The Puzzle of State Sovereignty:

Discourses of Contested Statehood;
"The Case of Barotseland in Zambia"

Amos Sikayile
Generous Mapping of Barotseland- often limited to Western province bordering Angola, Botswana and Namibia. Source: http://barotseland.net/barotsemaps1.htm
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Declaration

I, Amos Sikayile, declare that this thesis is a result of my research investigations and empirical analysis. Sources of information other than my own have been acknowledged and a reference list has been appended. This work has not been previously submitted to any other university for award of any type of academic degree.

Signature

Date
Acknowledgement

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Abstract

This thesis seeks to engage with the contested explanations as to why and how the Barotseland question keeps on re-emerging in Zambia while a peaceful solution remains elusive. It does so by analysing factors which account for its continuity since 1964 when the Barotseland Agreement, which unified two separate entities, namely Barotseland and Northern Rhodesia (thereby creating a unitary state called Zambia) was ratified but only to be prematurely and unilaterally terminated by the government in 1967. Over the years, Barotseland’s traditional elites have presented several petitions to the state to have the agreement restored, but the futility of a peaceful settlement continues to loom large, sparking separatist demands. Therefore, chapter one establishes how the Barotseland question invokes IR’s highly contested notion of state sovereignty since it challenges the very conventional interpretation of Zambia’s postcolonial state sovereignty. The second chapter historicises the Barotseland question by tracing its origin as well as mapping actors involved in the conflict. It also highlights the trajectories in time and space pertaining to the region’s quest for sovereignty, emanating from its precolonial autonomous status which apparently was enshrined in the 1964 agreement which was abrogated. Chapter three theorises state sovereignty by examining how the domestication of its problematic international norms or principles singled out by recent scholarship impedes rather than bolsters separatist movements. Notwithstanding the theoretical underpinnings of sovereignty as regards to the debate about redrawing Africa’s bizarre borders or maintaining the status quo, chapter three investigates the literature on the Barotseland question in order to determine the extent to which alternative explanations beyond the modernist arguments about separatism need to be reconsidered. In so doing, Barotseland’s sovereignty perils are discussed in the context of the region’s peripheral outlook alongside politics of neopatrimonialism and state patronage, all of which instrumentalise the continuity of the Barotseland question. The findings and analytical discussion in chapters four and five respectively justify the argument presented in chapter one. By its nature, the Barotseland question is simply separatism as an alias (rather, a political necessity) premised on Zambia’s juridical statehood which lends for Barotseland’s political elites’ in-group domination and contradictory national logic of resource appropriation for personal gain. Generally, this situation engenders the reproduction of the Zambian state and thus far negates its disintegration as promulgated by separatist groups who are seeking to free Barotseland. The thesis climaxes with concluding remarks which highlight among other issues practical recommendations with academic implications uncovered in the conclusion.
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BFM</td>
<td>Barotse Freedom Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BLA64</td>
<td>Barotseland Agreement of 1964</td>
</tr>
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<td>BPF</td>
<td>Barotse Patriotic Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>BRE</td>
<td>Barotseland Royal Establishment</td>
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<tr>
<td>BSAC</td>
<td>British South African Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BNC</td>
<td>Barotseland National Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>IR</td>
<td>International Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KCA</td>
<td>Kazanga Cultural Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>KRC</td>
<td>Nkoya Royal Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>MMD</td>
<td>Movement for Multiparty Democracy</td>
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<td>MOREBA</td>
<td>Movement for the Restoration of the 1964 Barotseland Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organization of African Unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PF</td>
<td>Patriotic Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNIP</td>
<td>United National Independence Party</td>
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<td>UNITA</td>
<td>The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola</td>
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<td>NCC</td>
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Chapter 1- Introduction

The UN Secretary General once warned that...“the fundamental cornerstones for the achievement of sovereignty, territorial integrity and world peace are and must remain ‘the state’. If every ethnic, religious or linguistic group claimed independent statehood, there would be no limit to political fragmentation, thus peace, security and economic well-being for all would become ever more difficult to achieve”¹. The African Union (AU) is particularly devoted towards “preserving the unity” of all its members, because Africa’s borders are particularly arbitrary and irrational. If any of the disparate ethnic groups that are trapped together in country A were allowed to secede, then the demand for similar secessions in countries B to Z would become irresistible². But on the other hand, “justice itself demands that the right to self-determination be legally granted: for there is no more certain injustice than alien rule imposed against the will of the people”³.

1.1 Setting the Stage

One might quibble about the paradoxes of Africa’s centrifugal forces of separatist movements, which arguably threaten the practice of adhering to the international norms of territorial integrity vis-à-vis state sovereignty, which was bestowed at decolonization. Indeed, other than the 1960’s Biafra war in Nigeria and Katanga in the modern Democratic Republic of Congo, separatist conflicts have spanned through to other parts of the continent such as Ethiopia, Senegal, Mali and Somalia—including the most recent breakaway movements in Sudan’s Darfur region (Englebert & Hummel, 2005). In reality, however, there is overwhelming evidence pointing to Africa’s ‘separatist deficit’ which clearly does not equate to the continent’s high propensity to separatist conflicts (Englebert, 2009). Yet, if we consider as well the bizarre nature of Africa’s state boundaries, it is questionable as to why many African separatist movements have failed to significantly challenge such established boundaries. However, at the core of this debate is the contradictory nature about the benefits of international sovereignty—which despite being problematic have domestically benefited many African state actors by being integrated into the international system.

This study is, nonetheless, not about Africa’s wholesome separatist conflict experiences as such. Rather, it presents Zambia, the case of a postcolony in which the troubled nationalism project and the ‘One Zambia One Nation’ mantra was unquestionably hyped following its celebrated political freedom in 1964, notwithstanding the Barotseland question⁴, which, like a

¹ “An Agenda for Peace Preventive Diplomacy, Peace-making and Peace-keeping”. Report of the UN Secretary General
⁴ The word ‘Barotseland question’ is here used interchangeably with the term ‘Barotse question’ to imply the general dialectics or discourse of the quest for restoration of the Barotseland agreement of 1964. Note that during
bad birthmark, has over the years kept on re-emerging, much to the detriment of Zambia’s national integration project and its sovereign outlook. Understandably, the Barotseland question demonstrates resistance by the people of Barotseland to the hegemonic erosion of the political existence of Barotseland as a pre-colonial nation. As argued by Caplan (1968), this is a crucial factor underpinning Barotseland’s attitude to Zambia’s nation state building project.

The Barotseland question appears to be a problem overlooked by the international community but there is no doubt that it is such a long standing impasse that deserves intellectual interrogation. What had been perceived as a bygone problem suddenly re-erupted in 2011 albeit violently so, threatening Zambia’s unproductive peace and stability. In fact, the contested manner in which the Barotseland problem re-surfaced presupposes not only absolute claims for statehood by Barotseland separatists but also the re-crafting of the country’s sovereignty so to speak. However, there is something puzzling about the Barotseland question that necessitates its closer examination. This is that it is such a ticklish issue to the extent that it keeps on re-materialising apparently without getting resolved let alone degenerating into a catastrophic separatist war as witnessed in other parts of Africa. Why is this case? Besides, whose interest does maintaining the status quo serve? What if it gets resolved? These are obviously mind-boggling questions, but for all we know, there have been repeated assurances in the past by the Barotseland Royal Establishment (BRE) that Barotseland would not challenge its integration into Zambia, much less subjecting the country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity into disrepute. So what has changed now? In reality, the collusion between compliance and resistance to the state have merely relegated Barotseland to a twilight existence as a peripheral region of Zambia. Nonetheless, January 2011 was the climax of political upheavals which were characterized not only by minimalist calls for the restoration of the abrogated Barotseland Agreement of 1964 (BLA64), but also outright calls for a separate state–Barotseland. Given that Barotseland once existed as an independent national

the colonial era the geographical status of Barotseland differed from that of other regions which combined to become Zambia. Barotseland was the first territory north of the Zambezi river to sign a minerals concession and protectorate agreement with the British South Africa Company (BSAC) of Cecil Rhodes. Later Lewanika, the king of Barotseland, protested to Queen Victoria that the BSAC agents had misrepresented the terms of the concession, although his protests did not materialize into anything. As a result, Britain decided to formally annex the territory as a protectorate in 1900 and administered this region as an integral part of North-Western Rhodesia.

As an international treaty, the BLA64 was the basis upon which shared legal command or mutual sovereignty between Barotseland and Northern Rhodesia was founded. Refer to this website [http://www.barotseland.info/Agreement1964.html](http://www.barotseland.info/Agreement1964.html) for a detailed online copy of the agreement
entity long before the creation of Northern Rhodesia, it could be argued that Barotseland’s separatist motives reflect an inviolable entitlement (right) that its people have held for so long (Englebert, 2009; Mufalo, 2011). However, this evidence defies the logic as to why the BRE has opted to remain submissive to the Zambian state, rather in a position of marginality and peripheral dependency. This contradiction coupled with the fact the state is opposed to Barotseland’s separation is what makes the Barotseland question a contested manner.

Therefore, the aim of this study is to examine the reasons why the Barotseland question keeps on re-emerging in Zambia’s political landscape. The factors which account for the continuity of this problem, since the signing of the BLA64 are also addressed. And if possible, the thesis will also offer tentative academic implications as to how the Barotseland question challenges IR’s conventional interpretation of postcolonial state sovereignty.

1.2 Main Argument

The manner in which African states have upheld their sovereign outlook by avoiding significant territorial re-configurations since their independence is incomprehensible (Englebert, 2009; Williams, 2011). Indeed, contrary to the continent’s many latent separatist conflicts—given as well all the ado about Africa’s arbitrary boundaries—it is surprising that only a few separatist conflicts have manifested into real ones. Virtually in every African state, there are separatist grumblings (often regional) of some sort. More often than not, regional elites tend to fight their way out of the established state boundaries, but they mainly seem to be fighting to break out in order to break into the state. Thus far, the nature of the Barotseland question can basically be said to be “separatism as an alias”7—which is pretty much similar to Mali’s Tuareg independence and nationalist movement for the liberation of Azawad (Bøas & Torheim, 2013). And when compared to most known separatist cases which have been very violent, the Barotseland question appears to be relatively peaceful; therefore this raises some questions. As already stated, this problem has persisted for so long; but then why does it not become violent as we have seen in such cases as Sudan? In what different ways has it continued to re-materialise itself in Zambia?

This metaphor of ‘breaking out’ in order to ‘break into’ relates to Englebert (2009)’s proposition that separatist groups in Barotseland are faced with two crucial choices which do

7 I owe ideas about “separatism as an alias” and “breaking out in order to break into” to my supervisor, Morten Bøas, who suggested them to me during one of the supervisory meetings.
not necessarily resolve the impasse but merely freeze it.\textsuperscript{8} Thus, the choice seems to lie between partial participation in a suppressive sovereign system and non-sovereign action. Choice of the latter depends primarily on whether Barotseland’s unrecognized self-rule declaration outweighs the potential rewards associated with the control or partial control of regional institutions within Zambia. Considering that Barotseland’s separatist groups are politically or economically isolated from the benefits which come with being close to the state, their agitation for breaking out from Zambia can be seen as a way of claiming benefits associated with Zambia’s sovereignty even though their ultimate objective might be to eventually break away. In other words, calls for secession by Barotse separatist groups are far less a strategic bluff but more of a bargaining chip for breaking into the state in order to become sovereign citizens, thereby integrate into the state patronage system which currently they are outside of\textsuperscript{9}. This may include regaining Barotseland’s principle authority over the administration of the region’s resources including issues of local taxation for instance.

With hindsight, Barotseland’s dichotomous citizenry is something that has always been perceived as having emerged from Zambia’s postcolonial era. This is so because of Barotseland’s citizens’ sense of belonging to the new state which is subsumed more by their allegiance to the customarily defined nationhood or authority (Mufalo, 2011). On the other hand, there is also the question of whether Barotseland’s citizens’ sense of belonging to the new state is subsumed more by the sense of socioeconomic and political inclusion—hence the argument about breaking in. This idea relates to Englebert’s (2009) model of ‘the fusion of elites’, which in the context of the Barotseland question Barotseland seems to be the epicenter for the foundation for Zambia’s postcolonial sovereignty. Seen from this perspective, the defiance by Barotse’s secessionists is surprising since it is incongruent with the fact that Barotseland and precisely much of the Lozi leadership (within the BRE) willingly chose to partake in the nation building process of the Zambia state and have unrelentingly chosen not to challenge the Zambian project.

\textsuperscript{8} Note that a more detailed reference of actors involved in the Barotseland question is presented in Section 2.2 of Chapter II. Further, a description of how these actors are situated within the political, economic and social landscape of Barotseland is also explained.

\textsuperscript{9} Author’s emphasis based on the analysis of the empirical evidence on the Barotseland problem
1.3 Research Question

Since 1964, successive Zambian governments have tried in vain to completely erase the Barotseland question from Zambia’s postcolonial discourse. However, this issue has continued to re-emerge time and again, particularly after the transition from a one-party state governance system to a multi-party democracy during the early 1990s (Mufalo, 2011; Caplan, 1968). More recently, many draconian tactics by the Zambian state have been instituted in order to obliterate the Barotse issue, though none has succeeded. In retrospect, the BLA of 1964 is inarguably the basis upon which Barotseland’s quest for political divorce from the rest of Zambia is founded. In spite of the BRE’s repeated calls not to secede, recent resolutions for breaking away by BNC are...“chiefly premised on the sense of belonging to a traditionally recognized and defined nationhood, and the consequent sense of Lozi national consciousness” (Mufalo, 2011:4). Therefore, in trying to shed more light on Barotseland's quest to liberate itself from Zambia, this study posits the following questions:

- Why has the Barotseland question kept on re-emerging in the Zambian political landscape and how has this impasse changed over the years?

1.4 Statement of the Problem

The nature of state sovereignty in Africa can generally be said to be a puzzle and even more a discourse of contestation. This is particularly so because many African states are said to be considerably weak. Recent scholarship in IR casts doubt on the cosy view of the misnamed treaty of Westphalia which 'created' the modern system of sovereign states, where each state claims exclusive control over a given territory (Camilleri & Elgar, 1992; Hashmi, 1997). Suffice it to say that self-determination can no longer be invoked as an automatic passage to sovereign statehood vis-a-vis political independence; evidence suggesting that separatist conflicts still resonate with marginalized minorities across the African continent (Williams, 2011). The Barotseland question in Zambia is undeniably a good case in point.

The Barotseland problem and the discourse of the deep-seated motives being championed by Barotse separatist groups have always been ticklish and persistent problems, especially now that fresh calls for breaking away have become louder than in the past. As a political hotbed, the Barotseland question has been taken to automatically imply secessionist motives by a few
misguided and unpatriotic individuals. As such, it has become a political problem for both its protagonists and critics, who are not at ease engaging with it, as it is fraught with ethnic and political sentiments (Mufalo, 2011). The major challenge is such that more often than not, the prime movers of this agenda tend to present their case (i.e. restoration of the BLA64) emotionally, but only to elicit hostile responses with equal vigor among opponents, due to unfounded fears that the prime movers are people from Barotseland, with a pre-colonial hangover from what would otherwise have been a formidable sovereign state. Nonetheless, what is even more apparent than real about the Barotseland question is the dilemma faced by the BRE and other actors associated with access to local benefits of sovereign statehood. But however contested Zambia’s territorial integrity may seem to be, it is hard to speculate about the outcome of the current impasse and how Zambia’s political and territorial configuration as a unitary state may possibly end up. It can probably be argued that Barotseland’s political elites can be expected to capitalise on regional grievances by advocating a separatist agenda, provided the potential benefits of statehood devoid of international recognition outweigh those associated with the legitimate or partial control of sovereign regional institutions of the Zambian state within Barotseland, however weak they may be. To the extent that the Barotseland question demonstrates the sovereign logic of ethnic domination over natural resources, the control of land by the Paramount Chief Litunga is in itself a function of access to sovereignty (Caplan, 1968).

Fundamentally, the Barotse impasse constitutes a sovereign problem not only to Barotseland as a region but to Zambia as a state. Given the monopoly of power by the Zambian government, separatist movements in Barotse such as Barotse Freedom Movement (MOREBA), the Linyungandambo and others can be expected to capitalise on the state’s failure to address historical grievances with non-sovereign actions; hence the centrality of the ‘break out’ in order to ‘break in’ metaphor, which has already been articulated in Section 1.2 above. The Barotseland question is clearly a problem which merits interrogation as to the validity of the nature of the influences determining whether Barotseland’s grievances and wishes as promulgated by these separatist groups necessitate their objective to break away from the rest of Zambia.
1.5 Significance of the Study

Why is this project prominent now and how was it envisaged as important in the first place? In order to answer this question, it is important first of all to understand the implications of Barotseland’s historical logic of statehood, insofar as it impinges on Zambia’s sovereignty as an independent nation state. The notion of sovereignty here should be seen as the “normative or enabling concept of IR through which nation-states assert not only their ultimate authority within their distinct territorial boundaries but also their membership in the international community (Evans & Newnham, 1998:45). That the Zambian state, however weak, would subject its territorial integrity to an irredentist idea of self-determination by Barotseland, rather a pre-colonial self-governing entity of a post-colonial state, may sound odd in the ears of many IR theorists. On the other hand, the continued relevance of the idea of sovereignty in the international system is arguable by the fact that at the national political level it remains fundamentally a major organizing principle of international politics (Evans & Newnham, 1998). If the conception of state sovereignty from an African perspective suggests ‘political or constitutional independence’ from the chains of colonialism, then it is sensible to argue that a more decentralized international system will, at least in the foreseeable future, continue to have recourse to the ideals of state sovereignty. Thus far, the Barotseland question demonstrates the puzzle of Zambia’s state sovereignty such that the discussion about the nature and implications of the demands and grievances should be analysed within the broader context of IR.

Perhaps the dominant argument about separatism movements in Barotseland, as elsewhere in Africa, has largely been centered on the crucial role of regional elites such that “their relatively greater material gains to sovereignty offer a significant premium to internationally recognised statehood” (Englebert & Hummel, 2005:399)–which is an empirical anomaly considering African diversity in terms of its political heterogeneity and contextual differences. In fact, the major problem with separatist conflicts in Africa is that many of the studies have tended to be normative and hence lack a theoretical foundation upon which groups such as the Lozi in Barotseland can argue their right to secede (Buchanan, 2003 &1991; Buchheit, 1978; Horowitz, 2003). Of course, one can also find particular causal factors of separatism, from a wide range of competing narratives focusing primarily on cultural, political and economic factors. Scholars such as Englebert (2009), for instance, have studied the Barotseland question but other than their empirical analysis of these determinants, lacking in depth and a more
systematic effort in contextualizing the problem, the approach for studying the problem suffers from various methodological flaws. Given this gap and the realisation of what lies beyond Barotseland grievances and the undying demand for the restoration of the BLA64 and recent calls for outright secession—the discourse and recent debates on this matter can be said to have largely been speculative, relying mostly on anecdotes and newspaper commentaries rather than hard facts (Sishuwa, 2012; Marshall & Gurr Ted, 2003; Caplan, 1968).

This study is therefore, significant and timely as it seeks to contribute to building an empirically in-depth and contextualized case thereby contributing towards new insights towards understanding the Barotseland question. Much of the literature on the Barotseland question falls short in taking stock of the complex factors which would otherwise improve our understanding of the problem, as they dwell so much on concepts of ‘postcolonial territoriality’, ‘nationalism’ and ‘weak states’ as they relate to Zambia as a post-colony. Such terms depend upon a subjective categorisation of what is not actually there, but rather what Eurocentric-inclined concepts, so to speak, demystify (Jacobsen et al, 2008). These concepts do not entirely reflect the actual realities which would otherwise shed more light on our understanding of the Barotseland question in Zambia.

1.6 Methodological Approach

At this point it is necessary to present the methodological approach which was applied in this study. It follows therefore, that the following should be explained and, where necessary, justified where they are given: i) the philosophical underpinnings; ii) the rationale of research paradigm; iii) the justification for the method used and iv) data collection techniques used and explanation of the targeted informants. More importantly, the approach for attaining rigor is presented by discussing how issues of validity and reliability were constructed which in the end contributed to building a contextually deeper case study of the Barotseland question.

1.6.1 Philosophical Perspectives

Political scientists continue to engage in a philosophical debate about what constitutes knowledge and the method through which facts are generated. Hence, depending on the nature of the study, methodology is important because it helps the researcher to understand the reality better through the application of scientific method (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2008). This debate is, however, multifaceted. For instance, one can look at controversies between
explaining and understanding facts, and the differences between positivism and post-positivism or between rationalism and reflectivism. While all perspectives are critical, an attempt is hereby made to zero in on the debate for the latter. According to Chalmers (1999:1), “science is highly esteemed and theorists who believe that it is special, point to its methodological approach”. But then what is so special about science? What is it about scientific method which leads to reliable research results? Fundamental to the idea of science is the notion of positivism, in which science is rooted in the empirical epistemology or theory of knowledge\(^\text{10}\) (Chalmers, 1999). However, not all empiricists subscribe to this position, since the validity and reliability of empirical data can still be maintained even without applying the ethos of positivism. Epistemologically, the argument by positivists is that “genuine knowledge is obtained through observation, adding that anything that cannot be experienced is not scientifically valid” (Bryman, 2008:14). Given the significance of their scientific tradition, one can argue therefore that positivists seem to misdirect themselves from dealing with ‘unobservable’ social realities which are nonetheless important when it comes to constructing knowledge from the ontological perspective.

But insofar as the philosophy of science is concerned, post-positivists strongly disagree with certain aspects of positivism. They do so by accommodating the significance of meanings, beliefs, emotions and feelings. In this sense, post-positivists predispose themselves to interpretivism which takes into account meanings, human beliefs, feelings and values as important factors in the study of a social phenomenon (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2008). This perspective can arguably “play a crucial role in unearthing deep-seated meanings that exist beneath the surface appearance of empirical data, measurements or observed reality for that matter” (Chalmers, 1999:9). Since human emotions, perceptions and values are fundamentally not quantifiable, one can argue that they cannot be studied using the positivist approach which relies heavily on statistical data.

Given that quantitative research methodology is associated with positivism (as it embraces natural science principles), one can argue that limiting social science research to positivism alone can result in incomplete understanding of social phenomena such as the Barotseland problem. According to Bryman (2008), this shortcoming can be avoided when other

\(^{10}\) As opposed to ontology, which focuses on the what, how and why of social reality, epistemology is used to imply issues concerning the questions of what is or what should be regarded as acceptable knowledge in a given field of study such as international relations (IR). A central position to epistemology, a position which positivists subscribe to, is whether or not the social phenomena should be examined according to the scientific ethos or method.
perspectives of methodology, such as the qualitative approach, are taken into account, since by nature social science is subject to variations on which methodology best fits the phenomenon. In practical terms, one’s choice of a given methodological approach depends entirely on a combination of factors such as the nature of the study itself, the context in which the phenomena being investigated is situated and above all, the research question a particular study is trying to provide an answer for. Depending on the academic orientation or discipline, scholars tend to be inclined towards certain philosophical viewpoints which ultimately influence their choice of methodology, data collection techniques and, more importantly, how validity and reliability are constructed. In view of these philosophical insights, the qualitative methodology was applied in this study in order to collect data which best answered the research question stated above.

1.6.2 Rationale for Qualitative Approach

This study is rooted in the qualitative epistemological position which recognizes the significance of locating qualitative research within a particular social, cultural, and historical context. But as a researcher, it was important to recognize the limitations of this approach. Bryman (2008) stated that qualitative researchers still encounter challenges in securing a common research orientation, a situation which makes the very essence of the qualitative approach problematic. Nonetheless, qualitative research methods facilitate the study of a phenomenon in depth and detail. Moreover, contrary to being constrained by prearranged categories of analysis, as is the case with quantitative methodology, “approaching fieldwork with a sense of flexibility contributes to the depth, openness and detail of qualitative inquiry, which are key aspects of data quality” (Patton, 2002:5). Given, therefore, that qualitative methodology lays emphasis on the process, it was necessary to reflect deeply on how the approach for this study was influenced by the contextual factors in which the Barotseland question is situated. It was equally important to reflect (during fieldwork) on the experiences emanating from the Barotseland problem as well as on the explanations people are constructing out of them.

In this research project, the aim, its objective and research question influenced the choice of methodology. Specifically, a combination of primary data obtained through semi-structured interviews as well as secondary data from official documents and reports were used. As a
politically sensitive and divisive matter, the Barotseland question has attracted wider attention, not only across the known media houses, but also in Zambian society at large. As such, additional data were obtained through the analysis of media editorial statements as well as citizens’ comments, as readily available on social media platforms. The use of semi-structured interviews provided an opportunity to probe issues about the Barotseland problem needing detailed clarification, while at the same time creating space for flexibility for both the researcher and informants. Official documents or reports, on the other hand, provided useful information about the historical background underlying the Barotseland question and in particular the 1964 agreement.

But there are no perfect data collection techniques; instead, there are always trade-offs (Patton, 1990). In the process, constraints pertaining to time and power asymmetry as well as ethical issues had to be appropriately dealt with. Hence, in choosing these techniques, the researcher was careful to avoid overstating the importance of qualitative methodology. This is why some scholars prefer to minimize the conflict between behavior and meaning in social research by applying mixed methods as a way of maximizing the strengths of qualitative and quantitative methods, while at the same time minimizing their weaknesses (Polkinghorne, 2005). Still, since my intention was to explore the complex views and experiences underlying the Barotseland problem, a qualitative approach was seen as most appropriate. Of course, one other reason for choosing this approach is that it allows one to see through the eyes of the people being studied within a limited setting of the larger context (Bryman, 2008).

1.6.3 Informants and Interviews

Even if one had the means, it is not worthwhile to collect data from every individual in a given research location, since valid and reliable findings can still be secured even from a section of a particular population. However, this demands the application of appropriate research techniques (such as convenient sampling/selection of respondents which was used in this study) for selecting informants. According to Bryman (2008), a convenient sample is one that is simply available to the researcher by virtue of its accessibility and also by know-how on the subject being investigated. Though there still are limitations associated with this technique, the approach of conveniently selecting informants continues to play a critical role in qualitative research. Its strength lies in providing for the selection of “information rich
cases of interest for in-depth analysis” (Bryman, 2008: 183). Guided by the research question, therefore, it was possible to figure out which respondents were to be interviewed from the targeted population. Nearly 15 informants were interviewed after being drawn from a cross-section of senior government officials, parliamentarians, traditional leaders, senior citizens, and members of the Barotseland Royal Establishment (BRE). Leaders of all pro-separatist groups in Barotseland, as well as those of the opposition were conveniently targeted. In this study, these were key stakeholders because they understood the Barotseland question better, as their statements and actions have tended to greatly influence the discourse of the impasse. But since the Barotseland question was increasingly polarising Zambian society, the researcher exercised the flexibility by interviewing five ordinary citizens in order to get a sense of what the common Zambian generally feels about the Barotseland issue.

Face to face interviews were conducted in the Capital, Lusaka; Mongu, the provincial capital of Western province (Barotseland); and Kaoma district, which is a region in Barotseland where those associations seemingly opposed to secession predominate. These places were chosen because most of the targeted informants live there. Overall, the convenient selection of key informants helped in saving time, money and energy. Since informants were drawn from three different respondent groups, it was possible to triangulate certain responses which in the end improved the validity and reliability of the data. The majority of respondents preferred to remain anonymous. Hence, there is no reference or appendix showing personal details of who said what. But throughout the analytical discussion the researcher has in most cases, referred to the interview data in the footnote by showing the place and date of the interview.

1.6.4 Strategies for Attaining Rigor

Some scholars have challenged the prospect of generating valid and reliable knowledge within the social sciences (Morse et al, 2001); however, it is still completely acceptable that qualitative researchers be subjected to scrutiny as well as that the credibility and validity of their data collection methods be carefully examined. It is understandable that the negation of the principles of validity and reliability in qualitative research around the 1980s seems to have brought into perspective the objective of “ensuring rigor” from the researcher’s actions during the entire process of qualitative research, considered in relation to the research outcomes themselves and to the research audience (Morse et al, 2002:13). Nevertheless, validity and
reliability remain appropriate principles not only for attaining rigor but also for evaluating trustworthiness and utility as realised upon the completion of a particular qualitative study. In this study, the liability for ensuring reliability and validity was reclaimed by executing those vital verification initiatives and self-correcting strategies throughout the data collection process. Without the use of such strategies it would have been hard to draw solid interpretations and conclusions on the Barotseland problem. Undeniably, the ‘attainment of rigor’ through initiatives inherent to a respective qualitative method ultimately shifts the concern for integrating and upholding reliability and validity from the research audience’s subjective judgements to the investigator’s objective actions themselves (Morse et al, 2002). The following sections therefore demonstrate how rigor was attained based on the principles of validity and reliability, which are increasingly becoming common in case study designs such as this one. Note, however, that in the process of constructing validity and reliability, the researcher was conscious of the choices during the entire process of data collection, data transcribing and also the use of such information in the analysis. All this was done in order for the research findings to be as transparent as possible.

1.6.4.1 Constructing Validity

The debate on what valid knowledge is raises a philosophical question of what the truth is. Kvale & Brinkmann (2009) argued that the truth can be discerned based on a number of principles which relate to the coherence and pragmatic utility of knowledge, although these are not exclusively detached from each other. Nevertheless, validity is not just an issue of choosing among the competing criteria of ensuring data quality. Rather, “it also involves falsifying certain interpretations based on the examination of provisions and arguments of relative credibility” (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009:247). Given the inadequacies which characterise validity in qualitative research, it was critical in this study to ensure that views of all respondents were handled in accordance with the criteria of validity, which involves data triangulation, entailing the use of multiple researchers, research methods, sources, or theories in order to assess the consistency of the findings (Bryman, 2008). Triangulation might invariably help get a fuller picture, but perhaps not a more valid one since its purpose in a particular context is completeness rather than convergence. Still, the major strength of the contextualised methodology to triangulation is the prospect of preserving “a truly novel
perspective”, which may have been discounted when “consensus understandings” are valued (Morse et al, 2002:10–originally cited from Tinsley, 1992).

In this study, validity was constructed through triangulation, which was applied through the use of a combination of data collection techniques affording an opportunity to objectively compare different pieces of information gathered. The fact that information was collected through primary and secondary data collection techniques is in itself a demonstration that there was no exclusive reliance on one technique which could have accommodated prejudice. Thus, biases emanating, for example, from semi-structured interviews were minimized by the usage data gathered from other sources, such as media editorial statements, official policy documents and reports, including comments published on social media forums. By triangulating the different data collection techniques, it was possible to filter out certain responses or pieces of information which appeared to be overly exaggerated and this, in the end, increased the credibility and more importantly the validity of the findings. Obviously, the strength of triangulation in this study lies in the coherent contradictions from the respondents and also on common sentiments on the Barotseland question from the secondary materials used. Hence, the beauty of employing different techniques is that it provides for the consistency and coherence of the data, which basically reflects the contradictory responses themselves (Bryman, 2008).

Another dimension of triangulation which was applied in this study is that of “investigator triangulation”. Kvale and Brinkmann (2009) stated that the usage of multiple investigators minimises potential biases in collecting, reporting, and analysing data, in the end contributing to internal validity. On the other hand, where there is more than one investigator, the degree of trustworthiness and transparency is higher, which increases the credibility of the findings (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). Therefore, the researcher’s decision to engage an experienced research assistant enhanced the credibility of the data collected during interviews, since it was possible to cross-check the notes as well as to figure out what they meant. Thus far, findings from the data collected using this strategy substantiated the convergence of researchers’ different perspectives, such that triangulation of those perspectives becomes the process of “mutual confirmation” (Morse et al, 2002:3) of the reported realities, and this then entails attaining rigor. By and large, it is such convergence of perspectives, rather than the evidential basis upon which the analytical findings on the Barotseland question are based, which are seen to be valid or in other words accurate and objective.
1.6.4.2 Data Reliability

To what extent can one trust that the findings of the qualitative researcher are true? To what extent can the audience of one’s research believe that the findings are trustworthy and ontologically authentic and fair? Clearly, these are fundamental questions which underline the fact that if anything has to be reliable, it has to be verifiable too. However, this realist and constructivist view of reliability as a criterion for evaluating qualitative research is only appropriate to the extent that qualitative research is conducted within the context of a naive or scientific realist context (Bryman, 2008). Indeed, for an issue which is politically sensitive and highly contested like the Barotseland question, it can be hard to guarantee that the findings are reliable in the absence of properly articulated verification strategies. In other words, the criterion of reliability in qualitative research could also denote the dependability of one’s research, which also brings into perspective the question of how consistent the research findings themselves are (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009). Underlying this superficial view of reliability lies the difficulty of maintaining verifiable research evidence, since human behavior changes with time and circumstances. This raises the question of whether or not people interviewed in this study could have been able to maintain the same responses on similar research questions if asked at different times by another researcher. This does nonetheless suggest that the criterion of reliability is more of a concern to those analysing statistical data. In effect, by ignoring the issue of reliability, qualitative researchers merely give room to arbitrary subjectivity which yields not only questionable findings, but also unreliable and unscientific conclusions (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009) which can be hard to verify. Thus, qualitative researchers have to keep an eye on the principle of verification which entails “checking, confirming, making sure, and being certain” (Morse et al, 2002:17). However, there are several verification strategies of increasing reliability in qualitative research, some of which include investigator responsiveness, methodological coherence, theoretical selection, and usage of confirmable evidence.

In this study, the choice had to be made to apply those verification strategies which consistently and reliably reflected on the Barotseland problem and most importantly the data collection methods applied in investigating it. Hence, the key point on how the principle of reliability was adhered to in this study was based on the researcher’s responsiveness, particularly in terms of theoretical creativity, sensitivity, flexibility and methodological know-how in applying those initiatives which influenced the reliability of the study as it evolved.
Thus, my responsiveness as a researcher enabled me on the one hand to remain open and analytically sensitive, but on the other to be systematically creative while at the same time eager to turn down any ideas and opinions from informants which were scantily supported, regardless of the delight and the aptitude that they initially appeared to provide with good insights on the Barotseland problem. The approach, though debatable, can be seen to have a bearing on social inquiry and to be certainly decisive in the attainment of optimal reliability.

In addition, materials used in this study, such as field notes, official documents and other reports on the Barotseland issue were compiled for verification purposes. While this is mainly used in quantitative research, compilation of verifiable materials can still prove useful in adding to the rigor of qualitative study, provided similar design and procedure of data collection have been consistently re-applied elsewhere (Bryman, 2008; Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009). Research materials used in this study are comprised of an interview guide, field notes jotted down during interviews, a copy of the Barotseland agreement and other relevant reports, and narratives of transcribed interviews, including interviews recorded on electronic files. To a great extent, the compilation of all these materials reflects how the criterion of reliability was adhered to in this study, since these research materials can be verified.

1.7 Outline of the Thesis

This thesis is divided into six chapters. The first, which is the introduction, sets the stage by outlining the aim, objectives and main argument of the study from which the key research question is derived. The methodological approach underpinning the study is equally discussed by highlighting how the principles of validity and data reliability were observed. This chapter introduces the study by highlighting key aspects of the nature of the Barotseland question. Further down is chapter two, which presents the historical context for the genesis of the Barotseland question. In this way the identification of major actors and how these are situated within Barotseland and broadly Zambia’s political environment is undertaken alongside the analysis of factors which have shaped the Barotseland question, particularly with regard to the region’s quest for self-rule. The discussion highlights, as well, those political events under which the region was on the verge of political sovereignty. This chapter lays the foundation for a more detailed analysis of the Barotseland question.
Chapter three is jointly about the theory and literature review. Theoretical issues discussed here are carefully chosen in order to reflect the empirical ideas underpinning state sovereignty (regarded as a major yet controversial concept of IR) both as regards to international politics and, particularly lately, in terms of domestic assertions that states are sovereign. To ensure a productive discussion, the concept of sovereignty is first and foremost defined and its competing arguments alongside its theoretical features analysed in relation to the Barotseland question vis-à-vis Zambia’s juridical sovereignty. The debate about “Africa’s exceptionalism” (Englebert, 2009:1-3) is noteworthy particularly with regard to the literature on the continent’s separatist deficit, which in this context lays the basis for engaging with the discourse and counter discourse concerning Barotseland’s separatist movement. The debate about the Barotseland question may not be new but the conditions under which the problem re-materialises makes it more paradoxical. For this reason, it is important to discuss the literature that specifically pertains to such paradoxes and practices which ironically foster the generation of Barotseland elites’ compliance with a postcolonial state.

Chapter four presents the research findings which provide data attempting to answer the research questions. Specific details are presented showing why the Barotseland question has been so ticklish and why it remains the unending story that we know today. Informed by these findings, the analytical discussion is presented in chapter five, showing how the Barotseland problem has been handled by different regimes and some of the major trajectories which have shaped it. The thesis ends with the conclusion presented in chapter six, which sums up key issues discussed about the Barotseland question. It winds-up by offering provisional implications for further research within the sphere of IR’s international norms of sovereignty for state (re) construction in Africa, and the ambiguous stabilisation effects emanating from relatively widespread separatist conflicts, which have been prevailing over decades.
Chapter 2- The Historical Context

This chapter presents the contextual influences which have historically shaped the Barotseland question. In so doing, it is imperative to begin by highlighting basic facts about Barotseland before providing an understanding of main actors and their interests in Barotseland and in Zambia at large. This brings us to the discussion about the origin of the Barotseland question; which then lays the foundation for examining Barotseland’s pre-colonial quest for self-rule. Much more can be said about the Barotseland question, including Barotseland’s precolonial quest for political sovereignty, including the negotiation process which resulted in BLA64 which was hastily annulled. Understandably, the undemocratic manner the BLA64 was abrogated is what is understood to have triggered and sustained Barotseland’s separatist sentiments over decades. In fact, the BRE is of the view that Barotseland’s integration into Zambia was as a result of an international treaty which apparently was wrongfully abrogated by the state (Marshall & Gurr Ted, 2003). On that note, it is important to highlight the post-independence separatist behavior and interests of some Barotseland’s fundamentalists and how their actions have had a telling impact in framing the Barotseland question to the extent that it has become such as unending story we are accustomed to today.

2.1 Basic Facts about Barotseland

Barotseland, currently designated as Western Province is a region in the western part of Zambia, historically known as Bulozi. It is the native land to the Lozi speaking people situated on the upper Zambezi river which runs through the province’s flood plain from the north to the south (Mainga Bull, 1973). Neighbouring territories include Angola to the west and bordered by the Namibia’s Caprivi Strip in the South, while in the north lie Central, North-Western and the Copperbelt provinces; and adjoined by Southern province of Zambia—all of which were debatably part of this Kingdom in pre-colonial times. Historically, Barotseland existed as a traditional monarchical with the Litunga (King) regarded as the ‘owner of the land’ (Caplan, 1968). At the core of the political and geographical configuration of Barotseland (see map below) was the political institution of kingship. It is widely reported that this “royal cult”, so to say, served as a political platform through which The Litunga exercised his power and authority as head of the social, economic and independent structure.
of the entire Bulozi Kingdom. This distinct way of political organisation earned Barotseland a special status and substantial autonomy different from other regions in Northern Rhodesia. As a matter of fact, the BRE continued to lobby for this position even after entering into the unity treaty which formed Zambia.

Barotseland’s population is estimated to be around 3.5 million inhabitants comprising diverse ethnic tribes (see footnote on different ethnic tribes)\textsuperscript{11}. These tribes are believed to have somewhat existed as a coherent polity that lived in tranquility within a diversified ethnic hodgepodge of the Royal Barotseland Kingdom (Stokes, 1965). This partly explains why the demands for separatism—rather a political objective motivated by historical grievances, mainly from lack of development—have not been altogether absent from the current political discourse in Western province. Nevertheless, it would be naïve to rule out tribal differences and indeed, the Barotseland question has re-evaluated the extent of tribal disorders and indigenous politics, given that certain tribes such as Nkoyas express conflicting interests in relation counter to the ethnic unity of Western province (Mainga Bull, 1997). In truth, however, no single ethnic group to date, except for the January 14, 2011 peaceful but ‘illegal’ demonstrations, has taken up arms in support of the separatist agenda.

Barotseland is characterised as a resource-deficiency region, which is why it is perceived as the poorest in Zambia. However, the state is partly to blame for neglecting the territory particularly for not investing in the exploration of mineral resources such as oil, diamond etcetera which the region is believed to be richly endowed with. Primarily, Barotseland boasts of the Zambezi river’s fertile flood plain which is conducive for rice growing. Consequently, the majority of lozis in the floodplain rely on a diversified livelihood strategy, combining subsistence crop farming, livestock rearing, fishing including exploitation of forestry based (natural/mineral) resource\textsuperscript{12} (IUCN, 2003). Most the people continue to depend on wetlands for diversified livelihood—a strategy which has helped to effectively spread risks and income. However, subsistence sources livelihood vary at different times depending on the season. The rural economy is for the most part subsistence-based, and is subject to high levels of

\textsuperscript{11} As many as 38 ethnic groups can be found in Barotseland, rather in what is often referred to as a ‘State of cohabitation’. These groups include among others the Kwangwa, Mankoya, Mafwe, Matotela, Mambukushu, Masubiya, Imilangu, Matokaleya, Makwamashi, Mambunda, Makwamakoma (Bamakoma), Mbowe (Mamboe), Mishulundu, Muenyi (Mwenyi), Mahumbe, Makwamulonga, Ndundulu, Manyengo, Mashanjo, and Simaa. Barotseland is a hierarchical society led by a monarch, ‘Litunga’. - See more at: \url{http://www.unpo.org/members/16714#sthash.3TQTWGHH.dpuf}

unpredictability and variability. Simwinji (1997), revealed that 76% of the rural population in Barotseland live in poverty, with lean months being November to January/February when incomes are lowest and expenditures highest, and little food is available.

2.2 Main Actors in the Barotseland Question

The question about what constitutes the Barotseland case necessitates an understanding of the key actors involved and their interests including the contested discourses about the abrogation of the BLA64 held as the epicenter of the Barotseland question. Thus, it is imperative to provide a clear reference to key actors, and not exclusively those on the Barotseland side of the equation but also how they are situated in Zambia at large. Historically, the traditional and legitimate actor in Barotseland through whom authority has always been vested is the Barotseland Royal Establishment (BRE) headed by the King-the Litunga. As an institutional actor that was instrumental in the negotiations for Zambia’s shared sovereignty, the BRE administered Barotseland through the indigenous system of governance comprising the Kuta (Barotseland Native Council-BNC) and the Native Treasury (Caplan, 1970).

More recently, though, and particularly due to the prevailing intensity of the political dynamics emanating from government’s failure to restore the terminated agreement, many pro-separatist actors, such as the Barotseland Freedom Movement (BFM), the Linyungandambo, the Movement for the Restoration of the Barotseland Agreement (MOREBA), and the so-called Black Bulls including the almost defunct Barotse Patriotic Front (BPF) have spontaneously sprung up (with an intolerable presence in the Provincial Capital Mongu), albeit with a remarkable sense of disunity and lack of a clearer direction and mutual interest about how to liberate Barotseland. Seeing these new actors as outlandish and incohesive forces could be a mistake even though they seem to have an acrimonious relationship with the BRE. Interestingly though, the BRE and the Litunga have in the recent notwithstanding, ambivalently, backed what looks like a regional consensus to secede from Zambia. As might be expected, all these actors have social and political connections with sympathisers and powerful politicians, not only within Barotseland but also in Zambia at large and, indeed, out there in the diaspora. Except perhaps for the BRE which has enjoyed cordial

13 Author’s emphasis based on the analysis of the empirical literature and interviews conducted on the Barotseland problem
relations with the state over decades enjoyed cordial relations with the state, the majority of the newly established separatists groups are operating outside the law. In fact, some of their leaders have been repeatedly arrested and face treason charges in the courts of law. The source of their legitimacy is equally questionable, though it is sensible to see them as potential political parties in a rather hard to conceive independent Barotseland nation. But there are other actors to the conflict as well; those otherwise perceived to be representing minority ethnic tribes in Barotseland, and categorically opposed to separatist intentions, such as the Kazanga Cultural Association (KCA) and Nkoya Royal Council (KRC) (Mainga Bull, 1996). To the extent that these actors oppose separatist objectives on the grounds that the idea tends toward subjugating them into Lozi hegemony or “slavery”, so to speak, pro-Barotse separatists regard them as allies of the state who are working not only to satisfy their selfish interests but also contributing towards entrenching Barotseland’s perpetual colonization by Zambia.

But if we are to stay close to the notion of breaking out in order to break in, it is in keeping with this metaphor that such a realistic view of the relationship between pro-secessionist actors and the state on the one hand; and that of the BRE and the state on the other should be conceived. Here again, it should be emphasised that nationalist sentiments being projected by Barotseland separatist groups are essentially instrumental. From a social and political perspective, these groups can be characterized as being placed outside the political and economic ‘power matrix’ in Barotseland. This is due to the fact that only the BRE constitutes the supreme ‘traditional body’ through which sovereign authority over land and local resources is exercised (Mainga Bull, 1996; Caplan, 1970). If the relationship between separatist actors such as the Black Bulls and the BRE were formerly evident, it could best have been characterised as loosely informal, and this would explain why the government has always criminalised their activities. But there is also something puzzling which has currently amplified the Barotseland question in Zambia, namely “a complex national logic”, largely instituted by the BRE’s exploitation of regional benefits, has been likened to state sovereignty, at the expense of advocating for the establishment of the Barotseland nation (Englerbet, 2004:27). That could be viewed as beneficial to BRE and the Barotseland king in particular. But one might then ask why this legitimate actor remains ambivalent to separatist sentiments in favour of the rewards being assumed for being amenable to the state?
In the context of the current discourse about the the Barotseland question, the position of these separatist groups is particularly interesting because they are located at the periphery of the patronage system of power within Barotseland (Englebert & Hummel, 2005). For this reason, separatist groups such as the Linyungandambo and MOREBA are essentially vulnerable, which makes them endure the economic withering and failure of the state’s institutional machinery. This contradiction is nonetheless puzzling, especially if one considers how Barotseland elites have been pandering to the dictatorial tendencies of the state. For it can be argued that the transition from a one-party state system to a multi-party democracy as well as the country’s unproductive constitution-making process may have provided Lozis with a good opportunity for restoring the Barotseland agreement. It is therefore implicitly reasonable that the BRE continues to remain compliant to the state. Invariably, this demonstrates Englebert’s argument regarding the inescapable manifestation of Zambia’s juridical statehood or weak sovereignty through which Barotseland’s regional elites have been ‘fused’ while the troublesome Barotseland separatist groups continue to endure marginality. All in all, these contradictions about the situation of actors have only served to frame and reframe the Barotseland question to the extent that it has become an unending story.

2.3 Origins of the Barotseland Question

It must be stated from the onset that the genesis of the Barotseland question in Zambia rests primarily on the ambiguous distinction of Barotseland’s pre-colonial past as a region. The name Barotseland was first used during the 1840s when the people who were found inhabiting the Uluyi Kingdom of the Kololo (Sotho) people later became known as ‘the Barotse’ (Mainga Bull, 1973). However, Barotseland’s historical narratives coupled with the region’s current political and economic realities in Zambia point to a different scenario, which clearly shows that the Kingdom existed as a separate traditional entity or nation long before the establishment of Northern Rhodesia and Zambia. Barotseland had its own “traditional institutions, political systems, economic activities, national anthem, flag and coat of arms, among others” (Stokes, 1965:296). As said earlier, Barotseland's status was at the onset of the colonial era differed in many ways from the other regions which were included in Zambia. It is this distinction which made Barotseland the first territory north of the Zambezi river to sign a minerals concession and protectorate agreement with the British South Africa Company (BSAC) of Cecil Rhodes (Mainga Bull, 1969; Caplan, 1970). Later around 1880, after enduring so much fear and external invasion by nearby kingdoms, Barotseland stabilised,
enabling its king to sign international treaties which effectively provided for Barotseland external recognition as a nation. In fact, Barotseland’s status as a ‘nation’ was acknowledged from the outset and later re-emphasised by the prime minister of Northern Rhodesia, Kenneth Kaunda, during a meeting with Barotseland officials in 1964.

Source: Caplan, 1968: 344

Figure 1 Map of Barotseland in Zambia, showing different ethnic groups

Barotseland’s political elites, embodied in the Barotse Royal Establishment (BRE), are known to have repeatedly rejected the secession agenda as a political objective, in exchange for promises of local autonomy (Englebert & Hummel, 2005). But what Englebert and Hummel seem to have overlooked is the pro-separatist mentality of the early 1960s exhibited by the BRE. The Litunga Mwanawina Lewanika III is believed to have championed calls for the secession of Barotseland in 1961 shortly before Zambia gained its political independence from British rule. As expected, nothing tangible materialised out of his efforts due to the divisive actions taken by Barotseland political elites. Barotseland leadership, even then,
forcibly declined to challenge the region’s integration into the Zambian state (Stokes, 1965; Caplan, 1968). Though literature on the historical details about the political existence of Barotseland, particularly in relation to the discourse about the Barotseland question, is virtually inexhaustible, any attempt to illuminate the historical background of the impasse should include these aspects: Barotseland’s question for self-rule, Barotseland’s motives in advancing their separatist agenda, and, more importantly, the circumstances under which the Barotseland agreement impeded the region’s aspiration for political sovereignty. The following sections attempt to concisely illuminate these issues.

2.4 Barotseland’s Quest for Self-Rule

Like many other African states which have been engulfed by separatist conflicts, Zambia’s colonial heritage is one which has been characterised by the Barotseland separatist challenge. However, the Zambian state has been reluctant to recognise Barotseland’s quest for statehood as indicated by the refusal to restore the 1964 agreement (Caplan, 1968). Before highlighting Barotseland’s quest for self-rule, it is important first of all to explain how Barotseland evolved into a nation. In the first place, why does Barotseland appear to have emerged as a formidable ‘nation state’ from where nothing existed before? Understandably, the traditional establishment by the Bulozi founding fathers of the Lozi state points to divinely ordained political traditions, suggesting that the Lozis may have had a politically symbolic foundation upon which the origin of Barotseland as a nation is based (Mainga Bull, 1973).

But the traditionally indigenous political existence of Barotseland’s nationhood cannot go unchallenged, considering the kingdom’s questionable territorial margins. Mainga Bull reported, the Lozi state sprang up through military conquest by its traditional leaders who “subscribed to well-developed ideas of administration and political organization” (Mainga Bull, 1996:23). Hence, the kingdom’s pre-colonial institutional arrangements such as the ‘Kuta’ (modern day Cabinet) lie at the heart of Barotseland’s historical quest for self-rule. Both Mainga Bull (1973) and Gertzel (1984) highlight that the Kuta was comparable to nothing in Africa but corresponded to similar institutions in the advanced Western democracies at the time. Further supporting the quest for self-rule is due recognition of the fact that during the pre-colonial era, only a few of Zambia’s ethnic groups had politically centralised chieftainships with developed bureaucracies comparable to that of the Lozi
This institutionalized way of organizing their political lives makes the Lozis regard themselves as “a distinct, superior and chosen people” (Caplan, 1968:343).

As a pre-colonial nation, Barotseland is also understood to have been the most politically centralized and socioculturally coherent society. No wonder, then, that its people have always had an inherent sense of Lozi ‘national consciousness’ which has been the source of inspiration of their quest for political sovereignty (Caplan, 1968). That the Bulozi Kingdom evolved out of a citizen and subject paradigm, in which minority tribes were coerced by the more dominant, is the most characteristic feature of the historical roots of Barotseland upon which the kingdom extended its ‘geographical sphere of influence’, subsequently cementing its regional autonomy as a traditional monarchy (Sichone & Simuntanyi, 1996). There has been a tendency to portray Barotseland’s political institutions as if they were static, when in fact the kingdom’s governance system was largely based on well-organized institutional structures of central authority. It is this authority which enabled the Litunga to establish ‘bilateral links’ with other territories as well as gain recognition as Head of the Barotseland nation by the British government. Some scholars have actually argued that Barotseland had an “endogenous democratic-like” system of inclusiveness, such that “all tribes had equal representation and participation in spiritual, military and judicial roles, although the supremacy of aristocratic heredity flourished” (Mufalo, 2011:2).

Figure 2: Picture of His Majesty King Mwanawina III, with the Queen Mother of Britain visiting Barotseland in 1960.
At the back of these historical developments, the kingdom’s quest for statehood gradually began to manifest in Lozi consciousness, along with fear of external invasion, which is why the Litunga was sought for protection. Consequently the Litunga, King Lewanika I, signed the Lockner Treaty of June 27, 1890 with the British South African Company (BSAC). Contrary to the Lozis’ expectations, this treaty diminished Barotseland’s autonomy, granting a leeway for the BSAC to incorporate the region into Northwestern Rhodesia, a move which led to Barotseland being declared ‘a protectorate within a protectorate’ (Caplan, 1968; Roberts, 1996). Meanwhile, Barotseland enjoyed its status in ‘its own right’ as a British protectorate although as part of the protectorate of Northern Rhodesia which was a British colony proper. Nonetheless, this loss of autonomy to the BSAC is perhaps the genesis of Barotseland’s ‘colonial phantasma’ for self-rule which historically transcends decades of the Lozis’ compliance to, and defiance of, the Zambian state (Pitch 1967; Caplan 1970). The desire for self-rule has been aired by the BRE from time to time, which generated some hostility with the UNIP government, as suggested in the latter’s changing its name from Barotseland to Western Province in 1969. However, this change of name could not change the thinking about the quest for self-rule, primarily due to the extent that the region was neglected by the state.

2.5 On the Verge of Political Sovereignty

Notwithstanding the declaration of Barotseland as a ‘protectorate within a protectorate’ during the establishment of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 1953, Barotseland maintained its legal autonomy, so to speak, based on the constitutional recognition by Northern Rhodesia (Caplan, 1968). Section 112 of the Constitution of Northern Rhodesia enshrined Barotseland’s protection against the alienation of any territorial part of the kingdom without the approval of the Litunga and the Barotse National Council (BNC). That the Litunga welcomed the federation’s constitutional arrangement is in itself the basis upon which Barotseland’s presumption for political sovereignty was premised (Caplan, 1968; Mufalo, 2011). This was particularly so in the event that Britain permitted Rhodesia and Nyasaland to gain political independence. While Barotseland’s constitutional status in Northern Rhodesia caused tremendous uproar among African nationalists, Barotse traditional leadership saw the decision of incorporating Barotseland into the federation as a tactical move by the British colonial office to frustrate their political objective of securing Barotseland’s political
sovereignty. By 1960, the BNC instituted demands for the secession of Barotseland from the federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Indeed, this attendant demand was well captured by Imasiku, the Ngambela of Barotseland, who lamented that:

“We do not consider ourselves a part of Northern Rhodesia or as a ‘protectorate within a protectorate’. We are a different country and a different people. We have our own government” (Caplan, 1970:193).

In response to the separatist campaign, the United National Independence Party (UNIP) pledged to establish a new independent nation with Barotseland which was to be anchored on the principles of republicanism: a strong central government with a president as a national leader whose electoral constituency would be the whole country (Tordoff, 1974). However, these nationalist sentiments were unpopular to the BRE as they saw them to be a threat to Barotseland’s longstanding aspirations for sovereign statehood. In an attempt to preserve Barotseland’s inalienable right to self-determination, the BRE secretly sent its representatives in 1961 to London to advocate for complete secession from Northern Rhodesia. But the British Colonial Secretary, Iain Macleod, rejected their proposal. Instead, he persuaded them to accept the Independence Order Constitution which later in 1962 was tacitly assented to by the BNC (Caplan, 1970). Secession thus remained the overall objective but the tactic in the eyes of the Lozi nationalists was to concede its unworkability, which implied advocating for a kind of semi-independent status of Barotseland within independent Zambia (Tordoff, 1974; Caplan, 1968). But when the BRE delegation negotiated with UNIP’s representatives in 1963, they upheld the argument that unless Barotseland were to eventually assume complete autonomy, its position as part of Zambia was unattainable. The support which the Barotseland traditionalists received was overwhelming, but largely less than expected. However, Caplan (1968) noted that Barotseland’s position regarding the sustained wish for the region’s special status in Zambia helped to preclude the eminent breakdown of negotiations. It is this state of affairs which smoothed the relationship between negotiating parties, thereby creating an atmosphere conducive to the national elections, which went in UNIP’s favour.

Considering the Lozi’s traditional heritage and the self-consciousness of its political elites, it is unlikely at this juncture that those separatist sentiments had ceased to exist. In fact, the recrudescence of secessionist rhetoric continued beyond 1963’s unviable prospect for outright separation, as ignited by UNIP’s increasing popularity in Barotseland (Roberts, 1996). As usual, nothing meaningful materialised out of the negotiations which could otherwise have strongly projected Barotseland’s quest for political sovereignty. On the contrary, and
presumably in an attempt to save a desperate situation, both UNIP and the BRE re-affirmed that Barotseland would remain an integral part of the wider territory of Northern Rhodesia as it approached its political independence in 1964. This turn of events is puzzling. What may have influenced the BRE to take this course of action, when in actual fact the kingdom aspired so strongly to pursue its own aspirations for sovereignty? There is, presumably, no direct answer to this question but the BRE’s unrelenting negotiations point to one key issue. Indeed, the BRE’s unyielding negotiations with the British colonial office and UNIP’s representatives show the extent to which Barotseland was on the verge of its political sovereignty. This is probably why talks regarding a special relationship between Barotseland and Northern Rhodesia were not altogether abandoned, but merely postponed in preference for finalizing talks about the agreement which later united these two separate entities.

2.5 The 1964 Barotseland Agreement

From the beginning of this thesis, the Barotseland agreement (BLA64) has been repeatedly referred to. Still, this agreement will continue to be used as a reference point since it is at the heart of the contested discourse about the Barotseland question, and it is certainly the basis upon which Zambia’s troubled nationalism project is founded. But then, what really was the BLA64 about? How does it relate to the debate about the Barotseland question? According to Pitch (1967), the BLA64 was a prelude to British colonial penetration into the territory north of the Zambezi River. This area later became known as Northern Rhodesia, the name coined in recognition of Cecil Rhodes who, as an ardent believer in British colonialism, founded the southern African territory of Rhodesia, named after him in 1895.

The BLA64 was the basis upon which “shared legal command” (Englebert, 2009:102) or, simply put, mutual sovereignty between Barotseland and Northern Rhodesia was founded. For this reason, Barotseland is neither a fiction nor an imaginary political entity. This is because the merger which resulted in an independent Zambia was based on what Caplan (1970) referred to as a conditionality for continued recognition of the kinship status and prerogatives formalized and enshrined under the British protectorate. This customary distinction is what guaranteed Barotseland’s special or legal status which has turned out to be inconsistent with the nationalist aspirations of the modern and sovereign state. By and large, the BLA64 paved the way for the creation of an independent sovereign state of Zambia in October, 1964. The
BLA64 designated significant features of sovereign powers to the Litunga, but then it failed to endure the nationalist pressure which had swept across the African continent around the mid-1960s and beyond. In 1969, for example, there were amendments to the 1964 constitution, and some of those amendments were aimed at bringing local government in Barotseland in line with other provinces. Later, Barotseland was renamed Western Province (Mainga Bull, 1996). Further, the BLA64 was repealed by legislative order without any discussion or consensus from the parties. These constitutional alterations drastically reduced the Barotseland king’s powers and realigned Barotseland’s legal status to that of other provinces elsewhere in Zambia. Generally speaking, the termination of the agreement greatly influenced the framing of the Barotseland question, even though the region’s historic grievances about lack of development seem to have aggravated the impasse. Yet, despite some vocal opponents here and there who generally fail to translate the discourses about the termination of the BLA64 into meaningful political mobilization, people of Barotseland have failed to promote separatist paths of development. This is generally, what constitutes the Barotseland question being examined here.
Chapter 3-Theory & Literature Review

This chapter—which is divided into two main parts—revisits the theoretical underpinnings pertaining to IR’s puzzling notion of state sovereignty vis-à-vis the literature on separatist conflicts in Africa, but with specific focus on the Barotseland question. There is so much that can be theorised about state sovereignty given its multifaceted meaning and political trajectories over time and space. Sovereignty, as characterised in this study of the Barotseland question is said to be perplexing. The historical roots as well as the re-envisioning of state sovereignty from the point of view of the Westphalian treaty and beyond are noteworthy. However, the following theoretical discussion focuses on the domestication of international sovereignty which has been presented as an inhibiting force against the disintegration of Africa’s juridical states. This leads us into insights about how the Barotseland’s question challenges Zambia’s juridical sovereignty, which consequently brings into perspective the problematic nature of state sovereignty as applied in the international system.

Though insights about Africa’s separatist deficit are well-founded (Jacquin, 1999; Englebert & Hummel, 2005), there seem to be misconceptions about the significance of historical claims for statehood by those who pursue self-determination objectives in the continent. On that note, the second part of this chapter zeros in on the Africa separatist conflicts, essentially laying the foundation for a more detailed and contextualised review of the literature on the Barotseland question. In so doing, Barotseland’s sovereign perils and the region’s peripheral state are discussed in addition to the destructive forces of neopatrimonialism and state patronage, all of which have had a telling impact in influencing the illusive nature of Barotseland’s separatism and more particularly, why this problem continues to materialise.

3.1 Theorizing State Sovereignty

Theorising state sovereignty is critical because it enables us to answer fundamental questions regarding shared sovereignty as well as those concerning separatist struggles for compromised or contested sovereignty. Given the complex nature of sovereignty, a choice is thus made to spread the theoretical details about sovereignty across the thesis rather than infusing them into this section, which may be unproductive. Throughout this chapter, the researcher suspends judgment not only as to why some of the most pressing issues in IR
revolve around a frequently invoked but highly contested theory of state sovereignty. The researcher is also uncertain about the extent to which sovereignty, as it plays out in institutional arrangements, rules, and principles, fosters challenges pertaining to its fundamental principles of territoriality and non-intervention by external actors in the domestic structures of other states. By countering the common view of state sovereignty which treats it as one coherent set of theoretical principles (Krasner, 2001), the disaggregation of the underpinnings of juridical sovereignty in Africa can then be seen as aiding political actors to establish territorial entities which are semi-autonomous, semi-independent, and/or semi-legal. This can help in resolving specific challenges stemming from competing claims to state authority. Moreover, if we consider Africa’s borders, which are said to be haphazard, the continent’s high propensity to separatist conflicts makes it necessary to re-think the theoretical foundations of state sovereignty. On the other hand, Africa’s separatist deficit is widely reported and this is indicative of the fact that the principles of state sovereignty and territorial integrity still reign over the procedural right to self-determination (Jacquin, 1999).

In view of the above, the following sections attempt to theorise not only why and how the concept of state sovereignty remains problematic, but also how it is linked to the Barotseland question, in so far as the state instrumentalises the principles of international sovereignty in order to ensure that Zambia’s territorial integrity remains unaffected.

3.1.1 Sovereignty–Concept in a state of Flux?

The manner in which the concept of sovereignty is used, both in terms of everyday discourse and in the academic arena, induces not only its political but legal and sociological connotations as well (Krasner, 2001; Biersteker & Weber, 1996). Besides its theoretical variants, which are hard to distinguish, there is also a tendency by some scholars to typically force the meaning of sovereignty into a single definition, but only to end up with unproductive outcomes. Hence, the failure to distinguish its meanings is an unrecognized foundation of disagreements which the debate about sovereignty itself rests upon. Understandably, sociologists use sovereignty to underscore a collective imaginary sense of territoriality, which instead of determining political outcomes merely enables them (Zick, 2005). Perhaps Zick captured it well when he postulated “nor is sovereignty something inherent to statehood”. It is, rather, what social construction theorists refer to as an “institutional fact”, one which is deemed to exist by human cognitive lenses (Ibid; p.236).
Legal practitioners apply the term sovereignty to symbolise the idea that individual states are the basic building blocks of the international system. Admittedly, this assumption underscores the significance of “juridical independence” and “reciprocity”, which from a realist perspective can be expanded into the assertion that states are at liberty to enter into cross-border treaties for their own interests and survival purposes (Krasner, 2001:1). Apart from the normative principle of nonintervention which provides for citizens’ socialization, logical ideas about institutionalism by both neorealists and neoliberals, for whom states are regarded as acting in a rather unitary, rational and independent manner, are also how political scientists conceive of sovereignty (Hashmi, 1997; Krasner, 2009).

By zooming in and out of these theoretical underpinnings of state sovereignty, though, one can uncover conceptual shortcomings between them, which as a result render the applicability of the fundamental principles in IR problematic. Such principles relates to the right to political self-determination, legal equality and reciprocity of states in the international system including external autonomy and non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other states. Thus, the argument about state sovereignty being problematic stems from the fact that there is not only a gap between the conceptualisation of sovereignty and its principles but also variations in the conditions under which sovereignty is applied (Krasner, 2001; Zick, 2005). Consequently, this leads states, to compromises that are sometimes inherently contradictory or somewhat hard to reconcile (Krasner, 2009). This situation is markedly problematic which raises questions; how do such differences render sovereignty an inorganic whole? Are states such as those in Africa really sovereign? Operationally, of course, they are; but a brief excursion into these questions draws us closer to the different forms of sovereignty which do not necessarily vary together, as the sovereignty bundle so to speak is increasingly a dynamic construct. This underscores the importance of the emerging discourse about “sovereignty in the making” for which the Barotseland question presupposes the “re-crafting” of Zambia’s sovereignty. By contrast, dominant narratives about modern state formation seem to present state sovereignty as a unified, universal and natural culmination of a teleological process (Rudolph et al, 2010). Thus, the naturalness and universality of this claim is further examined by clarifying on how international sovereignty is domesticated through juridical statehood, particularly with regard to the politics of the Barotseland question.

14 My usage of the idea of “sovereignty in the making” is based on the papers which were presented during the follow-up workshop on *Sovereignty in the Making* that took place in Oslo, December, 2012 from 10-11 at SUM – University of Oslo
3.1.2 Domestic Currency of International Sovereignty

The explanation about the puzzling nature of state sovereignty has been presented, what follows is the analysis of the outcome of its domestication, which has created a ‘mutual or symbiotic dilemma’ that has greatly shaped the Barotseland question. First, think of how international norms and principles of international sovereignty constrain the solution to separatist conflicts in the international system? Can these norms be compromised? Or are they in themselves an impediment as to why the Barotseland problem never fades out or indeed, opening up into a dire separatist war? Different interpretation to these questions abound. However, it is take note of two fundamental aspects. The first pertains to international recognition which provide states in African with sovereign authority to rule or legal command, to make, enforceable constitutional laws, which in principle no other state should interfere with (Krasner, 2001; Englebert, 2009).

The juridical texture of state power, gained from the international juridical make-up of sovereignty, partly explains the predominant legalism about politics of the state not only in Zambia but Africa as a whole. So the Zambian state might be incapable to addressing the developmental grievances in Barotseland, but then, it still retains its legal authority to rule (command) regardless of the extent of neglect and marginality people of Barotseland may be exposed to. What prevails of the Zambian state amid its fiscal bankruptcy and failure, is legal command—that is the sovereign capability to control, force, or worse still oppress through the very law enacted. In fact, several Barotse fundamentalists have repeatedly been thrown into prison by the police for merely expressing the right for self-determination due to the failure by the state to address their legitimate grievances. Thus, “sovereignty is indeed, broadly irrelevant to the question of what the state can do for you, but critical to what it can do to you” (Boli, 2001:53). In Barotseland, the state is concerned more with maintaining ultimate authority over people of Barotseland, which is why it does not tolerate talks about the region’s separatism.

If Barotseland’s nationalists is determined to secure Barotseland’s independence, then it is crucial to reconsider the extent to which the region’s traditional elites are compliant to the state. Nonetheless, it is hard to imagine how these elites can resist or disentangle themselves from the state, since maintaining the status quo safeguards their survival and dominance in Barotseland. This brings me to the second point about the domestic undercurrencies of international sovereignty, also considred as a force against Barotseland’s separatism. Given
the legal authority, derives from Zambia’s international recognition (sovereignty),
government has the freedom to instrumentalise state power in various ways such as the
redestribution of financial and other public resources to its citizens. Clapham (2000), argued
that African states’s survival is predicated on their use of international financial patronage
and rules of nonintervention to defeat internal opponents. Sovereignty, he added, is part of a
design of manipulative foreign policy primarily aimed at suppressing domestic opposition.
Indeed, Kaunda’s UNIP government, Chiluba’s Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) regime and currently Sata’s Patriotic Front (PF) government have all depended on the
 guarantees of the Zambian borders and the shieding of internal affairs derived from the
Zambia’s international recognition (sovereignty) not only to repress Barotse separatists but
also to copt some of the region’s leading elites with the appropriation of state resources.
Broadly speaking, this mechanism aids the fusion of Barotseland’s political elites into wider
state patronage system, which by and large, renders the Barotseland question simply as
separatism as an alias.

3.1.3 Barotseland Question; Sovereignty Illusions in Zambia?
Recalling the argument presented in the introductory chapter, one would recognize that the
Barotseland question is undoubtedly perplexing. This relates to the contextual influences
which engenders its continuity. Yet, there is no straightforward explanation as to why it never
disappears or worse still exploding into a violent conflict which therefore, underlines the
region’s sovereignty illusions. In order to validate this claim, it is critical to revisit the
empirical expressions regarding the domestic currency of international sovereignty to
demonstrate how these manifest in terms of sovereignty resemblances, which have had an
impact in framing the Barotseland question. Thus, Barotseland’s quest for statehood appears
to be lubricated by the availability of a “sovereignty script”, which derives from the
fundamental right of political self-determination (Krasner, 2001:3). Nonetheless, some
aspects of Zambia’s sovereignty from which Barotseland elites draw their legal command are
problematic because while Zambia enjoys international recognition, its de facto westphalian
sovereignty is questionable. This brings into perspective the dichotomous discussion between
the paradoxical attributes of Zambia’s “juridical” independence and also what has been
dubbed here as sovereign illusions pertaining to Barotseland’s international recognition.
Barotseland’s sovereign illusions appear to be more real than superficial. Invariably, the Barotseland question underlines the problematic nature of Zambia’s juridical sovereignty; whose negative manifestations impede Barotseland’s separatist movement. Consequently, Barotseland’s peculiar marginality remains while the fiscal and institutional bankruptcy of the Zambian state endures. The fact also remains that Barotseland has legitimate demands which serve as the basis for the region’s separatist movement. How then do we reconcile this argument with the widespread supply of international legal sovereignty, which Zambia acquired alongside the evidence poting to Barotseland’ contradictory national logic? Given the above theoretical insights, it is argued here that Barotseland’s separatist challenge to Zambia is largely influenced by sovereignty illusions directly associated with the domestic structure vis-à-vis the international recognition of Zambia as an independent state. Explanations about legal command draw from the tendencies of most African leaders to exploit state resources as a mechanism for self-contained depredation, personal rule, neopatrimonialism and prebendalism (Englebert, 2009) and the ‘politics of the belly’ (Jean-Francois, 2009), all of which effectively support the survival and reproduction of the state. Seen from this angle, the behaviour of state rulers in Zambia, as well as their regional counterparts in Barotseland, make rational sense particularly with regard to Barotseland’s extreme marginalisation and peripheral location in Zambia. What does not make sense, given the extent of neglect and marginality of the region, is why Barotseland’s traditional elites fail to meaningfully challenge the state, given the degree of their dispossession in the governance process of the nation. Still, what renders Zambia’s institutionalised legal command adaptable to self-encompassed benefits for both state leaders and Barotseland elites which is hard to be reproduced in Barotseland? This contradiction is obviously retrogressive.

Nevertheless, the manner in which international sovereignty is bestowed, including how its attendant attributes such as legal command are domesticated across Africa’s separatist-prone nations, is what largely explains the predicament Barotseland finds itself. In fact, it has been argued from Africa’s international system perspective that “the final authority over most, if not all social, economic and political matters rests within those (meaning the political rulers) in control of the territorial units making up the system” (Englebert, 2009:60). By this, Englebert suggests that a state is sovereign only when its monopoly of control (legal command) over its territory and citizenry is accepted as such by other states. This is notwithstanding, the state domestic attributes, which may be somewhat counterproductive. The idea of sovereign illusions shows that Zambia may be politically independent but deeply
permeated, even though the state may claim to be the sole legitimate guarantor of sovereign prerogatives within the country’s geographical boundaries; boundaries which may not be of its own design, but rather a manifestation of the Zambian state’s legal command. Thus, the PF government may be failing to address Barotseland’s historic grievances, which have now heightened the region’s separatist rhetoric. But there is no doubt that central government still retains its control over Barotseland—whose elites ironically enjoy from the benefits derived from what has been termed as ‘juridical sovereignty’ or ‘quasi statehood’ (Jackson & Rosberg, 1990). To the extent that the juridical nature of Zambia’s postcolonial sovereignty is paradoxical, it is also seen as an obstacle to Barotseland’s independence. This is because it provides for the flourishing of Zambia’s exogenous yet negative sovereignty thus lending itself as an impediment of Barotseland’s political divorce. These theoretical insights have a bearing on why the Barotseland question never fades.

Having discussed how Zambia’s juridical statehood render the Barotseland question an illusion, the discussion now focuses on the question of international recognition which (not only theoretically but practically) also serves as a stumbling block to Barotseland’s quest for statehood. The Barotseland question is certainly problematic because of the issues associated with the domestic structure and international recognition of the Zambian state. The question therefore is: Given the ambiguous nature of its pre-colonial existence as well as the region’s political configuration in Zambia, can Barotseland accomplish its separatist objective, let alone gain international recognition? Hard as these questions may be, the answer could be yes and no because separatist motives are in themselves political possibilities which are hard to realise, given that the principle of international recognition is so discordant. The problem is that rules of sovereignty are widely contested, which is why every state has its own benchmarks by which to determine recognition. A good example is the U.S., where the decision to recognize a nation can be made by the sitting president. Consequently, a bid for recognition may also hinge on who occupies the White House within a given presidential term, which suggests that the country’s preferences may swing every four years. Of course, the notion of sovereignty is still the organizing principle of international politics, but its principle of international recognition remain largely suspect, because it has not been acceptably clarified both in theory and in practice (Ilgen, 2003). But the fact that a nation fails to acquire international recognition does not necessarily imply that it is not a state, although the rewards that come with being a fully recognized member of the international community can be jeopardised.
Thus far, the question of Barotseland’s international recognition becomes a sovereign illusion because it is associated with the domestic structure and external recognition of Zambia’s postcolonial sovereignty. Zambia exogenously exists because it has been externally recognised since it was made a reality by the British sovereign state. By contrast, that of Britain, for instance, is internal as it is based on an endogenous process of revolutionary development. This means Britain is ‘recognized’ because it existed before being recognized. Therefore the question of external recognition considerably constrains both internal and external options which are available to resolve the conflict, thereby perpetuating it. At the domestic level, neither the separatist actors in Barotseland nor state leaders of the ruling PF government appear willing to secure an amicable resolution which would otherwise fall somewhere in between Barotseland’s complete breakaway from Zambia and maintenance of the status quo. From an external standpoint, one would agree with Englebert’s emphasis that the demand for international recognition of Africa’s peripheral and separatist regions is largely constrained by the limited supply of sovereignty in the international system. This perhaps explains why over the last 40 years the success rate for secessionist movements in Africa has been negligible though the continent has otherwise been plagued with forceful separatist conflicts (Englebert & Katharine, 2008). This elusive nature of international recognition tends to persuade Barotseland elites and other separatist figureheads to embrace the instruments of their torment, granted these outweigh the rewards associated with partial autonomy or total self-rule. This explains why the Barotseland question seems to be unending yet peaceful and hence, separatism as an alias. In the meantime, ‘the powers that be’ continue to redistribute merger state resources to its close allies such as the Litunga, as well as other potential opponents within Barotseland in order to keep them quiet, amid increasingly dire economic circumstances.

3.2 Contextual Understanding of the Barotseland Question

This second part of chapter three provides a review of the literature pertaining to the Barotseland question as seen from the broader context of Africa’s separatist experiences. The discussion begins by analysing competing arguments about the causes of separatism in before

15 Refer to the youtube video on http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eLasDm4ozO8 on; Africa’s Sovereign Sorrow: The Politics of Poverty; Presented by Pierre Englebert, Associate Professor of Politics at Pomona College (April 4, 2007 at Middlebury College)
highlighting the trajectories of Africa’s separatist movements. What accounts for Africa’s separatist movements which entails the re-thinking of the conceptual foundations of Zambia sovereignty? This question is engaging, because it offers an opportunity to closely examine the Barotseland question thereby contributing to the body of knowledge on Africa’s separatism. It is argued here that the lenses used to analyse separatist conflicts in Africa are often foreign–mainly from the West where the concept of sovereignty originated. Consequently, it is logical to contest for an alternative interpretation of the Barotseland question, one that provides for an African understanding of this problem, since it is evident that the politics of neopatrimonialism (or prebendalism) and state patronage vis-a-vis the apparent problem of center-periphery relations, which instrumentalise the Barotseland question, cannot be perpetually flouted.

3.2.1 Why Separatist Conflicts?

What really accounts for separatist conflicts in our modern world? This question is obviously crucial given the different contexts where such conflicts happen. Today, our global society has in many ways been challenged with multifaceted separatist conflicts, which is why there have been competing explanations about what really causes such problems. Of particular interest is the African continent, where separatist wars have stirred the debate about the driving factors and how best to address them. Although some of the dominant arguments about separatism in the continent may be flawed, it is perhaps fair to characterise African states as generally weak, hence susceptible to separatists movements (Clapham, 2000). Even so, the scholarship about separatism in Africa is often fraught with conflicting influences, some of which are based on theoretically harsh judgments while others are based on conclusions deemed empirically superficial. Furthermore, the dominant narrative about modern state formation seems to present state sovereignty as a unified, universal and natural culmination of a teleological process about the nature of states in the international system (Rudolph et al, 2010). However, the naturalness and universality of this claim has already been challenged above by clarifying not only why and how the concept of state sovereignty was constructed, but also how it is becoming questionable, particularly when engaging with politics of state formation and separatism among post-colonial African states. On that note, the following discussion analyses the validity of the dominant arguments which explain
secessionist disputes; or indeed, those that demand unjust contraventions of the principles of sovereignty upon which states and their territorial boundaries coincide.

First there are arguments which encompass structural determinants focusing on the geographical and demographical nature of a given state. According to some scholars, “the younger the country, the less likely it is to have already undergone the growing pains of national building integration, and this, therefore, presupposes its vulnerability to dismemberment” (Englebert & Hummel, 2005:404)16. A crucial aspect of this argument is the size of a country, which suggests that the larger the country, the more likely separatist disputes are expected to manifest. If size alone mattered, why is there such an impediment in the creation of the Palestine state which is separated politically from Israel? Added to this argument is the question of “cultural heterogeneity”, from which separatist sentiments are seen to be driven by social heterogeneity, ethnic polarisation and sometime irredentist support offered by ethnic diasporas, as in the case of Somaliland’s ‘negotiated’ statehood (Marleen & Ulf, 2010).

To the extent that this argument is justified, the solution for the Barotseland question is to redraw state boundaries, though there is no guarantee that new ones would not be disputed, especially if one considers the Nkoya ethnic group in Barotseland who do not identify themselves as Lozis. Ethnic polarisation in Barotseland can therefore be a stumbling block to the region’s quest for sovereignty, since secessionists cannot escape the reality of their ethnic diversity. Another good example is South Sudan, where newly redrawn state boundaries along the oil fields later became a source of renewed conflict with mainland Sudan. While such concessions can bring about an end to separatist conflicts, in reality the project of re-drawing Africa’s arbitrary state boundaries is one that can never end. In fact, this diversity is already reproducing ethnic tension and animosity between the Lozis and the Nkoyas within Barotseland which ultimately may render the region’s resolve to secede unattainable. Is it then in order for polarised ethnic groups to revolt and demand redrawing of borders amid diverse ethnic grumblings?

The second argument about the causes of separatist conflicts is associated with the works of scholars such as Collier and Hoeffler (2004), who have examined how natural resources promote separatist wars. By projecting “the logic of resource curse”, these scholars point to

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the effects of economic, material and human capital variables: the level of *per capita* income and the availability of natural resources as key determinants of separatist conflicts. Economically valuable resources such as oil have a higher propensity to attracting foreign investment, which as a result increases the likelihood for separatist conflicts, since foreign investment can only be attracted if international recognition is secured (Ross, 2004). Contrary to Ross’s assertions, separatist wars have equally occurred, albeit successfully, even in regions which are not economically wealthy or rich in mineral deposits. For example, a good number of countries which were part of Russia managed to break away despite most of them not being economically endowed with rich mineral resources. Therefore, as much as external economic interests and the mineral wealth of a region may be key determinants of separatist conflicts, they are not the sole determinants of such problems but merely some among many reasons. Why otherwise would Barotseland secessionists take the risk of committing a treasonable offense by agitating for secession of the poorest region in Zambia, if not of all sub-Saharan Africa? Likewise, the validity of the economic or rather resource-based argument is contextual. Hence, there is nothing in this argument which can make Barotseland’s breakaway from Zambia a bad idea, except for practical constraints faced by those pursuing the cause. Thus far, the Barotseland question can only be said to be a complex problem whose protagonists are motivated by ambivalent factors where, unfortunately, its futility equally lies.

3.2.2 Africa’s Separatism Deficit

By and large, the debate about the Barotseland question draws from the wider context of Africa’s separatism dating as far back as the early 1960s. This period marked the establishment of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), one of the main objectives of which was founded on the principle of territorial integrity and sovereignty of its newly independent member states. Although the prospects for territorial dismemberment and suffocation in Africa are astronomical, the authoritative diplomatic dogma by the OAU was most steadfastly set against them (Young, 1965). This explains why the success rate for separatist movements across the continent has been very negligible. Except, nonetheless, for the preservation of the continent’s weak states which have hitherto persevered (Robert & Rotberg, 1982), this aspiration has failed to halt the continent’s high prevalence for separatist conflicts. If anything, Africa has increasingly been plagued by separatist conflicts even though most of them have largely been unsuccessful. Why do Africa’s colonial states seem to
be stuck in the territorial confines of borders which are said to be problematic? There is something puzzling about Africa’s separatist deficit which resonates with the Barotseland question in Zambia, and which explains why this problem has been so ticklish.

It is widely held that Africa’s borders are erroneous, yet ironically, separatist conflicts have remained generally absent from the continent’s post-colonial episode. Comparatively, the frequency of Africa’s secessionist probability is way below that of other continents such as Asia where the likelihood of separatist conflict between 1960-2001 has been much higher than that of any other continent (Englebert & Katharine, 2008). For example, the table below shows African states where separatist conflicts have occurred since the 1960s to date, although not all of them have been severe. With the exception, perhaps, of the successful breakway of Eritrea from Ethiopia and Southern Sudan from mainland Sudan, most separatist movements such as that of Nigeria and Somaliland have either been shortlived or are ongoing. But there are also other separatist movements which have attempted to break away such as the boiling anglophone problem in Cameroon (Keller, 2007). To this list, one can also add the Katanga region which shortly separated from Congo D.R (former Zaire) after the end of the colonial era, but secessionists there were speedily crushed by joint Congolese, Belgian, and UN forces. Similarly in Casamance, the whole Senegalese territory has engaged in unspectacular conflict with the state since 1980, but a once strong independence movement quickly ruptured into competing and weakened factions (Williams, 2011). The Inkhata Freedom Party (IFP) – coomonly known as the “sad saga” of KwaZulu Natal equally attempted to gain regional autonomy from South Africa during the transition from apartheid minority rule to a multicultural democracy in 1994, although it never declared its intention to break away17.

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Table 1: An Outlook of Africa’s Secessionist Conflicts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Where</th>
<th>Who</th>
<th>Begin – End Violence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>Front for the liberation of Enclave Cabinda</td>
<td>1992-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comoros</td>
<td>Anjouan People’s Movement</td>
<td>1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>Katanga- South Kasai</td>
<td>1960-63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Eritrean Liberation Front, Eritrean People’s Liberation Front</td>
<td>1960-62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Western Somali Liberation Front</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ogaden National Liberation Front</td>
<td>1975-ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Afar Liberation Front, Afar Revolutionary</td>
<td>1989-96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Democratic Unity Front</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Islamic Union (Somali)</td>
<td>1996-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Oromo Liberation Front</td>
<td>1999-ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>Azawad People’s Movement, Islamic Arab Front Azawad</td>
<td>1990-94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>Air and Azawad Liberation Front, Coordination of the Armed Resistance,</td>
<td>1990-97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Union of the Armed Resistance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Democratic Front for Renewal, Revolutionary</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Armed Forces of the Sahara (Toubou)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Biafra</td>
<td>1967-70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>Movement of the Democratic Forces of the Casamance</td>
<td>1990-2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>Somaliland Republic</td>
<td>1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Southern Sudanese Liberation Movement, Sudanese People’s Liberation</td>
<td>1963-2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Movement, National Democratic Alliance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Englebert & Hummel (2005:401) – in Gleditsch et al. ‘Armed Conflict’. (Somaliland added by authors). Note: Timing of violence corresponds to at least 25 reported deaths per year.

Clearly, Africa’s separatist deficit is puzzling, and this casts some doubt on whether the Barotseland separatist movement could be listed among those successful cases, although it is fair to treat the Barotseland question in its own unique context. So what is it that explains Africa’s separatist deficit that might have implications for the Barotseland problem? First, Africa’s high level of social heterogeneity and polarization are noteworthy, but some regions are not fully ethnically identical, and this negates collective separatist intentions by diverse local ethnic groups of a given region (Jacquin, 1999) which by default confirms the claim about the colonial creation of African states. Others contend that the awarding of juridical statehood for African states paved the way for their replication amid the imaginary shortcomings of post-colonial sovereignty (Jackson & Rosberg, 1982). Thus far, the African state has been fixed within the bounds of its external prerogatives, which in practice inhibit future separatist conflicts. Again, if we consider Africa’s postcoloniality and the colonial episode itself, we can uncover deeper territorial sentiments of a nationalist character which rightfully cascade into counter-arguments to separatism. As such, the unification of Barotseland and Northern Rhodesia in 1964 can be understood to emanate from what Young (2002:7-17) referred to as the “shared experience of common colonial subjugation” from
which the real confrontation between territorial nationalism and ethno-territoriality is not to be expected.

In considering the alternative explanation of Africa’s separatist deficit or weak sovereignty equilibrium, it is important to comment on Jackson and Rosberg as well as Young’s contentions. By doing so, the researcher does not intend to wholly dispute Jackson and Rosberg’s emphasis on the significance of international recognition of Africa’s postcolonial sovereignty, neither does he exclusively accede uncritically to Young’s structural constraints of post-colonial territoriality. Admittedly, Englebert & Katharine (2008) drove home a point when they contended that Jackson and Rosberg’s arguments suffer from the lack of an in-depth analysis of the practical problems of the African state, while Young’s conceptualization of territorial nationalism does not fully capture the simultaneity of communal polarisation. If, as Young suggests, colonialism influenced a shared gloom, so to speak, how then are we to make sense of non-territorial separatism which has been experienced in Asia, for instance? It remains unclear why territorial nationalism undermines political ethnicity, particularly when it should be the cornerstone for statehood. It is no wonder that Barotseland’s regional elites, particularly the King’s Royal Establishment, tend to embrace the Zambian state not essentially out of nationalist sentiments but primarily out of political and economic convenience, thus rendering Barotseland’s quest for sovereignty arguably futile.

Beyond being merely the empirical basis for understanding Africa’s separatist deficit, the arguments highlighted above equally shed light on the inevitable challenges facing Barotseland secessionists in Zambia. The arguments about Africa’s separatism, however, have nothing within them providing for the resolution of separatist conflicts such as that in Barotseland. Seen in this light, the complementary account of Africa’s separatist deficit lies as well in identifying the dynamics of the genealogy of the African state rather than focusing on theoretical claims which only make up for the empirical construction of the African state per se. Clearly, separatism is no longer a ‘legitimate given’ for many separatist movements, as the project of redrawing African borders was from the outset deliberately complicated through the colonial arrangement which radically reshuffled the territorial cards (Jean-Francois, 2009). This would seem to be a dilemma for many peripheral and separatist regions which, in the context of Zambia’s ambiguous postcolonial status, has promoted the odds of recognition for Barotseland by encouraging secessionist groups such as the Linyungandambo to make claims for a separate state.
3.2.3 Barotseland’s Sovereignty Perils

The idea of ‘sovereignty peril’ is hereby used as an expression for rendering problematic those elements which seem to be jeopardising Barotseland’s quest for statehood or recognition. Having looked at the dominant factors which account for separatist conflicts vis-à-vis Africa’s separatist shortfall, it suffices at this juncture to review the literature which provides for an alternative or perhaps an African understanding of the Barotseland question. Moreover, whereas the juridical and external nature of African sovereignty have been widely debated within the context of IR (Jackson & Rosberg, 1982), the dominant effects of international recognition which define the postcolonial existence of the Zambian state remain largely unresearched. However, this does not suggest that the western interpretation of separatism, which mainly focuses on the logic of resource curse and other economic variables, has nothing to do with the Barotseland question. If we consider the nature of the postcolonial states in Africa within the context of center-periphery relations, alongside the dichotomous politics of neopatrimonialism and state patronage, it would be clear that all these influences conspire not only to safeguard the weaknesses of the state but also to impede Barotseland’s separatist movement. With this in mind, the following discussion demonstrates the extent to which these elements constrain Barotseland’s quest for sovereignty.

3.2.3.1 Barotseland’s state of Periphery

The discourse about separatism is largely influenced by the literature that stresses economic models of “greed-rebellion” (motivated by predation of rent-seeking) as well as distributional “grievance-rebellion” conflicts between the center and the periphery.\(^{18}\) In one way or the other, the center is either bent on extracting resources from the rich marginalised regions or depriving hinterland rebels against the well-off metropole (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004). However, such narratives tend to downplay the incompatible ethnic interests between different groups within the periphery. For example, the Nkoyas and the Mbundas reject the Barotseland’s separatist motive for fear of ethnic domination by the majority Lozis. Even more problematic are the ambiguous bureaucratic relations between the political leaders at the center and regional elites situated on territorial fringes. Thus far, separatist movements at the

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\(^{18}\) In sociological terms, the “center” and “periphery” often refer to the elite leadership of the state and the rest of society, respectively (e.g., Shils, 1975). Following most studies of separatism, the researcher uses “center” and “periphery” to refer to distinct physical areas.
periphery encounter intense opposition from national elites, thereby undermining their separatist motives. As a peripheral region, Katanga has a history of separatist leanings dating back to the rule of former Zairian President Mobutu Sese Seko. Yet, Katanga remains part of the Congo because of the contradictory relations existing between the centre in Kinshasa and Governor Katumbi’s resource-rich marginalised region.

In the context of the Barotseland question, secessionists such as the Barotse Freedom Movement (BFM) can be expected to resist the ‘ongoingness’ in which the state diffuses Barotseland by establishing its authority for implementing its policies. Moreover, authority can create a certain level of disposition enabling the state to repudiate separatist conflicts whenever they emerge and however violent they may be. According to Shils (1975), “society has the periphery as well as the center” even though man tends to be ambivalent toward the center.19 The center-periphery equation presupposes society’s innate vitality, which, as argued by Shils, creates the center which in turn “clothes itself” as the original benefactor in the disguise of compromise and disagreement. However, depending on the center’s political ties (as a guarantor) of the periphery’s interests, the status quo can either be favored or the periphery can opt for forceful separatist deeds.

This conceptualization of center-periphery relations applies to Barotseland’s separatist challenge to Zambia. But to understand its applicability, one needs to appreciate the bureaucratic nature of the postcolonial state in Zambia, even though it is sometimes not as bureaucratic as it seems to be. Barotseland, which is situated in the western part of Zambia, can chiefly be characterised as a peripheral region which is therefore marginalised; thus the source of the kingdom’s sovereignty perils. Being a peripheral region which is desperately poor and overwhelmed by nationalist sentiments, Barotseland should fairly be expected to lend itself to separatism. This also goes with the reality that the state is fiscally dysfunctional insofar as it has failed to address the region’s grievances. From a territorial point of view, though, Barotseland (particularly the Barotseland Royal Establishment (BRE)) has failed to meaningfully challenge the state by way of breaking out. On the contrary, Limulunga, the capital of a pre-colonial Kingdom of Western Zambia has been exclusively dependent on the

19 Please refer to page 334 of the the book review article: Center and Periphery: Essays in Macrosociology. Edward Shils. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, Book Reviews: The online version of this article can be found at: http://pos.sagepub.com/content/10/3/333
state for survival by exhibiting what Engelbert (2005 & 2009) referred to as the ‘passive acceptance of predatory statehood’.

Since the merger between Barotseland and Northern Rhodesia in 1964, there have been social, political and bureaucratic undercurrents which have synergised the pattern of the relations between Western Province (Barotseland) as a region and the state at the centre in the capital Lusaka. In simple terms, Barotseland can be distinguished as being located at the outward bounds (periphery) from the centre in Lusaka. The implication of this political arrangement has been the centrifugal manifestation of the uneven but symbiotic pattern of state building. Barotseland elites have thus been incorporated, albeit reciprocally so, into the modern state as an outcome determined by the center-periphery struggles, struggles which have themselves been shaped by the domestication of the state’s international recognition and assimilation of regional and national elites. For Jean-Francois Bayert (2009), the postcolonial state in Africa serves as a matrix of the new union in which there has been a reciprocal assimilation of elites within “the unequal state of the little men and big men”(p.60).

Barotseland is not in a catastrophic situation, but the BRE as a traditional institution is unable to act as a real substitute for the state. While the region enjoys its right to unilaterally decide its future, the center-periphery cleavages within the state, and the extent of its marginalization within Zambia diminished the region’s precolonial longing for sovereignty. To use Jean-Francois Bayert’s metaphor, Barotseland can only be likened to ‘little men’ who despite stepping into the institutional positions of the state cannot challenge these institutions, let alone exploit them to advance their separatist struggle, since by virtue of being at the periphery they are part and parcel of them. It has also been argued that traditional authority in Africa is very much a tool of the postcolonial state (Englebert, 2005). Seen from this angle, the king of Barotseland together with his BRE allies are merely agents of the state who in no way offer any sort of instructional competition to the central government. Granted that secessionist groups can effectively deal with such contradictory group interests within Barotseland (the periphery), it is hard to imagine them succeeding in their separatist struggle.

3.2.3.2 Neopatrimonialism, State Patronage & the Barotseland Question

One of the reasons the Barotseland story keeps on re-emerging time and again in Zambia is due to the nature of the postcolonial politics characterised by dichotomous transformations of
neopatrimonialism and state patronage. Barotseland has never lacked the appetite to secede from Zambia although the existence of the region has been shaped by what appears to be the “postcolonial inertia” of apparent neopatrimonialism and patron-client mechanisms of wealth distribution.\(^\text{20}\) The logic of neopatrimonialism entails a type of state system in which the ruling elites appropriate national resources for personal gain, notably in an administration arrangement that is inherently inefficient, nontransparent and of course, which fails to distribute public resources to large segments of the population (Jean-Francois, 1982). Consequently, the realistic survival schemes to which ‘common’ or ‘marginalised’ citizens resort as a reaction to such neopatrimonial neglect often necessitate their undeviating engagement with, rather than dissociating from, neopatrimonial politics. Even more perplexing is the nature of the political clientelism which for many postcolonial states in Africa has created “a pyramid-like structure”, in which patrons “at the top” distribute their resources to their clients who, in turn, redistribute to their clients and so on down (Engel, 2007: 107). One man’s client is typically another one’s patron, though not necessarily vice versa. And according to Englebert (2005), African states refrain from confronting challenges to their postcolonial existence from the multiplicity of heterogeneous groups they harbor by co-opting regional elites into a grand redistributing game preying on the state resources, not least among which were sourced externally, through neopatrimonialism and patron-client relationships for political support.

Since political union in 1964, the survival of the state in Zambia has not been interrogated either in terms of its own deficiencies or the Barotseland problem. It is the state’s inability to withstand its limitations, notwithstanding the heterogeneity and complementary adherences of Zambia’s diverse societies, which remain exceedingly paradoxical. However, if we closely examine Barotseland’s separatist challenge, we would discover how instrumental neopatrimonial relationships as well as patron-clients ties have fostered national unity. At the same time, such relations have created a significant and arguably irreversible damage of Barotseland’s quest for political independence or sovereignty. It can be argued therefore, that by assenting to the 1964 agreement, the Barotseland king, together with his close allies within the BRE and the Barotse National Council (BNC) paradoxically committed themselves as ‘distinguished clients’ to more influential ‘state patrons’ at the central government level.

\(^{20}\) See for instance, works by Medard, “The Underdeveloped State”; Sandbrook, “Patrons, Clients, and Factions”; Jackson and Rosberg, “Personal Rule; Van de Walle, “Neopatrimonialism and democracy”--which shows how such networks manifest.
In so doing, Barotseland’s political elites have been able to secure and safeguard their access to state resources, notably through political favours (in terms of obtaining government contracts) and appointments to senior government positions. For example, the co-option of Barotse nationals rose from 6.0% in 1964 to 18.2% in 1968 before marginally rising to 20% in 1970, invariably positioning Lozis as the third most integrated ethnic group into Kaunda’s UNIP government (Mufalo, 2011). These figures show the extent of neopatrimonial and patronage rule; in which governance representation has been void of inequities likely to cause dissent of a separatist nature by dominant groups in Barotseland. This has been due to Kenneth Kaunda’s authoritarian approach of tribal balancing\(^\text{21}\) (Mufalo, 2011), the continuation of which by subsequent regimes has preserved the prebendal politics of clientelism in which Barotseland elites (pretty much as clients of the state) occupy public offices entitling them to unbridled access to public resources. How then can Barotseland separatists retrieve Barotseland out of Zambia when the region’s political elites are “embedded” or “infused” in the state system (as beneficiaries of state resources), which they themselves are helping to reproduce?

The above question is critical given what seems to be a “double dilemma” faced by the Barotseland separatist movement. If separatist groups choose to engage in some form of a class struggle to confront the Lozi nationalists, this would trigger ‘peripheral rivalries’ with those co-opted by the state (in the appropriation of state resources), who otherwise are well-off to remain compliant with the postcolonial state. On the other hand, as potential state clients, leaders of separatist groups like the Linyungandambo can opt to exploit public resources by abandoning their secessionist demands in favour of supporting the government of the day. Whichever way, such courses of action can never resolve the Barotseland question, merely reformulating the problem as an unending story. Lacina (2013) makes a strong case for neopatrimonial and patronage-inclined regional rivalries by arguing that separatism transpires with the observation that separatist groups often call for self-rule or altered political arrangements for regional autonomy, in which the state elites are the patrons of existing arrangements at the regional level. Lacina adds that whether separatism becomes violent or not depends on how the state patrons act as guarantors, those actions in turn depending on the rulers’ political ties to interests at the regional level which favor the status quo.\(^\text{22}\) What this

\(^{21}\) See Mufalo’s full online article at http://www.academia.edu/4401202/1_Re-examining_the_argument_for_the_restoration_of_the_barotseland_agreement#

\(^{22}\) See Lacina’s full online article at: http://www.eitminstitute.org/2013presentations/P3_S2_paper_Lacina.pdf
implies for the Barotseland question is that ethnic tribes such as the Nkoyas and Mbundas (whose political elites are notably assimilated into the Zambian state system) who do not expect to have a huge stake under Barotseland’s self-rule may not support separatist demands. As pro-status quo minority ethnic groups, they may prefer central rule to an independent Barotseland that may be dominated by the majority Lozis. The non-Muslims who are opposed to Kashmir’s greater autonomy provide a good example elsewhere.
Chapter 4- Analysing the Barotseland Question

4.1 Overview

Following the discussion of the theory and the literature, the discussion of the research findings follows. Basically, this chapter seeks to demonstrate why the Barotseland question is seemingly unending yet a relatively peaceful predicament of Zambia’s postcolonial existence. The findings presented are consistent with the main argument in the introduction and, by and large, substantiate why Barotseland’s separatist movement is somewhat over-blown and therefore characterised as separatism as an alias. The analysis rests on the claim that despite Barotseland’s renewed demands for separatism, the region’s traditional elites have never been significantly averse to the controversial unification of the Kingdom.

The findings below reveal various factors, all of which spirally conspired towards preserving Barotseland’s transfixion into Zambia. First is the region’s sovereign logic of in-group domination alongside the traditional elites’ relatively ambivalent position on the region’s statehood. Another puzzling aspect revealed is the relatively peaceful nature of the Barotseland impasse, which is not comparable to Africa’s best known and extremely violent separatist movements such as those in South Sudan and Biafra, for instance, and which makes it an exceptionally insignificant case. Furthermore, this study uncovered Barotseland’s complex national logic—a constraining factor largely premised on Barotseland elites’ exploitation of local resources and accessibility to the benefits associated with Zambia’s state sovereignty. Hence, as opposed to fostering collective aspirations for statehood, this problem contributes to exacerbating the Barotseland problem. Seen from this perspective, Barotseland’s regional elites arguably relinquished their rights to self-determination due to their constraining preference to compete for appealing incentives associated with Zambia’s juridical sovereignty. But rather than lessening the differences, antagonistic interpretations about the implications of the 1964 agreement have also served to worsen the already delicate problem. Overall, these are contested perspectives which ultimately inform the analytical discussion and conclusions drawn in chapters five and six respectively.
4.1.1 Barotseland’s “sovereign logic of in-group domination”

This study sought to find out why the Barotseland question keeps on re-emerging in Zambia without signs that a lasting solution could be found. The major finding with regard to Barotseland’s ‘sovereign logic of in-group domination’ revealed the puzzling nature of the varieties of compliance. Rather than projecting a shared sense of resistance to the hegemonic erosion of Barotseland political existence, the region is inherently embodied by in-group domination which has exacerbated the conflict. In reality, Barotseland’s traditional elites have never challenged their controversial unification with Northern Rhodesia, except for the separatist rhetoric of the 1990s, largely perceived to have been the work of a few misguided Lozis outside the Barotseland Royal Establishment (BRE) structure. The BRE is in this regard the supreme organ which power over land, in this context seen as “a function of access to sovereignty” (Englebert, 2009:101) rests upon. As a matter of fact, the power of giving land to people is a crucial element of the BRE’s to maintain its local hegemony in Western Province.

Barotseland’s “sovereign logic of in-group domination” is founded on the region’s historical existence as a precolonial entity largely consolidated by its status as a protectorate under British colonisation, and later united via the Barotseland agreement of 1964 to become part of Zambia. Further, Barotseland’s expression of sovereignty is premised on the region’s being ethnically and culturally unique, added to the fact that it experienced greater autonomy and a milder form of colonialism than Northern Rhodesia, with which it was co-administered and later unified via the Barotseland agreement of 1964 (Stokes, 1966; Hall, 1976). However, BLA64 has since 1964 been a continual source of contention, with the BRE occasionally confronting the state to have the agreement reinstated, although these attempts have failed to yield meaningful results. The majority of the pro-Barotse separatists interviewed echoed similar sentiments concerning government’s deliberate action of not wanting to restore the agreement or rather releasing the people of Barotseland from what they most of them referred to as “political enslavement”.23 The leader of the Movement for the Restoration of the Barotseland Agreement (MOREBA) was, in fact, categorical about the fact the BLA64 “was unilaterally abrogated even before being implemented”, adding that all attempts to persuade the state to restore it have proved futile, leaving Barotseland with no option but to pursue self-determination. Again, a well-positioned figure of the BRE resoundingly put it as follows;

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23 Remarks from an interview with the leader of the Barotse Patriotic Front (BPF) conducted in Lusaka, in October, 2012
“Here, we are not only dealing with the state machinery which has failed the people of Barotseland by not delivering development, but one that has also failed to respect the will of the people of Barotseland by restoring the agreement. Therefore, our objective to break away from Zambia is justified. We will not stop at anything until we achieve it”. 24

This statement raises legitimate demands which demonstrate the gravity of the Barotseland question. But this study shows that Barotseland’s sovereign logic of ‘in-group domination’ manifests in a far more different form and for different purposes. The point here is that despite Barotseland’s loss of regional autonomy in 1969, the Litunga and his close traditionalists continued to exercise significant massive influence over the control of matters pertaining to local resources, which by default meant that, arguably, the BLA64 was still upheld. The Litunga remained as the traditional authority, which therefore guaranteed his prerogatives over land and other resources (Caplan, 1970). Apparently, these prerogatives, coupled with Litunga’s close ties with the government, induces Barotseland’s in-group domination for accessing local resources. It has been argued that by ratifying its local privileges as derived from the 1964 unity treaty with the sovereign internationally recognized Zambian state, the BLA64 preserved the Litunga’s powers, “conferring upon him the seal of law”, which effectively jeopardized the rise of potential challengers or competitors within Barotseland (Englebert, 2009:106). Indeed, the authentication of this provision in the agreement is noteworthy: “The Government of the Republic of Zambia will accord the recognition of as such to the person who is for the time being the Litunga of Barotseland under the customary law of Barotseland” (Barotseland Agreement, 1964:14). In this sense, the separatist groups which have recently emerged in Barotseland can arguably be perceived to be engaged in some form of class struggle or competition for the greater benefits of sovereignty from the state. This, therefore, validates the argument that Barotseland separatist movements are simply separatism as an alias, which is well underlined by the idea of Barotseland’s post-colonial logic of in-group domination.

“We are not blind to what is happening in this “nation”. There are prominent Lozis, who are deceiving us by pretending to be working with us to liberate people of Barotseland. These are the same people who have ‘dominated’ us for too long and milked this nation”25.

From the above it can be argued that the political schemes being exhibited by separatist groups may not necessarily be accommodated by some elites of Barotseland, even though they may defiantly appear to be on their side. In other words, the endorsement of Barotseland’s legal recognition is the very prerogative which gave a leeway for the

24 A statement extracted from an interview conducted in Lusaka, in October, 2012
25 I owe this statement from an interview conversation with one of the senior members of the Linyungandambo conducted in Mongu, in October, 2012.
domination of the majority Lozis, and is largely executed by the BRE through the legal
distribution of sovereign authority over local resources (Englebert, 2005). As it is, therefore,
the Zambia state remains significantly unimpeded amid regional inequality and marginality of
Barotseland, largely exacerbated by the exploitation of sovereign command by the BRE. This
has contributed to reframing the Barotseland question in such a way that it has become an
unending story.

Barotseland’s regional elites, though dominant over the majority Lozis, are entangled in the
“calculus of compliance” (Englebert, 2009:99), given that their outlook and actions are
influenced by their accessibility to the benefits of legal (sovereign) command at the center.
Over the years, this has preserved the region’s substantial grievances, upon which the recent
crisis has brought about more radical separatist claims by some dominated groups of Western
province. But it looks inconceivable that those dominated groups in Barotseland will manage
to disentangle the region from Zambia, as they are also trapped into the ‘calculus’, but only in
the context of being largely dominated or kept outside the neopatrimonial state-building
network which induces their neglect and oppression (Ibid, p.99). Simply because separatist
groups are largely dominated and kept outside the BRE structure of legal command does not
necessarily mean they cannot access the instrument of legal command. If they did, however,
that would be detrimental to their separatist agenda, since the majority of them are at the
fringes of the resource-sharing system of the fusion of elites at the national level. On the other
hand, there are internal political manipulations, double-dealings and tongue-twisting among
these separatist groups (pretty much seen as spoilers themselves) which therefore helps in
impeding the very collective agenda they are fighting for: Barotseland’s independence.
Meanwhile, traditional elites continue to exploit the benefits of postcolonial sovereignty
through their local strategies of domination and access to resources, which is increasing the
unlikelihood that Barotseland can separate from Zambia.

4.1.2 Why is the Barotseland separatist conflict relatively peaceful?

The question as to why the Barotseland question keeps on re-emerging in Zambia is just as
puzzling as why it is relatively peaceful. Claims on the restoration of the BLA64 have
historically been peaceful, except for the isolated incident of January 14, 2011 when Zambian
police brutally suppressed a ‘peaceful public rally’ on the restoration of the agreement,
resulting in the death of two people with several others injured and nearly 125 demonstrators
arrested for unlawful demonstration. Apart from this incident, Barotseland’s activism has largely been in the form of peaceful demonstrations, petitions, litigations and quite often propaganda by the known separatists. An interesting development was the May, 2013 petition to the Republican President Michael Sata, for a peaceful political resolution of the Barotseland dispute, which surprisingly was made after the March, 2012’s declaration of Barotseland’s freedom by the Barotse National Council (BNC). Why, then, is the Barotseland quest for statehood non-violent?

Findings of this study revealed a multifaceted divide between pro-Barotseland separatists on the one hand and those within Barotseland seemingly working with the state in order to maintain the status quo on the other. To the extent that this situation counteracts the flourishing of a formidable separatist movement, it has also impaired the potential for the use of violence as a weapon of separatism. As a senior member of the BRE aptly put it:

“Barotseland has always been a peaceful nation, and even now our approach is to resolve this problem in a peaceful manner. The possibility to engage into a civil [war] conflict with Zambia may be the last resort. But bear in mind that people of Barotseland are being pushed too far.”

Amid this seemingly passive character of Barotseland separatists, their separatist agenda is somewhat hampered by internal divisions which are not only ethnically driven but also motivated by their competition towards benefits linked to Zambia’s sovereignty via participation in national politics. Moreover, double-dealings and tongue-twisting conspiracies have also undermined possible chances of establishing militia groups to support the secessionist movement. For example, the withdrawal from action by Barotseland Prime Minister (Ngambela) Sinyinda caused bewilderment to the public as it was construed as a sign that the national council resolutions were being thrown overboard by the Litunga and the BRE.

Barotseland’s quest for statehood can also be said to be peaceful because the state has been very active in deepening the liability lineages of dividing Barotseland elites by constantly co-opting some of the most active members of the BRE and close family members of the

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27 See full article here: http://tumfweko.com/2013/05/22/petition-for-a-peaceful-political-resolution-to-barotseland-dispute/
28 A statement extracted from an interview conversation with one of the senior members of the BRE, in Lusaka, in October, 2012.
Litunga. A case in point is the PF government’s diplomatic appointment (although this was later revoked) of a Lozi Prince Mutangelwa, who, in the 1990s, formed a more radical separatist group called Barotse Patriotic Front (BFM). However, the role of the central government in deepening the fault lines dividing Barotseland elites (which have bolstered the non-violent outlook of the Barotseland separatist movement) goes beyond personal inducements to tactics of divide and rule.\(^{30}\) It is therefore clear why the Nkoya ethnic group of Kaoma district has been seen working against those agitating for Barotseland’s separatism, because they are more loyal to the central government than Barotseland’s traditional authorities. Hence, the Nkoya people’s opposition to Barotseland’s quest for statehood may be questionable, although their position is a limiting factor for possibilities of a violent separatist movement, which (if it occurred) could equally ignite state driven intra-ethnic violence within Barotseland. Franked by the members of the Kazanga Royal Council (KRC) of the Mbunda tribe, the Chairperson of the Nkoya Royal Council (NRC) is on record of having stated during a press briefing that;

“We want to state that we will never be part of Barotseland. We are part of Zambia and the issue of seceding does not arise, it’s a non-starter. As far as we are concerned, Kaoma and Lukulu districts are not part of their resolutions to break away from Zambia. Our position is very clear; we have said as custodians of the land, we will not be part and parcel of that area. We have nothing to do with Barotseland”\(^{31}\) (Lusaka Times; 2012).

The basis upon which ethnic groups in Kaoma and Lukulu districts are opposed to Barotseland’s statehood is that the agenda to separate is driven by selfish and greedy people who from their perspective have been partaking in looting the region’s resources. The majority of the informants in Kaoma generally perceived the BRE as an irrelevant feudalistic institution, which is why they have been calling upon the central government to not grant the BRE powers, as Lozis would oppress them. One of the senior advisors to the NRC categorically stated;

“We don’t want to be part of them. They are selfish, they are greedy. Even if we seceded with them, what benefit are we going to get under Lozi hegemony other than subjecting ourselves to oppression?”\(^{32}\)

How then can such ethnic tensions serve as a platform for violent solidarity to liberate Barotseland? Yet for most Lozis and particularly the ruling class, it has been and continues to

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\(^{30}\) My personal emphasis based on the views from people interviewed.

\(^{31}\) [http://www.postzambia.com/post-read_article.php?articleId=26320](http://www.postzambia.com/post-read_article.php?articleId=26320). These two associations represent the two districts (i.e. Kaoma and Lukulu) which are opposed to the idea of Barotseland breaking away from Zambia, although pro-separatist individuals see them as agents of the state with selfish motives.

\(^{32}\) A personal expression extracted from my interview conversation in Kaoma with one of the senior figures of the Nkoya Royal Council.
be important to locate their roots in the broader Bulozi kingdom, which includes the Nkoyas (Langworthy, 1972). It is therefore not surprising that many Lozi loyalists, particularly those close to the king of Barotseland, perceive KRC and NRC leaders as selfish Barotseland citizens who are only motivated by political and economic inducements by the state in order to make them turn against their fellow tribesmen.

Notwithstanding these findings, there is something paradoxical about the non-violent nature of the Barotseland separatist movement. Despite the state’s institutional weakness and fiscal bankruptcy, the position of the central government on the Barotseland question (in defending the status quo) is arguably somewhat rational. But it is much harder to understand why Barotseland elites, including Nkoya traditionalists, who are equally entrenched in the position of dispossession and marginality, should resort to peaceful means of resolving the Barotseland question. Why have the people of Barotseland chosen to live under perpetual oppression at the hands of the state which has neglected them and failed to address their legitimate grievances, instead of challenging it by violent means or otherwise? And why have the Litunga and the BRE, which is a prominent and authoritative body presiding over matters of political, economic and traditional welfare within Barotseland, not risen as an alternative source of power and institutional development?

4.1.3 Revisiting Barotseland’s complex national logic

Further interrogation of the Barotseland question revealed a much deeper sense of the region’s complex national logic, which is closely linked to the problem of in-group domination discussed earlier. Complex national logic refers to the internal impediments (of a political, structural and institutional nature) which contrary to fostering Barotseland’s separatism, inhibits it. However, the distinction between in-group domination and complex national logic may be neither here nor there. The former highlights the dominant outlook of Barotseland’s elites, while the latter exposes ways in which the region’s elites outmaneuver what Englebert (2009:109) referred to as “political expressions of regional particularism” in Barotseland. In this sense, Barotseland’s complex national logic equally plays a divisive role in contributing towards the re-framing of the Barotseland saga in such a way that it is such an unending story; it is unending because keeping it open serves the interests of both Barotseland’s traditional elites as well as the state. Of course, linked to this view are different forms in which the complex national logic manifests itself. This includes attempts by the king
to control the system of governance linked to land and other resources in Barotseland, and broad questions about the Lozis’ participation in the reproduction of the Zambian state.

The anatomy of Barotseland’s complex national logic is rooted in the ‘traditional’ governance system, which besides its inward drawbacks was also greatly stifled by the 1964 agreement. Far from being timid, the majority of the informants interviewed in Mongu lamented the obstruction of development in the region, which they attributed to the retrogressive nature of the BRE’s control of the governance system, linking its prerogatives over land and other resources (Marshall & Gurr Ted, 2003). Hence, the BRE is largely perceived as a hindrance to alternative economic power based on the promotion of private investment. This unfortunate state of affairs was captured by a former member of the BRE, who stated that:

“I don’t think the blame on lack of development in Western province squarely lies with government. In reality, only the Litunga has influence in the control of the land. However, the land tenure system in Western province is [traditionally] archaic. While you can manage to acquire a piece of land through the traditional system, it will be without a Title Deed. Therefore, how can you borrow money from a bank for investment without collateral in form of a title deed?”33

But at the core of these sentiments is the degree of the contradiction in which some members of the ruling class in Barotseland harboring secessionist motives are also opposed to the Litunga’s governance system. Barotseland’s complex national logic is more discernible given the inter–Zambian disposition by some Lozi nationalists of royal lineage. It has been observed that the opposition to the Litungaship by both Akashamatwa Mbukusita Lewanika (“Aka”) and Prince Imasiku Mutangelwa34 might be due to the fact that these individuals are intentionally hindered from gaining access to the benefits of legal command which comes with the position of the Litungaship (Gurr, 1993; Englebert, 2009). In fact, the denunciation by the BRE of the claim for “modernizing Barotseland”35 has led Mutangelwa to resort to separatist activities (through his Barotseland Patriotic Front (BPF)) although the state brutally dealt with him through arbitrary arrests and detention.36 On the other hand, the opportunity of ascending to the Litungaship eluded Aka, despite having embraced separatist rhetoric as well as projecting himself as the potential successor. Therefore, Aka’s defection to the ruling MMD government, accompanied by the public rejection of the separatist stance is

33 I owe this statement from my face to face interview with a former BRE official in Lusaka, in October, 2012
34 I personally interviewed Prince Imasiku Mutangwela twice, in which case he narrated how Barotseland nation came to be, how the Kingdom joined Northern Rhodesia to form Zambia; how the agreement was abrogated and why he strongly feels Barotseland must now seek self-determination.
35 Face to face interview with Prince Imasiku Mutangwela conducted at his residence in Lusaka, October, 2012.
36 The Post, Friday, February 26 (1999) (Zambia) : Home News
questionable while at the same time understandable, particularly in view of the economic benefits associated with being part of the government of the day.

So the question of why the Barotseland problem never ends can also be explained from the perspective of Barotseland’s complex national logic, particularly with regard to the ordinary Lozi’s participation in the reproduction of the state. It is often claimed that “you can take a Lozi away from Barotseland, but you cannot take Barotseland away from a Lozi.” Why therefore, do ordinary Lozis, the majority of whom are poverty stricken, seem to pander to the Zambia state when its reproduction is the very thing perpetuating their misery and disposition of utter neglect? Apparently a combination of factors abound, whose implications have been to foster the flourishing of the Barotseland impasse. In this study, the contribution by the grassroot Lozis in the reproduction of the Zambian state was overwhelmingly attributed to fear of retribution and being jailed, including denunciation by the Litunga for being anti-government. Indeed, besides the repeated detentions of the Lozi activists during the 1960s and 1970s, the state has not relented in imprisoning individuals who have been seen to engage in separatist activism, with the persecution of prince Muntangwelwa in the 1990s as well as the arrests of the more than 125 separatist activists in 2011, as other examples (Sishuwa, 2011).

Furthermore, some informants pointed to high poverty levels and heavy dependency on government contracts by most elite Lozi businessmen. Even more evident is the ‘irreconcilable dilemma’ between the extent to which ordinary Lozis themselves require the reproduction of the Zambia state while at the same time continuing to exhibit their loyalty to the Litunga—mainly for purposes of accessing arable land and other essential resources, and settlement of their domestic disputes, including recognition of their family status (Mainga Bull, 1973). In other words, the BRE’s enduring legal command privileges render it exceptionally hard for ordinary Lozis to circumvent the established traditional authority. Meanwhile, the reproduction of the BRE structures at different levels of Barotseland society arguably necessitates the extensive supply of its legal command and the reconstruction of a sufficient critical mass suitable to its preservation. In reference to Barotseland’s ‘complex

37 Remarks by a notable figure of the Movement for Restoration of the Barotseland Agreement (MOREBA). These remarks were said during an interview in Mongu in October, 2012
38 Article by Sishuwa Sishuwa, which appeared in the Post Newspaper of 2011/Tue 09 Oct. 2012, 11:10
39 Here, I am referring to some of the members of the BRE and other separatists whom I interviewed in Lusaka Mongu, in 2012
national logic’, as one informant metaphorically put it; ‘you don’t bite the finger that feeds you and certainly not when you are uncertain about what the future holds’.

The question that follows then is how has this ‘complex national logic’ influenced the Barotseland question in such a way that it seems to be an unending predicament? Admittedly, this question is hard to answer, given the complex political environment behind the problem. Still, a few competing explanations can be put across. Bearing in mind earlier remarks, that Barotseland elites’ exploitation of local resources are linked to benefits of state sovereignty, this would seem to present political manifestations of regional particularism in Barotseland (Englebert & Hummel, 2005). Englebert added elsewhere that it is sensible for the BRE to shun being accountable for the region’s underdevelopment while continuing to amass benefits from Barotseland’s traditional status as recognized and reproduced by Zambia’s state sovereignty. Taking into account the sheer difficulty in gaining international recognition, it seems less likely that Barotseland can be conferred with international recognition by the powers that be, unless they demand the restoration of the region’s autonomy, though this suggests a federal arrangement which looks highly unlikely.

Though it remains a political possibility, it is highly debatable as to whether or not Barotseland can manage to separate from Zambia, given that this approach was explored in the past but nothing meaningful materialised (Caplan, 1968, Langworthy, 1980). For instance, the Litunga’s 1997 expedition to the UK to pursue the restoration of the BLA64, and the 2001 appeal (demanding for the legal status of Barotseland as provided in the BLA64) to the AU both resulted in futility (Mainga Bull, 1996). Still, within Barotseland, the majority of the traditional elites have chosen not to challenge the Zambian project, repressing local demands for separate development. Besides, it makes sense for ordinary Lozis in Barotseland to refrain from engaging in separatist activities, since the state is still legitimate. Yet the state is equally accountable for the region’s underdevelopment, far less than the BRE which is circumventing its regional responsibility. On the other hand, the Casamance question’s local particularism can be seen to have resulted in active defiance towards the Senegalese state among many Diola elites, who have waged a separatist struggle since the early 1980s (Englebert, 2004).

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40 Quotation extracted from an interview conversation with one of the notable figures of the Barotseland National Council, in Lusaka in October, 2012

41 Author’s emphasis based on the detailed examination of the available literature on the Barotseland question.
4.1.4 Rival explanations on the implications of the BLA64

Beyond the findings presented above, this study revealed competing views about the implications of the BLA64, which to a greater extent have equally contributed in transforming the Barotseland question. Understandably, the importance of the coercive capacity of the Zambia state vis-à-vis the defiant character of Barotseland’s separatists are crucial factors which have tended to mutually exacerbate the impasse. Equally undeniable is the ambiguous manner in which the agreement was from the outset conceived, despite defective interpretations arising, such as have characterized the current debate. For how if it were not defectively conceived did its crafters pave the way for the autonomy (special status) of Barotseland, when the agreement did not create federal political arrangements? It is not surprising, therefore, that this study revealed controversial and competing explanations regarding the implications of the BLA64, which have contributed to re-materialising the Barotseland question in such a way that it remains a ticklish issue; or more simply put, a matter of separatism as an alias.

In the controversy-ridden theory of the state, the widespread recognition of the existence of a unitary state (Michel, 1966) provides a welcome point to engage with the politics of the Barotseland agreement vis-à-vis Zambia’s status as a unitary state. Needless to say that the agreement is in itself but the eye of a raging debate, it has also resulted in the production of a unitary state, albeit ambiguously providing for Barotseland’s autonomy. From this perspective, the conferring of Barotseland with autonomous status was theoretically not consistent with the principles of a unitary state system as such. Contrary to a federal state where power is shared, a unitary state is by definition a sovereign state which is administered as a single entity, in which power is indivisible and where the central government is supreme (Michel, 1966; Elazar, 1997). Therefore, regional administrative officials only exercise power as delegated to them by the central government and such powers can be retracted at the discretion of the central state. Barotseland is deemed a subunit of the central government in Lusaka, and has no power to challenge the legality of the state or acts of Parliament for that matter. A prominent politician who appeared to be in support of the status quo boldly stated during the interview that:

“The key thing to understand about this controversy is this; Northern Rhodesia and Barotseland came together through an agreement in 1964 which unified them. After this unification process, the two entities became a new ‘unitary state’ called Zambia—which never was in existence before. Perhaps, if they had formed a federation as it is in Nigeria, maybe it would then been possible to share power and possibly easier for Barotseland to have the autonomy or be completely separate. But now, those
agitating for secession are in a difficult situation although they are capitalising on the legitimate grievances of the region”42. From the forgoing it is noteworthy that the separatist claims for Barotseland’s nationhood are vividly far from being endorsed by the state. But the motive behind the granting of some concessions and privileges to the BRE, as contained in the Barotseland agreement, was quite obvious. Indeed, this was publicly admitted by Clement Zaza, Dr. Kenneth Kaunda’s political assistant, who stated a year after this agreement was ratified that “the Barotseland London Agreement was agreed upon merely as a passport to enable Zambia [to] integrate Barotseland and proceed to Independence as one country” (Caplan, 1968:356)43. After all, he further emphasised, “the Zambian Government has no moral obligation whatsoever to respect or honour the said agreement” (Ibid; 356). Nonetheless, this political rhetoric does not in any way diminish what appears to be an increasingly radical challenge to Zambia’s postcolonial territorial configuration. The dictatorial manner in which the Barotseland agreement was terminated and the failure to restore it is the very undertaking which has uncouched the impetus for the dismemberment of Barotseland from the rest of Zambia. It is surely no surprise that one of the leading officials of the Barotseland Royal Establishment (BRE) countered the unification argument by symbolically stating that:

“Assuming Barotseland and Northern Rhodesia went into a marriage arrangement…eh! But since in this case, the marriage certificate between these two entities was rubbed and torn apart by Kenneth Kaunda, it means that the unitary state is no more. So in the context of international law, there is no Zambia because the abrogation of the agreement effectively meant that these two entities can go separate ways. Therefore, no one should blame the people of Barotseland for declaring that they are no longer part of Zambia”44.

Underlying these contradictory interpretations about the obsolete Barotseland agreement is essentially the vagueness of the unification agreement itself, as it seems to have been shortsightedly conceived. The fact that Zambia’s nation building process is ongoing and more so that Africa’s state boundaries are said to be arbitrary, implicitly suggests that the Barotseland agreement was never completely obliterated even though it was hitherto an unimplemented unification project of two separate political entities. Yet, to the extent that such rival explanations fail to aid the altering of Barotseland’s position of marginality, they are arguably reinforcing the juridical configuration of the Zambian state; and thus far impeding Barotseland’s separatist movement.

42 Statement extracted from interview conducted in Lusaka, in October 2012.
43 Originally cited from a letter dated 23 June 1965 from the Ngambela Noyoo to President Kaunda, Boma Files, Negotiations with Central Government Dossier; Mr. Zaza made the same comments to Caplan in person.
44 Statement extracted from interview conducted in Lusaka, in October 2012.
Besides the political predicament, what emerged from this study is the undying sense of defiance currently exhibited by the majority if not all of Barotseland separatists in publicly maintaining the claim that their nation (Barotseland) had a particular status (as a protectorate) which according to the available evidence was recognized both under colonial rule and also in the Barotseland agreement (Tordoff, 1974; Caplan, 1968). Nonetheless, there is no empirical evidence to suggest that such a claim would have ever been successful in stimulating Barotseland’s juridical sovereignty or, worse still, international recognition. Understandably therefore, the Barotseland question is theoretically inescapable but superficially a closed matter. In Robert Jackson’s penetrating interpretation, “to be a sovereign state today one needs only to have been a formal colony yesterday” (Jackson, 1990:17). Surely, for Barotseland which was merely a protectorate, the separatist desire to break away from Zambia can only be said to be a farfetched political possibility which is so close yet too far from reality.
Chapter 5- Political Watersheds of the Barotseland Question

5.1 Overview

Barotseland’s complex national logic as well as the region’s sovereign logic of in-group domination by far demonstrates the extent to which Barotseland seems to have perpetually been transfixed into Zambia. Still, there is no doubt about the detrimental role the state has played in obliterating Barotseland’s quest for sovereignty, even though there is overwhelming evidence pointing to internal destruction of Barotseland’s nationhood. Drawing from the above findings, it follows therefore that an understanding of more nuanced discussion of the Barotseland question need be presented. Accordingly, this chapter is divided into two main parts. The first analyses the contextual occurrences that shaped the Barotseland problem from 1967, when the agreement was effectively up, until recently now that the issue has been seen as contentious in the past. For this reason, it is subdivided as follows:

1) The Barotseland question during UNIP ‘s authoritarian rule
2) The Barotseland question during the MMD’s democratic dispensation era
3) The Barotseland question under the current PF’s government.

The above culminates in part two, which essentially is about the discussion of the Barotseland question. By building on the analysis, the discussion further engages with more practical questions about the nature of the Barotseland question and the extent to which it challenges Zambia’s postcolonial project. Therefore, whose interest does the Barotseland problem serve? And what are the implications of resolving it or doing nothing about it? It would be simplistic to argue that either the status quo or the re-configuration of state boundaries–perceived as erroneous–could be the accepted resolution. On the other hand, maintaining the status quo can never address the state’s apparent fiscal and institutional weaknesses, which arguably have an impact on the impasse. Up until now, one important question remains. Does the Barotseland question in its current form threaten Zambia’s sovereignty? Presumably, there is no direct answer to this question. However, an attempt to illuminate on it is made by reflecting on Englebert and Jackson and Rosberg’s problematisation of international sovereignty–particularly in terms of its convertibility into legal command; rather a crucial factor that has shaped the Barotseland problem.
5.1.1 Barotseland Question in the One-Party State

The nature of the Barotseland question is typically puzzling. Compared to the known separatist cases in Africa, the Barotseland problem ticklishly keeps on re-emerging but devoid of a lasting solution. Why is that so and in which ways has this problem been changing? How come it never ends, given that it never gets relatively violent? Perhaps it remains that way in order to serve different purposes? These are analytical questions and in answering them it is important to briefly recall how Barotseland entangled itself with Northern Rhodesia—pretty much what can be seen as a process of ‘self-postcolonial decay’ characterized by the region’s complex national logic as well as its in-group domination. Even more evident is the dictatorial approach in the handling of the 1964 agreement by the UNIP government, which, through its authoritative termination of the agreement signaled the genesis of the current problem (Lindemann, 2011). Both Barotseland’s self-postcolonial decay and UNIP government’s undemocratic practices are two notable justifications underlying the argument about the nature of Barotseland’s separatist movement. To the extent that these justifications reinforce each other, they have also contributed in fashioning the Barotseland question in such a way that it has become an unending yet relatively peaceful dilemma characterizing Zambia’s unproductive postcolonial presence.

a) Barotseland’s state of ‘Self-Postcolonial Decay’

As a peripheral region in Zambia, Barotseland has endured what appears to be a process of self-postcolonial decay, which apparently has been reinforced by the region’s prevailing problem of complex national logic and in-group domination. But there is also overwhelming evidence pointing to how the BRE and other Lozi royalists effectively participated in instigating the postcolonial demise of Barotseland’s nationhood through the system of state clientelism and patronage. Of course, Africa’s state boundaries are said to be arbitrarily imposed (Mbembé, 2000). However, this argument is somewhat remote from the justifications pertaining to Barotseland’s self-postcolonial decay and the consequential framing of the Barotseland question itself. Indeed, it is clear in the context of the 1964 agreement that many of Barotseland’s traditional elites themselves ‘willingly’ acceded to the national identity as part of a sovereign independent nation (Zambia) which enabled them to advance their own political interests (Caplan, 1968; Mainga Bull, 1996). This was particularly so for the members of the BRE who strove as go-betweens for Barotseland and the Zambian
state. Hence, the King and his Lozi allies have benefited from their regional supremacy, as well as from gaining access to state institutions, and the spoils this situation unlocked.

Although Barotseland’s autonomy considerably diminished, regional elites on the other hand became more influential due to unintended allegiances Zambia’s sovereignty has manifested in the region (Englebert, 2005). Thus far, the idea of self-postcolonial decay is fruitfully in harmony with the argument that Barotseland’s separatist challenge is merely ‘separatism as alias’, because under these circumstances, it is evident that the BRE and other Lozi royalists have had an overriding role in instigating the postcolonial demise of Barotseland’s nationhood. But they may also have succeeded in building what appears to be Barotseland’s ‘sovereignty myth’, which Barotse separatists relentlessly prevent from turning into a reality. Precisely, certain decisions made by the BRE, such as their active involvement in abrogating the BLA64, including the regional elites’s predatory tendencies of clamoring for political positions (Pitch, 1967), equally show the extent to which Barotseland elites got themselves entangled in the calculus of compliance. It would seem then that those agitating to break out are merely doing so for purposes of breaking into the state in order to partake from the sovereign benefits association with legal command of the very state that oppresses them.45

Contrary to the collective sense of defiance being exhibited by the separatist groups, this study has revealed that there are equally prominent elites close to the Litunga, who are either ambivalent or altogether opposed to Barotseland’s separatism. This tendency is certainly puzzling but those elites who are ambivalent are at the same time devoted patriots to Zambia’s post-independence nationalism project. Their predisposed engagements to the alternative means of survival within Zambia arguably makes them trade national compliance for regional supremacy (Englebert, 2009). How then, in the context of Barotseland’s self-postcolonial decay do we make sense of this contradiction? Answers to this question require the analysis of the BRE’s decisions and actions which facilitated the ‘fusion of Barotseland elites’ into an alliance with the state, thereby creating a more dominant Lozi social class over ordinary Barotse nations. Noteworthy here is the controversial BLA64, which in this perspective set off the decaying process of Barotseland’s governance institutions, however outmoded they may have been. While the signing of the BLA64 nullified all treaties which were previously entered into between Barotseland and the British South African Company (BSAC), it also created the legal basis upon which Barotseland was amalgamated with

45 Author’s emphasis (remarks) based on the analysis of the empirical evidence on the Barotseland question
Northern Rhodesia to form Zambia (Mainga Bull, 1996). This ‘free willingness’ of the parties to the agreement is reflected under the third paragraph of the preamble of the agreement as follows;

“And whereas, it is the wish of the Government of Northern Rhodesia and the Litunga of Barotseland, his Council and the Chiefs and the People of Barotseland that Northern Rhodesia should proceed to independence as one country and all its peoples should be one nation” (Barotseland Agreement, 1964:1).

Perhaps the most remarkable political sentiments are those of Nakatindi Wina, a Lozi Princess, currently serving as Cabinet Minister in the PF government, who publicly questioned in 1968 that, “when the rest of the world is getting together, when great nations are joining up in the United Nations, how can little Barotseland hope to survive by herself?”

To be sure, even the national slogan of “One Zambia One Nation” which symbolized Zambia’s sovereignty was popularized by one of the prominent Lozi elites, Late Honourable Arthur Wina, known to have been the first Minister of Finance during the one-party state rule (Caplan, 1968). Be that as it may, the BLA64 was wrongfully abrogated and the basis for Barotseland’s grievances is of course well-founded and, more so, legitimate. Surprisingly though, the people of Barotseland by and large accept their Zambian identity. For instance, a survey conducted in 1996 by Daniel Posner revealed that 74% of his Lozi informants considered themselves Zambians before being Lozi. In actual fact, the majority of the Lozis have always voted for non-Lozis since Zambia’s democratization process of the early 1990s.

Underlying the above empirical evidence or, rather, Barotseland’s weakened solidarity outlook, is the extent of the regional elites’ involvement in the construction of a Zambian state, which implicitly indicates a mildly or acutely destructive process of the regions’ quest for nationhood or sovereignty. In fact, not many Barotse nationals were from the outset known to have opposed the Litunga’s decision to sign the agreement, except for the outspoken and largely subdued local opposition outside the BRE’s political system. However, the downside of this process is that the majority of the Barotseland’s elites chiefly remained outside the Zambian state’s post-colonial system of governance for quite some time (Englebert, 2009; Caplan, 1968). Though largely unintegrated in the postcolonial contract, Barotseland’s elites have managed to use elements of state sovereignty by reinforcing their

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46 Barotseland Agreement 1964. See also Section 4 and Sub-Sections 1, 2 and 3(Points 3a-r). See online Document http://miliko.vacau.com/Barots%20Agreement.pdf
local dominance and have thus recognized their own marginalization within Zambia, albeit sometimes hesitantly doing so. This remarkable measure of ‘self-postcolonial decay’ was well postulated by Rotberg (1972), who argued in his review of Caplan’s book on the “Political History of Zambia” that:

“Barotseland (the size of France) no longer exists. True, the Lozi still have their Litunga, or King, but unlike his predecessors, he lacks control [……] The Kuta, or Council, and the various Indunas, or Councillors, have lost their judicial and territorial administrative functions. What is more, since 1969, maps of Zambia have replaced the designation Barotseland with Western Province, thus putting the once-proud protectorate within a protectorate on an equal footing with the other sectors of the republic”(p.512).

Rotberg’s views correspondingly underline the extent to which the Barotseland problem is transfixed into perpetuity and potentially an unending saga. Further, compelling incentives linked to state sovereignty entangled Lozi nationalists in what Englebert (2009:99) inferred as the “calculus of compliance”, through which separatists groups themselves are supposedly entangled by virtue of pandering to the benefits of Zambia’s judicial sovereignty. Understandably, this validates the argument that the Barotseland question is simply separatism as an alias. Indeed, the behaviour of Barotseland elites (such as Princess Inonge Wina, currently occupying a ministerial position and others holding key positions in the opposition political parties) who continue to partake from the state, not only undermines the separatist movement but also underlines the demise of Barotseland’s aspiration for nationhood. Thus far lies the idea of ‘self-postcolonial decay’ which is also conceivable from the perspective of postcolonial contract, which according to Rotberg (1972:512) delivered “a fatal and ironic denouenced fate for Barotseland”. It is no wonder that some Lozis are pessimistic about the claims for Barotseland’s separation. For instance, a notable and well-connected Barotseland national stated that:

“I am a Lozi myself and I advise the Litunga and BRE members timely. The Ngambela (Barotseland Prime Minister) was actually here - in this office- two days ago. So they know my position. Some people [who don’t have better things to do] have chosen to talk about it daily—which is counterproductive. What Western province needs is development because poverty levels are very high there”

There may surely be other political elites from Barotseland who are either opposed to separatism or indirectly defending the status quo. However, it is politically naive to think that the region’s historic grievances or separatist claims will completely diminish from being harbored particularly by those separatist groups who feel they have a legitimate right to self-

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49 I owe this statement from an interview conversation with one of the senior figures of the BRE (who chooses to be treated anonymously) conducted in Lusaka, in October 2012.
determination; besides the fact that they are excluded from the client-patronage system. Granted these groups can penetrate into the sphere of resource appropriation emanating from Zambia sovereignty, but how feasible is that given Barotseland’s complex national logic alongside in-group domination in which separatists find themselves? Conceivably, this is a paradoxical situation which underlines that the Barotseland question will continue to re-materialise—albeit sporadically but with seemingly different actors, intensity of political violence and state repression at least going into the foreseeable future. This is arguably so because the problem seems to be politically managed and obviously not resolving it serves the interests of the state and perhaps those traditional elites within Barotseland, who are seemingly benefiting out of its continuity.

b) UNIP Government’s Authoritarian Acts

Zambia may have never been an authoritarian state in the theoretical sense. However, certain actions which were taken by the UNIP government in abrogating the Barotseland agreement are indicative of an authoritarian regime. But for all the evidence demonstrating Barotseland’s self-postcolonial demise, the undemocratic tendencies exhibited by the state under one party state rule all seem to have conspired in producing a symbiotic force which effectively obliterated Barotseland’s quest for sovereignty. Therefore, the characterisation of the Barotseland question (as an unending saga) falls squarely on the authoritarian exercise of power derived from international recognition (Englebert, 2009; Clapham, 2000), which in this context is an impediment to Barotseland’s self-determination.

A lot can be said about the Barotseland question, particularly as it relates to the negotiation process of the 1964 agreement.\footnote{But this is not to say the negotiation process was without opposition. The fact is this study overlooks the pro-separatism attitudes of the BRE in the early 1960s, particularly that of the Litunga Mwanawina Lewanika III, who agitated for secession of Barotseland in 1961 in the run up to Zambia’s political independence. Nothing though, materialized out of that and as it turned out, the Barotseland leadership later failed to significantly challenge Barotseland’s integration into Zambia.} It is sensible to refer to the transition from colonialism to post colonialism as a struggle. As in other African countries where nationalism suffered major setbacks, the BLA64’s political arrangements, despite having created a formidable foundation for a new state, were by and large not conducive to national unity in a newly independent state, hence could not last (Caplan, 1968). But the quasi-manner into which the BLA64 was entered posed challenges to national unity. Besides the fact that Barotseland’s existence was frozen by this very agreement, it was equally the fundamental basis why the UNIP had the
leeway to downgrade Barotseland into a mere province called Western province amid vocal opposition within the BRE inner circle. However, Barotseland elites’ failure to credibly oppose this move is understandable because of the authoritarian character exhibited by Kenneth Kaunda’s government at the time. But critics see this ‘passive attitude’ by Barotseland’s regional elites as a reflection of their acceptance and full involvement in the “national fusion of regional elites” into the state (Englebert, 2009:103).

UNIP government’s repressive actions should be understood from the standpoint of BRE’s capacity to exert local hegemony vis-à-vis national integration. However, this factor was not surmountable by the imperatives of ‘national unity’ and the desperate necessity to alter the colonial governance system to comfort it with the one party state system (Lindemann, 2011). Considering the absence of opposition, this entailed imposing further controls which endangered the political existence of Barotseland as a self-governing entity. For instance, the constitutional change of name from Barotseland to Western province is perceived by most separatists as a desperate measure by UNIP to equate Barotseland to other provinces which never enjoyed any special status (Caplan, 1968). Additional draconian actions thwarting Barotseland’s nationhood aspirations were instituted, such as the Chief’s Act, which gave authority to the Republican President to either uphold or withdraw state recognition of any traditional chief without being questioned. These reforms may have been appreciated by nationalists who considered the need for national integration as a top priority. But rights reserved for the Litunga and the people of Barotseland diminished to the extent that Barotseland’s governance institutions almost ceased to exist (Mainga Bull, 1996). By and large, these narratives point not only to the abrogation of BLA64 by UNIP but also desperate attempts to undermine the authority of the Litunga. Consider, for instance, the following remarks by Dr. Kenneth Kaunda (then Prime Minister of Northern Rhodesia) during a meeting with the Barotseland government in August 1964:

“I should now like to turn to the Barotseland agreement which was reached in London in May, and I wish to give an assurance that it is the Government’s full intention that the Barotseland agreement will be honoured fully after independence. I believe the Agreement reached in London was an honourable agreement from the point of view of both the Central Government and the Barotseland Government.”

These remarks by Kaunda were an assurance that the state had no intention to meddle into Barotseland’s domestic affairs as that was the responsibility of the Barotseland government.

51 An excerpt from the documented report of the speech by the Prime Minister of Northern Rhodesia Kenneth Kaunda at a meeting held at Headquarters of the Barotse Government at Lealui on Thursday, 6 August, 1964. The meeting is reported to have been attended by the Litunga, and members of the Barotse Government.
But it is one thing to utter such remarks and another to keep them, particularly in light of the unitary political arrangements Barotseland entered into with Northern Rhodesia. Still, how do we make sense of Kaunda’s political deception, back-pedaling or trickery which resulted not only in the abrogation of the agreement but also the genesis of the Barotseland question? Perhaps the termination of the agreement was a ‘necessary evil’ given UNIP’s constraining necessity to foster the troubled national unity project. However, with reference to the assumption of a ‘necessary evil’, one respondent who appeared to be in favour of the status quo had this to say:

“Not that Kaunda terminated the agreement with ill motives...No! Imagine if Barotseland maintained its special status as was provided for in the agreement? Do you think this country would have been governable in a manner it is today? In my view, the agreement was terminated in ‘good faith’ [to unite the people of Zambia] although people of Barotseland were largely not consulted”.

On the other hand, the signing of the 1964 agreement by the Litunga meant the exchange from Barotseland’s acceptance of Northern Rhodesia to proceed to independence as one country. Hence, the postcolonial destruction of Barotseland, through the repressive actions by UNIP, is in itself the very process which resulted in the colonial creation of the Zambian state, involving the undoing of Barotseland nationals’ sense of belonging to a traditionally established nation. Hitherto, the reasons why UNIP authoritatively terminated the 1964 agreement have been put across but one big question remains: How do we explain the UNIP government’s authoritative or otherwise oppressive practices which went on largely unchallenged by Barotseland elites to such an extent that it created the Barotseland question, which is seemingly unresolvable?

Drawing on the theoretical insights of the third chapter, two competing explanations appear to shed light on this question, and more broadly on the Barotseland question. Apparently, the manner in which the UNIP government made its political appointments, coupled with the distribution of state resources, was the driving force for the “fusion” or “reciprocal assimilation” of Barotseland’s elites which, from perspective of Englebert’s (2009:3) analysis of “patron-client relationships” and “neopatrimonialism”, essentially deactivated Barotseland’s potential challenge to the state. It may still be logical to add that this postcolonial ‘fusion of elites into the Zambian state’ reproduces the state from which leading Barotseland elites benefit, thus far sabotaging Barotseland’s aspirations for sovereignty. The

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52 Quotation extracted from interview conducted in Kaoma, in October, 2012
53 Barotseland Agreement 1964. See also Section 4 and Sub-Sections 1, 2 and 3(Points 3a-r). See online Document http://miliko.vacau.com/Barotse%20Agreement.pdf
alternate version of the Barotseland question rests on Jackson, Rosberg and Reno’s theorising of state sovereignty, which highlights the resistance to the challenge which African states derive from international recognition; rather the fundamental premise upon which many weak African states continue to persevere alongside their oppressive and predatory nature (Englebert, 2009; Englebert & Hummel, 2005). Hence, the granting of recognition by the international community to former colonial entities endorsed the replication of their empirical deficiencies, since it froze African states within their organic colonial sphere, thereby impeding separatists’ movements (Jackson & Rosberg, 1982:1-24). Indeed, the exogenous nature of state sovereignty bestowed Zambia at independence enabled the UNIP government to authoritatively exploit the instruments of legal command associated with juridical statehood by not only arbitrarily terminating the BLA64 but also inventing an imaginary problem (the Barotseland question), whose solution remains largely elusive.

Lack of resistance largely exhibited by Barotseland’s traditional elites over UNIP’s acts in dissolving the BLA64 is surprising. Nonetheless, the reaction from Lealui (Litunga’s alternate palace) was predictably that of a furious atmosphere. Traditional chiefs and headmen responded by discussing means of challenging UNIP’s news measures by forming a party to promote their interests (Caplan, 1968). Secession, as Caplan indicated, persisted as their objective. However, the tactic by many Lozi anti-Barotse secessionists such as Sikota Wina and others (who threatened to impeach the Litunga if secession was realised) was to concede the impracticability of secession, contending that Barotseland represented some residue of “old-style tribal rule which offends pan-African thinking”(p.350). While petitioning for the intervention of allies in London, Barotse secessionists understood the implications of provoking dire consequences for themselves although the outspoken elements convinced the Litunga that not all was lost. In reality, it was for too late to arbitrate and undeniably so, all was lost. Much more, the state was ready to incarcerate Barotse dissidents. In the end, several prominent Lozi elites, including the Wina brothers, Arthur and Sikota (whose father had been Ngambela—“Prime Minister”), Munukayumbwa Sipalo and Nalumino Mundia later joined the administration of Kenneth Kaunda (Pitch 1967; Caplan 1970). Whereas the prevailing genres concerning the expedition for hegemony by regional groups over the postcolonial state as a whole (Jean-Francois, 2009) explain the resistance of relatively dominant groups in Barotseland, one needs to look at the derivative uses of sovereignty in the reproduction of their local hegemony by regional elites in order to understand their lack of meaningful defiance to the postcolony. In other words, possibilities for local domination and resource
exploitation in Barotseland account in part for the nationalist outlook of both local elites and separatists—which validates the argument about breaking out in order to break in.

5.1.2 Barotseland Question in the MMD’s Era

Having discussed the Barotseland question during the one-party state rule, effort is now devoted on analyzing how it re-emerged during the Movement for Multi-party Democracy’s (MMD) democratic dispensation of the early 1990s, and how this regime handled it. By building on the findings presented earlier, the analysis further demonstrates the extent to which Barotseland’s separatist movement is simply a political possibility, which, though seemingly realistic, is potentially far-fetched. This view is premised not only on MMD’s strong opposition to the demands for the restoration of the agreement but also the unproductive tendencies of ‘resistance and withdrawal’ exhibited by the BRE during this era.

From being almost obliterated by UNIP, the advent of democratization under the MMD government (which ended UNIP’s one-party state rule) generated renewed impetus that resuscitated the demands for the restoration of the Barotseland agreement (Mainga Bull, 1996). The resentment and agitation over government reforms concerning the abrogation of the BLA64 were, however, not altogether new. Expectedly, Barotseland’s phantasm for autonomy via the restoration of the agreement re-emerged at the dawn of the multiparty dispensation. However, these demands fell on deaf ears as President Chiluba’s MMD government refused to yield to the BRE’s petitions, despite being overwhelmingly voted into power in 1991 by the people of Barotseland. Instead, the state alarmingly threatened to crush the uprising that was brewing in Limulunga (Barotseland’s historical Capital) calling for the region’s secession (Times of Zambia, 1993). Even more imperious was the follow-up decision by the state to declare that Zambia was a unitary state and as such indivisible, adding that no part of Zambia would be allowed to break away. These political blunders aggravated the impasse and further created a sense of discontent in Barotseland.

Contrary to conforming to the democratic principles of tolerance and openness, the MMD government continued with the epileptic manner of handling the Barotseland question with even more potency by enacting the 1995 Lands Act. In principle, this Act curtailed the allocation of land by Chiefs, unless through Presidential approval. Although this Act escalated the tension between the BRE and the MMD government, in reality the Litunga has continued
to enjoy his authority over land in Barotseland (Roberts, 1996; Mainga Bull, 1996). Outraged by the state’s failure to consult, the BRE issued its strongest threat of separatism: that if government continued with its obstinate deceit, Barotseland would have no option but to revert to its original status before 1964 through self-determination.⁵⁴ (BRE Resolutions, 1995). This demand could not be entertained by the state which consequently created sharp political tension between the MMD and the BRE. But between 1994 and 1995, the BRE surprisingly denounced its deep-seated intentions to secede (while maintaining that the region had the right to do so if it wished), by publicly unlinking itself from the separatist agenda. In 1994, for example, the Litunga Lewanika Ilute Yeta authoritative stated that; “We are not seceding and we shall not secede from Zambia” (The Post Newspaper, 1994:3). Still, Lewanika could not hide his displeasure about Barotseland’s underdevelopment through what he termed as “perpetual enslavement” of the people of Barotseland. His remarks were correctly captured:

> “the government should be aware of our interpretation of the right to secede. In our humble view, secession is a matter of right and inherent in the Barotseland agreement of 1964, so that the parties to the said agreement reserve the right to revert to their original status if the agreement upon which they intended to achieve unity can no longer work” (The Post Newspaper April, Friday, 1994:3).

It also suffices to argue that the politics about the restoration of BLA64 has mainly been used as a tool for ‘political propaganda and manipulation’ often characterized by political skirmishes ranging from total lies to near truth. It is alleged, for example, that President Chiluba’s motorcade was once stoned during his Presidential visit to Western Province. Politically unspeakable as this occurrence may have been, it was nothing compared to the vengeful propaganda that government was planning to attack the Litunga; for which Barotseland fundamentalists alarmingly responded by assembling a “military force” to shield the Litunga; a highly offensive and reasonable act by government (Englebert, 2005). Even more alarming and certainly damaging to the bilateral relations between Zambia and bordering Angola was the propaganda that the Zambia police had confiscated rocket launchers and other weapons in Western Province, which were understood to have been supplied by UNITA rebels in exchange for food⁵⁵ (Marshall & Gurr Ted, 2003). Responding to the state’s suppressive stance, the BRE unanimously resolved during the Barotse National Conference (BNC) of November 1995 that the state must honour the BLA 64 by incorporating it into the Zambian constitution as has hitherto been the case with all other

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⁵⁴ Report on the Resolution s of the People of Barotseland from the “Special Meeting” held at Lealui from 3-4 November, 1995.
honourable agreements\textsuperscript{56} (BRE Resolution, 1995). The BRE’s displeasure about the standoff over the agreement was further exhibited in March, 1997 when a petition was sent to The Secretary General of the Commonwealth Secretariat to intervene, although a remedy to the impasse remained largely futile. Thus far, this explosive impasse over the abrogation of the BLA64 can only be said to be one which was characterised by confrontation on the one hand, and a sense of ‘unrelenting dejection’ on the part of BRE and ‘tactical deceit’ by the MMD government on the other.

When Levy Patrick Mwanawasa took over the republican presidency in 2001, he attempted to mend broken relations between the state and the BRE. Old problems, indeed, never die, and likewise, the Barotseland question re-emerged later during the constitutional review process of 2003 (Mainga Bull, 1996). The argument as to why the pro-separatist semblance dwindled during Mwanawasa’s presidency is chiefly premised on the “cultural linkage” between the Lozi and Mwanawasa’s Lenje than of Chiluba’s distant Bemba ethnic group in the Northern part of Zambia (Englebert, 2005:37). Consequently, the BRE peacefully and fully participated in the national constitution review process by submitted that the BLA1964 and the legal status of Barotseland be restored. This gesture did not imply that the BRE had explicitly abandoned its demands concerning the restoration of the agreement. Yet, quite frankly, the people of Barotseland have been able to live without their wish for sovereignty realized. Sadly, the untimely death of Levy Mwanawasa in 2008 marked the demise of the increasingly unpopular MMD government. Nothing significant though is memorable under Mwanawasa’s predecessor President Rupia Banda, except the constituting of the National Constitutional Conference (NCC) which ruled against revisiting the BLA64 as well as Barotseland’s legal status—a move which triggered vigorous dissent by separatist groups in Western Province (Lusaka Times, 2010).

In terms of reframing the Barotseland question therefore, the MMD’s acts of repression deepened the impasse while threats of treason charges instilled immense fear among Barotseland activities which contributed in shaping the relatively peaceful nature of the Barotseland conflict. Intriguing, though, is the BRE’s back-pedaling which confirms Englerbert’s (2005 & 2009) claims about the extent to which Barotseland elites are entrapped in the calculus of compliance to the state. Indeed, the non-violent separatist rhetoric

\textsuperscript{56} As the author, I choose to highlight only the BRE’s position on the BLA 64, but in essence, the BRE’s Resolutions of November, 1995 also included other important matters such as the new constitution.
(propaganda) and more so the authoritative withdrawal of the separatist bid by the Litunga in 1994, underline the continuation of the BRE’s local hegemony which correspondingly underpins the reproduction of the Zambian state. Over and above, this local hegemony alongside Barotseland’s complex national logic and in-group domination weaken the region’s separatist movement, besides the “sovereign loyalty” (Englebert, 2009:109) of the Litunga and the BRE, which arguably impedes Barotseland’s exit. Thus far, the analysis presented here validates the expression of the metaphor of breaking out in order to break into the state.

5.1.3 Renewed Activism under the Patriotic Front Regime

Having analysed the Barotseland question during the democratic transition period, the discussion now focuses on the trajectories regarding the manifestations of the Barotseland question. The analysis begins by highlighting major events which have been impacting on the Barotseland question before engaging in a critical discussion of how these events relate to the findings and their implications in transforming the problem. At face value, it would seem that the people of Barotseland and more particularly the BRE had become resigned to the fact that their demands for the restoration of the BLA64 were unattainable. Yet, contrary to Barotseland’s complex national logic, the region’s sovereign logic of in-group domination coupled with the state’s continued dogma of neglect and repression, though without substantial challenge, the Barotseland question surprisingly re-emerged during the run-up to the general tripartite elections of 2011. Note, however, that the driving force behind the renewed activism about the demands for the restoration of the agreement during the 2011 tripartite elections was the apparent refusal by the NCC to accommodate the submissions by the BRE; to recognise Barotseland’s special status in accordance with the provisions of the agreement which was terminated by UNIP (The Post Newspaper, 2012).

The problem with many weak African states, as some Western scholars argue, is the “undemocratic tendencies exhibited by leaders which often become the very apparatus through which they themselves end up as political casualties of the system they embraced while in power” (Clapham, 2000:3). Indeed, the violent manner in which government cracked down on the renewed activism toward the 2011 period heavily cost Rupia Banda’s re-election after succumbing to a narrow electoral defeat and is now being charged with corruption allegations. Interestingly, his rival, Micheal Sata, (current President) the leader of the Patriotic Front (PF), capitalised on the renewed activism by supporting Barotseland separatist groups
such as the Linyungandambo and others. For instance, during a campaign rally in Mongu (the Provincial Headquarters of Western Province); Michael Sata publicly promised; “We shall implement the Barotseland Agreement of 1964 within 90 days, if voted in office”.\textsuperscript{57} It is questionable at this point whether this was indeed a sincere pledge or mere electoral propaganda. In fact, critics perceived Sata’s utterances as merely a desperate strategy to gain political mileage and hence, win votes from Barotseland, which turned out to be true. Appreciably, this tapered down the animosity between the state and BRE, thereby dwindling the intensity of the Barotseland question albeit temporarily.

The state attempted to keep the electoral pledge to the people of Barotseland by officially publicising the 1964 agreement, even though it had already been widely circulated unofficially. The state further pardoned all Barotseland activities who were detained by the police for their ‘unlawful’ demonstrations over the restoration of the agreement before finally setting up a Commission of Inquiry into Mongu riots which left two people dead (Post Newspaper, 2012). Amid overwhelming submissions which were inclined towards Barotseland’s self-determination, the reality which the BRE and separatist groups still live with today is not only the state’s failure to restore the agreement but also the President’s refusal to respect the commission’s conflict-ridden recommendations as he was captured having said; “I will be reluctant to recommend to Cabinet the restoration of the Barotseland Agreement of 1964”\textsuperscript{58} (Lusaka Times, Feb 23, 2012). Even more remarkable was the President’s unsympathetic remarks in Mongu later in 2013 that; “the people of Western province cannot eat the Barotseland agreement, but need development” (Lusaka Times, 20 April, 2013). Nonetheless, it is naïve to suggest that Barotseland’s development imperatives outweigh the region’s undying quest for statehood. In fact, one can argue that lack of development of a peripheral region is not in itself the sole defining factor which fuels separatist conflicts. On the other hand, neither does development serve as a guarantee that distinct or somewhat heterogeneous ethnic groups in a marginalised region will infinitely endure national integration. In reality, Barotseland’s peripheral outlook resembles what Jean-Francois (2009:70-74) coined as “conservative modernism” such that well-positioned lozi ethnic elites utilise strategies of regional domination, which create room for the perpetuation

\textsuperscript{57} See youtube video as evidence of the promise made: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tHjrGtF9P14

\textsuperscript{58} http://www.lusakatimes.com/2012/02/23/reluctant-recommend-cabinet-restoration-barotseland-agreement-1964-president-sata/
of policies of neglect and marginalisation by the central government at the capital city, Lusaka.

Unsurprisingly, secessionists groups in Barotseland perceive this lackluster attitude by the state as an act of bad faith and deceit to the people of Barotseland. A joint interview with the leader of the Linyungandambo and the Movement for the Restoration of the Barotseland Agreement (MOREBA) revealed the extent to which separatists groups are at odds with what they see as the state’s manipulative approach:

“When Micheal Sata was seeking for votes, he came here in Barotseland and said many nice things including the restoration of the Barotseland agreement. Because of that, we supported him but now that he has tasted how sweet power is, he has decided to turn against the people of Barotseland. People of Barotseland were clearly hoodwinked by the head of the state because he has now failed to honour his own campaign promises to the people of [this] nation”.

Sentiments such as these highlight the state’s lack of credibility to decisively resolve the Barotseland question. In terms of the continuity of the impasse therefore, this situation triggered forceful dissent which has transformed the Barotseland question from sheer rhetoric about the restoration of the BLA64 to outright separatist upheavals. In no time, the Barotse National Council (BNC) unanimously declared at Limulunga (on the 27th March, 2012); “Barotseland is now free to pursue its own self-determination and destiny” (The Post Newspaper, 2012). Indeed, the Linyungandambo and other secessionists agitating for Barotseland’s independence have created an cyber information portal which displays Barotseland’s ‘national symbols’ and government departments including the production of materials (see picture below) which the state could otherwise consider to be offensive.

However, except perhaps for the imaginary or cyber characterisation of Barotseland’s nationhood, nothing meaningful shows that Barotseland will secure their political independence from Zambia. To be sure, the Barotseland continues to endure its position of neglect and marginality. Why is this so? One respondent mockingly stated:

“We all witnessed the BNC’s declaration of Barotseland’s independence from Zambia. As I understand, they have been writing letters to the UN, EU, OAU and SADC in order to be recognized as a sovereign state. Have they received the answer they need? Do they have a parliament now? Do they have their own currency? The answer to these questions is No. And how come these so called secessionists are now quite still? Personally, I am not surprised why their hullabaloo has suddenly evaporated. It’s all due to ethnic disunity and deceit”.

59 A statement extracted from an interview conversation with one of my respondent in Mongu (Western Province) in October, 2012
60 I owe this information from an interview (conducted in October, 2012) in Kaoma in Western Province.
These views above do not, nonetheless, imply that the Barotseland question has been completely erased from Zambia’s political landscape. For one thing, if Barotseland elites and their King remain passive and dispossessed (as they currently are) and continue albeit unchallenged to maintain their local hegemony, the BNC’s 2012 idealistic resolution will remain elusive. But it remains difficult to understand that Barotseland elites seem to have forged a long-lasting sense of national identity; amid their domination of ordinary Lozis alongside continued exploitation of resources associated with Zambia’s sovereignty. Hence, it can be argued that the relatively peaceful nature of the Barotseland question is equally influenced by such tendencies, which in this context denotes Barotseland’s in-group domination and complex national logic. Whether or not Barotseland elites and the BRE in particular can effectively counter the ambiguous state of affairs, or indeed, disentangle themselves from this calculus in order to meaningfully pursue a separatist agenda, will have an impact on the nature and direction of this impasse. However, this is subject to question. Puzzling as it may be, it is rational from the perspective of the current government to sidestep from ‘paying back’ the people of Barotseland for their electoral support by restoring the
agreement. Doing so suggests reconstructing Barotseland’s political existence which apparently was transfixed into Zambia by Barotseland’s free willingness. But still, the PF government’s ‘manipulative failure’ to restore the agreement simply underlines the unavoidable reality that the Barotseland problem will continue re-emerging even though it is relatively peaceful at the moment.

**What therefore, can we concretely say about how the Barotseland question has transformed over years and what factors accounts for that?** Generally, there has been political undercurrents largely shaped by Zambia’s dynamic political context. Of particular interest is the political transition from one party state to multi-party democracy which inarguably had a great impact in shaping the Barotseland question. This fact was well captured by a former Minister of Legal Affairs in Chiluba’s regime, who pointed out that;

> “Kaunda kept the Barotseland agreement as a top state secret, then came President Chiluba criminalised it as treason, but then this country’s democracy is gradually maturing which is why the Barotseland agreement has now been publicized for all interested parties to democratically debate about it.”

Perhaps, this explains why at regional level, Barotseland has witnessed internal dynamics particularly with regard to the outbirth of new actors such as the Linyungandamboa, MOREBA, Barotse Freedom Movement (BFM). There is obviously no question about the instrumental role new actors have had in terms of vigorously reinforced Barotseland’s aspiration for independence. There is equally no doubt about those who appear to have been at loggerheads with established traditional authority, such as the Nkoya and the Mbunda speaking people, which is counterproductive to Barotseland’s separatist movement. Needless to say that dynamics in Zambia’s political landscape have widened political space thereby allowing the multiplicity of separatist groups to actively engage with the state. However, there is no guarantee that these separatist groups possess mutual and collective interest be it politically or ideologically. In reverse, the position of the state on the Barotseland question remains unaltered. On face value, the PF government may have de-criminalized public discussions of the Barotseland agreement but in reality the Barotseland question remains pretty much what it has always been. The reason is simply because it is politically managed through the government’s arbitrary and excessive exercise of state authority.

Achile Mbembe (2001) highlighted on the arbitrariness and intrinsic unconditionality of the uncontrolled usage of state of authority, which stands out as the distinctive feature of upon

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61 This information is credited to one of my key informants (Former Minister of Legal Affairs in Chiluba’s government), whom I personally interviewed in Lusaka, the Capital of Zambia, in October, 2012
which the continuity of Africa’s postcolonial sovereignty rests. Mbembe argued that “postcolonial state forms have inherited this unconditionality and the regime of impunity that its colollary”\textsuperscript{62}. This continuity, I argue is based on the domestication of international sovereignty, which in the context of the Barotseland question provides not only for the extension of Zambia’s postcolonial sovereignty but also for the absolutism of the state. seen from this perspective, the preservation of the the status quo serves the interest of the state and of course, those of a few privileged Barotse traditional elites—which invariably makes the impasse unending story.

5.2 The Discussion

By drawing from the domestic dimensions of international sovereignty as well as research findings, this section further illuminates the discursive narratives about the Barotseland question. The idea here is to critically engage with these narratives within the context of the discourses and counter-discourses upon which the Barotseland question has been framed over the years. The ultimate goal is to arrive at some conclusions which offer both academic and policy implications for the conflict. According to the objective of the study, questions as to why and how the Barotseland question keeps on re-emerging in Zambia have already been addressed. Still, other questions which are relevant to this study linger. These pertain to the following: Whose interest does this problem serve? What are the implications of resolving it or doing nothing about it? Does this problem threaten Zambia’s stability and sovereignty? How, if at all, does IR help us to understand the Barotseland separatist challenge to Zambia? As much as these questions appear to be simple, no one can be able to decipher concrete and straightforward answers because separatist conflicts are y nature complex and unpredictable. All the same, an attempt is hereby made to share some plausible insights on these questions based on the theory, literature review and research findings presented.

5.2.1 Whose Interest does the Barotseland Problem Serve?

One way to answer the question posed here is to look at Barotseland’s precolonial governance system. This calls for an analysis focused on interests of its traditional aristocracy, considering not only their historical prominence in Barotseland but also how the BRE is

\textsuperscript{62} Mbembe(2001:26) \textit{On the Postcolony}.
positioned in the modern state. The argument is that the continuation of the BRE’s local hegemony depends on the reproduction of the Zambian state, inarguably at the expense of the social and economic development of Barotseland. Zambia may be characterised as a weak state, but its endurance benefits Barotseland’s traditional elites since it preventing the rise of local institutional alternatives while at the same time aiding the Litunga’s control over his own people and local resources (Englebert, 2004). Understandably, this sanctions the BRE to operate as the Litunga’s individual business since recognizing the BRE entails according it with the sovereign immunity it requires to suppress local opposition or emerging separatists. A Mongu businessman is known to have said, "the government has neglected us. We have no roads, no development, no projects. But the BRE is not doing a good job either. There is much corruption in the BRE. They are only interested in their own welfare."63

It is imperative to add that by rematerializing, the Barotseland question strengthens the already privileged regional elites. But what distinguishes these elites from the BRE largely depends on their status as outsiders and also their personal motives to be inside and more broadly, to penetrate the state patronage system. Of particular interest, though, is the Litunga himself, who by virtue of being the King of Barotseland enjoys almost unlimited access to local material benefits. In any case, Barotseland still has a King, the Litunga, a tradition which is expected to be preserved in many years to come (Marshall & Gurr Ted, 2003). Further, it is an open secret that the Litunga receives a salary from the state, which also applies to other “paramount chiefs.” Still, the Litunga happens to have heavily invested in several business ventures ironically outside Barotseland through the state machinery, such as the exploitation of timber and the lease of national game parks (Englebert, 2004). These material benefits are critical given the limited source of sources of income for Barotseland as a province, except for levies from few markets and homages from the surrounding communities. In Englebert’s (2004) words, “the relative wealth of the Litunga, even in comparison to his unpaid indunas, cannot fail to surprise the visitor to Limulunga. “This is a poor kingdom, but a with rich king” (p: 24). To the extent that secession poses a threat to their enjoyment of such benefits, it is hard to conceive how determined regional elites can meaningfully support that. These manifestations, relates to Francois Bayert’s (2009) notion of conservative modernization in Africa, in which traditional elites expend benefits associated with postcolonial state sovereignty to consolidate their hegemonic interests and ‘monopolistic’ access to local

resources. Thus far, the Barotseland question fosters the reproduction of the state and its repressive policies on Barotseland—which invariably precludes the region’s exit.

Although fully aggrieved by the government’s failure to restore the 1964 Barotseland agreement, it is rational to argue that leading Barotseland elites refrain from challenging the state on the Barotseland issue because doing so is materially in their own interest. For example, by exercising authority over land, the Litunga and his allies benefit from local control of local resources associated with Zambia’s state sovereignty. Consequently, the state endures but only to the detriment of Barotseland’s quest for sovereignty. A senior advisor to the Barotse National Council (BNC) stated;

“There are many well-placed Barotseland nationalists—some in top government positions with others in the opposition—who otherwise should be advocating this agenda to free Barotseland. But most are constrained by the necessity to protect their interests while few simply fear being victimised”\(^\text{64}\).

Consider this alongside the following response from one of the notable Lozi politicians who apparently declined to be interviewed based on the fact that he was a “national leader not a lozi nationalist”; “I am sorry I cannot answer your research questions because I am an opposition ‘national leader’ and as such, I don’t want to be seen taking sides on this very divisive issue”.\(^\text{65}\) Clearly, these sentiments are a full manifestation of the clientelistic relations between Barotseland elites and the state. Such political ties undoubtedly preserve interests of the few (notably, the Litunga and other political elites within or outside the BRE) which breeds inequalities among the majority Lozis amid the perpetuating of the Barotseland question. Then again, government’s reluctance in addressing the Barotseland question equally shows the extent of the state’s vested interest in the impasse. After all, it is the Zambian government which abrogated the agreement in order to promote the ‘national unity’ project, for which resolving the impasse would simply be its undoing. If this problem remains unresolved, then it would mean that the interests of those kept outside the state-patronage ties (i.e., separatist groups advocating for Barotseland’s independence as well as the majority of poor Lozis) remain unserved. Therefore, this can only be seen as a potential risk that by any means would keep on refueling the conflicts, arguably for many years ahead of us.

\(^{64}\) Interview with one top ranking official/member of the Barotse National Council (BNC) held in Lusaka, October, 2012.

\(^{65}\) I personally obtained this response through a telephone conversation with Mr. Charles L. Milupi in September, 2012. Mr. Milupi currently serves as an a national opposition leader for Alliance for Democracy and Development (ADD) and once served as Member of Parliament.
5.2.2 Doing Nothing vs Resolving the Impasse

What if nothing continues to be done about the problem? This is a critical question with serious implications not only for separatist groups but also for political elites within Barotseland and the state who are in favour of maintaining the status quo. By any means, ending the problem would be costly, and the outcomes uncertain, yet doing nothing about it is predictable. By doing nothing about the Barotseland problem, separatist groups face two critical alternatives which as indicated in the preamble do not necessarily resolve the problem. Thus, the choice to remain in Zambia in a state of dependency and marginalization chiefly as agents of the states or exploring the world of non-sovereignty, depends on whether or not Barotseland’s unrecognized self-rule declaration compensates for the potential rewards associated with complete or partial control of regional institutions within Zambia. The decision about doing something about the Barotseland problem equally brings into perspective regional imperatives for altering the structures of regional state institutions which clearly are dysfunctional and predatory as they have failed to deliver balanced development in the province. But then the BRE does not act like a real substitute ready to fill up the institutional vacuum simply because it is traditional and institutionally an agent of the postcolonial state. That the BRE embraces the instruments of detriment makes it hard to figure out how something can be done about the impasse.

Besides, the implications for resolving the conflict are more costly for the isolated secessionists, since they are economically and politically excluded from the clientelism and patronage ‘networks’ through which they would otherwise benefit from the national resources. Socially conditioned, such networks may not necessarily be identical to client-patron ties as such, although they are socially founded upon the inequality which they themselves produce (Jean Francois Bayert, 2009:228). On the contrary, the state’s postcolonial politics of client-patron relations may be the consequence upon which Barotseland’s political elites associated with the state emerged. Consequently, there is no contradiction with regards to the interpretation of the implications faced by the separatist groups including the majority poor ordinary Lozis if nothing is done about the Barotseland question.

Suppose it gets resolved? This question invokes the inevitable necessity for ‘national unity’ prior and after Zambia’s political independence in 1964. In fact, it can be argued that the desperation to unite the nation was the fundamental reason why the legal provisions contained
in the Barotseland Agreement were unilaterally terminated by the UNIP government. That the Barotseland Agreement is now in the public domain gives an impression that the ongoing impasse around it may somehow, someday be settled. After all, Barotseland once existed as a self-governing territory long before the invention of Northern Rhodesia by the British (Caplan, 1970). Considering, nonetheless, the state’s foot-dragging attitude on this matter, it is predictable that the impasse would remain unresolved for the foreseeable future; although this does not necessarily suggest that a peaceful and amicable solution is inconceivable, only that there are implications.

Unfounded suspicions abound that entertaining Barotseland’s separatist demands threatens the nation’s ideological aspirations which constitute the state’s troubled nationalist project (One Zambia, One Nation); which successive regimes have steadfastly upheld. There are also acute implications for which any discussion about secession of any territory of the state is not only seen as something that can endanger the country’s peace and security but also treasonous. Surprisingly, some politicians have exploited the Barotseland question for their own electoral advantage, though no sitting President has genuinely shown full commitment to resolve the problem let alone accept Barotseland’s demand to secede. The refusal by President Sata\textsuperscript{66} to act upon the recommendations of the Commission of Inquiry he himself set up (to investigate and find the solution on the Barotseland issue) is a case in point. Understandably, any political maneuvering to accede to Barotseland’s separatist demands implicitly entails disrupting of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the state which politically can be a costly mistake, although a democratically acceptable decision. Thus, the Barotseland problem has increasingly become a ‘strategic political card’, such that depending on how any politician plays it, can either win or lose electoral support if not altogether stir ethnic hatred, without essentially resolving the impasse.\textsuperscript{67} As a matter of fact, Michael Sata rode to the Presidency by capitalising on the Barotseland problem. However, his electoral fortunes in Barotseland seem to have drastically dwindled due to the ‘tactical failure’ of not honouring the manipulative campaign promise of restoring the 1964 agreement.

\textsuperscript{66} http://www.lusakatimes.com/2012/02/23/reluctant-recommend-cabinet-restoration-barotseland-agreement-1964-president-sata/

\textsuperscript{67} The author’s emphasis based on the detailed examination/analysis of the Barotseland question in chapter 3, 4 and 5
The BRE has, over decades, consistently insisted on having the Barotseland Agreement restored (Caplan, 1970). Undoubtedly, the BRE face the dilemma associated with the necessity for the region’s autonomy and more chiefly the costly implications that squarely fall on them by virtue of losing the benefits linked to Zambia’s sovereignty; if supposedly the impasse is settled or worse still Barotseland is set free. How can separatist groups succeed to dis-member Barotseland when the leadership is so determined to further entrench its local hegemonic influence? Yet, given Barotseland’s current outlook of minimal opportunities for income generation, resolving the Barotseland question could allow them to salvage its legal control over local resources. The problem is that any maneuvering to settle the impasse threatens the BRE and other political elites who, if anything, would be comfortable to defend their status of local domination by doing nothing about it. And at any given calculation, the continued preservation of the BRE’s homegrown supremacy pretty much reproduces the Zambian state which, ironically, the BRE locally subsidises (Englebert, 2009), which inaptnly impedes any prospect of resolving the impasse. No wonder there has been “no encouragement for investment” even by successful Lozis because, according to Sikota Wina, “that could weaken the power of the Litunga”.68 Clearly, the Barotseland question is a ‘political necessity’ since by doing nothing about it, this instrumentalises the sovereign legal command for the BRE’s access to local resources–implicitly uniting regional elites in the embrace of the state, thereby shattering possibilities for resolving the conflict.

5.2.3 Barotseland Question–A Substitute Value of Legal Command?

Does the Barotseland question really threaten the sovereignty of Zambia? As already indicated, the future outcome of this problem is uncertain. However, one can argue (based on the analysis provided) that the Barotseland problem does not seriously threaten the stability and sovereignty of the Zambian state because of the manner in which it manifests–thus more of ‘an exchange value of legal command’ rather than being a crucial separatist conflict as some people see it.69 In retrospect, the Barotseland question remains a puzzle because of the nature of its ongoingness which is fueled, among other things, by the region’s sovereign logic of in-group domination alongside the complex national logic all of which collaborates in

68 Ibid, p.107
69 By “value of legal command”, I am referring to the institutional benefits associated with state sovereignty conferred on regional elites by national leaders holding the legitimate power arising from the domestication of international sovereignty.
shaping its relatively peaceful and unending nature. How, then, does IR help us to comprehend the Barotseland problem which have been characterized as a mere exchange value of legal command?

What is interesting to note, given the theoretical discussion about the Barotseland problem, is the manner in which international sovereignty (a key concept in IR) is domesticated, essentially as “the gold standard that underwrites the substitution of state institutions in the market for domination and resource extraction” (Englebert, 2009:80). Obviously, the Zambian state’s institutional failure and fiscal deficiencies are apparent, which arguably weakens the extension of neopatrimonial politics and more so the state’s assimilation of Barotseland elites. However, that is just how far the weakness of the state can go, because ultimately the sovereignty of the Zambian state maintains the command value of the state patrons and seemingly undermines the rational behavior of Barotseland’s political elites. According to some scholars, this situation allows national leaders holding legitimate authority to perpetuate the instrumentalisation of their clients’ access to the state through exchanging their legal command with domination and resources exploitation (Krasner; 2001; Englebert & Hummel, 2005). In simple terms, by supplying the BRE with an ‘enduring’ value of legal command over regional institutions, the Zambian state (by virtue of being internationally recognised) equally sanctions their exchange value, notwithstanding the malfunctioning nature and fiscal inadequacies associated with them. Simply put, the resiliency of the Barotseland question underlines the state’s institutional allure, so to speak. It is this allure or appeal which aided UNIP and subsequent regimes to tactfully get along with the BRE and other regional elites in safeguarding the state. Meanwhile, it has set up the rivalry between them as well as against Barotseland separatist groups in the race for the state’s reproduction, gradually fading out Barotseland’s phantasma for political independence.

If we revisit the question of whether or not the Barotseland problem threatens Zambia’s sovereignty, it would be clear from the preceding discussion that the answer would be negative. With hindsight, the idea of ‘negative sovereignty’ characterising separatist war-prone states in Africa may be seen as a transitional stage in the process of statecraft in an increasingly globalised world (Clapham, 2000). It is nonetheless understandable that negative sovereignty regimes protect their political leverage of the postcolony through such practices as neopatrimonial appropriation of resources. By virtue of being holders of state power at the

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70 Author’s remarks based on the discussion provided in the findings and analysis chapters.
periphery, the BRE secures sovereign prebends (revenue) of domination through collections of taxes from marketplaces including amassing of benefits from the logging and sale of timber and often without due authority leasing out contracts for the management of game parks in the region. This explains why the BRE has generally been more inclined to greater autonomy rather than outright secession of the province, ideally through the restoration of the Barotseland Agreement. Devoid of sovereignty, weak state institutions would typically be without the command value (and therefore, inconsequential with regards to individual power and appropriation) which would easily lend institutional competitiveness (Englebert, 2009). Nonetheless, this idealistic view is seemingly out of touch with the realism of separatism in Africa. Contrary to being threatened, Zambia’s juridical sovereignty shields the state from breaking up since the very institution (the BRE) expected to liberate the Barotseland is conferred with legal command, and this effectively negates the independence of the Kingdom. In the end, Zambia remains Zambia despite the fact that the Barotseland question remains basically unfinished business.

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Information obtained through an interview with Sikota Wina, in Lusaka, in October, 2012.
Chapter 6: Conclusions

This investigation was about the Barotseland question; rather a separatist challenge underlined by the historical claims to a separate colonial existence from Zambia to which Barotseland as a province is now deemed to belong. And to a greater extent, Barotseland’s separatist movement invokes the international norms of state sovereignty not only in the favour of separatist groups but also for the international recognition of the region at large. Interestingly, both the United Nations and the African Union enshrined the principle of state sovereignty, which explicitly stipulates that colonies have a right to sovereign independence within their intangible colonial boundaries.\(^\text{72}\) In our modern international system, separatism (interchangeabably used as self–determination) is best understood as a procedural right; which suggests that the people of Barotseland have a right to see their claims for statehood taken into account each time their futures are under consideration. Nonetheless, “that in itself may not amount to a right to secede or even a right to autonomy or certainly self-government although it does amount to the right to be taken seriously” (Williams, 2011:98).

Given the above, this study set out to examine the Barotseland question by analysing why and how it has become such an unending (yet relatively peaceful) story that has characterised Zambia’s political discourse. This meant analysing factors which have influenced the continuity of the Barotseland question; whose genesis was the premature termination of the 1964 Agreement (between Barotseland and Northern Rhodesia) and whose outbirth was an independent unitary state called Zambia. Over decades, Barotse nationals have expressed their sense of displeasure by demanding the restoration of those legal provisions which gave the Kingdom of Barotseland a special status in Zambia. In spite of recent calls for outright secession largely championed by separatist groups outside the BRE’s structures, Barotseland’s leadership have historically been ambivalent to the idea of seceding. That the state remains reluctant to resolve the impasse shows why the Barotseland question has become such an unending story. From the forgoing, this study sought to answer the following key research question:

- Why has the Barotseland question kept on re-emerging in the Zambian political landscape and, how has the impasse been changing over the years?

The point of departure was chapter two, where the historical narratives about the Barotseland question were presented. It follows, therefore, that the indisputable legal basis for the establishment of the modern Republic of Zambia as a unitary state was the Barotseland Agreement 1964 (BLA64), which by all means was a bonafide international treaty between Barotseland and Northern Rhodesia, witnessed by British colonialists. By implication, the BLA64 endorsed the continued autonomous status of the Barotseland Kingdom as a precondition for its amalgamation into Zambia. Unambiguously, the BLA64 provided for the transfixion of Barotseland into the newly independent sovereign state, granted the basic legal fundamentals of Barotseland’s nationhood—including the recognition of the King of Barotseland and his National Council, as the legitimate local authority for the government and administration of Barotseland—would continue to be possessed and exercised (Caplan, 1968). More recently, the National Council convened and accepted the state’s abrogation of the BLA64, with the logical outcome that Barotseland has reclaimed its independence since the agreement through which it freely constructed a union with Zambia which was broken—arguably with nothing left to salvage. However, the Barotseland question remains a contentious and persistent problem that has troubled successive Zambian governments after UNIP. In retrospect, the Barotseland problem emerged out of the authoritarian misrule and neglect of Barotseland by the state—but the involvement of Barotseland political elites into the reproduction of the Zambian state rather than the creation of a Barotse nation, ironically, negates the Kingdom’s phantasma for sovereignty and international recognition. In retrospect, this study has shown that the precolonial self decay of Barotseland and its enclosure into Zambia was motivated by vital necessity from the Litunga’s exploits in the run up to Zambia’s independence.

Theoretically, the Barotseland question has been framed around IR’s puzzling notion of state sovereignty presented in chapter two. Understandably, Barotseland’s separatist movement challenges Zambia’s juridical statehood, which brings into perspective the problematic nature of state sovereignty as applied in our contemporary international system of which Zambia is a part. Thus, problems such as separatism which impinge on sovereignty create states’ concessions that are every so often inherently contradictory or hard to reconcile, as in the expression “organised hypocrisy” (Krasner, 2009:211). This entails hypocrisy at the international level in terms of state power asymmetries vis-à-vis the responsiveness to the domestication of international norms of sovereignty; something which is often incompatible with international practice. This study has therefore uncovered why there are misconceptions
about the significance of Barotseland’s historical claims for statehood by Barotse separatist groups who are pursuing self-determination objectives in order to secure Barotseland’s sovereignty. Needless to say that Zambia is a weak state; doing nothing about the Barotseland question seems rationally sensible for the state even though it has failed to effectively address regional grievances. But having situated the Barotseland question within the domestic context of international sovereignty, this study has demonstrated how hard it is to understand why Barotseland’s regional elites who are marginalized fail to strongly challenge the state in order to liberate Barotseland. Diverse explanations have been discussed in this study, one of which hinges on the extent to which Zambia’s international sovereignty has been domesticated as a resource via legal command, which has significantly shaped Barotseland’s contradictory discrepancies of defiance and compliance to the state. Indeed, the Barotseland Royal Establishment (BRE) is often perceived as a separatist regional organ, although it has never resorted to violence in the pursuit of its ‘separatist agenda’ and neither has it at any given time attempted to establish effective territorial control.

The fundamental issue about the Barotseland question is the region’s citizenry, whose integration into Zambia is subsumed more or less by their allegiance to Barotseland’s customarily defined authority as exercised by the Litunga and his close allies within the BRE. However, the literature reviewed uncovered what appears to be a paradoxically negative relationship between the local strength of traditional systems and the likelihood that they will challenge the state, regardless of how successful the BRE has been at facilitating the assimilation of Barotse nationals into Zambia. Notwithstanding the significance of Barotseland’s peripheral position of marginality, this study has further highlighted the atypical undercurrents with the critical aspect being the eventual compliance with national integration which apparently contrasts with expectations based on Barotseland’s cultural peculiarities and grievances. Even more interesting, as this study has demonstrated, is the extent to which Barotseland endures the marginality of the neopatrimonial and client-patron system of power and predation. Thus, Barotseland suffers from the fiscal bankruptcy and failure of the state institutions. But what makes Barotseland continue to comply with the state illustrates the pervasive appeal of juridical or weak sovereign statehood—which conveys the metaphor of “breaking out in order to break into the state”, and which is beyond the fusion of regional elites, in which Barotseland separatist groups are arguably excluded from partaking. Thus, groups such as the Linyungandambo, MOREBA and others have limited alternatives and arguably stand little chance of acquiring Barotseland’s recognition. Were they truly to
have an independent state, it would happen only if they could claim post-colonial status for the region, which has been relentlessly tried but in futility. This claim hinges on Herbst’s (2002), argument that in Africa the dogma of recognition influences the limits upon which sovereignty can be gained either in compliance or defiance to post-colonial national integration projects.

6.1 Key Research Message

The Barotseland question can simply be characterised as a tornado that has rocked Zambia’s political landscape over decades, and interestingly continues to rematerialise. Furthermore, Barotseland’s separatist movement appear to be undermining Zambia’s territorial integrity and established statehood. However, to claim that this problem constitutes a serious threat to the nation’s sovereignty seems almost perverse. If we consider as well Lozi people’s customary inclination, coupled with self-awareness of their traditional elites, we could notice that separatist sentiments will continue to sporadically manifest as a challenge to national unity, although it is debatably impossible to envision Barotseland as a sovereign state unattached from Zambia. In fact, this study has revealed Barotseland’s contradictory national logic and in-group domination whereby the region’s traditional elites form an alliance with state leaders thereby creating a regionally dominant social class that controls local resources. Therefore, tactics of local domination being exercised by the BRE by and large undermine Barotseland’s demands for separatism.

Even more puzzling, as the analysis and discussion show, is the extent to which the PF regime continues to perpetuate Barotseland’s marginality alongside the traditional authority’s continued exploitation of sovereign prerogatives of legal command for their own benefits, at the expense of the majority of poor Lozis situated outside the state patronage arrangements. Clearly, it may not be good enough for people of Barotseland to stay but it is certainly not bad enough either for them to separate. And so, contrary to pursuing a meaningful bid for self-determination, Barotseland’s separatist movement seems to be caught up in a vicious circle of ‘selfless-determination’. These paradoxical circumstances shape the Barotseland question into being an unending episode or rather unfinished business; which is pretty much the case for the emerging discourse of sovereignty in the making. While the consequences of resolving it are uncertain and certainly costly, doing nothing about it seems predictable. Thus
far, recent minimalist calls for Barotseland’s separation are an apparent dream which is so near yet so far away.

6.2 Academic Implications

Africa’s wholesome ‘exceptionalism’ vis-à-vis the institutional weakness of its states appears to be over-stated, even though the continent’s susceptibility to separatist conflicts is high among its so diverse nation states. For instance, Barotseland and Casamance’s separatist movements differ in the extent to which they have developed separatist struggles, and also the degree to which their political elites belong to well structured power establishments. However, very few would counter the argument that the capacity of state institutions to exercise (often irrational) power and make protractive mandates, and their supremacy to administer them, often go unquestionable, virtually at all levels of the governance system. Yet, it is also imperative to reevaluate the practice of IR’s international norms of sovereignty particularly, with regards to state (re) construction across Africa. This also applies to the reconsideration of the continent’s ambiguous stabilisation effects emanating from relatively widespread separatist conflicts, which have prevailed for several decades. By and large, it is from context that wider implications for research can be drawn from this study of the Barotseland question.

The study examined factors which account for the continuity of the Barotseland. It recognised Africa’s puzzling separatists deficit to which African states have avoided significant territorial reconfiguration since decolonization which took root in the 1960s. Lastly, this section revists the theoretical and empirical influences examined and proposes how the analysis of the Barotseland question, may consolidate on our grasp of the consequences of postcolonial sovereignty on the reproduction of states in Africa. Characteristically, the debate about the Barotseland question closely relates to IR’s emerging discourse of ‘sovereignty in the making’. On the other hand, the crafting of sovereignty by Barotse separatist groups rests on the Kingdom’s precolonial existence as an autonomous political entity which had its own political systems of governance. Further, arguments for Barotseland’s separatism have been framed around the constitutional processes which eroded the fundamental features of Barotseland’s special territorial status in Zambia. Theoretically, the debate about the Barotseland problem invokes international norms of sovereignty and recognition which define
the parameters of Zambia’s juridical statehood of which apparently Barotse separatist groups no longer wish to be a part. This explains why Barotseland’s phantasma for sovereignty is highly contested and convoluted, if not altogether elusive. Therefore, what empirical underpinnings by IR scholars account for the endurance of the Zambian state, and the continuation of the Barotseland question on the other?

Paradoxically, the Barotseland question, characterizes a negative correlation between the local forte of the region’s prehistoric governance systems and the political panorama for challenging the state, notwithstanding how industrious the BRE has been at assimilating with it (Caplan, 1968; Englebert, 2004). Young’s (2002) empirical clarifications about Africa’s separatist deficit underline the complexity and territorial distinctiveness of nationalist feelings, which in the case of the Barotseland problem emanate from the precolonial era, through the colonial period superseded by the postcolonial episode. This “common colonial subjugation” is due to lack of real hostility between regional nationalism and political ethnicity (Young, 2002). Thus, Barotseland’s emotive bonds of territorial nationalism are impermeable to adverse widespread awareness of the postcolony which creates a buffer against Zambia’s disintegrating arguably. Granted these are rich empirical insights but nonetheless, thorny questions remain. What illuminates the restrictive appeal of Barotseland’s traditional system which suppresses the majority poor lozis/separatists from breaking into the state to access state benefits? Given that Barotseland experienced mild colonial bondage, differently from the rest of the region in Zambia; how then did Barotseland’s separatist consciousness emerge?

Secondly, Jackson and Rosberg (1982) broadly dealt with this question “Why Africa’s Weak States Persist.” Examining the international system, they argued that the awarding of “juridical statehood” by the international community to former colonies sanctioned their reproduction amid their empirical limitation, as it froze African states in their inherited colonial jurisdictions and inhibited separatism73. Why Africa’s juridical nation states resist breaking-up is according them due to their international recognition, which evidently thwarts domestic upheavals. Overall, Jackson and Rosberg succeeded in examining how legal command fosters state weakness and failure but paid a blind eye as to the question of why regional grievances (such as those in Barotseland) never materialise into a meaningful force for addressing the status quo, let alone serving as the basis for institutional alternatives. The

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73 Revist the theoretical chapter, where Jackson & Rosberg (1982)’s argument has already been cited.
question therefore is; what it is about IR’s international norms of sovereignty hinders Barotseland’s regional elites from challenging the state?

Inside Barotseland, conflictual relations between different social groups manifest partly due to the state’s rigid structure of sovereignty locally expressed through legal command, which fosters the endurance of the state but at the expense of Barotseland’s statehood. Beneath Zambia’s domestic currency of international sovereignty often lie very different, complex and certainly diverse issues influencing the Barotseland question. Chiefly, what is the nature of the conflict and relationship between the BRE and ordinary lozis vis-à-vis Barotse separatists and the BRE and state leaders on the other hand? Beyond regional elites’ (particularly the Litunga) compliance which reproduces the Zambian states, what precisely constitutes the ‘shared vision’ for separatism between ordinary Lozis and Barotse separatists? In theory, the Litunga exercises authority over local resources such as land but in reality he lacks full legitimate control over Barotseland as a province of Zambia. Contrariwise, the Litunga does preside over Barotseland’s traditional matters, but the Kingdom badly seeks recognition on the international arena, since only that type of recognition has real significance.

Therefore, rather than being primarily immersed into empirical inquires of international nature such as terrorism and climate change, IR scholars must also go local in order to ensure a greater intellectual understanding of how contextual (localised) realities impact at the strategic level—thus the international system. The beast rustling in Barotseland of Zambia, is a good example of how localized (contextualised) separatist grumblings can cascade into wider narratives of separatist conflict at the national and ultimately at the international level. All in all, it remains to be seen whether or not Barotse separatists will be able to meaningfully pursue their separatist agenda and bring the matter to a conclusive end. Surely, a question such as this is beyond the scope of this study.
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Appendices

Appendix 1: Detailed Interview Guilde

1. **Introductory Questions (on the respondent/s):**
   - Full names
   - Work place,
   - Title/position in society

2. **Genesis of the Barotseland Question:**
   - Can you give me a brief background about how the Barotseland question emerged?
   - What would you say were the main reasons (grievances) for the emergence of the Barotseland question?
   - What precisely were the main areas of contention that may have triggered this problem?
   - Who were the key actors and how were they situated within and outside Barotseland? What in your view is relationship between the co-existence of major ethnic groups in Barotseland? How does that impact on the framing of the Barotseland impasse?

3. **Prevailing Dynamics of the Barotseland Question**
   - Why has the Barotseland question kept on re-emerging in Zambia's political discourse despite several attempts to resolve it?
   - What factors account for the continuity (and sometimes discontinuity) of the Barotseland impasse since (Emphasis here is also placed on the repeated calls for the restoration of the Barotseland Agreement of 1964)
   - How has the Barotseland question been changing over years, and what reasons accounts for such changes? (Reference here is two aspects: new actors who have emerged under different political context; how different administrative regimes have handled the problem and how Barotseland’s traditional elites have been responding)
- Why have Barotseland’s traditional elites failed to significantly challenge the Zambian state given the substantial grievances and Barotseland’s legitimate logic of statehood?
- Why has the government been reluctant to resolve the Barotseland question in a democratic manner?
- Whose interests does the Barotseland question serve? And what are the consequences of resolving it or doing nothing about it?
- Does the Barotseland problem really threaten Zambia’s territorial entry and sovereign? If yes how? If not why?

4 On Barotseland Separatist Movement

- Who are the leading separatist groups in Barotseland and how are they situated internally and outside the province? What is their main objective and political ideas? Where do they draw their support in their separatist agenda? Do they have established political structures within Barotseland?
- To what extent would you say they have the legitimacy to fight for the independence of Barotseland?
- To what extent are these separatists groups said to be mutually unified (or dis united) in terms of having a common and mutually inclusive agenda to liberate Barotseland from Zambia?
- What practical steps have they so far taken to demonstrate that they are meaningfully working towards securing Barotseland’s independence?
- What is their relationship with Barotseland’s established tradition authority (i.e. the BRE)? How are they connected or disconnected with leading government officials? Why is the BRE so passive and not taking a lead in all this?
- Given the challenges associated with international recognition, how politically viable is Barotseland’s separatism movement?
- Most well-known separatist movements in Africa are violent but how comes the Barotseland movement is relatively peaceful?
- How does the apparent sense of unity and disunity among the separatists groups and traditional leadership within Barotseland impinge on their historical and current demands?
Appendix 2: Delegates at the 2012 Barotse National Council indaba held at Limulunga on March 26-27; where Barotseland’s Independence was declared
Appendix 3: The Barotseland Agreement
THE BAROTSELAND AGREEMENT 1964

Presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations
by Command of Her Majesty
May 1964

LONDON
HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE
EIGHTPENCE NET

Cmd. 2366
Kenneth Kaunda signs the agreement unifying Barotseland and Zambia
THE BAROTSELAND AGREEMENT 1964
This Agreement is made this eighteenth day of May 1964 between KENNETH DAVID KAUNDA, Prime Minister of Northern Rhodesia; on behalf of the Government of Northern Rhodesia of the one part and SIR MWANAWINA LEWANIKA THE THIRD, K.B.E., Litunga of Barotseland, acting on behalf of himself, his heirs and successors, his Council, and the chiefs and people of Barotseland of the other part and is signed by the Right Honourable DUNCAN SANDIS, M.P., Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations and the Colonies, to signify the approval of Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom of the arrangements entered into between the parties to this Agreement and recorded therein:

Whereas it is proposed that Northern Rhodesia shall become an independent sovereign republic to be known as the Republic of Zambia:

And whereas it is the wish of the Government of Northern Rhodesia and of the Litunga of Barotseland, his Council and the chiefs and people of Barotseland that Northern Rhodesia should proceed to independence as one country and that all its peoples should be one nation:

And whereas, having regard to the fact that all treaties and other agreements subsisting between Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Litunga of Barotseland will terminate when Northern Rhodesia becomes an independent sovereign republic and Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom will thereupon cease to have any responsibility for the government of Northern Rhodesia, including Barotseland, it is the wish of the Government of Northern Rhodesia and of the Litunga of Barotseland to enter into arrangements concerning the position of Barotseland as part of the Republic of Zambia to take the place of the treaties and other agreements hitherto subsisting between Her Majesty the Queen and the Litunga of Barotseland:
And whereas on the sixteenth day of April 1964 a provisional agreement was concluded at Lusaka with this purpose and it is the desire of the Government of Northern Rhodesia and the Litunga, acting after consultation with his Council, to conclude a permanent agreement with this purpose:

NOW THIS AGREEMENT WITNESSETH and it is hereby agreed between the said Kenneth David Kaunda, Prime Minister of Northern Rhodesia, on behalf of the Government of Northern Rhodesia and the said Sir Mwanawina Lewanika the Third, K.B.E., Litunga of Barotseland on behalf of himself, his heirs and successors, his Council and the chiefs and people of Barotseland as follows:-

1. Citation and commencement

This Agreement may be cited as the Barotseland Agreement 1964 and shall come into force on the day on which Northern Rhodesia, including Barotseland, becomes the independent sovereign Republic of Zambia.
2. The Constitution of Zambia

The Constitution of the Republic of Zambia shall include the provisions agreed upon for inclusion therein at the Constitutional Conference held in London in May 1964 relating to—

(a) the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms of the individual;
(b) the judiciary; and
(c) the public service,

and those provisions shall have full force and effect in Barotseland.

3. Administration of Justice

(1) Subject to the provisions of this Agreement, the people of Barotseland shall be accorded the same rights of access to the High Court of the Republic of Zambia as are accorded to other citizens of the Republic under the laws for the time being in force in the Republic and a judge or judges of the High Court selected from among the judges who normally sit in Lusaka shall regularly proceed on circuit in Barotseland at such intervals as the due administration of justice may require.

(2) The people of Barotseland shall be accorded the same rights of appeal from decisions of the courts of the Republic of Zambia as are accorded to other citizens of the Republic under the laws for the time being in force in the Republic.
4. The Litunga and his Council

(1) The Government of the Republic of Zambia will accord recognition as such to the person who is for the time being the Litunga of Barotseland under the customary law of Barotseland.

(2) The Litunga of Barotseland, acting after consultation with his Council as constituted for the time being under the customary law of Barotseland, shall be the principal local authority for the government and administration of Barotseland.

(3) The Litunga of Barotseland, acting after consultation with his Council, shall be authorised and empowered to make laws for Barotseland in relation to the following matters, that is to say:

(a) the Litungaship;

(b) the authority at present known as the Barotse Native Government (which shall hereafter be known as the Barotse Government);

(c) the authorities at present known as Barotse Native Authorities;

(d) the courts at present known as Barotse Native Courts;

(e) the status of members of the Litunga's Council;

(f) matters relating to local government;

(g) land;

(h) forests;

(i) traditional and customary matters relating to Barotseland alone;

(j) fishing;

(k) control of hunting;

(l) game preservation;

(m) control of bush fires;

(n) the institution at present known as the Barotse Native Treasury;
(o) the supply of beer;
(p) reservation of trees for canoes;
(q) local taxation and matters relating thereto; and
(r) Barotse local festivals.

5. Land

(1) In relation to land in Barotseland the arrangements set out in the annex hereto shall have effect.

(2) In particular, the Litunga of Barotseland and his Council shall continue to have the powers hitherto enjoyed by them in respect of land matters under customary law and practice.

(3) The courts at present known as the Barotse Native Courts shall have original jurisdiction (to the exclusion of any other court in the Republic of Zambia) in respect of matters concerning rights over or interests in land in Barotseland to the extent that those matters are governed by the customary law of Barotseland;

Provided that nothing in this paragraph shall be construed as limiting the jurisdiction and powers of the High Court of the Republic of Zambia in relation to writs or orders of the kind at present known as prerogative writs or orders.

(4) Save with the leave of the court at present known as the Saa-Sikalo Kuta, no appeal shall lie from any decision of the courts at present known as the Barotse Native Courts given in exercise of the jurisdiction referred to in paragraph (3) of this article to the High
6. **Civil Servants**

All public officers of the Government of the Republic of Zambia who may from time to time be stationed in Barotseland shall be officers serving on permanent and pensionable terms.

7. **Financial responsibility**

The Government of the Republic of Zambia shall have the same general responsibility for providing financial support for the administration and economic development of Barotseland as it has for other parts of the Republic and shall ensure that, in discharge of this responsibility, Barotseland is treated fairly and equitably in relation to other parts of the Republic.
8. **Implementation**

The Government of the Republic of Zambia shall take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that the laws for the time being in force in the Republic are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement.

9. **Interpretation**

Any question concerning the interpretation of this Agreement may be referred by the Government of the Republic of Zambia to the High Court of the Republic for consideration (in which case the opinion thereon of the Court shall be communicated to that Government and to the Litunga of Barotseland and his Council) and any such question shall be so referred if the Litunga, acting after consultation with his Council, so requests.
10. Revocation

The hereinbefore-recited Agreement of the sixteenth day of April 1964 is hereby revoked.

In witness whereof the parties hereto have hereunto set their hands in the presence of:

[Signature]
Governor of Northern Rhodesia.

[Signature]
Ngambela of Barotseland.

Signed by the Right Honourable Duncan Sandys in the presence of:

[Signature]
Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations and the Colonies.

Prime Minister of Northern Rhodesia.

[Signature]
Litunga of Barotseland.

[Signature]
Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations and the Colonies.
ANNEX TO THIS AGREEMENT

1. The Litunga and National Council of Barotseland have always worked in close co-operation with the Central Government over land matters in the past, have agreed that the Central Government should use land required for public purposes, and have adopted the same procedures as apply to leases and rights of occupancy in the Reserves and Trust Land areas, where applicable. At the same time, the administration of land rights in Barotseland under customary law and practice has been under the control of the Litunga and National Council in much the same way as customary land rights are dealt with in the Reserves and Trust Land areas.

2. In these circumstances it is agreed that the Litunga should continue to have the greatest measure of responsibility for administering land matters in Barotseland. It is however necessary to examine the position of land in Barotseland against the background of the Northern Rhodesia Government's overall responsibility for the territory.

3. The Barotsa memorandum has indicated that Barotseland should become an integral part of Northern Rhodesia. In these circumstances the Northern Rhodesia Government will assume certain responsibilities and to carry these out they will have to have certain powers. So far as land is concerned, apart from confirmation of wide powers to the Litunga over customary matters, the position is as follows:

(1) The Northern Rhodesia Government does not wish to derogate from any of the powers exercised by the Litunga and Council in respect of land matters under customary law and practice.

(2) The Northern Rhodesia Government would like to ensure that the provision of public services and the possibility of economic development in Barotseland are not hampered by special formalities.

(3) The Northern Rhodesia Government recognises and agrees that full consultation should take place with the Litunga and Council before any land in Barotseland is used for public purposes or in the general interests of economic development.

4. The position regarding land in Barotseland in an independent Northern Rhodesia should, therefore, be as follows:
(a) There should be the same system for land administration for the whole of Northern Rhodesia including Barotseland, that is, the Government Lands Department should be responsible for professional advice and services with regard to land alienation in all parts of Northern Rhodesia and that the same form of document should be used for grants of land (i) for Government purposes and (ii) for non-Government and non-customary purposes. The necessary preparation of the title documents should be done by the Government Lands Department.

(b) The Litunga and National Council of Barotseland will be charged with the responsibility for administering Barotse customary land law within Barotseland.