Voting Patterns of Urban Dwellers in Informal Settlements: A Case of Kibera and Mathare, Nairobi

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Declaration

I, Alice Wangui Muthua, declare that this thesis is a result of my research investigations and findings. Sources of information other than my own have been acknowledged and a reference list has been appended. This work has not been previously submitted to any other university for award of any type of academic degree.

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ABSTRACT.

Ethnic voting is prevalent in African politics, where policies that form the basis of provision of public goods are not all-inclusive but rather disintegrate along ethnic lines. Patronage politics have impeded development for a majority of African countries as those who have access to political power are seen to favor their co-ethnics, thereby alienating other ethnic groups. Across the developing world, the state has failed to deliver social redistribution especially to those that are disadvantaged. Ethnic groups therefore provide what the state cannot.

In Kenya, patronage politics continue to inform policy and the day-to-day operations of government institutions where ethnicity has been efficiently used to maintain the status quo of ruling elites together with their co-ethnics while intentionally leaving out other ethnic groups in the provision of public goods and access to state power. The electoral process in Kenya is an ethnic census where the country is largely divided along ethnic lines. Poverty as a main challenge for the growth and development of Kenya is therefore strengthened especially where political power is seen to only favor the elite and the affluent in society. The adverse effects of poverty are seen and felt by a majority of slum dwellers who continue to live in deplorable conditions mostly because of the lack of an imperative will by political leaders to unify Kenyans, thereby instilling a shared sense of national prosperity for all.

This study, therefore analyses the voting patterns of the urban poor in Nairobi slums; with an aim of understanding what influences their voting choices when it comes to elections and if and how ethnicity also informs their choices.

Key words: Ethnicity, Slums, Poverty
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Declaration

ABSTRACT

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CHAPTER ONE

1.0 Introduction

1.1 Background of the Study

1.2 Definition of Terms

1.2.1 Urban poor

1.2.2 Poverty

1.2.3 Informal Settlements

1.3 Problem Statement

1.4 General Objective of the Study

1.5 Specific Objectives of the Study

1.6 Scope of the Study

1.7 Justification of the Study
CHAPTER TWO

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

2.0 Introduction

2.1 Research Design

2.2 Area of Study

2.3 Target population

2.4 Sampling Technique

2.5 Data Collection and Analysis

2.5.1 Interviews

2.5.2 Focus groups

2.6 Reliability and Validity of Research Instruments

2.7 Research Ethics

2.8 Limitations of the Study

CHAPTER THREE

LITERATURE REVIEW

3.0 Introduction

3.1 Voter behavior

3.2 Theoretical Framework

3.2.1 Sociological model

3.2.2 Party Identification Model

3.2.3 Rational choice Model

3.3 Politicization of Ethnicity
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

KANU- Kenya African National Union

GEMA- Gikuyu Embu Meru Association

KPU- Kenya Peoples Union

CDF- Constituency Development Fund

ODM- Orange Democratic Party

PNU- Party of National Unity

CORD-Coalition for Reforms and Democracy
Figure 1 Map of Kenya

Source (CIA, 2015)
CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

1.0 Introduction

It has been suggested in several studies that Africa’s ethnic diversity can explain the region’s poor economic performance as this correlates with bad economic policies. Subsequent research confirms this observation as ethnically diverse countries are seen to have poor government performance, civil wars and the inadequate provision of public goods. An explanation to this has been political where it is posited that ethnic diversity leads to different ethnic groups competing for public goods. These arguments further imply that groups that are dominant politically use their position to provide economic benefits to their members. In such contexts ethnic diversity is seen to be linked to ethnic favoritism, where groups that come into power fashion government policies that exclude “ethnic losers”. Some heterogeneous societies are seen to fashion government policies in ways that exclude minority groups and favour the majority. Ethnicity thus “serves as an exclusion tool” when the “winning groups redistribute resources” (Franck and Rainer, 2009, p.2). More research continues to show that societies that are ethnically diverse are prone to corruption, poor institutional performance and political instability. When ethnic divisions are pronounced, nation building process is slow. Addressing ethnic divisions is therefore important for Africa if we are to move the continent away from poverty (Miguel, 2004, p. 34). Bratton and Kimenyi (2008, p. 5) find that “ethnicity and linguistic cleavages explain an individual’s support for parties in power in most African countries”. Their study further shows that “identity voting is strongest in ethnically fragmented societies”, although the performance of government is also important in influencing voting choices.

The political life in Kenya for the past two decades, has been inherent of a long –term struggle between two forces; those who “cling” to older style of identity politics rooted in patronage, ethnic appeals and the division of resources and power among the “privileged elite”; and those “who wish to break” free from these skewed patterns of governance, establishing an all-inclusive and accountable system that would see Kenya achieve full democracy (Barkan 2011, p.2).
Negative ethnicity\(^1\) continues to be evident of Kenyan elections. When Kenyans vote; voting patterns have little to do with ideology and issues. Elections continue to increase ethnic hatred among Kenyans as different ethnic groups seek to get into power in order to access state resources. Instead of conducting issue-based campaigns, political leaders continue to use negative ethnicity to mobilize support. It is no doubt that “ethnicity has become a primary cleavage” for politics in Kenya. Negative ethnicity therefore continues to be a threat to the overall democracy and development in Kenya. To date, Kenya has had five national elections, the most recent one being in 2013. These elections have been characterized by sharp ethnic divisions. It is the common understanding that ruling ethnic groups get more resources than those out of power. Ethnic divisions have thus polarized society weakening the institutional foundation for economic development (Kimenyi & Romero, 2008).

However, despite the existence of “theoretical arguments that link poor economic outcomes of African countries to ethnic favoritism, there is no systematic evidence that members of African ethnic groups actually benefit from having their leaders in power” (Frank & Rainer, 2009, p. 2).

Kenya is facing an increase in the growth of its informal settlements in urban areas. As urbanization increases, so has the growth of slums. It has been shown that Kenya’s annual informal settlements growth rate of 5% is the highest in the world. This may also double in 30 years if intervention measures are not undertaken. Informal settlements are a consequence of both official indifference and “explicit government policy”. It is expected that those living in poverty will be trapped in their current situations because of exclusion from the rest of the society. The lack of good and proper leadership continues to worsen the situation for a majority of people living in the slums. Low quality of housing, lack of infrastructure especially drainage, sanitation, lack of access to clean water and energy and levels of high unemployment in the urban areas are seen to give rise to conflicts. The situation is not made any better by the lack of supportive policies that ensure effective urban planning and improvement (Mutisya & Yarime, 2011).

This study therefore aims at looking at the voting patterns of urban poor within two slums in Nairobi, Kibera and Mathare in order to understand what influences the voting behavior of

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\(^1\) Negative ethnicity is a term coined by Koigi Wamwere in his book, *Negative Ethnicity: From Bias to Genocide* to differentiate ethnic pride from ethnic hate. Wamwere promotes the term to explain the deep rooted tensions that have led to violent clashes in African countries. To most Africans ethnicity is not necessarily negative, but rather a positive distinction. Negative ethnicity thus denotes ethnic hate that stems from ethnic superiority.
people living in the slums. Millions of Kenyans continue to live in conditions of deprivation that not only hampers their social, economic and physical growth, but also the overall development of the country. It is no doubt that poor people living in slums are disempowered to make better choices for themselves and their families.

1.1 Background of the study

Kenya as a Multi-Ethnic state comprises of at least 46 different tribes. Its total population is 41 million people with no single group constituting a majority. The largest ethnic group is Kikuyu, which comprises of at least 17% of the population. The second largest ethnic group is Luhya at 13.8% and the third largest is the Luo with 12.8%. The coexistence of different ethnic groups has been evident even before colonization and still is evident to date. However, the practice of ethnic patronage is an increasingly popular tool, which politicians use to mobilize ethnic groups (Copeland, 2013).

One cannot talk about ethnic divisions in Kenya without looking back at the colonial history of the country. This is where divisive policies and ethnic hatred between different communities was established as the colonial masters used the divide and rule policies to occupy Kenya. Kenya is among other countries like Tanzania that were under the British colonial rule, but whose effects of ethnic divisions have played out differently in the larger political contexts.

Although Kenya gained independence in 1963, the country’s politics is still shaped by the colonial legacy. Colonialism in Kenya can be traced back to the Berlin conference in 1885, when East Africa was divided into territories for European powers. Founded in 1895, the East African protectorate led to the opening up of the highlands to white settlers. They settled on the most productive areas in Kenya, the highlands that lie mostly in Central Kenya (Barkan 2011, Copeland 2013). Central province was primarily chosen for occupation because besides the fertility of the land, the region was also close to the growing market in Nairobi. The Kikuyu ethnic group originally occupied central province and their land was slowly taken away as more white settlers moved into Kenya settling into these fertile region (Archer 2009). The Kikuyu community were prominent in the nationalist movement, in the early 1950’s and were instrumental in leading the so called Mau Mau revolution against the British colonial rule (Barkan, 2011 ).
The first President of Kenya, Jomo Kenyatta who hailed from the Kikuyu Ethnic group, was the pioneer of a conservative bourgeois kind of politics. Once in power, the plantations that were owned by Europeans were then given to farmers, favoring the Kikuyu, along with “their allies” the Meru’s and the Embu’s. The end of 1978 saw the three ethnic groups, Kikuyu, Meru and Embu owning most of the wealth in the country and they later came to be known as the GEMA (Gikuyu, Embu, Meru Association) community. They constitute at least 30% of the population. Jomo Kenyatta facilitated the recapturing back of land from the white settlers—even when this land previously belonged to other groups and favorably distributed it to the GEMA community, leaving out other ethnic groups. Despite the British government donating money to buy back land from the Europeans and “redistribute it to all Kenyans” Kenyatta’s Kikuyu friends became the beneficiaries (Tutkuay 2013). This pattern of development that favored the Kikuyu community meant that overtime, the Kikuyu have become the most privileged and “educated” group, a position that has been “protected” and “encouraged by Kikuyu leaders” throughout the post-independence period. Today, the Kikuyu dominate Kenya’s middle class (Barkan, 2011, p.5).

This is how ethnic tensions began to rise since the other 70% of Kenyan groups felt left out—thus the emergence of tribalism. Jomo Kenyatta also led to a one party state with the first dominating political party being KANU, dominant of the GEMA community. KANU (Kenya African National Union) was the only party from 1964-1966 until a Luo Leader, Jaramogi Oginga Odinga, formed an opposition party, KPU (Kenya Peoples Union). This party criticised KANU’s slow progress in land distribution. In 1969, Tom Mboya, a Luo leader was assassinated and this heightened the hostilities between the Luo and the Kikuyu that are still evident to date (Tutkuay 2013).

Upon Kenyatta’s death, Daniel Arap Moi became the president and immediately began reducing “Kikuyu dominance” while increasing the gains of his own ethnic group the Kalenjin’s. He therefore continued Kenyatta’s policy of ethnic redistribution. Kikuyu’s in the civil service were systematically replaced. In 1981, he changed the constitution making Kenya a one party state, where his presidency became a classic example of dictatorship. In 1991, after mounting pressure, Moi allowed multiparty elections. The first multiparty elections in 1992 were therefore characterised by ethnic alliances, as different ethnic groups felt that the only way to get into power was to form political parties by their ethnic tribes. However, Moi hugely frustrated his opponents by systematically delaying registration of new
parties, withdrawing permits for campaigns and raiding media houses by use of police in order to control the airwaves (Barkan, 2011, p. 6).

In Kenya, these first two post-independence Presidents are considered””tribalists”, and “political opportunists who benefitted greatly “on the politics of ethnic division”. Moi has been widely implicated for arming and financing ethnic violence prior elections in 1992 and 1997. Distribution of central government resources such as health and infrastructure has politicized ethnicity in Kenya to a far greater extent (Miguel, 2004, p.10).

Until 2007, Kenyan elections were generally peaceful and stable but the post-election violence in 2007 made everyone react with much surprise and shock as to how a country that seemed to have a well-functioning democracy could suddenly be engaged in violence that left thousands of people killed and displaced. While it is no doubt that ethnic tensions have been part of the political atmosphere in Kenya, never had the country found itself on the verge of a civil war as a result of ethnicized politics (Archer, 2009).

Ethnicity continues to be a determinant factor of the nature and dynamics of conflicts in developing countries especially when used to distinguish actors from opposite groups. State power has “often been assumed” by one “specific group” thus rendering many other groups powerless or less influential. In environments where “ethnicity is politicized, allegiances to political parties strongly” correlate with” ethnic loyalties” (Okombo and Sana 2011, p. 10).

In addition to this, political power continues to explain regional disparities from independence to present. These disparities among Kenyans ethnic groups have led to “suspicion and mistrust” thus the manipulation of ethnicity for political advantage. Where “ethnicity in itself need not be a problem”, when politicised, “ethnicity has been” seen to be a “threat” to” national integrity”. The two ethnic groups that had a lot of political power after independence i.e. Luo and the Kikuyu have become “bitter rivals over state power” (Okombo & Sana, 2011, p.10).

Increased urban-rural migration within Nairobi emerged towards the end of 1980’s decade. The growth of informal settlements in order to accommodate low-income population was a result of unemployment problems. The inception of Slums in Nairobi dates back to the colonial period where the city’s designated residential areas were reserved for the Europeans and the Asians. Kenyans that had to work in Nairobi had to look for settlements outside of the towns whose planning was largely ignored by the colonial government. Nairobi’s initial
development plans did not include services such as roads to link outside settlements to the city. As a result Nairobi “developed along segregated lines” (Okombo & Sana, 2011; Mutisya & Yarime, 2011).

Slums by nature are known to be prone to violence and criminal activities as slum dwellers battle with unemployment. Moreover, “slum dwellers have developed survival tactics”, for instance ethnic groups in the slums choose to live closely in “ethnic villages”. The Nairobi slums are almost representative of a “smaller model of the Kenyan society”, with political tensions that arise from the politicization of ethnicity. Poor slum dwellers continue to hope that their ethnic leaders will rescue them from conditions of deprivation (Okombo & Sana, 2011, p. 11).

In addition to this, slums remain the most inflammable settlements in Kenya where politicians “play on” slum dwellers “emotions with wicked skill”. Slum dwellers continue to chase the illusion that political leaders will save them, too often a time failing to” perceive the class underpinnings of the political battles” that exist between the haves and the have-nots. Class interest and benefits are inherent in political conflicts that often arise in Kenyan elections, yet slum dwellers continue to remain miserable “oblivious of the fact that those in whose names they destroy themselves” continue to thrive together. Slum dwellers continue to be willing, if not oblivious of the fact that they are a tool of the political class who will make them turn on each other or even die on behalf of this political class (Okombo & Sana, 2011, p. 11).

Okombo & Sana (2008, p.11) further note;

*The main discourse strategy employed to throw a veil over the eyes of the slum-dwellers is the notion that members of the political class and their upper middle class henchmen, who are rewarded with government appointments, in some undefined sense eat on behalf of their communities.*

In 2007, Nairobi’s slums were the “epicentre of the post -election violence” that led to destruction of property and lives. People were forcefully evicted from their homes. Smaller communities had to relocate where their ethnic groups constituted a majority. At the same time vigilante groups in the slums grouped themselves into rival groups so as to defend their communities. According to the WAKI\(^2\) report, the “brunt of the suffering” in Nairobi was

“borne by poor people living in low income neighbourhoods”. People living in informal settlements found themselves in a situation where those who were meant to offer protection failed. Socially the post-election violence in 2007 “provoked mistrust and bitterness” between ethnic groups that were “on both sides of the political divide” i.e. those that were for the leading party PNU (Party of National Unity) versus those that were for the main opposition party ODM (Orange Democratic Movement). PNU was majorly dominant of the GEMA community whilst ODM was dominant of the Luo and Luhya ethnic groups (Okombo & Sana, 2011, p. 32).

The violence became a trying moment for the nation. The subdivision of the country into two equally antagonistic coalitions during the violence subjected the slum dwellers into more violence as different ethnic groups re-grouped themselves into ethnic militias and vigilantes for defence purposes. “It is a fact that many survivors of the post-election violence” survived because they received protection from “their ethnic enclaves which acted as barriers against opponent groups”. Tribes provided protection to their members where the state failed (Okombo and Sana, 2011, p 43).

Okombo & Sana (2011, p.8) also note,

*The historical reality in Kenya since political independence in 1963 has been that political power is the single most predictable determinant of the fortunes and misfortunes of communities, especially in terms of the availability of and accessibility to health, educational, transport, financial and other resources that enhance their well-being.*

Moreover, the provision of public goods and development of national policies in Kenya has continued to follow these skewed patterns of ethnic favoritism where political leadership is seen as a zero sum game for those that get into power. Over the years, the regions that have been highly neglected are the slums. The governments that have existed since independence have continued to ignore the deplorable life conditions under which these people live in, making the conditions of the slums worse over the years (Mutisya and Yarime 2011).

Kenya continues to be so ethnically divided that inter-ethnic grouping is necessary to secure power (Markussen & Mbuvi, 2011). In the recent years, Kenya’s elite has connected ethnic identities to land politics and economic opportunities. Ethnicity and the issue of land rights were also factors that fuelled the 2007/2008 post-election violence. Land ownership plays a big factor in power relations since land dictates ones’ economic and political influence. As
aforementioned, The GEMA community owns most of the land in Kenya, something that sparks huge grievances from other ethnic groups (Kanyinga, 2009).

The challenge of ethnic tensions and rivalry continue to threaten the survival and efficiency of the state. The slums are majorly ethnically diverse, and are areas where ethnicity is quite conspicuous especially in everyday interactions. Effective management of ethnic relations and developing a shared sense of national prosperity are prerequisites to the overall development of Kenya. Urban dwellers living in informal settlements are most vulnerable to the practice of skewed development as they continue to live in neglected areas where their overall social, economic and physical development is inhibited.

The economic growth in Kenya and its rising young population coupled with a high level of urbanization pose a major challenge that could also fuel “future violence”. Income inequality has increased over the years and the county’s urban unemployed make up a “class whose members are prone” to criminal activities, violence and providing muscle for political leaders (Barkan, 2011, p.4).

This study reckons that in a society of over 40 million people, it is almost impossible to have everybody agree on whom should lead the country for the common good of all.

This study aims to find out how the urban poor who are a mix of different ethnic groups vote and how ethnicity influences their voting behavior.
1.2 Definition of Terms

1.2.1 Urban Poor

For purposes of this study, the urban poor are equated with those who live in informal settlements or slums (Oxfam, 2009).

*A slum is a continuous settlement where the inhabitants are characterised as having inadequate housing and basic services. A slum is often not recognized and addressed by public authorities as an integral or equal part of the city (Oxfam, 2009, p. 5).*

*Slum settlements are characterized by poor housing conditions, poor social services, poor basic amenities, poor health outcomes and unstable incomes and livelihoods* (Zulu et al, 2011, p.186).

1.2.2 Poverty

The World Bank defines poverty as the lack of what is necessary for material well-being especially food but also housing, land, and other assets. Poverty is the lack of multiple resources leading to physical deprivation (World Bank.org).

1.2.3 Informal settlements

Informal settlements are defined as areas where groups of housing units have been constructed on land that the occupants have no legal claim to, or occupy illegally; and areas where housing is not in compliance with current planning and building regulations (unauthorized housing) (stats.oecd.org)

1.3 Problem Statement

Poverty as a multidimensional phenomenon in urban areas is not only characterised by inadequate income thus inadequate consumption of necessities but also by inadequate shelter, public infrastructure, health care, schools and protection of poorer groups rights (Oxfam 2009).

Residents in these marginalized areas live in disturbing and inhumane conditions with “severe lack” of housing, health services, solid waste management facilities, clean water supply and improved sanitation. Informal settlements in Nairobi are as a result of indifferent government policies or lack of it thereof. Slum settlements are not officially recognized as residential areas thus denying residents essential services that are provided by the government. A further lack
in good governance and leadership in these settlements means that slum dwellers not only continue to live in deprivation but are also trapped in poverty (Mutisya & Yarime, 2011, p.4).

The ethnic composition of Nairobi slums is diverse though two or three tribes dominate each settlement. The four main tribes are Luo, Luhya, Kikuyu and Kamba. Ethnic allegiances also provide cohesion amongst those of the same tribe. However, as evident in the post-election violence in 2007, while ethnicity is capable of providing valuable social networks, it can also be used destructively and divisively (Oxfam, 2009).

In the report done by Oxfam (2009, p.4) they found that 60% of the population in Nairobi live in slums where the high levels of inequality have significant negative implications for human security and economic development. With recent estimates of 2 million slum dwellers in Nairobi, this then implies that there are around 1.5 Million people living in poverty. Since the post-election violence in 2007, many people in the city’s informal settlements feel insecure. Poverty in the city is worst especially among those with low levels of education largely “because fewer children attend later stages of school in Nairobi than their counterparts” in rural Kenya. Many slum areas have few or no public schools and gender inequalities are severe with female slum dwellers being five times more likely to be unemployed than males in the slums (Oxfam, 2009, p. 4).

Slum dwellers face scary and increasing range of vulnerabilities. In the slums, child health is one of the most heartbreaking indicators of vulnerability for slum dwellers. “Less than half the children” in the slums are fully vaccinated in comparison to 80 % in other areas of Nairobi city. Children living in slums are also less likely to be immunised and are more susceptible to diarrhoea, acute respiratory infection and fever. Urban poor are at more risk for contaminated water, and the lack of waste management encourages the outbreak of disease. The lack of proper drainage also increases the risk of urban floods under the wake of climate change. The dramatic increase in the cost of food has caused slum dwellers to decrease the number and size of their meals. Only 20% of slum households are food secure, and close to 50% being food insecure for both adults and children (Oxfam 2009, Zulu et al 2011).

Urban poverty is a key challenge in the development of Kenya that requires attention in terms of development strategies and initiatives than it is getting. Urban poverty is linked with urbanisation in the country that is on the increase and unless sufficient measures are put into place, urban poverty will continue to be on the increase thus exposing slum dwellers to more vulnerability.
Ethnic voting in Kenya continues to be prevalent. When voting is based primarily on identity, other issues such as performance, accountability and transparency of leaders are ignored, thus undermining the democracy of a country. This kind of voting inhibits the electoral process in Kenya where governments are kept in office not primarily based on their credit, but rather on grounds of who gets the biggest ethnic affiliations. As a result, poor urban voters, especially those living in slums continue to be exposed to higher risks of vulnerability due to the continued lack of good governance and leadership. Ethnic voting and ethnic alliances do not help the marginalized and the poor in urban areas.

As it may be expected, the urban poor should perhaps be the least affiliated towards ethnic alliances when it comes to voting in leaders since the lack of good governance policies has led to increased levels of poverty and unemployment mostly in the slum areas. Existing ethnic divisions have meant that distribution of resources and opportunities is done based on ethnic alliances. Little research exists on how the urban poor vote in Kenya. Therefore this study aims at finding out how the urban poor who are a mix of different ethnic groups vote and whether they are unified in seeking better leadership for themselves and for the country at large.
1.4 General objective of the study

This study seeks to investigate how the urban poor who are a mix of different ethnic groups vote.

1.5 Specific objectives of the study

i. To determine what influences voting behavior among the urban poor.

ii. To verify whether poor urban dwellers are united in seeking all-inclusive leadership and governance devoid of ethnicity.

iii. To determine why there is a perceived strong allegiance to one’s ethnic group among the urban poor voters.

1.5.1 Research Questions

In light of the research objectives, I ask three interconnected research questions:

i. What factors do urban poor voters consider when voting?

ii. What role does ethnicity play in influencing voting patterns of the urban poor?

iii. Are poor urban voters united when seeking better leadership for themselves and the country at large?

1.6 Scope of the Study

This study was carried out in Kibera and Mathare Slums in Nairobi, Kenya. In Kibera, samples were drawn from Gatwikira and Kisumu Ndogo. In Mathare, samples were drawn from Mathare 4A, 4B and Kosovo.

1.7 Justification of the Study

This study is important because it highlights an under-researched issue i.e. to analyze how poor urban dwellers vote during elections. The study is important for policy makers, research organizations, government actors, development students and practitioners who may want to gain a deeper understanding of the voting patterns of poor urban dwellers.
I hope this study can build upon existing scholarly work that looks at how patronage politics in Kenya hinders development and how this undermines national prosperity especially for poor people.
CHAPTER TWO
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

2.0 Introduction

This chapter presents the research design, target population, sampling technique, data collection and data analysis.

2.1 Research Design

Research design means that one has a framework for collecting and analyzing data. It refers to the whole study process, starting from conceptualization of the problem, data generation, data analysis and finally interpretation and analysis of findings (Bryman, 2008).

This study will employ a case study approach. Case studies allow one intensive examination of a setting. A case study approach involves studying of a specific unit(s) or case in details in order to explore their in-depth nuances and complexities at the same time coming up with explanations that can be generalized for similar cases. Case studies can either be cross-sectional or longitudinal. A cross sectional study refers to research that is done at one particular time while longitudinal research means that research is carried out multiple times leading to case examination over a long time (Bryman, 2008) In this study, a cross sectional case study was done with the population sample.

The study also employed a qualitative approach. Qualitative research means a deeper understanding of the subjects being studied, since qualitative methodology means that one gets access to peoples’ personal experiences and their realities in their everyday interactions. Qualitative research also allows the researcher to generate rich data in the form of words through comments and statements unlike quantitative research where data is in the form of statistics. Through qualitative research, the researcher is able to see the social world through the eyes of the people they study. One is able to get peoples’ own interpretations and understanding of the world they live in. Qualitative research, gives the researcher an opportunity to find out the positions that people take in relation to different social phenomena. Qualitative research also helps the researcher get access to peoples’ personal experiences towards the phenomena that are being studied (Bryman, 2008).
2.2 Area of Study

The study was done in 2 two slums in Nairobi, Kenya i.e. Mathare and Kibera. 60 % of the Nairobi population live in the slums. Kibera is Africa’s biggest slum with a population of at least 1 million. Housing in Kibera consists of shacks with an average size of 12ft x 12ft built with mud walls, dirt or concrete floor with a corrugated tin roof. Shacks house eight or more people. Shack owners are mostly Kikuyu, although in most cases they do not live here but are absentee landlords. Majority of the tenants in Kibera are Luo, Luhya and Kamba. Mathare on the other hand is no different from Kibera. Mathare is the second biggest slum in Kenya, and is actually built over many years on top of a garbage dump. Mathare is a long strip of tin and wooden shacks and earth walls (Darkey & Kariuki, 2013).

Fig 2 Source: (Mutisya & Yarime, 2011).
Fig 3 Informal settlements in Mathare: Source (Corburn et al, 2012).

Fig 4. Informal settlements in Kibera: Source (Mutisya & Yarime, 2011).
2.3 Target population

This study targeted the urban poor who live in the slums of Kibera and Mathare.

2.4 Sampling Technique

In this study, random sampling was done. Random sampling as a basic form of probability sampling means that each unit has an equal probability to be included in the sample (Bryman, 2008). Sample population was comprised of residents who live and work in the slums of Kibera and Mathare. The sample population comprised also of both men and women, above the age of eighteen years.

2.5 Data Collection and Analysis

The technique used for data collection should take into consideration the research questions that need to be answered, the characteristics of the sample, and also provide information that is linked to the learning outcome.

Data was collected through the use of in depth interviews and Focus group discussions. The study employed the use of an interview guide where the researcher presented key questions to respondents. The interview guide allowed the researcher to prompt for responses from respondents.

Secondary data was gathered from books, previous research work, journals, articles and research reports. This study primarily uses thematic analysis to analyse the primary data. Data coding was done thematically.

Bryman (2008) also distinguishes two types of interviews associated with qualitative research i.e. Life history and oral history interviews. A life history interview invites the subject to look back in detail across his/her entire lifetime. An oral history interview is more specific in tone in that the subject is asked to reflect upon specific events or periods in the past. These two methods of interviewing have a disadvantage of the possibility of bias introduced by memory lapses and distortions. However, the good thing about oral history testimonies is that they allow voices of groups that have been marginalized in historical research to come through. One main advantage of life history interviews is that that it emphasizes on the point of view of the person in question and is committed to the processual aspects of social life, showing how events unfold and interrelate in people’s lives (Bryman, 2008).
The aim of using this method was to get information about how ethnic voting had evolved in the slums, and how people have viewed ethnicity and ethnic voting over time in the course of their lives, while living in the slums.

Focus groups provide an alternative to individual interviewing, where the interaction among participants is a source of data. Here the interviewers’ role is to moderate and steer the discussion. Such steering may involve recalling the original focus of the group, identifying agreements and disagreements amongst members of the group, and prompting group members to respond to issues raised by others. It is also important to set rules that also promote confidentiality. What group members say should not be taken outside of the group by individuals (Willig, 2013).

### 2.5.1 Interviews

For this study, 20 in-depth interviews were carried out; 10 respondents were drawn from Mathare and 10 from Kibera. Respondents were between the ages of 18-60, with an equal number of men and women being interviewed.

The aim of using this method was to investigate the evolution of ethnic voting in the slums and to establish how people have viewed ethnicity and ethnic voting over time in the course of their lives, while living in the slums. An interview guide was used as this allowed the researcher to design key questions that would be used for reference and prompts if necessary.

### 2.5.2 Focus groups

Two FGD’s were carried out in this study; one in Mathare and one in Kibera. The focus group in Kibera comprised of ten respondents, while the focus group in Mathare comprised of six respondents. The FGD’s had representation from both men and women. The age bracket of respondents for both FGD’s was between 18-60 years old.
2.6 Reliability and Validity of Research Instruments

Reliability in social research is concerned with the question as to whether the results of a study are repeatable. This is to mean that any significant findings when a study is done must be more than a onetime finding and that they should be repeatable. Other researchers must be able to perform the same study, under the same conditions and generate the same results (Bryman, 2008).

The researcher took measures to ensure that this study can inform other readers in making inferences based on this study. This could be in the way they can be confident in transferring results or conclusions to other urban informal settlements. A thick description of the phenomenon being studied has been given, allowing other readers to have a sufficient understanding of this and to be able to make comparisons. Moreover, concepts, meanings and definitions have been thoroughly articulated and the specific target areas of the study have also been brought out in the study.

2.7 Research Ethics

Informants’ consent was sought beforehand and respondents were informed that all information received would be confidential and solely for this study. The respondents’ privacy and identities were highly promoted in this study. The Norwegian Social Science Data Services and Kenya National Council for Science and Technology authorised data collection.

2.8 Limitations of the study

Elections in Kenya is an emotive subject, therefore, it was difficult to have respondents talk about voting and leadership in an open and unbiased way devoid of emotional subjectivity.

Another limitation was the fact that the interviewer was from the Kikuyu ethnic group, which is considered to be the ruling class of the Kenyan society. Despite slum areas being multi-ethnic, gaining entry into some areas was a challenge. To overcome this, the researcher enlisted the help of well-known locals to assist in navigating the areas. In some instances, the researcher allowed the local guide to begin the interviews as a way of gaining the respondents’ trust.
In Kibera, the researcher enlisted the help of a man from the Luo community who convinced residents to participate in the research. In Mathare, the researcher enlisted the help of a man from the Kikuyu community. At the data collection stage it was evident that slums are highly ethnicized and ethnic enclaves were quite evident.

Lastly, audio data recording was quite a tedious process, given the crowded nature of the slums, as background noise was a challenge. This was overcome by handwriting key points while conducting the interviews.
CHAPTER THREE
LITERATURE REVIEW

3.0 Introduction
This chapter examines available literature and studies carried out in light of their relevance to this study. This study examines literature with the assumption that poor urban voters in the slums vote ethnically because they believe that in doing so, their economic and personal interests are promoted. Ethnicity serves as a means to an end, the end being access to state resources and power. Electoral behavior has been extensively studied by European scholars. The study will examine various theories and explanations posited in order to explain voting behavior of poor urban voters in Nairobi, Kenya.

3.1 Voter behavior
Erdman (2007) notes that, “voting behavior in Africa is predominantly explained by factors such as ethnicity, personal linkages and clientelism” where “ethnicity as a social cleavage has gained a prominent place in understanding politics in Africa” (p.5) However, the idea that ethnicity majorly explains voting in Africa has also been challenged. In their study of Ghanian elections, Lindberg and Morrison (2007) suggest there is no empirical evidence for this, but more of assumed evidence other than empirically provided. On the basis of individual interviews in Ghana, they point out that a conclusion that ethnicity is the predominant motive for the electorate is an “ecological fallacy”. Ethnicity in Ghanian elections is seen to be significant although not a deciding factor. Their argument is that the study of voting behaviour and alignments in African politics remains an under researched area, in part because most of the independent states moved towards authoritarian regimes from the mid 1960’s to the early 1990’s. Hence lessons on voting behaviour were produced under limited competition in one party States. Nonetheless, there exist explanations for voter’s behaviour such as rationale choice, socio-psychological and historical cleavages (Erdmann, 2007, p. 6).

Moreover, many African societies have been characterised as clientelistic and Kenya is not an exception. Clientelistic politics is seen to thrive in conditions of high inequality, low productivity and sharp hierarchical social relations especially in young democracies. In societies where clientelistic networks are prevalent, voters are seen to vote for candidates in exchange for economic or social benefits. Nevertheless, ethnicity has been seen to be an important social cleavage in Africa (Archer, 2009).
3.2 Theoretical Framework

3.2.1 Sociological model

The first social model that can explain voter behavior finds its origin from Lipset and Rokkan (1967) social cleavage model. The model provides an analytical framework for the structuring of voter alignment and the formation of political parties in Western Europe. While many authors have accepted the prominence of ethnicity within African politics, only few have tried to explain the relevance of ethnicity in the context of the model, thus modifying it to include ethnicity (Erdmann, 2007).

The “model is first of all concerned with the identification of social cleavages and the historical sequence in which they emerged in Western Europe, i.e. the sequence of conflicts” (Erdmann, 2007, p. 7) The social cleavages in Western Europe were thus the centre vs periphery (subject/dominant culture) social class (owner vs worker), religion (State vs Church), and economy (rural vs urban). Secondly the model addresses the conditions under which stable cleavage systems are articulated in how political parties are formed. According to the model, cleavages determined the emergence and content of European parties. In its third complex, the model is concerned about individual voting behavior within the established political system. Party systems are seen to encourage citizens to distinguish between their loyalty to the total political systems and their attitudes towards the competing politicians. Political parties therefore had an expressive function, in that they developed rhetoric for the translation of social and cultural structure into demands and pressures for action or inaction (Erdmann, 2007).

Although not directly addressed in the Lipset-Rokkan model, Erdmann (2007, p.11) notes that;

..Ethnicity can be subsumed under the centre –periphery cleavage. In Western Europe this cleavage described the conflict about the dominant culture of the emerging state-which of the various regional cultures would become the nation’s state culture. Put differently, it was the conflict between various ethnic groups about cultural dominance in the state.

In Africa the conflicts are not so much about the dominant culture, but about who controls channels of distribution (Erdmann, 2007).
Incorporating ethnicity into the model would mean that ethnicity is utilised as a social cleavage that provides a basis for political party formation and voter alignment. However, Erdman (2007) notes that “Ethnic cleavages are variable and ethnicity can, but need not, lead to voter alignment” (p. 11) as this depends on the way ethnic identities are politically developed.

Today, this political-sociological approach shows that” electoral choices are based on a limited number of social cleavages”. These cleavages are thus **social class** (owner vs worker) **religion** (state vs church) and **ethnicity**. The argument here is that if you belong to a particular dimension and there is a political party that represents that particular segment, one would vote for that party. Party identification however does not always happen along these social cleavages (Archer, 2009, p. 38).

Erdmann (2007) goes on to note that, the effective mobilisation of parties is also dependent factors such as the political strategies of the elite, and not just the social cleavages that exist. This is to mean that the development of party systems and voter alignment as emphasised by the model is not just limited to the social cleavages that may constitute party systems, but rather the extent to which these conflicts are treated and institutionalised into “more or less stable political party systems”. This is because insights on voting behavior in institutionalised party systems cannot “be explained exclusively by socio-structural variables”. The output and input performance of the political regime, political parties and the government are also important determinants of voting behavior (Erdmann, 2007, p.8) The model thus promotes an “agency oriented approach” towards the explanations of voting behaviour. But Due to “fluid political conditions”, the cleavage model can be useful in explaining the voting behavior and party alignment of “only a fraction of the electorate” (Erdmann, 2007, p.8).

The model emphasizes the historical dimension of party systems and voter alignment, and as a result of its long-term historical dimension, it may not apply for African countries that formed their political parties after the 1980’s. It is thus doubtful that the model can provide empirically grounded findings about voter orientation and party alignments in Africa. In addition to this Lipset and Rokkan” never claimed that this would be applicable to other parts of the world” (p.10). the cleavage model also suggests that people’s electoral behavior is determined by group membership irrespective of their value orientations (Erdmann, 2007).
3.2.2 Party Identification Model

Erdmann (2007) puts across this model as a model that came into being when cleavages declined. Here it is recognized that the strength of the feelings of partisanship is an important predictor of people’s political attitudes and behaviour including the stability of party choice turnout. According to the party identification model, voter alignment is informed by a “perception of three factors: issues, “candidates, and links between parties and groups”.” Party identification as an approach to voting provides political cues to voters who are in need of guidance in making political decisions under confusing circumstances. Party identification is also seen as having a “direct impact on voting decisions” and also on the “perception of candidates and issues” (Erdmann, 2007, p.9).

However we must note that values on the other hand did not lose their political significance once social cleavages did. The arguments made in European electoral theory is that even when social cleavages lost political significance, value orientations that historically were part of social cleavages did not lose significance. For instance, even when class cleavage lost importance, the value of “equal distribution of income” might still be of great relevance. An individual will not vote for a party out of objective group interests without sharing the values of the members of the group. When individuals vote they would like their political values implemented in the political system (Archer 2009). Values are still embedded in social cleavages and even party identification. In general people’s value orientations are formed during their lifetime and will gradually change and continue to be of importance for people’s party choice even when they are least anchored. Values are therefore persistent during a people’s lifetime (Erdmann, 2007).

3.2.3 Rational Choice Model

This model on the other hand follows along two dimensions i.e. the “object of evaluation in terms of the individual representative” or the “political party” and the “orientation of evaluation in terms of retrospective versus prospective voting”. Rational choice models are also important in explaining voter behavior for “those with weak or no party identification”. A voter is thus seen as an “appraiser of past events” “who judges retrospectively on the past performance of the government. Retrospective voting means that voters look at government’s performance and they can decide to punish the government if they are dissatisfied. Voters can
also apply the retrospective view on the personal performance of a candidate. However evaluation of a candidate's personal performance may sometimes be hard to differentiate form clientelistic practices. Prospective voting would then mean that voters consider what a candidate or political party will bring into the future. Parties are thus identified by” rational calculation or reflection” and not “affective ties” like what is seen in the party identification model (Lindberg & Morrison 2007, Erdmann, 2007, p.9).

In summary, “the sociological model explains why people identify with parties over a period of elections (often undisturbed by government performance)”. The rational choice model explains “why some citizens change their vote”, while “the party identification model” explains why many” citizens do not change their vote” (Erdmann, 2007, pp 9-10).

In light of this study, these three models allow the researcher to analyze the voting patterns of urban poor in Kibera and Mathare, establishing how voter choices may or may not rely on these models of voter behavior.

3.3 Politicization of Ethnicity
Eriksen (2001) argues that ethnicity emerges and is made relevant through people’s social situations, encounters, and their ways of coping with demands and challenges of life. He also notes that “theorists of nationalism and ethnicity have pointed out that identification is relational, situational and flexible where each person carries a number of potential identities but only a few become socially significant in everyday life” (p. 17).

Furthermore, Eriksen (2011) stresses that ethnicity is an aspect of relationship between us and them and not a property that is inherent in groups. He goes on to show how culture is differentiated from ethnicity where it is shown that there is no “one to one relationship between culture and ethnicity” because the relationship between culture and ethnicity is variable and complex. Cultural differences are seen to cut across ethnic boundaries and ethnic identity is seen to be a social construct, based on cultural differences that are not “real”. He further posits that “ethnicity appears when cultural differences are made relevant in social interactions”, thus should be “studied at the level of social life”, not “at the level of symbolic culture” (p.5). However, Davidson (1999) also posits that ethnicity is often equated with culture especially with minority populations in Western Europe or non-Western cultures. This shows that there are those who approve ethnicity as an affirmation of a cultural identity, emphasizing the innate differences between humans that maybe cultural, and there are those who disapprove ethnicity as manifestation of real or imagined differences.
This close overlap between ethnicity and culture appears problematic because both concepts though used to denote identity; they at the same time appear to create two different kinds of understanding about how identity appears. Ethnicity denotes a notion of a shared ancestry, while culture represents shared norms and practices. Ethnic groups can thus be totally distinct from each other, while at the same time, ethnic groups can have shared norms.

Davidson (1999) posits that in as much as ethnic attributes can mean that people see differences between ethnic groups( real or imagined) nations can also be made up of a people who share the same common myths, a historic territory, a mass culture or even common rights and duties for members. Ethnicity therefore is part of the formation of nations. If we are to follow on this premise, one can argue that ethnicity in itself need not be divisive, but division happens when ethnicity is equated with cultural differentiations between groups, as Davidson (1999) notes, for ethnicity to come about, the groups must have minimum contact with one another and they must consider others to be culturally different from themselves.

When nations are thus established on the premise of “ethnic” attributes (assumption being that there are differences between groups) than “national” ones, it is no doubt that the “ethnic group” will emerge as the main primary source of identity. The problem with ethnic identity that separates “us” and “them” is that, shared sense nationalism is undermined especially where ethnic identity is combined with politics.

Eriksen (2001) further posits that just like ethnicity, identity is also a situational concept that changes overtime and is mostly expressed politically. He thus defines identity politics as;

*Political ideology, organization and action that openly represent the interests of designated groups based on essential characteristics such as ethnic origin or religion and whose legitimacy lies in the support of important segments of such groups (p.2).*

Social scientists such as Benedict Anderson (1983) with his influencing works, *Imagined Communities*, “points out that “any form” of identity politics, takes away “personal identity, thus “transforming personal experiences into political material” (Eriksen, 2001, p, 16).

Already in 1974 Abner Cohen’s (1974) work on Urban Ethnicity showed that the “manipulation of kinship and cultural symbols by political” entrepreneurs seeking political expedience was done consciously (Eriksen, 2011, p 2-3).

Cohen (1974) further asserted that ethnicity therefore was not just cognition of identity obscures but was also rather a variable that was operationalized and modified within political
relationships whereby ethnic groups as symbols of culture, whose existence universally is formally non-political became politicized in the course of social action.

Fish (2008) also gives a good description of the nature of identity politics:

*You’re practicing identity politics when you vote for or against someone because of his or her skin color, ethnicity, religion, gender, sexual orientation, or any other marker that leads you to say yes or no independently of a candidate’s ideas or policies. In essence identity politics is an affirmation of the tribe against the claims of ideology…. An identity politics voter says in effect, I don’t care what views he holds, or even what bad things he may have done, or what lack of ability he may display; he’s my brother, or he’s my kinsman, or he’s my landsman, or he comes from the neighborhood.*

A classic example of why identity informs voting in African countries like Kenya, is the voting hypothesis promoted by Horowitz (1985) where he argues that “ethnic voters use their votes to register their identity as members of groups”. This implies that voting is not as a result “of careful evaluation of policy or performance of leaders”, but rather “it is identity that matters” (Kimenyi & Romero, 2008, p. 4).

Eriksen (2001) posits that, identity politics is emotive in the sense that, it can mobilize emotions of “intimate sphere of kinship” and “personal experience”; people feel that they owe their existence to their parents, and their “feelings of childhood” are attached to the places they grew up, where this is not just a place, but rather a nation where “each person carries a number of identities” with only a few becoming “socially significant”. Some of these identities gain political significance through power struggles and group competition. However, though ethnicity is seen as being the psychology of identity, there is also a tendency to posit ethnicity “as a strategy manipulated by individuals to advance personal interests and maximize their power”. It is “occasionally argued along sociobiological lines that humans are driven by aggressive instincts which emerge when social fabric falls apart” (p. 6). To add on to this we see that in the developing world, the state has continuously failed to redistribute and deliver social goods to the most disadvantaged, with some parts in Africa having experienced increased levels of poverty and acute social collapse. In these circumstances, the ethnic community provides what the state cannot (Davidson, 1999).
Societies therefore approach ethnicity as primordialists, instrumentalists or constructivists. Primordialists believe that ethnicity is a fixed characteristic of individuals, and communities, therefore ethnic division and tensions are seen to be natural (Lake and Rothchild 1998). Primordialism sees ethnic conflicts as coming “from ancient hatreds between ethnic groups and that frustration comes with differences in natural ties” that may be racial, religious or regional. To add on to this, primordialism thus stems from the givens of society such as the immediate contiguity and kin connection. One is bound to one’s kinsman, and therefore ethnic ties are seen to be inherent in humans; that we either have “deep natural connections” that link us to some people or that we have” natural divisions with others”, whether based on language, race, religion or location. Whilst primordialism may have elements of common sense, it has been disregarded for its simplification of “complex situations and its suggestions of ethnic conflict being therefore natural and to be expected” (Weir, 2012, p.1).

Instrumentalists understand “ethnicity as a tool used by individuals, groups or elites to obtain some larger end”. Whether used offensively to achieve one’s own end or defensively to thwart the ambitions of others, ethnicity is “primarily a set of symbolic ties that is used for political advantage”. Elites “mobilize ethnicity in pursuit of their own interests” (Lake & Rothchild 1998, p.5-6). “Instrumentalism is also based on the notion that conflict is either driven by active manipulation of ethnic identities by political leaders for political gain” (Weir, 2102, p.1).

Furthermore, Varshney (2009, p.9) posits that the core idea of instrumentalism is that ethnicity is neither inherent in humans nor intrinsically valuable. Ethnicity is seen to mask other interests be they economic or political; where ethnicity becomes an important tool for gaining power or for drawing resources from the state, reason why it is often deployed in multi-ethnic societies. Under the instrumentalist view, conflicts take place because leaders are seen to strategically manipulate ethnicity to gain power and extract resources from the state. This line of reasoning appears problematic because accepting that leaders gain from ethnic mobilization, means we must also seek to know why the masses then tag along. Two questions therefore arise; firstly why doesn’t mobilization happen along ideological or economic ideas? And secondly why are people almost coerced to participate in ethnic mobilization? To answer this, instrumentalists argue that the problem of ethnic mobilization is one of coordination, and not one of collective action. In the latter, it is rational to “free ride” while in coordination games it is” rational to cooperate” as long as others are cooperating. Ethnicity serves as a focal point that simply requires coordination of expectations and it
therefore ceases to be of intrinsic value but only important for politics. This kind of mobilization shows how ethnicity provides epistemological comforts of home, but this still does not answer why party or class mobilization cannot offer the same comfort to people.

In addition to this, Varshney (2003) applies Weber’s concepts of value rationality and instrumental rationality showing how “rational calculus” lies “beneath nationalist pride and passions”. He notes that “ethnic or national conflict is best conceptualized as a combination of value rationality and instrumental rationality” (p.85-86). Value rational behavior is seen where people consciously act from an ethical, aesthetical, religious or other belief regardless of whether this will achieve any success. Instrumental rationality on the other hand entails a cost benefit calculation with regards to goals, where goals are abandoned if the costs are too high. Either way, behavior that is driven by such values can mean people embark on great personal sacrifices. “Ethnic or national mobilization” can therefore not “begin without value rational foundations”. For ethnicity to be instrumental for leaders, it “must exist as a valued good”. Besides, ethnic mobilization cannot succeed on “value rational grounds alone”. Coalitions and strategies are necessary. Many people would also join this kind of mobilization when there is a “chance for success”. The “origins of ethnic mobilization” are thus “value-rational” and they “contain a lot of strategic behaviour” (Varshney, 2003, p. 86).

In the politics of national exclusion, a dominant group will seek to “impose its own values on other groups within that society” or will seek to violently “exclude other ethnic groups from channels of power”. Typically this is done by enforcing culture, language or religion via “control of the state or excluding groups from power” on the grounds of ethnicity (Varshney, 2003, p. 86).

Constructivists on the other hand emphasize the social origins of ethnicity arguing that ethnicity is constructed from social interactions and it is not an individual attribute but a social phenomenon. A person’s identity remains beyond control or choice and as social interactions change, conceptions of ethnicity evolve as well. Constructivists thus believe that ethnicity is socially constructed but not inherently conflictual (Lake & Rothchild, 1998, p. 6). Constructivists further argue that ethnic conflict is as a result of “historical processes” over time that leads to hostility between ethnic identities (Weir, 2012).

Are constructivism and instrumentalism merely two sides of the same coin? The two are undoubtedly opposed to primordialism, but they are not similar. Instrumentalism views ethnicity as not valuable in and of itself but rather a mask for a core of real interests whether
political or economic. As interests change, masks change thus the fluidity of ethnic groups. One would expect these “people to pick different sides of their multiple identities at different time” and places. Constructivism on the other hand is not about the short term “fluidity of identities”. But rather it is about “the long-run formation and the consequent” “stickiness of identities”. That identities are constructed, they do not necessarily become internalized, institutionalized and acquire meaning (Varshney, 2009, p.288).

For African contexts ethnicity is multi-faceted and changeable and has several meanings (Erdmann, 2007, p. 11). But this is not to mean that ethnicity is purely an African problem. Ethno-nationalist movements in Post-communist Europe, ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia, radical right wing violations against foreigners in Western Europe, amidst the growing old-new racist ideologies, racial conflicts of the 1960s and 1970s in the USA are a reminder that ethnicity cannot be simply explained away; affirming Africans that ethnic or tribal particularism is not specifically an African problem (Lentz, 1995).

Noyoo (2000) posits that how ethnicity emerged in nation building for African countries is different from European nationalism (p.61). He goes on to note that, when examining ethnicity as a modern political resource, one sees that already in 1963, for most African states, there was a connection between post-colonial state formation and politicization of primordial sentiments with writers posing the question as to why competition for education, status, income, infrastructure and political influence occur on grounds of ethnicity rather than religion or class struggle. The answer to this question was that ethnic group formation was seen as “dynamic” and “rational” behavior that attempted to deal with, organize and benefit from the modernization of societies (Lentz, 1995, p.11).

Furthermore we must understand that the history of ethnicity in Africa’s nationalism cannot be discussed in isolation from the impact of colonialism in the continent. African states were not able to rebuild themselves after de-colonialization because despite the newness of states, the primordialism of ethnic groups was a stronger bond than the pull of civic ties being forged by new states. This is because, the invasion of the continent by Europeans in the 17th and 18th centuries not only created havoc by seizing most of the productive areas, it also created divisions, suspicion and mistrust between communities.

Noyoo (2000, p. 61) further notes that, the “genesis of the African state”; was not an “intrinsic evolutionary process”, that would allow for the “growth of unambiguous feelings” of “nationhood” noting that people in these states often “came from rival, ethnic groups”. Before
colonialism, pre-colonial societies had generated political and economic systems amongst the different tribes. Tribes were unified and were unitary self-governing entities. The penetration and subsequent plunder of both human and natural resources by European countries led to the disintegration of these systems. In the Kenyan context, the British administration system was very instrumental in creating tribes. The clear demarcation of ethnic identities meant that the colonialists could effectively prevent inter-ethnic cooperation. British colonialists settled Europeans in between neighbouring ethnic entities to effectively prevent inter-ethnic cooperation. Attempts by Kenyans to organize cross ethnic resistance were met by a ban by the British that only allowed associations with members from one ethnic group. This prohibition to organize nationally left Kenyans with only one choice of developing locally restricted ethnic associations that strengthened ethnic nationalism which still forms the foundation of Kenyan politics to date. (Noyoo, 2000 Weber, 2009).

Furthermore, Noyoo (2000) notes that, the economic crisis towards mid 1970’s and the end of the cold war, revealed the weak nature and functioning of the new born nationalism for African states. States became objects of elite rivalry whereby different groups were in competition for control of power. Ethnic mobilization and manipulation of cultural groupings became a tool for these elites as political “leaders created the conditions for ethnic tensions by allocating opportunities and resources to individuals from their own tribes” (p. 63) The lack of promotion of cultural tolerance and harmonization of different ethnic groups created states that only bore the rhetoric of nationalism but lacked the proper and efficient strategies to re-shape the attitudes of various ethnic groups in creating a unitary state.

Noyoo (2000) adds that despite the self-determination efforts of African states to emancipate themselves from colonial rule by acting as a united front in the wake of nationalism, Post-colonial African states have always been fragile. Citizens still hold on to their ethnic identities and do not identify with their nation states because nations in Africa did not” arrive at a clear conceptualization of citizenship; whereby the hurried transfer of power, from the colonial authorities did not create an opportunity for cohesive nation building” (Noyoo, 2000, p.8). The imposition of the artificial boundaries by the European colonies is by and large the reason why ethnicity remains a powerful negative force in Africa, which still dominates modern African Political discourse. Even though African states are no longer under economical subjugation of European nations, there is still insignificant progress in areas of economic emancipation.
Wimmer, Cederman & Brian (2009, p. 317) put across that the modern state is neither “an ethnically neutral actor” nor an “arena for political competition” but rather a “central object” in the participation of “ethno political power struggles”. Unlike empires, “nation states are governed in the name of their peoples” thus providing incentives “to align political loyalties along ethnic divisions”. “Political elites in control of executive state power favor co-ethnics” when deciding whom to ally to and whom to distribute public goods to as they lay claim to their own legitimacy. Politics are then seen to “center on the question of which ethnic group controls the executive government” pitting ethnical groups against each other.

In addition to this, Wimmer’s (2002) theory of nation state formation states that “ethnicity matters for politics not because of a universal, natural tendency to favor ethnic kin over non-kin, nor because of a primordial attachment of individuals to their identities, nor because it provides lower political organization costs”. Rather, ethnicity matters because “nation states rely on ethno-national principles of political legitimacy” i.e. the state is “ruled in the name of an ethnically defined people” and rulers are thus expected to “take care of their own” people. “Ethnicity and nationhood have much greater political significance in nation states” than they may do for empires. Given this kind of institutional environment, political office holders gain more by favoring co-ethnics when distributing public goods just as voters would prefer parties led by co-ethnics or co-nationals. However “not all modern-nation states are characterized by such ethnic and national favoritism”. This kind of favoritism is likely to happen in “poor states that lack resources for universal inclusion as well as states with weak civil institutions” (Wimmer, Cederman & Brian, 2009, p. 321).

The nexus between competitive politics and politicization of identities is primarily an instrumentalist construct that plays out differently in different countries. The following section examines how political parties are formed and the salient nature of ethnicity in the formation of political parties and provision of public goods.

The fact that a country comprises of different ethnic groups does not automatically imply that there is negative ethnicity. This line of thought has been upheld because there are other multi-ethnic countries that have not experienced conflicts. Tanzania³ as an example has many ethnic groups. However it has managed to avoid ethnic tension and hatred unlike Kenya. This is

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³ Tanzania has a large number of small ethnic groups unlike Kenya which has a few large ethnic groups. See (Barkan, 1994; p.10).
because Julius Nyerere, the founder and visionary of the Tanzanian state after independence worked hard to instill a sense of shared nationalism through the concept of Ujamaa.

Political economists have argued that the polarization of ethnicity for political ends is possible where there are a few large ethnic groups and not where there are large numbers of smaller groups. For instance this sort of mobilization is not characteristic of a country like Tanzania with large numbers of small groups rather than a few large groups (Bekoe, 2012).

3.4 Clientelistic Parties and Ethnic Polarization

Ethnic alliances have become notable in Kenya’s politics as witnessed particularly in the 2007 and 2013 elections. However this extractive approach continues to face increasing pressures and as the competition for power rises over time, amidst population growth, leaders are even now regrouping.

For instance, during the 2013 election, Uhuru Kenyatta formed the Jubilee Alliance together with William Ruto, which saw them become elected as President and Deputy President respectively. The Jubilee Alliance comprised largely of the Kikuyu and other communities in Central Kenya and Rift Valley communities. Most Political leaders in Kenya view power as ‘my turn to eat’.

Political campaigns are therefore seen to play divisive roles into the stability of the country. Ethnic groups are mobilized against one another, building on the same rhetoric that those that win, will automatically benefit. This kind of patronage politics have become a vicious cycle in every Kenyan election where most times the country is largely ethnically polarized with ethnic tension being felt and seen throughout the country.

Political parties in Kenya continue to be non-programmatic, clientelistic parties based on ethnicity. Despite slum dwellers living peacefully with each other; politicians polarize and politicize ethnicity negatively especially during election periods. As mentioned above, ethnicity as a form of identity informs peoples’ everyday interactions with each other. Due to the flexibility of ethnic identification people create and re-create their identities at the same time creating their own ideas of how they think about others and themselves. When these ideas differentiate between us and them, values of shared nationalism are erased in part because ethnic identity becomes the most important factor for people; and ethnicity remains

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4 “Eat” Denotes how access to national resources is viewed as chance to share the gains
the sole identification factor between different ethnic tribes. Ethnicity in Kenya therefore, continues to shape the political atmosphere because politicians have learnt how to manipulate ethnicity to custom fit their party formations and alliances.

According to Bekoe (2012) Kenya's political parties are not programmatic, that is to mean that ideologies and policies are not seen to be important. Politics continues to be viewed as a “winner takes it all zero sum ethnic game”; where various ethnic groups argue openly that it is their turn to “eat”, and the “national economic cake” is what is aimed for. Political parties thus seek to control the national resources by having a fellow co-ethnic to be president. Since parties are not programmatic and institutions are weak, politicians then primarily become distributors of private rather than public goods.

Empirical studies show that Members of parliament in African Multi-party systems do spend large amounts of campaign funds on personalized networks, where votes are exchanged based on the ability of the incumbent MP or the opposition to buy votes and take care of his people by paying fees, providing jobs or providing gifts (Lindberg & Morrison, 2007, P. 88).

Political losses therefore mean that others are excluded from access to state resource. This has resulted in what is called a “communal logic of tribalism” where the only way to access state resources is having one of your own persons in power; as this has been considered the only way to eat. Kenyan politicians obtain power by using the ethnic card as a mobilizing factor whether articulated openly or not. The lack of institutional checks on the presidency and his personal power, the expectations of his clients’ and the existence of non-programmatic political parties, promotes ethnicity as a critical determinant for the distribution of resources (Bekoe, 2012).

Moreover, voting in co-ethnics for the presidency has also been associated with patronage politics where “elected politicians target public spending to reward their loyal backers”. “Our turn to eat” game is prevalent in Kenyan politics where ethnic altruism and ethnic reciprocity is prevalent. When previous leaders disproportionately favor their own people, successive leaders will do the same, this becoming a never ending cycle. The issue here has always been why the first president of Kenya adopted ethnic policies on redistribution of resources rather than nation building policies. Both “patronage and vote buying politics”, lead to “ethno-
favoritism” where “dominant” ethnic groups in the government redistribute state resources such as “public investments”, and “civil servant positions towards its own members” (Burgess et al, 2010, p.4)

Wamwere (2003) posits that, Africans suffer a curse that is the greed of the elites, who will promote negative ethnicity for their own gain. “Now is our turn to eat”, is the truest and most basic expression of the motive behind postcolonial African elites' negative ethnicity. Studies show that the post-colonial struggle to gain control of Africa's rich natural resources opened way for negative ethnicity. Postcolonial elites encouraged negative ethnicity to justify their exploitation of others and of their own communities. Negative ethnicity then becomes a personal quest for resources in a tribal war. Capitalism in African states, with a lack of clear accountability and transparency mechanisms is what has strengthened greed and corruption. In the scramble for resources, individuals realize that their abilities to grab are limited and they unite with others to maximize their wealth and power. The use of ethnic superiority is used to explain why one group should have more power, more wealth or more land.

More arguments for this, is that when these elites capitalise on the notion that it is our turn to eat, they cannot do that without power. This means that they then create another notion of ethnic power, where they claim that is their turn to rule. To eat you must rule. The incorrect assumption is that when an individual in Kenya becomes president, so does his community. All people are supposed to share power and wealth as well as guilt and loss purely by ethnic association. When negative ethnicity takes root in a multi-ethnic state like Kenya, it influences its adherents with a zealous patriotism, a patriotism that is not rooted in their country but rather their own ethnic community. Ethnic patriotism is thus promoted ahead of national patriotism. To achieve this, elites know that when people starved of food and information they are susceptible to ethnic propaganda (Wamwere, 2003).

Additionally, when a state is weakened by polarization, ethnic groups become fearful and are seen to have collective fears with regard to their safety. Ethnic activists and political entrepreneurs operating within these groups reinforce these fears, driving groups’ rather apart. “Political memories, myths and emotions magnify the fears within groups and these between-group and within-group strategic interactions breed a toxic situation full of distrust, suspicion and can explode into murderous violence, including systemic “slaughter of one people by another” (Lake and Rothchild, 1998, p.8).
In Kenya one cannot talk about ethnicity and fail to connect it to conflict. As mentioned earlier, the aftermath of the 2007/2008 general elections, saw violence erupt mostly in the Kenyan slums. The existence of ethnic enclaves in the slums, were a good breeding ground for ethnic tensions that culminated into the worst violence that the republic has ever experienced since independence.

As most slums are basically areas of great deprivation, these conditions create a situation where some parts of the population feel neglected. When combined, poverty and state weakness lead to a situation where people feel grieved.

Grievances in Kenya have therefore become pre-conflict conditions. Arnson & Zartman (2005) note that, conflicts come into play when people feel discriminated against for ascriptive reasons, i.e. for what they are. Identity is involved in all conflicts, albeit in different forms. Today it takes the form of ethnic identity because ethnic groups are the most easily mobilizable social groupings and because discrimination is frequently done by one ethnic group against the other. The subjective sense of deprivation is made more credible therefore making identity a major resource for the generation of conflict.

However, ethnicity in and of itself is not a cause of violence, but when it is linked to acute social uncertainty, a history of conflict and collective fears within groups, it then becomes a major fault line along which societies fracture. Groups become fearful for survival when the central authority declines. They will prepare and invest for violence, and thus make violence possible. “Emerging anarchy and violence arise out of strategic interactions between groups” that is inherent of ethnic activists and political entrepreneurs who will stop at nothing to mobilize members, polarize the society and magnify intergroup dilemmas (Lake & Rothchild, 1998, p.8).

However poverty alone does not explain the rise of rebellion, but even if poverty and conflict do not coincide, it is not hard to see that grievances over deprivation of basic needs play a role in conflict. Grievances come from unmet needs, unwarranted deprivation, felt hurts and resentments. Poverty as sensitized by relative deprivation creates the conditions out of which conflicts can grow as well as state incapacity either through failure or outright collapse. This causal chain can apply to the entire state or to neglected regions (Arnson & Zartman, 2005).

Arnson & Zartman (2005) further note that political entrepreneurs are the lighting match when thrown into existing conditions of poverty, state failure and neglected people that feel
grieved light up the fire of negative ethnicity. However, political entrepreneurs can rarely-never indeed- mobilize an entire population, their effectiveness depends on their ability to make a selective appeal to a part of the population. In most cases mobilization depends on their ability to seize on peoples’ sense of identity.

An interesting aspect of political patronage and how it is played out in Nairobi slums is brought out by Dafe (2009) who argues on how political patronage is rampant in ethnically fragmented societies. Here we see how class and where one lies in social hierarchical structures inhibit upwards social mobility, how ethnicity unites the ruling class against the poor class and also how ethnic divisions prevent the poor class to join in collective action. Politicians in these kinds of societies establish patron-client relationships to mobilize or reward those who support then politically. Furthermore he points out that, “political coalitions aimed at the capture for resources have a strong incentive to limit their size in order to increase winner’s share; and ethnicity works as an excellent criterion” (p.9).

Dafe (2009, 9) further shows how informal rental housing in Nairobi is dominated by large scale landlordism where the deliberate exclusion of informal settlements from public services is done so that the process of exclusion creates benefits to a variety of actors who have an interest in maintaining the status quo. For instance in Kibera structure owners are affluent elites and public officials i.e. residents of higher income areas, public officials and landlords who own housing structures in the slums. The argument put forth is that these beneficiaries are well connected and are able to bypass official regulations when constructing units. They therefore have an incentive to provide low quality housing. Moreover, this study also shows how landowners and landlords form these patron-client relationships based on ethnicity where they tend to come from the same ethnic tribe.

Dafe’s (2009) assertions show how class besides ethnicity is also a major determinant of political decisions in Kenya. Class as a factor for mobilization and opportunities shows how affluent elite and public officials are able to organize themselves as an interest group where they are able to maintain these patron-client relationships. This is because they have more resources they can spend in lobbying activities. In contrast, a lack of resources prevents poor interest groups from establishing such relationships. The poor will even have more problems in accessing and evaluating information; “the poor are likely to face more severe collective action problems and are thus less organized. This is because, “resources are necessary to mobilize group members, gain necessary skills and; even take time off from gainful
employment” (pp. 10-11). Their exploitation is further strengthened by ethnic fragmentation that already exists between different ethnic groups, which limits the poor in uniting for collective action. Ethnic polarization is thus a major cause of collective action problems that may inform the persistence of Nairobi slums (Dafe, 2009).

To add on to this, we see that exploitation is central to the Marxist understanding of history and contemporary society. Though not all social conflicts are a struggle between exploiters and the exploited; oppression can explain social conflict. Oppression refers to the systematic discrimination by one social group against another on the basis of inherited (gender, color, skin) or socially acquired (sexual orientation or religious belief) characteristics. Oppression experiences cut across class, and are more severe depending on where the victims are placed in the social structure. Ruling classes throughout history have endorsed the oppression of different groups in order to maintain or create divisions over whom they rule (Davidson, 1999).

It is evident that ethnicity as a socially acquired characteristic is also used by the ruling class to oppress those of a lesser social class than them. Ethnicity is thus seen to cut across class, where the rich are seen to use ethnicity as tool to enhance their economic interests. The arguments above show how ethnicity in Kenya does not just serve politicians, but it is also a valued tool by businessmen. They too will unify based on ethnicity to promote their personal interests. However slums are not the problem. Rather “the spatial manifestations of urban poverty, social exclusion and inappropriate government policies”

3.5 How Are Ethnic Enclaves Recreated in Slums?

Since the 1960s, debates about the political role of ethnicity in post-colonial Africa, often took a constructionist approach to analyzing “tribalism in town” whilst adopting an essentialist understanding of tribes in rural areas (Lentz, 1995, p.308). An early essay by Wallerstein (1960) on ethnicity and national integration, rural communities were referred to as” tribes”, while urban groupings based on common ancestry and/or culture were qualified as “ethnic groups”. In contrast to rural tribes, ethnic group memberships were flexible and a matter of social definition that appealed to administrative units formed by the colonial governments (Lentz, 1995).

*See http://dignitasproject.org/documents/studies/200806-CommunityProfile.pdf*
In a case study of a Rhodesian mining town, it was demonstrated that tribal loyalties were significant in relations between Africans outside the workplace. Tribalism played a role in organizations such as trade unions, and thus tribalism was seen to rather be an expression of growing urban social inequality—the lines of an emerging class structure. Other studies as those on the Xhosa in the South African city of East London emphasized that different migrant groups had varying degrees of importance to their home ties and tribal loyalties and the new urban friendships and associations. In times of economic crisis and political instability, home ties and ethnicity would represent an important source of security, especially for migrant workers in urban areas (Lentz, 1995).

Lentz (1995, p. 309) notes that,

*Ethnicity when turned outwards facilitates the categorical interaction between anonymous city dwellers: people are identified by ethnic indicators and this identification predicates the patterns of behavior expected from them. On the other hand, a common ethnicity turned inwards, provides the basis for enduring personal relationships, friendships networks and mutual aid associations (Lentz 1995, p.309).*

Wallerstein (1960) argued that with increased urbanization, loyalty to “ethnic groups” would overlay loyalty to the “tribal” community as ethnic groups were then seen to be a self-liquidating phase for new families; where these ethnic associations played a role in the re-socialization of rural migrants. Ethnicity also became an outlet for political tensions such as dissatisfaction with new governments that would take the form of less disruptive complaints about ethnic groups or groups presumed to be on power. However, nepotism, corruption and in some cases secessionist movements were also brought about by ethnic loyalties.

Urban ethnicity has also been studied with inference to the significance of “educated elites”, citing that this group “failed to develop into a pan-ethnic dominant class with common interests due to the pressures that were exerted on them by their well-off kin and villagers. This was considered as a failure because, the more advantaged members of the group were expected to share the benefits derived from their advanced positions. The advantaged groups were thus forced to also consolidate themselves as an ethnic grouping. In addition to this, individual progress was thus construed in ethnic terms and was closely determined by the collective standing of the group. “Educated elites of disadvantaged groups” thus “became ethnic missionaries”, who organized ethnic associations devoted to the development of their home regions thus imparting to the “rural masses a sense of belonging to an ethnic
community”. In politics too, “ethnic appeals” are useful to politicians because constituencies are dominated by an ethnic group and the “appeal of common ethnicity generate unified support where other issues would be divisive” (Lentz, 1995, p.311). However, the actual or presumed nepotism of those favored by this kind of modernization aroused feelings of disadvantage in other groups and these feelings were also construed in ethnic terms.

Here, one sees that ethnic membership in the urban setting is “situationally dependent”, manipulable and flexible. “Urban ethnic categories” thus “do not correspond to rural tribal groups”, but rather “migrants create new ethnic groups” as their “situation requires”. Tribes then become organized political units (Lentz, 1995, p.310).

Wallerstein (1960) hoped that “tribal and ethnic particularism” would in the long run give rise to “cultural homogenization and national integration”, but his optimism disappeared in the face of ethnic conflict for example the Biafra war in Nigeria. In his later works, he interprets ethnic groups as “status groups” and “blurred” collective representations of classes. He claims that “ethnic consciousness” in a “primordialist mode” is everywhere, “but it is only realized when groups feel either threatened with a loss of previously acquired privilege of conversely feel that it is an opportune moment politically to overcome denial of privilege”( Lentz, 1995, p. 311).

Since this study is aims at understanding the voting patterns of urban poor, it would be imperative to discuss the issue of ethnic territorialisation and its prevalence in Nairobi slums. According to a research done in Kenya, by Sarah Jenkins (2012) ethnic territoriality is an instrument that promotes ethnic voting. The study was done between 2009-2010 with residents of urban slums and Peri-urban centers in Eldoret, Nairobi and Nakuru.

In her study, Jenkins (2012, pp.3-4) explains that ethnic territoriality and the immigrant metaphor is a “typical mode of thought” in the “everyday life and social interaction” of Kenyans. Secondly, Jenkins concludes that ethnicity and land-territory are inextricably linked and to ask somebody in Kenya where they come from is indeed to ask about their identity. People who have migrated from their ancestral homes characterize urban areas in Kenya. These people are considered to be immigrants or guests within the urban areas. Nairobi for example, is home to Kenyans from all the 42 ethnic tribes of Kenya. Kenyans believe that nobody can be from Nairobi because everybody is from somewhere, everybody has an ethnic background and everybody has a rural home. This identification with persons’ ancestral homes explains why ethnic cleavages are evident even in urban settings.
The study further gives a case example of a territorialized identity narrative of a Luo man and Kikuyu Wife who were married and lived in Nairobi. Otieno (Luo man) had bought land in Ngong (Kikuyu area) and having lived there for many years, he wished that upon his death, he was to be buried there. After his death, however, a dispute arose between his wife, and his fellow clansmen who wanted him buried in his ancestral land, according to the Luo customs. After a court case, and an appeal of the initial verdict, Otieno was buried in “Siaya the heart of Luo Land” in 1987. This is a strong demonstration of an attachment to rural homes, showing how people who have moved from their rural homes remain attached to their homeland. Thus, constructions of the immigrant metaphor are part of the continuous reconstruction of ethnic identity. Burying the dead in their ancestral homeland or in the rural village is important in many Sub-Saharan African countries. No matter how long one has lived outside the land of one’s ancestors, it remains the place where you belong (Jenkins, 2012, p.5).

As Jenkins (2012, pp 581-582) notes,

*Burial practices are emphasized as being central to the practice of identity within a particular space and the justification of ownership claims in that territory. In this way, then, burial practices are illustrative of a deeper understanding of territorialized identity and belonging in Kenya. They reflect the continued attachment to the rural home that is at the heart of understandings of citizenship, belonging and exclusion.*

Ethnic enclaves in the slums are also seen to be a symbolic appropriation of territory and space. Studies show that the “formation of ethnic enclaves in countries across the world is common and they often acquire names that are representative of the dominant community”. These references to such “spaces” show ideas of “ownership and belonging”. The use of these names by rural-urban migrants shows a reflection of their affective attachment to “home” and it also “accentuates their visibility in the area”. In Kenyan slums, ethnic enclaves are also” named with reference to a prominent place” of the “dominant group’s homeland”. For example, In Kibera there are villages by the name Kisumu Ndogo, meaning "little Kisumu". This Luo dominated enclave is linked to the Luo Homeland of which Kisumu is the capital. The use of these names by slum dwellers is understood as a “reflection of their affective attachment” to “home”. Ethnic enclaves therefore act as a" symbolic appropriation of territory and space” (Jenkins, 2012, 7).
Last but not least, the study goes on to show that “economic prosperity and development” has been understood by people as being “directly linked to having a member of the ethnic group in Power” (Jenkins, 2012, 11).

...there is a strong perception that in addition to macro-scale development prospects, individual material benefits in the form of employment opportunities, access to land, loans and localized development projects will result from a member of the ethnic group attaining political power (Jenkins, 2012, p. 586).

Based on a review of this study, it is evident that ethnic enclaves characterize slums in Kenya. These ethnic cleavages thus will make people vote for those whom are of similar ethnic origin as them or they will vote for the dominant group (which could also be non-ethnic voting) because they fear hostility from the majority group. Politics therefore continues to be a struggle among different ethnic groups to” put their own into a position of political power”, therefore “ethnic voting patterns while certainly not universal”, become “prominent”. Ethnic enclaves in the slum will result in ethnic voting, where elites and local-level actors conceptualize new guests who move into the slums as one “who is expected to abide” by special “rules of hospitality, namely conforming to the political wishes of the host community”. Tension arises between guests and “natives when the former are perceived to be in opposition to the political wishes of the host community” i.e. the dominant ethnic group within the slums (Jenkins, 2012, 11).

3.6 How Ethnicity Impedes Development

Development as a multi-faceted process can be promoted or inhibited by several factors. Development is still seen to be difficult for most of the poor countries to achieve. Generally development means “a positive transformation of people’s lives” that is qualitative and quantitative. Ideally development should be about raising the material and living conditions for people. This means that there are improvements in services such as education, health security and social welfare. Development also means that people have equal access to opportunities such as employment and security. When these opportunities are hindered due to the fact that people are from a different ethnic group or another, development is them impeded. The state as a prime mobilizer of resources should ensure that social justice is achieved. When the state is “hijacked” by one or several ethnic groups, upwards mobility becomes a preserve of those groups who then “use the state for selfish needs as opposed to national development. “A predatory state” is therefore created whereby “clientelism and
nepotism are used as yardsticks for state contracts and tenders. Ethnicity in its negative form negates development” (Noyoo, 2000, p.58).

Redistribution of a country’s resources based on ethnicity means that those who don’t come from ruling ethnic groups are neglected. When fuelled these ethnic tensions result in wars and death. Development cannot take place in turbulent environments; even Foreign Direct Investments cannot happen in Nations where ethnic tension results into civil wars (Noyoo, 2000).

Ethnicity when analysed in Africa, continues to be a self-inflicted misery especially in countries where it has brought division and strife amongst citizens. “Ethnicity seems to thrive in chaotic social and political environments”; a negative force that is utterly destructive and undermines a country’s morality. However, arguments that view the” nature of ethnicity in African states”, as being more “instrumental than primordial”, indicate that significant liberalization and democratization are possible (Noyoo, 2000, p. 3).

In addition to this, it is now accepted that the main problem that prohibits development in many countries is weak institutions. Moreover poor quality of governance characterized by the lack of transparency and accountability influences development results as this determines “human interactions in society and the types and quality of policies a government adopts” (Kimenyi and Romero, 2008, p. 5).

Furthermore ethnically diverse countries continue to exhibit low macro-economic stability, diminished growth rates and decreased provision of public goods. It is not ethnicity per se that explains social conflict or the breakdown of democracy, but rather its role in the political process. The political salience of ethnicity is linked to increased ethnic favoritism and politicization of ethnicity (Weber, 2009).
CHAPTER FOUR
DATA PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

4.0 Introduction
The researcher employed an explanatory framework where data was categorized into themes and analyzed in relation to the research objectives in order to establish patterns of ideas, concepts and attitudes. Data was also analyzed in relation to literature reviewed with the aim of identifying comparisons and/or differences. The study was guided by the following objectives;

i. To determine how ethnicity influences voting behavior among the urban poor

ii. To verify whether poor urban dwellers are united in seeking all-inclusive leadership and governance devoid of ethnicity

iii. To determine why there is a perceived strong allegiance to one’s ethnic group among the urban poor voters

The following were the emergent themes; factors considered among poor urban voters, the influence of ethnicity in formation of social networks in the slums, the nexus between ethnicity and corruption and finally the unity of urban poor voters when it comes to voting devoid of ethnicity.

4.1 Factors that are considered by Poor Urban Voters
Respondents identified themselves first as Kenyans. Ethnic tribe did not seem to be a major issue that informs their personal identity. The question on one’s ethnicity was aimed at measuring the saliency of ethnicity or the weight that individuals place on ethnicity as the main identity as compared to other available identities (Bratton, Bhavnani and Chen, 2012, p 12).

Informants view ethnicity as a problem in society by attributing ethnic behavior to others who tend to behave in a “tribalist” way and not themselves necessarily.

To begin with, this study established that poor urban voters consider candidates that have done well for the community. Respondents also care about the creation of jobs especially for the unemployed youth, the provision of better housing services, and creation of business opportunities for those living in slums where respondents see the giving money to establish
small businesses an aspect of leadership. Poor urban voters also consider voting in leaders who offer personal assistance to them for instance giving school fees to them for their children. The most interesting thing when respondents voiced their views was the idea of voting in leaders “who had done well”. This response, albeit articulated differently was widely shared, and implies that in most elections, it is mostly existing leaders who run for elections every other time. Urban poor voters also show a degree of prospective and retrospective voting where previous performance and future expectations are considered.

In Kibera, research data confirms this;

*I would focus on the work that this person has done for us here in the community. Like, somebody that does well to all of us without discrimination (Research data, February 2013).*

*I would vote in for leaders who remember us after we have voted for them. Leaders that will come back and help me when I have my own problems. But I have seen that these leaders once we vote them in, they stay away from us for even 5 years, then they come back after the 5 years to seek for votes. That is when they will come and give me 100Ksh. Good leaders are those that come back to help us (Research data, February 2013).*

Respondents in the focus groups discussion in Kibera also support these views.

*We would focus on what the person has done in the community. You know that is what a leader does. It’s not about how rich they are. It’s about what good they have done in the community. A party’s manifesto is also important. Not just voting for someone who is your friend or family. However a party manifesto is not that important compared to the track record of that particular candidate. We would also look at the transparency of the candidates (Research data, February 2013).*

Similar views were also shared in Mathare. One respondent was of the view that leaders that offer personal help to her and other traders are good leaders to elect or re-elect.

*For me when voting, I would consider if a leader can help small business traders, give us better stalls to run our businesses and someone who can help me educate my children if I am not in a position to...but I am yet to encounter such a leader. They just talk and talk during elections, but after the elections they don’t help at all (Research data, February 2013)*

*We need people that can love and develop this country i.e. leaders who are not selfish. Sometimes you hear someone has been given 50 million to construct a road. Then he colludes*
with his people, they inflate the price and then they use these monies for their own gain. We need leaders that can also take care of the family. If a child cannot go to school because of school fees, this leader should be able to assist. Organize the CDF (Constituency Development Fund) so that such children do not miss the opportunity to go to school. Another thing is that we need leaders that are accessible, the governor of this area, since he was elected I have never seen him, even when this road was being constructed, he did not come in person (Research data, February 2013)

The study also established that poor urban voters consider the development record and past performance of leaders when voting.

*I would say development records. This person has to be able to take care of our needs. It is a must we look at the previous work that this person has done in the community (Research data, February 2013).*

Sometimes you find that someone has been in power for many years yet there is nothing to show for it. Then one wonders why we should vote for that person to be president if he cannot manage a constituency. If you look at Kalonzo (Kamba leader, who has been an MP for many years, and has tried to vie for presidency), he has done nothing for our region. If you cannot manage 100 Ksh why one should be given 1000 Ksh? We must look at the work that this person has done before we vote them in again (Research data, February 2013).

The findings here are supported by a study done by Bratton and Kimenyi (2008, p. 6) on ethnic voting in Kenya, where they find the performance of the incumbent government also matter in influencing voter choices in Kenya.

In Mathare, voters also consider candidates who promote policies that lead to provision of job opportunities. One respondent who completed high school education but did not have the means to attend college, and has lived in Mathare for four years, had been without employment since he finished his secondary education. He was an optimistic young man, who lived in a small one roomed house in Mathare together with his friend. As a result of unemployment, he had been involved in criminal activities in the slums, but was very optimistic of getting a job in the near future.

*I mostly consider someone who will look into matters of the youth. If you look at most of the youth here, we are jobless and some of us have even been involved in crime. I would want to vote in someone that has policies that can help everybody, policies that can build the
community. For me getting a job is very important, or being able to run my own small business (Research data, February 2013).

During the group discussion in Kibera, it further emerged that urban poor voters consider the accessibility of leaders to help in youth empowerment.

We have so many idle youth here in Kibera. They are so many. We need leaders that can help to organize these young people into groups, and then assist them to get jobs. And he should be able to help all without discrimination (Research data, February 2013).

To be honest, all the times I have tried, I have never even come close to 10 inches near the MP of this area. It is impossible. He is so untouchable. I would want these leaders to be open to us the youth. We should be able to access their offices without fear. And he should be able to come and see how we live here. If I am eating dry food with water, he should also join me in the same meal. He should not feel he is above us. He should help me sustain myself. We expect a lot from them in terms of development and mentorship (Research data, February 2013).

In Kibera, it also emerged that poor urban voters vote for candidates who give them money.

It’s because this person will come and bring money. We are all living in a slum. Sometimes one has not even eaten for three days. Then one day this leader comes with a lot of money, and even takes you into a hotel in the neighborhood and tells you to choose what you want. Honestly sometimes we just live for today, we don’t think about tomorrow (Research data, February 2013).

People believe that when they vote in leaders from their ethnic backgrounds they are going to benefit. It is not true that they benefit, they are somehow manipulated by the same leaders, and are given some cash handouts. These are poor people being manipulated, given little money, and then the small cash blindfolds their eyes, they can't see, the real common issues and they cannot free themselves since the pressure from the politicians is too high. The poor cannot defend themselves that is why they will always be manipulated by the rich politicians who have money to misuse them (Research data, February 2013).

The findings here, agree with studies on voting in Africa, which have shown that, “Africans are concerned” about particular “pocketbook issues such as their incomes” and measures of economic wellbeing such as provision of public goods and employment (Kimenyi and
Ro
ero, 2008, p.8). Literature has documented a correlation between vote buying and poverty a practice that is quite pervasive in Kenya. There reasons as to why vote buying thrives in contexts of widespread poverty can be; that poor voters lack access to resources such as water, food and health care which politicians promise to provide during campaigns. Secondly, it is assumed that the “marginal utility of income” for poorer people is higher, meaning that it is easier for voters living in material deprivation to sell their votes. Last but not least, political parties are able to buy votes from the poorest by offering modest amounts to each voter. This then gives political candidates the opportunity to create clientelistic relationships between them and the voters. The use of these “pre-election rewards” allows politicians to mobilize support from the poor (Jensen & Justesen, 2013, p.223).

Respondents further implied that a candidate’s manifesto was important for them to consider when voting but they acknowledge that previous performance of the candidate is more important than a manifesto.

*Party Manifestos are also important. One should be aware of the policies being promoted by this political party. That one feels you are well contented with the manifesto (Research data, February 2013).*

An informant in the Kibera FGD had a differing opinion about the consideration of Party Manifestos.

*I personally do not consider party manifestos. I would only check the development record of the person. Track record is very decisive for me (Research data, February 2013).*

However, questions raised to analyze how people identified political parties bring out ethnicity as a major deciding factor.

A local administrative chief, who has been in office for several years in Kibera had this to say about party formation;

*Out of my own experience, there are several factors that people consider when joining or forming political parties. One is Ethnicity. It is hugely considered here. Number two is the Political party itself. You can be a good leader with a good manifesto but just because you do not belong to a particular ethnic group and a particular political party, your party manifesto does not really hold water (Research data, February 2013).*
Elaborating more on ethnicity as a major deciding factor for party formation he went on to say;

*Immediately after independence, the first president’s conduct introduced tribalism whereby even his successor saw that political parties were formed along ethnic lines. We threw away the opportunity after independence to have a vibrant multi-partysm, because each tribe wanted to consolidate power. The second president solidified his power by banning the formation of political parties. Our original constitution talked about multi-partysm but it was not practiced. Political parties since then are formed along ethnic lines and people will tend to vote for political parties that are led by their own (Research data, February 2013).*

These findings on ethnicity as a determining factor for party formation, are also supported in Banarjee and Pande (2007) who note that, when voters care about the ethnic identification of politicians, then the candidates or/and parties politicians associated with the dominant group in a particular setting, have an obvious competition advantage. They will win even when other dimensions such as competence are non-existent.

### 4.2 Influence of Ethnicity in Formation of Social Networks in Slums

Here the aim was to establish the degree to which negative ethnicity is strongest in the slums. Respondents implied that divisions based on ethnicity mostly occurred during election periods where ethnic tensions would arise between people but these would also subside after the elections were over. The study found that ethnicity influences formation of social networks in slums

The study finds that, poor urban dwellers may interact with others who are of a different ethnic groups, but in some cases, they will also relate ethnically for instance when choosing where to live.

Respondents in Mathare had this to say;

*Yes, in this area, groups are formed ethnically; most groups separate themselves according to tribe, but not everyone. I am part of groups where we are all mixed (Research data, February 2013).*
Yes, people will relate based on ethnicity. Sometimes it is easier to live and be around someone who is from your ethnic group. But when we form groups, people interact well. Things are normal on most times; people are united (Research data, February 2013).

The study also established that ethnic tension would arise during elections but quickly subside after elections because most slum dwellers have to work together. However, the study also found that in some areas ethnic tensions did not necessarily subside after elections.

During elections, people have disagreements. Some of them, since people are different, get drunk for example and will insist that a certain candidate must be voted in. Yet what I normally tell people is that tribalism will not help us at all. It is God who chooses a leader. Whoever gets in is the one who will lead everyone, so tribalism does not help (Research data, February 2013).

Ethnicity plays a big factor only when we vote, but when it comes to how people in the country are working; most people have to work together. I am a Kamba, working for a Kikuyu. I understand that for your business to thrive and grow you have to cooperate with your neighbour even though they are not of your tribe (Research data, February 2013).

During elections, people will meet based on their tribes, but not everyone, but after elections people start to interact freely (Research data, February 2013).

During elections there is tension, after elections, there is post –tension like now when we voted in last year’s election. I believe in social media, but people take the war to the social media. So the social media has played a big role in promoting ethnicity. Like, you see, most of the time you see people commenting and stereotyping other tribes. This means we have a sense of false calmness. If people are given a chance to fight, people would kill each other. I guess we have fake peace (Research data, February 2013).

You know people should not confuse calmness for peace. You might be my enemy but when if you come and talk to me, you may think I am your friend. But you don’t know what is going on inside my mind. If we keep doing this same thing where a leader says that he will lead for 10 years, and then give the presidency to his deputy, what do you think the other communities will feel? The minority groups feel bad. Can’t they also lead us? Kenya is bigger than an individual...some of these remarks we make, just cause people to hurt each other...we may have had peace in the last election, but it is not to mean people are not grieved (Research data, February 2013).
The study also found that, ethnic tension is also felt in the family level where families that have spouses from different ethnic groups end up in ethnic conflicts within their marriages.

During elections there is a lot of trouble because every person wants their own to win, but when we are not voting, people are normally united. In fact during the last elections, people were even against each other as spouses, amongst couples who come from different ethnic groups...there are actually those who completely separated. I am married in a place where there have been previous clashes and I have seen people separate. But after elections some of them meet up and make peace but during elections, people separate, tribes separate themselves that is the problem with ethnicity (Research data, February 2013).

The research also established that housing services in the slums are provided on the basis of ethnicity and respondents feel that it is more socially acceptable to live among members of one’s ethnic group. Respondents in both Kibera and Mathare would rather live or rent a house within the vicinity of people from the same ethnic group. One informant who is a Luo felt that living in an area with Kikuyu in Kibera would be problematic for him.

The great challenge is that we are still being divided into small groups here...ethnically...kikuyus live on Laini Saba, Kisumu Ndogo for Luos, Kambas from Mashimoni, Nubians, Luhyas from Rukungu...ethnicity has roots, so I think you will still find this in slums. Group stereotypes also make it hard for one to find housing in an area where one’s ethnic group is not a majority. I might want to rent a house in an area dominated by a Kikuyu, but you find that they already believe that we Luo’s we don’t pay rent (Research data, February 2013).

I think for most people, we prefer living near people of the same ethnic background. One feels safer that way. When one moves to these slums, if you don’t find people of the same tribe as you are, one feels very bored and lonely (Research data, February 2013)

The study also established that ethnic enclaves are desirable to new migrants in the slums, especially when they look for housing.

Here in Kibera we have many Luo people, you find that when a person who is from the Luo tribe moves into this Nairobi, even if he spends the night in another neighbourhood, the very next day he will be looking for the areas in Kibera where people from his tribe live, his mind will be focused on finding a house where he will live with other Luo people. And this is the same about Luhyá’s too, and Kikuyus and Kamba’s. Everyone has done this. Sometimes even
we live in a row of houses, and I find I am the only Luhya there, I feel alone. We may interact on normal day to day activities, but when voting periods come, you will find me going round with my fellow Luhya’s. Even though you are my best friend, during elections we will just go different ways. We have this mentality that we must live with our fellow co-ethnics (Research data, February 2013)

The findings here, are supported by studies have shown how ethnic groups can be viewed as institutions for collective action where shared culture, language and experiences of interaction makes co-ethnics more effective in “working together and establishing” co-operative norms. These “shared” memberships in social networks may also enable co-ethnics to group together during elections in support of their preferred candidates. Ethnic groups as “institutions for collective action” especially where there is a shared culture makes it more effective for co-ethnics to work together unlike non-co ethnics (Habyarimana et al 2007, Isakson, 2013).

After the aftermath of the 2007/2008 elections, there were new social challenges that emerged as a result of the violence. Ethnic tensions and hatred were further strengthened especially between the Luo and the Kikuyu. Research shows that interactions between the Kikuyu and the Luo were reduced in the slum communities. Marriages fell apart due to ethnic violence, where some “couples voluntarily separated” for their safety. In some extreme cases children were divided between parents. The emergence of ethnic boundaries in the slums had a severe effect of these intimate relationships. A Kikuyu man that hosted a Luo man was considered to be betrayer who deserved punishment. It is no doubt that when political differences affect marital affairs, the slum community can only become more prejudiced against one another. Such tensions continue to sow seeds of intolerance and create breeding grounds for renewed violence (Okombo and Sana 2011).

Moreover, survivors of the post-election violence in the slums survived because they were protected by their “ethnic enclaves which acted as barriers against opponent groups”. Tribes were seen to provide protection where the state failed. Even with the easing of ethnic tensions, ethnic “village arrangements” are still a vital part of slum residents’ lives in terms of their “role as safety providers”. This goes further to strengthen the already existing primordial sentiments (Okombo & Sana, 2011, p.43).

In this section, this research established that social networks In Kibera and Mathare are partly formed based on ethnicity. How people live and rent housing is partly done based on ethnic identification. Social networks between co-ethnics are seen to be an important part of the
everyday interactions of slum dwellers. People feel much safer when they live and interact with members of their own ethnic groups, but this is not to imply that different ethnic groups do not co-exist peacefully. Social conflict in the slums also happens mostly during elections, since this is the time when people are most sensitive about their primordial sentiments. However, I cannot generalize these findings to be true of all slum dwellers but rather the population sample of this study.

Moreover, this study also established that the existence of ethnic enclaves in the slums impacts upon the nature of the social relations between people living in the slums. Ethnic enclaves are seen to provide a sense of belonging for people, and at the same time, they also symbolize the ethnic mistrust that exists between different ethnic tribes. It appears that people living in the slums are almost “pushed” to live in areas where their ethnic groups constitute a majority. Slum dwellers may not necessarily have a problem in interacting with each other, but the normalization of ethnic enclaves within the slums largely informs their choices on where to live.

In the next section I further discuss the prominence of ethnicity especially as an influencing factor for voting.

4.3 Why Ethnicity is a Prominent Factor influencing Voting in Slums

Since respondents ascribe ethnic voting to others and not themselves, respondents felt the question as to why poor urban voters vote ethnically, did not concern them personally. Poor urban voters do not see themselves as voting ethnically, but rather attribute ethnic voting to others.

Here, the study finds that ethnic voting in the slums is prominent because leaders manipulate the poor to vote for leaders who come from their ethnic group based on the idea of “he is ours”. Voters will vote for co-ethnics because they believe it will enhance their group interests.

The study also established that poor urban voters view ethnic voting in the slums as a never ending practice even where people have not automatically benefitted from having a co-ethnic in power. However, poor urban voters will still vote for “their own” person.
A 29 year old man in Kibera, who also openly admitted to not having ever voted in any election, was quite vocal on the strength of ethnicity in influencing voting choices. His reason for not voting in any election was that political leaders have always been the same, and his personal preference is to wait until new leaders decide to run for public office. He however had interesting views as to why ethnicity is prominent when urban voters vote.

Research data confirms this;

*Ethnicity is a political thing, they want followers they are not looking for leadership and their personal interests are what they put ahead. Kenyan leaders are what we call liars, they come with empty promises but at the end of the day what they are looking at is to protect their own interests; they are not focusing on the issue and the problems that people are undergoing through. They come up with this the ethnical thing, saying this is our person but at the end of the day they don't solve any problems, and so far we have never had new leaders, they keep on changing political parties but they are the same people (Research data, February 2013).*

*But ethnic voting is a reality in Kenya, and it is unfortunate that it has affected us, the youth, this is a curse that was planted by our forefathers, and what I think, it's bad, because in all the elections we have had, we vote ethnically, we only elect along tribal lines. We are always saying that this person is ours. We have the concept that he is ours and that our tribesman then places us at the forefront in getting jobs (Research data, February 2013).*

*I think it’s because people believe that if you vote in your own person, they will help you, but I think this is not always the case (Research data, February 2013).*

*I think it is because they see that that person from their tribe will help them, but I don't think like that, and how do you think they will help them? It is a strong perception that is something which is in their minds, it's a mindset, and something that was fed to the people that if they vote in their own person they are going to benefit… In reality ethnicity is very strong it is something that is very powerful, especially in Kenya and in Africa especially in Kenya it is very strong, and I would say that Most of the job factors and/or opportunities come through ethnicity (Research data, February 2013).*

Other similar studies have also shown that “If voters expect patronage goods form the leaders with whom they share an identity with, they are likely to practice identity politics” (Kimenyi and Romero, 2008, p.12).
The study found that, ethnic voting in slums is further promoted by the use of *mother tongues*. To capitalize on voters, political candidates use their own mother tongue to mobilise voters and seek for votes. This is a powerful tool to use within the slums that are already ethnically fragmented. When political leaders speak in their mother tongues, they only attract people from their ethnic backgrounds, a situation that further polarizes different groups against each other.

Research data confirms this;

*Sometimes during the elections, when people are gathered listening to politicians, you find that people speak in their own mother tongue so one cannot even understand what is being said* (Research data, February 2013).

*The use of mother tongues has now become a tool that politicians use in order to gather votes* (Research data, February 2013).

Use of mother tongues to gather votes is supported by Bratton and Kimenyi (2008, p.5) who put across that “ethnicity and linguistic cleavages are important in explaining an individual’s support for parties in power in most African countries”

The study also found that that ethnic voting in the slums is also made possible by the use of “ethnic missionaries” in the slums, whose work is to do everything possible to ensure that their ethnic leaders get all the needed support. One male respondent during the focus group discussion in Kibera had this to say;

*We all live in Kibera and we have friends who are of different ethnic groups. You find that during elections these leaders have “their” people among us whose work is to make these leaders win. If ethnicity is what they can use to keep these leaders at the top, this is what they will do. They start saying “this is our person so let’s vote for him” So at the end of the day you find that you become enemies even with people who are normally your friends* (Research data, February 2013).

This study also found that ethnicity influences voting in slums because poor urban voters rationally choose to vote ethnically.

*I will not go and support someone else when I know someone from my tribe is running for election. A kikuyu will not support a Luo even though a Luo speaks Swahili. I don't think this will ever end* (Research data, February 2013).
The study also established that illiteracy promotes ethnic voting in the slums.

Illiteracy is also a contributing factor to divisive politics. Politicians also capitalize on this. The moment they start to look for votes, they capitalize on this. Another thing is that people believe that if their leader is chosen, they will benefit. But this is just an assumption (Research data, February 2013).

This study also found that urban poor voters vote ethnically because a candidates’ ethnic group may constitutes a majority in the slums. If people do not follow this ethnic identification, they risk be killing or injured. Voters are then compelled to vote ethnically in order to feel safe.

Respondents in Kibera, confirm this;

Here in Kibera for example, majority of the people support Raila (current leader of the opposition Party CORD) so if one sort of goes away from what the majority want, one can get hurt. During election time there is so much tension. One is almost forced to follow the majority (Research data, February 2103).

During political campaigns, leaders distribute T-Shirts with their pictures to their supporters. Here in Kibera, we know the majority are Luo’s. So when you see them wearing these T-shirts, you know that that is the person being supported in the whole place. I am a Luhya. So I will feel I have no voice. In Swahili language we have a saying that says, let him who has more power, have his way. That is how I feel. These people can even beat you up. My freedom to even vote a leader of my choice is limited, and also my freedom of movement. I therefore feel much oppressed (Research data, February 2013).

Similar findings have proposed that when a polity becomes more ethnicized, the quality of political representation then becomes ethnic. Voters will vote ethnically because they have no choice. They instinctively feel that they are pulled towards voting for their co-ethnics. However, more compelling explanations to this would be that a “shared language” or “shared social networks make political action easier” to follow along ethnic lines (Banarjee and Pande, 2007, p 6).
The study also established that interethnic distrust is a reason why voters are also pushed into voting ethnically and in groups.

*I as an individual would rather vote in someone who will work for the good of all Sometimes people vote in groups and they somehow decide who to vote for in groups that are formed using ethnic tribes (Research data, February 2013).*

To further promote ethnic voting in slums, this study established that political leaders travel out of Nairobi for example, going out to the rural areas and bringing in young people from their own ethnic tribes as a way of increasing their party members, thus ensuring that they get more votes from their own tribes. In order to garner the much needed support, from their fellow co-ethnics, politicians have had to promise these young people they “ship” from rural areas jobs and economic support. This interesting dynamic strongly shows the instrumental use of ethnicity as a determinant for ethnic voting in the slums. The promise of jobs and economic opportunities by political leaders, even when this is more of an assumption than a reality further explains why urban voters will rationally organize themselves ethnically to get their own in power.

A local community leader in Kibera, who works with youth empowerment, felt that it was very wrong and selfish of political leaders to use the young unemployed people who were jobless in order to gather more support for their political parties.

*After 1990, ethnic voting became so rampant. People are so unconfident of themselves and they believe only people from their ethnic backgrounds will vote them in. So they will even ship people from other areas to bring them here in Kibera as they are campaigning in order to add their votes. This is something that has lasted and I hope one day we can vote differently. As a community leader I have seen leaders bring young people to vote for them here in Kibera, and after that they are just left as misplaced youths. If you look at Hardy, that area is just for Luhyas, if you look at Kisumu Ndogo, the area is for Luo’s. these people were moved here a long time ago by political leaders. So it is very impossible to unite all these people together. Raila Odinga was a good leader, but he made a mistake when he once brought in so many young people to vote for him (Research data, February 2013).*

This view is supported by another respondent.
Our leaders have used us as stepping stones, especially here in the slums. They keep using us but we hope this can change. These people come here to use us. And it’s like a cancer that they have spread all over (Research data, February 2013).

This study also establishes that despite ethnic voting in the slums, poor urban dwellers are of the view that ethnic voting has no benefits.

Voting based on ethnicity is not good at all. This is a very bad thing for us. Because you can find good leaders among people who are not of the same tribe as you are. We should just analyze and look at someone who can help us all. I think people vote ethnically mostly because they have this mentality that” he is ours”. Not that this person will necessarily help us. It’s just because people believe that this person is ours (Research data, February 2013).

Another respondent has this view;

You know these leaders promise a heaven that does not exist. They just lie. Maybe we should gather them in a forum and ask them why they have not fulfilled the promises they make to us (Research data, February 2013).

The study also established that ethnic voting is prevalent in slums because ethnicity it has been institutionalized.

Ethnicity has really taken a toll on the country and I don't think it will end, even preachers in churches, they preach on ethnic lines. If this is something that will end, it will take another 200 years. I think that is when most people will understand what being Kenyan is, even someone who will want to lead the country will know what that means .The problem is we have never chosen leaders, we always vote tribalism. We need to look at people and see the leader in them not tribe (Research data, February 2013)

In this section ethnicity thus emerges as a salient factor that influences voting patterns of poor urban voters. However I cannot make a final conclusion from the correlation between ethnicity and voting intentions; as correlation does not always reveal causalities. Amidst factors such as politician manipulation, distrust amongst different ethnic groups, grievances and material deprivation, Poor urban voters are also seen to rationally choose ethnic voting.
4.4 The Nexus between Ethnicity and Corruption

The nexus between corruption and ethnicity emerges as a factor that can also explain voter behaviour in the slums.

Respondents also view the Institutionalization of ethnicity as an aspect that promotes corruption whereby it is seen to be almost impossible for people to benefit from public resources especially if those who control channels of distribution are of a different ethnic group than theirs.

*Personally, I think the system has been ethnicized, even institutions. There is a relationship between ethnicity and corruption. Our founding fathers, have strengthened it; am a kikuyu, he is a kikuyu, he needs a job, so we speak in kikuyu, and I end up giving him the job, and the other person sees that and they feel that it's corruption. Our political leaders are the problem with corruption. I don't think new leaders can do differently because this is something that is deeply rooted in us, do me I do you I guess what we can do is just teach our children (Research data, February 2013).*

The issue of corruption and tribalism is a disease that is here to stay. I don’t like talking about these issues because they have been there since time in memorial. And don’t expect them to end. We can only control it. We cannot end it. It is here to stay. Because every time we choose new leaders they continue with the same. Corruption is just here to stay. We should accept (Research data, February 2013).

To support these findings Isakson (2013, p.3) posits that, “ethnic divisions impact corruption by reducing the popular will to oppose corrupt politicians” .The argument here is that “redistribution across ethnic groups makes people support candidates from their own ethnic groups”. The question with respect to corruption along ethnic lines is what constitutes collective behavior of co-ethnics working together. Is it because their “collective endeavour” will uphold “corrupt relationships” or prevent them? Evidence shows that belonging to leading ethnic groups has a greater probability of increased corruption among co-ethnics therefore suggesting that corruption is more prevalent in countries that are “more ethnically fragmented”. However, we cannot entirely draw causal conclusions based on this correlation. Furthermore, more studies have found that countries with high levels of ethnic inequality tend to have higher levels of corruption (Isakson, 2013)
There is also more evidence that shows that rulers recruit bureaucrats primarily from their own ethnic group. This is common in African countries whereby the recruitment of public officials in ethnically fragmented countries is not neutral. In Kenya the largest ethnic group is actually largely made of the ruling elite. Corruption experiences are therefore common when individuals are applying for documents and permits (Isakson 2013, Kimenyi, 2006).

A report by the Public service Commission in Kenya in 2014\(^7\) showed that the “three most populous communities in the country hold half the civil service Jobs”. In the same report, Tribalism appears to not just be rampant in the “civil service” but also in institutions of “Higher learning”. Campus politics are now done along tribal lines.

Below is a graph showing these demographics from this report.

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4.5 Unity of Urban Poor Voters

To begin with, poor urban voters care about issues such as previous performance of political candidates or party manifesto’s. This in itself is seen as a unifying factor for poor urban voters.

This study establishes that poor urban voters express both negative and are positive feelings about the possibility of developing a leadership style and culture that is all inclusive without, the consideration of ethnicity as an informing factor during voting.

Unless that time comes when we stop being politically confused, this kind of voting will not end. Unless politicians stop taking advantage of people here, this will not end. Then we can eliminate poverty. Another thing we need to empower youth, have a leader that can help young people to uproot poverty. Somebody who will unite people, educate people more about the impacts of negative ethnicity (Research data, February 2013).

Another thing is that we slum dwellers need to change the mentality that we have about always voting in our own people. I have seen here in Kibera people refusing to buy newspapers because Raila (Current Opposition leader) is not featuring in the papers, then they say there is nothing to read in the papers. This mentality is bad. It’s like Raila is a god. We can only change things when we just start voting leaders not based on ethnicity (Research data, February 2013).

To begin with, people can vote someone from their tribe and then realize they will suffer a lot. It is possible for people to unite and choose one leader, but am afraid tribalism makes it impossible to choose one person (Research data, February 2013).

No, I don’t think it will end because it is something that has been there for a very long time, and it has become so ordinary today. It’s almost like a curse, but in my view I think that the more people are getting educated and learning more about tribalism, maybe it can change (Research data, February 2013).

People believe that when one of their own is in power, they find pride in that because it means other tribes will not have a say in matters. People boast about that yet ethnic voting has not gotten rid of poverty in Kenya. I would say it has just strengthened the problems we have, and I would say that negative ethnicity will not end in Kenya (Research data, February 2013).
One interesting Business man in Kibera, who has lived and worked there for 50 years, was very supportive of ethnic voting and he was honest enough to admit it. He was highly skeptical that ethnic voting would end in Kenya.

*Here in Kibera, Katwikira is for the Luo; Laini Saba is for Luo’s the rest of us live here in the middle. Kenya will always have two tribes. The Kikuyu and the Luo are the ones who divide Kenya ethnically. It is hard for ethnicity to end because of these two groups. You have heard of the conflict between Palestinians and Israelis. That conflict will never end until the world ends. It is the same thing with ethnicity in Kenya. The Kikuyu and The Luo have learnt how to use other smaller tribes to form coalitions but they are the biggest perpetrators of ethnicity. A Luo will never vote for any other person other than a Luo. Some say that they can vote for non-ethnics but that is a lie. Saying is not doing, they just say that for the sake of saying it. Here in Kibera, the Luo just vote for the Luo. Ethnicity is on the increase. Even other smaller tribes have now decided that they will also start voting for their own. The biggest problem in Kenya is that since the beginning of Kenya’s political history, we vote ethnically. I live here. I have seen how people are ethnically divided. Even I as a Luhya, if I get money, the first person I will give is my fellow Luhya man. I will not give you (referring to me as a Kikuyu) (Research data, February 2013).

This study establishes that poor urban voters are united by the electoral process itself despite differences in political affiliations.

*I think the Election Day itself is a positive thing for us. People show up to vote, and even your enemy will greet you that day. Even though the previous day people were campaigning, the Election Day itself is a peaceful day. People come out in numbers and one feels so good to see everyone participating in it. You might be my enemy but that day we are united in participating in the process (Research data, February 2013).*

The study also established that the unity of poor urban voters appears irrelevant because of the existing political hegemony of the ruling class. Respondents were of the view that voting in new leaders was possible, but the ruling class has created a political hegemony that is impossible to break.

*We can only get them out by voting new people in but some of their tactics is that they own the government. We cannot have new people in the positions because whenever new people try to enter the political arena, they are somehow stopped or somehow the new guys are bribed, so*
there is no day we are going to have new people, good people and thus effective leadership because they system which is there is very strong (Research data, February 2013).

The problem with Kenya is that power is not rotational. It has rested in the hands of certain ethnic communities. Until we learn how to share the power and allow other communities to lead, ethnicity will not end. Here in Africa, leaders want to be in power mostly for selfish gain that is why they ethnicize us. It is easy for them to then use their ethnic groups. In America for example, leaders want to power to create a name for themselves, unlike here (Research data, February 2013).

Good leaders don't exist, if we bring other people in, they will just finish this country, I would rather we just stay with the ones we have because new leaders just mean that more people will enrich themselves. I agree we need to unite together, but the biggest challenge is how we will unite (Research data, February 2013).

In conclusion, this study establishes that there is a possibility for poor urban voters to unite when they seek better leadership that is devoid of ethnicity, but this possibility purely exists as an ideal, because according to the views given, respondents felt that ethnicity is deeply rooted in Kenya and it is almost impossible to end it. The study also established that poor urban voters would like to put their ethnicity aside when voting but at the same time they are almost compelled to accept it is not possible to do so.
CHAPTER FIVE
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

5.0 Introduction
This chapter highlights key findings, draws conclusions and suggests recommendations pertaining to the study.

5.1 Summary of the Study
The specific objectives of the study were firstly to determine how ethnicity influences voting behavior among the urban poor. Secondly, the study was done to verify whether poor urban dwellers are united in seeking all-inclusive leadership and governance devoid of ethnicity. Last but not least, the study sought to determine why there is a perceived strong allegiance to one’s ethnic group among the urban poor voters.

To address these objectives, the study employed a qualitative approach. Data was collected from two informal settlements i.e. Kibera and Mathare using in depth interviews and focus group discussions.

5.2 Summary of Findings
Firstly this study establishes that poor urban voters consider various factors when it comes to their voting choices. Party Manifestos, a candidate’s previous performance, provision of social and economic services in the slums such as job opportunities are important factors. The giving of personal gifts such as money or giving of personal help to poor urban voters is also considered a yardstick for voting in candidates. Poor urban voters do not consider voting in leaders who have been in government and have not developed their regions or have done nothing for the community. However, these leaders may very well be voted in again because they are able to manipulate poor urban voters.

Secondly, this study establishes that ethnicity is a prominent factor that influences the formation of social networks in slums. Housing services are given based on ethnicity and people feel safe living in areas where their co-ethnics are a majority. These social networks
further inform the voting choices of poor urban voters who vote in groups, choosing to vote in their co-ethnics. This they believe will cater to their group interests. Ethnic voting is further promoted in the slums because politicians apply strategies such as use of mother tongues to attract co-ethnics.

Thirdly the study further establishes that there is a connection between ethnic voting and corruption practices. Poor urban voters will also vote in their co-ethnics because they expect to benefit from the redistribution of public goods such as jobs from leaders who are from the same ethnic group as them.

Last but not least, this study shows that poor urban voters display both positive and negative expectations concerning the abandonment of negative ethnicity in Kenya. Here, voters are optimistic that it is possible to end ethnic voting in Kenya, but also maintain that ethnic voting is a practice that will never end in Kenya.

5.3 Conclusion

Ethnicity in Nairobi slums is not primarily primordial, but rather constructivist and instrumentalist. Different ethnic groups living in the slums do not really attach so much meaning to their ethnic identities when it comes to voting, but rather the subjective manipulation of ethnic identities by politicians for political gain is what promotes ethnic voting in the slums. Secondly Poor urban voters are not entirely irrational when they choose to vote based on ethnicity. Poor urban voters are also seen to rationally choose ethnic voting. In addition to this ethnic voting in the slums is also dependent on politician mobilization as a valued tool for amassing political power or protecting group interests. Both politicians and slum dwellers are seen to rationally mobilize themselves ethnically because ethnic alliances are valued within the society.

Ethnic conflicts and tensions in the slums are also of an instrumentalist and constructivist nature because it is only when ethnicity is manipulated by political leaders that tensions seem to arise. Slum dwellers, even when they live in ethnically fragmented sections of the slums, peacefully co-exist side by side with each other. Due to the structural differences that have existed in Kenya since independence, most ethnic groups have always felt that they only way to get access to resources is by having one of them
in power. The recurrence of skewed distribution of land and other resources such as appointment of civil servants which is mainly done based on nepotism and ethnicity has strengthened the practice of ethnic voting. It is evident that identity politics has paid off in Kenya, with most sitting presidents having awarded those from their ethnic groups more opportunities. Poor urban voters still strongly perceive that when they vote for those that are from their own tribes this will in turn effect a change in their lives. An urban poor voter from the Luo community is most likely going to vote for a Luo candidate, more so because he believes that a Luo leader will help them more than a Kikuyu candidate.

Last but not least, Ethnicity in the Kenyan slums is also seen to be an outlet for political tensions. Ethnic categories in the slums are seen to correspond to rural tribal groups. Ethnicity is seen to be instrumental in the everyday interactions of poor urban voters where ethnic associations are seen to help in the re-socialization of urban dwellers when they migrate in the urban areas. It is clear that during times of political instability, home ties and ethnicity create an important source of security for slum dwellers. Different ethnic groups continue to group themselves ethnically because of the continued mistrust that exists between different ethnic groups. Collective fears are seen to be a major point for informing their voting choices. The practice of ethnic voting in the slums greatly undermines the development of a shared sense of prosperity as people continue to vote in their ethnic members with the hope that this will translate into eating opportunities.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


APPENDIX

1.0 Interview Guide

To Find out How the Urban Poor who are a Mix of Different Ethnic Groups Vote.

1. What are the most important issues for you to consider when voting
2. What is the determining factor when it comes to voting?
3. What are the attitudes that people having concerning voting? Are there factors that unite/divide people living here when it comes to voting?
4. What is the influence of local leaders on voting choices? How are groups formed and leaders chosen?
5. How do local Politicians /MP influence voting?
6. What do you look for in good leadership?
7. What challenges do you face in common?
8. How important is a candidates' party manifesto in influencing voting? Do voters vote based on candidate performance?

To Understand the Role of Ethnicity in Influencing Voting Behaviour amongst Urban Poor

1. Is ethnicity important when it comes to voting choices?
2. How important is ethnicity in group formation/social network formation?
3. Do ethnic enclaves exist here? How do people interact with one another?
4. In your views how are inter-ethnic relations during elections and other times?
5. What are the advantages/disadvantages of voting ethnically?
6. Does ethnic identity of political candidates determine who wins an election?
7. Do people find it easy to attach ethnic group labels as a way of expressing their ethnic identity?
8. What is the influence of parents, background and origins, where they grew up and specific life experiences have on their perspectives to voting? To ethnic voting?
9. Have their views changed over time?

Questions to Explore own Ethnic Identification (Individual Interviews) consider Information about the interviewee: age, gender, ethnicity, education, employment, length of stay in the present area of residence, membership (formal/informal) in social association; community work etc.

1. How important is ethnicity to their sense of they are?
2. How much does ethnicity say about them?
3. Are they influenced by others' expectations regarding them? If so how?
4. What is the influence of parents, background and origin, where they grew up and specific life experiences have on their perspectives on voting?

5. Has their perception of ethnicity changed at all in the past few years? How? Why?