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Policy transfer: a tool for political development

A comparative study of child welfare services between Norway and Bolivia

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Abstract

**Title:** Policy transfer: a tool for political development  
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**Author:** Katya Andrea Nogales Crespo

**Key words:** policy transfer, policy learning, policy making, policy planning, policy design, policy development, political development, state building, comparative study, multi-case study, welfare states in the making, Latin-American welfare states

The value of social work is not only to reinforce preconceived ideals. Sometimes the best social work practice may be to contribute to fairer and more effective social institutions. If for instance we picture a context in country A of a well ordered social policy and country B were it is not working, the chances of effective social work would be higher in country A. Should and could the shape of the policy in country A then be exported to country B? This is the paramount question I address at two levels in this thesis: First I look and explore the policy issue: the scope, capacity and implementation condition in two different social contexts: Norway and Bolivia using the child welfare service as an exemplar policy area. Then I analyze if such policies, using Norway as a model, may be transfer from the one context to the other within the interest area of policy learning, policy making, policy transfer and political development. I not only found a possible way by which political development can be promoted using policy transfer, but this research contributes with an innovative scope in transfer research, this is transfer as a tool for political development.
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Stavanger May, 2015

Katya Andrea Nogales Crespo
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1. Introduction

1.1. Background

Human beings are probably one of the most multifaceted organisms inhabiting the earth with an outstanding social nature. The dynamism of the human relations had led to a vast variety of social institutions, diverse in type, propose, size, composition and complexity. Society’s fundamental cells such as the family, church and state had developed at different rates and patterns worldwide, providing care and welfare in diverse manners and shared of responsibility. In this context, social work takes place in a variety of setting, working and using the human relations as both tool and object of interest. When people’s inner social circles are not sufficiently sustaining well-functioning human relations, social workers professionals are trained to provide guidance. Their role in society is to support through interactive processes that enable service users to improve their quality of life. As a tool, the nature of the relation between service users and the professional has particular characteristics. Social workers act as guides and advocates, using both knowledge and a framework of relevant legislation and procedures stablish at a local, national and international level.

1.2. Research question statement

In consequence, the support and guidance provided by social workers is dependent on the shape of the surrounding social institutions. In fact, social work and like professions are supported and legitimated by the state, meaning that their conception of welfare mirrors the priorities and values of the community. Their aim is to enable users to achieve the conditions and attainments of an ordinary life set by the standards of their own society using their own strengths and terms (Clark, 2006, pp. 78-79). However the value of social work is not only to reinforce preconceived ideals. Sometimes the best social work practice may be to contribute to fairer and more effective social institutions. In this sense advocacy does not only take place at an individual level. Social workers can channel the voices of society and promote process of change guided by the experiences and knowledge built within the global community and their direct interaction with service users, social institution and main street society.

With this in mind, if, for instance, we picture a context in country A of a well ordered social policy area where as in country B it is not working, the chances of effective social work would be higher in country A. Should and could the shape of the policy in country A then be exported to country B? This is the paramount question I address at two levels in this thesis. First I look and explore one specific policy area – the policy issue – in two different social contexts, asking how a fair and well-functioning policy may look like and identifying a context where there is clear need of such policies. Second, I ask whether such policies may be transfer from the one context to the other within the interest area of policy learning and policy making – the transferability issue. In
In this introduction I first present these two main questions in more detail, before sketching my research design and the structure of the thesis.

1.3. The policy issue: Norway

In an environment of increasing interest and action headed by the European Union in the family policy arena, specifically through mechanism such as the soft law, the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) and the new millennium; the Scandinavian welfare model and experience has been taken as an exceptional prototype recognized for its effectiveness levels (Lindén, 2007; Blum, 2014). With the impetus of cooperation, European countries had faced the learning from abroad process as a tool of development. In general terms, the Nordic welfare states often served as example when it comes to work–family reconciliation and a more equal share of household and waged work between parents, characterized by generous public support systems (ibid). Being Norway a country worldwide recognized for its effectiveness in translating policies into practice I take it a model from which practices and ideas can be transferred to promote development in Bolivia. This is done based on the normative and scope similarities that both countries share in relation to the provision covering children under six.

1.4. The policy issue: Bolivia

In Latin America, countries like Bolivia and Venezuela have faced in the last couple decades the challenge of reducing income inequality and poverty not only through the allocation of higher rates of social expenditure but also by major legislative reforms (Huber and Bogliaccini, 2010). For Bolivia the transitional process was rather a radical change were structural glitches were unveiled (Peña, 2012). By the beginning of 2009, a new constitution was ratified by popular election, stating a new social pact. The new principles aimed to assured an inclusive citizenship for the diversity composing the country, as well as to build avenues for legitimation of the new agenda through a new order of participation and representation (s.e. article 26 new Constitution in Asamblea Constituyente de Bolivia, 2008). Bolivia’s new vision shared the principles established by international tools such as the International Declaration of Human Rights and the United National Convention for The Rights of the Child, giving foot to further legislative reforms (s.e. New Children’s Code, New Autonomy Framework Law, etc.).

On the international sight of the conditions that Bolivia has in the implementation of the humans rights and the rights of the child are controversial. In regards to the Children’s Rights, since 2010 recommendation had constantly been made in concern to both practices and normative principles by international organization (European Network of Ombudsperson for Children, 2010; Child Rights International Network, 2010). By 2015, co-party reviews were positive in relation to the increase of the scope of the state’s responsibility over the provision of human’s rights in general. However results were different in respects to the scope and the capacity of the state to ensure the implementation process. Peer-review countries on one hand, positively characterized Bolivia as having an increase in the budget assigned to social development and major legislative changes in line with the United Nation Declaration of the Humans Rights, Rights of the Child, and previous recommendations. On the other, international organisms such as the Indian Counsel of South
America, Human Rights Watch, and Franciscans International, recognized the advanced legislation on human rights in Bolivia, but noticed a lack of mechanisms to implement, being necessary to strengthen resources and capacities to deal with risks mainly associated to indigenous groups, women and children (The United Nations Office at Geneva, 2015).

1.5. Delimitation: The policy issue

Both countries have ratified both, the United Nations Declaration of the Human Rights, and the Rights of the Child, both had assumed and endorsed coherent stands on their constitutional and legal provisions, still, results remain different. By 2010, The United Nations Human Development Report (2014) ranked Norway as the leading country with a score (0.944) nearest to the ideal 1 in the Human Development Index. Bolivia showed a far different situation, with a 0.667 index, ranking on 113th position of 187 countries. Similarly the Income Gini Coefficient positioned Norway with the nearest score (25.8) to the ideal 0 of absolute equality, whereas Bolivia score 56.3. There are several conditions leading to this difference. In this study I provide an analysis of these conditions from the stand point of political development, where emphasis is put on the differences on the capacity of both states to translate policies into practice. This comprehension serves as the fundament to explore the possibility of using Norway as a model to promote development in Bolivia through the means of policy transferability.

In fact, effective social policy regimes should not only work towards lowering the levels of poverty and inequality, but also by increasing the levels of human capital (Huber and Bogliaccini, 2010). In this context, this thesis will explore the policy issue by first addressing the characteristics of the policies, services, and institutions that make the Norwegian child welfare service efficient and effective in not only reducing and attending risks, but enhancing higher levels of human capital. A similar analysis will be conducted for the Bolivian scenario. In this case attention will be centered on identifying the features that need to be developed, the challenges and the necessities of change within the policies, services and institutional framework in accordance with the new framework laws and New Children’s Code assumed by the country in 2014.

1.6. Delimitation: the transferability issue

The second part of the thesis will focus on addressing the issue of policy transferability. Traditionally there had been two contradictory position towards the used of role models in the process of policy making. On one hand, some scholars had begun to question the whole idea of transferability and remain sceptic over the extent to which experiences from abroad can be used to enhance development elsewhere. On the other, a different group supports the idea that policy learning is in fact possible as it enhances a process of contribution without the risk of dependent learning (Gough and Therborn, 2010; Rothstein, 1998).

In fact, these positions can be traced back to the drive mechanisms on the continuum from coercion to voluntary adoption (Blum, 2014). For those against the idea of policy transferability, the fear towards coercive processes of policy making is characteristic of the experience of
dependency and colonization lived by the global south. From this view, the south has been historically overpowered by the pressure to comply with the standards and footprints left by the developed world, giving foot to a process of ‘dependent learning’ (Gough and Therborn, 2010, p.710). For this scholars, the promotion of development of welfare states and social policies in the South cannot simply be an add-on to the conventional Eurocentric approach. In fact, policies can become so institutionalized and historically embedded that is virtually impossible to break free as replication of historical steps and conditions is unrealistic (Grenner, 2002).

On the other hand, there is abundant evidence from successful experiences of policy transferability and policy learning in both the developed and the developing world. In fact there are different degrees to which policies can be transferred, allowing different levels of adjustment freedom. Dolowitz and Marsh (2000) distinguish between four different degrees: direct copying, emulation, combination, and inspiration. These degrees not only provide sufficient flexibility, but they solve the power issue consider by the path-dependency and dependent learning point of view. By going beyond the compulsory requirements, it’s possible to practice a flexible policy learning where there is sufficient room for the emergence of autonomous social policy within a context of cooperation. The debate over the issue of policy transferability is far from reaching an end; and is actually in its climax with the introductions of international mechanism off cooperation like the Open Method of Coordination. The second part of this thesis will explore the possibility of policy transferability and policy learning from the Norwegian to the Bolivian model through an analysis on the area of child-welfare services. The aim is to contribute to a better understanding of the process of policy development.

1.7. Methodology

Methodically speaking, this research subscribes within the context of a comparative study of qualitative nature, providing an in-depth understanding on the nature of both models in relation to the field of early child welfare (under 6 years of age). In order to explore the policies, services and institutional circumstances of both models the welfare provisions were order within the two specific areas: Child protection services and health services.

For the collection of data I used semi structures interviews with experts and servants. The interviews were divided in two sections, the first one aimed to explore general institutional features, whereas the second aimed to gather specific implementation conditions. To guide this second part a tool was develop. The tool consists of two multiple case scenario grills used to enquire social professional and experts on each area. Questions in relation to the services, institutional conditions and policy framework were organized along the four descriptive dimensions consider: provider (public - private), coverage (minimal - extended), accessibility (selective – universal), and quality (high - low). Supplementary official texts were used to corroborate and clarify certain information provided by the experts. The content of transcript of interviews was analyzed fallowing the principles of a qualitative ethnographic analysis.

1.8. Research outline
The organization of this dissertation follows eight steps. First I provide a brief overview of previous research done on the area of policy transferability. Thereafter, in the theoretical framework I introduce the main notions used to analyze the data. Concepts and models within the topic of political development, and implementation will be borrow from Rothstein and Fukuyama. Following, present the methodological approach and design. Later, I organized the findings and analysis in two chapters for practical reasons, one discussing the policy issue, and the other the policy transferability. Following I will draw general conclusion and frame the contribution of this study. Finally I attach supplementary information in the form of annex.
2. Knowledge Base

In this chapter, I outline the literature review relevant to this study. I start by discussing the path-dependency in policy learning strategies issue better known as, getting to Denmark (2.1). Then I provide a brief overview of research done in the field of policy transferability (2.2), to later introduce the laboratory federalism (2.3) and the Open Method of Coordination (2.4) as a formal tool of policy leaning. Finally, in 2.4, I situate Norway and Bolivia, emphasizing their current conditions and social welfare strategies and structure.

2.1. Getting to Denmark and policy learning

When modeling modern political institutions, certain standards have largely been assumed as the target stage of political and institutional evolution. For the developed world, this yardstick has been settled by the ideal of “Denmark”, as a mythical realm which is stable, democratic, peaceful, prosperous, inclusive, and low in corruption (Fukuyama, 2011, pp.14). In this context, some understand the challenge of creating modern political institutions as finding a way to get to Denmark. However, the agenda of forcing extreme poor and chaotic countries to transform with this exclusive target is an unrealistic task. It is not only that institutions reflect the cultural values of certain society, but that their development is also dependent on a unique struggle (ibid).

Whether new welfare states are to follow a pattern defined by the western yardsticks or not is still a controversial point in the academic field. For some scholar continents, regions, countries and communities had experienced different patterns of development to those of the western world and therefore, development as a monostatic concept is no longer admissible. For them, it is either the uneven pace of industrialization what led to uneven development of social security schemes (Hubber and Bogliaccini, 2010), or the ethno-cultural variety that traversed diverse historical paths (Riesco, 2009). Whatever the case, what is strongly emphasized is the need to respect each country’s path (Draibe and Riesco, 2009). On the other hand, other group of scholars argue the contrary. For them regions such as Latin America follow to some extent the terms of western typologies, such as the one proposed by Esping-Anders (Arts and Gelissen, 2010).

Regardless who is right or wrong, the possibility to learn from previous experiences is a resource that not many countries can afford to ignore. Within the field of policy learning it is possible to enhance a process of contribution without the risk of deterministic development and dependent learning (Gough and Therborn, 2010). Policy learning assumes that the replication of specific conditions is not necessary in order to exploit the resourceful experiences from abroad; it leaves room for the emergence of autonomous social policy within a context of cooperation.
2.2. Policy transferability research review

2.2.1. Conceptual overview

Policy transfer or lesson drawing are widely understood as a process by which development in a political system is built on the past or present knowledge of policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas on another political system either within or between different political contexts (Dolowitz, & Marsh, 2000; Evans, 2009; Benson and Jordan, 2011), and in this context, policy transfer can be understood as a theory of policy development (Evans, 2009). According to Benson and Jordan (2011) the concept of policy transfer mutated from its early stage of policy innovation. Early research of policy transfer was conducted under the concept of policy innovation that emphasized learning within and between particular federal states and cities in the United Stated. It was later that under the concept of lesson drawing it shifted to the voluntary act of transfer by rational actors working in specific political contexts. However, the scope was still narrowed to both rational and voluntary processes, therefore David Dolowitz and David Marsh in 1996 coined a new term: policy transfer to emphasize both voluntary and coercive forms of policy innovations.

Research in policy transfer currently takes the form of three major approaches (Benson & Jordan, 2011). The first one, groups research that aims to develop theories of policy transfer (s.e. Rose, 2005; Bulmer, Dolowitz, Humphreys and Padgett, 2007). The second, studies of empirical value used to study specific policy areas (s.e. Pierson, 2003; Stone, 2004; Jones and Newburn, 2006) and the many actors that are involved (s.e. Bulmer et al., 2007; Stone, 2004; 2010) The third, research that has adopted a normative stance, promoting policy transfer as a means for policy innovation (s.e. Rose, 2005).

2.2.2. Agents of Policy Transfer

A review done by Dolowitz and Marsh (1996) identified six types of actors engaged in transfer activities: elected officials, political parties, bureaucrats/civil servants, pressure groups, policy entrepreneurs/experts, and supra-national institutions. To this list Evans (2009) adds two more: knowledge institutions (KIs), academicians and other experts; and global financial institutions. Additionally, transfer occurs across different levels, at horizontal and vertical level within states but also across borders (Betsill and Bulkeley, 2004), with the mediation of instance such as transnational corporations, intergovernmental norm diffusers and global financial institutions (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000; Stone, 2004; Evans, 2009), or the coordination between parties such as the one known as peer-to-peer transfer between national governments (Dolowitz, 2003).

2.2.3. Objects of transfer

Reviews and research has been conducted to identify the different objects that could be subject or are often subject to transfer. A group of objects of transfer are those known as ‘hard’ elements such as policy instruments, institutions and programs (s.e. Dolowitz, 2003; Jones and Newburn,
Another group of objects are known as softer elements, such as ideas, ideologies and concepts (Stone, 2004).

### 2.2.4. Forms of policy transfer

Typically, policy transfer analysts refer to three different processes of transfer: voluntary transfer or lesson-drawing, negotiated transfer and direct coercive transfer (Evans, 2009; pp.245). According with Evans’ (2009) review, the first is a rational action-oriented approach that emerge from professional dissatisfaction, poor performance, or a new policy agenda; whereas the second and third involve varying degrees of coercion common in developing countries, being the latest and purest form of involuntary action.

### 2.2.5. Policy transfer, scope of studies in the future

Benson and Jordan (2011) reviewed publication in the last three decades related to the field of policy transfer. They come to notice that not only studies within this field have significantly declined since 2005, but that also three trajectories for the future studies were clear. This first one, has to do with the continual evolution of the concept as it develops further theoretical and empirical perspectives. The second one, was the possibility of assimilation of the concept as part of other areas of knowledge (s.e. Marsh and Sharman, 2009 cross-fertilization attempt between knowledge of diffusion and transfer). And the final one arguments that policy transfer may either continue to evolve or enter a period of conceptual decay.

### 2.2.6. The knowledge problem when policy transfer

The issue of policy innovations and policy learning in which best policies are identified by comparing a number of already implemented practices is a recently emerging method (Noaksson and Jacobsson, 2003; Arrowsmith, Sisson and Marginson, 2004; Kerber & Eckardt, 2007)

The main issue when talking about policy innovation is the knowledge problem Kerber and Eckardt, 2007). What is actually an optimum policy? How do we define that in order to share and transfer positive tactics? To this respect, Hayek (1978) conducted some studies about highly complex systems, reaching the conclusion that knowledge is limited on how to intervene in modern complex societies and therefore an approach of trial and error is the best alternative. Moreover, methods of policy innovation such as the Open Method of Coordination and Laboratory Federalism, are only effective if countries have a high capability of innovativeness and adaptability in regard to its policies and institutions (Kerber, 2006). So the issue of policy innovation and transfer is not only how to asses good practices and policies; but the necessary conditions in recipient countries to assume the innovative process.

### 2.2.7. Some comparative studies of policy transfer

Research in the field of policy transfer has focused in examining the conditions surrounding the process as such. They have examined the circumstances that facilitate and the extent to which influence has taken place between different models and countries. Thus research in this field
have examined how policy transfer serves as a tool for policy development. However, little
attention has been paid to policy transfer as a tool for policy design, this is documenting how
policy transfer can be used as an instrument to enhance future changes in policy arrangement,
policy transfer with a scope to the future.

Most policy transfer studies have focused on highly developed countries (s.e. Dolowitz and
Marsh 1996; 2000; Evans, 2004). Randma and Kruusenberg (2012) conducted a study aiming to
document the existing literature on policy transfer in new democracies. Their study took
Estonia and Latvia as exemplifier cases of transitional policymaking and the emergence of new
policies. By applying a comparative case study design, they found that:

- Choosing policy transfer as a tool for policy-making was mainly caused by factors related
to post-communist transition: shortage of domestic expertise and funding, transitional
urgency in decision-making, and willingness for west-like development.
- Temporal aspects of policy-making are particularly important.
- The choice of role models is determined and depends on factors such as budgetary
constraints, willingness, etc.
- Administrative capacity is a key concern in policy transfer in immature policy
environments, as it could lead to poor capacity for policy analysis, biased selection of role
models and democratic deficit.

Using a similar design, Blum (2014) conducted a study aimed to explore the extent to which
family policy reforms in Germany and Austria were influenced by vertical and horizontal policy
transfers. His results show that not all policies consider the reforms were influenced and that
the ones that were varied in object and extent. Transfer between these countries was an example
of a constant and partly institutionalized exchange. He argues that the level of influence was such
that family policy reforms could not be fully understood without the consideration of cross-
national policy transfers.

Another example is the research done by Fawcett & Marsh (2012) that explored the factors that
affect the success of policy transfer using a putative example of successful policy transfer, the
Gateway Review between 2001 and 2010. The Gateway policy was developed in the UK,
disseminated within and later transferred to Australia, New Zealand and the Netherlands. Results
suggested that the policy was both a process success and a programmatic success; the reason of
such was because it was informed, complete and appropriate. Fawcett & Marsh (2012) argue that
far from a quick fix, successful transfer depends on extensive prior investigation about highly
demanding commitment from politicians and, especially, public servants.

As these three exemplifier research show, attention has mostly been centered on the conditions
that made policy transfer successful, the difference form that transfer takes in terms of extent and
objects, the motivation factors, etc. All aiming to reach a better comprehension of policy transfer
as a tool of policy development and therefore improve it’s use. However, research of policy
transfer in the making, with a scope to the future is a largely unexplored field.
2.3. Laboratory Federalism: an Approach for Policy Innovation and Policy Learning

There are two main avenues when it comes to formal mechanisms to share good policies and practices by comparing a number of already implemented strategies (Kerber and Eckardt, 2007). One of these avenues is Federalism as a decentralized system.

“Federal multi-level systems of jurisdictions can be seen as innovation systems, in which public policies are the object of a continuous process of innovation and imitation, driven by decentralised experimentation and competition” (ibid; pp.6)

Therefore, the issue of policy innovation and policy learning is a matter of how to design appropriate federal multi-level systems of jurisdictions (Kerber and Eckardt, 2007). The concept of "laboratory federalism" is based on the idea that competitive federalism can be a suitable institution for the generation and spreading of knowledge about superior policies (Kerber, 2000; 2006). In this context, three different competitive transmission mechanisms are possible (Kerber and Budzinski, 2003; Kerber and Eckardt, 2007):

- **Pure yardstick competition**: where countries learn from each other about the success or failure of their policies by mutually observing their policy performance in contrast to a foreign "yardstick". Their intra-jurisdictional political competition incentivizes the generation of policy innovations
- **Inter-jurisdictional competition**: where the danger of losing resources to and from other jurisdictions are an incentive for the jurisdictions to increase their competitiveness in order to attract and keep the mobile of goods, production factors, firms, and individuals
- **Regulatory competition**: when individuals and firms enjoy free choice of law regardless of their location. Competition among legal rules emerges having positive effects in the generation and diffusion of new legal rules

2.4. Open Method of Cooperation: as an Institution for Supporting Policy Learning

Another exemplifier of formal mechanism of transferability and policy learning towards the future is the Open Method of Coordination (OMC). The OMC is a new governance method (Kerber and Eckardt, 2007) developed by the European Commission to exchange good practice on the way European Union Member States design and implement policies and funding schemes within many policy areas (European Commission, 2015). Through an exchange of experiences and cross criticism, it stimulates emulation between Member States, stimulates diffusion of innovations and adaptation of welfare models, and facilitates follow-up procedures, assessment and transparency by using targets and indicators (Ferrera, Matsaganis, and Sacchi, 2002). By encouraging a learning dynamic this method has a strong potential for influencing policy development and promoting a knowledge base practice. The advantages of this formal
mechanism is that it serves its purpose while respecting national diversity. Ultimately reconciling common European action with legitimate national diversity (Zeitlin, 2005). Additionally, it mobilizes the diversity within Europe as an asset instead of an obstacle (Zeitlin, 2005; European Commission DG EMPL, 2002; Cohen and Sabel, 2003).

The impact of the OMC is been felt at different levels. It has influenced substantive policy changes as well as governance and policymaking arrangements (Zeitlin, 2005). Moreover, the OMC is a two level game which combines top-down and bottom up practices (Ferrera et. al., 2002). It promotes interest on learning from each other when preparing domestic policy reforms, while at the same time gives foot to bottom to top flow of information where nationally designed programs have been modified according to the experiences or needs of the lower territorial levels (ibid).

The idea of decentralized experimentation and mutual learning can be found in both OMC and the Laboratory Federalism. A comparative study conducted between these two mechanisms by Kerber and Eckardt (2007) in regards to their capability to establish permanent learning processes for public policies, showed that OMC as a more centralized top-down method of benchmarking and spreading best practices, and laboratory federalism as a more decentralized bottom-up approach able to foster processes of policy learning. The scope of the OMC narrows to the diffusion of policies, whereas laboratory federalism serves policy innovations and policy diffusion. However, this study also found that although the OMC implies lower costs by avoiding parallel assessments through a centralized approach it also entails the potential dangers of centralization and harmonization: decisions as outcome of political bargaining processes, and lock-in effects and path dependency.

2.5. Situating Norway and Bolivia

2.5.1. The Norwegian and Bolivia welfare models

Norway’s Social-Democratic Model

One of the most recognized and used categorization of welfare models in the academic field is the one proposed by Esping-Andersen (Del Valle, 2010). For Esping-Andersen (1990) welfare models can be identified along two fundamental dimensions: the degree of decommodification and social stratification. This is the degree to which different models rely on the market, the state or the family to correct the negative outcomes resulting from inequalities (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Arts and Gelissen, 2002; Del Valle, 2010).

In contrast to the liberal model and the conservative corporatist model, the social-democratic model achieves both high level of decommodification and low stratification (ibid). Norway is a typical example; their social-democratic principles translate into generous universal and highly distributive benefits. Social policies aim to maximize the capacities for individual independence through high labor market participation, which is a feature that is also essential to maintain the high-level of solidarity (s.e. Arts and Gelissen, 2002; Lister, 2009; Kautto, 2010). Moreover, in regards to child welfare provisions, the state assumes a broad responsibility of ensuring
appropriate conditions for the upbringing of children, thus rates high on de-familiarization, the 
degree to which the state benefits reduces individual’s dependency on kinship (Gilbert, Parton 
and Skivenes, 2011).

The Nordic nirvana (Lister, 2009) defines the social-democratic model as the best of all possible 
thinkable worlds marrying economic competitiveness with social justice (Kangas and Palme, 
2005). Where equality, solidarity, and universalism are values underpinning its commitment to 
the principle of inclusionary and equal citizenship (Lister, 2009; pp.246), representing a useful 
lesson for contemporary debates on democratization, development and inequality and a 
development strategy rather than an end state (Mkandawire 2005).

**Bolivia and the Latin-American Welfare Models**¹

Although Esping-Andersen’s welfare typology provides an exquisite guidance to understand the 
industrialized world, in Latin-America other parameters have been more suitable (s.e. Filgueira, 
1998; Barba, 2004; Mesa Lago, 2004). In fact in this continent

“[…] we can refer to a dual social protection system that needs to be interpreted not as consequence of residual approach of the welfare state, rather as a result of the interaction between the occupational model and the specific characteristics of the labor market, the functioning of the family and parental system and intergenerational relations, and the solidarity nets as means to guarantee financial support and care for the individuals” (Del Valle, 2010; pp.72)

Several studies have been conducted in the attempt to understand and organize the welfare 
models in the developing world. Wood (2004) analysis of Africa, Asia and Latin America, 
concluded that for the latest a major characteristic is the informality element. Here States have 
little control over the market, selective schemes and services and therefore rely on the family and 
social network as the main provider of welfare. This means that social security schemes depend 
on the formal employment, leaving informal workers uncovered and under the protection of 
traditional care systems like the family (Barrientos, 2004).

Bolivia can be described as an intermediate model, having developed social security schemes 
during the 40s and 50s (Mesa Lago, 1989), with an exclusive regime, where an elitist social 
security system enlarges the gap between social groups and low social expenditure (Filgueira, 
1998; Barba, 2004). In respect to the latest Abdullahi (2009) conducted research to explore if 
leftist government in Bolivia and Chile during the last decade had impacted the social welfare 
distribution and size of welfare transfer per inhabitant or not. The results showed that although in 
Bolivia there was an increase on the representation of excluded social groups, the reaction of 
formal sector workers, banking community, conservative elements in the government, and weak 
democratic institution created an environment of instability, and therefore increases in size of 
welfare transfer and distribution was limited.

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2.5.2. Comparative Figures

According with peer-reviewers and Navarro (Permanent Representative of Bolivia to the United Nations Office at Geneva), important progress has been achieve in Bolivia especially in regards to women’s and indigenous peoples participation, and conditional cash transfers schemes to vulnerable sectors of society (The United Nations Office at Geneva, 2015).

Table I: Human Development Comparative Measurements by 2013²

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INDICATOR</th>
<th>Indicador descripción</th>
<th>Range express in Human Development</th>
<th>Norway</th>
<th>Bolivia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Human Development Index</td>
<td>Based on long healthy life, being knowledgeable and have decent standard of living</td>
<td>Very high</td>
<td>0.890</td>
<td>0.944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
<td>0.735</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>0.614</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>0.493</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Rank 1 - 187</td>
<td>1-187</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health index</td>
<td>Life expectancy at birth</td>
<td>Very high</td>
<td>0.926</td>
<td>0.946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
<td>0.838</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>0.737</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>0.605</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education Index</td>
<td>Calculated using Mean Years of Schooling and Expected Years of Schooling</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>0.910</td>
<td>0.674</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy, expressed in international dollars divided by total population</td>
<td>Very high</td>
<td>40.397</td>
<td>62.858</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
<td>12,920</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>5,875</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>2,830</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income Index</td>
<td>GNI per capita</td>
<td>Very high</td>
<td>0.905</td>
<td>0.976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
<td>0.738</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>0.617</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>0.509</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population living below $1.25 per day (%)</td>
<td>Percentage of the population living below the international poverty line $1.25 a day (last update 2008)</td>
<td>Very high</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>15.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
<td>8.7</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>18.0</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>33.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

² Unless different specify
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table Title</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>HDI Value Adjusted for Inequalities</th>
<th>Income Gini Coefficient</th>
<th>Expenditure on Education, Public (%)</th>
<th>Expenditure on Health</th>
<th>Maternal Mortality Ratio</th>
<th>Under-five Mortality Rate</th>
<th>Children under-five who are stunted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inequality-adjusted HDI</td>
<td>HDI value adjusted for inequalities in the three basic dimensions of human development.</td>
<td>Very high: 0.780 High: 0.590 Medium: 0.457 Low: 0.332</td>
<td>A value of 0 represents absolute equality, a value of 100 absolute inequality.</td>
<td>Very high: 5.3 High: 4.6 Medium: 3.7 Low: 3.8</td>
<td>Very high: 12.2 High: 6.0 Medium: 4.6 Low: 4.2</td>
<td>Very high: 15 High: 42 Medium: 186 Low: 426</td>
<td>Very high: 6 High: 15 Medium: 47 Low: 94</td>
<td>Very high: 4.0 High: 11.1 Medium: 40.5 Low: 41.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income Gini Coefficient</td>
<td>Measure of the deviation of the distribution of income among individuals or households within a country from a perfectly equal distribution.</td>
<td></td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expenditure on education, Public (%)</td>
<td>Total public expenditure (current and capital) on education expressed as a percentage of GDP.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expenditure on health,</td>
<td>Total health expenditure is the sum of public and private health expenditure. Express in total (% of GDP)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maternal mortality ratio</td>
<td>Ratio of the number of maternal deaths to the number of live births in a given year, expressed per 100,000 live births.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under-five mortality rate</td>
<td>Probability of dying between birth and exactly age 5, expressed per 1,000 live births.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children under-five who are stunted</td>
<td>Percentage of children ages 0–59 months who are more than two standard deviations below the median height-for-age of the World Health Organization Child Growth Standards.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>27.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Author: Self-production, based on Human Development Report 2014

However, in the opinion of international organizations like the Human Rights Watch, Franciscans International, Action Canada for Population and Development, Amnesty International, United Nations Watch, the conditions are far from optimal performance; concerns in regards to implementation mechanism are prevalent.

Figures from The United Nations Human Development Report (2014) describe a Bolivia with significant weaknesses ranking in position 113 out of 187. As table I shows, Bolivia scores in most HD indicators significantly lower than Norway. On its part, the Scandinavian country is in leading position when it comes to HD ranking world wide, scoring Very High in all Human
Development Indicators, whereas Bolivia scores between a *Medium to Low*. Although the south American country shows a growing economy with a GDP and Income Index ranking medium, still 15.6% of the population lives under the international poverty line, with an uneven distribution of wealth: inequality is as double as in Norway with a Gini Coefficient of 56.3. Attempts to improve the conditions of the population through a very high assignation of budget to education, doesn’t encompass with the low health budget. Figures also show alarming challenges in regards to children under five. With a 190 out of 1000 maternal mortality rate to a 7 in Norway, 41 to 3 mortality rate for children under five, and a prevalence of 59 of children who are started.

**2.5.3. Contextualizing Bolivia**

In the past, circumstances surrounding development in Latin America were rather different than those experienced by the western world. In general terms, the industrial capitalism wave enforced further political development in the global north, as it incited more challenges to the unready global south (Nullmeier 2010; Gough & Therborn 2010; Peña, 2012). In fact, in Latin American social programs were badly focused or ineffective, characterized by a regulated citizenship that led to a regressive social security system and scheme and higher inequality levels (Aspalter 2013).

Nevertheless, different countries in Latin America had followed different development patterns. Democratization was reached in different terms and stages. This in combination with the uneven pace of industrialization, determined an uneven development of social security schemes between the different countries (Huber & Bogliaccini, 2010).

Some countries had just recently entered a race for reaching better social, economic and political outcomes. This is the case for Bolivia, where in the last couple of decades it has become crucial that reduction of income inequality and poverty through the allocation of higher social expenditure and new legislative frameworks (ibid). Like in Europe, the new challenges come in hand with the demand of social rights and an institutional order that can fulfill the duty of securing the welfare of its citizens. In this context, stress is put on political development as a tool to ensure the rule of law and democracy, but also as a necessary step into the construction of a common goal (s.f. Aroncena; 2008; Peña, 2012) – a sense of national identity. For Bolivia, state building and further political development cannot be achieved only by increasing the basic incomes or raising the income per capita. Development in the Bolivian context means the development of mechanisms that can enable a growing range of freedoms (Sen, 1990). In fact, effective social policy regimes should not only work towards lowering the levels of poverty and inequality, but also increase the levels of human capital (Huber and Bogliaccini, 2010). In Bolivia, major changes result from major challenges. Peña (2012) describes this:

“[…] unveiling off a state crisis involving: The insufficiency and corruption of the mechanisms of social representation, the existence of a fallacious governance because it is based on agreements that reproduce just the surface of democratic formality, and the almost total absence of social mobility in the spaces of political representation” (pp.9).
In fact, the country ranks low in governance and freedom international reviews. The World Bank Institute’s Worldwide Governance Indicator (WGI) that measures governance rated Bolivia has having very poor conditions – all negative values in a scale from -2.5 to +2.5, in all dimensions. Similarly, Freedom House, an independent watchdog organization dedicated to the expansion of freedom around the world, classified Bolivia as partly free.

Bolivia has entered this century with an impetus to work on these challenges. In regards to the major legislative changes, by the beginning of 2009, a new constitution was ratified by popular election. Bolivia’s new vision encompasses with principles established by international standards such as the International Declaration of Human Rights and the United National Convention for The Rights of the Child.

The Framework Law of Autonomy and the Framework Law of Participation and Social Control were key steps for the country’s new democratic era. Indeed, Bolivia’s new constitutional order was the result of a new political pact, which includes territorial, political, social, cultural and economic arrangements under the wellbeing (Vivir Bien) paradigm (Peña, 2012). As expressed by the president at the time, Evo Morales Aima, the new constitution mirrored a Bolivia base on Unity, Equality and Dignity, continuing the democratic and cultural revolution, a permanent liberation process started from the time of the Spanish colony (El País, 2009). These principles assured an inclusive citizenship for the diversity composing the country (Kymlicka 2002). As well as avenues for legitimizing the new agenda through a new order of participation and representation (f.e. Article 26 New Constitution in Asamblea Constituyente de Bolivia 2008).

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3 World Bank Institute’s Worldwide Governance Indicator (WGI), online: http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#reports, retrieve on 12.03.2015
4 Freedom House, online https://freedomhouse.org/country/bolivia#.VTNDspPg-Dl, retrieve on 12.03.2015
3. Theoretical Framework: An Institutional Perspective

Outlining my theoretical framework, in this chapter, I first give reasons why the main perspectives lean on institutional theory (3.1). Next, I introduce the premise to have a working modern state (3.2). In section 3.3. I give a general overview of the relation exiting between normative and practical implementation matters, to later discuss the normative premises of what is expected as the functions and scope of the state (3.4). Lastly, I look into how welfare reforms and new institutional design may be implemented in a successful way (3.5).

This theoretical framework centers on understanding of political development through the means of policy transferability, focusing on the perspective of future needs in a framework of institutional analysis. This will be discussed in this chapter with two targets in mind. Firstly, the policy issue, examining the conditions behind a successfully working state, where an institutional analysis is used as the main theoretical background. Here, the dimensions of political development considered by Fukuyama’s theory are combined with Rothstein’s scope of the normative institutional arrangements. Secondly, the transferability issue, examining the condition behind a successful implementation of policies, and providing grounds over which institutional and policy changes can be enforced in order to secure better levels of service and overall social and political development. Here Rothstein’s implementation components are explored as necessary conditions for a successful implementation of social policies and transferability.

Political development

An institutional perspective in the analysis and design of social policies, is closely linked to the concept of political development. Political development can be consider as the change over time in political institutions (Fukuyama; 2014). As such, political development is a construct difficult to apprehend from a single point of view. It is often confused or reduce to a certain amount of its components, relevant to the historical circumstances or the predominant academic language at the time (Pye, 1965; Sen, 1988). Efforts to study development have been unsuccessful as scientist end up studying other analytical surrogates (Moses, 2011). Consequently, the concept of political development has been attributed with different connotations, sometimes even disemboaging into overlapping typologies. Some of these definitions describe political development as: the political prerequisite of economic growth, the politics typical of industrial societies, the process of political modernization, the operations of a nation-state, the administrative and legal development, and the provenance of freedom of choice for its citizens and the building of democracy, among others (Pye, 1965; Sen, 1988).

As a result, the tendency has been to either catalogue even more definitions, as the work done by Riggs (1981) summing up to sixty-five different views of political development, or to narrow and try to integrate the different connotation into one. For the latter, two are the definitions relevant to this study. First, political development as a process of social change, result of the integration of different spheres. The second, political development as freedom of choice. Regarding the first, Pye (1965) identified political development as a multi-dimensional process of social change. In
her view, political development revolves around the relationship between: the political culture, authoritative structures, and general political process (Pye, 1965; Moses, 2011).

Another possible route taken to define political development in a more integrated way has been done by Sen (1999), achieving even a greater success than Pye in freeing the concept of political development from the dominant economic tradition and taking it to a more holistic and social realm. Amartya Sen argued that agency and human capabilities are the dimensions holding the same relevance as more traditional measures of utility and welfare, and have in fact a central role in securing development (Moses, 2011). For Sen, development is not about promoting and securing economic growth rather it is about providing an environment in which individuals are free to exercise their full potential. She believes that by removing the constraints such as: poverty, tyranny, poor economic opportunities, systematic social deprivation, neglect of public facilities, intolerance and over-activity of repressive states, and providing the opportunities necessary, citizens will be entitled to perform their agency (Sen, 1999; pp. 3).

In this thesis, both perspectives of Pye and Sen are combined using an institutional analysis of political development. As it will develop later, an analysis and intervention based on institutions can open the possibility of social and political development through institutional design, as institutions can also be a source of change and not just the reflection of the traditional dimensions - the economic, cultural and social conditions - by which development was explained in the past. Therefore, here in this thesis, political development can be understood as a relation between the political culture, the authoritative structures, and the general political process by which institutions arrange providing an environment where agency and human capabilities are ensured and promoted, enhancing the possibility for individuals to exercise their full potential within a certain society.

### 3.1. An institutional perspective

In the academic field, the study of political development has been constantly overruled by the use of the economic approach as the predominant strategy (Pye, 1965; Sen, 1988; Kuttenen and Petersen, 2011; Moses, 2011). The ways in which political development has been defined are development through economic growth or change in well-being (Moses, 2011; pp. 23). This also means that it is assumed as a solid-unit in which the economic sphere is predominant and the direct cause of variations at the social and political level (Fukuyama, 2011; 2014; Kuttenen and Petersen, 2011). Consequently there are two contradictory aspects that are commonly associated with political development. On one hand, there is a strong causal attribution of present circumstances to conditions that are particular to specific societies (Fukuyama, 2011; Rothstein, 1998) and therefore impossible to replicate. While on the other, there is also the assumption of a unique metical target of development applicable without distinction for each and every society (Fukuyama, 2011).

This conception results are problematic placing political development in a dilemmatic position where every society is recognized as having its own path, but asked at the same time to comply with a benchmark of development. By attributing development to singular causes, replicability becomes impossible. Simultaneously, by recognizing this singular causality it also establishes a
unique target to every society regardless of their difference. Alternatively, an analysis centered on the political institutions is capable of explaining the variation in social norms away from this structural determinism (Rothstein, 1998; pp. 217), minimizing this challenge. Based on the understanding of the coherence of each society, an institutional approach takes institutions as the central concept of interest to explain variations, but also tools to promote change towards a more coherent translation of the normative components into practical arrangements or to in fact transform the normative component through practical arrangements.

In essence, a comprehension of differences between societies and their development by looking at social institutions turns the relationship between social norms and institutions upside down (ibid). Institutions are not only the reflex of social norms, but the manner in which political institutions are structured can also explain changes in this other sphere. Therefore, economic and social arrangements are no longer perceived as dependent only on external social factors such as culture, but rather difference can be traced back to the design of political institutions. The advantage of this institutional approach is the opening to new possibilities of social and political development through processes of institutional design and change.

“If instead norms vary with the character of political institutions, then we as citizens have a critical role to play. We can, at least on some occasions, decide which norms shall prevail in the society we live in, because we can choose how to design our political institutions. It has proved possible, […] for centrally placed political actors to shape political institutions consciously, and in such a manner as to favor the generation of certain social norms (and interests)” (Rothstein, 1998; pp. 135)

Development from an institutional approach can take the form of policy planning as the means to enforce institutions that better suit the necessities of certain community. Certain societies had been more successful in translating the “What institution should do” (normative component) into “What institutions can actually do” (practical component). Therefore, through the share of institutional arrangements that had proved to be efficient in doing so, the advantage is the consolidation of a circuit in which institutions can enforce two different things: the translation of what is expected into practice, but also the modification through the practice of what is expected in order to adjust the welfare provisions to the changing necessities of society or specific social groups.

### 3.2. General terms for working states: Institutional Development

Fukuyama’s account of political development and political decay goes beyond the material conditions to the dimensions involved in the process, distilled from an historical account of the many interlocking factors involved in institutional evolution (Fukuyama, 2011). Its innovative scope combines the comprehension of each dimension of development as a unity of analysis, with its own coherence, developmental role, and inter-linkages (Fukuyama, 2011; 2014). By doing so, his theory covers a double perspective: the conditions under which political development takes place but also the circumstance of decay; both necessary to bring light on the characteristics of successful practices and the conditions of failure and possible improvement.
Also, it highlights the evaluation of the aspects necessary to enhance political development far from a deterministic approach.

To explore political development, institutions are a central unit of analysis, as they both reflect and play an active role in the process of change. According to Fukuyama (2014), political development takes place when systems successfully master their environmental demands, translating these arrangements into stable patterns of behavior named institutions. On the contrary, if there is a rigid preservation of patterns the tendency is a regression to traditional forms of power and authority where societies become less institutionalized, which in turn signals a state of political decay.

In order to proceed with an analysis of political development, first one has to frame political development as a component of development as such. Fukuyama (2014) considers that development takes place within a context of four dimensions: economic growth, social mobilization, legitimacy, and political development.

“The economic, social and political dimensions of development proceed on different tracks and schedules, and there is no reason to think that they will necessarily work in tandem. Political development, in particular, follows its own logic independent of economic growth. Successful modernization depends, then, on the parallel development of institutions alongside economic growth, social change and ideas; it is not something that can be taken for granted as an inevitable concomitant of the other dimensions of development. Indeed, strong political institutions are often necessary to get economic growth going in the first place. It is precisely their absence that locks failed or fragile states into a cycle of conflict, violence and poverty” (Fukuyama, 2014; pp.51)

The political development is central in the comprehension of development beyond the economic and the culture-specific scope (Fukuyama, 2011). It explores how institutions are arranged and at the same time reflect the ideas behind the relation existing between the ones in power and the remaining citizens. As having an independent logic, it’s not illogical to analyze the conditions of political development in a way that is more or less independent from the other components of development; mostly when the development of these three set of instructions is a universal condition for growth at a social and economic real to all societies (Fukuyama, 2014).

**Figure 2. Dimension of development**

![Figure 2. Dimension of development](image_url)

Source: Fukuyama, 2014; pp. 43
As showed in Figure 1, in order to understand political development, the emergence and coexistence of a set of three institutions need to be considered: the state, the rule of law, and the accountable government or democracy. The coexistence in equilibrium between these institutions is what determines at last the conditions of political development or political decay. What is expected as political development in modern liberal democracies is a healthy balance where the state concentrates and deploys power to enforce law, keep peace, defend, and provide public goods; while in parallel law and mechanisms of accountability constrain the state’s power and ensure that its power is used only in a controlled consensual manner (Fukuyama 2011; pp.16). In other words, the requirement for stability rests on the capacity of a system to discourage desires that conflict with the principles of justice, framing the nature of institutions and at the same time encouraging the virtue of justice in those who take part in them (Rawls, 1971; Rothstein, 1998). On the contrary, if this balance breaks, the tendency of society is to become less institutionalized, turning back to more traditional forms of power, such as those present in more primitive forms of society – the tribal society (Fukuyama 2011), eventually leading to a state of political decay. However, this in any way means that decay is the result of an unbalance in favor of the state authoritative power only. In fact, things can become unbalanced in either direction. It can be the case of insufficient checks on state power, or excessive veto power on different social groups that prevent any sort of collective action (Fukuyama, 2014; pp.39).

Despite all three institutions being essential to political development, one has a priority role. State building is not a precondition for the emergence of rule of law, nor democracy; but it is a neural in conducing political stability, as the organ capable and responsible for enforcing the role of the reaming two other institutions. In fact, if democracy comes too early, when state is not yet strong to take on this task, consequences can be rather negative (Fukuyama, 2014). In these conditions, repatrialization can take the form of corruption breaking the balance necessary for development and conducing to political decay. Indeed, in many countries democracy itself is threatened because the state is corrupt or too incompetent to fulfil its tasks of providing security, protecting property rights, making available education and public health services, and building the infrastructure that is necessary for private economic activities to occur (Fukuyama, 2014, pp.54). So sequencing is crucial: History has proven that both sorts of institutions may suffer when democracy is reached before the rule of law. In fact, Fukuyama (2014) provides clear examples of this situation. In his historical account of development and decay, the most modern contemporary bureaucracies were established by authoritarian states pursuing national security, like the case of modern public administration, strong national identity is often most effectively achieved under authoritarian conditions (ibid, pp. 30). In consequence, conflicts on sharing a national narrative prevail, negatively impacting the conciliation and cooperation
capacity, and even the legitimacy of broader actions as society is likely to be sectorized (Fukuyama, 2011).

3.2.1. State Building: stateness and efficiency

The state is an ancient human institution that allows individuals to coexist and cooperate towards common targets based on the use of cohesive power (Fukuyama, 2004). The functions of the state range from a wide variety, from good to ill depending on how this power is practiced. In fact, the same power that allows the protection of rights and provision of safety can also be fuel for abuse. Therefore, in order to ensure functions that promote development politics have the role to tame the power of the state under the rule of law, by directing it towards legitimate ends (Fukuyama, 2004; 2011). As a result, different countries have reached different levels of stateness, having varied consequences on the capacity of politics to ensure development. Weak states are still in the necessity of state building, whereas strong states constantly push towards a weakened one, at least to some extent (Fukuyama, 2004). However, the emphasis put into the necessity of ensuring a sufficient state capacity and scope has no regards to the size of the state as such. What is argued here as state building is that much more important than the size of government is the quality in order to ensure a good economic and social outcome (Fukuyama, 2015).

Why is it state building important: The importance for stability or social justice

In fact, the central idea of state building is its essential role in promoting two things: economic growth and social justice - stability. In relation to the latest, the relevance of state building is based on the fact that only through the monopoly of legitimate power persons are exhorted to cooperate beyond their individual interests (Fukuyama, 2004). Citizens’ wellbeing and social justice are based on the commitment to a common conception of good life, the pursuit of which being premised by fair social and political institutions which are fair (Rawls 1971; Kymlicka, 2002). According to Fukuyama (2004; 2011; 2014), this is the balance achieved by the coexistence of the state, the rule of law and the accountable government. These are the three central institutions needed to have well-ordered political systems, the necessity of the last two being to counterbalance the state’s power. When effective, the three institutions combined will have a direct impact on the states effectiveness to provide social justice; this is to ensure good or at least minimal levels of living conditions.

Well-functioning institutions create legitimacy circles. In fact, policy’s political legitimacy has a direct impact on the capacity of the state to carry out with programs successfully. Moreover, legitimacy as such is related to the level of trust that citizens hold towards their governmental institutions. No matter how well designed or well-organized its implementation, if a program or policy does not enjoy the confidence of the citizens, failure is at high risk (Rothstein, 1998).

Why is it state building important: The importance for economic growth

Well-functioning institutions also create an appropriate atmosphere for economic grow. State capacity is a necessary condition for economic growth, and in the particular case of liberal economies, economic growth is the answer to social justice. In fact, the rise of the modern
economic world is the direct result of the capacity of the state to provide order, security, law and property rights (Fukuyama, 2004).

Modification on the role of the state in the regulation of economic matters had contrasting implications for different countries. During the XX century, as result of the dysfunctions and inefficiencies of excessive state scope in totalitarian regimes, the healthy size function and scope of state was decreased on the international sight (ibid). The problem was that as consequence pressures for liberating the market ignored the different necessities of countries in relation to state building. Thus in countries where states power was needed to be cut back, at least in relation to their role in the market, benefited as it enhanced economic growth in the long run. However, a wide variety of countries in the former communist world (Latin America, Asia and Africa) the international pressure towards a lesser degree of state intervention in economic affairs did more harm than good. Agreements such as the “Washington consensus” under the wing of the International Moneraty Found and World Bank, ignored the national agendas of state building, and in the absence of proper institutional framework, these counties were left worse off after liberalization, not been capable of cover and provide appropriate levels of care and wellbeing to their citizens (Fukuyama, 2004; 2011). In trying to reduce state scope, these reforms also reduced state strength (Fukuyama, 2003).

“A critical issue facing poor countries that blocks their possibilities for economic development is their inadequate level of institutional development, they do not need extensive states, but they do need strong and effective ones with the limited scope of necessary state functions” (Fukuyama, 2004; pp.162).

A model to explore states functions and capacity

The way states are successful or not in securing these two objectives: social justice and economic development can be explored by looking at what Fukuyama (2004) calls degrees of stateness - this is the state’s functions and the capacity it has to carry on with this functions. According with theory of political development, states activities are organized along two axes as showed in Figure 2. To describe the characteristics that make a state strong and effective one can locate single institutions, as well as the states as a whole along this two continuums. Axis X identifies the scope of states activities; this is the functions and goals taken on by governments (Fukuyama, 2003; 2004; 2014). Axis Y refers to the institutional capacity, the strength and quality of the state power or the ability of states to plan and execute policies and to enforce laws cleanly and transparently (Fukuyama, 2003; 2004; 2014), meaning to administrate efficiently and with minimal bureaucracy, to control graft, corruption and bribery, and to maintain high levels of transparency and accountability in their institutions (Fukuyama, 2004; pp.15). Thus, Y-axis address the capacity of the state to execute the control role that rule of law and democracy has over the state’s power. As in X-axis, there is no commonly accepted measure to address the strength of state institutions; however, the Corruption Perception Index, the International Country Risk Guide Number, the Governance Indicator, and Freedom of House had been largely recognized as tools to evaluate states strength (ibid).

Additionally other strategies can be used, as the comparison between the normative and practical components of policy implementation proposed by Rothstein and to be explored later on 3.3. in general, and more specifically in 3.4. and 3.5. In fact, Rothstein suggests that the use of
impartiality as a measure of government quality, a normative characteristic that correlates strongly with efficient performance, consequently it makes sense to use measures of dysfunction such as the perceived levels of government corruption (Fukuyama, 2014, pp. 59)

**Figure 3. Stateness and efficiency matrix: State’s scope and strength**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quadrat I</th>
<th>Quadrat II</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Quadrat III</td>
<td>Quadrat IV</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Fukuyama, 2004; pp. 14

In modern societies, the central aim of the functions and scope of the state is to enforce an economic growth alongside social justice. By combining axis X and Y, a descriptive matrix with four quadrats can be built to evaluate stateness effectiveness in this double task. The matrix can be used to evaluate single agencies or states as a whole, with the purpose of comparing different institutions or states at a point in time, or to describe the dynamic nature of stateness by comparing a single institution at different points in time (Fukuyama, 2004).

The location of the institutions or states along the four quadrats describes four different possible combinations of capacity and functions. The best and worst case scenarios depend directly upon the balance between these two dimensions. Fukuyama says quadrant I is where development can be successful and quadrant 4 is often where development efforts break down (Fukuyama, 2003). From an economic standpoint the favorable place to be is in quadrant I but it comes at the price of social justice (Fukuyama, 2004). If state combines a limited scope of functions and strong institutional effectiveness, the chances of successfully covering its ambitions is high, but the scope of coverage is minimal. On the other hand, if the state maintains its strong institutional effectiveness (Quadrat II) and increases as well its functions social provisions will grow but economic success will decrease. In fact the presumption is that economic growth will tend to fall as states move farther to the right along axis X (ibid). The problem for many countries in the past with reforms such as the Washington Consensus during the 90’s, was that reductions in state scope came together with a decreased state strength and rise of new demands, leaving states in quarter IV instead of I (ibid). The worst place for both goals is quadrant IV. If state moves forward on axis X but remains with low levels of institutional strength, neither economic growth nor social justice is secure. In this case, an ineffective state will be force to take on activities that cannot successfully fulfill, failing to secure even minimal standards (ibid). To sum up,

“Quad 1 is optimal—strong, with minimal provision of public goods. (eg.: U.S.)
Quad 2 (eg. Former Soviet Union, and Western European welfare states)
Quad 3 includes many failing and failed states (eg.: southern Africa)
Quad 4 is worst—ambitious state without power to implement. (eg.: Pakistan)” (Fukuyama, 2003)

This model will allow me to later situate Norway and Bolivia along these two dimensions and the four quadrats, in relation to two specific policy areas: the health and the child protection services for the first infancy (children under six year of age).

3.2.2. Rule of Law

In order to understand rule of law as an institution is necessary to clarify first the distinction between law and legislation. Law can be understood as a body of abstract rules that bind a community together; whereas legislation corresponds a function of political power also knows as positive law - the ability of a ruler to make and enforce new rules using a combination of power and authority (Fukuyama, 2011). In this context, rule of law is different to legislation and a specific way of law. In fact, its functions is to contra-rest rulers political power through a set of socially accepted set of conducts that bind even the most powerful political actors in a specific society (Fukuyama, 2014).

“The rule of law in its deepest sense means that there is a social consensus within a society that its laws are just and that they preexist and should constrain the behavior of whoever happens to be the ruler at a given time. The ruler is not sovereign; the law is sovereign, and the ruler gains legitimacy only insofar as he derives his just power from the law” (Fukuyama, 2011; pp.262).

The regulatory role that rule of law holds onto the state’s power determines a constant state of tension between these two institutions (Fukuyama, 2014). The rule of law not only smoothen the process of regulating citizens and authorities behavior by avoiding constant renegotiation and setting common standards of behavior, but it can also have a harming effect as the law can also prevent rulers from doing things they would like to do, not on their own interest but also in the interest of the community as a whole (Fukuyama, 2011).

Historically the rule of law was under the wing of institutions that ruled beyond the state or similar authorities. This origin has an effect on the way is shaped in the currents world (Fukuyama, 2004; 2011; 2014). For instance, the fact that in modern democracies the rule of law is likely to be managed by an independent organ from the executive power (Fukuyama, 2014) that is entitled to make new laws, but at the same time subjective and must function within the rule of law (Fukuyama, 2011). This could be traced back to the control role that the Catholic Church had onto the monarchies in Europe.

Why is it rule of law important

The historical accountability of the rule of law has also determined different levels of institutional development in different parts of the world. In contemporary developing countries, one of the greatest political deficits lies in the relative weakness of the rule of law (ibid). In fact, in larger
parts of the world, like Latin America, its absence or weakness has devastating effects being one of the principal reasons why some of these poor countries can’t achieve higher rates of growth (ibid). In these countries, building rule of law can be complicated, as there is no direct avenue to ensure its presence, not even through democracy. Looking at the rule of law in contemporary conditions implies going beyond the contents of written constitution and the principles by which political authorities are subject to law. It takes the observation of the characteristics of embodiment of this rules (ibid).

3.2.3. Accountable government: democracy

Democratic accountability was the last institution to emerge after the state and the rule of law. Historically the central mechanism of accountability, the parliament, can be traced back to the institutions that represented the elites in society during feudal law and that later evolved into having a regulatory role over the power of the state to tax their citizens (Fukuyama, 2014)

In general terms, accountability here is equivalent to modern democracy in the sense that it defines procedures that make governments responsive to the whole society rather than their own self-interests (Fukuyama 2011; 2014). There are mainly two types of accountability: Procedural accountability that takes the form of election by which citizens are entitled to choose and discipline their rulers through their votes; and substantive accountability by which rulers are bound to respond to the interests of the general society (Fukuyama, 2014). Although substantive accountability can function without procedural accountability, to secure the well function of democracy is assumed that at a point procedural accountability will be necessary as is the principal mechanism by which common good can be ensured (ibid).

Accountability can be achieved in a number of different ways and looking at this ways provides hints on the characteristics and level of effectiveness that has to contra balance the state’s political power. Accountability on one hand can rise from moral education where authorities socialized into feeling responsibility for their society, like is the case of China (Fukuyama, 2011); as it can be result of formal procedures. Formal accountability depends on the conditions by which the government agrees to summit itself to certain mechanisms that limit its power. This mechanisms of control, likely contained in the constitutions as a form of rule of law, allow citizens to replace the government entirely on the grounds of malfeasance, incompetence or abuse of power though democratic election (ibid).

3.2.4. Summary

In this part, I have given account to the relevance of an institutional analysis in order to better understand processes of political development. I had situated and argued the pivotal role that the political sphere has into achieving greater outcomes in overall social and economic development. I had situated the concept of political development as freedom but also as the maturity of a coherent, sufficient, and integrated set of institutions. Just recently in Bolivia the reduction of income inequality and poverty had taken a central role in the political agenda. The main steps had been to higher the allocation of resources in social expenditure but also a new set of legislative frameworks (Huber and Bogliaccini, 2010). However, political development does not depend solely on the improvement of economic conditions. For Bolivia, further political development
cannot be achieved only by the increase of basic incomes or income per capita. Development in the context of countries that had experienced the corruption of their system means the development of mechanisms that can enable a growing range of freedoms (Sen, 1990).

For these propose, in this section I also emphasized the state as a one the three fundamental institutions present in modern working states. The state was presented also as having a primary role into ensuring the well function of the other two institutions: rule of law and democracy. Sequencing in the process of political development was exposed as critical to avoid contesting conditions between the institutions. It was described the negative effects that reaching democracy before a sufficient stateness had in several countries, in which Bolivia can be subscribed. It is therefore evident the necessity for state building and further political development. Changes in legislation and budgetary assignation have to go along with a strengthening of the conditions and capacity of the state, enabling it to fully assume its responsibilities, a real practice of democracy – accountability.

Coherently in this part I also emphasized the role of the rule of law and the accountable government in order to provide some level of contention to the power invested on the state, providing the healthy balance necessary for development. Being of central interest, a model to evaluate the state’s qualities was also explained centered on the valuation of the scope of functions and the capacity of fulfilling them.

### 3.3. Specific institutional conditions: ideological and practical components of policy implementation

As detailed before, the general terms of political development can be analyzed by looking at three crucial institutions: the state, the rule of law and the accountable government. However, to explore the conditions by which these institutions are able or unable to perform their role is necessary to have a look at the normative and practical components of the implementation. It was argued the central role that state has in securing the functions of the rule of law and democracy. Moreover the balance between these three basic political institutions is a crucial condition that all societies aim to target at some point in time (Fukuyama, 2014). In order to face an analysis of the institutional conditions that make a model A successful and a model B with clear pinpoint to be improved, with the aim of later using the experience of model A to improve model B, I here complement a general analysis of the institutional conditions with a more specific analysis of the characteristics of implementation - to what extent are the institutions of a certain society capable of translating “what the state should do” into “what the state can do”.

Rothstein’s theory is bases on an extensive review of implementation research, by which he pretends to unite two ambitions perceived at the time as opposite: speculation and discipline (Rothstein, 1998). This characteristic is precisely what makes this theory relevant for a transferability analysis, as it attempts to say something about the shape of the future – the speculation component, but does so by going beyond a descriptive level to provide arguments for how policies should be framed in the future – the normative and empirical component. Rothstein (1998) argument is that:
“For attempts to analyze the future represent an exercise in constructive theorizing, an attempt to make predictions concerning what is both possible and good. Such an enterprise requires a combination of empirical and normative analysis. If one is to say something about the future, both “can” and “should” must be addressed. It is meaningless in this context to discuss what the state should do separately from what in fact can do, and wholly inappropriate and unethical to try to answer what it can do without reflecting as well on what it should do” (pp.9).

Analyzing normative and practical components: three premises

So how do we analyze what the state should do, in contrast to what the state can actually do in the realm of implementation? To guide an analysis of this nature, one can dissent three different premises critical to this process.

Firstly, Rothstein (1998) proposes that an analysis of welfare policy and its future must be based on a constructive discourse, only viable through the combination of both normative and empirical discourses. The consequence is that what the state should do – normative component, must be looked at with equal relevance as to what the state can do – empirical component.

Second, the premise establishes the importance of looking at the institutional conditions. Various formal systems of rules: constitutions, systems of taxation, programs; are all to be seen not only as rule-systems determining which strategies of action are rational and legitimate, but as established normative arrangements (Rothstein, 1998). This premise adds something new to what Fukuyama (2004, 2011, 2014) considered relevant from the rule of law in relation to political development. For this author, rule of law provided certain standards by which authorities were also limited, ensuring that their actions correspond to the benefit of the broad society rather than their personal interest. However, for Rothstein (1998) this broad socially accepted ways of conduct are more than just rules, since they also effect what values are establish in society, regarded as common culture, collective identity, belonging, trust, and solidarity. Thus, institutions not only reflect the ideological arrangements of a society, but they in fact are a tool capable of also promoting changes.

This is in fact the third premise relevant for an analysis of the normative and empirical component of political development. By analyzing the principles forming the fundamentals of established and generally accepted institutions, it should be possible through and analogous reasoning to come to general normative principles for the framing of social policy in the future (ibid).

3.4. Normative premises: Descriptive criteria for what the state should do

What are the extents and the characteristics of the provisions that are attributed as responsibilities of the government? Is a question that directly depends on the nature of the relationship existing between citizens and the state. Different models reflect different levels of responsibilities attributed to each part, which in turn have implications in how the institutions are built and
provisions arranged. In turn, institutions also reflect the ideological position in relation to the participation of each part in this concern. Kymlicka (2002) argument is that in some occasions some welfare states assume the largest responsibilities, allowing citizens to pursue their life projects from a neutral position ensuring that no specific pattern of life is prioritized over others. While in others, states attribute the larger responsibility to the communities, individuals or social network. The challenge for both positions is the same, how to ensure equality? And to what extent securing this is the responsibility of the state?

3.5. Implementation premises: Descriptive criteria for what the state can do

The successful implementation of policies rests on the capacity of the state to design and organize services with legitimate value. To explore this capacity Rothstein (1998) proposes two tools, the first one is a model that looks at the design, organization and legitimacy in terms of contents and procedures as the key elements for a successful implementation of policies. The second explores the policy theory (critical component of the design) as a precondition for the level of stress enforced onto the organization and legitimacy in terms of flexibility.

Rothstein’s (1998) six major components model for implementation has basically two categorical features that organize the conditions of success or failure. The first features refer to where is the causes located among the different steps of implementation: the design, the execution, or the political legitimacy of the policy. The second features explore what is exactly that is failing within this condition: if it’s a matter of substance - problems in the content, or a matter of process - problems in the dynamic. In this respect, the challenge can be on how to adjust the objective to best fit the necessities of both clients and provider, or how to arrange the political system to operate in regards to this objectives (ibid).

**Figure 4. Six major categories of factors affecting policy implementation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Substance</th>
<th>Process</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Design</td>
<td>1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>2.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimacy</td>
<td>3.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Rothstein, 1998; pp. 73

As showed in Figure 4, six are the different possible situations. In principle, a green light in each of the six boxes will ensure that the implementation of a program corresponds and fulfils the objectives that motivated its creation (Rothstein, 1998; pp.73). However conditions of certainty in this respect are rather rare. In most circumstances, successful implementation is a question of flexibility (ibid). It is a crucial element the capacity to accommodate the actions anticipated by the policy theory to the variances and the uncertainty that characterizes reality.
Rothstein (1998; pp.114) devised a simple formula to explore the successful implementation of public policies by looking at the preconditions. As shown in Figure 4: he proposes that depending on the degree of certainty in the policy theory, more or less stress will be enforced onto the adaptive capacity of the organization, and the extent to which legitimacy will be necessary during the implementation stage. Therefore, the higher the uncertainty on the policy theory, the higher the pressure applied on the organization and legitimacy process. Whereas the more certainty on the policy theory, the simpler the tasks that the organization has to assume and the easier the legitimacy is achieved in the process of implementation.

**Figure 5. Preconditions for the successful implementation of public policy**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case 1: Broad targeting (static regulatory)</th>
<th>Policy theory</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Legitimacy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case 2: Dynamic interventionism</th>
<th>Policy theory</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Legitimacy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Rothstein, 1998; pp. 114

### 3.5.1. Substance of policy design

The substance of a policy design is the first out of the six major components useful to examine the extent to which normative expectations can be effectively translated into actions. According with Rothstein (1998), this component is about the degree of knowledge over the causes of a certain social problems, and the effect that this knowledge has on the design of the policy as such. In fact, a critical recommendation that the author derives from research is that clear and precise objectives are vital, and can be better achieved if those in the position of elaborating them have prior knowledge of the relation that existed between efforts and results in past experiences.

However, knowledge is not the only fundamental cause by which the design can fail. The real applicability of a design also depends on other factors such as ethical, political, legal and economic conditions (ibid). In certain circumstances, there are cases in which programs can also be purely symbolic or demand driven. These types of programs or policies are not aimed to solve the problem, rather there are elaborated as evidence to prove to the larger society that something is being done. It is often the case that programs of this nature are inspired by the pressure that authorities once a problem has been widely recognize by the society (ibid).

### 3.5.2. Process of policy design

The design of certain policy or program is not conducted in a vacuum; in fact, political conflicts often have relevant effects over the design outcome (Rothstein, 1998). During the design process, negotiations often take place between conflicting parts. One possible shortcoming of such situations can be the rendering to unclear or even contradictory objectives due to the preponderance of achieving a compromise (ibid). However, in order to achieve clear objectives, it
does not mean that negotiation and compromises need to be avoided. In fact, both are inevitable and necessary steps. What is relevant is the level of coherence and clarity achieved in the design as well as the skills of those carrying on with the duty of designing (ibid)—a matter of being accountable.

3.5.3. Substance of Organizing

The substance of organizing refers to several conditions that ensure an effective application of the designed measures. Based on a review of research in the area of policy implementation, Rothstein (1998) identifies the following as the most relevant attributes that ensure an effective practice: a motivated and capable staff, sufficient material resources, and a good level of coherence between the structure of the organization carrying with the task and the objectives of these policies, programs or services (ibid). In relation to this last aspect, a suitable avenue to explore the coherence organization-objectives is to look at the degree of adjustment to individual conditions demanded by the tasks. In case were adjustment is highly required, structures that allow flexibility are more suitable (ibid).

3.5.4. Process of organizing

The main problem in this component is the responsibility drift, better known as the “black hole of democracy” (Rothstein, 1998). Programs do not operate as depending on single organizations. Often they involved a number of different organizations along the continuum private-public, which coordination conduces to a complicated net of authority relations and levels of responsibility and accountability (ibid). Indeed, according with the author this relation is often played within a three-dimensional net composed by: the state, the producer (direct organization in charge of providing the services) and the citizen. The successful coordination between these three basic nets is what will define a successful process of organizing or not. Coherently, there are at least two mechanisms that the state can use to regulate these institutions: on one hand it can be normed through ethical codes. On the other, it can allow the market to regulate by giving citizens the opportunity to choose (ibid).

Therefore, what the state can do is defined by the state’s capacity to: first, coordinate, direct and regulate the political interest; second, to standardize the action repertoires to the ideological ambition of the producer institutions in relation to the citizens, and third, to ensure a sufficient level of coherence between their services and the objectives of the policy as defined by the design (ibid).

3.5.5. Substance of legitimacy

Citizen’s trust in the institutions responsible for implementing public policies is decisive for what the state can or cannot do. Rothstein point here is about the relevance of legitimacy, just as it was pointed out in previous sections through the concept of rule of law and democracy. The states capacity is more than a matter of programs, design, casual theories, or organs of implementation, is also a question of the view citizens hold over the existing state (Rothstein, 1998). As Fukuyama (2011, 2014) and Rothstein (1998) also recognize democracy as the main avenue to
legitimacy. Moreover, he proposes that if the discrepancy between policy goals and practical measures increases, it can be expected that legitimacy eases. Thus, its relevance to keep sufficient room for flexibility to meet the changing or unexpected needs of citizens, which in turn will reflect on an increase in the support and legitimacy of public policies (ibid).

3.5.6. Process of legitimacy

Rothstein (1998) identifies six ideal-typical models of what the state can do in order to ensure that its policies are implemented in a manner regarded as legitimate:

a. The legal-bureaucratic model: ensures legitimacy through the enforcing of uniform rules by which citizens can predict the outcome of their dealings with the state. However the limitation is that this model tends to be stiff and dependent on uncorrupt and impartial bureaucrats.

b. The professional model: transfers the implementation power to specialized professionals, by doing so the state becomes dependent on the professionals’, and this entails limitation on what measures it can take within their group. However, the professionals also become dependent on the state to grant them membership and the right to look after the citizens.

c. The corporatist model: is based on the idea of using representatives to legitimize policies and programs targeting the group accountable. For this model to be effective, representatives must be elected in a democratic fashion and enjoy confidence of the members they represent. Additionally, it can only be applied when such an organization exists in the society and when organizations are considered as co-responsible instead of antagonists.

d. The user-oriented model: it grants influence over implementation to direct service users. The limitation here is the possibility of conflicting interests among the same group of users, or even conflicts with the professional ambitions of the staff.

e. The politician-oriented model: functions in a similar manner, but instead of direct service, users elect local politicians, assuming they have certain civic discernment so the participation in decision will be regarded as legitimate. However the risk here is higher, as administrative power will be resting on individuals responding also to the political party ambitions. Moreover, support by the citizens can also be partial decreasing the level of legitimacy of their decisions.

f. The lottery-based model: solves this problem by selecting individuals through a lottery, ensuring legitimacy by a process in which all citizens enjoy the same chance to occupy the decision making power. This model can be in fact effective if specific experts are difficult to reach or are inaccessible.

3.5.7. Summary

In this last three sections 3.3 – 3.5. I had given an account of the conditions necessary to translate the normative components of policies into practice. However, as stated at the beginning of 3.3. an approach of this nature also allows a completion of a cycle of change, by which institutional arrangement can also enforce change on a normative level. To examine these conditions I have first given a general description of the normative and practical components of implementation. It was then argued that in order to explore the conditions by which these institutions are able or
unable to perform their role is necessary to have a look at the qualities of implementation. In fact, although the stateness is key element in providing a sufficient and stable atmosphere for political development, it is not the sufficient condition. In line with Fukuyama, the quality of the state is essential and Rothstein’s theory arguments for how policies should be framed in order to promote a quality of state in the future. Here three main points were presented as principles to analyze implementation. The first one, describes two important discourses that need to be combined for the analysis: the normative and the empirical discourse. The second, had to do with the importance of looking at the rules (institutions) as inflicting effect on what is valued in a society. The third, indicated that by identifying principles forming the fundaments of generally accepted institutions one could also do an analogous reasoning to generate normative principles in the future.

Subsequently, I gave an overview of the two aspects of implementation. In 3.4 the normative premises are presented I looked at the principle of neutrality and individual autonomy, by which the state has the pressure to balance the provision of equal opportunities with the neutrality towards citizen’s choice. Finally in 3.5 I presented six major factors affecting policy implementation, organized around two different steps: the substance and the process. There, it was stated that beyond this six categories, the successful implementation of policies are a question of flexibility: the capacity that institutions have to accommodate the actions anticipated by the policy theory to the changing reality.
4. Methodology

This chapter briefly describes the research method. I first outline the research approach (3.1) to later characterize the research design (3.2), study area (3.3), data collection method (3.4), interview process (3.5), analysis process (3.6), ethical considerations (3.7) and limitations (3.8).

4.1. Research Approach

The research initiated when I realized the similarities between discursive principles present in Norway and Bolivia. It caught my attention that regardless of their distinctive location and history, both had embraced a common political approach: social-democracy. Although the discursive elements were similar, practical results seemed very different based on the content of news, professional opinions and academic papers. As been familiar with the Bolivian history, a major process of change has started with iconic steps such as the approval of a new constitution in 2004. As a result, social services and local administrative layers had been faced with the challenge or assuming to new responsibilities. Ten years later the operationalization of such is still in progress and results are far from being visible. An initial overview of the policies targeting children’s wellbeing in both countries showed further similarities on the scope of services. However, it also made evident the contrasting results both countries had in this respect, bringing to surface the interest to: understand better the conditions associated with these contrasting outcomes, but also finding ways in which development could be enhanced in Bolivia.

The complexity of the topic led me to consider different options of narrowing the scope of feasible research with concerns to resources, experience and time. It was also evident that the difficulty to find a solid theory to analyze both the general but also the practical components in each country. Therefore, I decided to combine two theories. Fukuyama’s Theory of Political Development and Decay, and Rothstein Theory of Policy Implementation to explore the protection and health care services for children under six. These theories were selected as they have clear descriptive categories in the form of models, allowing a comparative analysis of the contexts. The analytical process followed an inductive orientation, in which the theory did not guide the research question and design (Bryman, 2012), but came along after the data collection as an element for the organization and interpretation of the data.

There are many comparative studies conducted in the topic of policy transferability but little has been done with a scope towards the future, this is the analysis of policy transferability as a tool for policy design, policy planning and overall development. In consequence, for this research a qualitative approach is suitable as it is the design for excellence to develop theory (Merriam, 1998; Bryman, 2012). Additionally, a transferability analysis requires the contrast of a phenomena along different context. Coherently this research subscribes within a qualitative approach with a comparative design.
4.2. Study Design

In simple words, a comparative design allows the study of two cases (which may be organization, nations, communities, etc) using the same research instrument with the aim of explaining similarities and differences, bringing awareness and understanding on a reality in different national contexts (Bryman, 2012). Moreover, when a comparative design is applied with a qualitative strategy it takes the form of multiple-case study. The advantage is that it helps to generate theory within the real-life context (ibid). In this case, in the form of factors for transferability, through the analysis of mechanism working in contrasting contexts.

This study centers on the issue of policy transferability between a case where policies for children under six are broadly considered effective, the case of Norway, and a context where it is not, the case of Bolivia. Therefore in this study Norway is a model that can be used to improve the services and provisions arranged in Bolivia for the wellbeing of children during the pre-school period. Both countries have similar legislative mandates and have agreed to international regulations on the topic (like the United Nations Declaration of the Rights of the Child), however their results are dissimilar. The study aim is to provide hints on the conditions behind these differences, examining practices that could be transferred in order to achieve better conditions in Bolivia. In this respect, the analysis of the implementation of policies is centered to the case of Bolivia, to identify the conditions that limit the effective practice of the rights and entitlements assumed at a formal legislative level. Norway at this level is used as a model to see the conditions, mechanisms and means for an effective practice of the normative principles.

To perform an analysis on transferability, first I look at the conditions behind working intuitions: the policy issue. Thus, the objectives of this study are two:

a. Identify the specific characteristics of the policies, institutional body, services and benefits available for child under the age of six in Cochabamba-Bolivia and Stavanger-Norway.

b. Explore the possibility to use the experience of Norway in the Bolivian setting as a tool to improve the child welfare provisions.

4.3. Study Area

The research took place in two different contexts: the Stavanger Kommune in the Region of Rogaland, Norway; and the municipality of Cercado (Cochabamba City) or the Department of Cochabamba, Bolivia. According with Statistics Norway (2014), by the last quarter of 2014 Norway had 5 165 802 inhabitants, from which Rogaland hosted 466 302, and Stavanger 132 102. In regards to Bolivia, the National Institute of Statistics (2011) in last updates in 2011 found that from the 10 624 495 inhabitants that the country has, 618 376 lived in Cercado.

In respect to the policy field of interest in this research, three welfare areas were identify for children under six: Child protection services, child benefits, and child health services. In this
research, experts and servants were interviewed in respect to the first and the latest (Child protection and health services). In Norway, experts were contacted through their participation with the University of Stavanger. In Bolivia, experts and servants were contacted based on their academic experience or their experience working in public institutions.

4.4. Data Collection Method

The empirical data for this study was gathered through a main source: semi-structures interviews with experts and servants. The interviews for Norway were done face to face. For Bolivia, the interviews where done with the cooperation of a surrogate and the support of phone calls. To further strengthen the findings, I also used supplementary sources of data to corroborate or clarify what was mention by the respondents. These sources were directly pointed out by the interviewed party. Questions were conducted to clearly identify these sources so they could be retrieved later. In other occasions, these sources were printed and shared by the respondents as to support their statements. The secondary sources were abundant and helped to understand what was stated in the interviews, however only few were finally used in the analysis.

4.4.1. Specific characteristics of the data collection instrument

Interviews are the most common method to collect empirical data on qualitative research (Merriam, 1998; Bryman, 2012). Commonly the asset of interviews is their capacity to provide access to information that otherwise cannot be observed such as feelings and perception, getting a grasp of what is in someone else’s mind (Patton, 1990; Merriam, 1998). However, in this research feelings and personal opinions are threated carefully. The aim of the interviews was to access large amount of information through the answer of experts and servants. It was asked to the interviewed party to be as objective as possible and to answer based on information that could be supported by reliable sources (such as researches, professional experience, or official documents). Therefore the nature of the questions was informant factual questions. These questions focus on accessing information that is familiar to the respondent, where interviewed candidate takes the role of informants rather than respondents answering questions about themselves (Bryman, 2012).

Semi-structured interview

There are two types of qualitative interviews depending on their flexibility level: un-structure and semi-structure (Bryman, 2012). For this study a semi-structure interview was the most adequate. In a semi-structure interview, there are thematic areas that are supposed to be covered as well as suggested questions, but the form of the questions and the sequence is subject to adjustments to: follow more naturally the discourse of participants and encourage them to answer with certain freedom, as well as to allow the interviewer to explore more in-depth certain areas or ask for clarifications (Packer, 2010). Having thematic areas is important for comparative research since context needs to be contrasted under the same terms (Bryman, 2012).
A total of seven semi-structure interviews were conducted, three for Norway and four for Bolivia. The interview guides were designed following two aims:

**a.** Identify the policies and institutional conditions behind the services and benefits relevant to the field of child welfare.

**b.** Characterize and describe the specific services and benefits available in each context in regards to Child Protection and Child Health care policies for children under six.

Following this double aim, the first phase of each interview was composed by general open questions. Later, to attend the second aim a grid of possible case scenarios was built and used for each policy area. Open questions around four thematic areas: Coverage, access, provider and quality, were also asked to guide the interview. Since the interviews were conducted in two different countries with different languages the guide was first designed and tested in English in a pilot interview; and then translated into Spanish. For detailed information about the guides see Annex I and Annex II. To ensure that the grids and question were relevant to the aim of the study they were also controlled and approved by an experienced supervisor.

**Phase II instrument: case-scenario grids**

Whereas critics argue that it may be advantageous to have a more open-ended approach in many instances, the need for comparison often means that the researcher needs to develop an explicit focus having effect on what is considered for the collection of data (Bryman, 2012). To balance between flexibility and common categories that can be used to contrast two contexts, the semi-structured interview was tooled with a grid of possible case scenarios for each policy area (See Figure 6). The thematic areas were chosen following the most common categories when describing welfare state models (see for example: Esping-Andersen, 1990): Provider, coverage, and access. Quality, a fourth dimension was also considered since the mere presence of services or benefits may not allow an in-depth understanding of the level of effectiveness. These four thematic areas were organized as a continuum between two opposite poles. For each case scenario, questions were made eliciting the description of the services rather than a simple categorization along these ranges.

**Figure 6: Child Welfare Service Areas and Thematic Areas**

| Provider: | Public | Private |
| Coverage: | Extensive | Minimal |
| Access: | Universal | Selective |
| Quality: | High | Low |

Source: Self production.
It is desirable to conduct a pilot study before administering structured tools, since piloting has the role of ensuring that the research instrument functions well (Bryman, 2012). Although this is commonly done for self-administrated instruments such as questionnaires, the grids are also structured case scenarios that were built by the researcher. Therefore, to ensure that the instrument would help to gather relevant information in regards to the research question and aim, it was tested prior to its application to the respondents and adjusted as needed. The grids can be seen in Annex I for the English version and Annex II for the Spanish version.

### 4.4.2. Participants

A total of eight participants were selected. Due to the complexity of the topic, the nature and the aim of the interviews, only professionals with experience and expertise in the areas of interest were selected. In Norway, interviews were conducted only with experts, whereas for Bolivia both experts and field professionals were considered. This was due to the necessity to cross, validate, contrast, and complement information in Bolivia, as the opinion of experts and professionals could be biased due to their belonging to political parties or pressure from social organizations. In consequence, for Norway three experts were interviewed. One with knowledge over the general organization of the welfare and political system, and two other experts on child welfare and health care services. In Bolivia, two experts: one in child protection services and another in health care provisions; and three field professionals: two working with protection services for either the municipality or the region; and another middle-range authority of the health care service. Although purposive sampling can be containing (Silverman, 2013), this combination between academics, low-range professionals, authorities, regional and communal based was important for Bolivia as coordination between systems is limited.

The criteria for selecting the experts were their academic experience on the specific area of interest. For Bolivia it was important to select only academics that were not involved with the public service or political parties. In this country, research is mainly done through NGO’s initiatives. Therefore experts were contacted through a net of NGOs that appointed possible informants. In Norway, academics were contacted through the university as it is the common environment for academic production. To select the servants to be interviewed in Bolivia the criteria was at least one: part of the regional system, part of the community level, middle range authority, and low-range servant; and were contacted through colleagues working at the public university.

### 4.4.3. Interview Process

The interviews start with a description of the aim of the study and it’s possible academic and practical contribution. I then clarify the nature of the interview and the qualities of information that was requested. It was mentioned briefly the importance of their participation and the anonymity of their participation. Then it was allowed for them to comment on their capacity to provide reliable relevant information and agreed of not to take part on the study. All interviewees confirmed they met the criteria for selection and accepted to participate. Then it was asked if they would agree to have the interview recorded with the finality of having an adequate transcript of
the data (Merriam, 1998). Only one participant denied to be taped. Detailed notes were taken instead.

The interviews were conducted in two different countries with different languages. The interviews in Norway were a face-to-face dialogue in English. In Bolivia, initially interviews were tried to be through skype. However it was difficult for the respondents to meet the dates. This was considered in advance as a possibility because of the lack of familiarity to this means of communication. Therefore, a surrogate was a better option. She was charged of conducting the interviews. Two sessions were arranged prior the interview to inform the surrogate about aim of the study and the logic of the questions and case-scenario grids. On the last session, comprehension and familiarity with the tool was proven through role playing.

4.5. Analytical Procedures

A qualitative approach emphasizes words rather than quantification when collecting and analyzing data, following an inductive process (Bryman, 2012). The general strategy when processing the data was grounded theory. After the data collection, transcripts were made considering what was said by the experts. Because of the nature of this study, there was a strong emphasis on the content rather than the emotional component on their narrative. These transcripts were later read in detail. Notes were taken of the overall impression after every single transcript. First the three interviews were read for Norway and then the four for Bolivia taking a long pause in the middle. It was considered important to analyze the data first in a separate manner avoiding preconceptions when reviewing the interviews for Bolivia. Then the transcripts were reviewed again, in this time sentences were highlighted and named descriptively in regards to their contents following an open coding strategy. In this way, my interpretation of data shaped the emerging codes and not the other way around (Bryman, 2012; pp.568-569).

Secondly, the interviews were read again, the codes that were at time extensive description of the contents were named with a thematic tag. Codes then were organized and named under inclusive topics. The result was four thematic diagrams: two for Norway and two for Bolivia, one per policy area: child protection and heath care services. Then these themes were contrasted per country giving a final organization of the themes per country: two thematic diagrams. Interviews were read again using these diagrams. Quotes exemplifying the themes were extracted for each country. This process of constant comparison helped to maintain a close connection between the data and conceptualization (ibid). Finally, the results were contrasted with the models and the theoretical concepts. Although there was a clear idea about the use of the model and concepts to facilitate the comparison of Norway and Bolivia, the process of the data was done independently to ensure objectivity.

4.6. Ethical Considerations

The first ethical consideration is in regards to the aim of the study itself. Traditionally Denmark’s have been used to force countries into following certain pathways of development, sometimes against their own interests and needs (s.e. Washington consensus effect in developing countries
in Theoretical Framework). To what extent is transferability an asset or a risk? In fact, this research study aims to provide some evidence of how transferability can be considered an asset for development. This is mainly achieved by keeping the interest and conditions of the recipient country in central focus. Transferability in this research is not done through the imposition of policies or programs, but rather as ideas. This is important, as it gives room for the recipient country to develop practices around those ideas that better fit their context.

The second group of ethical reflections are practical. When dealing with respondents, there are several factors that need to be considered to safeguard their participation in the study. Silverman (2013) points out five ethical aspects to be consider in this respect: inform consent, confidentiality, voluntary participation, avoid harm, and conflict of interests. Respondents were provided with information about the scope, method and aim and the research and were asked to voluntarily participate. Their anonymity was ensured and tape records were only used after their approval.

4.7. Limitations

A set of logistical and practical limitation were present in the study and could had implication on the loss of possible relevant data:

- The restricted amount of time and resources: narrowed the scope of the study and the amount of interviews. It also made it impossible to conduct the interviews face-to-face in person for the case of Bolivia.
- As a complex topic it was not possible to corroborate and examine documents that could have provided a deeper picture.
- By interviewing experts and servants I had access to large amount of information in a very short time, but information was in a way selected by the respondent when answering.
- The language: In Norway the interviews were done in English, second language to both respondents and interviewer. In Bolivia, the interviews were done in Spanish, native language to both respondents and interviewer, but interview guides and the later answers had to be translated into English. To lower the loss of information to the minimum, the analysis of data for Bolivia was done in Spanish and later translated into English.
- The use of surrogate interviewer in Bolivia.

Additionally, a set of limitations are also attached to the methodological approach of the study:

- Reliability and validity are often considered weak in qualitative studies. However, are matters of the quality of the measures rather than the design itself (Bryman, 2012). In this case, this risk was lowered by presenting clear descriptions about the procedures of selecting respondents, design measures of concepts, research instruments and analysis of data.
- Being a comparative study based on two cases in two specific communities, generalization is low. Nevertheless, it is important to consider that generalization in qualitative studies can take a different form than the traditional by looking at generalizability in regards to structures rather than single social practices (Gobo, 2008)
It has been argued by some scholars that the downside of a comparative multi-case study is that the researcher pays less attention to the specific context and more to the ways in which the cases can be contrasts (Bryman, 2012). This limitation was lowered by using the multiple case scenario grids, this tools allowed to explore in specific the ways policies and principles were implemented through specific services. By not only asking about the general institutional, political, administrative and organization conditions behind services and asking for the characteristics of the services as such, specific context were grasped.
5. Analysis I: Institutional Appreciation: strength and scope

The analysis is divided in two chapters. In Chapter 5, I explore the capacity and scope of the states by looking at their functions and their ability to carry on with these functions. This analysis provides a clear comparative picture of Bolivia and Norway. Both countries have assumed a similar coverage in regards to child welfare – health and protection; however they reached contrasting results. As the results show this is directly related to the balance or unbalance between scope and strength, and the implementation conditions. In this chapter, Bolivia and Norway are described in terms of the state scope-strength. In Chapter 6, I introduce the analysis of the implementation conditions as the fundamentals for policy transfer.

Outlining the content, first I present the result in terms of general institutional conditions of Child Protection Services and Child Health Care Services in Norway and Bolivia (5.1). The scope (5.2) and the state strength (5.3) are presented in terms of the rule of law and democracy. Together these steps provide a general overview of the institutional conditions.

5.1. Findings: General Institutional Features

After a review of the interviews with experts and servant in Bolivia and Norway, similar but also different categories were identified. These categories are organized in different topic areas and provide an overall picture of the general institutional conditions for services. Following, I briefly present these categories and the general contents covered by each one of them as a start-up for the later comparison of both systems.

Before I introduce the general results, it is important to clarify that I do not present direct quotation in this section in order to avoid repetition. The categories and their content serve as the building blocks for the overall analysis. Direct support for these categories is presented along the rest of the sections providing clear example of the meaning of the categories in regards to the analytical tools and concepts.

5.1.1. General Institutional Features: Findings in Norway

Contents of the information gather are organized in four areas:

- Organizational arrangements
- Legal framework
- Control mechanisms
- Services and values
The first area includes three aspects: the administrative levels and roles, the political and organizational features and the local autonomy and decentralized services. There are three administrative levels: the national, the regional and the community level. The national level is in charge of establishing common targets. The regional and community level both function within the parameters of the Child Law, Children Act and UNCRC (United Nations Convention for the Right of the Child). However, the region responds to the national department and the community enjoys certain autonomy. Within the region, there is also an independent control organ that monitors the services and administration of the Region and Community.

There are two topics in regards to the political and organizational features:

- The general political organization of Norway in three organs: parliament, judicial power and executive power to ensure the functionality and reliability of decision making and administrative processes.
- The mixed experts-political composition of administrative levels, bringing democratic representation, stability, continuity, and expertise.

In respect to the last organizational feature, local autonomy and decentralized services, the manner in which services are provided to the public is described as: accessible to users with decentralized services in local units and division in specialized disciplines/tasks; as well as flexible and subject to local adjustment. Two features were identified in relation to these arrangements:

- Institutional coordination as a crucial factor for quality. Coordination was described in terms of mediation agents and institution, communication of relevant information, and coordination rather than merging of services.
- Adjustment of national programs to the local reality, as dependent of the characteristics of the population and the capacity of local institutions to do so.

The second area, legal framework refers to the law behind services and law enforcement mechanisms. In Norway, this framework subscribes national and local level to the mandates of the Child Law, Child Welfare Act and UNCRC. The law establishes the overruling primacy of the children rights. Law bounds professionals in contact with children to report provide a quality of service, and collaborate for the welfare of the child. The law is represented at the regional level through the Family Courts and a national level by the Supreme Court, both working in an independent manner from other institutions. This is an essential feature that has brought a sense of fairness and trust from citizens towards decision makers and the overall system. Nevertheless, law is just one ingredient to the formula for effective services. The conditions of the system, professionals, and resources are also critical components.

The third thematic area, the control mechanisms identify means to control and connect citizens with the services. Control mechanism exists in two different levels:

- For providers: the Control Province is the agency working at a regional level to ensure the quality of the services and administration. The control has a sanctioning but also a constructive nature, ensuring support to develop the institutions.
- For citizens: agents and institutions, such as the Public Health Nurse and the Mother-Child Offices act as agents of surveillance and mediation, connection citizens to services.

Finally, the area of services and values contain the descriptions of how services work within and reinforce certain values. Seven values were identified in the discourse of the experts in relation to provisions for children under six: the value of keeping women in the labor market, children come first, prevention before attention, keep families together, individual autonomy, and equality/integration.

5.1.2. General Institutional Features: Findings in Bolivia

In Bolivia, the same four categorical areas are present. In respect to the first, organizational arrangements, four sub-thematic are present: administrative levels and roles, political and organization features, autonomy and decentralization, and bureaucracy. Although the first three are common to Norway, the content of each section diverges significantly and an additional topic is included: bureaucracy.

In relation to the first subtheme, administrative layers are organized in a similar way to Norway, in a hierarchical structure from national to local: national ministries, regional governments and municipalities. Likewise municipalities enjoy certain autonomy and the responsibility to develop national programs and polices into local services. However roles and coordination channels are different. The national level prescribes targets and programs that function at local level but depend on national head offices. The consequence is a parallelism of services attending similar issues but working in little or no coordination.

The regional and municipal levels are under the National Constitution and the Children’s Act and UNCRC as it’s in Norway. Both enjoy in theory certain autonomy. In practice autonomy becomes difficult since mechanisms and responsibilities are unclear. Similarly, there is a supposed control mechanism functioning at a regional level, but in practice the budget for this function is insufficient and the monitory reduces to an administrative and financial control. This control mechanism is dependent on the regional governance which has implications on its reliability.

In regards to the political and organizational features one new topic is added and the contents for all are rather different to Norway:

- General political organization of Bolivia is in four organs: parliament, judicial power, executive power and national democratic court. The former is a control organ to prevent corruption during democratic processes.
- Composition and selection of administrative levels responds to a mixture between designated authorities by political leaders and professionals appointed on personal or political interests. Consequentially policies and services are constantly changing and are effectively and quality wise different from one community to another and from one political period to the next.
- The personnel are regular staff (more stable with long term contracts) or consultants (highly mobile).
In respect to the local autonomy and decentralized structure, same as in Norway, services are provided to the public through de-concentrated local units. Challenges were identified by the respondents:

- **Highly disperse communities.**
- **Missing channels that connect families and services.**
- **Insufficient personnel and resources**
- **Decentralization is not encompassed with the necessary coordination between services and administrative layers.**
- **Autonomy and local based projects:** local project to respond to local demands with limited continuity beyond different government periods.
- **Autonomy and national programs:** National programs respond to their own administrative units which makes coordination difficult at local level.

The last organizational feature has to do with bureaucracy and efficiency. Parallel layers and an over-complicated administrative organization are factors leading to high levels of bureaucracy. Everyday decision making is constrained and overall efficiency of the system is compromised.

In relation to the second area: legal framework, both national and local levels subscribed to the same legal framework the Children’s Act recently issued in August 2014. The act attributes the legislative and executive power to the national level. For this purpose mechanisms such as the Intersectorial Council of Infancy and Adolescence are considered essential but remain as a project. The act also recognizes the implementation of policies and provision of services concurrent to regions, municipalities and indigenous territories. Moreover, within the framework of autonomies regional and municipal level have the responsibility to develop local policies. Thus, their decision making authority is considered equivalent to the national level. Still they have to respond to targets and programs enforced by national law. However, local policies have not been developed yet. Similarly roles of municipality and region in respect to national programs in the new framework laws have not been clarified.

In relation to control mechanisms, the Children’s Act stipulates the responsibility of professionals working with children to report. However, there are no mechanisms to monitor this. For social servants law only recognizes their accountability if they are regular staff. For consultants and short term employees no control mechanism applies. Finally, law is represented at regional level by the Regional Family Courts and at national level by the Supreme Family Court, both independent from other institutions and overloaded with cases and slow bureaucratic procedures.

In respect to the third thematic area, control mechanisms function on two different levels:

- **For providers** carried in three different ways:
  - **Formal control mechanism:** embodied within the regional governmental institution compromising its reliability. Budget and political disposition is poor, so control authorities respond to media pressure. Thus certain social organizations, like the association of health professionals, can act in opposition to the control in protection of their own interest.
b. **Social action**: at times social organizations are also mobilized to advocate. Just recently, ministries have used this tool to pressure municipalities. This is related to the lack of formal mechanisms of coordination and control after the new law was enforced.

c. **Care-giver involvement and control**: service users can also act as control agents, pressuring but also mediating for the improvement of local units. Caregivers can bridge between local services.

- **For citizens**: the state controls the access of children to their rights through bonuses. By law, Child Protection Units and Local Health Services should have a proactive role, controlling the well development and wellbeing of the children. However, the precariat conditions of these units make this task impossible, as well as the lack of technological tools to keep a track on the highly mobile population.

Finally, services work within and reinforced certain values. Four values were identified by respondents: regional not individual based redistribution (redistribution takes place by the allocation of more resource in the most deprive neighborhoods and areas), protection overrules family bonds, attention over prevention, and childhood as a passive uniform experience (adults in becoming).

To sum up, a similar organizational structure was identified in both countries; this corresponds to the levels of administrative organization, local autonomy, presence of control mechanisms, and common legal frameworks covering all administrative levels. However, differences were also identified in regards to procedural and implementation practices: administrative conflicts between administrative levels, client centric and minimal services, high bureaucracy, limited coordination, and lack of professionalism were common to the Bolivian context. In the following sections, I will show how these conditions are linked to the capacity of the state to cover the scope of services it assumes in the provision of child welfare.

### 5.2. Scope: The Extent of State’s Functions

#### 5.2.1. Scope of Rule of Law

The scope of rule of law are similar between Norway and Bolivia. From national to local, all levels are subject to the same body of rules aimed to limit authority’s political power (Fukuyama, 2014). The occurrence of the children rights and the responsibility of the state and the decision makers to that respect are common and represented by the National Constitution, Child Care Law, Children Act. In both countries this also entitles:

- The national level to enforce certain standards, targets and budgets to which regional and community level need to adjust.
- Responsibility to provide the direct services to the regional and community level.
- Certain freedom to adjust the services to the population’s necessities and demands.
“By law and constitution the State recognizes the superior nature of the rights of the child, the primacy and pre-eminence of the care of children and adolescents; also states that the guarantor of the appliance of their rights is the State through public institutions […] which implies that the central government is the one with the legislative and executive powers […] and at the same time must answer to this responsibility. Likewise it recognizes that the implementation of policies and provision of services is concurrent with the regions, municipalities and indigenous territories” (Expert Health Care Bolivia).

The attribution of responsibilities to different administrative levels bounds the authorities to make decisions and arrange services within these limits. Authorities are not free to make decisions based on their freewill or personal interest, there are limited by the rule of law (Fukuyama, 2011). Law also rules over the citizen’s freewill by ensuring that their interaction happens within certain normative premises and is represented at the regional and national level trough the Family and Supreme Court respectively. Courts are the institutions in charge of applying the law regulating individual-base interaction between citizens, better known as the capacity of states to legislate - positive law (Fukuyama, 2011).

In fact, the development of a legislative independent institution was a process in which decision making transited from the politicians to a new independent organ. This is a key feature of modern democracies (Fukuyama, 2014) as it controls that the application of law is made by an organ independent from the state (Fukuyama, 2011), ensuring transparency in its practice and elaboration, and controlling the power of authorities by subjecting them to it.

Referring to the Family Court “This court is independent and that’s very important [...] because in Norway the whole system is a sharing between the one who delegates, giving the law; and the executive, who administrates; and the judicial power. The court is part of the judicial power. [...] before in history there was team of politicians deciding that and that was a problem, now is left to the court” (Expert 1 Child Protection Norway).

The configuration to this respect in Norway and Bolivia corresponds to the same levels: Executive Organ, coordinating and administrating; the Legislative Organ, elaborating law and representing the people; and the Judicial Power, enforcing the law and controlling that constitution is met (Health Expert Bolivia).

Although the levels are the same, the effectiveness could differ due to two reasons: the scope of the law as such or the strength (the conditions of the system, professionals, and resources to apply the law) (Fukuyama, 2003). In relation to the scope, Norway and Bolivia have similar conditions. Law clearly stipulates role, responsibilities and mechanisms at all levels. However, the quality of the description of the role is different. For example, in Norway, law is very specific in terms of the active role that professionals have in relation to the wellbeing of the child, to work not only as control agents but also in partnership with the users and the services.

“The school law says that if the teacher sees that the child is bitten [...] they are to report to the child welfare services and that there are to collaborate with the child welfare services […]. The same you have in the kinder garden and in laws for nurses
and hospitals and all kind of different areas concerning a child upbringing. In each of 
their laws they say that you are to work together to help the child” (Expert 2 Child 
Protection Norway).

In Bolivia, what we see is that responsibilities to professionals are new in the legal framework. 
Moreover these attributions are limited to the role of control. For example, back in 2004, the 
Bolivian Children Law there was no responsibility attributed to regular citizens and public 
servants to ensure the wellbeing of the child, unless there was already and abuse of rights, and 
then reporting was an obligation of the maximum authority.

“Article 8\textsuperscript{th}: [---] the directors of hospital centers or establishments public and 
private health, should warn abandonment, abuse or sexual violence affecting a 
newborn a child or adolescent, they are obliged to report the fact in writing together 
with relevant documents to the closest Child Protection Service” (Bolivian Children 
Law, 2004).

Although some progress has been made through the addition of the New Children Law 
(2014) in a specific reporting responsibility section; the content remains limited to just 
control. Article 175\textsuperscript{th} states that:

“Everyone has the obligation to report to the Child Protection Service cases of threat 
or violation of the rights [---] The public servants have a duty to report such threats or 
violations, and failure to report is an offense that is punishable” (New Bolivian 
Children Law, 2014).

Nowadays, Bolivia and Norway consider the accountability of regular citizens and public 
servants in their control role. However as we will see in a later section, where the capacity for 
rule of law is explored, the effectiveness on its appliances goes beyond the scope to the 
conditions of the system, organizational features, and human and economic resources.

5.2.2. Scope of Democracy

The political organization of Norway and Bolivia was described having several similarities. The 
division in powers was a key element for accountability, as it prevented the state from acting on 
its own self-interests (Fukuyama, 2011; 2014). In Bolivia, additional to the executive, legislative 
and judicial power (which are common with Norway), there is the electoral organ since 2004. 
This power is in charge of the democratic process, ensuring that elections are corruption-free.

“In addition to these three Bolivia has the National Electoral Court, it’s a separate 
etity from the three powers, and is in charge of running the elections. Also it has its 
representatives at the local level through the departmental courts [---] this is because 
in Bolivia, because of the history, people do not trust the state, then this measure is to 
support the electoral process so that elected authorities are the result of a process of

\textsuperscript{5} New Children Law, 8\textsuperscript{th} of April 2004. Law 2026
\textsuperscript{6} New Children Law, 17\textsuperscript{th} of July 2014. Law 548
participation of the civil society. Unfortunately, despite these efforts in every election, there have always been complaints even before international agencies” (Health Expert Bolivia)

In this sense the scope of democracy in Bolivia is to ensure that law is applying indifferently to all citizens and authorities, and that democracy is practice in an adequate representative process. However, the need for an electoral organ signals certain deficiency. What we see in Bolivia is that the mere presence of the state was not a precondition for the emergence of democracy (Fukuyama, 2011). In fact, since democracy came too early, when the state was not ready, consequences were negative, taking the form of corruption (Fukuyama, 2014). Thus the necessity to include an independent organ that controls democratic processes additional to the parliament, which is the traditional mechanism of accountability (ibid). This also signals a regression in the form of power, associated to the insufficient capacity of the state to carry on with the task of accountability, a tendency towards political decay.

Norway’s scope of accountability is provided by high levels of participation of regular citizens and the independence between the different organs. In Norway, there is a combination between political authorities, skilled professionals and regular citizens. What is critical to understand for the scope of democracy is that the authorities are qualified and legitimate decision makers, bringing a sense of fairness and trust towards the system. Participation of ordinary citizens is encouraged, reinforcing the legitimacy and trust on the decisions taken, thus transparency in the process is also a key element. For example, when talking about the family court:

“Before in history there was team of politicians deciding [---] now is a team compose by a leader and two experts […] you also have something call Layman, there are two ordinary people. It has to do with our system we want to also have the regular people in the court” (Expert 1 Child Protection Norway).

To sum up, there are mainly two types of accountability: Procedural accountability and substantive accountability (Fukuyama, 2014). Bolivia has similar and even stronger provisions for ensuring procedural accountability, however their presence results from strong challenges giving reasons for additional mechanism of control, thus the scope responds to a failure of the state to ensure procedural accountability. Similarly, a mechanism of substantial accountability is weak due to the high levels of corruption (this will be explained in more detail in the following section). On the other hand, Norway is tooled with better mechanisms of control, such as the participation of regular citizens ensuring high levels of both procedural and substantive accountability.
5.3. **Strength: The State’s Capacity**

5.3.1. **Capacity to enforce Rule of Law**

In the previous section, the rule of law was described in terms of its coverage. However, a large scope does not ensure effectiveness. This can only be addressed by looking at the capacity of the state to enforce rule of law (Fukuyama, 2011).

**Autonomy and rule of law**

Autonomy is a critical component in both systems. It allows certain levels of freedom for the local level to develop the national disposition into relevant services for the communities. Norway and Bolivia have embraced autonomy; however, with contrasting results. Autonomy and a stiff hierarchical administrative order can be counterproductive. What is important to avoid such mismatch is flexibility and adequate clear roles. Norway has successfully applied both measures.

“[…] the Parliament will adjust laws that are enforced at national level. Local are used as consultation when they are changing the law. […] At the community level […] they have some freedom but also have some tasks coming from the national level […] they decide how to organize the resources” (Expert 1 Child Protection Norway).

In Norway, the inclusion of the local government in the processes of making new laws to be embraced at national level helps to establish parameters that are sufficiently flexible and sensitive to the local needs. Additionally, participation and freedom at local level makes policies and programs down to earth, benefiting instead of constraining the local services. In Bolivia however, what we see is first a disorientation of the functions and responsibilities between national, regional and municipal level governments, leading to an increase of bureaucratization and the ineffective assignment of resources.

“What happens is that health has been municipalized, then at the autonomous regional level such as the department government and municipalities, do not understood that is their responsibility and end un bureaucratizing the services […] and this is the problem. Sometimes they are short in the provision of medicines and supplies” (Servant Health Bolivia).

Second we see that policies, laws and programs are elaborated at a national level without the real participation of the local. By law, participation should be considered, however, it rarely happens. In result, satellite programs are basically forced onto the local level with little flexibility and adequacy to the needs. Moreover, programs work in a parallel level to the municipalities. They are organized in their own Departments having an independent authority from that of the municipalities and regions. Coordination becomes difficult having a detrimental impact on the effectiveness of the service as such. For example:

“The SAFSI (Family Communitarian Intercultural Health Program) are mobile team units. They make the diagnosis of the health risk factors. They do family counseling
about the risk factors that should control in the family, or formed strategic alliances of community organizations that exist in a territory for risk present at community level [---]. After that they transfer the files to the local health service or unit. The local team is responsible for ensuring that these commitments are met, and that the work plan left by SAFSI is applied; that’s where the problem is, SAFSI works in total incoordination with the local teams. In fact there are conflicts of interest, […] because SAFSI belongs to an independent Department and local teams belong to national health networks [---] they also have a substantial difference in salaries, the SAFSI units earn more” (Expert Health Bolivia).

In this case, what we see is exactly what Fukuyama describes as the rule of law having a harming effect by preventing rulers from doing things they would like to do in the interest of the community as a whole (Fukuyama, 2011). The fact that programs such as SAFSI work in parallel with little coordination limits the possibility of the local authorities to adjust the service to the local needs of: the population and institutions providing the services.

**Control mechanisms and the rule of law**

The results from the data processing showed two different types of control mechanisms present common to both countries. The mechanism to control providers by which authorities and services are held accountable of their performance and actions; and control to citizens, the capacity of the state to enforce law onto the overall population.

In relation to **control for provider**, a strong rule of law would be tooled by a legitimate and trustworthy institution to control. In Norway, the control at regional and local level is carried on by an independent non-political agency in charge of monitoring both the direct services and administrative performance of municipalities and region.

“Both levels regional and community follows the Child Care Law. But the regional is under the national department that’s the difference; whereas […] there is more freedom for the Kommune, is a type of autonomy. At the regional level there is a control organ (control province) that assures that the community and the region follows the role and mandates from the national level. They control if they are following the law. […] They have also control in the health area as well. […] they control not only the institution assessing and making the decisions but the institutions of placement and other services” (Expert 1 Child Protection Norway).

The monitoring process is not only aimed to control and sanction inappropriate or ineffective practices, but also targets the identification of need and the provision of support to develop the institutions.

“Well they can give some assistance, support or amendment, or also a fine; a correction. […] The quality is looked at inside the services, at local in the community and at a regional level” (Expert 1 Child Protection Norway).

In Bolivia, control takes the form of formal and non-formal processes. In reference to the first, dispositions are to Norway; however this task is embodied within the regional department and
therefore the level of reliability is lower since often private interests from the political authorities interfere.

“Each department is autonomous, so one of the main roles of the SEDES (Department’s Health Service) is to track the quality of the services [---]. There are norms from the central government of how the services need to be like. There are regions that are doing well at following the quality, but not all of them, precisely because of the organizations. For instance, if somebody belonging to the associations of doctors becomes the director of the SEDES, gives the command not to do the control and evaluations” (Servant Health Bolivia).

Moreover, the mechanisms of control have such precarious conditions that their action limits to the monitoring of the administrative and financial issue. The accountability of the professionals providing the service is rarely looked at. The legal disposition is that only the staff (long-term contracted personnel) should be accounted as responsible. Professionals hired under short term contracts (consultants) are not hold legally accountable for their actions.

“The control mechanisms are very precarious, […] are done mainly in administrative and financial issue but not in relation to job performance. The changing staff is also a problem, […] the stuff working as consultants according with law 181 have no responsibility over their work and only institutionalized personnel has responsibilities of their performance” (Servant 2 Protection Bolivia).

In fact, in Bolivia control often takes the form of non-formal methods, such as social pressure. Since the capacity of the state is limited in enforcing the law, citizens represented through social organizations or civil mobilizations exert pressure onto authorities and services. For example:

“Only after an infamous situation, a murder or something like that, does the authorities start to feel the pressure and act upon it” (Expert Protection Bolivia)

At times the control through social action can lead to forms of mediation by which services are improve as users build bridges connecting different providers that otherwise function in an isolated manner. For example:

“What we see is that the higher the involvement of parents the better the selection of personnel is, the better the service and the overall provision of care to the children. As a successful practice we can mention 3 centers (…) that had begun to coordinate with the local health service, so the regular health control and vaccines for children are provided at the center. They had also coordinated with the SERECI (Civil Court Office) so they can register and give birth certificate” (Servant 1 Protection Bolivia)

In relation to the control for the public: Norway has legal dispositions attributing power to the institutions that are in direct contact with children to monitor their wellbeing and development. By law professional working with children have the duty to advice but also report in case of conditions that might be threatening. Moreover, law also requires their involvement in the intervention process, acting in partnership with service providers and client.
“Kinder gardens is about if they listen well, if they see well, if there are all over… then they say that is something you should have a checkup. They advise and you go. Or they can say this to the Child Protection Services, that there is some risk and they want them to find out what is happening” (Expert Health Norway).

However as the control at this level is applied by individual professionals, it highly depends on their professional discretion. In consequence, the capacity of the state to enforce law in this case depends on the quality of professionals working with children. Professional discretion depends on factors that are outside the control of the institutions, like employees’ education; but also factors within the institutions, like guidance or referential parameters.

“I know that the people in the municipalities they had made some kind of material to help for instance kinder garden teacher and doctors, but usually is not regulated [---] discretion depend on the education, the professionals but also the organization” (Expert 2 Child Protection Norway).

However, not all children are in contact with institutions that are responsible of monitoring. Therefore to ensure that all children are cared for, other control agents are also available, manly servants like General Doctors, Midwives, Public Health Nurses, School teachers and psychologists; or institutions like the Mother-Child Services, that act as the eyes of the state to look after the child. These agents function in a pro-active way, actively contacting the family with the specialize prioritizing a preventative approach. For example,

“[…] mostly everybody goes to the public health service […]. If they don’t come, then the Public Health Nurse, she will take contact and ask why are not here? And then if the mother says I have a private doctor where I go to and it seems ok, then is ok. But if the public health nurse is worry because it can be that the mother is addicted or something like that… then she can contact the Child Protection Services […]” (Expert Health Norway).

In Bolivia, the capacity of the state to enforce the legal disposition by which citizens, authorities and professionals are responsible to denounce cases of abuse is limited. Often they are only done after extreme conditions. In contrast to Norway, here the strength of the state to look after the child is passive and reduced to minimal levels. Bolivia has developed a different control mechanism for only minimal rights (such as the right of health) though the provision of bonuses.

“To encourage public access to these services the current government has implemented Juan Azurduy law, is to encourage control during pregnancy where women are paid a bonus […] distributed in quotas for each control during pregnancy […]. After delivery for checkups and control of growth and development of the newborn up to their six month […]. And if she has her delivery at a health facility” (Expert Health Bolivia).

**Paradoxical legal dispositions**

In Bolivia, the authorities are selected at regional and local level following a procedure recognized by law but that acts against the rule of law. Here, authorities and decision makers are
appointed in a pyramidal way directly by three elected authorities: the president, regional governor and mayor. The president in Bolivia is entitled with the power to appoint its ministries. The ministries have also the same right over subrogate layers. Similarly the governor and mayor appoint the heads of the different agencies working at the regional and municipal level.

“According to the constitution the president can appoint ministries and from a list presented by the minister appoints vice ministers. The minister appoints all directions [---]. Now the SEDES (Department’s Health Service) are appointed by the governors. The department directors are appointed by the mayors. The appointed responsible of SEDES appoint their head of units and areas and others [---] They usually don’t include new people, they rotate between each other” (Servant Health Bolivia).

Experience and knowledge are not required, which has damaging effects on the capacity of different authorities and servants to decision making. Moreover, authorities can belong to different political parties and in consequences conflicts and competition are reproduced at different administrative levels.

“There are professional profiles, there are, but when is time to hire they can just appoint whoever he wants, sometimes they are good, but sometimes they are not, they are not ready, not capable. Like there was this […] because it was time, she was enrolled with the party, she didn’t have studies” (Child Protection 2 Servant)

Law and rule of law are two different things and can act in contradictory ways. Building rule of law can be challenging as it goes beyond the appliance of legal dispositions. There is no direct avenue, not even through democracy (Fukuyama, 2011). In Bolivia, we see a limited capacity of the rule of law to control the power of the state. Sometimes law entitles more authority to the state, functioning in a paradoxical way against the purpose of rule of law.

5.3.2. Capacity for Democracy

When the scope of democracy was presented, corruption was a strong indicator of the capacity of the state to fulfill this task. In the case of Bolivia, a regression in the forms of power is visible through four means: the high corruption during electoral process; nepotism when allocating new personnel and authorities; corruption of control mechanism; and tokenistic allocation of economic resources. This regression signals limitation on the capacity of the state to carry on with the task of accountability.

Corruption and control mechanism

Accountability can result from the moral education of authorities, as it could come from formal procedures of control (Fukuyama, 2011). This last one is called formal accountability. What is critical to understand is that accountability functions on all levels: the authorities, the direct service providers (professionals and technical staff), and the citizens. Norway has strong mechanisms to ensure accountability on all levels, whereas Bolivia has limited capacity to do so,
providing minimal control. This is covering only financial and administrative performance of institutions and control of entitlement of minimal rights through bonuses.

In fact, in countries where democracy has come too early, before the state is strong enough to regulate, the effects can lead to a regression in the forms of power (Fukuyama, 2012). In Bolivia, this is visible to a tendency to an extremist sectorial attitude of the population. The social organizations, such as professional associations and syndicates, which are often tools of representation, act on a protectionist matter based on partial interests rather than to the overall wellbeing of the society, working against principles of justice. In fact, the requirement for stability rests on the capacity of a system to discourage desires that conflict with the principles of justice, framing the nature of institutions and at the same time encouraging the virtue of justice in those who take part in them (Rawls, 1971; Rothstein, 1998). Building state means strengthening a common goal that can convey different social groups; that can hold authorities, citizens, servants and professionals accountable of their actions. Sectorialization can act against this by confronting social groups with conflicting interests and by acting in a protectionist manner against accountability.

“Overall who is always in opposition to this evaluations are the syndicates, the doctors association, the federation of health professionals” (Servant Health Bolivia).

**Allocation of new personnel and authorities**

In Norway, the organizational arrangement of the different organs and levels respond to a share between politicians and employed experts. Head authorities are politicians; however they work with a team of experts, also open to the inputs of relevant social groups. The permanence of the expert beyond the change of governments is an important feature, as it brings stability, continuity, knowledge, experience and skills to the process of decision making and implementation of services.

“Is not the politicians that write, is the department. The head of department is politician, but the rest are employed. The head changes but the people below stay […] they work together with experts working, that are employed, and that helps because they can advise they can know what is possible because they are good professionals and they know the system” (Expert 1 Child Protection Norway).

In Bolivia, the conditions are different. Although the composition is also a mix between professionals and politicians, some of these authorities are not elected but appointed by an elected authority, and professionals are hired under unstandardized procedures, depending on the criteria or interest of the authority in turn.

“What is practiced is […] the arbitrary designation of positions […] in consequence we could say that the majority of the people working in this services are not skilled professionals, they don’t meet the minimal criteria which is an infringement of the rights of the child” (Expert Protection Bolivia)
Moreover, there are two different kinds of personnel: the stable staff with little mobility; and the consults hired on short term contracts and highly mobile. Both groups are selected under old forms of power (Fukuyama, 2011) regardless the presence of professional profiles.

“The institutional positions are based on a direct invitation and therefore depend on political weight. Although is necessary to comply with a profile (item psychologist: must be a psychologist) it’s easy for the authorities in power to order in this matter without taking into account administrative career or years of experience” (Servant 2 Protection Bolivia).

This has detrimental effects on the processes of accountability, and brings instability to the system and services. It is not only that the quality of the professional is irregular and might not meet required criteria, but also that every time there is a change in government there are changes on the authorities and therefore the staff. This leads to the interruption of previous policies, programs, projects, services, or procedural arrangements, and therefore the provision of only minimal services: the attention of cases.

Each time there is a change of director there are also change in the technicians. [---] Thus, one of the factors of the poor quality of these services is also the lack of permanence of staff, beside the low budget and the lack of departmental policies. Each director, especially in the SEDEGES (Office of Social Monitoring), is going to initiate new policies. The only thing that continues is the basic attention services like shelters and care of cases of violence and abuse.” (Expert Child Protection Bolivia)

5.4. Summary

Norway and Bolivia present similar scope, however they considerably differ on the capacity to cover the responsibilities assumed; this is associated to several features that can be organized among:

Administrative organization and Bureaucracy

Autonomy, decentralization and administrative layers are concurrent in Norway and Bolivia. Autonomy is a critical element in both systems aimed to entitle certain freedom to the local level to develop national policies into relevant practices for the communities. To meet this goal, two elements are necessary: flexibility and clear roles. Norway successfully meets both. However in Bolivia the reproduction of political conflicts at the administrative layers and a paradoxical administrative organization leaves to an overall ineffective and inefficient performance in social services. In theory, organization arrangements are aimed to ease the process of decision making, but in practice lead to the opposite result. Poor coordination; parallel power to national programs; discontinuity of policies, programs and servants with change of political authorities; nepotism and political-based appointment of authorities and personnel; unclear roles are some of the features that signal a weak capacity of the state.
Control mechanisms

Both control mechanisms for providers and citizens are successfully assumed in Norway. There an independent non-political organ monitor and enable resources to resolve challenges at regional levels. Where as in Bolivia, this role is embodied within the regional authorities is subject to their personal and political agenda. Control of professionals is also different. Professional accountability is new to Bolivia and only holds for recurrent staff. In practice, the role of servants is just of control and attention of already denounced cases.

To control citizens, Norway has developed agents and institutions that monitor the development and wellbeing of the child. Responsibility of reporting and partnering in the resolution of challenges is attributed to all the professionals working with children. Thus there is much dependency on professional discretion. As such, selection of personal is highly regulated. In Bolivia, the role of services is given attention after denounce has been made. Moreover, the control of minimal rights is ensured only through bonuses that become available only when caregivers attend the minimal monitoring services for the development of children.

Corruption and trust

In Norway, decisions are made in cooperation between political authorities, skilled experts and regular citizens, not only mobilizing more resources but also reinforcing transparency and trust. In Bolivia, the complex administrative organization and the attribution that authorities have to appoint their team, lowers transparency and trust. Thus, in Bolivia there is a regression in the forms of power visible through: the corruption during electoral process, nepotism in allocation of authorities and staff, corruption in control mechanisms, tokenistic allocation of resources, and mistrust and sectorialization.

Economic Resources

Therefore, in Bolivia the assignation of budgets for social development is poor. Moreover the allocation is subject to the highly bureaucratized process and the political disposition for projects and programs. Regularly budgets are assigned with little control and regardless to the sustainability of actions, due to a reactive approach result of social pressure when making decisions.
6. Analysis II: Implementation and Policy Transfer

Outlining the content, first I describe the capacity of the state to provide services in both policy areas using three models: the preconditions of implementation (6.1), conditions of implementation (6.2), and state’s stateness (6.3). The implementation analysis builds on the analysis conducted in Analysis I and it serves as fundament to finally point out the features that can be transfer from Norway to Bolivia in order to promote political development (6.4).

6.1. Preconditions of Implementation

Health Care Services for Children under six are public and universal. In Both countries, they aim to monitor the development of the child before and after birth. In this sense, there are free of charge and broad targeting. For example, in Bolivia they describe the service as:

“Universal for children under five. For the Bolivian State the priority is children under five, so all the attention is free of charge. For example we have the program to fight malnutrition and starvation in the rural but also the city area. The women get a bonus if they bring the baby to the check ups and vaccination […] Bono Juan Azurduy” (Servant Health Bolivia)

In both countries, monitoring of development take place as part of the vaccination schemes. However, the approach to ensure the access of children to these rights is done in a different manner. In Norway, this access is followed by the Public Health Nurse, who keeps a close look at the child and provides additional support to parents to ensure a healthy family environment. There the service aims to identify possible need at an early stage and connect the user with the necessary treatment.

“[…] it also depends on how the growth is […] is much about when you have a vaccination, but is also about development and it depends if the parents are worried of the Public Health Nurse is worry about development then they can have extra checkups to see if everything goes ok, or if they need to go to a General Practical of if they can go to the physiotherapist or an specialist” (Expert Health Norway).

According with Rothstein (1998) broad targeting lowers the stress inflicted onto the organization and legitimacy. In Norway, the capacity to monitor and connect users with services shows a very developed organization. However in Bolivia, although stress on the organization should be low, the weak capacity of the state to provide the services, stress the organization that in turn can only promote but not ensure the access of children to their right of a healthy life and development.
There is no control agent; the access of children to their right health is done through bonuses that only become available if care-givers meet the minimal checkups and vaccination.

“The programs of control of development and growth […] are free services […] when the child is sick it also has free health care service until he/she is five. […] however in practice, is not all the population that has access. The population with scarce resources will use these services because they have no other choice. But parallel there are also the insurance services for those parents that have formal jobs […] Finally the middle-high economic class […] have hospitals denominated five stars, similar to hotels” (Expert Health Bolivia)

Consequently the universal public services are minimal and considered as the last option. Stratification of society becomes visible and is reflected on their access to different providers with different quality.

Figure 7. Preconditions for the successful implementation comparative matrix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case 1: Broad targeting</th>
<th>Policy theory</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Legitimacy</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>+ HEALTH CARE SERVICES</td>
<td>- NORWAY</td>
<td>- NORWAY</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>+ BOLIVIA</td>
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<tr>
<th>Case 2: Dynamic interventionism</th>
<th>Policy theory</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Legitimacy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- PROTECTION SERVICES</td>
<td>- NORWAY</td>
<td>- NORWAY</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>+ BOLIVIA</td>
<td>+ BOLIVIA</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: Self production, based on Rothstein, 1998; pp. 114

In respect to the Child Protection Service, this can be cataloged as a dynamic interventionist. In both countries, the Child Protection Services is involve in the once there is some level of risk or worry and the intervention will depend on the conditions of this situation. In theory, this should inflict a higher stress onto the organization and the legitimacy (Rothstein, 1998). Norway shows a great capacity to deal with this stress and provide an effective service. Keeping the services close to the population through the accountability of professionals working with children to refer possible cases, they make a way to work not only in a reactive manner, but also with a promotion and preventative approach.

“In all municipalities a kind of system for family to help with family relations so they can go there for guidance or supervision or talk about the topic. And in some municipalities […] In every municipality you also have health service for families and children […] They can be there for the family as well” (Expert 2 Child Protection Norway).
However, in Bolivia the case is rather different; the capacity of the state to cope with the stress inflicted on the organization is overwhelming. Strong limitations are not only associated to poor budgets, but to the overall organizational arrangement. This has been described in previous sections:

- The power of servants and authorities to make decisions is not paired with their accountability,
- nepotisms and political assignation of position in the public system reproduces political conflict and the instability and discontinuity of policies, programs, services and local protection units,
- the little control is subject to the authorities power

Thus the services that reach the population are minimal and of low quality, far from what is attributed as the scope by the children’s Act, National Code and UNCRC. For example:

“Child protection has the duty to attend, intervene and monitor permanently looking for any threatening condition that might affect the child […] what we see in practice is that the child protection offices are doing a bureaucratic work, very little or no supervision or monitoring […] The technical instances SEDEGES that were the responsible for ensuring housing, food, family and all the basic rights […] in this bureaucracy have also lost clarity of their tasks” (Protection Expert Bolivia).

6.2. Conditions of Implementation

The strength of the state to carry on with the tasks and responsibilities that it assumes does not only depend on the ability to enforce the rule of law and democracy. The strength of the state refers also to its capacity to implement policies, projects and programs. The implementation conditions depend on the design, the organization and the legitimacy (Rothstein, 1998). The outcome of these three steps reveals the capacity of the state to transform the normative aspects that inspired the programs and policies into effective practices. Several factors can intervene when transforming premises intro practice.

6.2.1. Norway as a model for implementation

To remember: Autonomy in Norway allows municipalities to work in a decentralized manner, having services close to the communities and arranged in regards to the prevalent risks and social issues. Additionally the local level makes available options and specialized services coordinated by public agents and institutions. Coordination mechanisms help to bridge clients and services, finding the best fit and combination for the necessity of each client.

The design of policies, programs and services at national and local level is done with the cooperation between political authorities and experts; this ensures democratic representation and knowledge base practice. By equipping authorities with teams of experts that have knowledge and experience, policies and programs are better designed, and enjoy continuity regardless the
authority in turn. Additionally, the design of policies in Norway is done with the participation of relevant social actors, which in turn leads to policies coherent to social necessities.

6.2.2. General conditions of implementation in Bolivia

Autonomy, flexibility and design precision

As in Norway, Bolivia has also assumed local based autonomy and decentralized services through small local units. Nevertheless units are often not in the condition to adjust national policies and programs, and limit their job to the coverage of minimal functions. This is associated to the fact that units are manage as projects, which comes along with constant bureaucratic delays, scarce resources, and discontinuity of services.

“The decentralized Child Protection units are managed as projects. These are in charge of caring for children and their rights and do preventive work and promotion, but practically will reduce their work to the sole provision of attention of cases where rights have been violated [...] These units usually work only between 4-5 months because each year they must apply for budget and that involves a very inefficient rating process” (Expert Child Protection Bolivia).

Additionally, adjustment of policies is also difficult. National programs answer to their own authorities’ independent from local units and with little or no-coordination. For example the SAFCI (Family Communitarian Intercultural Health Program), a program that aims to identify risk factor for health in different communities, works through mobile units that spend only short period of time in each community, functioning in a mechanic homogeneous way regardless of the specific conditions of each context and ignoring the resourceful knowledge of local servants. Moreover, even national programs are exposed to discontinuity due to the constant change of authorities and professionals.

“National policies have also national Directions [...] local teams answer to local and national authorities, SAFCI respond to a different independent authority, its own Direction [...] so as the authorities don’t coordinate, the team also don’t coordinate [...] we, people who have experience working in the field with communities know that is not enough, even to do a good diagnosis [...] we don’t know where the SAFCI is going, it’s been review by new authorities” (Expert Health Bolivia).

Since national policies are hermetic and build at time distant from the real needs, local institutions and units often try to develop local projects to answer to local necessities. However, these projects are again subject to bureaucratic procedures, limited resources and discontinuity.

“Like the school of parents, we started with one school, now there are many but we don’t have the budget nor the conditions [...] In Cercado, Cochabamba and really in whole Bolivia violence is a prevalent problem. We have a lot of early parenting [...], they need support and there was nothing to offer, there were only NGOs and Charities working, wasn’t enough” (Expert Protection Bolivia).
Personnel, authorities and expertise

As is Norway, political authorities are supposed to work paired with experts. However in practice authorities appoint their direct collaborators regardless of what is stipulated in the professional profiles. In consequence, policies are design with little expertise and reality-based knowledge. They are limited to provide basic services. For example:

“There is a total disorientation in regards to this issue from the institutions and authorities, [---]. In Bolivia a program for children under 5 years cannot be ignore the diversity […]. Then there is a strong difficulty to see in a holistic way” (Expert Protection Bolivia).

Consequently in contrast to Norway, the qualities of the authorities what defines better of worst outcomes. Regions where authorities have experience, knowledge and commitment reach better results. Instead of experts guiding political authorities as in Norway here we see a dependence on authority’s discretion.

“It calls a lot of attention that regional authorities, and some municipalities showed better improvements and overall preoccupation for topics related to childhood […] there we found some authorities with a strong commitment […] able to guide the social operators.” (Expert Protection Bolivia)

To sum up:

In Bolivia, the capacity to adjust national disposition to local necessities is different to the one present in Norway. This has to do with: the limited economic and personnel resources, the lack of flexibility in national policies and programs attending in a mechanic manner, the little or null coordination and cooperation between national policies and local units, the design of policies in a vacuum from the context, and the dependency of authority’s discretion. In consequence, small units try to compensate the holes left by both national programs and attentions services through local projects. The results are again limited, as projects are subject to bureaucracy, limited resources and discontinuity.

6.2.3. Comparative implementation analysis

Rothstein (1998) proposes a model with six components to examine the extent to which normative expectation can be effectively translated into actions. A green light in each of the six boxes will ensure that the implementation of a program corresponds and fulfils the objectives that motivated its creation.
Figure 8. Comparative Chart Norway-Bolivia Policy Implementation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Norway</th>
<th>Bolivia</th>
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Source: Self production based on: Rothstein, 1998; pp. 73

**a. Substance of policy design**

Knowledge is not the only fundamental cause by which the design can fail. The real applicability of a design also depends on ethical, political, legal and economic conditions (ibid). Norway successfully meets all this criteria. The accountability of professionals, the existence of relevant legal framework and sufficient mechanism to ensure its appliance, as well as a strong investment in social development had been described in previous sections.

In Bolivia, shortcomings in the appliance of legal and normative disposition, due to corruption and the unlimited power of authorities, the high levels of inefficacy associated to complicated bureaucratic procedures and little coordination, and scarce budgets were also described. Additionally programs can have a faulty design when are purely symbolic or demand driven (Rothstein, 1998). In Bolivia this is often the case:

“Only after an infamous situation, a murder or something like that is that the authorities start to feel the pressure and act upon it” (Expert Protection Bolivia)

**b. Process of policy design**

What is relevant is also the coherence and clarity achieved in the design related to the skills of those carrying on with the duty of designing (Rothstein, 1998). This has also been described previously. For Norway the combination of skilled experts with political authorities brought stability, continuity and knowledge to the process of policy design. For Bolivia conflicts between authorities and highly politicized decision makers limit the process of design. In fact, political conflicts can negatively impact the design outcome (Rothstein, 1998).

Additionally new organizational arrangements in Bolivia detriment the possibility of a good policy design. For example, with the unification of diverse social sectors into the vice-ministry of equality decision making was constrained and overwhelming responsibilities were attributed to a single institution. Scopes of different necessities become less visible, critical factor for an effective design.

“The Vice Ministry of Equal Opportunity, is not what was formerly the Vice Ministry of Childhood, Youth and Elderly, […] were instances could have quick access to decision making […]. It has become the bag of the secluded sectors […] children and
youth [---], elderly, disabled, and women. One cannot imagine a vice ministry capable of addressing these issues and these very challenging social groups [...] the childhood as a social issue becomes completely invisible” (Expert Protection Bolivia).

c. Substance of Organizing

Norway and Bolivia are administratively organized in a similar way. However, their results are different. The main difference is on the arrangements related to clear roles, formal organizational standards and procedures, support (both in terms technical and economic), and coordination channels.

In Bolivia, we see that the ministries are the national administrative level in charge of elaborating policies. But municipalities and regions are entitled with certain autonomy to develop the general programs and policies into relevant services for the communities. This entitlement is not encompassed with clear role, support and coordination channels, this organizational arrangement is not allowing the needed flexibility, leading to a mismatch between structure and organization (Rothstein, 1998). For example:

“...What happens is that health has been municipalized, then at the autonomous regional level such as the department government and municipalities, do not understood that is their responsibility” (Servant Health Bolivia).

In consequence, decisions on how to use the resources are not made coherently to the operative necessities and neither long term vision.

“There is a lack of staff, lack of resources [...] services are not effective, the police is often short in gas for their vehicles but also paper to print reports. Municipalities like the regional government allocate their budgets to infrastructure and not to social ends” (Servant 2 Protection Bolivia)

Coherence between the objectives and organization can also be limited because of the nature of the organization as such. The embodiment of control mechanisms within the organization that are ruled by political authorities limit the objective of control as such, since authorities in Bolivia tend to respond to private or political interests. For example, SEDES is the regional agency in charge of administrating but also monitoring the performance of municipalities in regards to health policies. However, the performance of the control depends on the very same political authorities or servants that the control is aimed to asses.

“One of the main roles of the SEDES is to track the quality of the services provided by the health insurance, private services [...] There are regions that are doing well at following the quality, but not all of them, precisely because of the organizations. For instance, if somebody belonging to the associations of doctors becomes the director of the SEDES, gives the command not to do the control and evaluations” (Servant Health Bolivia).
d. Process of organizing

Although Bolivia and Norway share the same administrative layers, Bolivia has arranged the different ministries and departments in a more complex net, characterized by high levels of bureaucracy narrowing the capacity of decision making at the local level. Thus accountability becomes also more difficult, responsibility drift (Rothstein, 1998).

e. Substance of legitimacy

Policy’s political legitimacy has a direct impact on the capacity of the state to carry out with programs successfully (Rothstein, 1998). Citizen’s trust in the institutions responsible for implementing public policies is decisive. In fact, in Bolivia the quality and the inadequacy to local demand creates a relation of mistrust between from the citizens to the system. The state capacity is more than a matter of programs, design, casual theories, or organs of implementation, is also a question of the view citizens hold over the existing state (Rothstein, 1998).

“One of the most difficult issues for the access of the population to the services is on one hand the quality. Generally in Cochabamba there is large amount of population that speaks quechua […] This is the first barrier. Then we have the barrier of the paradigm that the population has in respect to health problems in discrepancy to the academic vision […]. The last barrier, […] perception of the low quality and the abuse that exists within the public services. Population in general really appreciates more alternative services [---] like the charity, university hospitals and NGOs” (Health Expert Bolivia)

The lack of flexibility to adjust to local characteristics, such as the language barrier, shows a discrepancy between policy goals and practical measures which in turn can be expected to ease the legitimacy (Rothstein, 1998).

f. Process of legitimacy

Rothstein (1998) identifies six ideal-typical models of what the state can do in order to ensure that its policies are implemented in a manner regarded as legitimate. Bolivia and Norway have arranged different means to do so. Norway uses a combination between a legal-bureaucratic, professional and corporatist model. In this way, combines predictability, competent professionals, and legitimation through citizens participation in decision making.

In Bolivia, the model corresponds to a politician-oriented model by which elected politicians act as agents for legitimacy (Rothstein, 1998). The shortcoming is that elected authorities are only at high ranks (President, mayor, regional governor, national deputies) the decision makers at implementation level are not democratically elected. They are appointed by the politicians based on private or political criteria. Therefore the authorities in charge of implementation are neither elected nor expertise on the area. This results in high levels of corruption and ineffectiveness.
6.3. State’s Stateness

According to Fukuyama (2014), political development takes place when systems successfully master their environmental demands through the balanced coexistence of three institutions: the state, the rule of law, and democracy. Norway is effective in ensuring, which in turn leads to political development: economic growth and social justice (ibid). Norway’s capacity of carrying with the scope of responsibilities assumed. As showed in previous sections this has to do with:

- Legitimating procedures and direct participation of relevant social actors when designing new policies.
- Combination of political authorities with experts, bringing continuity but also knowledge when designing, and applying policies.
- Reliable independent control mechanism regulating the action of citizens and the power of decision makers (taking the form of accountability).
- Autonomy combined with coordination channels through institutions or agents communicating users with services.
- Flexibility at local level and knowledgeable decision makers which in turn lowered the stress applied on the organization and legitimation process of implementation.

On the other hand, Bolivia embraces similar principles and values to those in Norway, such as the ones stipulated in the major legislative bodies like the constitution, children’s Law and UNCRC. However in Bolivia:

- Similarly autonomy is attribute to local level but not encompassed with sufficient coordination channels, leading to:
  - High levels of bureaucracy
  - Corruption in the allocation of resources and personnel, thus
  - Rule of law has not sufficient capacity to limit the power of political authorities.
  - The representation of political authorities and experts as decision makers is uneven. Professional profiles exist; still selection depends on the appointed authorities discretion.

In fact, unbalance between the state, rule of law and democracy pushed towards a state of less institutionalism, turning back to more traditional forms of power (Fukuyama 2011). In turn implementation capacity is lowered, reducing the practice to minimal attentions services. Implementation conditions are not sufficient failing at all levels: design, organization and legitimacy.

The unbalance of institutions and veto power

Moreover, conditions of decay not only result in favor of the state authoritative power; things can become unbalanced in either direction. In Bolivia, insufficient checks on state power comes along with an excessive veto power on different social groups (Fukuyama, 2014). This is the result of the arrival of democracy before state was capable of enforcing the rule of law. For example,

“After these Directions is the technical staff, […] is called institutionalized staff; it’s a staff that can hardly be change […]. They cannot move them because of the
syndicated of health workers. It’s a strong syndicate that has taken authorities out”
(Expert Health Bolivia)

**State building and sectorialization**

Syndicates where democratic measures were first born to protect the rights of excluded sectors. During the 70’s, democracy was regain after a long period of authoritarian regimes. Syndicates of works played a critical role in constraining the dictator’s power. However, in time the weakening of the state, corruption and mistrust continued, thus syndicates became stronger, protecting workers interest, even against the general citizen’s wellbeing. (Iriarte, 2004). In consequence, the conciliation and cooperation capacity, and the legitimacy of broader actions demises as society is likely to be sectorized (Fukuyama, 2011).

State building is essential in promoting economic growth and social justice, for which is necessary that people cooperate beyond their individual interests (Fukuyama, 2004). However, if the state is weak then we can see opposite results were power is used by person to respond to individual or sectorial interests. In Bolivia, authorities and social organization do so. A clear example is the way personnel are selected. It was clearly described in previous sections that in Norway experts comply with a professional profile when selecting staff. On the other hand in Bolivia, the power that authorities enjoy to appoint their staff and technicians has negative impact on the legitimacy.

**State building and trust**

Legitimacy as such is related to the level of trust that citizens hold towards their governmental institutions. No matter how well designed or well-organized a policy is, its implementation is at high risk of failure if does not enjoy the confidence of the citizens (Rothstein, 1998). In Bolivia, citizens largely mistrust the services and decision makers. On the contrary in Norway people trust in institutions. For example:

“The parents themselves […] go and talk to the family services and as well the health nurse […] doesn’t need to be serious to go there […] they can talk to her about anything, they trust her”. (Expert 2 Protection Norway)

What we see in Bolivia is that if the state fails to provide then other resources as NGOs are mobilized. In many occasions, even serving as technical support to the public services and the state, signaling a state in need of development. Trust from the citizens to the state is lower as rights entitlement is not criticized in practice.

“For example SOS villages are assisting the Cercado municipality to implement a program to prevent risk situations in families […] the people they really much better appreciate the work of the NGOs” (Servant 1 Protection Bolivia)
**Strengthening or weakening states power**

In fact, weak states like Bolivia are still in the necessity of state building, whereas strong states like Norway constantly push towards weakening state’s power (Fukuyama, 2004). In Norway the tendency is to limit authority’s power by:

- Amplifying legitimizing process through the direct participation of social actors and strong control mechanism.
- Democracy, by returning the power of electing representatives to citizens.
- Offering a relative open market where citizens have the freedom to use either public or private services, both cover in its major share by the welfare state. For example in the health service, parents have the right to choose between the private and the public:

  “They can go to the general practical, or a private doctor. The child has the right for this services but the family can chose where they can have the service. But mostly everybody goes to the public service is very few that doesn’t go there” (Expert Health Norway)

In Bolivia, similar mechanisms are consider by law, but had serious difficulties when they operationalized. The capacity of the state to successfully perform the task that it assumes is limited by:

- Low political disposition and accountability of decision makers
- Little transparency and control mechanism: corruption.
- Democracy process only for major authorities that are later entitle with power to appoint decision makers responsible for design, operationalize and implement policies.
- Insufficient resources for social programs and services

  “The norm when assigning responsibilities to different elements points out at aspects that otherwise are just part of a discourse. Like the Children’s Act that stipulates the overrule of the rights of the child […] well now the problem is that when to a real political predisposition to attain this matter, that predisposition does not exist. So without this political disposition assignation of recourses are also unreal. We insist that in the children’s act it should be appointed a percentage of how much should be assigned. […] moreover it urge us that even the small sums that are assign are subject to corruption […] so no matter if we have the Acts and laws, the old or the new one, where is even stated the creation of the children’s council, institution in charge of monitoring and operationalizing. If there are not resources, no political predisposition, then we will always have a weak institution, if not incapable” (Expert Protection Bolivia)

This shows that in the practice, the rule of law and democracy can exist, but if the state is not strong, then this institution will remain at a discursive level, state will be incapable of assuming its responsibilities. Moreover, the pressure is to include more normative premises on these legal buddies, as a tool to limit the power of the state. In practice, implementation of new laws and mechanism of control are often delayed by bureaucratic procedures. The inclusion of new
regulation is an important but not sufficient step if state is not strengthened in its capacity to enforce the rule of law and democracy.

For all that was described I can then locate both countries in the stateness matrix as follow:

**Figure 9. Stateness and efficiency matrix: State’s scope and strength**

![Stateness and efficiency matrix](image_url)

Source: Self production based on: Fukuyama, 2004; pp. 14

**Stateness: Norway**

Norway provides extensive coverage with strong institutional effectiveness (Quadrat II). It is expected that in relation to the double aim of stateness that social provisions will grow but economic success will decrease. However Norway prevents the decrease of the economic growth by promoting large labor participation with a high taxation scheme. This in turn promoted high levels of redistribution through the economic provision of social welfare services.

**Stateness: Bolivia**

Bolivia on the other hand, locates somewhere in between quadrat III and IV. At times state takes little responsibilities, like direct economic support or assistance in case of incapacity; whereas in some other cases assumes a middle range responsibility like those in direct relation to protection services and health care for children. In any case, the strength of the state is low, having in consequence the provision of less than the minimal standards in some respects and the incapacity to assume the responsibilities stipulated by law. In turn, both stateness aims are at risk: low social justice and poor economic growth.
6.4. Features for transferability

Political development takes place in an environment where the scope and the strength of the state are coherent. The key elements to achieve such conditions are the combination of a strong state, subject to the rule of law and democracy. The general institutional conditions of these elements have a direct impact on the capacity of the state to adequately implement its policies. This research showed how policies revile the scope of the state, whereas the strength is visible through the implementation effectiveness.

In previous sections Norway was characterized as having common policies with Bolivia; however the mechanism in Norway were more effective when implementation was carried on. This section will point out the features of the implementation conditions that could help Bolivia achieve a better performance when translating normative premises into practice.

6.4.1. Policy transfer for lowering corruption and the development of control mechanism and trust:

a. Municipalities and regions enjoy of certain level of freedom, however they must answer to national targets to ensure that conditions for social justice and equality are met. In this concern adequate mechanism of control are necessary. Norway has independent regional agencies monitoring the performance of administrative and practical instances. By law, in Bolivia this agency depends and is embodied within the regional government. This has contributed to corruption. Having control agencies as independent organs is then an element that could be transferable as it has proved to be more effective.

b. In regards to the professional accountability of servants and authorities. Discretion capacity depends on the education, but also on the organizations features. In Norway there are the mechanism that hold professionals accountable for their actions, moreover when selecting personnel, professional profiles are used to ensure that staff meets the necessary skill and experience. Bolivia is very weak in this aspect. Accountability here could be reinforced by transferring the idea that accountability needs to be applied indistinctively to consultants and staff.

c. In Bolivia, the overruling power of authorities in regards to their right to appoint staff and direct collaborators leads to poor practical outcomes. Although professional profiles do exist, policies in regards to the control of these procedures need to be developed. The elected authorities are only three: president, regional governor and mayor. The heads of the different services are appointed by these authorities. In Norway, heads of offices and servants are elected on democratic grounds or hired following standardized procedures. These administrative arrangements could be transferred as they have proved to be more efficient in avoiding corruption, and smoothing processed of design, decision making and coordination.

d. As a universal system, with extensive coverage, the Norwegian state has assumed the largest share of the responsibility of securing the welfare of its citizens. For this purpose
the system has develop different mechanism working on the behalf of the state to control
and connect citizens with the services. In Bolivia often the citizens are unnoticed of the
services available; neither there are surveille on their duty to ensure the overruling welfare
of the child as its stipulated by national law and international agreements (UNCRC).
Moreover, the promotion of services is often done by bonuses and only ensure the
minimal coverage of rights. This is associated to a passive culture in regards to the rights
of the Child.

“Another feature is also the passivity of the overall population. They don’t take action
on their own health care” (Servant Health Bolivia).

In Norway, agents such as the Public Health Nurse, Mother-Child Units and the General Doctor
are pro-active elements that not only monitoring but also connecting the population with the
services. These agents are a feature that could be transfer from Norway to Bolivia, helping to
mobilize the institution from an attendance approach to a proactive-preventative scope, which is
in fact recognizes as the principle by law.

e. Rule of law and accountability has not sufficient capacity to limit the power of political
authorities. Not because of the lack or norms but because of a weak state, what can be
done then to strengthen the state? One of the aspects is transparency. In Norway the free
access of information and participation of citizens in the design of policies are ideas that
could be transfer and help to develop transparency. In Norway one can go on a data base
and see who kind of social servant has reported and what (Protection1 Expert Norway),
surveillance on the effectiveness of the system is simple. However in Bolivia, citizens
depend on the media covering the cases, thus surveillance is subjective to what is
informed either though the media or social organizations (subject of political interest).

6.4.2. Policy transfer for the development of a functional administrative
organization with lower bureaucracy

a. In Bolivia, coordination between different instances is constrained by the parallelism of
authorities. The lack of coordination has been answered by citizen initiatives that largely
depend on the contexts. There is a need for stable bridges between services, so access is
universal. Norway has clear coordination channels represented by the control agents as
well. The relevance of the control agents is not only to surveille citizens, but also to
connect the different services to the needs of singular individuals.

b. Another feature is the independence of programs in regards to the community units and
authorities in Bolivia. This arrangement method created gaps between programs and local
services, lowering the possibility for cooperation. In Norway, national programs and
policies are carried on and respond to local authorities. This way adjustment and holistic
attention is promoted. This is a feature that could also be transferred, as it answers to the
same principle, that of autonomy and decentralization as a tool for cultural and necessity
sensitive community services.
c. In Bolivia, there is a prevalent appreciation of the childhood as a stage of little relevance and understanding. The constitution and legislative bodies just recently recognized the importance of the first years\(^7\). However organization arrangements show contradiction to this new vision. For instance the unification of in a single ministry (the ministry of equality). There is the need to highlight the matter of childhood.

Although there is the need for further policy development, this does not ensure the modification in the normative component; this is the general appreciation of childhood. Therefore, another road is the change of these values through the practice (Rothstein, 1998). In Norway, there are specific institutions and services working with children, these institutions are the first to embrace and transmit a vision of childhood different from that of complete dependency and an adult in becoming. Then a factor that can be transferred this way of working, from the services to the norms.

### 6.4.3. Policy transfer to ensure better resources

In Bolivia, for child protection services local units are managed as projects. The limitation of managing the decentralized protection units as projects is the discontinuity and lack of resources that this carries on the service available for users.

> “An evaluation of the legislative organ to the child protection services showed that around 10% of all Child Protection Offices were covering their functions. The remaining 90% were not.[---] one of the most important factor that was identify was that the units were not working year around and that the teams were incomplete ”

(Expert Protection Bolivia)

In Norway, units are well establish offices that work year around. In consequence, there are subject to the control mechanisms but also avoid bureaucratic procedures, thus ensure more stable resources and a continuing provision of service.

\(^7\) New Children Law, 17\(^{th}\) of July 2014. Law 548
7. Conclusions

In the spirit of positive and negative reviews by international organisms in regards to the process of change in Bolivia, I evaluated two policy areas related to the early childhood as a sample to understand the challenges faced by Bolivia – the policy issue. In addition, to compare this challenge with the positive practices and ideas that could be transferred from a model, Norway, which has proven to be highly effective in achieving political development. This research mobilizes policy transfer in an innovative way by focusing its scope to policy design and policy development, similar to international mechanism such as the OMC.

Bolivia and Norway are similar in many aspects, but still very different. In theory, both social-democratic countries discursively assume the most responsibility onto the state in securing the wellbeing of the child. Both had signed the United Nation Declaration of the Right of the Child and thus had assumed the responsibility to look after the wellbeing of children as one of their main roles. However, the results are rather different. In practice, Norway is the leading role model of political development with outstanding results in both economic growth and social justice. Whereas Bolivia, a welfare-state in the making, is currently dealing with the ordeals of a new constitution. This thesis revels that this is associated not only to the cultural, historical and economic differences, but also to the resulting weakness of the state (Fukuyama, 2004; 2011; 2014). The unbalance between the three basic institutions: rule of law, democracy and state; negatively impacts the capacity of the state to implement the policies and programs.

7.1. Scope and strength

National Constitution and Children’s Acts are the normative premises that attribute responsibilities to the national level to design and enforce standardized targets and policies, and to the local level to provide services and develop this national disposition into relevant practice. These normative premises limit in theory the power of the decision makers by attributing clear roles and objectives, and at the same time regulate citizens’ interaction by setting rights. Although these normative premises are in overall similar between Norway and Bolivia, they differ in the specificity and clarity of the roles. Nevertheless, the bridge is not the content, but rather the capacity of the states to build a coherent organization that can operationalize these premises into practices.

The capacity to translate national policies into local relevant practices depends on the flexibility and clarity of the roles of different agents and institutions: such as the responsibilities of municipalities, local units, regional offices, etc. In Bolivia flexibility is constrain by a highly bureaucratized, politically conflictive administrative organization and dynamic.

The roles are also unclear. Although responsibilities are clearly stipulated in paper, the state does not account for links necessary to translate these roles intro clear practices. In Bolivia, there is a state of disorientation on the different administrative levels and national programs, mostly after the wave of normative changes started by the new constitution back in 2004.
By law control it is also one of the main responsibilities of the state, this is to monitor at two levels: providers and citizens. In practice, the state in Bolivia has little capacity to perform both types of control. Here we see how the law can entitle power to the political authorities to the point it functions in a paradoxical way against the purpose of the rule of law as an institution. The regression in the forms of power lead to an atmosphere of corruption and mistrust. Sectorialization is reinforced, and private and political interest interfere with the decision authorities make. This in turn signals the low capacity of the state to ensure accountability at both levels. Norway on the other hand has solved this by: organizing independent non-political regional control agents for providers and clear control agents for citizens.

### 7.2. The contribution of the models

Implementation conditions were explored through two models, one assessing the preconditions and another assessing the conditions in terms of the design, the organization and the legitimacy during the implementation.

The first model was useful to situate Child Protection and Health Care policy areas. Bolivia shows challenging conditions whether stress was lower or higher onto the organization capacity during implementation. Bolivia signaled difficulties when meeting an adequate organization that can make services accessible to the children. There minimal control mediums, like the provision of bonuses, promote not even ensure, the provision of only basic rights. On the other hand, Norway proved to have sufficient mechanisms to support the implementation of policies. Effectiveness had to do again with keeping the services close to the population, this was done though control and mediating agents such as the Public Health Nurse that connected users with the adequate services; and the attribution to professional working with children the responsibility to report and assist in the intervention of challenges.

The model of conditions of implementation, serve to contrast the challenges that Bolivia present in all the different stages of policy implementation. There it was identified that:

- In relation to the design: shortcomings could be expected as result of the corruption, political conflicts, high bureaucratic procedures, little coordination, and scarce budgets. Moreover programs were found also subject of faulty design due to its symbolic or demand driven motivation for creation.
- In relation to the organization: organizational arrangement did not allow flexibility, leading to a mismatch between structure and organization. In consequence decisions on how to use the resources are not made coherently to the operative necessities
- In relation to the legitimacy: in Bolivia the quality and the inadequacy to local demands creates a relation of mistrust from the citizens to the system. Moreover, the lack of flexibility to adjust to local characteristics, showed a discrepancy between policy goals and practical measures which in turn can be expected to ease the legitimacy (Rothstein, 1998).
7.3. Level of Stateness

Norway was situated in Quadrat II, thus described as a state that provides extensive coverage with strong institutional effectiveness. Bolivia on the other hand locates somewhere in between quadrat III and IV. At times state takes little responsibilities, like no direct economic support or assistance in case of incapacity; whereas in some other assumes a middle range responsibilities like those in direct relation to protection services and health care for children. No matter what, the strength of the state is low, having in consequence the provision of less than the minimal standards in some respects and the incapacity to assume the responsibilities stipulated by law and international agreements (UNCRC). In turn both stateness aims are at risk: low social justice and poor economic growth.

7.4. For policy transfer

So how has this thesis contributed to improve the conditions of Bolivia? In this research I departure from an analysis of the general institutional conditions to land on the implementation capacity of the state. This structural-to-practical analysis helped me repeatedly identified the features that helped Norway achieve a better performance. Not only challenges were visible, but possible resources in the form of ideas were search for within the model – Norway.

However, this is only a theoretical attempt for policy transfer. As other mechanism such as the OMC, much is left to the state in the process of assimilating and traducing the recommendation into practice. Again this is subject to the same features that were described along this dissertation, the stateness of the state. If transferability is possible in practice is a question that remains to be considered in new enterprises. Here I was able only to conduct an analysis that proved in abstract way how can policy transfer be a tool for political development.

I identified key features that make implementation conditions better and help build capacity on the state to perform its task. I organize these features along three critical challenges faced by the Bolivian welfare system: corruption, weak control mechanism and low trust; beurocracy and administrative inefficiency; and insufficient economic resources.

**Policy transfer for lowering corruption and the development of control mechanism and trust:**

f. Monitoring agency in Bolivia is embodies within the regional government, been subject to corruption. Having an independent non-political control agency is an element that could be transferable.

g. Accountability needs to be applied indistinctively to consultants and staff. Mechanism of transparency like public data bases could also be useful for surveillance or services.

h. In Norway heads of offices and services are elected on democratic grounds or hired following standardized procedures. These administrative arrangements could be transfer as they had proved to be more efficient in avoiding corruption than the right attributed to political authorities to appoint their collaborators.
i. Public Health Nurse, Mother-Child Units and the General Doctor are pro-active elements that not only monitoring but also connecting the population with the services. These agents are a feature that could be transfer from, helping to mobilize the institution from an attendance approach to a proactive-preventative scope.

j. Free access of information and participation of citizens and relevant social actors in the design of policies are ideas that could be transfer and help to develop transparency, diminish corruption and build trust.

**Policy transfer for the development of a functional administrative organization with lower bureaucracy**

d. Clear coordination channels represented by the control agents.

e. Avoid parallelism by transferring national programs and policies to the responsibility of local authorities.

f. There is the need to highlight the matter of childhood. In Norway there are specific institutions and services working with children, these institutions are the first to embrace and transmit a vision of childhood different from that of complete dependency and an adult in becoming. Then a factor that can be transfer this way of working, from the services to the norms.

**Policy transfer to ensure better resources**

a. Transform child protection local units and health mobile units to stable offices and services. In this way there are subject to the control mechanisms but also avoid bureaucratic procedures, ensuring stable resources and continuity of service.

### 7.5. Final thoughts

Political development is a matter of two things: economic growth and social justice. Economic growth or higher budgetary assignation to social development will not due much in the effective attention of social needs. Neither will an increase on the scope of the responsibilities. This analysis shows that state building is essential to promote social and political development. The institutional and implementation analysis repeatedly pointed at three areas of challenges faced by the Bolivia. These challenges are associated to the unbalance existing between the three main institutions for political development: the state, the rule of law and the accountable government. This unbalance has detrimental effects on the capacity of the state to transform normative principles, policies and programs into practice (limitation on the implementation capacity). What is necessary is to parallel social investment with state building. State building not as the: attribution of more power to decision makers, neither the ascription of overwhelming responsibilities to an insufficient state, nor the lowering of the scope responsibilities. Rather, to equip the state with better tools to reinforce its capacity to carry on with the scope of responsibilities it assumes. Thus, in this research by using Norway as model for political development I identified the features that are key to for better effective implementation, tools for building state capacity.
8. References


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Annex I

Interview guide English

Each interview will have two aims:

c. Identify the policies behind the services, benefits and the institutional buddy that is available to provide the services and benefits in the field of child protection services, child benefits and care, and health services for children less than six years of age.

d. Characterized and described the services, benefits, and institutional buddy available in the framework of child welfare coverage for children less than six years of age.

Following this double aim, the first phase of each interview will be guided by open questions targeting the aim A. Later, a grill of possible case scenarios within each field of interest will be used to guide the characterization and description of the services, benefits and institutional buddy available.

Phase 1:

What are the institutional and organizational conditions of the services and benefits?
What are the legislative framework and the policies behind these services and benefits?

Phase 2:

Guiding questions, for each stage consider in the hypothetical case diagram the following questions will be answer
Coverage: What services are available? What do the services cover? How are this services?
Provider: Who provides these services?
Conditions of access: what are the conditions (gate-keepers) to have access to these services? - Who can have access to these services?
Quality: What is the quality of these services? What are the institutional conditions to provide these services? Are these services effective? Why? Is the quality of the services depending on something?
A. Topic: Health care

A woman suspects she is pregnant.

Yes she is pregnant.

During pregnancy

Healthy

Prevention

Promotion

During delivery

Mother

Sick

Attention

Healthy

Prevention

Promotion

Child 0 - 2 years of age

Child

Sick

Attention

Healthy

Prevention

Promotion

Child 2 - 6

Child

Sick

Attention

Healthy

Prevention

Promotion

No she is not pregnant.
B. Topic: Child Protection

There is a household with children under 6 years of age. Risk conditions suspected among...
Annex II

Interview Guide Spanish

Entrevista con expertos y personal

Cada entrevista tiene dos objetivos:

a. Identificar las políticas detrás de los servicios, beneficios y arreglos institucionales que está disponible para proporcionar servicios y beneficios en cada una de las tres áreas.

b. Caracterizar y describir los servicios, beneficios y arreglos institucionales disponibles en el marco de los servicios de bienestar para niños y niñas menores de seis años.

A raíz de este doble objetivo, la primera fase de cada entrevista se guiará por las preguntas abiertas dirigidas al objetivo A. Más tarde, una parrilla de posibles escenarios de casos dentro de cada campo de interés se utilizará para guiar la caracterización y descripción de los servicios, beneficios y arreglos institucionales disponibles.

Fase 1:

¿Cuáles son las condiciones institucionales y de organización de los servicios y beneficios? ¿Cuáles son el marco legislativo y las políticas detrás de estos servicios y beneficios?

Fase 2:

Guía de preguntas, para cada posible escenario del esquema hipotético de casos:
Cobertura: ¿Qué servicios están disponibles? ¿Qué cubren los servicios? ¿Cómo son estos servicios?
Proveedor: ¿Quién proporciona estos servicios?
Condiciones de acceso: ¿cuáles son las condiciones de acceso a estos servicios? - ¿Quién puede tener acceso a estos servicios?
Calidad: ¿Cuál es la calidad de estos servicios? ¿Cuáles son las condiciones institucionales para prestar estos servicios? ¿Son estos servicios eficaces? ¿Por qué?, de qué depende la calidad de estos servicios?
A. Topico: Servicios de salud
Tópico: Servicios de protección infantil

Hay una familia con niños/ninas menores a 6 años

Conductas situaciones de riesgo sospechadas en relación a...

Condiciones de familia y vivienda

Violencia doméstica entre los padres o figuras paternas o miembros significativos de la familia extensa

Violencia hacia el niño o niña menor de 6 años

Conductas de riesgo en los padres o proveedores de cuidado

Confi rma la presencia en la forma de...

Adicciones

Problemas mentales o emocionales

Habilidades de cuidado insuficientes o riesgosas

Participación en actividades criminales

Pobre o bajo desempeño en nivel pre-escolar

Problemas de salud

Capacidades especiales o discapacidades físicas y/o mentales

Poverty

Poor/inapropriate housing conditions
Annex III

Non-plagiarism declaration

I hereby declare that the Dissertation titled:

Policy transfer: a tool for political development
A comparative study of child welfare services between Norway and Bolivia

Submitted to the Erasmus Mundus Master's Programme in Social Work with Families and Children:

• Has not been submitted to any other Institute/University/College
• Contains proper references and citations for other scholarly work
• Contains proper citation and references from my own prior scholarly work
• Has listed all citations in a list of references.

I am aware that violation of this code of conduct is regarded as an attempt to plagiarize, and will result in a failing grade (F) in the programme.
Date (dd/mm/yyyy): 31.05.2015
Signature:

Name (in block letters): KATYA ANDREA NOGALES CRESPO

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