Unfolding the international at late modernity: international society and the humanitarian space

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Unfolding the international at late modernity: international society and the humanitarian space

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[Abstract] The paper discusses the emergence of the International as a regime of power at the end of the eighteenth century and the transformations this regime has been facing since the end of cold war. Two main questions were proposed to the paper. First, how these transformations can be understood and re-described. With this question, I do not want to establish a debate among different theoretical orientations, but to make an experiment that departing from a theoretical proposition, try to understand how a specific regime of power – in this case, the international – arise and transform itself. The second question is related to the very nature of these transformations: What has been changing in the last two decades and how these changes have been processed in terms of strategies and techniques of power.
The Modern International

This section discusses the epochal transformations that took place in Europe by the end of the eighteenth century, given birth to modernity. These transformations had change the structures of meaning that until then sustained the absolutist state and its subjects, and had opened a logical space in which several forces struggled against each other. Although this problem has been addressed in a variety of ways by several authors, especially from a post-structuralist stance, I shall argue that in general those approaches underestimate three points: first, the raise of nations as a form of political community that predicates its own sovereignty; second, the impacts of that predicament over the very understanding of sovereignty; and, finally, third, the effects of the former processes over the structures of meaning that underpins the understandings we have on political communities and their interaction. Let me indicate the direction of the argument this section is trying to make, formulating the following hypothesis: at modernity, sovereignty is no longer a juridical tool but an apparatus (dispositive) in which the blend of knowledge and power, operates inside communities manufacturing national subjects and populations as well as outside them articulating a society of nations that allows the reproduction of the national sovereignty formula over time and space. The section is structured around two movements: the first presents the rise of normalized societies at the modern age; the second discusses how the processes of normalization was articulated by the International regime of power.

Bio Power and Normalization

Several elements have contributed to draw the space in which the classical sovereignty collapsed and gave place to modern forms of governamentality. The abundance of gold and the demographic explosion (reflected in European cities overpopulation were some of the aspects that helped settling the transformations we can identify in the eighteenth century, especially in its last quarter. From an epistemological perspective it should be observed that the mathesis crisis was motivated by the emergence of man. It was at that point when men posited himself in a specific temporality, i.e. the point he established his own historicity, that he emerged as a finite being without any metaphysical assurance of his own existence. The emergence of man coincided with the assertion that (i) he was an organic structure composed by organs which have specific functions as in any other animal; (ii) his work was ruled by rules and institutions that preceded himself and over which he had slight or none control; (iii) he understood the world and communicated it by means of a inherited language which was a historical artifact (Foucault 1970, p.252 -299). In this sense, the treatment of language as a historical mean implied that every utterance had to be interpreted regarding space and time. From that point, the very understanding of the triad, man, language and community became a problem. Indeed, the comprehension that the triad composed a speculum in which every term reflection was necessary to form a proper interpretation and, in the end, to allow communication, opened up a noteworthy space for cultural relativism. In political terms, the assumption of cultural relativism could mean the establishment of borders and otherness. The individual became a hermeneutist who lives in a space where “symbolic mirrors lining the inside walls of cultures and reflecting all interpretative discourse” (Fabian 1983, p.45) gained an existence objective. The problem of relativism, was,
therefore, circumvented by the assumption of interpretative communities; an aggregate
of individuals who predicates sharing the same language, heritage or culture1. As much
as the human experience is bounded by language, the search for coordinates both in
time and space became a necessary requirement to communitarian predicament, whatever
they would be. As Foucault has pointed out:

“Actual experience is, in fact, both the space in which all empirical contents
are given to experience and the original form that makes them possible in
general and designates their primary roots; it does indeed provide a means of
communication between the space of the body and the time of culture, be-
tween the determinations of nature and the weight of history, but only on con-
dition that the body, and, through it, nature, should first be posited in the ex-
perience of an irreducible spatiality, and that culture, the carrier of history,
should be experienced first of all in the immediacy of its sedimented signifi-
cations” (Foucault 1970 p,319).

There is the space where the human sciences could rise; a space where “man constituted
himself (...)as both that which must be conceived of and that which is to be
known”(Foucault 1970, p.344). Besides the specific way to conceive man as a tran-
scendental subject who assures the possibility of knowing the historical man as an em-
pirical object, the assumption that the actual human experience is bounded “leads to an
unending quest for the proper chronological and geographical limits of its origin, at
which language and society are essentially pure and harmoniously united” (Bartelson
1995, p.200). If the rhetoric of finitude could entail a babelic chaos, this problem, how-
ever, could be circumvented by two different but non-contradictory formulas: the as-
umption of the discreteness of bounded interpretative communities that aggregate
individuals who predicate the same culture; or the transcendental existence not only as
a condition of possibility of knowledge, but as a practical conductor. If the boundaries
of actual interpretative communities assured a peaceful life for insiders and protection
against outsiders, the transcendental deduction would assure a peaceful life among
those communities. Bounded interpretative communities and transcendental existence
were the non-contradictory sources of truth available at the moment in which mathesis
felt. These two sources of truth have to be explored in order to address the questions
proposed in this paper.

Starting with the rise of interpretative communities, by the end of the eighteenth cen-
tury, if Tocqueville’s tale makes any sense, in pre-revolutionary France the people were
already a matter articulated alongside the axis rulers against ruled (Tocqueville 1866).
Retrospectively Jules Michelet had come across April 1789 and established “The États
généraux convocation in 1789 was the genuine era when the people was
born”(Michelet 1868, p.133).The event that brought people into existence resulted
from the erosion of an enunciative field that, for the past centuries, had articulated
what could be seen and what was just invisible, what could be said and what could not
even be thought. And if the people, as an autonomous object of thought was until there
unthought, it was because sovereignty was “the condition of representability”
(Bartelson 1995, p.152). In this sense, the people could only be articulated as the sov-
ereign’s subject. Hence, what was at stake just before the French revolution was the

1 See: (Clifford 1988)
sustained the main caveat of the territorial state itself: to keep together an enunciative field that had the representation of the sovereign at its own centre. In pre-revolutionary France that was no longer the case. The king and, foremost, the classical sovereignty could no longer sustain the bonds that kept the westphalian edifice together, namely, security, peace, and order. Two supplementary movements superseded the classical sovereignty enunciative field.

The first movement, as described by Michelet, was the articulation of the people as an autonomous object that had to be contrasted and opposed to the figure of the sovereign and his court. What Michelet was describing had, until the end of the eighteenth century, “remained below the threshold of the visible and the expressible” (Foucault 1973, p.xiii). Its appearance was an event that meant a change in the enunciative field; “new alliance was forged between words and things, enabling one to see and to say” (Foucault 1973, p.xiii). Michelet’s revolutionary enthusiasm could not have described better the event in which “the people” came into sight: “Grande scène, étrange, étonnante! De voir tout un people qui d’une fois passait du néant à l’être, qui, jusque-là silencieux, prenait tout d’un coup une voix” (Michelet 1868, p.134). The new field gave form to the matter, allowed its existence as an object of discourse and of the gaze. In this first movement, “the people” were opposed to the king and to the court; it was a mode of designation of an inequitable situation, that is, a situation in which the sovereign body had been detached from the state sovereignty. “The people” seemed to be a form deployed in opposition to the sovereign’s body and all the iniquity it disseminated along the society. It is that very sense that, in this first movement, “The people” is pure negativity. It is a unity whose function is derogatory: it is the non-privilege, the non-inequality, the non-injustice. According to this mode of designation “the people” is a dangerous specter that represents a threat to the privilege “cette union des classes diverses, cette grande apparition du people dans sa formidable unité était l’effroi de la cour” (Michelet 1868, p.140), although, as a spectre, still unknown: “ce people, comment répondrait-il? C’était une grande question” (Michelet 1868, p.134).

Although Michelet has a historian retrospective gaze working in his favor, the question he raises as a narrative recourse is, indeed, noteworthy. Who are the people? What can be expected from them? “The people” or “the ruled”, as opposed to the rulers, is pure negativity, is a matter without form. The appearance of “The people” can be understood considering the absolutist state’s own developments. Since the sixteenth century the development of the administrative and political powers around the sovereign resulted in the feudality debacle and in an uniform social landscape wherein subjects, as well as territory, were controlled and articulated as disposable sources of the State’s power. In a sense, the expansion of the raizon d’état was responsible for the crafting of a homogeneous people and for the very distinction between the ruler and the ruled. The logical space in which the Classical State fell was settled by the emergence of this threatened body: the people. However, the appearance of the people at the very moment in which it became visible is coeval with the articulation of a series of discourses and techniques that had them (the people) as their object. As Foucault perceived the problem, the people were a matter trans-formed in population through the development of completely new techniques of government. The unformed matter that had just detached itself from the representational architecture of the ancient regime received the form of a population through the operation of governmental techniques. Increasing the
wealth, its life expectancy, health, education, and above all, its work productivity, the governmental operations had assumed population as its ultimate goal (Foucault et al. 1991). These techniques were named by Foucault as bio-politics of population and were deployed by a new regime: bio power.

As a regime of power consistent with the logical space which opened up with modernity, bio-power operated along with two techniques: discipline and regulation. According to Foucault, the disciplinary dimension of bio-power (anatomo-politics) has its focus on individual bodies which are treated as machines whose productivity must be progressively increased. In the end, its operation produces docile and useful bodies but, above all, it does so through mechanisms of subjectivation. The utility and efficiency of those bodies result from their integration in complexes and meticulous systems of control (Foucault 1978, p.139). The second technique described by Foucault does not have its focus on individual bodies but in the species as a whole. In fact, regulatory practices have the population as its target. Those practices are related to a new form of exercising power, namely, bio-politics (idem).

Normalization is the element which distinguishes bio-power from the preceding regimes of power. In fact, the exercise of power under the new regime does not take place in the realm of law, but in the normative domain. The normative dynamic is not negatively devoted to the repression of subjects or its freedom; on the contrary, norms are positivities in a constitutive sense. Normalization gives form to subjectivities. In modern societies the normalization process is related to disciplinarization of individual lives and regulation of population behavior. In modern western societies, the norm circulates between the disciplinary and the regulatory dimensions of the exercise of power: “the norm is something that can be applied to both a body one wishes to discipline and a population one wish to regularize” (Foucault 2003, p. 252-53). Normalization produces a system of surveillance and control, but primarily this system works through the inscription of a form in an unformed matter (an individual or a population), transforming control into self-control. As soon as the inscription takes place a new visibility emerges. However, the normalization process produces classification methods, hierarchical criteria. Along with the normalization process there is an articulation of statements which ascribe a function, an aim or a purpose to the visible form (Foucault 1973; Deleuze 2000).

Normalization can be treated as a process that crafts selves making them visible (through their subjection to a norm) and articulable (through statements that objectify them). A normalizing society, says Foucault, is “a society in which the norm of discipline and the norm of regulation intersect along an orthogonal articulation” (Foucault 2003, p.253). Normalization means, therefore, integration between power and knowledge, between the visible and the articulable, between form and function; in this case,

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2 In Discipline and Punishment Foucault points out the differences between norm and law. For our purposes, three differences are relevant: (i) although norms have as objects individual acts and behavior they are referred to a rule differentiation and comparative field; laws compare the individual conduct with a specific code; (ii) norms evaluate conducts and, in order to homogenize individual behavior, they establish patterns that ought to be reached; Law distinguishes what is allowed and what is forbidden; and, (iii) norms establish boundaries; regarding the law nothing is external – an action can be in accordance or not with the law.
normalization means an authoritative and exclusionary process. The norm has, indeed, the capacity to ascribe functions and authorize action and behavior, creating new visible forms and articulating new functions. Conversely, norms can define their own exterior as well. By defining which is not normal, which is abnormal and pathological, normalization excludes and draws boundaries between individuals or groups (Foucault et al. 1994; Foucault 1995).

The normalization of conduct assures that no conflict or disagreement between individual and community shall take place. Through the development of mutual dependency relations and by the inscription of the norm in each body, individuals are able to become subjects by means of self-contention and self-awareness (Elias e Schröter 1991; Foucault 1978; Elias 1993). The rituals of power under the new regime could make visible and articulate subjects whose freedom was an affect of their own subjectivation to the norm. As Foucault have pointed out, in such society, the underpinnings of the juridical form which guarantees a catalogue of rights to their subjects, can be found in micro-power systems which discipline individuals and regulate the entire population (Foucault 1978, 1995) A individual becomes a subject by subjectivation to the norm and self-containment; this is how the modern subjectivity becomes visible. The question remaining is, therefore, how those subjects are articulated, what is the source of truth that sustain bio-power and the normalization process that comes with it? Having presented the emergence of bio-power and the consequent normalization process, I can now explore the two axes that will craft the regime of power itself and the subjectivities affected by it: the nation and the transcendental subject.

The Sovereign Nation

Let me start with the nation, recovering Michelet’s problem. The first edition of Histoire de la Révolution Française was released in 1847. At that time, Michelet was not completely aware of the events that had happened since the États généraux, but he had his gaze equipped with a collection of rules to govern what could be seen and what could be said. And that equipment allowed him to see the emergence of another being: the nation: “un mouvement si vaste, si varié, si peu préparé, et néanmoins unanime!... c’est un phénomène admirable. Tous y prirent part et (moins un nombre imperceptible) tous voulurent la même chose. Unanime! il y eut un accord complet, sans réserve, une situation toute simple, la nation d’un coté et le privilège de l’autre” (Michelet 1868, p.140-41). The story Michelet was narrating did not have “the people” as its object, but had its dissolution in a positivity, in a form that, in fact, was visible and articulable. That positivity was the historical a priory that allowed abbé Sieyès to identify the third state with the general will and, hence, with the entire nation (Sieyès 1789). Sieyès’ third state reunited the entire citizenship in a single social body which was represented by the National Assembly.

3 As Neocleous has pointed out: “representation is thus a projection of a symbolic social body onto a real institutional body, of the eternal sovereign body of the people onto an active assembled body in which representation organically links the real body of the National Assembly to the symbolic body of the nation. The double corporeal perpetuity reminds us not only that na-
masses of individuals and their random behavior populating their streets, but the way
to handle the threat was no longer the confinement. As seen in Foucault’s work, the
emergence of bio-power and its variety of techniques, as described above, coped with
the threat, transforming vagabonds in citizens; conducting their conduct, subjecting
each individual in particular to a collection of meticulous disciplinary techniques and
the whole population to regulatory procedures.

In the modern world, as from the eighteenth century, national identities started to pro-
gressively organize political life and the social dynamic of human collectivities. The
deployment of national sovereignty as the main component of recognition created the
conditions for the comprehension of a nation as an unity entitle of Will; as an identity
above all other forms of allegiance, belonging or kinship. As Craig Calhoun has
acutely noticed, “from early in the era of nationalist discourse, the world was in prin-
ciple divided into formally equivalent national states, each of which was or should be
sovereign” (Calhoun 1995, p.265). The national citizen was someone who shared with
his fellow citizens a common category, a category which distinguished one nation from
the other. As far as the sovereign nation was deployed as a model that shaped the rep-
resentation of any political community it became the main formula of belonging, until
the point in which the individual, who did not belong to any nation, had no rights at all.
Sovereign nation was, therefore The modern political form; a dispositive trough which
the International promoted “categorical identities over relational ones” (Calhoun 1995,
p.256). In this sense, “national identity, thus, in its main western ideological form, is
precisely the opposite of the reckoning of identity and loyalty outward from the fam-
ily.” This new relation of allegiance, “suggests also a different notion of moral com-
mitment from other modes of understanding existence. (…) (It) is sharply different
from the discourse of kinship and the ideology of honor of the lineage” (Calhoun
1995,p. 256). Regarding the International, the nation can be deployed exactly because
of its vacuity. It is the very fact that the nation is an empty vessel - it has an abstract
existence as Benedict Anderson (1991) recalls - that allows it to be spread as the
main political form; a model that fits everywhere since it is able to equalize the indi-
viduals who will fill and give form to the national body.

Categorical identities emerged in decentered environments, overcoming identities cre-
bated by dependent or interpersonal relations. In fact, categorical identities imply, as
their own referent, large-scale communities, and its inscription on the subject’s bodies
can even dissolve any other identity built on face-to-face relationships. They produce
moral commitments presumed from a direct and automatic belongingness to a political
community which is already there. In a circular movement, the national citizen and the
national sovereign state have a mutual acknowledged purpose: to secure the nation.

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4 The national principle of citizenship roots can be found in the “idea of a revolutionary action
as the action of the entire people as to the struggle to democratic citizenship rights against the
monarchs. Nationalism thus emerged alongside modern states as a discourse for understanding
questions of legitimacy and more generally the “match” between people and state”
(Calhoun 2007, p.104)
The citizen has to defend his nation, represented by the sovereign state, if necessary with his own life; and the sovereign state has to provide security to the nation and its subjects.

However, the puzzle here is that population is not an anodyne mass, or a simple aggregate of docile individuals. Besides its own economic production, population was articulated to speak as well. What has been unnoticed by Foucault and many of his followers is exactly the positivity of the nation; its dispersion through the micro-mechanisms of power twisting them in order to articulate populations as a unitary political body. Perhaps, the discard of sovereignty as a power mechanism, has made the analysis steered clear of the puzzle imposed with the emergency of the nation as the modern political community. As Mark Neocleous has suggested:

Michel Foucault once commented that “we need to cut off the King’s head: in political theory that has still to be done”. This was his way of signaling an attempt, taken up with a vengeance by his followers, to move the debate about power beyond the question of sovereignty. What such a beheading fails to recognize, however, is the possibility that the sovereign body remains alive and kicking. The evidence suggests that the long process which saw the gradual secularization and depersonalization of sovereign power “the process, in other words, of state formation” involved a shift from the sacred body of the king to the abstract body of the state. (Neocleous 2003, p.18)

The National and the International

What Neocleous fails to recognize is that the “shift from the sacred body of the king to the abstract body of the state” involved a circulation of a new model of polity: the nation. What Foucault seems to have missed out on his analysis is the transformation of sovereignty along with the raise of bio-power. The assumption of a historical, geographical and cultural community is the very condition of existence of the nation as the primary form of modern polity. Indeed, the discreteness and the homogeneity presupposed to predicate the communion of meaning made nation a form that, at that moment, could be both articulated and visible. As long as the nation is considered a historical and geographical bounded community it can also proclaim both the right of self-government and external recognition of this right. After all, the nation, as the most quoted formula proposed by Benedict Anderson states, “is an imagined community as limited and sovereign” (Anderson 1991). In this sense, one may follow Ashley’s insight according to which,

“The modern concept of sovereignty (...) involves not only the possession of self and the exclusion of others but also the limitation of self in the respect of others, for its authority presupposes the recognition of others who, per force of their recognition, agree to be so excluded. In effect, sovereignty is a practical category whose empirical contents are not fixed but evolve in a way reflecting the active practical consensus among coreflective statesmen who are ever struggling to negotiate internal and external pressures and constraints and

5 On the metaphor of the body, see: (Neocleous 2003)
who, if competent, orient their practices in respect of the balance-of-power scheme.” (Ashley 1989p. 272 - n.101).

Nonetheless, Ashley’s formulation is still missing the point which I believe to be critical. The modern concept of sovereignty is a practical category and, because of that, it can articulate its own content. This content can change, but from the end of the eighteenth century onwards, sovereignty has been an apparatus which constitutes national states. And this proposition does not seem to be that distant from Ashley’s attempt to recover classical realism. According to him, a theoretical model able to carry on classical realism insights

“would be developed to account for the emergence, reproduction, and possible transformation of a world-dominant public political apparatus: a tradition or regime anchored in the balance-of-power scheme and constitutive of the modern states system. The regime should not be construed to organize and regulate behaviors among states-as-actors. It instead produces sovereign states who, as a condition of their sovereignty, embody the regime. So deeply is this regime bound within the identities of the participant states that their observations of its rules and expectations become acts not of conscious obedience to something external but of self realization, of survival as what they have become. We may refer to this regime as a balance-of-power regime.” (Ashley 1984, p.276)

Working on Ashley’s proposition we can say that, at the modern age, sovereignty became the main apparatus (or dispositive) that could articulate and make visible the new forms of power that would craft the subject, the nation as its political community, and the community of political communities. In fact as an apparatus, sovereignty could mobilize knowledge and techniques of power capable of joining individuals in a series of polities and those polities in a society of states – an anarchical society whose technique was the balance-of-power. In this sense, my first proposition is that sovereignty was rearticulated at the end of the eighteenth century and forgathered with the body of the nation. This argument has three consequences:

First, the national sovereignty became a key element of a new regime of power which emerged in the nineteenth century, namely, the International. The International was neither a space in a strict sense nor something which was outside the national political unities. On the contrary, the International can be treated as a regime, a matrix which generated its own subjects (nation-states), making them visible and articulable. Besides that, as a regime of power, the International ordered the relations between states through a series of techniques that imposed the conditions for social interactions among them: war, balance of power, great powers recognition, international law and diplomacy. The International was an abstract machine able to manufacture a new species – the national states – and new subjects – each individual nation. Recurring to Deleuze’s formula, as an abstract machine, the modern international was “almost blind and mute; even though it makes others see and speak”. Foremost, the International unfolded two coordinates that appeared as conditions of existence of national unities: space and time. In fact, once the International established the criteria with which

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6 What is, hereinafter, named techniques are Hedley Bull’s International institutions (Bull 2002)
boundaries would be drawn, i.e. the national principle, it allowed the predicament of culture to be inscribed into space.

The alignment between nation and space, generated “bound cultural spaces, necessary for the function of the nation-state as a unit of analysis and a meaningful political form” (BonuraJr 1998). Space became an expressive territory that connoted both the national singularity and the national sovereignty (Walker e Mendlovitz 1990). As Friedrich Ratzel had described the territory at the end of the nineteenth century, “each people located on its essentially fixed area, represents a living body which has extended itself over a part of the earth and has differentiated itself either from other bodies which have similarly expanded boundaries or by empty space” (apud Cloke e Johnston 2005 p, 44). However, territory signs, first and foremost, the lines between self and other, order and anarchy, identity and difference (Walker 1993), or in Ratzel words: “The boundary is the peripheral organ of the state, the bearer of its growth as well as its fortification” (apud Cloke e Johnston 2005 p, 44). The spatial conditions for the existence of the nation-state, namely, the national inscription into space, colonized the entire planet, transforming culture and politics in bounded activities contained in a particular territory. As for the international society the territorialization of the space created the conditions for, firstly, the imperialist race and, after that, for the expansion of the International by means of decolonization movements. These movements, however, just indicated the expansion of the International and the territorialization of the international society as well as the planet. As Bartelson (1995) have noticed, since its emergence, “in its peculiar blend of universalism and particularism”, the International carries a prophecy of its own expansion (Bartelson 1995, p.230).

The second coordinate which the International interposes to let the national unities reproduce is a peculiar conception of time. The naturalization of time, which rose along with the breakdown of classical age, signed the end of any kind of pastoral power or rhetoric of salvation. The secularization and naturalization of time allowed for the emergence of bio power in a context in which finitude was certain (Foucault 1970, 2007; Benjamin 1985). The significance of this transformation can not be denied. Two aspects of the International’s temporality are, indeed, critical: the denial of coevalness and the temporalization of history. To understand the first aspect one should consider that the vision of the time as a history of salvation was “inclusive and incorporative”, while the naturalistic conception of time “defines temporal relations as exclusive and expansive”. According to Johannes Fabian if the pre-modern conception of time considered the Others as candidates for salvation, the naturalization of the time created another time frame in which the Other “is not yet ready for civilization” (Fabian 1983 p.26). As in the anthropological writing, the International will emulate a conception of time that denies the coevalness of the Other. Actually, as far as the European society of States was the nucleus from which the International expanded...
itself by means of the reproduction of national unities, the denial of coevalness - or allochronism, as Fabian named it - can be unfolded in two moments: in the first moment allochronism sustained and legitimated the imperial expansion; in the second moment, decolonization, it inscribed belatedness on the identity and territory of those nations which recently had joined international society (Bhabha 1994). As result of the denial of coevalness to the Other one may observe the raise of international society’s periphery and the rhetoric of the development. Allochronism meant a strategy of spatialization of time; a strategy with which the International allowed a reproduction of inequalities and exclusions. The Picture 1, elaborated by Fabian (1983 p,27) tries to show graphically the denial of coevalness through a time/space strategy.

The second aspect of the modern International treatment of time is temporalization of history. The genealogical quest to find the origins of the term “modern” drive us back to the fifth century (Gumbrecht 1992; Jauss 1978). However, at that time, modern was used as an adjective which had in the latin word *modernus* (from mode) its etymological origin. From that origin, modern connotes the present as a temporal dimension which is known, familiar, shared with the community – *nostrum aevum* – distinguishing it from the past. When the adjective modern became the noun modernity, the idea of *nostrum aevum* was assimilated by the concept of *nova aetas*, transforming the present both in subject and object of temporal acceleration (Jauss 1978; Koselleck 1985). Modernity designates, then, the delimitation of an epochal change as well as a linear conception of time (Koselleck 1985). These two proprieties of modernity allowed for a new conception of history as an universal narrative in which all particular histories and temporalities might be reunited as an emancipator tale. That is why, beside the

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8 As Kant stays, “one can regard the history of the human species at large as the realization of a concealed plan of nature, meant to bring into being an internally and, to this end, externally perfect state constitution, as the only condition in which nature can fully develop all of its predispositions in humankind” (Kant 1983).
prophecy of expansion, the International carries a promise of transcendence, to cite Jens Bartelson’s (year?) expression (Bartelson 1995; Walker 2005; Walker 2006) 9.

The second consequence of the argument is that the assemblage between sovereignty and nation (national sovereignty) conferred to the former a substance and to the latter a political character. Nation’s political face was projected upon the state which became an expression of an alleged organic and discrete totality. In this sense, the population which was carefully crafted by disciplinary power became a categorical identity (Calhoun 1995); a community who imagined itself as sovereign and whose sovereignty could be expressed by the state. The invention of the transcendental subject as a generalized other with whom any citizen could identify itself with was the condition for the assertion of sovereignty as a quality and a demand of the political community. However, with the nationalization of the social relations, the nation became an object of cult which rose about individuals, even if inscribed in each one of them, as a index of its origins and pertinance. In that sense, nations gains objective existence. The nationalist bio-politique, as we can name it, has a pedagogical character. As Homi Bhabha has perceived, “(...) the people are the historical ‘objects’ of a nationalist pedagogy, giving the discourse an authority that is based on the pre-given or constituted historical origin in the past(...)”(Bhabha 1994,p.145). The pedagogy which drives the disciplinary collection of techniques, acts on the population level as well. In this level, bio-politique deploys techniques of homogenization of people in order to turn it into an unity. Those techniques may include assimilation or expulsion, border revision, genocides or “ethnic cleansings” (Hayden 1996) 10. Pathological homogenization is how Rae has “designate[d] a number of different strategies that state-builders have employed to signify the unity of their state and the legitimacy of their authority through the creation of an ostensibly unified population. (...) these strategies are all a means to the end of creating a ‘homogeneous’ population within the boundaries of the sovereign state” (Rae 2002, p.5) 11. As well demonstrated by Rae, this process did not start in what would be called

9 In the lectures at the College de France – “The birth of biopolitics” and “Security, population, territory” - Foucault opens a perspective to deal with the problem of transcendence trough liberalism, understood by him as an art of government. That alternative implies on the treatment of the market as a source of truth and civil society as an effect of the market logic, the liberal government and the raise of homo oeconomicus. Considered the limits of this paper, although it seems promising, that perspective could not be explored here.

10 In a totalizing perspective, one should perceive, as Robert Hayden (year?) has, that even after the humanitarian catastrophes in Yugoslavia - when Croatia was constitutionally defined as the “national state of the [ethnic] Croat people” (Constitution of the Republic of Croatia 1990, preamble) or Slovenia as the state of the sovereign Slovene people - “We, the people” has a very different meaning than it does in currently dominant American imagery (Hayden 1996)

11 Despite the relevance and rigor of her work in demonstrating how state-builders have carried out homogenizing policies, the name pathological homogenization is unfortunate. It is so because it loses an important dimension of the process of homogenization itself: the deployment of a national norm and the articulation of its antagonist, the abnormal, the pathological. In this sense, at some point, the International deployment of the sovereign machinery allowed a process in which, what Heather Rae considers to be pathological was, in fact, the mean for the consecution of the norm itself.
at some point, periphery of the system. On the contrary, this process was initiated in
the very center in which the international system would conform itself as such.

Third, national sovereignty twisted both bio power micro-mechanisms and the
anatomo-politics in such way that the exercise of power started to feed two combined
processes of identification: the identification between the individual and his/her nation
and the nationalization of the state. Summarily, the processes of individuation de-
ployed by sovereignty had, as their own effects, the national citizen. Not only its estab-
ishment as a juridical being but, above all, its articulation as an object of a completely
new bunch of disciplines as well as its appearance as a subject who belongs to a long
ancestral, tradition which gives him a proper relation towards truth, obligations and
others. National inscription offered the individual and the whole population a purpose.
Sovereignty deployment, by the international regime of power, changed in a quite sig-
nificant way the microphysics of bio-power whose affects would produce the align-
ment between the individual (the national citizen) and the population (the nation).

The International at Late Modernity

From Perpetual Peace to Liberal-Democratic Peace

In January 1992, for the first time, a Security Council section was counted with the
presence of heads of states and governments. That section celebrated the end of the
Cold War and, at the same time, announced a new time of peace and security, despite
the new threats that had just came into sight. According to the Security Council’s
president – UK’s Prime Minister John Major – the “meeting takes place at a time of
momentous change. The ending of the cold war has raised hopes for a safer, more equi-
table and more humane world. Rapid progress has been made, in many regions of the
world, towards democracy and responsive forms of government, as well as towards
achieving the Purposes set out in the Charter” (United Nations. 1992). At the end of the
meeting the members of the Security Council, once more, reaffirmed their faith in the
United Nations and in its central role “in promoting international peace and security”.
In that sense, “they invite the Secretary-General to prepare, for circulation to the mem-
bers of the United Nations by 1 July 1992, his analysis and recommendations on ways
of strengthening and making more efficient within the framework and provisions of the
Charter the capacity of the United Nations for preventive diplomacy, for peacemaking

In June of that year, the Secretary General Boutros-Boutros Ghali delivered a report
with his analysis and recommendations on the future of the United Nations and its role
in the maintenance of order and security. The document can, indeed, be considered a
monument to celebrate an epochal change. Contextualizing his own report, the secre-
tary general drew a picture tainted with hope and, perhaps, faith. Indeed the image he
projected signified the end of the Cold War as a victory of the liberal-democracy: “In
the course of the past few years the immense ideological barrier that for decades gave
rise to distrust and hostility has collapsed. (…) Authoritarian regimes have given way
to more democratic forces and responsive Governments” (United Nations. 1992, §8 e
9). The progress of liberal-democracy and the growing number of countries that have
adopted this regime is taken as a cause of the expansion of the international society. Such expansion is demonstrated by the admission of new countries into the United Nations. According to the report, “[o]nce again new States are taking their seats in the General Assembly. Their arrival reconfirms the importance and indispensability of the sovereign State as the fundamental entity of the international community” (United Nations, 1992, §10). The canvas would not be complete without the identification of the threats to peace, security and stability of international society. The contrast between an excessive optimism and a prospect of an anarchic future shapes the introduction “of a new vocabulary and new definitions, a ‘new ordering of names’ in the practice of world affairs, which shall cover more thoroughly and accurately the extent of global changes” (Debrix 1999, p.54). The new vocabulary creates its own referents, and it starts by the designation of new threats. The first one, signaled at the 11th paragraph, is identified in nationalists, ethnic and religious dissension. In fact, the document has indicated two different processes, the first being the movement towards cooperation: “[w]e have entered a time of global transition marked by uniquely contradictory trends. Regional and continental associations of States are evolving ways to deepen cooperation and ease some of the contentious characteristics of sovereign and nationalistic rivalries” (United Nations, 1992, §11, our emphasis). The risk of particularistic manifestations that could lead to conflicts and, ultimately, to the use of force was identified as the second trend and the most serious threat to peace and security. As the document stays, “(...) at the same time, however, fierce new assertions of nationalism and sovereignty spring up, and the cohesion of States is threatened by brutal ethnic, religious, social, cultural or linguistic strife” (idem).

Within the entire landscape drawn up in the “An Agenda for Peace”, the list of threats is far more impressive than the end of Cold War celebration, or even than the prescriptions for the UN role in the future. The reason for that lies on its ability to propose new articulations, new discursive chains that create a new series of statements on the international society, its purposes and the means to achieve them. Those chains will be distributed alongside the enunciation of the new threats. The first threat, nationalistic rivalry, has a generative role, since the rest of the list can be deduced from it. In fact, the first eleven paragraphs underline the relevance of (i) democracy; (ii) state sovereignty; (iii) a democratic government of state sovereignty; in order to achieve: (iv) peace and security; (v) cooperation and integration and, finally, (vi) prosperity. The entire International’s mythology is reiterated once more, in order to address what is supposed to be a new time. However, at this time, democracy is the primordial element of the chain; democracy organizes the whole tale. There seems to be even an opposition between nation or nationalism and democracy. But this point of view misses the point, and this point shall be well understood. It is not a matter of denying the national sovereignty or the national “almost natural” right to self determination. What is at stake in the document is that the national cohesion, or “the state cohesion” as it says, should be rearticulated in a democratic way. The new emphasis on democracy and how nationalism has to be contained or driven by democratic forces, blends democracy and sovereignty, opens up a chain of statements that was, until that point, only a prophecy. The connection between democratic regimes and international security is well established in the paragraph 59 where the secretary is presenting UN’s role in post-conflict peace-building: “There is an obvious connection between democratic practices – such as the rule of law and transparency in decision-making – and the achievement of true
peace and security in any new and stable political order. These elements of good governance need to be promoted at all levels of international and national political communities” (United Nations. 1992, §59). With this kind of enchainment the document monumentalizes the re-articulation of the entire regime of power after the cold war. The entire meaning chain can be described through the idea of democratic peace that is disseminated by the international’s main dispositive. In fact, from that point onwards national sovereignty has to encompass a democratic clause. The point can be clarifying reading the list of threats proposed by the Secretary General:

1. As stated in paragraph 12, the question of proliferation is still a problem. But a problem that has received a new form: “As major nuclear Powers have begun to negotiate arms reduction agreements, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction threatens to increase and conventional arms continue to be a menace in many parts of the world” (United Nations. 1992, §12 our emphasis). As implied in the diagnostic, at the center of the international system, the problem of proliferation seems to be pretty much settled. However, at the periphery, or in many parts of the world either arms of mass destruction or conventional weapons, is still a problem.

2. Paragraphs 12 and 13 present a series of new threats covering ecological issues through the “disparity between rich and poor” which are treated as problems that could aggravate human suffering – “drought and disease can decimate no less mercilessly than the weapons of war” – and bring instability to international society.

3. Finally, in the most quoted paragraph, namely the 15th, the secretary general asserts what can be done by UN in order to address those challenges to peace and security. In his last statement in this paragraph the secretary general declared that in the new world which emerges from the Cold War, one of the aims of UN must be “(...) to address the deepest causes of conflict: economic despair, social injustice and political oppression.” (United Nations. 1992, §15). A liberal-democratic comprehension of those problems allows its supporters to say: United Nations has to spread democracy!

A liberal-democratic or cosmopolitan comprehension of the balance between threats and opportunities would consider the “United Nations as an agency of global democracy” (Archibugi, Balduini, e Donati 1999). According to that kind of understanding, “the United Nations has the authority, the means and the opportunity to be a central actor in promoting democratization at all levels” (Archibugi, Balduini, e Donati 1999, p.128). Despite the clear overestimation or even misunderstanding of UN’s role, the shift in the discourse about the international order, its threats and main actors had been clearly articulated. The secretary general designated a new world, a new organization and a new diplomacy: as Debrix has noticed, “for Boutros-Ghali, it is diplomacy that has to be redefined, discursively restructured, in a (verbal) way that is able to accommodate the necessary presence of the UN and the central function of its peacekeeping policies” (Debrix 1999, p.54). Spread democracy; that should be the new face of diplomacy.

The world envisaged in the series of documents produced or commissioned by the general secretariat, is a peaceful and progressively integrated world of democratic sov-
ereign states. Boutros-Ghali’s three agendas – “Agenda for peace” (1992), “Agenda for Development” (1994) and “Agenda for Democratization” (1996) – delineated a process of epochal change. That change can be regarded as a transformation of a regulatory ideal – the predicament of a perpetual peace – in a program, as I will discuss in the next pages. In fact, the debate around the postulate of the democratic peace – already found in “An agenda for Peace” – squared the organization’s normative production during the 1990’s. In Boutros-Ghali’s Agendas, democracy appeared as follows:

(i) **An Agenda for Peace (1992),** presents democracy as a condition for peace and prosperity. In this sense, democracy has to be a principle which orients the actions of governments both in the domestic and international arenas:

§ 81. Democracy within nations requires respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, as set forth in the Charter. It requires as well a deeper understanding and respect for the rights of minorities and respect for the needs of the more vulnerable groups of society, especially women and children. This is not only a political matter. The social stability needed for productive growth is nurtured by conditions in which people can readily express their will. For this, strong domestic institutions of participation are essential. Promoting such institutions means promoting the empowerment of the unorganized, the poor, the marginalized. (...)

§ 82. Democracy within the family of nations means the application of its principles within the world Organization itself. This requires the fullest consultation, participation and engagement of all States, large and small, in the work of the Organization. All organs of the United Nations must be accorded, and play, their full and proper role so that the trust of all nations and peoples will be retained and deserved. (...) Democracy at all levels is essential to attain peace for a new era of prosperity and justice.

(ii) **An Agenda for Development (1994):** Democracy is presented as a human right and an element to promote development. Once democracy is presented as “a basic tenet of development”, there would be no development without democracy; in this sense An Agenda for Development shifts the meaning of development understood either as purely economic growth or as environmentally sustainable development. Without democracy, the report states, the opportunities for civil strife will increase, jeopardizing the whole developmental process:

§ 120. Democracy and development are linked in fundamental ways. They are linked because democracy provides the only long-term basis for managing competing ethnic, religious, and cultural interests in a way that minimizes the risk of violent internal conflict. They are linked because democracy is inherently attached to the question of governance, which has an impact on all aspects of development efforts. They are linked because democracy is a fundamental human right, the advancement of which is itself an important measure of development. They are linked because people’s participation in the decision-making processes which affect their lives is a basic tenet of development.

§ 121. The accumulation of economic despair, and the lack of democratic means to effect change, have sparked or exacerbated violent and destructive impulses even within relatively homogeneous societies. Civil conflict and strife have increasingly become threats to international peace and profound obstacles to development. Ethnic antagonism, religious intolerance and cultural separatism threaten the cohesion of societies and the integrity of States.
in all parts of the world. Alienated and insecure minorities, and even majori-
ties, have increasingly turned to armed conflict as a means of addressing so-
cial and political grievances.

§ 122. Democracy is the only long-term means of both arbitrating and regulat-
ing the many political, social, economic and ethnic tensions that constantly
threaten to tear apart societies and destroy States. In the absence of democracy
as a forum for competition and a vehicle for change, development will remain
fragile and be perpetually at risk.

(iii) An Agenda for Democratization (1996): Democracy is presented as “a system of
government which embodies, in a variety of institutions and mechanisms, the ideal of
political power based on the will of the people” (United Nations. 1996, p.1). According
to the report, since the end of the Cold War democratization and democracy have been
spread across the globe. In that sense the comparison with the decolonization period is
quite revealing: “Just as newly independent States turned to the United Nations for
support during the era of decolonization, so today, following another wave of acces-
sions to statehood and political independence, Member States are turning to the United
Nations for support in democratization” (idem, p.2). In this new context, sovereignty is
no longer only a matter of building authority, but building democratic means to exer-
cise authority. This assumption had several impacts on the organization: “The peace-
keeping mandates entrusted to the United Nations now often include both the restora-
tion of democracy and the protection of human rights” (idem). In its third section, An
Agenda for Democratization presents its own foundations. With this step, Boutros-
Ghali tried to give a historical perspective to the democratic predicament. Returning to
the Covenant of the League of Nations, the secretary general recalled that its creation

“has been intended to guard against the dangers of thwarted nationalism
through respect for self-determination; to transcend the dangerous reliance on
power balances through a shared system of security; (…) Democracy within
and among States was understood as the binding element of these efforts. It
would preserve the sovereignty and political independence of nations, by al-
lowing individuals to exercise their fundamental right to political participa-
tion, and of peoples, by allowing them to exercise their fundamental right to
self-determination” (idem, p. 11).

Democracy was the hidden element necessary to keep the international system in
peace. This understanding – although it has its roots in the League’s Covenant – is the
same, according the report, that motivated the creation of the United Nations: “within
the original framework of the Charter, democracy was understood as essential to ef-
forts to prevent future aggression, and to support the sovereign State as the basic guar-
antor of human rights, the basic mechanism for solving national problems and the basic
element of a peaceful and cooperative international system” (idem).

As one can read from the documents generated by the UN General Secretariat, the new
world order that was emerging at the end of cold war would be a peaceful order sus-
tained no longer by the balance of power but by the spread of democracy. The new
world order was articulated around the principles of Democratic Peace. As summarily
described by Maoz and Russett (1993), the Democratic Peace hypothesis is sustained
on two assumptions: (i) “states, to the extent possible, externalize the norms of behav-
ior that are developed within and characterize their domestic political processes and
institutions” and (ii) “the anarchic nature of international politics implies that a clash
between democratic and nondemocratic norms is dominated by the latter, rather than by the former” (Maoz e Russett 1993, p. 624). Democracies do not fight each other and the presence of non democratic regimes may cause the engagement of democratic regimes in international conflicts. According to Doyle (1983), the tension between liberal-democratic and non liberal-democratic States could be alleviated by two remedies: “One is a human rights policy that counters the record of colonial oppression and addresses the ills of current domestic oppression in the Second and Third Worlds. The other is a policy of free trade and investment” (Doyle 1983, p.342). Doyle was the first to recognize that those remedies had failed once liberal-democracies usually supported dictatorships and that free trade had been jeopardized by protectionist policies. Nevertheless, Doyle and the Democratic Peace advocates can rely on a powerful ally: history. If these remedies have not achieved their effects yet, they would do at some point. The liberal teleology that had forged the International itself, is Doyle’s ultimate foundation: “The cosmopolitan right to hospitality permits the ‘spirit of commerce’ sooner or later to take hold of every nation, thus impelling states to promote peace and to try to avert war” (Doyle 1983, p.231).

The Democratic Peace thesis embraces the promise of transcendence carried out by the International since its raise as a regime of power in modern time. As such, Democratic Peace discourse works as the foundation and source of legitimacy to the very model of international society that the International had been emulating. As a promise of transcendence the Democratic Peace discourse conjugates the exigencies of an international order with a predicament of justice sustained by values which reclaim universality. The perpetual peace promise or regulatory ideal is, at late modernity, converted into the democratic peace program, creating for liberal democracies their own historicity. In this sense, for instance, Doyle can consider the increasing number of liberal states as an indicator that the world has been closer and closer to the point in which the liberal-democratic model could cover the entire planet (Doyle 1983). Considering its own historicity, democratic peace is a program to be accomplished here and now.

As a prelude to the prospects and puzzles of the new world order, “An Agenda for Peace” presents a new cartography or at least the contours of the International after the Cold War. The International appears to be suffering a germane mutation. As seen, the International was a regime of power whose emergency in the modern world was able at the same time (i) to articulate national citizens as subjects of national sovereign states recognized and authorized by other states to act on behalf of them; and (ii) to deploy a set of norms regulating the relationship among them or, if one wants, inside the international society. Those norms regarding war, balance of power, great powers, international law and diplomacy, did not include any consideration on regimes of government or individuals whatsoever. It is right that, considering all the cartography the International had drawn, there was a promise of transcendence which, in Kantian terms, supposes indeed the maturity of citizens aware of their duties and republican states responsible for handling the perpetual peace. In 1992, the new International Cartography seems to duplicate itself double over yourself to produce new subjects and novel norms in order to assure peace and security. Some debates and decisions at the Security Council look as if a new Cartography was, indeed, emerging. Since it produces the bond between peace and democracy, in terms of a program – or in UN terms, a call for action –“An Agenda for peace” is not only a document, but an event which signs the
discontinuities in the International itself. These discontinuities have been processed as an assemblage, meaning, a process of superposition and co-adaptation in which discursive and non-discursive practices (hereinafter democratic peace practices) are articulated and made visible. To address transformations in the modes of articulation and visibility means to deal with a process of epochal change, that is, the transformations of the structures of meaning that have sustained, through the assemblage of power and knowledge, the regime of power and the modes of existence emulated by it. The question could be formulated as follows: what are the conditions that allow the transformation of sovereignty from a dispositive that forges national States to a dispositive that engenders liberal-democratic States? The hypothesis I would like to present here is the follow: the transformations of the categories of space and time characteristic of the late modernity, allow the democratic peace practices. The next section discusses the articulations of space and time at late modernity and their effects on the International as a regime of power.

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**Globality, humanity and the humanitarian space**

The debates on the enforcement measures claimed by the secretary general or the quarrel around the question of humanitarian intervention are examples of the assemblage that has took place after the cold war. As far as the demands over the peace operations have increased at the beginning of the 1990’s the questions regarding sovereignty and cosmopolitan justice gained, once more, centrality. As frequently asserted, “in this context, peace operations have become clearly subject to the search for a balance between particularism and universalism, and between human security and state sovereignty”. Nevertheless such assertion misses the point exactly because “the search for a balance between (...) human security and state sovereignty” empties the first part – “the balance between particularism and universalism”. The simple enunciation of such a thing like human security establishes a completely new relationship between particular and universal. The point, therefore, is not the conflict of the norm of non intervention and humanitarian intervention, or intervention in any way. The question
seems to be how the humanitarian intervention has been authorized. How could humanitarian intervention become a practice, or even, an object of thought? What changes or transformations in the regime of power allowed humanitarian intervention or human security to entry in the vocabulary of international relations?

Answering these questions requires unfolding the International at late modernity. As already seen, at the beginning of the 1990’s sovereignty was progressively bonded to democracy. At the end of that decade, democracy was almost a condition which allowed the predicament of sovereignty: “In an interdependent world, in which security depends on a framework of stable sovereign entities, the existence of fragile states, failing states, states who through weakness or ill-will harbour those dangerous to others, or states that can only maintain internal order by means of gross human rights violations, can constitute a risk to people everywhere” (International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. 2001). Concepts as democratic sovereign state, human security, and so on, do not represent a reality always already constituted; on the contrary they forge new types of visibility, verisimilitude patterns, and modes of existence.

As Vivienne Jabri (Jabri 2007) has argued the rising of bio-power at the modern age had as its effect a landscape where man, understood as a generic being, had taken a central position. In this sense, modernity’s landscape was spread out beyond national boundaries creating, discursively, a horizon of expectations in which the humanity dispersion in particular communities made sense against the transcendental existence. Nevertheless, as already seen, the deployment of the sovereign dispositive by the International regime of power at the same time allows the operation of bio-power and circumscribes it in a bounded space – the national territory. The homeostatic relation between each element of the triptych – territory, people and power – is an effect of the spatialization of bio-power (Walker 2006; Jabri 2007). At late modernity, as the reading proposed here of “An Agenda for Peace” and the subsequent documents proposes, the own sovereignty dispositive is transformed. However such transformation does not imply a defect in terms of its prerogatives, but rather a new spatial and temporal articulation. The meaningful change in the articulations of space and time by the International regime of power is the condition of possibility for the transformation of Perpetual Peace into Democratic Peace. As seen above, at the modern age the International had articulated space in terms of territorialization or bounded cultural spaces and time in terms of a denial of coevalness. At late modernity, both coordinates suffered radical changes. Indeed, the International have compressed the fragmentized and territorialized space into a “single place” by means of an assemblage between “bounded societal units and a widespread sense of global continuity” (Robertson e Chirico 1985) 12.

Once more “An Agenda for Peace” is an indicia of a new conjunction of forces that has allowed the international to produce both the globe, – as a space of socio-political ex-

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12 Although Robertson’s conception of globalization as a production of a single place is still working with categories as system and unities, I want to preserve here, first, the sense of permanent change due to processes of reciprocal relativization between self/society and humanity/world, and second, the resilience of bounded societal units, which, seems to me is usually misleading.
experiences – and, as it will be demonstrated below, the humanity, as a unity of belong-ness and expectations. Re-articulating space and time and re-creating the relationship between universal and particular, globe and humanity are new categories providing new guidance to practical life:

Globalism and nationalism need not be viewed as opposing trends, doomed to spur each other on to extremes of reaction. The healthy globalization of contemporary life requires in the first instance solid identities and fundamental freedoms. The sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of States within the established international system, and the principle of self-determination for peoples, both of great value and importance, must not be permitted to work against each other in the period ahead. Respect for democratic principles at all levels of social existence is crucial: in communities, within States and within the community of States. Our constant duty should be to maintain the integrity of each while finding a balanced design for all. (UNITED NATIONS, 1992, p.6).

Those forces articulated in/by “An Agenda for Peace” make themselves visible in the governmental practices constructed in the multilateral and transnational arenas (Duffield 2001). The document that is, perhaps, the best synthesis of governmental ambitions is “Our Global Neighborhood” (1995); document devoted to debate and propose of new mechanisms for a global governance. While “An Agenda for Peace” just enunciates some governmental techniques – preventive diplomacy, peacemaking peacekeeping and peace-building operations – suggesting a broader definition of security, “Our Global Neighborhood” designates who has to be secured. The Global Neighborhood calls attention to the shared space (the globe) and to its inhabitants (the humanity):

The global neighborhood we have today is, like most neighborhoods, far from ideal; it has many imperfections. Its residents are not all fairly treated; they do not have the same opportunities. Millions are so deprived that they do not even think they belong to a neighborhood, as the tides of progress of recent decades have passed them by. If the communications revolution has touched them, it has served to confirm their sense of isolation. This reaction does not disprove the emergence of a neighborhood, but it does pose a challenge to its governance to reduce alienation among neighbors. (The Commission on Global Governance. 1995)

The visibility humanity gains as a community is possible because of the assumption of a Global space and a synchronic temporality. Once there is a single place and a same time (or a coeval space of experiences) there could be a community. In late modernity, humanity replaced people as a community of reference of the International as a regime of power (see Caldwell 2004). Indeed, after the cold war, democracy, security and development were melted into an amalgam that could be found in the very idea of Global Governance. Global Governance have transformed the democratic peace program into techniques of power (Zanotti 2005), shaping a new face to the International regime of power. It is in this sense that one can consider Global Governance as a strategy that unfolds the International over its own articulation vectors – expansion and transcendence. The end of cold war allowed the International to expand itself in special terms, generating new bounded communities and bringing back international society’s myth of origin (Walker 1993; 2005; 2006). The evocation of international mythology
allows the assembling of history and progress, event and finality, making sense of past conflicts, of present challenges and future prosperity and peace. The expansion of the international means the fulfillment of the promise of its horizontal expansion across the space, producing alignment and contiguity by means of the transformation of locality into territory and territory into unities and unities in globe – generating the “sense of global continuity” alluded by Roland Robertson.

Besides the articulation of space in a global continuity it is also possible to identify, at late modernity, the reconfiguration of temporality. As Castells has noticed, forging a global economy means to build a planetary real time (Castells 1994, p. 21). The expansion of the exchange market across the globe has as its condition the homogenization of time and its previous historicity dismantle. A “present without time”, or without temporality, is a late modernity landmark. (Castells 1996).

To sum up, my second proposition is that Globality, humanity and coevalness are the conditions of possibility to the transformation of perpetual peace from a promise into a program. This argument has three consequences:

First, the new articulation of space/time and the new referent of the international society produces a shift in sovereignty, understood here as a dispositive of the International regime of power. As one has seen in the last section, sovereignty was a dispositive which generates both national sovereign states and the international society, itself. As sovereignty is not understood any longer as a predicament of bounded cultural communities, those communities have to be de-nationalized, and in the place of the nation, the liberal—democratic practices of sovereignty has to develop a new discourse of citizenship and belonging. The problem of citizenship and belonging, or as Robertson (Robertson e Chirico 1985), call it, the process of relativization of citizenship, as long as it progressively de-nationalize societies, generates on the one side, an opportunity to the emergency of a series of identifications processes which can, at some point, generate ethnic and religious conflicts inside those polities and on the other side a production of new international governmental techniques.

The rise of international society’s governmental techniques is the second consequence of the argument hereby proposed. Indeed, once sovereignty is understood through the liberal democratic lenses, the international society has been becoming a society of democratic states: a progressively integrated society which the main landmark, can, perhaps, be found in the practices of mobility – flows of goods, services and people. The processes of de-nationalization and integration between democratic societies have as its counterpart the spread out of international society in a new governmental direction. Indeed it is noticeable the development of international strategies and techniques to foster what in the UN vocabulary is known as Global Governance. International society’s governmental surplus articulates new discourses and makes visible new practices “to guide, shape and foster specific types of not only states, but also other polities, as well as individuals. It sets up standards of behavior for individuals and models of institutions to be implemented and followed by all good members of the international community” (Neumann e Sending 2007).

The third consequence is related to those cases in which Global Governance mechanisms fail, or to use Neumann and Sending terms, the cases in which bad members
show their face. The failure of international society’s governmental techniques generated a space outside international society itself: the humanitarian space.

**Final remarks: the humanitarian space and the rise of therapeutic politics**

By developing governmental techniques, international society creates its own boundaries, meaning, a new line demarcating the distinction between the democratic States which give form and meaning for the globe and the regions that didn’t adhere to it; at least not yet. The new boundaries between inside and outside international society establish new exclusionary processes creating a space beyond the globe: the humanitarian space. Humanitarian space has its roots in the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and 1977. The Conventions established that “certain areas should enjoy special protection even in the midst of ongoing conflict”. In this sense, safety, neutralized or demilitarized zones could be established through the agreement of belligerent parties (States) in order to protect wounded combatants and civilian population. The Geneva Conventions started, in this way, to establish the principles which would guide the humanitarian action: the prior consent of the states evolved in the conflict and the non-use of the force. Once the establishment of humanitarian spaces requires prior consent of the states, neutrality and proscription of the use of force, the creation of protected spaces where the humanitarian action could be deployed were fully congruent with international order (Yamashita 2004).

Universality, independence, and neutrality are the core principles which have been orienting the humanitarian action. Universality implies that every person, every victim, by virtue of his/her humanity has to be helped. Independency, in this context, assures that the humanitarian action should not be a political action at all. Finally, neutrality means that the humanitarian action will not benefit any of the parties in a conflict. Against the underpinnings of the humanitarian action, one can find at least two types of critique. The first tries to demonstrate the very impossibility of the separation between the political decisions and humanitarian action. In this sense, as Fionna Terry has pointed out,

> These principles, based on the Geneva Conventions, predominantly aimed at convincing belligerents that all sides are equally entitled to humanitarian assistance and that humanitarian assistance does not constitute interference in conflict. They are aimed to create a ‘humanitarian space’ in war which is detached from the political stakes of the conflict. The term ‘humanitarian space’ has been used to invoke a space ‘separate from the political’, but [...] such a separation is seldom possible in practice (TERRY, 2002, p.19)

The second type of critique considers that the humanitarian practices are functional regarding the States’ interests, once they keep the crises in the borders of the system of states creating, at the same time, governance networks responsible to manage them (Duffield 1994, 2001; Dillon e Reid 2000). However these critiques don’t ask why is it so crucial to assert humanitarian’s space non-political character. What seems to be a reductionist conception of power and politics hides, nevertheless, a germane question: how the processes, which articulate and authorize the humanitarian practices and making visible techniques of subjection and forms of subjectivity? Even though she misses
the point, Terry provides an important clue to address the question. To keep apart the political and the humanitarian is, indeed, an element that articulates discursively the autonomy of the later over the former, but that separation is already a power effect. Still, the question remains: how was that autonomy established?

The first technique used to establish an autonomous space is its categorization as a complex emergency. As defined by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), a complex emergency consists of “a humanitarian crisis in a country, region or society where there is total or considerable breakdown of authority resulting from internal or external conflict and which requires an international response that goes beyond the mandate or capacity of any single and/or ongoing UN country program”. When a situation is classified as a complex emergency there is call to suspend the political in the name of the alleviation of human suffering. If international society has the responsibility to protect human life, the identification of a complex emergency situation is a call for action in order to create a space to protect the endangered life.

The second technique consists in the containment of populations at the border of the international society. This containment is produced through the classification of fleeing population as Internal Displaced Persons (IDPs). The emergence of IDPs in international society during the 1990’s have created the discursive tools to contain people outside; in that sense those individuals who constitute the masses which fled from conflicts are not refugee candidates or asylum seekers. On the contrary, they are now IDP’s who have to be protected in spaces where aid can be deployed and they can stay still alive.

Once there is a complex emergency in which masses are fleeing the humanitarian space is constructed. Humanitarian space is understood as a “conducive humanitarian operating environment, the humanitarian space is an arena outside the international itself, in which international society’s organizations have access to the populations”. The humanitarian space is exactly the element that makes possible the constitution of humanitarian actors, being them organizations or individuals.

References


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