Not an Empire: Reclaiming America’s Destiny (Washington, DC: Regnery Pub., 1999).
355 Defense Planning Guidance for the 1994–99 fiscal years (February 18, 1992) authored by U.S. Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Paul Wolfowitz and his deputy Scooter Libby. The New York Times leaked the draft, and controversy ensued. The draft was eventually discarded, but the policy seems to have been followed ever since, regardless of which president has occupied the White House.
356 The phrase belongs to Derek Chollet and James Goldgeier, America between the Wars: From 11/9 to 9/11 (New York: Public Affairs, 2008), xiv.
unipolar international system\textsuperscript{358} – were able to assert U.S. hegemony more freely in the world than their predecessors, which the more frequent military interventions attest to. The United States was exercising, in Robert Kagan's phrase, “benevolent hegemony.”\textsuperscript{359}

Nor did the absence of a balancing power mean that the United States again used the United Nations for what it purportedly had intended: multilateral diplomacy and security. The penchant for unilaterality and asserting American hegemony did not change with the end of the Cold War, but rather proved to be aspects of continuity from the Cold War era and before.\textsuperscript{360} In the American version of the commonly told story, the United States fought and won the Cold War, vanquishing the “evil empire” and bestowing “upon the admiring world a benevolent great power,” using and preserving the unipolar system for good.\textsuperscript{361} Indeed, the reasons for intervening around the world were much the same for Democratic liberals and Republican neoconservatives: to promote democracy, human rights, and the rule of law – American principles.\textsuperscript{362} Despite the permissive condition of unipolarity, then, the post-Cold War presidents acted much the same upon the world. In other words, the post-Cold War era was a highly unilateral internationalist era in U.S. foreign policy.

With the attacks of September 11, 2001, these interventions took on a larger scope under a unifying theme – a “war against terror” in

\textsuperscript{358} In the early 1990s, there was initially a debate over whether the end of the Cold War meant the world was now multipolar or unipolar. See Charles Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment” \textit{Foreign Affairs} 70, no. 1, America and the World (1990/1991). Unipolarity, connoting an international system with only one powerful state, theoretically allows this state to act as it wishes upon the system. Whereas realists would predict that eventually, another state or a coalition of states would rise to counterbalance the unipole (see, for example, Kenneth Waltz, “Structural Realism after the Cold War,” \textit{Foreign Affairs} 25, no. 1 (summer 2000)), neoconservatives advocated for the United States’ perpetuating its “unipolar moment” in order to act as the world’s “benevolent hegemon” for as long as possible. See, for instance, William Kristol and Robert Kagan, “Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy,” \textit{Foreign Affairs} 75, no. 4. As opposed to a normative argument, authors William Wohlforth and Stephen Brooks have argued that it seems theoretically unlikely that another power will be able to balance against the United States for purely geographic and material reasons. See “American Primacy in Perspective,” \textit{Foreign Affairs} 81, no. 4 (July/August 2002).


\textsuperscript{361} Luck, \textit{Mixed Messages}, 17.

\textsuperscript{362} For a critical examination of neoconservative thought by a previous neoconservative, see Francis Fukuyama, \textit{America at a Crossroads: democracy, power, and the neoconservative legacy} (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006).
the Middle East and Central Asia – but not even compared to the
war on terror can the 1990s be categorized as inactive, isolationist or
even a “holiday from history,” as George Will put it. Indeed, with
the presidency of George W. Bush and the appointment of Wolfowitz
to the office of Deputy Secretary of Defense, the 1992 aim of actively
maintaining hegemony and preventing future challengers to U.S. uni-
polarity came full circle.

How the end of the Cold War changed very little
in U.S. foreign policy

George H. W. Bush

With the removal of the Soviet Union from the picture, there was
a brief flash of hope in the wake of the Cold War that the United
Nations Security Council would finally function as intended. And
indeed, the post-Cold War era started with what is widely seen as
the classic multilateral case study: the Gulf War. Unquestionably,
it was multilateral both procedurally and operationally. The world
community, as represented by the United Nations, agreed with the
U.S. assessment that Saddam Hussein’s Iraq had transgressed against
Kuwait’s sovereignty. Had the age of collective security perhaps finally
(NSD) 74 in November 1992 – the first policy statement since the
Truman Administration advocating active U.S. support for UN peace-
keeping missions – seemed to suggest exactly that.

But what if the UN had not agreed with Bush’s assessment of the
threat from Iraq? In the memoir of Bush and his national security
advisor, Brent Scowcroft, their superficial commitment to multilateral-
ism is clearly laid out: ”While we had sought United Nations sup-
port from the outset of the crisis, it had been as part of our efforts to
forge an international consensus, not because we thought we required
its mandate.” They go on to write that “The UN provided an added
cloak of political power. Never did we think that without its blessing

363 George Will, “The End of our Holiday from History,” Washington Post, September 12,
364 Kreps, “Multilateral Military Interventions.”
365 William J. Durch, “Keeping the Peace: Politics and Lessons of the 1990s,” in UN
Peacekeeping, American Politics, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s, ed. William J. Durch
we could or would not intervene. What, then, if Beijing or Moscow had decided to veto Resolution 678? Foreshadowing events in 2003, Bush and Scowcroft explain they “would ask the council to act only if we knew in advance we had the backing of most of the Arab block and we were fairly certain we had the necessary votes. If at any point it became clear we would not succeed, we would back away from a UN mandate and cobble together an independent multinational effort built on friendly Arab and allied participation.” This is, of course, exactly what happened in 2003.

Furthermore, nine months earlier, President Bush had not been very concerned with multilateralism when intervening in Panama, owing in part to the “proprietary stance” the United States has taken on crises in the Western Hemisphere since the Monroe Doctrine. Echoing the negotiations over both the League Covenant and the UN Charter, there was clearly no way the international organization would have a say inside the U.S. sphere of influence – the Western Hemisphere. Furthermore, whereas President Bill Clinton would be accused from the right of committing the United States to too many UN peacekeeping operations, it was Bush’s National Security Directive that encouraged U.S. support for UN peacekeeping missions, and it was Bush who committed U.S. troops to Somalia. In fact, in 1994, after much criticism and controversy, President Clinton’s Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 25 stepped back from what had originally been an optimistic assessment of future US participation in UN peacekeeping operations, essentially overruling Bush’ earlier NSD.

In essence, the post-Cold War did not enable a fresh start for multilateralism. Bush’s “New World Order” did not signal a new beginning for the United States and the United Nations, but rather a continuation of the U.S. penchant for unilateralism.

369 Luck, “The United States, International Organizations, and the Quest for Legitimacy” 64.
370 This issue took on a new meaning with the botched humanitarian intervention in 1993 in Somalia. Ivo H. Daalder, “Knowing when to say No: U.S. Policy for Peacekeeping,” in *UN Peacekeeping, American Politics, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s*, ed. Dorch, 36. This was the first comprehensive statement on US policy toward multilateral peace operations, and was much more circumscribed than what had been announced upon Clinton taking office.
While personally likable as seen from the perspective of America’s allies, the fact that President Clinton was presiding over the world’s “benevolent hegemon” was more to the liking of neoconservatives like Robert Kagan and William Kristol than U.S. European allies. In the words of the British permanent representative to the United Nations in 1997, “American exceptionalism cannot mean being the exception to the laws everyone else has to obey.”

While the collapse of the USSR would in theory free the United Nations to perform its original duties, it also revealed an international order no longer distinctly American. Republican Senator Robert Dole spoke for many Americans when he said that international organizations too often reflected a consensus that opposed American interests or did not reflect American principles or ideals. Indeed, in expressing amazement that the United States and the United Nations failed to reunite in the 1990s, analysts have overlooked the fact that the UN of the 1990s – seen from the U.S. perspective – was a far cry from the organization created mainly by the United States in the 1940s.

Exemplifying this estrangement, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright argued on the Today Show in 1998 that the reason the United States was having problems getting other UN members to agree with the U.S. analysis of the threat from Iraq, was because “we are America, we are the indispensable nation, we stand tall – we see further into the future.” The UN had become, quite simply, something rather “un-American” – an epithet rather unique to the United States and its special kind of nationalism.

Whereas President Clinton may have been personally enthusiastic about the possibilities of the UN, he focused mainly on domestic

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371 Kristol and Kagan, “Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy.”
372 John Weston quoted in Luck, Mixed Messages, 13. On the issue of being personally likable, Europeans seemed to have a fascination for Clinton, apart from the political fact that he was a Democrat and therefore closer to most European mainstream parties than most Republicans. Clinton was also preoccupied with being liked. In his memoirs, Clinton recalls going to a jazz club in Prague with Václav Havel, where Clinton jammed with the band (playing “Summertime” and “My Funny Valentine”) while Havel played the tambourine. See My Life (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004), 137.
373 Whereas Sarah Krebs finds a slight increased rate of multilateral military interventions on the part of the United States in the 1990s, David Skidmore finds the opposite. See Krebs, “Multilateral Military Interventions” and Skidmore “Understanding the Unilateralist Turn in US Foreign Policy.”
politics and soon found himself facing a nationalist Congress very much suspicious of the UN.\textsuperscript{376} In an unprecedented address to the UN Security Council on January 20, 2000, Jesse Helms (R-NC) – chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations committee – said, “If the United Nations respects the sovereign rights of the American people, and serves them as an effective tool of diplomacy, it will earn and deserve respect and support.” Helms went on to warn that “a United Nations that seeks to impose its presumed authority on the American people, without their consent, begs for confrontation and – I want to be candid with you – eventual U.S. withdrawal.\textsuperscript{377} Perhaps even more remarkable was the beginning of his address, where Senator Helms expressed the hope that this day would be the beginning of a “pattern of understanding and friendship” between UN diplomats and US senators, as if these two groups were somehow enemies.

And indeed, there were times when this seemed to be so. Whereas President Clinton was an economic free trade internationalist, he presided over a government that imposed new unilateral economic sanctions, or threatened to do so, sixty times on thirty-five countries, the most extreme of which was the Helms-Burton Act aimed at preventing trade with Cuba.\textsuperscript{378} Furthermore, during the 1998 monetary crisis in Asia, the United States’ efforts at compelling those Asian states receiving assistance from the International Monetary Fund to undertake internal reforms the United States had long sought, was met with accusations of using the IMF to impose a unilateral agenda on much of Asia. Indeed, in 1998 South African President Nelson Mandela, during President Clinton’s visit, publicly declared that he resented U.S. efforts at imposing conditions on its freedom of trade.\textsuperscript{379}

\textbf{George W. Bush}

George W. Bush came into office with a rather simple foreign policy strategy: put American interests first, and focus on large (and

\textsuperscript{376} Not that the skepticism toward the UN was simply a Republican trait – the Foreign Relations Act for Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995 – passed by a Democratic Congress – stipulated that the United States should unilaterally limit its payments for UN peacekeeping to 25 percent of total costs, while the United States was falling behind in its arrears payments to the UN. See Durch, “Keeping the Peace: Politics and Lessons of the 1990s,” 15.

\textsuperscript{377} Address by Senator Jesse Helms, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, before the United Nations Security Council, January 20, 2000, <online>.

\textsuperscript{378} Its full name was the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996. See Maynes, “Two Blasts Against Unilateralism,” in \textit{Understanding Unilateralism in American Foreign Relations}, Prins, ed., 46.

\textsuperscript{379} Ibid., 47.
potentially threatening) state actors such as Russia and China. This echoed the realism of his father, which was remarkable precisely because the realist doctrine is rarely found in U.S. foreign policy. This doctrine was evidenced by, among other things, his choice of Condoleezza Rice as his National Security Advisor. Her specialties were the Soviet and Czechoslovakian armies – issue areas directly relevant to the bipolar superpower politics of the Cold War. When asked by ABC’s This Week during the presidential campaign what he would do if another Rwanda occurred, for example, Bush said, “We should not send out troops to stop ethnic cleansing and genocide in nations outside out strategic interest. I don’t like genocide and I don’t like ethnic cleansing, but the president must set clear parameters as to where troops ought to be used and when they ought to be used.” This was clearly different from President Bill Clinton’s policy of committing U.S. troops to humanitarian missions, as seen in Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo (although Clinton was vulnerable to critique from both sides of the aisle: too much engagement as seen from the right and too little as seen from the left).

But the disagreement was not nearly as fundamental as many like to think: first, Clinton did not send any troops to end the Rwandan genocide. Second, both presidents viewed the United States as the natural leader of the world order it had nurtured during the Cold War and both saw it as acceptable for the United States to act alone when necessary. Clinton was more preoccupied with getting his European allies to see things from his perspective and genuinely agree with and like him, but the fact that Clinton was less inclined to use American military power served to gloss over the fact that the Clinton administration would unilaterally employ U.S. military power if so inclined. Indeed, after the disaster in Mogadishu in 1993, Clinton ordered UN Ambassador Madeline Albright to deliver a speech at the National War College declaring readiness to use force without reference to or even in defiance of the UN Charter. Furthermore, one could argue

380 Quoted in Daalder & Lindsay, America Unbound, 37.
381 Bill Clinton wrote in his memoirs that he failed to intervene in Rwanda mainly because “we were so preoccupied with Bosnia, with the memory of Somalia just six months old, and with opposition in Congress to military deployments in faraway places not vital to our national interests that neither I nor anyone on my foreign policy team adequately focused on sending troops to stop the slaughter.” He called it “one of the greatest regrets of my presidency.” My Life, 167.
that Clinton’s policies towards the Israel–Palestine conflict were more unilateral than Bush 43’s were.\textsuperscript{383}

In the area of arms control, Clinton signed (1993) and the Senate ratified (1997) the Chemical Weapons Convention, but “implementing legislation” subsequently passed by the Congress carved out unilateral U.S. exemptions. For example, Congress gave the president authority to reject a challenge inspection of U.S. chemical facilities if the president deemed that such an inspection would pose a threat to U.S. security interests. Congress also mandated that any samples collected through inspection must be analyzed on U.S. territory. Finally, Congress narrowed the range of industrial facilities that would be obligated to declare activities involving chemicals posing a risk of proliferation.\textsuperscript{384}

The first eight months of the Bush 43 presidency, while upping the intensity of U.S. unilateralism, did not change its direction. Bush pulled the United States out of commitments his predecessor had agreed to – the Kyoto Protocol (which National Security Adviser Rice told European Union ambassadors as early as March 2001 was dead), revoked Clinton’s signature on the International Criminal Court treaty, and opposed a pact to control trafficking in small arms, a new protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention, and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.\textsuperscript{385} The pullout of the ICC was particularly hostile, as the administration actively put pressure on third countries to sign bilateral agreements with the United States stipulating they would not extradite U.S. citizens to the Court. Clinton’s almost-agreement with North Korea on freezing its missile program was abandoned, as well as peace efforts in Northern Ireland and Colombia.\textsuperscript{386} But these differences mask an important fact: the Kyoto Protocol and the ICC were unlikely to have been ratified by the Senate anyway – indeed, that is why President Clinton did not submit them for such action.

September 11, 2001 provided the impetus for President Bush’s foreign policy doctrine to move from limited to expansive, and with the invasion of Iraq in 2003, a debate commenced on whether the

\textsuperscript{383} Thomas G. Weiss, Margaret E. Crahan & John Goering, “The serendipity of war, human rights, and sovereignty” in \textit{Wars on Terrorism and Iraq}, 5. Granted, this only holds once the Bush administration made the conflict a priority, which it did not do in the beginning. Indeed, the U.S. involvement in the Israel-Palestine conflict was initially scaled back; specifically the Clinton-created position of special Middle East envoy that Dennis Ross had held was eliminated.

\textsuperscript{384} Skidmore, “Understanding the Unilateralist Turn in US Foreign Policy”: 211.

\textsuperscript{385} Daalder & Lindsay, \textit{America Unbound}, 65

\textsuperscript{386} Ibid., 67
neoconservative mission to spread democracy at the point of a gun at the beginning of the twenty-first century was, in fact, the natural conclusion to the Wilsonianism found at the beginning of the twentieth century.\footnote{Henry Kissinger cited in G. John Ikenberry, Thomas J. Knock, Anne-Marie Slaughter & Tony Smith, The Crisis in American Foreign Policy: Wilsonianism in the twenty-first century (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), 3. The difference between the foreign policy ideas of Bush 43 during the presidential campaign and those espoused after September 11, 2001 are startling in terms of their divergence on the view toward military interventions. Bush 43’s views on unilateralism seem not to have changed, however.} Certainly, many liberals supported the war, as did a significant majority of the American people and U.S. congress members.\footnote{The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, “Midterm Election Preview: Americans thinking about Iraq but worried about the Economy,” (October 10, 2002). For commentary and link to report, see “Most Americans Support War with Iraq, Shows New Pew/CFR Poll – Commentary by Lee Feinstein,” (October 10, 2002) <online>.} Such a widespread majority in favor of the Iraq war signals either a fundamental agreement on important assumptions in U.S. foreign policy by the American body politic; or the successful manipulation of a population by a cynical administration.\footnote{For instance, in order to support the war in Iraq one would have to agree on the legitimacy of the use of military force to cause regime change, as well as agree on the legitimacy of this act despite possible (and after March 2003, actual) lack of procedural or operational multilateralism. For opponents to the war, the theory of public manipulation by the Bush administration has been popular, see for example, Miriam Pemberton & William D. Hartung, eds. Lessons from Iraq: Avoiding the next war (Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers, 2008); James Bamford, A Pretext for War: 9/11, Iraq, and the Abuse of America’s Intelligence Agencies (New York: Doubleday, 2004). For a comparative perspective on media coverage leading up to the war, see Alexander G. Nikolaev & Ernest A. Hakonen, eds. Leading to the 2003 Iraq War: The Global Media Debate (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2006).}

**Unilateralism at the century’s end**

Whether one argues that the neoconservative “crusade” in the Middle East was a perversion of Wilsonianism because the Bush administration showed contempt for international law;\footnote{Thomas J. Knock, “Playing for a Hundred Years Hence: Woodrow Wilson’s Internationalism and His Would-Be Heirs” and Anne-Marie Slaughter, “Wilsonianism in the Twenty-first Century” in The Crisis in American Foreign Policy: Wilsonianism in the twenty-first century. They both argue this was a perversion because Wilsonianism was more about a rule-based international system than it was about spreading democracy. Thus, Bush violated the more important tenet of Wilsonianism in order to pursue a second-order goal.} or one argues that this “liberal imperial ambition” of spreading democracy was at the core of both Wilsonianism and Bush’s foreign policies,\footnote{Tony Smith, “Wilsonianism after Iraq: The End of Liberal Internationalism?” in ibid.} I would argue this debate misses the point. By using Wilsonianism as the baseline for comparison, this debate misses the extent to which the Bush foreign policy agenda was compatible with the foreign policy tradition that...
won out with the Second World War: Lodgian, or unilateral, internationalism. Bush’s aversion to multilateralism in diplomacy and international constraints is indeed compatible with this foreign policy tradition. What was new was the overt flaunting of this fact. Part of the reason why the Bush Doctrine engendered such dramatic opposition abroad was the fact that the doctrine did not even attempt to hide the administration’s efforts at exempting itself from international law.\footnote{See Harold Hongju Koh, “America’s Jekyll-and-Hyde Exceptionalism,” in American Exceptionalism and Human Rights, ed. Ignatieff, 124–28; George W. Bush, National Security Strategy of the United States of America 34 (2002).} The focus on spreading democracy at the point of a gun also seems entirely consistent with U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War.\footnote{See Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War, for an argument that connects interventionism in the Third World with American and Soviet ideological nationalism. His book focuses mostly on the 1970s and 1980s.}

Furthermore, although the war on terror has ended the brief fame human rights acquired in the 1990s, this does not amount to a break in American foreign policy tradition. Rather, the campaign against terrorism has marginalized human rights in much the same way that the fight against Communism did during the Cold War.\footnote{John Donnelly, “International Human Rights” in Wars on Terrorism and Iraq, 98; Jennifer K. Harbury, Truth, Torture, and The American Way. The history and consequences of U.S. involvement in torture (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 2005). On the issue of human rights in the war on terror, see Mark Danner, Torture and Truth. America, Abu Ghraib, and the War on Terror (NY: New York Review of Books, 2004).} This is not to say there were no differences between President Clinton and President Bush – there obviously were. It seems that President Clinton would have preferred more multilateralism than he got, and that President Bush would have preferred more unilateralism than he got.\footnote{One might speculate, for instance, whether President Clinton, had he been president in 2003, would have initiated a war against Iraq. One could also ask what President Clinton would have done with the United Nations, for example, were he not facing a Republican Congress. On Bush, it was reported that the reason the United States returned to the Security Council in the spring of 2003 was because of the urgings of British Prime Minister Tony Blair. The United States, Great Britain, and Spain withdrew their resolution on Iraq once it became clear that France and Russia would veto it. See for example, Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004); Mark Danner, “The Secret Way to War,” New York Review of Books, June 9, 2005.} But Clinton’s primary foreign policy objectives – the defense of human rights, enlargement of democracy, and support for market-based economies – seem identical to Bush’s, and neither president was above unilateralism to achieve these objectives.\footnote{See Daalder, “U.S. Policy for Peacekeeping,” 40.}

In conclusion, the United States has always sought to safeguard its historic tradition of unilateral internationalism. For those seeking to understand U.S. foreign policy, this is the tradition one must look to.
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U.S. foreign policy traditions

Multilateralism vs. unilateralism since 1776

As the world's most powerful state the foreign policy choices of the United States have affected global security for a century and will continue to do so for quite some time. The study of U.S. foreign policy traditions is therefore an important aspect of the study of international relations. The conventional assumption of several scholars of U.S. foreign policy is that the United States abandoned its policy of isolation and aloofness and adopted one of responsibility for international security during the Second World War. But rather than the Second World War and the international institutions of 1945 signifying a “turn-around” to Wilsonian multilateralism, the postwar order built by Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman in fact accommodated the historic U.S. foreign policy tradition of unilateral internationalism. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the United States actually safeguarded its unilateral maneuverability when constructing the second postwar order in the 1940s. This study argues that the United States acted in the 1940s according to a foreign policy tradition that goes all the way back to the founding fathers.

Hilde Eliassen Rastad holds a PhD in international relations from the University of Virginia, and currently works as a senior research fellow at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI). Her academic interests include U.S. foreign policy and international relations, as well as American politics and culture, in particular U.S. elections. She writes a blog in Norwegian about U.S. politics and society, called Dagens DC.