The Dynamics of Public Opinion and Military Alliances
Japan’s Role in the Gulf War and Iraq Invasion

Photo credit: Peter Rimar, April 2005

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Preface

When studying Japanese politics, I found much conflicting research on the role of Japanese public opinion and its influence on policy, especially in regards to how much it affects Japanese politicians. One of the contrasted issues that stood out to me were Japan’s different responses to the Gulf War and Iraq Invasion, where Japan faced pressure from the US to contribute personnel to the war effort, while the Japanese public opposed dispatching the Japanese Self-Defense Forces overseas. The general aim of this thesis is therefore to weigh the influence of conflicting Japanese public opinion and pressure from the US, on Japanese politicians.

I would first and foremost like to thank my advisor for this thesis, Professor Paul Midford. It was initially his Japan and East Asia-focused courses at NTNU that sparked my academic interest for Japan and East-Asia. I owe him a lot for his continued encouragement and support throughout my studies. His thesis advice has been invaluable, and he has made sure that I have adhered to proper methodology, reliable data and thorough analysis.

I would also like to thank Natsuyo Ishibashi for reading parts of my paper, providing feedback, and helping me with sources. I would also like to extend my gratitude to my professors at Kanazawa University, Masahiro Kashima, Andrew Beaton, Yoshiomi Saito, Toru Kurata, in addition to my classmates there, whose feedback on my thesis proposal was very helpful.

I am also indebted to the Sasakawa Foundation, which generously provided me with a scholarship to study at Kanazawa University in 2010/2011, and to Kanazawa University which also provided me with an additional scholarship. My stay there would not have been possible without this generosity. Studying at Kanazawa University gave me many opportunities, such as access to their library on Japanese and East-Asian academic literature and sources, a great study environment, and a chance to improve my Japanese.

Last but not least, I am forever thankful to my family and friends, whose support and encouragement throughout writing this thesis has meant a lot to me.

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Stian Carstens Bendiksen
Regarding Japanese Transliteration of Names

For the ease of readers not familiar with the Japanese language, I have tried to write things as straightforward as possible. While in the Japanese tradition, family names are stated first and given names last, I have used the Western standard of given names first, so as to not confuse readers. I have used a Hepburn style of romanization without macrons or additional vowels to make the readability of the text as straightforward as possible.
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Introduction

Japan had since 1952 been a strategic military ally for the United States in the Pacific, and the two nations grew more interdependent on each other’s economies throughout the decades that followed. As a nation flush with cash and with a highly advanced military force, Japan was expected to assume a greater international role by the US when the Gulf Crisis broke out in 1990. However, to the US’s dismay, Japan was not ready to step onto the international scene with manpower when the US called for greater burden-sharing as allies. Their monetary contributions, despite being the large sum of some 13$ billion, was written off as checkbook diplomacy. Japan managed to salvage their strained relationship with the US by dispatching minesweepers to the Persian Gulf after the Gulf War.

When an US attack on Iraq loomed in the horizon over a decade later, Japan responded more swiftly. On the eve of the US-led attack on Iraq in 2003, the Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi came out and supported the war. At the end of the year, Japan began dispatching their Self-Defense Forces (SDF) to Iraq for reconstruction, humanitarian and disaster-relief activities. The Japanese public has traditionally held an antimilitarist view of their own military forces, and had been especially critical to sending them overseas (Berger 1993, 2003). The US also pressured Japan to take on a greater international role as allies, in both the Gulf War and the Iraq Invasion. The US was particularly interested in Japanese personnel contributions. What made Japan decide on the two different policies after the Gulf War in 1990-1991 and the Iraq Invasion in 2003?

In this thesis I therefore attempt to answer the question: Does public opinion or pressure from a military ally weigh more on politicians, when the two clash? My primary hypothesis is because public opinion only has a vague and negligible influence on policy, pressure from a military ally weighs more on politicians when it conflicts with public opinion. A corollary of this hypothesis is that the elitist view of public opinion dominates in Japan, and politicians are therefore more influenced to act toward security imperatives. My competing hypothesis is because public opinion can exert significant influence on policy, pressure from a military ally weighs less on politicians when it conflicts with public opinion. A corollary of this hypothesis is that politicians must pay heed to public opinion in order to stay in office, and might therefore adapt policies that favor public preferences over their ally’s preferences.

I will argue that investigating which one weighs more is important: Other studies as discussed below have argued that Japanese public opinion can affect policy, but no study has
juxtaposed conflicting Japanese public opinion and US pressure to this degree. With this thesis, I hope to contribute to Japanese public opinion studies, the Japan-US alliance studies and also the studies of two-level games theory by Putnam (1988), which will act as the framework for this thesis. This thesis concludes that when politicians are influenced by a strong internalized pressure to support their ally, and have a strong political leader whose preferences are in line with the state’s ally, the pressure from the military ally weighs more than public opinion. If these two factors are not fulfilled, then public opinion weighs more than pressure from a military ally on politicians.

This thesis begins by exploring what public opinion is, its influence, and how it can be measured. This thesis defines public opinion as “opinions held by private persons which governments find it prudent to heed” (Key 1961: 14). It then proceeds to discuss the pluralist and elitist schools of thought on public opinion. Due to space considerations I have selected key works that represent the most common arguments. The pluralist view is that public opinion can affect policy to various degrees (Key 1961, Page and Shaphiro 1992, Watanabe 1977, Sobel 1993, Eldridge & Midford 2008, and Midford 2011). The elitist view is that public opinion does not matter, because it is too volatile and incoherent (Lippman 1925, Almond 1950, 1956). Other elitist researchers also point to the media’s power to influence public opinion (Shinoda 2007, Hollstein 2008), and the power of interest groups (Scheiner 2006). This part concludes with defining public opinion as a variable that can be measured via polls, and its potential effect through opinion majorities.

The next part of this thesis defines what an alliance is, alliance considerations (Walt 1987, Snyder 1997) and forms of pressure from an alliance partner, including its effectiveness (Schoppa 1997). The thesis defines a military alliance as a formal agreement between two or several states that adds legal obligation to further the common security goals of the alliance partners (Snyder 1997: 7-9). It goes on to discuss alliance considerations like moral obligations to support your ally in interests outside of the formal contract, and the alliance security dilemma (Snyder 1997). Based off of the discussion, this part defines the variable of pressure from a military ally with two dimensions: bargaining pressure (a form of pressure applied directly to an alliance partner to gain a form of support), and internalized pressure (the internal pressure in a state to support its ally outside of the contractual arrangements).

After this, the thesis introduces the two-level games theory as a framework for this study (Putnam 1988, Evans et.al 1993). Two-level games theory is a way to think about the entanglements of domestic and international politics. It utilizes the role of a chief negotiator (such as the Prime Minister, or President) to find overlapping “win-sets”. Win-sets represent
the policy constraints of the domestic level and the international level, and the negotiator must attempt to find overlapping policy constraints that both levels can agree on.

The thesis then moves on to discuss the methodology. The first part discusses the case selection of Japan’s role in the Gulf War and Iraq Invasion, based on Mill’s Method of Difference (Mill 1843: Ch. 8). Afterwards, it discusses the strength and weaknesses of case studies, and how we can utilize process-tracing and the multiple-congruence procedure. Finally, it discusses some methodological barriers.

The next parts of the thesis are the two case studies, Japan’s role in the Gulf War, and the Iraq Invasion. The Gulf War chapter begins with a brief outline of the Japan-US alliance, and Japanese public opinion before the Gulf War. It then becomes an in-depth case study on Japan’s role in the Gulf War. It presents empirical data in a chronological fashion of the Japanese perspective before, during and after the Gulf War. It focuses on data relevant to the independent and dependent variables: public opinion, pressure from a military ally, and policy outcome. After each period of the case, I analyze the influence of public opinion and the US pressure on Japan. After this, the thesis looks at the case from the two-level games perspective. The first case’s findings indicate that public opinion weighs more than pressure from a military ally.

The next chapter is a case study of Japan’s role in the Iraq Invasion. Like the previous chapter, it presents empirical data relevant to the independent and dependent variables, analyzing them before, during and after the Iraq Invasion, before analyzing the case through the two-level games theory’s perspective. The findings from this case indicate that pressure from a military ally weighs more than public opinion.

The final chapter discusses the findings of the thesis. As I discussed above, this study finds that when politicians are influenced by a strong internalized pressure to support their ally, and have a strong political leader whose preferences are in line with the state’s ally, the pressure from the military ally weighs more than public opinion. If these two factors are not fulfilled, then public opinion weighs more than pressure from a military ally on politicians. These factors help explain the different policy outcomes to the two case studies. The conclusion also shows that by not ratifying the dispatch policy with the Japanese public, Prime Minister Koizumi and his party lost upper house control in the parliament the subsequent election, thereby demonstrating that the public can exert vetoes or partial vetoes on agreements through public opinion majorities, but more importantly, through elections.
Theory

“… if a democracy is to exist, the belief must be widespread that public opinion, at least in the long run, affects the course of public action.” (Key 1961: 547)

The theoretical part of this paper will have three main parts. The two first parts focus on the independent variables of this research. I will define public opinion, its importance and effects in general, in relation to the thesis, and how we will measure and use it. Additional attention will be given to Japanese contextual issues regarding public opinion. Next I will define pressure from a military ally. I will begin with defining what an alliance is, and introduce the alliance dilemma and alliance dynamics. I will then discuss bargaining pressure and internalized pressure, its effectiveness (Schoppa 1997), how it creates different considerations for politicians (especially for Japan), and I will define it as a variable.

The last section will establish the framework for our analysis: It will act as a way of thinking about the relationships and interactions between the variables. The framework for this paper will use Putnam’s (1988) Two-Level Games Theory, which is a way of thinking about the entanglements between domestic and international politics.

Public Opinion

The influence of public opinion is an important part of the thesis. I will therefore introduce and discuss several theories about public opinion. The key points I want to focus on are whether public opinion can affect policy, and how we can measure it as a variable. First I will define public opinion as this, using Key’s definition: “opinions held by private persons which governments find it prudent to heed” (Key 1961: 14), as I think this sums it up very accurately. There are basically two schools of thought. One is the pluralistic school, who argue public opinion can affect policy (to various degrees). The pluralist works include among others V.O. Key (1961), Page & Shaphiro (1992), Watanabe (1977), Sobel (1993), Eldridge & Midford (2008) and Midford (2011).

The other one is the elitist school, who argue that elites like politicians and bureaucrats, act as a guardian of the public, and have a more paternalistic approach to it. On the elitist side, we have Lippman (1925), Almond (1950, 1956), Shinoda (2007b), Scheiner (2006), Katzenstein (2008) and Hollstein (2008). This side carries more diverse views as to why
public opinion matters less, as will be detailed below. Both schools can include both
behavioral and normative arguments. In this research paper, the pluralistic view will gain
credibility when public opinion outweighs alliance concerns. The elitist view will gain
credibility when alliance concerns trumps public opinion.

The list of literature covering public opinion is far too extensive to discuss in its
entirety in this thesis. I have therefore selected works that represent the main arguments of the
pluralist and elitist directions. Since the field of study is Japan, extra attention has been given
to works detailing Japanese public opinion.

One of the main arguments against the influence of public opinion is the notion that
public opinion is unstable and often made up of nonattitudes. Lippman ([1925] 1992: 20) in
his The Phantom Public presents the sobering argument against the idea that the public is
inherently competent to have a say in public affairs. This is due to a lack of significantly
detailed knowledge of the problems that need to be solved (ibid: 36-37). Further research after
the Second World War continued in the same vein, (for example by Almond 1950, 1956) and
what came to be called the Lippman-Almond consensus, broadly agreed that public opinion
was too volatile, lacked any structure or coherency, and had little impact on foreign policy

Furthermore, politicians and bureaucrats are in their respective positions because they
have access to detailed knowledge, and draws upon this knowledge to make informed
decisions (usually, at least). If the public lack detailed knowledge of the issues they are
concerned (or indifferent) of, then public influence on policy could be suboptimal. This is a
normative democratic problem of should public opinion affect policy? However, this begs our
question of does public opinion affect policy? If so, how can we expect the public to affect
policy? The remainder of this section will be used to answer this.

One of the leading researchers arguing for the plurality approach is Key (1961), who
in his Public Opinion and American Democracy argues that while public opinion can seem
erratic in the short-term, long-term opinion will show the underlying tendencies of public
opinion, which are based on fundamental values and new information. These long-term
opinions affect policy because politicians must pay some heed to public opinion lest they lose
their position. As such, Key argues that the importance of public opinion becomes a
prerequisite for a democracy to function at all (Key 1961: 546).

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1 For more on this, see Converse (1970). Converse’s main argument is that the public doesn’t hold meaningful
Arguably the most important issue here is to explain why public opinion seems unstable. Key explains the instability of short-term opinions with three factors: Individuals can be “sluggish” and “erratic” (ibid: 239). These are reactions to “stimuli”, which Key defines as “objects of political attention” (ibid: 243). Stimuli can be anything within that definition, like news or elections. When people respond to this new information, sometimes the response is “sluggish”. This means the response is strongly colored by underlying beliefs, values, indoctrination and so on. On the other hand, a person can have an erratic response to stimuli. The erratic response is based on the person’s inability to correctly understand, appreciate, or interpret this new information (ibid: 239). In relation to this, there can also be group-induced long-term stability in opinions. Here, group norms and values affect opinion (ibid: 247). For the purpose of this thesis, it is worth keeping this in mind in relation to Japan’s consensus- and group-oriented society. Especially, how do SDF dispatches appear to the public in view of their anti-militaristic values?

Because the public isn’t directly split in a two-party system (or more parties) based on party loyalty, but also votes over issue preference (ibid: 164, 462-466), politicians gain more incentive to pay heed to public opinion. This incentive grows when there are fewer cushions politicians have to fall back on if they lose an election. Candidate-oriented opinion can be misleading, because it plays an important role, but determining exactly why an individual likes the candidate is difficult, and it is inherently different from policy oriented opinion and voting (ibid: 247-253).

While Key’s arguments are backed up by research, a strong point about his argument is that we can logically deduce the same conclusions as Key. Since public opinion can reflect tendencies for voter preference, it is natural that politicians have incentive to follow this up to some degree so they do not lose an election. This does beg the question of whether public opinion only then matter when an election is near. I will consider this in the thesis analysis. In his conclusion, Key argues that while politicians will not necessarily acknowledge the importance of public opinion with more than a nod on the head, they are genuinely concerned about it (ibid: 547). If public opinion did not matter, all the opinion polls would be for naught. But as Akio Watanabe (in Watanabe 1977: 106) points out, because the (Japanese) government and media conducts so much polling, public opinion must necessarily exert some degree of influence, or the polling would be meaningless.

If we take it that public opinion matters as Key’s theory argues, the next question we need to answer is what form of public opinion matters. Building upon among others Key, Page & Shaphiro (1992) tries to answer this question. Page & Shaphiro argue the public
develop underlying opinions over time depending on available information on issues, and that perceived instability is due to measurement errors. A clear policy issue with clear choices can create stable, underlying (even wise) opinions (ibid: 8). They credit information availability as an important reason behind underlying opinions forming over time. In other words, media coverage plays a very important role, and as issues are more exposed in the media, the public forms basic, informed opinions. This also opens up the possibility for the public to be misled by media coverage. While individuals can have some unstable opinions, collective public opinion can show stable opinions over time (ibid: 12-14).

Page & Shaphiro go against the elitist argument by showing that the instability-arguments are due to measurement errors. These measurements errors are based on faulty polling of public opinion. For example, changing question wordings – even if they essentially are the same questions - can produce different responses. Other problems include asking political trivia questions to measure whether the public is “informed”, which is arguably fairly irrelevant from both the respondents side, and to measure public opinion on important issues (ibid: 4-8, 12-23). The reason this is irrelevant is, as Anthony Downs argues, because an “informed” public is not realistic in itself, as this requires perfect information. Moreover, it is not rational to put that much effort into voting, as a single vote will rarely affect the outcome (Downs 1957). Measurement errors can be cancelled out by using large surveys and aggregate opinions: So while individual opinions can fluctuate some, collective average-, majority- and plurality opinions will be fairly stable (Page and Saphiro 1992: 15-17). An individual’s opinions can fluctuate based on new information he gets (ibid), if he’s ambivalent about a policy and is considering different choices (Hochschild [1981] 1992: 15), or if he’s picks an answer randomly due to the pressure of the interview situation (Zaller and Feldman [1988] 1992: 15). Research has also shown that policy change follows majority national public opinion change 2/3 of the time (Page and Saphiro 1992: 2).

Page & Shaphiro’s research is based on polling in the US, but they note that their research is generally applicable (ibid: 17). Their research results on long-term opinions are not specifically catered to the US, so I will use their research as parts of my hypotheses, which are focused on Japan.

Similar methodology has previously been used to look at public opinion’s influence on security policy. Paul Midford (Eldridge & Midford eds. 2008, Midford 2011) argues stable, coherent majority opinion can constrain political action. This research is Japan-focused, and Midford argues that opinion majorities can restrain SDF overseas dispatches (Midford 2011: 3, 21). Additionally, Watanabe (1977: 123-124) has shown strong congruency between public
opinion in Japan and the policy towards Korea regarding the establishment of relations after the war. His argument is that the Ikeda administration in Japan delayed diplomatic relations to the Republic of Korea due to public opposition, and that the US-Japan treaty extension in 1970 would have come sooner if not for strong public opposition. Watanabe concludes that public opinion can act as a constraint or delay. He notes that public opinion reviews Japan’s foreign policy in terms of Japanese national independence (ibid: 144-145). This is highly relevant for this thesis, as the use of Japan’s Self-Defense Forces could be seen as Japan trying to stand on their own feet in foreign territory, instead of relying on their alliance with the US. Midford’s (2011) argument that Japanese public opinion is moving from an anti-militaristic attitude\(^2\) towards a defensive-realist attitude in recent years, supports this notion.

What can we draw from the pluralist explanations of public opinion? First, Key’s definition of what public opinion is (“opinions held by private persons which governments find it prudent to heed”). Second, the most common measurement of public opinion is polls. Third, seemingly unstable and fluctuating opinions have two causes: The individual’s ability to comprehend (available) new information, and underlying beliefs, and measurement errors in polls. Also, elections can be important, as they can show a connection between public opinion and voting behavior. These measurement errors can be cancelled by collective opinion measurement, as Page and Saphiro argues. This makes the use of opinion polls a fairly accurate measure. Because an individual needs new information to form a real opinion, the media plays a crucial role. Finally, stable, long-term underlying opinions can be found by looking at coherent majority opinions over time. These public majority opinions (usually measured through polls) can affect policy. However, these views can be contrasted to more elitist views.

Since this the area of this study is Japan, I will focus on the elitist perspective on public opinion found in Japan. I have previously discussed the Lippman-Almond consensus, and mentioned Converse. Their elitist view has traditionally been the dominant view of Japanese public opinion, with public opinion to some degree being dismissed (Midford: 4 in Eldridge & Midford 2008).

There are also other arguments against public opinion in Japan. For example, Tomohito Shinoda (2007b) thinks that while Japanese public opinion in some ways can influence politicians in giving them leeway to do or not to do things, opinions are largely formed by the media. While Shapiro & Page certainly argues that media plays an important

\(^2\) For more on Japan’s anti-militarism, which is arguably different than simply pacifism, see Berger (1993, 2003).
role, we need to distinguish the media as acting like an information-highway to the public, who then collectively can form (potentially wise) opinions, and Shinoda’s argument that the opinions are molded by it. Mark Hollstein supports Shinoda’s argument in his chapter “Insider and Outsider Media Discourse about the SDF Dispatch to Iraq” (Hollstein 2008) where he asserts that the government has the ability to “use the media to articulate its position and advance its frames.” (ibid: 120).

Another criticism against public opinion – according to Peter J. Katzenstein – is that it only functions as an unspecific broad limitation, because of non-congruent public opinion and policy since the 1950’s. Politicians deal with this restraint by incremental changes and is thus not very affected by public opinion as far as foreign policy goes, though public opinion may slow it down somewhat (Katzenstein 2008: 67-69). Kono adds that since the LDP (The Liberal Democratic Party of Japan) has been a dominant party for many years, they have tended not to care too much about public opinion (interview with Kono 2011). Of course, the LDP has been in a weaker position since the end of the last century, and has had periods of unstable lower house majorities (late 1970s), non-majorities in the upper house (from 1989), and loss of power (1993-1994). However, this view might explain the incongruence between public opinion and policy after the war that Katzenstein talks about.

An alternative view in favor of the elitist side is one held by Ethan Scheiner. In his work *Democracy Without Competition in Japan* (2006) he argues that the reason the LDP has stayed so long in power has been favorable state and election structures, where governing power can direct resources to different groups in exchange for their votes. Scheiner uses the term “clientelism” to describe this, in which groups like dentists associations, farmers associations and construction companies are swayed to vote in favor of the ruling party, getting benefits in return. While Scheiner explains this in terms of why there is so-called “opposition failure”, the implicit argument we can take from this would be that because elections are so largely decided by this system, the government can safely put public opinion aside, true to the elitist model. In other words, because of the benefits interest groups receive they are largely insensitive to other issues. However, we can at the same time argue that this view is weakened by the fact that the Democratic Party of Japan gained power in 2009. Not to mention the LDP’s loss of upper house control from 1989. One could argue that if Scheiner’s hypothesis was right, there should have been less opposition success before 1989 than was actually seen too.

Thus, the elitist view contrasts the pluralist one. A premise for the pluralist argument is that public opinion influences politicians. However, if these politicians do not have
incentive to heed it (Scheiner), or can mold it (Shinoda, Hollstein), then public opinion means less. Additionally, there are the previously mentioned arguments of Converse and Lippman about nonattitudes and ignorance of the public. We might also consider the possibility that all of these arguments can hold true, in different situations. For example, a politician influenced by public opinion might have his policy delayed by clientilist groups, but not stopped. Or that molding public opinion can work, but not necessarily consistently. None the less, the goal behind this research is to decide which matters more between public opinion and pressure from a military ally, in the case of Japan. Therefore the full extent of how public opinion operates, for example how it is formed, is beyond the scope of this paper. The two different takes on public opinion gives us two possible explanations of why – or why not – public opinion weighs more. Moreover, I think we can draw the alliance pressure presented in the next part, together with the elitist public opinion argument – that conservative politicians not very influenced by public opinion, can be more inclined toward responding to alliance pressure. This means that we can also set up the public opinion vs. alliance test as a pluralist vs. elitist test.

With the literature in mind, I will define public opinion as an independent variable for the purpose of this paper. Public opinion itself is “opinions held by private persons which governments find it prudent to heed”. The most reliable way to measure it is public opinion polls. These polls will be analyzed as long-term opinions and can be measured collectively and as majority opinions. Polls can be prone to measurement errors due to different wording, faulty questions (or missing answers) as mentioned by Page & Shaphiro. These effects can be negated by looking at the long-term and collective opinions. The last important point is that we are considering public opinion majorities as the variable. That means that if the opinions are not stable over the long-term (at least months), we cannot expect them to influence policy.

*Pressure from a Military Ally*

In this part I will define pressure from a military ally as a variable. The alliance literature is very large, so I will draw from two very influential alliance works, namely *The Origins of Alliances* by Stephen Walt (1987) and Glenn Snyder’s *Alliance Politics* (1997). I will also draw some pressure discussion from Schoppa (1997). The variable is “pressure from a military ally”, which means we need to understand how an ally can exert this pressure, what kind of pressure, why, and consequences of giving in to it or not. I will first define what a military alliance is, based on the discussion by Snyder (1997: 7-9): a military alliance is a
formal agreement between two or several states that adds legal obligation to further the common security goals of the alliance partners.

On the theoretical side, Walt (1987) explains alliance formations as a result of “balance of threat” (or rather, perceived threat). This means that states ally to balance against other states based on their power (military, economy, population etc.) plus the perceived aggressive intentions from that state; together they equal the perceived level of threat. Alliance formation has two general natures, balancing and bandwagoning. Balancing is when a state joins an alliance to balance against another perceived threat, while bandwagoning is allying with the threatening state (Walt 1987: 17). In general, balancing is the dominant form of alliance formation (Walt 1987, Snyder 1997).

While power can be reasonably quantified (Walt 1987: 274-275, 289-291), the perception of threat is more ambiguous. Factors that determine the level of threat include aggregate power (ibid), geographic proximity, offensive capabilities and aggressive intentions. Basically, the further away a state is, the less threatening it appears. Their offensive capabilities such as power projection create more threat. Aggressive intentions are the most ambiguous, because it is hard for states to each other’s intentions (Walt: 22-28). This is a problematic aspect of Walt’s argument, since aggressive intentions can come down to a guessing game between states. What we really would be measuring though, are the perception that a state has of another’s aggressive intentions, which we can measure qualitatively. Walt also argues that common ideology can matter, but only to a modest degree, so it is not a crucial part of the alliance (ibid: 181).

In other words, the reasons for the formation of an alliance are explained through these factors, and are what defines the main common cause for the allies. The details of the obligations the allies commit themselves to varies, but the pillars of the alliance are usually common causes in response to a perceived threat. It then follows that if the common cause ceases to exist, or one part fails its obligations (explicitly or normatively), the alliance is in danger. This relates to pressure from a military ally, as there will be some form of pressure to fulfill these obligations and work toward the common goal of the alliance.

Snyder (1997) deals with alliance management, which “… involves pursuing both common interests and competitive interests and thus is essentially a process of bargaining” (Snyder 1997: 165). What Snyder is saying is that an alliance is a process of bargaining by states to reach these interests. In this process there are different forms of actions an ally can take, and considerations that must be contemplated (respectively bargaining pressure and internalized pressure). The management of the alliance involves different forms of pressure,
and I will use Snyder’s management theory to detail how and why pressure occurs, and how we can measure it in the form of a variable.

In managing an alliance, each ally has bargaining power. This bargaining power can be used implicitly or explicitly to apply pressure to an ally. The amount of bargaining power one ally has depends mainly on three aspects: A state’s dependence on the other ally, a state’s commitment to the alliance, and a state’s interest in the specific issue that is being bargained about. In general, a state gains this power the less it depends on the ally, the less committed it is to the alliance and the more interest it carries for a particular issue (ibid: 165). Dependence relates to a state’s need for military assistance (such as more personnel, power projection ability, firepower and so on), and the degree an ally fulfills that need. States also need to consider alternative way to fulfill that need (like a unilateral arming strategy) (ibid: 166). Commitment is the state’s commitment to the alliance. Snyder describes two different levels of commitment: The commitment to the alliance’s contractual agreement (like responses to events like an invasion), and a state’s aid to an ally’s interest (such as supporting its ally in other things than what is defined within the contractual agreement, like political or economic support in an international dispute).

When it comes to commitment, a state can bargain by for example withholding military support. However, as Snyder notes, this is a form of tactical bargaining. Depending on the situation, it might be a form of rhetoric. Ironically, the weaker state may have the upper hand when it comes to commitment, because an asymmetrical power relationship in an alliance means the stronger state needs to seriously commit to help the weaker state, because this weak state depends on the strong state’s military support. On the other hand, the weaker state can threaten to withdraw support because the strong state is not necessarily dependent upon this support (ibid: 168-170).

The last factor is interests, or rather, the interest the allies bear towards a specific issue. An issue that is very important for one ally can give that respective state more bargaining power regarding that issue. In terms of bargaining, there are two dimensions. On one hand, the allies have one or more dependent interests, usually the main reason(s) the alliance was formed. On the other hand, these allies can have conflicting interests. The conflicting interests can be disagreement on which actions or methods to take on the dependent interest, or conflicting interests outside the formal agreement (ibid: 170-171). The biggest conflicting interests usually arise with international crises (ibid). To use an example: Ally X has an adversary Z. X wants ally Y to support them. The conflict of interest could then revolve around ally Y’s degree of support. Would Y only commit to political support, or help their
ally militarily? Or would they try to restrain their ally from military action? It is possible to look at it from another angle: whether an ally prioritizes the long-term alliance as a whole, or short-term interests, which could be the real deal-breaker when it comes to support or not. This is why “interests” are so important in the alliance management process.

In *What American Pressure Can and Cannot Do* (1997), Schoppa, from a political economy point of view in the context of US pressure on Japan, argues that US pressure can influence Japanese policy. Moreover, he argues that it is most effective when the Japanese domestic political arena’s preferences are supportive of the US policy, either because it is seen as in Japan’s national interest, or because politicians will use this external pressure (I will use the term bargaining pressure) to their own gains.

How can we relate these three factors to the pressure variable? First off, bargaining power equals power to pressure your opponent to do as you want. This means that a state can exert more pressure the less it is dependent on its ally (and/or the more dependent the ally is on the state), the less committed it is to the alliance and the more interest it has in a particular issue. To exert pressure, a state can look to strengthen its military position to be less dependent, or look for another ally. I would characterize the former as internalized pressure because the state tries to pressure the opponent by changing itself. The latter would be bargaining pressure, because the state would threaten to change alliances.

When it comes to commitment, a state can threaten to leave the alliance, lessening its own commitment. It can also pressure its ally to commit more. These are both directly applied bargaining pressures towards an ally. The last factor, interests, rather than being a form of pressure, is the factor that along with the long- and short-term dimensions of a state’s interest, decides if and how much pressure a state wants to put on its ally, and whether it is in the state’s interest to stay allied at all.

Another dimension regarding pressure, is the “alliance security dilemma”. This is a state’s fear of being abandoned by its ally, and the fear of being entrapped in an ally’s conflict. These fears are based on a worst-case scenario, which politicians often tend to do when it comes to security policy (though perhaps not to the degree that defense officials would) (ibid: 192), but the scenarios are still very real and something they need to keep in mind. The dilemma is basically how to balance commitment to the alliance. If a state does not commit sufficiently to the alliance, their ally may abandon them. But if they commit too much, they might get entrapped in a war that is not in their national interest (ibid: 181-186).

There are several ways this dilemma can be dealt with. If a state is concerned about abandonment, Snyder argues it should establish a reputation for loyalty – especially because a
reputation for disloyalty comes quicker than reputation for loyalty (ibid: 184, 314). The most efficient way to deal with entrapment is to try to restrain an ally from military action as far as possible (ibid: 186). Entrapment is in general easier to “correct” than abandonment, and can be done by loosening commitment or withhold support on particular issues. Because the bar for abandonment is so high (a more realistic outcome would be to punish an ally, not leave the alliance), and the consequences dire if it happens, abandonment is the riskier issue. However, entrapment in a war not in one’s interest can also be very dire. For example, one could imagine a state getting entrapped in a nuclear exchange between two superpowers. A state needs to evaluate the cost of moving towards an ally and possible entrapment, or facing abandonment. (ibid: 313-315).

What are the methods of pressure that can be applied in these cases? In the case of avoiding entrapment, a state should seek to restrain their ally by pressure via discussions and consultations. The state can threaten to withhold support or defect from the alliance, and point out that the alliance is a defensive one in nature. This method of pressure relies upon the credibility of the threat made. For the ally that is pressured in this way, it must weigh what it gives up by succumbing and the harm if it does not succumb to the pressure (ibid: 320-326).

A question that begs an answer is what a state should do if an ally asks for support on something outside of the contractual agreements in the alliance. Snyder argues that all alliances bear an “alliance Halo”, in that by becoming allies, the respective states value alliance norms and obligations. These obligations create expectations of support, also outside the contractual support (ibid: 356-364). Thus, a state is expected to support their ally on issues outside the alliance agreements. The exception is when this issue conflicts with the state’s interests. It then becomes the question of the “interest” dimension we discussed above, and thinking long-term or short-term. In other words, an ally can carry internalized pressure in regards to alliance obligations to support their ally, outside the contractual agreements.

Finally, bargaining pressure is more effective when the domestic political actors see the pressure as in their national interest, or when they can use it to further their own policies.

Using this theory, I will now define “pressure from a military ally” as a variable. First, this “pressure” is to a state via intermediates such as politicians or diplomats. The pressure comes from their military ally, via its intermediates. It has two dimensions. The first dimension internalized pressure, the second is bargaining pressure. Internalized pressure is the pressure to fulfill the formal or informal expectations of the alliance partner, which are to work towards the common interest of the alliance and the reason it was formed, and to support one’s ally on other issues as well. A main factor of internalized pressure is that is focuses on
the ally’s role outside the actual, contractual obligations. Following Walt, a crucial reason for alliance-formation is to balance out a threat. Bargaining pressure is pressure exerted as a form of bargaining. This can be one state threatening to leave the alliance, or to ask for support on an issue. To measure this variable, we need to look at the actions of the politicians with the power to do this. How can we use the variable in testing the hypotheses? We can look at several factors: The congruence of pressure being made compared to the policy of the state under pressure, and whether it is internalized or bargaining pressure. Additionally, we will use process-tracing (see method chapter below) to see how this pressure affected the politicians.

Framework: Putnam’s Two-Level Games Theory

Putnam’s two-level games theory (1988) is a way to think about the entanglements of domestic and international politics. It is basically a framework for understanding how diplomacy and domestic politics interact.

Putnam’s Two Level theory is a game theory where a chief negotiator must consider demands from two different levels (see figures below). The negotiator is usually a statesman with the power and/or authority to somehow negotiate forth a policy that can satisfy the domestic level (level 2) and the international level (level 1). To be more specific, we need to look at the empirical evidence for each case, and infer which statesmen have the negotiating role. Putnam primarily refers to a “chief negotiator” for each state. Examples of negotiators can be the Prime Minister (influenced by his Cabinet, the politicians in the ruling coalition, diplomats and so on), the head of an organization or business and so on. The domestic level can in theory be any group of people that somehow represent a domestic interest, for example an organization or company. For this thesis, Level 2 is public opinion (Putnam states public opinion is a valid level, see Putnam 1988: 436), and level 1 is pressure from a military ally. The negotiator must then try to find overlapping “win-sets” (see figure 1.1).

Win-sets are basically successful negotiations. They are agreements that in some way or another satisfy both level 2 and level 1. The larger the win-sets, the more likely a mutual ratification is to take place, i.e. the demands from both levels need to overlap. These win-sets can be voluntarily defected from if a negotiator is not willing to go through with the deal after it is been placed, but the consequences of this (lost reputation and credibility) is high, and so the bigger problem is involuntary defection (ibid: 437-439). Involuntary defection refers to the negotiator’s “deliver-ability”, the ability to deliver on the terms of agreement which have been reached.
For example, if the Japanese Prime Minister promises the US to dispatch the SDF, but is unable to dispatch it because of public opinion later on, the Prime Minister (the negotiator) has involuntarily defected from the deal. Win-sets and perceptions of possible involuntary defections can thus be used by the negotiator in his favor when negotiating on level 1, for example by claiming his win-set as small, forcing the opponent to give in to more demands. Putnam’s framework has previously not been used to analyze security policy and public opinion this way, but Yasuaki (2005) has used two-level games for looking at Japan and the Iraq Invasion in 2003. Yasuaki does not deal much with public opinion however. Two chapters in Double-edged diplomacy (Evans et.al. 1993) touch upon security policy, but they do not deal with public opinion and security policy, as this case will do.

![Win-sets illustrated as a model. Idea behind the model is from Putnam (1988).](image)

How do we read win-sets? In the model I use, the white arrows signify the total range of options for each level. If they are white, not grey, these options are either already fulfilled, irrelevant at that particular point, or outside the respective level’s constraints. The grey area’s represent the constraints of each level at the time of discussion. A black arrow indicates a constraint desired by a negotiator, but which is outside the acceptable constraints of that level’s win-set. It might not always be possible to identify what constraints are desired by a negotiator.

Putnam supposes that the agreements must be ratified by both levels, either informally or in a formal ratification process (like consent from a domestic organization etc.) Martin and Sikking (1997) argue that a ratification process can be said to have 3 forms: Approval (as Putnam supposes) where level 2 must approve of the agreement; Authorization, in which the negotiator has authorization to go through with specific deals from the domestic level, and Acquiescence: the level 2 ratification institution does not play a direct part in the ratification process before or after, but if it has significant opposition to the issue, it may try to overturn it (ibid: 352). In terms of variables, X1 is public opinion, X2 is pressure from a military ally.

Since this research paper looks at the influence of public opinion versus pressure from a military ally, I think Putnam’s theory will be an excellent framework. It gives us a point of view from which we can combine the theory of public opinion (as level 2) and the alliance
theory (as level 1), and look how they both affect policy, as the negotiator(s) evaluates and manipulates the constraints of each level.

In *Double-edged Diplomacy* (1993), Evans et.al. do case studies using Putnam’s theory as framework. The researchers were free to utilize it as they wish, and from their work, we can draw the common factors of analysis to use for this thesis. Moravcsik (1993) describes three basic building blocks for the framework: Statesmen’s manipulation of domestic constraints, the international negotiating environment, and the statesman’s preferences. These roughly correspond to Putnam’s two (three with statesmen) levels, from the statesmen’s perspective (ibid: 23).

The win-set (or constraints) for the domestic level depend not only on which interests the level has, but also on its influence. As we have discussed regarding public opinion previously, some research argues that it can matter and has some influence. It should be noted that a negotiator can expand this win-set by linking the issue in question to other issues. Putnam calls this “synergistic issue linkage”. Additionally, the more control a negotiator can exert over the domestic variable, i.e. public opinion, the more ability he or she has to shape the final agreement (ibid: 24-25, Putnam 1988: 448). This might make the negotiator more vulnerable to pressure from an ally, if the ally understands how much control said negotiator has. The negotiator might try to use the “tied hands” strategy as discussed below to avoid this. A statesman can also use “synergy”, which is using international arrangements to gain ground domestically. The domestic institutional flexibility for ratification can also be decisive (Moravcsik 1993: 26-27).

The other side of the coin becomes the international negotiating environment, or the international level. In our case this is the military alliance (pressure), and is tied up with level 2, the public opinion. A negotiator can increase the chance of reaching an agreement with a large domestic win-set. Another strategy can be to have “tied hands”, in which a negotiator attempts to constrict his win-set, in order to force the opposing negotiator closer to his own preferences. A negotiator can also exploit asymmetrical information in issues with much uncertainty, to exaggerate the constraints of his win-set. There are also options for targeting the foreign win-sets, that is, the foreign domestic groups to expand their win-set. For example, raising the cost of no-agreement for the foreign constituencies, or offering benefits to powerful foreign constituencies (ibid: 26-30).

Lastly, there are the preferences of the statesmen (the negotiators). For this, there are three main factors we need to consider: The statesman’s interest in enhancing or maintain his domestic position; his interest in mobilizing an optimal response to international imperatives;
his individual policy preferences based on his past, party or ideology. Additionally, the acceptable win-set for a statesman varies, and we can roughly categorize these types into three personas. The first persona is a negotiator that reflects the median domestic interests and is encompassed by the domestic win-set. The second persona is a negotiator that is prone to accepting a win-set closer to the foreign win-set than to his domestic win-set. The final one is a negotiator that not necessarily reflects the median domestic interest, but does not concede to the international win-set (ibid: 30-31).

To sum up the framework, it is a framework for how statesmen (as negotiators) deal with the entanglements of domestic and international agreements (overlapping win-sets). Whether the negotiator concedes more to the domestic or international win-set, will reflect whether public opinion (the domestic level) or pressure from a military ally (the international level) weighs more. There are three basic factors to analyze: How the statesmen deal with and manipulate domestic constraints, how they deal with and manipulate the international level, and their own preferences. Statesmen might also be prone to concede more to one or the other level’s win-set.

There are some challenges with Putnam’s approach: Lack of parsimony (Snyder 1997: 131), the fact that the two-level model is only in its beginning stages (Moravcsik 1993: 33) and public opinion as a level 2 actor. The first two are two sides of the same challenge. The lack of parsimony can be attributed to the complexity of Putnam’s theory. Putnam’s theory becomes complex because the two levels are fairly general, and open up for many different variables and their position for the negotiator. Because of this, I have chosen to utilize Putnam as the framework, and the respective theories for each “level” (as variables). We can say there is no universal unified theory of domestic and international politics in terms of public opinion and ally pressure. Yet, the public opinion and alliance theories help us make sense of the two “levels” in this thesis, analyze them as variables, and, through Putnam’s theory as a framework, systemize the interaction these variables (public opinion and ally pressure) have on the statesmen in terms of influence.

The challenge with applying Putnam’s two-level games theory to public opinion (as a variable and an actor), is the ratification process. Putnam supposes that an agreement need to be ratified by both levels. This poses the question of how can public opinion ratify an agreement on the international level? Focusing on public opinion as the main actor of level 2 thus necessitates some minor modifications to the theory when applying it for this particular thesis - especially since Putnam’s framework has not been applied directly to public opinion before. First, we can look back to Martin and Sikking’s (1997) Acquiescence type of
ratification, where the domestic institution for ratification does not play a direct part in the ratification of the international agreement. However, this institution may try to turn over the agreement if it has a big interest in it.

Using the *acquiescence* type of ratification as a starting point for public opinion, we can argue that public opinion does not play a *direct* part in ratification of agreements. I would argue that this is because public opinion lacks any form of immediate veto for the agreement. There are therefore basically two ways for the public to ratify an agreement (a policy): An opinion majority may indicate that the public does not informally ratify the agreement, so politicians will look to these when proposing policies and legislations. If they fail to heed this ratification process, they might suffer short-term approval ratings, and in the long-term, defying these informal ratifications might lose them their seats. This loss of seat is the second way for the public to either ratify or not ratify an agreement. Basically, unseating the government (or make them lose political power) is a veto on the agreement.

The implication of this is that politicians might only honor an international agreement in the short-run, and voluntarily defect on it before the next election, or they might be prone to only engage in short-term agreements that end before the next election, if the public does not favor it. It also introduces another distinction between ratification (not unseating the government, and not an opinion majority opposing the policy) and vetoing: A partial veto. This would mean that the government does not lose the election completely, but might suffer some “penalty”, such as loss of seats, especially if they introduce, for later to water them down, effectively reducing public opinion veto power. We might expect this in the case of an opinion plurality, or very narrow majority.

*Hypotheses*

Now that we have explained the methodological approach, the theory, defined the variables and the framework, we can finalize the hypotheses. Based on the theory, either public opinion or pressure from a military ally should weigh the most.

H₁: Because public opinion only has a vague and negligible influence on policy, pressure from a military ally weighs more on politicians when it conflicts with public opinion.

H₂: Because public opinion can exert significant influence on policy, pressure from a military ally weighs less on politicians when it conflicts with public opinion.
The $H_1$ hypothesis starts with more credibility due to the dominance of the elitist view of public opinion in Japan. When public opinion and policy are congruent, and/or process tracing shows a chain of causality from public opinion to policy, it is evidence for the $h_2$ hypothesis. Congruence, and/or when process tracing shows a chain of causality between pressure from a military ally and policy is evidence for $h_1$.

As I discussed earlier, $H_1$ can act as a test of both the elitist view of public opinion and pressure from a military ally, while $H_2$ can act as a test of the pluralist view of public opinion, and the possible influence public opinion might have.

**Methodology**

The primary methodology, along with potential challenges will be detailed and discussed here. There are three main points I want to address. The first is how the cases were selected, namely by Mill’s Method of Difference. The second point is how the hypotheses will be tested, namely process tracing and multiple-congruency procedure. The third point I will address are potential methodological challenges for this paper.

**Why Japan and the Iraq wars?**

As I discussed in the introduction, I have chosen two cases to study. These two cases are Japan’s contributions to the two different Iraq Wars in 1990-91 and 2003. The cases were selected based on Mill’s Method of Difference (Mill 1843: Ch. 8). Mill’s Method of Difference is an inductive method of comparing cases with similar characteristics, but different outcomes.

Both the Iraq War in 1990 (hereby known as the “Gulf War”) and in 2003 (hereby referred to as the “Iraq Invasion”) shared the same general characteristics, yet had different policy outcomes for Japan. In terms of similarity, both were wars where Japan’s military ally, the US demanded Japan to contribute, preferably in terms of personnel. The modern interpretation of Japan’s constitution does not allow Japan to dispatch the SDF overseas for the sake of exercising the right of collective self-defense, or for the sake of engaging in military activity. The public was largely against a dispatch of their military forces. It should
be noted that the public opinion against a dispatch for the Iraq Invasion was less uniform than in the Gulf War, as you can see in the table below, and in the empirical part of each case.

Yet, the outcome in the Gulf War was no personnel dispatch, only financial contributions. After the war, minesweepers were sent off to the Persian Gulf. On the other hand, the GSDF (Ground Self-Defense Forces) and ASDF (Air Self-Defense Forces) were dispatched to Iraq at the end of 2003 in relative proximity to arguable unsafe combat zones (Kyodo News 2003, October 15), which as the Iraq Invasion case will show, was a contented topic among the different parties. While the dispatches were of a humanitarian relief nature, it was still a big step away from the policy response after the Gulf War.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Public pro dispatch?</th>
<th>Military ally pressure:</th>
<th>Policy outcome:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gulf War</td>
<td>Opinion majority against dispatch, small pro-dispatch minority</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Minesweeper dispatch, financial contributions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq Invasion</td>
<td>Opinion majority against dispatch, large pro-dispatch minority</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>GSDF/ASDF dispatch, financial contributions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1.1 A table representing the similar characteristics, and different outcomes.

There is little clear-cut difference between the two cases, except for one difference: One could argue that the Gulf War was strategically defensive in nature, since it was to liberate Kuwait from Iraq, while the Iraq Invasion was strategically offensive, against a country who had not initiated any military action. Also, the public opinion had less of a clear margin against a dispatch compared to the Gulf War, as will be shown in the case studies.

**Research procedure**

Case studies have traditionally been seen as the weakest form of study, compared to experiments and large-N analyses: The main points of criticism have been the weak potential to make generalizations, and vulnerability to the perturbing effects of third or omitted variables. The reason case studies are difficult to generalize are due to the difficulty in discovering outliers, as opposed to a large-N study. Therefore, more case studies are needed to do generalizations (Van Evera 1997: 53-54).
Case studies have also been seen as vulnerable to third variable’s influence, due to lack of control over test conditions. An experiment allows you to carefully control all the conditions, while a large-N study (for example a statistics regression) let’s you find strong correlations between variables and exclude irrelevant ones. On the other hand, case studies can suffer from nonrandomized data (thus selection bias) and too few data points (ibid: 51). However, case studies have methods which allow a researcher to control for the impact of omitted variables: the multiple-congruence procedure and process tracing (detailed below). In this paper I will use process tracing, in addition to looking at the congruence between, for example, public opinion and policy.

The reason we can control for omitted variables is because we are selecting similar cases. If the cases are similar, the uniform conditions of these cases acts as a form of controlled environment by holding the variables constant. If we also selected cases with extreme values, it lowers the number of omitted variables strong enough to affect the dependent variable (ibid: 51-53). While the values on the cases I have picked are not extreme, they differ significantly and thus the omitted variables should not have too big of an impact.

The strength of doing a case study is that this form of hypothesis testing is very strong when it comes to hypotheses regarding politics. This is because case studies as a qualitative study allow us to examine things like political statements in a way that large-N studies cannot. These can be tied strongly to political hypotheses. It is also easier to explain how the independent variables cause the dependent variable outcome in a case study, via process tracing or congruence testing (ibid: 53-55). This is why I feel the case study method is the best one for this paper. Also, this thesis is not only testing the relationship between public opinion and policy in general, but also attempts to understand two important cases. Next I will describe the method of analysis, process tracing & multiple-congruence procedure.

Process Tracing & Multiple-Congruence Procedure

In this section I will detail the inquiry methods for this paper. I will use process tracing, and look at congruence between variables.

Process tracing is tracing the chain of events that lead to an outcome we want to study. With this method, we look at how the independent variables and the intermediate variables lead to the value of the dependent variable. This is done in a chronological fashion to uncover the causality. The chain of events (or decision-making) is uncovered by breaking the independent variables and the events that lead to the dependent variable, into smaller steps,
and finding evidence for these. There can be several or just a single chain of event(s) (ibid: 64-67). Since we are investigating the effects of public opinion and military ally pressure on politicians, it makes sense to investigate how politicians react to different opinion majorities, exposing the chain of events leading up to a policy outcome. The same would be done for ally pressure. In this process, we need essentially need to consider the different scenarios and policy options the statesmen face.

Congruence procedures test for the congruence (or incongruence) of values between the independent and dependent variables, both in the predicted and observed values. Optimally the cases should have extreme values, so that if congruence is found between the independent and dependent variables with extreme values, we have strong evidence for our test. You can either look at the congruency between variables within one case and compare with another case, or you can look at congruency between a larger number of paired variables within a case, under different circumstances (ibid: 58-63).

In our case, it makes sense to for example look at the congruency between public opinion and policy outcomes across several points in time. If public opinion affects politicians more than military ally pressure, public opinion should have a larger congruence with policy than ally pressure would (and vice versa).

Methodological Barriers

There are some methodological challenges in this paper that will be addressed. First, how long of a time delay is there between an event and it is reaction? This needs to be addressed on a case-by-case basis as we do our analysis later on. However, I think in general, the effect of public opinion (for example, a poll in a newspaper) should be given a timeframe of up to a month. It is likely that politicians reading the newspaper or conducting their own private polls could see new ones quickly, and react fast. It is also possible that they do not act rashly, but look at polls over time, or with longer intervals in between.

For example, in an interview I conducted for this thesis with the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) member Taro Kono, he told me he checked polls regarding himself about once a month (interview with Kono by author 2011). For this paper the interview methodology is a minor issue since only one interview was conducted. Kono gave his consent to use his name and quotations from the interview. The interview was audio recorded, and then transcribed word for word.
How was the public opinion polls selected? Public opinion polls from Japan were collected based on having a representation of liberal, conservative and moderate bias among the poll conductors. The pollers were rated as the following political orientations: Asahi, Japan Times (liberal), Yomiuri, Nikkei (conservative), NHK (moderate).3

Another problem when using the polls from Japanese media is that they often does not reveal their margin of error, or make second or third line data available.

There might also be some bias in the other sources. The media coverage of politicians can present things differently. For example, we will need to take care of bias when a liberal media source like Asahi Shimbun covers conservative policy, or conservative politicians. I use some government documents and texts, which might present some positive bias toward the government or state. Secondary academic sources might have interpreted information one way or the other, or have a personal bias. I also use the memoirs of Armacost (1996), which could be prone to US bias. To overcome these source biases, I will attempt to find multiple sources when presenting empirical data, where possible, especially on controversial points.

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3 The political orientation was decided on through advice from the Norwegian University of Science and Technology’s post-doctoral researcher Natsuyo Ishibashi and Professor Paul Midford, director of the Japan Program at NTNU.
Japan and the Gulf War

“The biblical injunction ‘From those to whom much has been given, much will be asked’ seemed pertinent.” (Armacost 1996: 104)

Background

This chapter will analyze Japan’s role in the Gulf War in light of Putnam’s framework and the variables that account for the policy outcome. The Gulf War is the conflict that entailed Iraq’s invasion and annexation of Kuwait in 1990-1991. Kuwait was liberated by UN authorized multinational coalition forces in 1991. This case study finds that public opinion weighs more than pressure from a military ally.

We first need to understand the background of Japan’s alliance with the US Japan has been a military ally with the US since 1952. The relationship began as a way to guarantee Japanese security, and Japan became a reliable ally over the years, as a foothold for the American military presence in East-Asia. This was particularly important during the cold war, as Russia stretches into Asia, and there were different proxy-wars fought between the US, China and the USSR in Korea and Vietnam. American bases in Japan allowed for effective deployment of personnel and supplies.

For Japan, the US military presence meant they were guaranteed military protection and could focus on building up their economy, a policy which has been dubbed the “Yoshida-doctrine”. The US also provided Japan with extended nuclear deterrence through their alliance with Japan. This way Japan can avoid serious debates about having to build their own nuclear arsenal to deter, for example, China and North-Korea. However, the US bases create other domestic controversies (Johnson 1999). After the cold war ended, the alliance has been revised to reflect post-cold war conditions, and the revised Japan-US treaty guidelines in 1997 expanded further cooperation for the defense of Japan, and in areas close to Japan. Article 9 in the Japanese constitution, states that Japan may not maintain military forces. This has been

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4 The Treaty of San Francisco came into full force in 1952, and the security cooperation between Japan and the US was expanded on in Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan in 1960. The alliance specifies that both countries must assist in the defense of Japanese administered territories. Japan is therefore under no legal obligation to defend the US, or dispatch personnel overseas to support the US.

5 The reason this is vaguely stated is to not send strong signals to China about a potential defense of Taiwan, and the definition of areas close to Japan is situational (Midford 2004: 124).
interpreted in various ways over the years, but the key interpretation is that modern-day Japan has so-called “self-defense forces” with no real power projection ability, and that this does not constitute the “war potential”, that is banned under Article 9. This de-facto military is technologically very advanced, with a budget of roughly 1% of Japan’s GDP.

*Japanese Public Opinion Pre-Gulf War*

Japanese public opinion toward the military after the Pacific War has been one of military distrust. As Thomas Berger argues (1993, 2003), Japan’s overall attitude has been that of antimilitarism, not specifically pacifistic. This means that while the general public finds it necessary to have some form of state protection from outside forces, it does not trust the state to control its military forces. This belief can largely be attributed to the Japanese Army’s takeover of security policy during the 1930’s, and the aggressive expansionism that followed. Japan got trapped in a war on two fronts against China and the US, with devastating military and civilian losses, culminating in the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Public opinion gradually came to accept the Japanese Self-Defense Forces over time. This happened with incremental changes to the SDF’s role (Midford 2011: 67, Katzenstein 2008: 67-69), and the public came to accept the SDF as a defensive army whose main utility is humanitarian aid and disaster-relief (henceforth referred to as ‘HADR’). Overseas dispatch of the SDF had opinion majority support for HADR⁶, while the plurality (46% opposed vs. 22% support) was against SDF dispatch to conflicts, such as UN peacekeeping operations (Prime Minister’s Office 1989: 12).

*Japan’s Initial Reaction to the Gulf War*

As Iraq attacked and occupied Kuwait at the start of August 1990, a cabinet meeting regarding this event was held in Japan. Tokyo initially froze Iraqi assets in Japan as their first response. President Bush was quick to call the Prime Minister Kaifu to request cooperation for economic sanctions to which the Prime Minister’s cabinet quickly responded to. The sanctions were announced early in August, and included an embargo on Iraqi and Kuwait oil, suspension of all financial transactions with Iraq, and a freeze on foreign aid to Iraq.

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⁶ In Hook (1996): 114, the author cites the numbers as a “high two-thirds to three-quarters ... opposed ... the SDF dispatch”.
congruent with the UN sanctions announced a few days later, though these also included arms embargoes (Armacost 1996: 98-99, Heinrich Jr. 1997: 143-144).

There were two notable factors regarding this decision. The Director General of the Defense Agency was not called in for the decision-making process. While this was not unusual in itself since the armed forces had not been seen as an instrument for foreign policy for decades, it points out that this issue was not treated as a war or crisis.

Second, part of the discussion was whether Japan should risk angering one of their larger oil suppliers in solidarity with the United States. While Iraq and Kuwait was the source of (only) 12% of Japan’s oil imports at the time, Japan could face serious consequences if Iraq were to attack Saudi Arabia and establish greater control of the oil in the Middle-East. Tokyo was still wary of the 1973 oil shock that had shaken the Japanese economy. Iraq also owed large debts to Japanese companies (about 600 billion yen), that might not be recovered if Japan were to side with the US (Heinrich Jr. 1997: 143). As such, the cabinet did not initially agree on what to do, but increased pressure from the US and worries about the energy supplies created a relatively quick initial response. The Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama was quick to point out that supporting the US was the obvious choice, since the US guaranteed for Japanese security (Heinrich Jr. 1997: 143).

The first actions of the Japanese government was unilateral, that is to say, it did not have anything to do with US pressure or alliance concerns. Freezing assets of states in conflict is a logical reaction. Neither was public opinion an important factor in the beginning. The conflict was far away, and most Japanese were more concerned about the consumption tax introduction. At this point there was no talk of personnel dispatch or SDF involvement. There was no HADR missions as of yet, nor did the politicians mention the public. As such we can conclude that at this point public opinion played no role in influencing policy, but at this time, public opinion was not in direct conflict with US pressure. However, it serves as a good background and starting point for the rest of the case.

The rest of the actions however, were influenced by their alliance with the US. First, we can roughly trace the decision-making process for the first sanctions. The cabinet meeting was held in order to decide further actions regarding Iraq. Their concern had two dimensions: domestic oil supply, and the alliance with the US. While Iraq and Kuwait accounted for “only” about a tenth of Japanese oil supply, they had to consider further expansionism by Iraq as a possibility. If they decided on strong measures against Iraq, they might have trouble securing oil from them in the future. If they did not go through with strong measures, they risked that much of their (Arabian) oil supply could come under Iraqi control, but at least their
relationship with the current Hussein regime would be better. This train of thought somewhat reflects a worse-case scenario, as Snyder argues politicians need to consider.

On the other side of the coin, inaction against Iraq might anger the US, whom was (and is) largely dependent on international oil sources, to the extent that Iraqi control of Gulf-oil presented a significant issue. As such, the Japanese leaders were presented with a conflict of interest in accordance with the alliance theory. As we know from this theory, the state with the larger interest in the issue has more bargaining power and can exert pressure more effectively. While Japan had interest and worries about the oil in the Gulf area, the US had bigger stakes in this interest. This was made even clearer when President Bush directly pressured Prime Minister Kaifu to enact economic sanctions against Iraq. The Japanese Foreign Minister also pointed out that the US provided Japanese security, and therefore Japan should support them.

The policy result was the economic sanctions against Iraq that Japan enacted a few days later. While we cannot precisely determine the effectiveness of Bush’s call, in a counterfactual world in which Japan did not value the US alliance and experienced no pressure, it might not have any incentive to go through with these sanctions. On the other hand, the potential losses from the sanctions were relatively small, and it might have been a god move for normative reasons vis a vis the rest of the G-7 countries. We can also look at the policy congruency: The Japanese economic sanctions were congruent with the policy the US pressed for. The pressure the Japanese leaders faced was both internalized pressure and bargaining pressure. They faced internalized pressure because alliance norms dictate to support your ally, even outside contractual agreements, though how much a state should support an ally does of course depend on the issue itself. Bargaining pressure stemmed from the US asking for economic sanctions. This signified that the US held the Iraq issue in very high interest.

Additionally, as Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama asserted, Japan was dependent on the US for its security. Thus, Japan’s dependency on the US increased the effectiveness of both the indirect and direct pressure on them. Moreover, bargaining pressure and internalized pressure played a role. We can therefore say the pressure variable had a high value. We need to note that the Gulf War was not interpreted as an international crisis for Japan at this point. This should in this case have triggered a bigger response from Japan, and more questions regarding the degree of support. This foreshadowed the problems of the coming months, however.
The US ambassador Armacost met with the Vice Foreign Minister Kuriyama, Deputy Foreign Minister Owada and the LDP Secretary General Ozawa to discuss burden-sharing as allies regarding Operation Desert Shield, early in August. He prepared the Japanese officials about possible US requests for financial assistance, and also the dispatch of noncombat personnel (Armacost 1996: 101). Come mid-August, an official request for Japanese contribution arrived from the US government, who wanted “financial aid to the multinational forces operating in Iraq, economic aid to the Gulf region, and increased financial support to the US forces in Japan.

More importantly, Washington asked for personnel contributions to the multinational forces. The US also wanted minesweepers in the Gulf (Armacost 1996: 102, Shinoda 2007: 51-53). While it was “only” a request for personnel that could help with rear support and noncombat duties, Kaifu knew that any dispatch of the SDF (Self-Defense Forces) to the Gulf would be met with heavy domestic resistance (Heinrich Jr. 1997: 148). Vice Minister Kuriyama asserted to Armacost that while the financial assistance was sure, any personnel dispatch, including minesweepers to an area of potential conflict, would be “difficult”. The difficulty seemed to lie in the interpretation of the conflict, as Armacost argued that Japan’s contributions would be of a defensive nature, while the Vice Minister was of the opinion that any SDF dispatch would be seen as aggressive security policy (Armacost 1996: 102). We can link this to the historical memories of other Asian states as previously mentioned in this thesis. Nations such as China and Korean suffered greatly under aggressive Japanese expansionism, and, for example, the population in Korea still fears a Japan that could send its military abroad, due to lack of sufficient reassurance from Japan (Midford 2008). Armacost also met with other Japanese leaders to discuss the points he had talked about with Kuriyama (Armacost 1996: 103).

Armacost made repeated public calls for the Kaifu government to provide more assistance. His arguments were that inaction against Hussein would question the viability of the UN, and that the conflict with its oil-bound ramification could upset the world economy. Additionally, he called for proper burden-sharing as allies (Armacost 1996: 103). We can note that this form of communication is what we can classify as “Target Linkage” from Putnam, meaning Armacost tried to influence the Japanese public to favor more contributions from Japan. He notes that “If the Japanese were willing to provide [minesweepers or transport vessels], all the better; if not, they might compensate by further sweetening their financial
contribution or providing other forms of nonmilitary backup support” (ibid). In his memoirs, he also mentions that the US dispatched an interagency team led by US officials (Desaix Anderson, Karl Jackson and Carl Ford), who met with Japanese officials to press for more decisive Japanese action (ibid: 104).

The initial package announced on the 29th of August included loans to Turkey, Jordan and Egypt, small logistics support such as providing water and refrigeration units to soldiers and a 100-man medical team of civilian volunteers. Japan would also use civilian ships and aircraft for transport of personnel and troops. Kaifu also stated that this was the maximum extent Japan could do (Heinrich Jr. 1997: 155). A public opinion poll conducted in the beginning of September by Yomiuri showed this:

Table 2.1

Japanese Initial Iraq Contributions

“The Japanese government has announced plans to join the United Nations’ sanctions against Iraq, provide financial support and transportation services for the Allied Forces, provide financial support to surrounding countries, and send medical specialists to treat soldiers and refugees. Which of the following views is closest to your own regarding these plans”?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>View</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Japan should contribute much more</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approve of the government’s plans</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approve of the plans but the timing is too late</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan should not contribute that much</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Together with the contribution, Japan should take initiative in diplomacy to become a mediator for peace</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan should not do anything</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


A majority of the respondents approved of the present contributions to varying degrees. We can see that the public in general is positively inclined for their state to contribute in a non-armed way, and the medical specialists can be seen as a form of HADR. However, there was also an important poll regarding a SDF dispatch:
Table 2.2

*SDF Participation in UN PKOs*

"Which of the following views concerning the issue of the Self-Defense Forces' participation in the United Nations Peace-Keeping Operations is closest to your own?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>View</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Self-Defense Forces should not be sent overseas</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approve of sending the Self-Defense Forces overseas if requested by the United Nations</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approve of sending unarmed members of the</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-Defense Forces, such as medical specialists, if required by the United Nations</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Response</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: *Yomiuri* 1990: September 1.

This poll shows us some interesting results. While the plurality unconditionally did not want an SDF dispatch, there was a conditional majority for dispatching the SDF, if the UN requested one: a plurality of those in favor of a dispatch requested by the UN, approved of a specialist dispatch. The unanswered question is whether the remaining 23% of the respondents would approve of any armed SDF forces. Another poll also showed that only 8% were in favor of revising the constitution to allow overseas SDF dispatches, while the plurality of 43% wanted policies based on peaceful resolutions.³

The American response to the Japanese contributions however, was one of disappointment. Kaifu had estimated the package figure to about $1 billion which was too low for Bush, who expected far more. Even more troubling, was the fact that the US congress passed an amendment that would require Tokyo to pay the full cost of stationing US troops in Japan, or face an annual withdrawal of 5000 troops from the country. While Armacost calls the amendment "silly" in his memoirs, it did provide additional incentive for Kaifu to promise more financial support (Heinrich 1997: 157, Armacost 1996: 108-109).

Sending Japanese freighters also proved difficult, as it encountered much opposition from the All-Japan Seamen’s Union. This was eventually solved by assuring the union that its members would not be operating in the conflict zone. Assembling a medical team was also difficult since it would be associated with military activities and danger, and in the end only 26 civilians were sent to Saudi Arabia for a very short time (Heinrich Jr. 1997 158-159). The earlier mentioned amendment was the last preceding form of pressure before Japan increased

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³ It should be noted that this poll allowed the respondents to choose up to two responses. However, the point that only a very small portion of the responds were in favor of revising the constitution to allow overseas SDF dispatches stands, together with a plurality for peaceful resolutions, still stands.

⁴ The amendment was later dropped (Heinrich Jr. 1997: 157).
its support, to an additional $3 billion (Heinrich Jr. 1997: 160, Armacost 1996: 109). A poll conducted in the beginning of October shows us this:

Table 2.3

Government reaction

“Overall, how do you feel about the Japanese government’s reactions to the Gulf Crisis?”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reactions not prompt enough</th>
<th>29%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Too concerned with pleasing the US</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current actions fine because it is being cautious</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


While the previous polls in September had approved of what the government had been doing, public opinion in October was more critical this time around. Only 14% thought the current actions were fine. In other words, the public did not much approve of the reactions, despite the fact that the previous poll had indicated that further contributions would also have been welcome.

We can see this in relation to the second answer in the poll: the government’s reactions seem to have come from US pressure. This leads us to conclude that a plurality of the Japanese public thought that the Japanese politicians conceded too much to the pressure from their military ally, and indicates a slight trend of being more responsive to their ally rather than the public opinion. The US had already been “considerate” in not asking for direct combat support, but rather rear support, logistics, and financial contributions. The politicians however, did not fully commit to the demands, in that they were careful not to send armed troops.

What were the next steps in the decision-making process and how much congruency was there between the variables and policy outcome? Let’s first trace the decision-making process. There were two instances of US pressure at first. Ambassador Armacost prepared the Japanese officials for financial and personnel requests. He tied this directly with burden-sharing as allies. The official request that came was as Armacost had prepared them for. At this point, the Japanese officials needed to consider the two parts of the request. Contributing financially was not a problem and in line with alliance burden-sharing. The personnel dispatch request was the divisive issue.
There were several dimensions the Japanese officials had to consider. First, Article 9 of the Japanese constitution forbids Japan to go to war and/or use force to settle international disputes. This meant that personnel dispatch for backup roles in the Gulf would indirectly be participation in an armed international dispute. Hence, a personnel dispatch was problematic from a legal point of view. Next, due to historical memories of other East-Asian states, a SDF dispatch, even in noncombat roles, could alarm these states. Japan had strained relationships with for example China and Korea. Lastly, while public opinion had been open to HADR roles for the SDF, it had firmly been against armed dispatches or conflict-related dispatches. Public opinion made it difficult to consider a more flexible interpretation of the constitution to allow some sort of minimal SDF dispatch. This explains why the Vice Minister told Ambassador Armacost that a personnel dispatch would be difficult.

The policy that followed reflected this. Financial contributions and a civilian medical team, in addition to civilian transport contributions reflect the decision-making process up to this point. There was no mention of rear-area support for the multinational forces. This would indicate that public opinion constituted an important limitation on the initial Iraq contributions.

The public opinion poll by Yomiuri indicated support for the contribution package, but not for SDF dispatch in the role the US wanted. While medical specialists would be fine, the US wanted backup roles and minesweeping during the war. Moreover, the public showed preference for a peaceful approach. The US was not satisfied, which showed through Armacost’s public remarks (Armacost 1996: 103), and the actions of the US congress. This led PM Kaifu to give additional financial contributions, but limited by public opinion he could not promise more personnel. While there is no doubt the increased pressure from the US was responsible for the additional $3 billion, on the same coin public opinion seem to have limited any notion of an SDF personnel dispatch.

In terms of congruence, the first contributions package was congruent with public opinion as far as financial contributions and noncombat (civilian) specialist aid was concerned, both historically and the immediate reactions, though slightly more skepticism about sending medical specialists into a zone where there could potentially arise conflicts, could also have been expected. However, the Seamen Union’s opposition and the difficulty in assembling a full medical team shows that there were indeed underlying tensions about conflict area involvement. The polls also showed annoyance at the slow reactions from the government, but the overall disposition for the actual policy was congruent. The congruence between the form of pressure exerted from the US and Japanese policy was less congruent than that with public opinion. This is because the important rear-area support personnel did not become part
of the policy outcome, despite being requested by the US. The US had exerted a fair amount bargaining pressure at this point. Armacost had actively tried to pressure the Japanese politicians and the public, as mentioned above. While not threatening to leave the alliance per se, the US congress also showed the will to lessen the protection they provided Japan by pulling out troops or force them to pay for the base costs. This signified that the US could be less committed to the alliance, and at the same time it exposed Japanese dependency. It also strengthened the US position in the area of interest, showing how serious it took the Iraq issue. Nevertheless, the actions of the US congress can be seen more as an empty threat or a form of very critical rhetoric— even Armacost called the amendment “silly”.

Despite this, they did not get rear-area support they had been seeking, like minesweepers, and Japan also had trouble assembling the civilian medical team. While the $3 billion was a significant economic contribution in itself, rear-area support personnel was still an issue under contention. The US overestimated Japanese willingness to defy its constitution and long-standing public opinion. If public opinion had not been important in this case, the politicians could have circumvented the constitution as they had done over the years to create a de-facto military and dispatched SDF personnel for rear-area support and logistical purposes. Overall, the policy throughout late-August and September indicates that public opinion played a more important role in influencing policy when weighed up against the strong US bargaining pressure.

*The Peace Cooperation Bill Attempt*

Come September and Kaifu was facing increased US pressure, domestic pressure to be cautious, and pressure from the LDP's Secretary General Ozawa and his allies (such as Takeo, the LDP Executive Council Chairman, and Mutsuki, the chairman of the Policy Affairs Research Council) who saw this as an opportunity for Japan to shake loose from its passive international role (Heinrich Jr. 1997: 161-162). Due to the US pressure and pressure from Ozawa, Kaifu had to consider a SDF dispatch in some form or another, and thus put a MOFA team to work on a bill that would permit an SDF personnel dispatch. This was despite the fact that the Kaifu government had insisted that a dispatch would be in contradiction to Article 9 (ibid).

The MOFA team came up with different options, including revising the existing Japanese laws to allow for a SDF dispatch, or to reorganize SDF personnel under a different organization. Kaifu chose to reorganize SDF personnel for peacekeeping chores, in what
would be a form of the Japanese version of the Peace Corps (Shinoda 2007: 52-53, Heinrich Jr. 1997: 164). On a side note, the use of force was officially sanctioned by the UN on the 29th of November. However, many LDP politicians were cautious about any dispatch for the UN sanctioned operation, because it could serve as a slippery slope for SDF dispatches. As Armacost notes, “… if an experienced and seasoned politician like Gotoda harbored such doubts, it was no wonder that other Asian countries remained apprehensive” (Armacost 1996: 116-117). Gotoda opposed sending the military for UN missions on the grounds that it could open up the door for Japan to become a “military superpower”, and that other countries did not want that. He added that “Once a damn is broken, it is very difficult to stop the flow” (Mainichi Daily News 1990, October 23).

This Peace Cooperation Bill ultimately included a dispatch of SDF personnel, with the rights (vaguely termed) to bear a minimum of arms for self-defense only. The SDF would provide noncombat rear-area logistical support, in addition to some HADR and peacekeeping related activities (Heinrich Jr. 1997: 166-169, Ito 1991: 1-3). When the bill went to the Diet in October, the LDP had the necessary votes to pass it in the lower house, but did not have upper house control. They did not have the 2/3 majority votes required to bypass the upper house either (Heinrich Jr. 1997: 170). Moreover, the bill was plagued by infighting between the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the Defense Agency, the government and the LDP on the nature of the dispatch (Shinoda 2007: 53-55). While Kaifu wanted the dispatch similar to the Peace Corps, the LDP Secretary-General Ozawa wanted to dispatch the SDF as-is. Vice Minister Kuriyama saw this as problematic and noted to Ozawa “Please do not forget that the SDF is essentially a military force.” (Ishihara 1997: 74-75). Additionally, a poll in the beginning of October showed the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SDF Dispatch</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>How do you feel about sending members of the Self-Defense Forces overseas?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>They should never be sent overseas</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sending members overseas is fine, as long as they are unarmed and cooperate with UN Peacekeeping Operations</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sending armed members overseas is fine, as long as they cooperate with UN Peacekeeping Operations</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We can see from the poll that a plurality was against sending the SDF overseas. The plurality was against sending the SDF. Most of those who were for a dispatch favored only an unarmed dispatch. Protest rallies came against the bill in mid-October. The public was also contacting local politicians to express their concerns (Heinrich Jr. 1997: 173-174). Politicians were facing a lot of opposition from constituents in their electoral district, especially from women. “As a result, there was growing anxiety among local politicians affiliated with the LDP, many of whom would be running for reelection in April” (ibid). A former DA director general and LDP member Kanemaru Shin, felt that the Diet should respect public opinion (Asahi Shim bun 1990, October 16: 2). A by-election in Aichi also supported the notion that the public did not endeavor the bill, as the LDP won with significantly less margin than usual there, and the Peace Cooperation bill was blamed for this (Heinrich Jr. 1997: 181, Weisman 1990: 1). Additionally, polls in Asahi Shim bun (1990, November 6: 1, 3) showed a majority opposed to the Peace Cooperation bill. Moreover, Kaifu’s approval rating (35%) fell below his disapproval rating for the first time since his cabinet was formed 13 months prior to the poll (Mainichi Shim bun 1990, October 23: 1-4).

Less than a week later the bill was withdrawn. Even though infighting, different beliefs and power-struggles in the parties and were important reasons as well (though not as relevant for this paper), we can see that public opinion formed a majority against the dispatch, and played an important role as well.

Operation Desert Shield Begins

When the Gulf War began in mid-January, the US made clear it expected financial and personnel contributions. Ambassador Armacost had told the key politicians that a Japanese response should be quick and able to meet ambitious requests. Armacost had also discussed political and budgetary restraints with Finance Minister Hashimoto before the official requests were made in January. Having learned their lesson, the Japanese government announced a contribution of $9 billion and financial assistance to the Gulf Cooperation Council. In addition to this, they would dispatch SDF aircraft and ASDF 200 personnel to the Gulf for transporting refugees. The relatively quick action here indicates that Japan was thinking of their alliance reputation.

An opinion poll during the war revealed that the public was split on whether they supported or opposed the attack on Iraq (42% vs. 42%). It also showed an opinion majority of 55% against dispatching SDF aircraft, while 33% supported the dispatch. A plurality of 44%
opposed the additional 9$ billion financial contribution, while 39% were in favor of it (Asahi Shimbun 1991, February 5: 3). This was in line with public preferences for avoiding combat or combat situations as discussed above. A majority of 51% of those opposed to the Kaifu cabinet chose foreign policy as their main reason, indicating that it was an important issue (Yomiuri 1991: March 1). Comparing this to the same questions from a September poll the year before, of those opposed to the Kaifu cabinet, 25% chose foreign policy as their main reason (Yomiuri 1990: September 1). In other words, the Kaifu cabinet’s critics grew more skeptical of their foreign policy.

In regards to Japan’s additional financial contributions and aircraft dispatch, it was important that they acted fast. As Snyder points out, bad reputation is more easily gained than good reputation. A question that arises from this is whether Japan gained a form of bad reputation as an ally during this time, which I will come back to at the end of this case. Dispatching the SDF meant utilizing legal maneuvering in which military aircrafts could transport “state guests” by “cabinet ordinance”, which the opposition parties including Komeito (The Clean Government Party) feared could create a dangerous precedent as a slippery slope, and would require amending the SDF laws. This maneuver would also avoid any Diet discussion on the matter. The financial contributions had to go through the Diet first though, and Komeito (who could deny the bill through their upper house control) made the government choose between the ASDF dispatch and the financial contribution. Komeito also forced restrictions on the usage of the financial contributions were placed so as to not subsidize the use of lethal force, and made the cabinet drop the ASDF dispatch plans. So while the dispatch of SDF aircraft had to be dropped to pass the financial contribution in the Diet (7th of March), Japan managed to charter civilian aircrafts for refugee transport from Cairo (Heinrich Jr. 1997: 186-187, Armacost 1996: 119-121).

The politicians responded more quickly this time, and maybe that’s why it didn’t seem as if they just gave in to pressure. Additionally, the SDF aircraft dispatch was dropped. However, by just making financial contributions, Japan was criticized for using checkbook diplomacy. In the end, President George W. Bush was ultimately pleased by Japan’s large financial contributions (Armacost 1996: 123-124). So going back to the question of Japan’s alliance reputation: while they somewhat saved their reputation as an alliance partner in terms of financial contributions, the lack of manpower contributions gave them a “bad” reputation of not sharing the burdens and risks as one might expect out of alliance norms, as the epithet “checkbook diplomacy” indicates.
When it comes to tracing the decision-making process here, we established in the previous section that public opinion had played an important part in limiting any SDF personnel dispatch. Prime Minister Kaifu was presented with MOFA’s plan, where he went with reorganizing the SDF under another organization akin to a Japanese version of the Peace Corps. Another option had been to revise existing laws to allow for a SDF dispatch. However, a previous public opinion poll had indicated that only 8% favored this direction, and that the majority wanted a peaceful, diplomatic approach. When the Peace Cooperation bill was presented however, SDF personnel were allowed to be armed for security reasons. Up until the bill was presented, the decision-making process indicates that public opinion was again playing an important role in limiting the form of dispatch possible. Realistically speaking, it is arguable whether an unarmed dispatch would be feasible when considering the safety of the personnel. However, the bill included a dispatch with the right to bear light arms. This conflicted with previous public opinion, and therefore shows a slight tendency in this period towards ally pressure.

However, when push came to shove, the bill met much opposition domestically, especially in the public, and was withdrawn. The majority was clearly not in favor of a dispatch, much less an armed one. Politicians up for election in April also showed signs of public opinion worries. Additionally, there was internal disagreement between the officials of the nature of the dispatch, as mentioned above (Shinoda 2007: 53-55, Ishihara 1997: 74-75). It is therefore difficult to give final word on as to whether public opinion played a crucial role in this particular policy outcome. We can play with two counterfactual scenarios: 1) If there had not been internal disagreement between the officials and 2), if there had not been public opposition.

In scenario 1), the officials could have agreed on the dispatch nature, armed or not. Their worry would then have been about public opposition to the dispatch, especially an armed one. A second worry would be the negative reactions of other East-Asian states, as Armacost mentioned in his memoirs in relation to a meeting with Gotoda, discussed above. This could still have opened up for a completely unarmed dispatch for peacekeeping purposes or humanitarian relief. In scenario 2), if public opinion had not mattered, the LDP might have secured the cooperation of Komeito in the upper house to pass the Peace Cooperation bill. In terms of no public dispatch opposition, the government, influenced by the hawkish Ozawa, should have conceded to US pressure and dispatched more manpower for rear-area support or transport, lightly armed or not. This would have been in line with the internalized pressure for Tokyo to support their ally in issues outside of the contractual obligations, as Snyder predicts.
If we consider the congruence between public opinion and policy here, it ultimately shows congruence between public opinion and policy outcome (withdrawn bill). In the case of policy outcome and US pressure, it seems Kaifu was intent on dispatching some personnel, and Ozawa even more so. However, the end result between policy and pressure does not indicate congruence in this period. Based on tracing the decision-making, counter-factual evidence and congruence, I find public opinion to have influenced policy outcome more than US pressure did, in this case.

The next period following the war outbreak in January showed the tide turning a bit to US pressure. The US expected both financial and personnel contributions, and Armacost had also tried to influence politicians. Because the officials had previously suffered criticism for slow reactions, the new demands from the US gave them the opportunity to rectify this somewhat. They still had to consider public opinion which had been skeptical of SDF dispatches, especially armed ones. This meant that while the financial contributions were a safe bet, they had to tread carefully around the dispatch issue. However, the legality of an ASDF dispatch came into question and was therefore avoided.

The decision-making process thus shows us considerations of both public opinion and US pressure. We can take the US demands as bargaining pressure, together with Armacost’s pressure. There was also internalized pressure within Japan to rectify their reputation as slow-acting. This made Japan quick to comply with the US demands. Again, they were unable to dispatch personnel for extra support. The personnel issue this time was not only due to public opinion, but also worries from the opposition parties about the legal issues and the dangerous precedent it could create for SDF dispatches. However, the economic contributions had restrictions on them, so they would not contribute to lethal purposes, in line with the public’s wish for a peaceful approach. That being said, it was still a financial contribution to the war effort, one way or another. While one might say the slippery-slope argument was a worst-case scenario, it comes as no surprise to a state that has experienced a loss of control over their military.

This time, public opinion showed some congruency with the policy outcome, more so than pressure from a military ally. Meanwhile, the US did not get more personnel, but did get additional financial assistance. Overall, public opinion seemed to have weighed slightly more than the US pressure.
End of the War, and Minesweeper Dispatch

With the war over, Japan did not seem to have much opportunity to rectify their checkbook diplomacy reputation. However, a minesweeping dispatch was brought up as one way to contribute manpower, and would allow Japanese companies safe seaway passage in the Gulf area (Shinoda 1997: 56-57, Heinrich Jr. 1997: 188-190). The government saw their opportunity to rectify their reputation as minesweeper dispatches were (ambiguously) legal, and the official end of the armed conflict was announced in April recognized by a UN resolution (ibid).

Thus Kaifu announced on April the 24th that Japan would dispatch minesweepers to the Persian Gulf, which actually gained public support. A poll by Asahi revealed that 56% favored sending the minesweepers to the gulf (Asahi Shimbun 1991, April 24: 1). This could be due to international criticism (especially from the US), and also the end of the hostilities, thus not involving the SDF in combat. The six minesweepers were dispatched the 26th of April. In the end, the whole conflict gave a foundation for the new International Peace Cooperation Bill approved in 1992, opening up more possibilities for Japan to take a larger role on the international scene.

While personnel dispatches had been a difficult issue, it had specifically been armed SDF dispatches or dispatches into a conflict zone that clashed with public opinion. The US had not requested troops for combat, but taking indirect part in the war had still been too much to ask for from the Japanese politicians. With the war over, the Japanese leaders faced their last decisions regarding the war. While they had been wary of public opinion, the lingering reputation for checkbook diplomacy combined with the inability to provide manpower, their relationship with the US had been strained. In some sense we can tie the feelings of the Japanese leaders to the alliance norms as described by Snyder, and exemplified by Armacost’s repeated calls for burden-sharing. Even though the US’s requests were exocontractual, the US requests fell under alliance norms as a form of quid pro quo for their military assistance to Japan.

For the Japanese politicians, the suggestion to send manpower in form of minesweepers was a lifeline. It would be a dispatch to a post-conflict zone, peaceful, and help Japanese shipping companies with safe sea passage. In this sense, it could be interpreted as a form of HADR, as some researchers argue (Midford 2011: 80-81). With this in mind, the dispatch of minesweepers should actually not come as a surprise, as it presented the
politicians with an opportunity to show the public (and the rest of the world) that the Japanese military could take on a peaceful and responsible role overseas.

We can trace the policy outcome here back to the Japanese politicians’ internalized pressure to support their ally outside contractual agreements, and rectify a bad alliance reputation. From the perspective of Snyder’s alliance theory and alliance norms, it makes sense to dispatch minesweepers: they would support their ally by sending manpower to clear out dangerous mines around the post-conflict area. Since the US had showed signs of punishing Japan for its lack of commitment (like the Senate amendment), in addition to US sentiments toward Japan as an unreliable ally (Woolley 1996: 805) Japan should increase its commitment to the alliance. The minesweeper dispatch was exactly these things.

If we were to evaluate congruence in this case, we first need to consider that there was not specifically US bargaining pressure or public opinion for this exact dispatch at the time. The US had requested minesweepers the year before, but the situation had changed since then. What this means is that we need to consider congruence in terms of previous pressure (or rather, the internalized pressure created from it) and public opinion with the final policy outcome. To quickly reiterate the points made through this chapter, the US wanted financial contributions and personnel for things like logistical backup. The majority of the public favored the financial contributions (except at one point, where a small plurality opposed a financial contribution) and were positively inclined for conditional SDF HADR missions, but not armed missions, or conflict-related missions. The public at times also expressed disappointment at how Japan had handled the Gulf War, especially the slow reactions from the Japanese government, as demonstrated by the opinion polls above. Thus, we can infer from this that the dispatch of the minesweepers aimed at repairing the checkbook diplomacy-reputation Japan had suffered, in addition to showing the public a successful dispatch of minesweepers as a disaster and seaway relief mission.

Before, throughout and after the Gulf War, Japan had to balance the alliance security dilemma. They had no desire to get entrapped in what they considered an overseas conflict that was by and large not in Japan’s national interest to get involved in, and where they might anger one of their oil suppliers, as I discussed in the beginning of the chapter. Of course, for some politicians, like the hawkish Ozawa, it presented Japan with the opportunity to take on a bigger international role. On the other hand, the US – as an ally of Japan – expected Japanese support. Japan had to consider the possibility of being abandoned by the US for their lack of commitment. While an unrealistic scenario, they were threatened with “punishment” from the US for their lack of commitment early on, through the congress amendment discussed above.
In such a scenario a state should look to establish a reputation for loyalty. Japan tried to rectify their lack of early commitment with what was dubbed checkbook-diplomacy, and later the minesweeper dispatch. The final act of sending manpower in the form of the minesweepers somewhat rectified the strained relationship between Japan and the US during the Gulf War.

So for Japan, is All’s Well That Ends Well? Not quite, as the Iraq Invasion 12 years later would show.

The Double-Edged Bargaining Between Public Opinion and Alliances

This section will reflect upon the analysis done so far in light of Putnam’s two-level negotiation theory. We remember from the theory section that there are factors of constraints called “win-sets” that determines how far level 2 (public opinion) is willing to go on an issue, and that these win-sets must overlap with the constraints and wishes of level 1 (pressure from a military ally). I will therefore show graphical representations of the win-sets that we can deduce from the previous analyses.

These win-sets will be discussed in terms of three areas: how the statesmen deal with and manipulate domestic constraints; how they deal with and manipulate international constraints; and the policy preferences and motivations of the statesmen. We also remember that public opinion is an indicator of whether the public is willing to ratify the agreement or not, and that politicians might be considering upcoming elections too, as these can act as (partial) vetoes for the public on ratification.

The statesmen for the purpose of this paper are the Japanese statesmen, and more specifically the politicians. The problem with only using the politicians as negotiators is this: Putnam’s theory dictates that negotiations are led by a “chief negotiator”. Since this thesis deals with security policy and public opinion, it is natural that this chief negotiator is the state leader, the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister acts as a negotiator for his state, and he is of course influenced by the diverse opinions of his cabinet and other policy advisors he has contact with. In some ways, the chief negotiator can act as a proxy for the combined interests and opinions of his cabinet or a coalition government.

In other words, the negotiator can be the chief representative of the decision-makers on specific issues, and we need consider the different views influential politicians may hold. We can infer from the previous parts of this chapter who the negotiators are. The Japanese negotiator is Prime Minister Kaifu. He negotiates with the chief negotiator for the US,
President Bush. However, the US also has other statesmen that act as a representative of their interests and can also influence negotiations, for example US Ambassador Armacost.

Based on the analyses I have created two initial win-sets, for the Japanese public and the U.S respectively:

The Japanese public:

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Do nothing  Diplomatic contribution  Financial contribution  HADR  Logistical support  Rear-area combat logistics  Combat Operations
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The US:

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Nothing  Political support  Financial support  ...  Logistical support  Rear-area combat logistics  Combat troops
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Figure 2.1

We remember from the Putnam discussion in the theory section that white arrows represent the full range of options (if they are white, they are not within the acceptable constraints, or have already been achieved or are irrelevant) for that level, grey arrows represent the constraints of each win-set, and sometimes black arrows are used to show a policy that a negotiator wants, but which is outside of that level’s constraint.

These win-sets represent the different domestic and international constraints the politicians had to deal with. I will discuss these in light of the analyses we did for each period. Japan’s initial reactions have not been included because it did not involve a trade-off between the domestic and international side. When the win-sets are presented, can we assume the politicians have win-sets of their own? As we discussed in the theory chapter on Putnam, one of the building blocks for the analysis are the statesmen’s preferences. These included their interest in maintaining or enhancing their domestic position, their interest in mobilizing an optimal response to international imperatives, and their individual policy preferences based on party, ideology or past. With these preferences in mind for the analysis, it would be redundant to introduce win-sets for the different politicians.
The Bargaining Process of the Personnel Dispatch Request

To reprise the key points from earlier here, the US asked for financial aid and personnel contributions to the multinational forces. Tokyo responded with some financial aid, some logistics and a small team of civilian volunteers. The US was disappointed with these contributions, and pressured Japan to do more. Tokyo increased the financial support. The public by and large agreed with the Japanese contributions, but remained ambivalent towards an SDF dispatch.

The Japanese public:

![Win-sets Diagram]

The US:

![Win-sets Diagram]

Figure 2.2

The grey areas represent the constraints in each win-set. As we can see from the win-sets, the Japanese public was willing to go from diplomatic contributions to HADR dispatches, as indicated by the grey arrows in the public’s win-set. That being said, it is not clear whether the public would have accepted a dispatch into a conflict region, even if unarmed. However, for security reasons, dispatches into a conflict region would most likely require the troops to be armed. Hence, the de-facto win-set here would be limited to specialists into a non-conflict zone at best. As indicated by the US’s win-set and grey arrows, the US, at a minimum, wanted financial support in addition to some form of logistics support. It is also conceivable that they would have been happy for any combat troops, had Japan been willing to reinterpret Article 9 to allow that.

For the Japanese politicians, a middle ground had to be found. The natural solution here would be financial support at the very least. When considering the domestic level, Kaifu and his cabinet could possibly have sent the minesweepers as the US requested. Arguably, this could have been said to be disaster-relief, but on the other hand, it might not have been
considered disaster-relief during a militarized conflict. I think this indicates that the Japanese negotiator manipulated the domestic win-set to a small extent. By being hesitant of a personnel dispatch, Kaifu and his cabinet constrained their domestic win-set to a financially based one. It is also possible that if the cabinet had acted fast and promised some form of personnel dispatch to the Gulf, public opinion might have made it difficult to reinterpret the constitution to allow for an overseas SDF dispatch anyway. This again could have led to an involuntary defect of such a promise.

At the same time Kaifu had to consider the international level. By attempting to make any personnel dispatch seem difficult, Kaifu and his cabinet tried to lower US expectations and constrain their win-set down from logistics backup in conflict areas. This is the so-called “tied hands” strategy. The LDP’s lack of control over the upper house also gave this strategy more credibility, as well as being closer to reality. The initial contributions tried to reconcile the win-sets by offering financial support, civilian transport, civilian medical volunteers and some logistics. This way they avoided involving the SDF, but could at the same time claim to provide a small degree of logistics support. Any SDF involvement at this point could also have been thwarted by the domestic institutional flexibility of Japan by its limiting constitution. Of course, the constitution itself did not necessarily limit a logistical-type overseas dispatch of the SDF, but rather the fact that critical public opinion regarding overseas dispatches made a more liberal interpretation difficult for the politicians. As we would see later on, the Kaifu cabinet was able to introduce the Peace Cooperation bill that would have allowed that form of logistical dispatch, but was hindered by public opposition. At this point however, it appears that the politicians were unable to meet the full demands of their military ally, and that as far as the domestic side goes, it made a bigger impact on the area where it clashed with the ally pressure.

How did the preferences of the politicians influence negotiation? The first answer is that the Kaifu cabinet would play the domestic level as much as they could to enhance their own positions vis-à-vis public opinion, as public opinion, like Kono told me in his interview, shows trends of how votes will be distributed in the next election. At the same time, they stretched towards the US demands as much as they could. However, they downplayed their win-set slightly with the “tied hands” strategy. The mistake they made was not increasing their financial contributions quick enough, in order to make up for the lack of proper logistical support. However, in the end, Japan contributed some 13$ billion, a huge sum. The public opinion polls showed that the Japanese public was positively inclined towards the contributions, and we might interpret the increased financial contributions as also being
influenced by public opinion. We should also consider that the LDP had a history of following the Yoshida doctrine of relying on the US alliance for military situations, and therefore underestimated the US expectations of Japan entering new roles in a post-Cold War world – especially when it was a military situation far from Japanese shores.

After this initial period, Armacost made public calls for greater contributions, as discussed above. The US Ambassador tried to target Japanese public opinion, in an attempt to expand the Japanese public’s win-set. He did this through his attempt to raise the cost of no-agreement, by for example pointing out that inactivity against Hussein could place the viability of the UN in danger. He also pointed out that the conflict could have economic ramifications for the world economy due to the oil resources in the area. While we might interpret Armacost’s public remarks as a form of rhetoric, it was still an attempt to expand the Japanese public’s win-set. The US congress also tried to influence the Japanese politicians by raising the costs of no-agreement through their amendment, which could force Japan to pay for the US troops on Japanese soil. In a worse-case scenario that we must consider, the US pulling out troops would mean Japan would be forced to expand their own military. This could alert their east-Asian neighbor states due to the historical memories of Japanese militarism. In an absolute worst-case scenario, these states would build up their own military as a response to the perceived threat of a militarized (normalized) Japan. This could lead to an arms race. Therefore, the worst-case scenario of the no-agreement consequence was a serious one. On the other hand, the amendment was never put into law, and Japanese politicians would most likely understand that this was a form of strong symbolic bargaining pressure, more than anything else.

Another point on this is that there were political frictions between the US and Japan, due to the US trade deficit with Japan. US companies would meet nontariff barriers when trying to breach into the Japanese market, meanwhile, Japan enjoyed a great export industry, for example with their automobile exports.\(^9\) The asymmetrical trade interdependence had given rise to many critical voices in the US about the Japanese free riding their alliance, and the small role and little responsibility Japan carried internationally, relative to their strong economy.\(^10\) This might have played a role in US frustration with the Japanese responses to the Gulf Crisis, and the US might have expected Japan to take more responsibility in order to contribute to their alliance.

\(^9\) See Noland 1993. Noland does an in-depth study about the trade frictions between the US and Japan.

\(^10\) Armacost 1996: 19-30. Armacost discusses the political discontent and differences between the two sides.
The initial package Japan announced was also, arguably, involuntarily defected due to heavy domestic resistance to the civilian transport that was promised. In October, public opinion reacted negatively towards the way Japan had handled the Gulf War up to that point, after Tokyo announced the additional 3$ billion (Table 2.3). The biggest point was that the public thought their leaders were too concerned with pleasing the US. This indicates that the public was not happy with the way the Japanese politicians had negotiated between the two levels. Since the polls had shown satisfaction with the actual contributions to varying degrees, it did show that the public ratified the current contributions.

The Japanese negotiators tried to please both sides in the end of this period in September, by making an additional $3 billion contribution. This played into both the domestic and international win-set. As we discussed above, the domestic win-set is based on the public’s constraints and influence (Putnam argues that any domestic interest group, including public opinion, can represent the domestic level and its win-set, depending on the context and bargaining issue at hand). However, if we compare the minimum and maximum constraints on the domestic and international win-sets, we can see that the policy outcomes in this initial period were closer to the domestic level, rather than the international level. While the Japanese negotiators to some degree tried to stretch their win-set, they were ultimately unable to concede or ratify the US demands for more personnel. I therefore argue that in this period, public opinion mattered more than the pressure from Japan’s military ally.

The Bargaining Process over the Peace Cooperation Bill

We remember from earlier that the Peace Cooperation Bill was the cabinet’s attempt to dispatch the SDF to conduct non-combat, rear-area logistical support, and some peacekeeping related activities. It met strong domestic opposition (both from the public and from politicians) and was withdrawn. The cabinet later tried to dispatch the ASDF and give an additional 9$ billion. Public opinion opposed the dispatch. Komeito forced the LDP to choose between the dispatch and the financial contribution, and the LDP opted for the latter.

The Peace Cooperation Bill represents a direct failure of ratification on a domestic level. As we can see from the win-sets below in figure 2.3, the Japanese public’s constraints were between diplomatic support and HADR operations. Tokyo tried to press for a form of logistical support indicated by the black arrow, which was outside the public’s constraints. The US’s win-set remained unchanged, with them asking for as much support as they could get. While the Japanese negotiators had tried to balance both levels, politicians like Ozawa
wanted to push an SDF dispatch. While on the previous occasion, the Japanese negotiator had been trying to reconcile both levels, the influence of political advisers like Ozawa wanted Kaifu to concede towards the international level. The negative reactions from the US over the first contributions, made the Japanese negotiators consider an approach that would concede more to the international win-set. However, this meant going beyond (marked in black) the current constraints of the domestic win-set:

The Japanese Public:

![Diagram showing the win-sets for Japanese and US contributions]

The US:

![Diagram showing the win-sets for Japanese and US contributions]

Figure 2.3

However, as we discussed in the analysis, the bill met both public and institutional opposition. They were unable to ratify this international agreement on the domestic level. Additionally, the political flexibility was not there, as shown by the disagreements between the MOFA, Defense Agency, the government, and the LDP.

When the war began in January, Japan took their lesson from the initial contributions to heart. While they had made the mistake of not compensating the lack of logistics backup the first time around, they pledged an additional $9 billion and ASDF aircraft transport this time. The financial contribution overlapped with both level’s win-sets. The ASDF was to be used for what was (arguably) functionally a form for HADR, which was refugee transport. The public had mixed opinions of any overseas SDF dispatch, and a majority opinion was against dispatching the ASDF, in addition to major opposition party critique of the ASDF dispatch. This thus represents a failure to ratify the ASDF dispatch deal on the domestic level. That being said, the Japanese negotiators managed to provide some civilian transport for the refugees.

It is possible to speculate whether the Japanese negotiators foresaw the possibility of the ASDF problems, and therefore made such a huge financial contribution to compensate for
any problems. On the other hand, the 9$ billion helped Komeito deny the ASDF dispatch. The problematic part of the agreement (the ASDF) was not ratified due to public opinion and partially the preferences of the opposition politicians. These were policy preferences of not creating a precedent for SDF dispatches that would circumvent Diet discussion. Other than this, the agreement attempted to balance both sides. The movement in the win-sets shows us that the Japanese chief negotiator wanted to move towards the international level, which strengthens the pressure variable. However, the domestic level did not ratify the initial deal, and the Japanese Prime Minister had to concede more to the demands of the domestic win-set, rather than the international win-set, suggesting that public opinion weighed more than pressure from a military ally in this period.

*The End-Deal Bargaining*

To reprise the key points, the cabinet decided to dispatch minesweepers as a way to send manpower to the Gulf region and hopefully repair the strained relationship with the US. It came to be endorsed by public opinion.

The Japanese public:

![Diagram of Japanese options]

The US:

![Diagram of US options]

The minesweeper dispatch can be said to be a HADR mission in the eyes of the public since it was post-conflict and the UN had declared the war over, while for the US it was a form of logistical support. The US had never directly asked for this form of disaster-relief, as minesweepers during the war could arguably have fallen under “Rear-area combat support”, or perhaps “logistical support”. In other words, the policy outcome falls somewhere between the public’s “HADR” and the US’s “Logistical support”, and it can be interpreted as functionally overlapping constraints.
The end to this story marks how Japanese leaders eventually found a compromise between the domestic and international level. While there was not significant pressure from either level in March and April, the Japanese politicians still dispatched minesweepers in April. In the first analysis of this, I pointed out the lingering internalized pressure and the opportunity to rectify their relationship with the US. Another perspective we can take on this via Putnam’s lenses are the statesmen’s preferences. First, dispatching minesweepers post-conflict as a form of HADR would show political action in line with the public’s win-set. This could enhance their domestic position, and it did gain public majority support. Second, the statesmen will have an interest in mobilizing an optimal response to international imperatives. This of course means optimal from the Japanese perspective, not just giving in to US demands. Because they had been unable to ratify an agreement that would reach the US’s expectations, they had an imperative to find a better response. The minesweepers presented a way to dispatch manpower in line with that the US had first requested the year before, and simultaneously adhere to the domestic win-set. Japan’s final agreement was ratified by public majority support, and the US was pleased in the end by what Japan had contributed.

Findings

I will now go through the findings of the analyses in the Gulf War case. We first found that Japan’s first reactions of freezing Iraqi assets were not directly influenced by the US. However, the US pressured Japan further to enact economic sanctions. We found that the economic sanctions were the result of strong US pressure. When the US further pressured Japan to contribute financially, and with personnel, the tides turned. When public opinion clashed with US pressure over personnel, public opinion weighed more in this case. When considering this through Putnam’s lenses, the politicians acted closer to the constraints of the domestic win-set, rather than the international one.

The Peace Cooperation bill situation showed that public opinion again weighed more strongly than the US pressure for a personnel dispatch (especially a military dispatch) when they clashed. Additionally, this incident showed a failure of ratification on Japan’s political arena, since so many politicians opposed it. When the war broke out in January, the Japanese politicians initially moved towards the US win-set more so than the domestic one. In the end though, the acted closer to the domestic win-set, rather than the international win-set. The minesweeper dispatch was aimed more towards the internalized pressure to repair the strained relationship between Japan and the US. However, the statesmen’s preferences showed us that
the minesweeper dispatch was directed at both the domestic and international level, and was favored by both.

As such, the variable pressure from a military ally played a role throughout the Gulf War. Public opinion did not play a role in the very start, but whenever personnel dispatches were involved, it was important. If we quantify the number of periods where public opinion played a stronger role, as opposed to where the US pressure played a stronger role, public opinion comes out on top. Additionally, if we take into account the periods where public opinion clashed with the US demands regarding personnel, public opinion also comes out the victor.

In light of this, I find that the empirical and analytical evidence strengthens the $H_2$ hypothesis: *Because public opinion can exert significant influence on policy, pressure from a military ally weighs less on politicians when it conflicts with public opinion.*

The $H_1$ hypothesis is weakened: *Because public opinion only has a vague and negligible influence on policy, pressure from a military ally weighs more on politicians when it conflicts with public opinion.*

**Summary and Conclusion of the Gulf War Case**

This case has examined how the Japanese politicians had to consider both public opinion and US pressure in regards to the Gulf War. The empirical evidence have been analyzed through a framework using Putnam’s two-level game theory, in addition to careful analysis of public opinion and pressure from a military ally, during different periods of the Gulf War. Ultimately, the findings support the hypothesis that public opinion weighs more than pressure from a military ally. However, the study also shows that the politicians try to stretch themselves as much as possible to meet pressure from their military ally.

The next chapter will look at Japanese public opinion and pressure from a military ally before, during and after the Iraq Invasion in 2003.
Japan's SDF Reconstruction Dispatch to Iraq

“If we were to leave the personnel contributions to other countries … it can not be said that Japan is fulfilling its responsibilities as a member of the international community.”

(Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet 2004, January 19)

This chapter will analyze Japanese public opinion, policy and pressure from Washington in the context of the Iraq Invasion in 2003. The Iraq Invasion (otherwise known as the Iraq War, The Second Gulf War, and Operation Iraqi Freedom) was the attack and subsequent occupation of Iraq done by US, U.K., Polish and Australian forces in 2003. While the war was declared over by George Bush Jr. in May 2003, insurgents in Iraq have continued attacks up to the time of writing of this paper. I will analyze both the period before the war, during, and the post-war insurgency. This case finds that pressure from a military ally weighs more than public opinion on politicians.

Leading Up to the War

Japan had after the Gulf War created a precedent for some rear-area logistical support through the SDF. This had been done through an anti-terror law passed in 2001 as a response to support the US after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The SDF had been dispatched to the Indian Ocean to provide logistical support such as refueling. Additionally, non-combat SDF personnel had been dispatched to Cambodia in 1993 as part of a UN peacekeeping operation. The Japanese Peacekeeping Operations Law passed in the Diet in 1992, authorizing the SDF to participate in UN Peacekeeping Operations, with tasks such as medical assistance, logistics support, and reconstruction, in what was arguably functionally similar to a form of HADR. This was met with favorable public opinion (Midford 2011: 107-109).

The starting point of Japan’s role in the Iraq Invasion came as in January 2002, although for the public, this realization came a few months later, in June. During President Bush’s visit to Japan in January, he brought up a possible attack on Iraq in a meeting between himself, his National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, the Japanese Deputy Foreign Minister Toshiyuki Takano, and the Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi. Koizumi responded that Japan would support the US endeavors in the “War against Terrorism” already
then (Mainichi Shimbun 2002: June 9). Nevertheless, Koizumi’s statement was vague, and did not mention how Japan would support the US endeavors.

During a strategic dialogue meeting between Japan and the US, the US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage hinted more towards the possibility of an attack, since Iraq had continually refused UN weapon inspections for a long time. The Japanese Vice Foreign Minister Yukio Takeuchi fell in line with Armitage about weapon inspections, but stressed that an international coalition was necessary before any military action was taken. While Armitage did not request any form of support from Japan at the time, he later told the press that he expected international support once a decision had been made. This might have been a hint that Washington would expect Japanese support later on. However, LDP Secretary General Taku Yamasaki pressed for agreement in the international community, similar to what the Japanese Vice Foreign Minister had said, and added: “I believe an independent decision by the US would create international mistrust of the US and (Japan) as an alliance partner.” (Japan Times 2002, August 29). Around the same time, US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld expressed expectations of support from US allies if an attack were to happen (U.S Department of Defense 2002, August 27). However, Japanese public sentiment on a potential US attack on Iraq was overwhelmingly against it, with 77% opposing an attack (Asahi Shimbun 2002, September 3: 4). We should of course note here that opposing an attack and opposing sending your nations military to it are different things, but it should still be a good indicator for the latter.

The Japanese demand for international support and cooperation was taken further during a US – Japan summit meeting in September, where Prime Minister Koizumi pressed President Bush to “undertake further international cooperation”. Bush noted that while this was the plan, he was open for “other means” should diplomacy with Iraq fail to bear results11. Japan also continued to push for a resolution through the UN12 in October. Yasuaki notes in his paper that the Japanese ambassador to the UN at the same time ignored a US and UK proposal that would allow for military action, suggesting that Japan wanted to avoid the topic (Yasuaki 2005: 850). After this, the US officials started to press more directly for support. The Deputy Assistant Defense Secretary Richard Lawless called for personnel from Japan at the Security Subcommitte Conference (SSC) held at Washington in October, in addition to logistical support (Asahi Shimbun 2004, June 2). Undersecretary of Defense for Policy

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Douglas Feith echoed this sentiment a few weeks later to another Japanese official. Feith wanted logistical support similar to the rear-support the MSDF dispatches to the Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea was providing for the war in Afghanistan (ibid: 2002, November 9).

Similar calls for logistical support were made on other occasions, in October, November and December (Mainichi Shimbun 2002, November 20; December 10). The Koizumi cabinet decided to dispatch additional vessels to the Indian Ocean in November. Although the Iraq Invasion had not started yet, this signaled support to the US. Two weeks later the cabinet also decided to dispatch an Aegis destroyer in order to replace another combat ship. The dispatch of Aegis ships had been a contentious issue domestically when it was first brought up in 2001, and although a stable public majority opinion had not opposed it, the original Aegis plans had been shelved (Midford 2011: 110-124). This therefore marked a turn of events.

The UN Security Council passed Resolution 1441 in November, which gave Iraq a final chance to comply with weapon inspections and armaments complaints among several issues. In response to this resolution and repeated calls for logistical support from US officials, Japanese officials noted that they were “considering all options regarding support for refugees and the neighboring areas in the case of armed conflict following severe Iraqi violations of the UN Security Council resolutions”. As the resolution did not authorize military action, Japan pressed for another (supplemental) resolution, and again pushed for international cooperation, rather than unilateral military action from the US. Japanese officials did not wish to politically support US military action unless the international community could agree through the UN. Koizumi did, however, mention that he was contemplating Japanese reconstruction efforts in Iraq (Kyodo News 2002, December 10). At the same time in December, the public was still firmly opposed to the whole idea of an attack (Asahi Shimbun 2003, January 27: 3). More requests for Japanese support followed at the turn of the year, with Armitage expressing hopes for Japanese reconstruction efforts (Mainichi Shimbun 2003, January 19).

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Officials from MOFA on a visit to Washington echoed the demand for a new resolution in January (Mainichi Shimbun 2003, January 24), as did Koizumi in a conversation with President Bush (Asahi Shimbun 2003, January 26: 1) and in the Diet. There were also hints at expectations for logistical support by the tone of the US Ambassador to Japan as the war came closer (Asahi Shimbun 2003, March 3: 1). Japanese officials pressed for another UN resolution at two occasions in February, at the Japan-US Strategic Dialogue conference held in Washington February 10 (Nihon Keizai Shimbun 2003, March 2) and at a UN Security Council meeting. The Japanese ambassador pointed out that the international community had to stand united against Iraq and show strong determination, lest the UN’s legitimacy would come into question. Curiously enough, this argument was very similar to what the US Ambassador Armacost had publicly argued to gain Japanese support for the Gulf War (see previous case). That being said, UN legitimacy was important for Japan, but since the US attacked Iraq without UN support later on, the Japanese demand for UN support would most likely not have had a strong effect on Washington.

When the UN adopted a new resolution with March 17th as the deadline to comply with previous demands, Japanese Foreign Affairs Minister Kawaguchi supported this “…final effort to lead Iraq to disarming voluntarily”. Realizing that war was closing in rapidly however, Japan started to gravitate toward support of the US, even though Koizumi was hesitant about officially declaring support (Kyodo News 2003, March 13). The Japanese public was firmly against the prospect of war, with a majority of 65% and 69% opposing a US-led attack on Iraq in December and January, respectively (Asahi Shimbun 2003, January 27).

The period before the Iraq invasion was characterized by Japan’s attempts to restrain US military action through seeking international cooperation through the UN. Glenn Snyder’s alliance theory does posit that an alliance can serve as a valuable tool to restrain an ally (Snyder 1997: 320-329), and Japan’s actions up to the Iraq Invasion reflect this. That being said, the Japanese attempts to restrain the US were unsuccessful in the end.

We can point to different causes for wishing to restrain the US. Japan did not want to support an offensive war politically. While the Gulf War was defensive in nature because Iraq

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attacked Kuwait, an attack on Iraq would be an offensive war. Given Japan’s military history and that their neighboring states were vary of a (normal) militarized Japan, supporting offensive wars could be a red flag to them. Indeed, as the Japanese Vice Foreign Minister Yamasaki pointed out, independent action from the US could breed mistrust, and this could reflect badly on Japan, as the US alliance partner. This is also why Japan continued to push for a UN resolution, as it at least would legitimize support for offensive military action. After all, the Gulf War was sanctioned by the UN. Japan had also participated in UN peacekeeping missions beginning in Cambodia and subsequently in several other places, like Mozambique, The Golan Heights and from late 2001, East Timor. Tokyo’s logistical support in the Indian Ocean for the US’s “war against terror”, while an offensive war, was provoked by the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and therefore had some legitimacy.

The potential Iraq attack was therefore unsettling for Japan, and also presented itself in the form of a potential alliance dilemma further down the road. Legitimacy aside, Japan could become entrapped into supporting a war not seen to be in its national interest, and that the public opposed. On the other hand, Tokyo had received a lot of criticism of their degree of support to their ally during the Gulf War, and would not want to tarnish their reputation as an ally by not committing to support the US. Indeed, allegedly Koizumi duly responded to Bush in January 2002 that Japan would support the “war against terror”, drawing from the lessons learned in the Gulf War, while not committing specifically to support an attack on Iraq.

Nevertheless, Japan remained noncommittal to an attack despite continued hints from the US that they would expect support from Japan should they invade Iraq. While not explicitly stated by the politicians themselves, the public was firmly against a potential attack on Iraq throughout the pre-invasion period. The dispatch of more Japanese vessels to the Indian Ocean in order to support the US’s war in Afghanistan, can be seen as “testing the waters” of the public.

As the likelihood of the invasion seemed increase throughout the year, Japan gravitated more toward supporting the US, but remained uncommitted. Tokyo instead continued to press for international cooperation through the UN, and in this way restrain the US from acting independently and possibly involving Japan in an offensive war that lacked international legitimacy. The process tracing therefore indicates that Japanese politicians were considering how bad it would reflect upon Japan, especially in the eyes of the Japanese public, if they were pressured into supporting such a war. There is more congruence between the lack of support for the US attack and the public opinion firmly against the war, than the continued pressure the US exerted on Japan to support them politically, or with logistical support. It is
also congruent with the public’s view of preferring peaceful resolutions, as seen in the Gulf War above.

Regarding US pressure, we first have the bargaining pressure that the US exerted on Tokyo on several occasions. The other form of pressure is the internalized pressure Tokyo experienced. This had several dimensions. First, there was internalized pressure to maintain or enhance their reputation as a good ally – this was especially important due to the way the government had handled the Gulf War. They were also internally pressured by the alliance norms to support their ally in this issue As we remember from Snyder’s alliance theory, alliance partners carries an “alliance Halo”, which obligates them through norms and expectation to support their ally, even outside contractual obligations. Japan did not have much of an interest in the Iraq dispute, but it was an important interest for the US.

The refusal of the Japanese politicians to support an offensive attack that lacked UN legitimacy is in line with a Japanese opinion majority that opposed the attack, and a public that prefers peaceful resolutions or post-conflict HADR as demonstrated by the Gulf War case above. The US also continually expressed hopes of support from Japan, but did not receive any form of specific support. Koizumi’s initial response that they would support the US endeavors in the “war against terror”, stemmed from internalized pressure to not make the same mistake as in the Gulf War, and a wish to maintain a good reputation as an ally.

It is conceivable that the additional support in the Indian Ocean was a way for the Japanese politicians to signal support for US military operations, while simultaneously avoiding any policies that could be interpreted by the public as giving logistical or political support to the upcoming attack on Iraq. In this regard, it shows that Tokyo was arguably restrained by a Japanese opinion majority from supporting the US. Their lack of support for the US, despite Koizumi wanting to support Bush, and the pressure from Japan’s military ally, indicates that public opinion played a restraining role on Japanese policy during this period.

Perhaps due to Japan’s noncommittal stance and wish for a UN resolution, the US turned to hopes of Japanese reconstruction efforts at the turn of the year, which as we will see in the next part, was more successful.

*Japanese Support of the Iraq Invasion*

As the Iraq Invasion began March 18th, Koizumi was, however, quick to declare political support for the US, and notably mentioned the importance of the alliance: Damaging the
confidence of this bilateral relationship would not be in the best interest of Japan. In a press conference March 20th, Koizumi explained the government’s position on the Iraq Invasion in more detail. His reasoning for supporting US’s decision to go to war was based on the US-Japan alliance, and to prevent the potential spread of WMDs to terrorists. He also wanted Japan to take on a greater international role, and mentioned nonspecific reconstruction for Iraq. On a question of why he had decided to support the US despite wanting a new UN resolution, Koizumi answered that “… it seemed to me that… it would not be possible to achieve disarmament … as long as President Saddam Hussein is the supreme leader.” However, the majority of the public did not support Koizumi’s statement, with only 36% voicing their support. For those who supported him, US cooperation on the North Korean problem was the most important factor, in addition to the Japan-US alliance itself. (Asahi Shimbun 2003, April 1: 4). Moreover, Koizumi’s cabinet approval rating fell from 46% to 42%, while his disapproval rating increased from 35% to 41% (Shinoda 2007: 115).

Table 3.1

Japanese Public Support for Iraq Invasion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opinion</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oppose the war</td>
<td>59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support the war</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Interestingly, a plurality of those who opposed the invasion did so because of principled opposition to war itself, while 8% cited the lack of a new UN resolution as the reason (Asahi Shimbun 2003, March 30). Nevertheless, of the 36% that supported Koizumi’s statement, 21% supported him because US cooperation on the North Korean problem was needed (Asahi Shimbun 2003, April 1: 4). Moreover, 67% of the respondents answered that they considered North-Korea as a factor when evaluating Koizumi’s statement (ibid).

The same day as Koizumi’s statement, the Japanese Security Council (which included the Prime Minister and several other ministers) met, and planned several measures dealing

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21 Ibid.

22 Shinoda does not provide the source for this in this instance.
with the war, among them were “emergency humanitarian assistance” The planning for the reconstruction legislation was mainly done by MOFA and the civilian bureaucrats from the Japanese Defense Agency, and also included many uniformed SDF officers (Shinoda 2007: 115-116).

Despite Koizumi’s reasoning based on the Japan-US alliance, the framework for the legislation was based on international collaboration, not on the alliance (Shinoda 2007: 115-116). The quick inclusion of the JDA and SDF officers was a stark contrast to the Gulf War, where the JDA and SDF were not involved from the get-go. The coalition parties (LDP, New Komeito, and the New Conservative Party) also formed a General Party (GP) council to deal with Iraq and North Korean issues as part of a WMD counter-measures (ibid). This could indicate that there was political willingness to tie together US support as part of the war on terror and WMD, and Iraq. This might suggest a strategy to build public support for sending the SDF to Iraq by linking the issue with North Korea.

In early April, the first legislation drafts included economic assistance, reconstruction assistance, humanitarian assistance, WMD search & dismantlement and minesweeping, counter-terrorism and stabilization missions, all of which would require SDF support. This would include direct logistical support such as weapons transportation for the US (Shinoda 2007: 116; Ito 2007: 85).

The turn of events in this period was marked by Koizumi’s declaration of political support for the US. While he had withheld public support earlier, the start of the invasion signaled the time to act. As Koizumi himself stated, the alliance partnership was an important motivation for expressing support. Drawing on the bad Gulf War experience, the Prime Minister acted quickly with both the political support, and plans for various forms of assistance. As we saw in the Gulf War case, the Japanese public had been critical of how slow the Japanese government had acted in the 90’s. In that sense, Koizumi drew upon old negative backlash from both the US and the Japanese public. He also considered that the war might affect Japan through their relationship with the US, and in contrast to the Gulf War, included the JDA and the SDF from the beginning when planning a response.

The initial legislation draft reflected the importance of the alliance in Koizumi’s response. Not only would Japan give economic aid and reconstruction support, Tokyo would also help with security operations through the SDF. The rhetoric used by Koizumi when he voiced his support was also (retrospectively) telling in two ways: Because the US went to war, the Japanese attempts to restrain US military action had failed. This means that Koizumi had to confront the alliance considerations. He had noted in the initial press conference for his
statement, that it would not be in Japan’s interest to damage the bilateral confidence. This tells us that rather than going down the risky road Japan had walked in the Gulf War and face threats of abandonment, Koizumi saw committing to the alliance as the best option. This also falls in line with the congruency in this period. While the public majority opposed the war, Koizumi publicly declared his support for the US. Somewhat predictably, he lost support in the public.

However, there are two key questions we need to answer in regards to this. Why did a bigger part of the public support Koizumi’s statement (36%), compared to those who opposed the war (31%)? The fact that a plurality of the 36% chose US cooperation on the North Korea issue is telling, in addition to the 67% that considered North Korea as the most important issue when evaluating Koizumi’s statement. We can interpret that the public showed some worries over abandonment by the US, and therefore chose to support the US attack on Iraq. Koizumi also took up the issue on abandonment by reinforcing the importance of the alliance, and that damaging the confidence in their bilateral alliance would not be in Japan’s best interest. If we turn this on its head, it means that Koizumi opposed public majority opinion that did not support his statement of political support, did not agree with his argument about abandonment, and opposed the war.

The decision-making process-tracing and congruency evidence in the invasion period thus tells us that pressure from a military ally played the biggest role. While we inferred from the previous period that the public opinion majority against the war had constrained Japanese action, Koizumi opposed public opinion majority by his declaration of support for the US. So in this period, pressure from a military ally weighed more than public opinion. The government acted upon the internalized pressure to do what they could as alliance partners. The fact that many of the actions they took - such as actively involving the JDA and the SDF – stood in contrast to the Gulf War, supports the notion that much of this internalized pressure stemmed from previous experiences.

In other words, the internalized pressure which the government acted upon was both to support their ally (as Snyder’s alliance theory predicts), and to proactively improve their reputation as an ally. In this sense, the bargaining pressure the US had exerted prior to the war might have had an effect, but the stark contrast to the Gulf War seems to say “lesson learned”.
Post-War Reconstruction Efforts

As the dust settled from the fall of Baghdad in April and the end of “major combat operations” on May 2nd (though the fighting continued), the scene opened up for Japanese reconstruction efforts. However, the draft legislation for Iraq reconstruction efforts was still kept out of the public’s eye. The Diet was already discussing emergency legislation for SDF mobilization in the case of an attack on Japan, which was a controversial issue due to Japan’s anti-militarism (Japan Times 2003, May 20). The government could therefore not afford another controversial bill to spark public opposition (Shinoda 2007: 117).

On the other hand, the SDF had previously been dispatched for peacekeeping in UN Peacekeeping missions, like in Cambodia. When the UN adopted the Security Council Resolution 1483 in May, which called for humanitarian aid and assistance, the Koizumi government gained more legitimacy for the reconstruction draft legislations23. Shortly after the UN Resolution was adopted, Koizumi met President Bush for a Japan-US summit meeting, where he told Bush that while an SDF dispatch and other reconstruction efforts in Iraq was something Japan itself had to decide, he was considering an SDF aircraft dispatch and various reconstruction efforts24. It should be noted that at the time of this summit (May 23, 2003), the government had yet to announce the specific legislation for Iraq reconstruction, which means Koizumi discussed an SDF dispatch and reconstruction efforts with the US President before letting the Japanese public know. An LDP member reflects back on the meetings between Koizumi and Bush: “I think … [the most important part was] [the] personal relationship between the Prime Minister and the President”, and emphasizes the value Koizumi held in the Japan-US alliance (Kono Taro interview 2011 by author).

By early June, the coalition party leaders wanted to submit the Iraq reconstruction bill during the current Diet session, by June 13. By that time, the SDF emergency mobilization bill had passed, so they would avoid having two controversial bills on the agenda simultaneously. The Iraq reconstruction legislation used the UN resolutions, most notably #1483, as a base for political legitimacy for Japan, most of all in the eyes of the public, to dispatch the SDF overseas. It allowed the government to send SDF and civilians on missions for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance, support the US and other forces to ensure security, and assist in WMD dismantling. The activities would be limited to noncombat areas.

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(Shinoda 2007: 118-119). However, the bill met heavy resistance within LDP, both in a smaller joint conference between the Cabinet, Defense and Foreign Policy Subcommittee, and in the LDP General council. The biggest criticism was the use of arms and whether noncombat areas really existed in Iraq (Kyodo News Service 2003, June 10; June 11).

The government managed to get the approval of the LDP General Council, but had to compromise. The point about SDF assistance for dismantling WMDs had to be removed. In an interview with one of the LDP members who opposed the idea, he explains that there was little legitimacy for the war. Additionally, no WMDs had been found after the war (Taro Kono interview 2011 by author). This sheds some light on the opposition to the WMD clause in the legislation. At this time, public opinion was almost evenly split on the issue: 46% was for a dispatch, while 43% opposed it (Asahi Shimbun 2003, July 22: 4). The US Deputy Secretary of State Armitage was very pleased with these developments, and emphasized how important it was for Japan to contribute with boots on the ground. He likened the Gulf War contributions as “paying to watch a baseball game on the side of the stands”, and that this time, Japan was stepping into the playing field (Kyodo News 2003, June 10).

The upcoming LDP presidential election in September meant that there was tension between those who supported or opposed Koizumi in the LDP (Mainichi Shimbun 2003, June 13). This meant that Koizumi’s opponents would want to play on the Japanese public’s opposition to involvement in overseas combat to gain ground ahead of the elections.

The government forced the current Diet session to extend another 40 days, despite protests from the opposition parties (Kyodo News 2003, June 16). As the LDP wanted to quickly pass the legislation, they sought support from the opposition party, the DPJ (The Democratic Party of Japan). However, the DPJ, based on a report on the Iraq situation, rejected the legislation. The reasons behind this were that Japan could contribute to reconstruction without dispatching the SDF, and the difficulty in drawing the line between combat and noncombat areas, and the dangers in these areas (Kyodo News 2003, July 1). The DPJ submitted its own Iraq reconstruction legislation, but without an SDF dispatch. When asked about noncombat zones in Iraq during a Diet session, Koizumi was unable to mention specific noncombat zones (ibid: July 23).

Despite the DPJ’s opposition to the bill, and their competing legislation, the LDP managed to pass the Iraq reconstruction bill, including an SDF dispatch, in late July, with Koizumi adding that “This law will benefit Japan in the long run” (ibid: July 26).

However, public support for the dispatch shrank to 33% in July, while 55% opposed it (Asahi Shimbun 2003, July 22: 4), and shrank even further in August: only 28% supported a
dispatch, while a majority of 52% opposed it (Nihon Keizai Shimbun 2003, August 22). Of those who opposed it, a plurality responded that their reason for opposing a dispatch was that Iraq was unsafe. This reason was consistently the reason for the dispatch opposition among respondents, with a 16% plurality in June, 25% plurality in July, 26% plurality in December, 22% plurality in January, and 18% plurality in February.\(^{25}\) The US continued to apply pressure to Japan to dispatch the SDF. The US ambassador to Japan, Howard Baker, told the press that Washington expected SDF troops to be sent, and to “contribute to the region’s stability and reconstruction” when he met with the Chief Cabinet Secretary Fukuda to discuss the Iraq’s reconstruction (Kyodo News 2003, September 26).

This period once again showed Koizumi discussing Iraq reconstruction directly with Bush, and Koizumi seemed very intent on doing what he could to provide assistance in Iraq. Ironically, Koizumi did note that it would be Japan’s decision to make, despite the fact that the specific reconstruction plans had been kept under a lid. The public had been opposed to the war, but had generally favored noncombat HADR dispatches. As the UN called for aid in Iraq, it gave the Japanese government’s plan more legitimacy. However, the fact was that while the major combat operations in Iraq had been declared over, the war was still very much alive. This made any dispatch plan problematic, since SDF dispatches to conflict areas was still opposed by the public, and could be seen as unconstitutional. This can be taken as evidence that the continued fighting in Iraq was something the Japanese politicians had not taken into account when they started planning the reconstruction assistance. Indeed, the ongoing insurgency later became a problem, especially since the opposition parties would contend whether any noncombat areas really existed in Iraq. One researcher notes that at one point in August, the government wanted to postpone the dispatch due to the bombing of the UN headquarters in Baghdad (Ishibashi 2007: 776).

The fact that Iraq continued to be in turmoil put the government – particularly Koizumi - in a pickle: Follow up with reconstruction assistance that was essentially promised by Koizumi, and face public resistance due to Iraq’s instability; alternatively, wait until Iraq had completely stabilized before laying detailed plans. The former choice could face public resistance and might provoke retroactive voting, for example. The latter choice could warrant the same criticism that Japan had received after the Gulf War: “too little, too late”. The

politicians chose the former, and as we saw, the legislation had to be significantly watered down as it would be controversial enough to dispatch the SDF to a country that, for all intents and purposes, was still at war. A public opinion majority opposing an SDF dispatch formed over the summer, while the US encouraged Japanese boots on the ground in Iraq.

The fact that the government chose to pursue a watered-down bill and forced an extension of the Diet to pass it as quickly as possible is telling: it indicates that despite public opposition, the government chose to prioritize quick action for the sake of their relationship with the US. Even though they tried to pass the bill quickly, the actual dispatch did not happen until December/January 2004. We might interpret this as a relatively quick symbolic act from Tokyo, which nevertheless showed Washington their determination to contribute to Iraq’s reconstruction. However, as the subsequent analysis will show, public opinion opposed the bill and the actual dispatch. The opposition parties also strongly argued against it. The LDP also shelved the bill during the general election in the fall, as it was unpopular with the public. These factors contributed to delaying the actual dispatch.

Is this outlook changed if we consider the congruence between policy and public opinion or pressure by a military ally? The policy the government pursued was an SDF dispatch. Koizumi had somewhat ambitious plans for the dispatch, as it would not only assist with humanitarian and reconstruction work, but also security missions such as WMD search & dismantling. Additionally, it was unclear to where they could be dispatched. This was incongruent with public opinion, as it opposed the SDF dispatch. We can also infer that as Iraq was by and large still a conflict area, it made it even harder for an interpretation of the constitution that would make an SDF dispatch seem legitimate in the public’s eyes. The legislation that they ended up proposing was different, and more congruent with a public that had long favored humanitarian aid, but opposed SDF dispatches to conflict areas. At the same time, the policy was fairly in line with the US’s wish for “boots on the ground”, and reconstruction assistance. In this regard, the pressure to support their ally seems to have weighed slightly more than public opinion.

The pressure from the US had both the internalized pressure dimension, and the bargaining dimension. During this period, we can point to the meeting between Koizumi and Bush, Armitage’s appraisal of the SDF dispatch developments and Baker’s expectations of an SDF dispatch, as bargaining pressure. These happened on different occasions, and shows that the US was not relying on Japan’s internal pressure. That being said, I would argue that the wish to act quickly (if only symbolically so) and Koizumi’s aggressive pursuit of keeping his “promises” to Bush, shows a strong internalized pressure to fulfill their role as alliance
partners, outside of contractual obligations. At the same time, the fact that they had to water down the legislation and keep it under a lid until they presented it to the Diet in order to avoid controversy, suggests that the opinion majority opposing the SDF dispatch also played a strong role. In that sense, this period marked the need for politicians to balance the weight of conflicting Japanese public opinion and pressure from a military ally.

Did public opinion or pressure from a military ally weigh more? The bargaining pressure from the US was fairly strong, and the government also seems to have acted on internalized pressure. This explains why Tokyo introduced and passed the bill. At the same time, a public opinion majority formed against the bill. The public’s opposition also explains why the details of the bill were initially kept secret, and why the bill had to be watered down. The actual enactment of the legislation and the dispatch was also delayed. We can from this evidence interpret that while public opinion played a constricting role on the policy outcome, the pressure from a military ally played the decisive role, as the government ultimately acted against the opinion majority.

*The LDP and the General Elections & a Continued Dispatch Battle*

It is a bit surprising that the Koizumi cabinet forced this bill through, even though an anti-militaristic public backlash was a possibility, especially considering that an LDP presidential election would be held in September, and that Koizumi might dissolve the lower house to begin a general election. However, the Diet’s term would end by June 2004 anyway, so he had to call a general election soon, or he would risk the gamble of not being able to control the election’s timing - he might have risked both an upper and lower house election in July 2004.

However, Koizumi won the presidential election by a significant margin in September. Koizumi subsequently dissolved the lower house in October and called for a general election. LDP and New Komeito stayed in power after the election, while the NCP merged with the LDP. The LDP lost ten seats, the NCP five, while Komeito gained three seats. The DPJ emerged as a stronger opposition party, and gained forty seats. Leading up to the election, Baker continued to meet with Japanese officials regarding Iraq’s reconstruction, and expressed satisfaction over Japan’s financial contributions (Kyodo News 2003, October 15). On the other hand, Armitage told the press that Japan could “not walk away” from Iraq’s reconstruction (Japan Times 2003, August 31).
Before and during the election, the government coalition had not begun to enact the actual SDF dispatch, and fled from the Iraq issue. One LDP leader argued that the SDF should not be dispatched until after the election (Ishibashi 2007: 774-776). As one observer argues, the media focused more on the potential two-party dynamic between the LDP and the DPJ, and voters were more concerned about social security and economic recovery (ibid). Thus, the Iraq issue did not become an important topic for the election.

Since the DPJ became stronger, they posed a bigger threat as an opposition party. At the same time, casualties in Iraq were rising. The DPJ opposition leader Naoto Kan opposed the SDF dispatch, as the security situation in Iraq was worsening (Kyodo News 2003, November 20). A former LDP Finance Minister Masajuro Shiokawa, argued that how the the Iraqi issue turned out, would “decided the future” of the Koizumi administration (Kyodo News 2003, November 19). During a visit to Japan, the US Defense Secretary emphasized the importance of the alliance, and the value of past Japanese contributions. He also noted that the southern areas of Iraq were quite stable (Asahi Shimbun 2003, November 12: 9). In late November, two Japanese diplomats were killed on their way to a reconstruction conference in Tikrit in north central Iraq, further fuelling the question of whether even noncombat zones were safe.

The murdered diplomats further fuelled the opposition’s protest to an SDF dispatch. The Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the Japan Communist party (JCP) also fell in line with the DPJ, warning that the SDF “should never be dispatched” (ibid: November 30a) However, Koizumi stated that the basic policy for the Iraqi reconstruction efforts remained the same (ibid: November 30b). Nevertheless, Koizumi had yet to clearly state the policy on Iraq following the election. Public majority opinion still opposed the SDF dispatch: 33% supported a dispatch, while 52% were against it (Midford 2011: 135). The US ambassador stressed that he expected Japan to “be fully involved in the matter of trying to stabilize the country and its reconstruction”. He noted that even small personnel contributions would be appreciated, as an expression of “national will and determination by Japan” (Kyodo News 2003, December 8).

The Basic Plan for the dispatch to Iraq regarding the Iraq Reconstruction bill, was formulated in secret by the cabinet, to avoid opposition from both the LDP and the opposition parties. This led to criticism from both LDP and Komeito officials. However, the plan outline was disclosed a week later on December 8th. The dispatch would include about 600 Ground SDF troops that would carry out humanitarian and reconstruction activities in southern Iraq. According to the dispatch plan, they would be limited to noncombat areas, where there was at
that time, and presumably thereafter, no combat. Despite that many members of the coalition expressed opposition, the Basic Plan as a whole was approved on December 9th (Kyodo News 2003, December 10; Shinoda 2007: 128-130; Asahi Shimbun 2003, December 10: 5).

At the press conference after the cabinet decision was made, Koizumi argued that the dispatch was constitutional based on international calls for Japanese assistance. This was arguably a very loose interpretation of the constitutions. He argued that since the UN had asked its member states for reconstruction assistance in Iraq, financial contributions were not sufficient. The Japanese constitution says that the Japanese people pledge their national honor to accomplish, with all their resources, the high ideals in regards to everyone’s right to live in peace, and free from fear. Koizumi argued the people of Japan should act in accordance with these ideals. He also reinforced the importance of the Japan-US alliance, and that the SDF personnel were fit for a reconstruction dispatch, due to their training regimen26.

Table 3.2
Cabinet support rate

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>November 12, 2003</th>
<th>December 12, 2003</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Support</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not support</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


As we can see from table 3.2, Koizumi’s support rate fell significantly down after his statement, and his disapproval rating increased. Moreover, only 23% of the public was satisfied by his justification (Asahi Shimbun, December 12: 1).

Komeito also had to consider their pacifist supporting organization Soka Gakkai. Soka Gakkai typically supports New Komeito in elections, and holds pacifist beliefs rooted in Buddhism (Métraux 2007: 157-159, 162). Komeito later explained the dispatch as a purely humanitarian assistance dispatch to concerned Soka Gakkai members (ibid: 166-167). Komeito’s leader Takenori Kanzaki travelled to Samawah where the GSDF troops would be sent, to check on security in person, and reported that the area was “relatively stable” (Kyodo News 2003, December 22). He agreed to the dispatch on the condition that every SDF dispatch needed consultation among the ruling coalition parties beforehand, and that thorough

research had to be conducted before the dispatch. (Kyodo News 2003, December 6; Shinoda 2007: 128-130). The government therefore held a consultation meeting on January 6th the following year, and agreed to dispatch the ground troops three days later.

Koizumi’s cabinet approved the final Basic Plan on December 18th, and the JDA’s director general issued a dispatch order for the first air force contingent on the 19th. The ASDF was dispatched on the 26th. The day before the dispatch, Armitage mentioned in a published interview how he felt the importance of the Japan-US alliance was greater than even Japan’s relationship with the UN. The dispatch would strengthen their ties even further (Kyodo News 2003, December 25). The GSDF left Japan the 16th of January, a dispatch that was praised by Armitage. He highlighted the (relatively) swift dispatch, and the fact that Japan was stepping up their game on the international scene (Kyodo News 2003, February 2).

In his general policy speech on January 19, Koizumi once again drew upon Japan’s responsibility as a member of the international community to justify personnel contributions. He strongly emphasized the humanitarian and reconstruction efforts Japan would contribute to Iraq, and that the SDF was the best fit for this task, as they were trained to work in a dangerous environment (though they would not use any force, and retreat if the operation area was threatened). Unlike his initial statement, he did not draw upon the Japan-US alliance as vital for the SDF dispatch, framing it purely as a reconstruction and humanitarian assistance mission.

Reports from the GSDF troops a week later informed the government that their base was stable, and LDP and Komeito agreed to dispatch the main ground force. The main GSDF force arrived in Samawah the 8th of February and began construction and humanitarian assistance. Newspaper coverage (namely by the progressive Asahi, and conservative Yomiuri) of the dispatch was consistently neutral, and the non-neutral reports included more negative than positive descriptions. TV reports were more mixed: News Station (from TV Asahi) and News Forest focused on the armed SDF soldiers and dangers in Iraq, while News 7 (NHK) presented a more positive picture of the SDF dispatch in Iraq (Hollstein 2008: 104-120).

The public remained ambivalent about the dispatch through the end, and was almost evenly split in February (41% for, 42% against), while a plurality of 48% formed to oppose the dispatch in March (with 44% supporting the dispatch) (Asahi Shimbun 2004, March 17: 4). Long-term opinion also indicates a stable majority opinion preference for withdrawing the

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SDF as soon as possible: When asked about extending the SDF deployment for another year, 53.9% opposed it in November 2004, 58.3% in December 2004, and 59.8% in December the following year.\(^{28}\)

The LDP lost the upper house election in July 2004, and as one researcher notes (Midford 2011: 139), the Iraq issue “moved … floating voters, away from the LDP and toward the DPJ … producing a stinging defeat for the LDP”.

Ultimately, Koizumi decided in 2005, despite a victory in the general election, that the GSDF would be withdrawn within July 2006, one year before the dispatch was set to expire, after having tested the patience of public opinion for a long time on the Iraq issue. According to one study, Koizumi managed to win the election by shifting attention away from pension reform and the Iraq issue, to the postal privatization he wanted to go through with, in addition to framing the election as a battle between him and the LDP (ibid: 153). The ASDF dispatch was extended for another year right before the upper house election in 2007, in which the LDP lost their upper house control to the DPJ.

While Koizumi’s victory in the LDP’s presidential election was important, the most relevant part for this thesis to bring up is the general election, since that is decided by the public. In general terms, we can say that the Iraq issue did not decide this election. While it was a bit bold by Koizumi to dissolve the lower house to initiate the general election amidst controversial issues such as the SDF mobilization bill and the ongoing Iraq legislation, the coalition government dodged the topic during the election period, and shelved the dispatch plans until after the election. This indicates that they were worried about a public opinion majority that opposed the dispatch, and did not want to bring it up during the election period.

This, and that Koizumi was arguably unclear on whether there actually would be a dispatch, might explain why there seems to be no retroactive voting for the general election in 2003, and the deciding issues seem to have been economic policies.\(^{29}\) This evidence indicates that public opinion majority opposed to the SDF dispatch played an important constricting role, and weighed more than pressure from a military ally in this period.

Nevertheless, the DPJ became stronger after the election and was the LDP’s biggest critic when it came to the Iraq issue. The coalition government continued their policy, and was undeterred even in the face of the continued insurgency in Iraq, the ambiguity of “safe” areas in Iraq, and public opposition. However, in the face of public opposition, they found it


\(^{29}\) For an in-depth study on the policies that decided the 2003 general election, see Ishibashi (2007). While Ishibashi argues that the Iraq issue did not play a large role the 2003 general election, Midford (2011: 139) argues that the Iraq issue contributed to LDP’s loss in the upper house election in 2004.
politically advantageous to keep the Basic Plan under a lid until it was finalized, suggesting their undeterred façade was imperfect.

In his initial statement in December, Koizumi justified the SDF dispatch based on a rather loose and selective interpretation of the constitution. He emphasized that Japan had a duty to the international community, and that enhancing the Japan-US alliance was also imperative. While the former argument can be interpreted as an attempt to sway a public opinion that had favored HADR types of missions in UN peacekeeping operations, the latter argument indicates that he faced internalized pressure to act in Japan’s best interest in the alliance.

In his general policy speech in January 2004, he framed the dispatch purely as a humanitarian and reconstruction-related assistance, and that trained SDF personnel were the best fit to operate in a potential dangerous environment. This time he did not justify the dispatch by linking it with the Japan-US alliance, but tried to sway public opinion by framing the SDF dispatch as a HADR type of mission. If we compare the final dispatch policy to Koizumi’s original plans, they were much more oriented toward security missions such as WMD dismantling, in addition to reconstruction assistance, yet again suggestion public opinion played a constricting role. Moreover, Komeito had to adhere to its pacifist-oriented voters, which resulted in another restriction on the dispatches. This is another point indicating that public opinion did play a role in the decision-making for the politicians.

This leads us to the policy congruence. In this last period leading up to the dispatch, there was a clear discrepancy between the public opinion and policy outcome. The majority of the public continued to oppose a dispatch. The public became split after-the-fact in February, and returned to oppose the dispatch in March, though the numbers in March was a plurality, not a majority. If we consider the public opinion throughout the case, it was overall a fairly stable long-term opinion majority against the SDF dispatches (with a few cases of plurality opinion). The opinion majority in 2004/2005 that wanted to withdraw the SDF forces is also indicative of a fairly stable long-term opinion majority against the SDF dispatch.

US pressure and Japanese policy outcome was more congruent. While the SDF’s logistics and security role that Koizumi had envisioned was shifted to a pure reconstruction mission, the dispatch was still congruent with the US’s wishes for assistance, and boots on the ground. Indeed, Baker’s emphasis on a small personnel contribution as a gesture from Japan shows that more than anything, Japan’s willingness to bear more international responsibility was the key goal for both the US and the Japanese government, indicating congruent behavior.
between the Japanese policy outcome and US pressure. I therefore find the congruence in this period to favor pressure from a military ally.

That being said, this period continued to see internalized pressure playing an equal – if not more important – part, compared to bargaining pressure. If we look at the time from Koizumi’s meeting with Bush in January 2002 until the SDF was dispatched in 2004, the coalition government steadily continued to press for SDF dispatch plans regardless of the amount of bargaining pressure the US exerted, after the war started in March 2003. If the internalized pressure was less significant, we should have seen more sporadic pushes for Iraq contributions akin to the Gulf War, especially considering the public opposition. Additionally, in Koizumi’s original statement regarding the Basic Plan for the reconstruction plan in December, he emphasized the Japan-US alliance, indicating an internalized pressure to support his ally in an issue of interest, even outside of the alliance’s contractual agreements, acting in what he perceived to be Japan’s best national interest.

At the same time, we saw that Koizumi had to alter his ambitious plans for the SDF from being a security and reconstruction dispatch, to a pure HADR mission. While the public opinion formed a stable, long-term opinion majority (at a few points plurality) opposing the SDF dispatch, the SDF was dispatched. On the other hand, while the original dispatch plans were more ambitious, the dispatch policy fell in line with what the public generally could accept as a humanitarian dispatch, albeit in a somewhat unsafe country. In other words, the government found a middle ground between what the public could accept (a HADR mission) and what their military allies wanted (boots on the ground). Nevertheless, the SDF was dispatched into an area of potential conflict. I therefore find that in this period, overall, pressure from a military ally weighed more than public opinion.

The SDF Dispatch to Iraq as a Two-Level Bargaining Process

This section will analyze this case from the perspective of Putnam’s Two-Level theory, before concluding whether public opinion or pressure from a military ally weighed more. I have derived default win-sets similar to the Gulf War case, that reflects pressure from the US, and public opinion. Similar to the first case, grey areas will represent the constraints in the win-sets.

We also need to specify who the chief negotiator is. Based on the empirical evidence presented in this chapter, we can define the chief negotiator here as Prime Minister Koizumi, with his cabinet and the coalition government playing an influential role. There are also actors...
in the opposition such as the DPJ politicians, but they did not seem to play a decisive role in the policy outcomes.

Since this paper is focused on Japan, I will define the US chief negotiator the Japanese point of view. This appears to have been the US President Bush, while the ambassador to Japan Baker, and also the US deputy-secretary Armitage also played influencing roles. While there are of course more people behind US led policy towards Japan, these were major representational figures that determined US policy and exerted pressure at Japan on the international level. The domestic Japanese level are once again the public, and we define the bargaining constraints based on what the public opinion polls indicate, in addition to previous empirical evidence such as from the Gulf War, on what constraints are realistic (such as HADR). The default win-sets for the domestic and international level thus look like this, respectively:

Japanese public:

![Diagram showing win-sets for the Japanese public]

The US:

![Diagram showing win-sets for the US]

Figure 3.1

We remember from the previous two-level games sections that we read the win-sets as follows: The white arrows above form the total range of options. Grey arrows are the constraints of each level. In win-sets where there are grey arrows, the white arrows represent options outside the current constraints, or options no longer desired (or that have been fulfilled). If there is a black arrow, it represents a policy goal for a negotiator, which is outside the constraints of that level.

Another factor to consider is whether negotiators have their own win-sets, or if they simply try to find ways to overlap the domestic and international win-sets. This would suggest that the negotiators have their own preferred win-sets that also need to overlap with the domestic and international ones. However, as we remember from previous discussions, I
chose not to give the negotiators their own win-sets in this study. Rather, I cover their preferences in the analysis akin to the framework set up by Evans et.al (1993), where the building blocks for the two-level analysis include the statesmen’s preferences. This lends itself better to the analysis because it is more parsimonious than introducing another factor (a third win-set), in addition to analyzing the statesmen’s preferences as Evans et.al. suggest. The distinction from using a win-set for the statesmen and analyze their preferences is that it gives us different lenses to look at how they handle the two different levels, and that the preferences does not reflect as well in a win-set if you want to directly compare it to the other two (such as maintaining or enhancing his domestic position, policy preference based on ideology etc.).

As a reprise of the Putnam framework, the analysis has three basic dimensions: How the statesmen handle and manipulate the domestic level, the international level, and the statesmen’s own preferences. We also remember that the public can ratify the agreement through opinion majorities, or elections.

*The Pre-War Bargaining Process*

Let us first reprise the key points of this period: Iraq denied UN weapon inspections, and during 2002 it became increasingly clearer that the US might attack Iraq. Washington pressed for political support, and also personnel contributions from Japan. Japanese politicians continued to insist on international cooperation through the UN, and pressed for additional UN resolutions. The majority of the Japanese public opposed the prospect of war. The Japanese politicians ended up not supporting the prospect of an attack during the pre-war period in 2002/2003.

The bargaining process early on was focused on restraining the US’s win-set. The Japanese statesmen put their efforts into the international level, so seemingly the domestic level did not play a big role in the beginning. However, Japan’s push for UN resolutions and unwillingness to support an attack might have been an attempt at gaining more public support. If Koizumi had expressed support for the US’s intention to go to war, he might have faced a public backlash as the public majority was against it. The constraints of the public would affect what Japan could contribute should an attack on Iraq happen, which is something the Japanese statesmen had to keep in mind. In the initial analysis of the pre-war period, we touched upon restraining the US as an important motivation.
We can now also interpret this restraint as proactively increasing the win-set for the public by trying to build public support: If the UN would sanction an attack on Iraq, the public might be less negatively inclined towards contributions (financial or otherwise) to an offensive war (as opposed to the Gulf War, which was defensive). In this respect, they intentionally attempted to manipulate the constraints of the public’s win-set. The attempt to build more public support shows us how the Japanese politicians actually tried to manipulate both levels simultaneously, in order to enhance their domestic position (via public support).

Their manipulation of the international constraints was direct, as they sought to constrain the attack by waiting for and negotiating a UN resolution. The US officials such as Lawless and Feith repeatedly stressed that they expected logistical support and personnel if a war broke out. The initial win-sets for the pre-war period thus looked like this:

The Japanese public:

![Japanese public win-set diagram]

The US:

![US win-set diagram]

Figure 3.2

The fact that the US wanted boots on the ground is the reason I stretched the constraints from just logistical support such as minesweeping akin to their Indian Ocean dispatches, to more combat oriented contributions, as demonstrated by the US constraints marked in grey in figure 3.2. At this time we need to note, though, that the exact details of what the US would expect was unclear, because the war was not a certainty yet. As we can see from the constraints in the win-sets (marked in grey), the Japanese public did not overlap with the US at all, because there was a stable opinion majority firmly against the offensive war. This does beg the question of whether the Japanese public’s constraints should include HADR, to overlap with the US’s reconstruction constraint. However, at that point in time, it was still uncertain whether an attack would actually happen, and as such, it is a moot point.

The tactic to press for a UN resolution was relatively successful for the Japanese statesmen. By withholding political support, they did not get early involved with the war, and
at the same time avoided a public backlash. At the turn of the year when the war
loomed on the horizon, the focus for the US and Japan became reconstruction assistance,
which was what Armitage expressed hopes for (Mainichi Shimbun 2003, January 19).
However, the Japanese public did not support the war itself. As we discussed in the Gulf War
chapter, the public had been positive for a HADR role for the SDF, diplomatic contributions
and financial contributions. The minesweeping was accepted post-conflict, and Japan had
through their support to the US’s “war on terror” provided some rear-area logistical support
for US endeavors in Afghanistan. However, while the support Japan had provided for the US
for the “war on terror” could be said to be defensive in nature, an attack on Iraq would be an
aggressive war in nature (since Iraq had not attacked anyone). While research indicates that
the Japanese public finds utility in military power when used defensively (and as such would
be more inclined to support defensive operations), offensive wars are not perceived to have
utility (Midford 2011). If the public finds an offensive war to have a lack of utility, then it
follows that offensive wars lacks legitimacy. Additionally, any SDF dispatch to an actual
conflict area not sanctioned by the UN would also not be well received.

As we can see, the Japanese statesmen did not manage to gain overlapping win-sets.
The statesmen’s preferences did not come out very clear before the war, but we can infer that
their main motivations were to either constrain unilateral US action, or at least gain
international legitimacy if they were to support the US, not to mention domestic legitimacy
with the public. In the Gulf War, the dispatch of the minesweepers had not been possible until
the UN declared the war over.

However, Koizumi’s own personal preferences were more hawkish, as he seemed to
have promised to support Bush early in 2002. If his intent all along was a post-war dispatch,
he would want to push for as much UN support as possible. The decision to send another an
Aegis Destroyer (to replace a Destroyer) to the Indian Ocean can also be interpreted as a
signal to support the US. There is also some evidence suggesting that Koizumi and the
director general of the JDA might have wanted to dispatch the SDF to provide medical
services for the initial attack, which would solidify his hawkish approach, but this was never
official at any rate (Kliman 2006: 126). Nevertheless, Koizumi’s intentions became crystal
clear when the war broke out. For the pre-war period at least, the statesmen conceded more to
the Japanese public than the international level.

The first win-sets illustrate how Japan’s hesitancy to declare official support conceded
more to the public’s constraints than the US’s.
The Bargaining Process during Major Combat Operations in Iraq

Let us first reprise the key points from this period: When the Iraq Invasion began in March, the Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi quickly declared Tokyo’s political support for the US-led attack. Koizumi’s justifications were based on valuing the Japan-US alliance, and potential WMD-terrorist risks. Additionally, he wanted Japan to take on a greater international role. The majority of the public did not support him, though the support for his statement was higher than support for the war itself. Koizumi and his cabinet started to draft legislation for Japanese assistance to Iraq, with early drafts including financial assistance, HADR operations, WMD search & dismantlement operations, minesweeping, counter-terrorism and stabilization missions by the SDF.

As Koizumi voiced his support for the US attack on Iraq, it was clear that he was conceding to the US win-set, rather than the Japanese public’s. By using the alliance as the reason for support, he used what Putnam calls “synergy”, in which he used the alliance as the basis for trying to expand the public’s win-set. However, his manipulation of the public win-set failed, as an opinion majority disagreed with his statement. None the less, his statement was better supported than the war itself. Of those who supported him, US cooperation on the North Korean issues was the most important reason for their support.

Furthermore, the government created the General Party Council to deal with the Iraq and North Korean issues as a whole, suggesting a long-term synergistic issue linkage, tying in Iraq with North Korea, WMDs and terror. One might interpret this as evidence for attempting to manipulate the domestic win-set to gain more public support for overseas SDF deployment, in effect perhaps attempting to expand the public’s win-set beyond a HADR role for the SDF in Iraq. By doing this, Koizumi acted on his hawkish political ideology (statesman preference) of a greater role for the SDF on the international scene.

The government did not manipulate the international constraints during the war. This is because Koizumi was inclined to concede to the US win-set, and only tried to extend the Japanese public win-set. This made Koizumi’s preferences clear, as he moved toward the US’s win-set. His hawkish standpoint to prioritize the alliance and his wish for Japan to undertake a bigger international role played a big part. His preferences, together with the Japanese Security Council’s preferences were very clearly in favor of the US. The initial

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30 36% supported his statement, versus 31% who supported the war. The North Korean threat was cited as the biggest factor for this (Asahi Shimbun 2003: March 30; ibid April 1.

85
drafts of the legislation they had MOFA and JDA prepare reflect their wish to stretch the public win-set as far as possible.

The Japanese public:

The US:

![Diagram]

Figure 3.3

The Japanese public did not support Koizumi’s declaration of support for the war, so as of yet, no other form of contributions was within the public’s constraints, as marked by the grey arrow. The black arrows indicate how far Koizumi wanted to push the Japanese contributions in this period. As indicated by the US win-set, they had gained political support, but the grey arrows show that they still wanted more.

It is clear that Koizumi wanted to stretch the win-set for the Japanese public to accommodate the US as much as possible. However, this range of options was not made public at this time, and as such it would take some time before the public would ratify or fail to ratify the win-sets. Koizumi did not manage to sway the public opinion majority to favor his statement, and the public remained opposed to the war. The fact that his cabinet rate dropped, and that an opinion majority opposed his statement, indicates a short-term failed ratification of the policy outcome here (political support). However, only political support in itself was not necessarily too risky vis-à-vis a public (partial) veto from the public later on. The most important issue would be actual contributions.

The Post-War Bargaining Process

The key points from this period were that the Koizumi cabinet was forced to water down the Iraq assistance legislation before submitting it to the diet, removing all security-related missions. There were also worries about how safe Iraq was. The coalition government
managed to pass the legislation in June, despite political opposition. Washington also pressed for SDF troops to be dispatched. A very small opinion plurality of 46% vs. 44% supported the reconstruction dispatch in June, but an opinion majority quickly formed against it over July and August\footnote{Asahi Shimbun 2003: July 22; Nihon Keizai Shimbun 2003, August 22.}. The coalition government shelved the Iraq reconstruction dispatch during the summer, and avoided the Iraq issue during the general election. The coalition government survived the election. Washington continued to press Tokyo, and the Basic Plan for the Iraq dispatch was disclosed in December, which turned out to be an HADR type of mission. The SDF began dispatching late in December, while public majority opinion opposed the dispatch. Despite winning the general election in 2005, Koizumi announced the withdrawal of the GSDF within July 2006. The ASDF dispatch was extended for one more year right before the 2007 upper house election that the LDP lost.

The first period following the end of major combat operations in Iraq saw domestic political pressure not ratifying the policy outcome Koizumi wanted. The LDP on several occasions opposed to several issues with the legislation, such as the uncertainty of noncombat areas, the SDF’s right to bear arms, and security activities like WMD dismantling. If the politicians in the LDP that would run for the upcoming general election supported hawkish policy that extended beyond what the public would expect, they might face retrospective voting. Supporting an SDF dispatch that would assist with WMDs that had yet to be found would also be strange.

Thus, the domestic political pressure forced Koizumi and his hawkish cohorts to concede back to the public win-set, rather than the US. When the draft law for authorizing SDF dispatch for reconstruction was made official, the public was not necessarily inclined to ratify the deal, as 46% supported it, and 43% opposed it in June. Interestingly, the DPJ opposed the dispatch and submitted their own legislation that did not include the SDF. This might be an attempt to accommodate the public win-set, reflecting the DPJ statesmen’s preference in enhancing (or maintain) their domestic position. The fact that the LDP also watered down the legislation before submitting it to the Diet shows that (non-negotiating) statesmen’s preferences in an opposition party can play an important part at this stage.

Throughout the summer and after the government passed the dispatch legislation, a public opinion majority formed to oppose an SDF dispatch, meaning that the public win-set did indeed not extend to support the dispatch. In other words, the public did not ratify the deal, but the non-ratification was not as strong since there was also a plurality opinion.
supporting it in June. The public had opposed the war, and the fact that Iraq was still not safe made the policy hard to swallow. The public win-set did not change as the dispatch drew nearer and the action guidelines for the dispatch were formulated, but more importantly, Koizumi effectively shelved the dispatch idea when the general election approached, showing the power of the potential veto that public opinion held. As the coalition government fled from the Iraq issue and other issues became more important for the election (such as economic policies), they did note face retroactive voting or loss of political power, especially considering that in June, there had been very weak plurality support the dispatch.

I have formulated the final win-sets and policy (marked in black) below:

The Japanese public:

![Diagram of Japanese public win-sets](image1)

The US:

![Diagram of US win-sets](image2)

Figure 3.4

We see in the Japanese public’s win-set that diplomatic and financial contributions were possible after the war, but that HADR was out of the public’s constraint. The black arrows indicate the final policy that the coalition government made, which was a HADR and logistical dispatch. The constraints in the US win-set were still wide, as they had asked for many different forms of contributions, stretching from financial aid to personnel.

The policy was an (lightly) armed GSDF dispatch focused purely on humanitarian and reconstruction assistance, and an ASDF dispatch for logistical support, in addition to financial contributions. However, as we have previously discussed, the fact that the war itself had been an offensive one, and that Iraq remained relatively unsafe (as opposed to after the Gulf War, for example) resulted in a public win-set that did not overlap with the policy. The difference between the public’s preference (no dispatch) and the final policy (armed dispatch and logistical support) in the win-sets reflect the notion that an SDF dispatch into a country that is still at war, having an insurgency generally not safe for SDF personnel, and where it is
It is ultimately a question of safety and the nature of the dispatch. While the public win-set overlapped with the US’s minimum requests for financial assistance, the Japanese side had more dimensions to the reconstruction part, such as the safety of the areas, as discussed above. However, one could also argue that as the insurgency in Iraq continued, the US’s requests for boots on the ground from Japan grew stronger in order to help the US legitimize the war.

The Iraq Invasion ultimately represents a case where the public did not ratify the final deal (policy). What were the consequences of domestic ratification failure? It did not break Koizumi’s international agreement immediately. This is because, as we discussed in the theory section about Putnam, the public does not hold immediate veto power. While public opinion majorities can ratify agreements, elections can act as a display of (partial) veto power. The coalition government survived the general election in 2003 (with the exception of NPC) by fleeing from the Iraq issue during election, and shelving the dispatch until November. This might indicate that when a negotiator such as Koizumi, has very strong personal policy preferences, it might be possible to defy a public opinion ratification, at least in the short-term, because the public lacks immediate veto power. Moreover, public ratification might be mulled by postponing a policy and watering down the policy, such that it becomes hard for the public to veto it, since the policy is made more “acceptable”.

Additionally, the public had some “experience” with SDF dispatches from for example Cambodia. The short-term consequences of this seem to be dips in the statesmen/negotiators domestic position (visible in lower approval ratings and the loss of Diet seats). However, the LDP lost the election for the upper house in 2004, and other research indicates the Iraq and SDF dispatch issue was crucial for this loss (Midford 2011), signifying a partial veto on the dispatch “agreement” by the public.

What we can also infer from this is that during the bargaining and ratification process, until the final policy is set, there are no severe consequences for the negotiators on the domestic side in the short-term. However, if the final deal is not ratified, it might result in serious long-term consequences. This supports the argument that negotiators might be prone to make short-term agreements despite lack of public ratification. However, the public also displayed its veto power by the LDP’s upper house election loss.

Furthermore, a year later, Koizumi announced the withdrawal of the GSDF before its deployment time was over, voluntarily defecting from the level 1 agreement. We might
interpret this as evidence for Koizumi recognizing that the LDP might be punished by voters in the future (such as the 2007 upper house election) for not heeding the public non-ratification. It is also possible to interpret the long period from 2004 to 2007 as two partial vetoes, or the sum of those elections as one public veto.

Findings

This part will go through the findings of the Iraq Invasion case. In the pre-war period of this case, we found that Japan tried to restrain US action on Iraq, pressed for a UN resolution and remained noncommittal up until the war began. Pressing for a UN resolution might be interpreted as trying to gain more legitimacy for the war in the eyes of the public. Additionally, the policy of not supporting the US politically indicates that the politicians conceded to the Japanese public’s win-set, not the US one. Therefore, public opinion weighed more in this period.

However, when war came, Koizumi quickly came out to support the US politically despite public opposition to offensive war. This is a strong point for pressure from a military ally. Furthermore, the government started to plan several ambitious measures to accommodate US pressure, such an SDF dispatch that would be active in security missions.

After the war, the government continued to pursue a policy that was in part conflicting with public opinion, and conceded to the US wishes rather than the public. The government chose to pursue and pass a watered down legislation even in the face of public opposition, and Koizumi was all along very intent on strengthening the Japan-US alliance as best he could. That being said, the fact that the bill was watered down shows the influence of the public, in this case in a constraining role. Interestingly, I think that the government’s pursuit to support the US shows that internalized pressure was more important than the bargaining pressure the US exerted. This is because Koizumi and the government continually pursued a policy that would accommodate the US’s wishes. If the bargaining pressure played the larger role, I think the Japanese policy initiatives should have been more volatile as the Gulf War policy initiatives were. This case therefore demonstrates that negotiators with strong personal policy preferences (such as Koizumi), were more driven by internalized pressure (not making the same mistakes as in the Gulf War).

The government in this case also exemplifies how negotiators are willing to concede to the international level, can go through with deals that are not ratified by the domestic level (the public), but also demonstrates the price of doing so (lost upper house control).
While this seems to overtly favor pressure from a military ally, rather than public opinion, the other side of the story is that Koizumi’s ambitious plans that would by far concede to the US pressure were severely watered down. In other words, public opposition constrained the policy to be more in line with what the public favored, which was a HADR dispatch in nature. That being said, Koizumi went over the public’s win-set constraints by also dispatching the ASDF for logistical support. The compromise between the US constraints and the public constraints were the final policy outcome, a policy outcome whose policies were constrained - but not stopped by - public opinion. The internalized pressure to act as a good alliance partner, forced the hand of the government to dispatch the SDF to a semi-conflict area. Had they not, they would most likely have received as harsh criticism from the US akin to the Gulf War, and this might have damaged the confidence in the bilateral alliance. That being said, it is unclear whether the US would have punished Japan more if they had not supported them, since many Western nations also opposed the Iraq Invasion.

In other words, the politicians acted in the interests of both the public and their ally, but the fact that the war continued after the major combat operations ended became the major issue. At this point, the politicians with the decision-making power chose to adhere to their ally’s wishes to a greater extent than to the public’s. And as such, that is the answer to this case’s question of which weighed more. Taking into account the fact that public opinion heavily constrained and dictated the nature of the dispatch, the scale only slightly favors pressure from a military ally.

H₁ hypothesis: Because public opinion can exert significant influence on policy, pressure from a military ally weighs less on politicians when it conflicts with public opinion.

H₂ hypothesis: Because public opinion only has a vague and negligible influence on policy, pressure from a military ally weighs more on politicians when it conflicts with public opinion.

The evidence in this case therefore strengthens the hypothesis that pressure from a military ally weighs more on politicians when it conflicts with public opinion, and weakens H₁. Ultimately, pressure from their military ally weighed more, and the hawkish intentions of Koizumi and the politicians in line with him seem to have tipped the scale.
Summary and Conclusions of the Iraq Invasion Case

This case went through the events before, during and after the Iraq Invasion in 2003, and analyzed whether public opinion or pressure from a military ally influenced the Japanese politicians more. The study was done through the framework of Putnam’s two-level games theory. This case ultimately supported the hypothesis that pressure from a military ally weighs more on politicians when it conflicts with public opinion, a finding that conflicts with the findings of the Gulf War case.

Next, I will discuss the differences between the two cases, and conclude whether public opinion or pressure from a military ally weighs more in the end.
Thesis Findings

In this chapter I will compare and discuss the findings of both cases, and answer the question of whether pressure from a military ally, or public opinion weighs more when they clash. I conclude that when a state is influenced by a strong internalized pressure to support their ally, and has a strong negotiator with similar preferences to their ally, pressure from a military ally weighs more than public opinion on politicians. If that is not the circumstance, then public opinion weighs more.

Inference from Comparing the Two Iraq Cases for Japan

In the beginning of this paper, we briefly went through some general similarities and differences when discussing the case selection. In both cases, the public was against SDF dispatches, and in both cases, Japan was put under pressure by their military ally. The two cases yielded different policy outcomes, despite more than a decade of time in between: The Gulf War saw a post-conflict minesweeper dispatch and financial contributions, while the Iraq Invasion saw financial contributions, and an SDF/ASDF dispatch into ostensibly non-combat zones in a country where fighting was still taking place.

The circumstances of the wars were also different. The Gulf War can arguably be called a defensive war in nature, as Iraq attacked Kuwait, and the UN coalition forces came to Kuwait’s aid. The Iraq Invasion was a proactive attack on Iraq by the US and some US allies. The latter was not UN sanctioned, though the UN did solicit reconstruction help for Iraq, something Koizumi used to his advantage. For Japan, there were some differences. Japan’s economy during the Gulf War was relatively stronger than during the Iraq Invasion, which took place after Japan’s “lost decade” following the bursting of their bubble economy. While Japan did offer financial aid in the Iraq Invasion too, their weaker economy might have made them more prone to dispatch the SDF instead of additional financial contributions. A counter-argument to this would be that dispatching the SDF also costs money, but far less than 13$ billion. However, a dispatch would further the legitimacy of the SDF as a HADR organization in line with the domestic views, and also strengthen Japan’s international standing, but more importantly, Koizumi clearly wanted to legitimize the dispatch for mission beyond HADR.
Interestingly, neither case saw a policy outcome that went strongly with either Japanese public opinion, nor US pressure. Both times, the policy outcomes can be seen as policy compromises to satisfy both the Japanese public opinion and the US. That being said, the Gulf War saw the evidence favor public opinion slightly, while the Iraq Invasion case found that the pressure from Japan’s military ally was favored over public opinion, more so than in the Gulf War.

Based on the findings from both cases, my explanation to the different policy outcomes, and whether public opinion or pressure from a military ally weighs more, has two points: The first point is the internalized pressure on Japan to support their ally, combined with the second point; a strong negotiator whose policy preferences were more in line with his state’s military ally, than the public. Japan initially received criticism due to their “checkbook diplomacy” during the Gulf War. While they contributed a large amount of money (about $13 billion), the US was disappointed that Japan did not participate in the risk-sharing with personnel. It also happened when there already were trade frictions between Japan and the US. This was somewhat rectified by the minesweeper dispatch, but left a stain on the Japan-US relationship. The negative (and previous lack of) experience from the Gulf War, created more incentive for Japan to improve their relationship with the US. We remember from Snyder’s alliance theory, that it is harder to rectify a bad alliance reputation, than creating a reputation as a good alliance partner. Because Japan had suffered a reputation of using checkbook diplomacy, Koizumi saw the opportunity this time around to strengthen the alliance.

While the US certainly exerted a lot of bargaining pressure in both cases, the Japanese policymakers seem to have been more driven by internalized pressure in the Iraq Invasion case. For example, throughout the Iraq Invasion period, Koizumi was very conscious of the importance of Japan’s alliance with the US. A counter-point to this could be that geopolitical changes, like the rise of the North-Korean threat. It is worth noting though, that Koizumi did not bring up North Korea and the Japan-US alliance in his general policy speech in January 2004, and that a majority of the public did not buy this argument previously. Another thing that leads us to the internalized pressure as a crucial factor, is that Japan with Koizumi in the lead was more consistent in their intent to contribute economically and with personnel, than in the Gulf War case. Aside from Japan’s hesitancy to politically support the US in their attack on Iraq, Japan took a lot of initiatives, such as quickly planning assistance to the surrounding countries, and disaster relief. On the other hand, Japan’s responses in the Gulf War case seem to have come from a more volatile disposition, where Japan categorically responded to US bargaining pressure (and Ozawa’s ideological standpoint).
Does this mean that when juxtaposed, public opinion weighs more than bargaining pressure? And on the other hand, does bargaining pressure from a military ally, combined with a strong internalized pressure to go along with your ally, weigh more than public opinion? I think this is part of the explanation.

The other part is that a strong negotiator is needed to find a solution to the conflicting win-sets. This is because neither case presented a clear-cut “victor” between public opinion and pressure from a military ally, but that the policy outcomes were essentially compromises. Even so, there was a stable opinion majority against the dispatches, and thus, while the dispatch policy was a compromise, it was not truly ratified by the public, resulting in a loss of the upper house election in 2004 as a partial veto against the dispatch agreement from the public. It might in fact be more appropriate to say that a “strong negotiator” is needed to go through with a policy that adapts to - but is not completely ratified by – the public. One could also make the argument here that a strong negotiator knows when to water down the policy, so that it becomes more difficult for the public to exercise their veto, as the policy becomes more (but not completely) acceptable. While Koizumi never managed to fully reconcile the public win-set and the US win-set, the final policy outcome was not far removed from the constraints of public opinion.

If we compare Kaifu and Koizumi, the influence of a negotiator becomes clear. Kaifu was against dispatching the SDF, and envisioned something like a Japanese version of the Peace Corps instead. Meanwhile, Koizumi envisioned an SDF dispatch that would even assist with security missions. Neither of these visions turned into the actual policy outcomes. However, Koizumi’s vision was closer to the final policy outcome than Kaifu’s vision was. On the other hand, Kaifu’s vision was perhaps more adhering to the public’s vision of the SDF’s role, than that of Koizumi. This indicates that what is referred to as “the statesmen’s preferences” in Putnam’s theory, such as political ideology, is in fact an important factor when there are two conflicting win-sets. Koizumi’s preferences made him more prone to concede to US pressure.

This suggests that pressure from a military ally weighs more than public opinion, when the negotiator’s preferences are closer to the international win-set than the domestic win-set, and there is strong internalized pressure for these statesmen to support their military ally. This can also be interpreted to support Schoppa’s (1997) argument that US pressure on Japan is most effective when the Japanese domestic political arena’s preferences are supportive of the US policy, either because it is seen as in Japan’s national interest, or because politicians will use this pressure to their own gains.
Under these circumstances, the hypothesis H1, “Because public opinion only has a vague and negligible influence on policy, pressure from a military ally weighs more on politicians when it conflicts with public opinion”, is strengthened.

In the case where there is not a strong internalized pressure, and the statesmen’s preferences are not closer to the international win-set than the domestic win-set, public opinion weighs more than pressure from a military ally.

Under the latter’s circumstances, the hypothesis H2, “Because public opinion can determine whether politicians survive politically, pressure from a military ally weighs less on politicians when it conflicts with public opinion”, is strengthened.

We also discovered in the Iraq Invasion case that going through with a policy that is not ratified by the public, can in fact result in the loss of political power, as the LDP lost the upper house election in 2004. Since the public lacks a direct and immediate veto power on agreements, they cannot ratify them directly. However, the findings of this thesis do show that public opinion can be used as an actor within two-level games theory with some modifications, to make up for their lack of immediate veto power on agreements. This is an interesting finding, as public opinion has not been used as the main domestic level actor in previous two-level games research. If we consider Putnam’s framework, it indicates that when a statesman’s preferences conflict with an opinion majority, it might be mutually exclusive with his wish to maintain or enhance his domestic position, in the long-run. It also adds some additional validation to H2. While only half of the upper house was up for election in 2004 and the LDP-Komeito alliance managed to keep control, it set the stage for the DPJ to win upper house control in 2007, and Koizumi also bowed down to public opinion and announced the withdrawal of the GSDF in 2005.

The overall findings of the paper further indicates that public opinion may exert significant influence on policy as the H2 hypothesis poses, which substantiates the pluralist school of thought for public opinion. This was arguably demonstrated in the Gulf War case, and to a lesser extent in the Iraq Invasion case, as discussed above. It also showed that pressure from a military ally is more effective when combined with internalized pressure to support ones ally, which means that the alliance norms that Snyder’s theory poses were substantiated. The internalized pressure, as we recall from the discussion about Snyder’s theory, is the pressure politicians experience to support their military ally outside the contractual agreement. Snyder argues that when two states become allies, their bound to an “alliance Halo”, which gives expectations of support outside the contractual agreement. In Japan’s case, the agreement only dictates that Japan defends itself, not go on overseas
missions to support their ally. Additionally, Koizumi faced internalized pressure to avoid the same mistakes as in the Gulf War, and to strengthen the Japan-US alliance.

Under the above-mentioned circumstances of strong internalized pressure and a strong negotiator, the elitist school of thought on public opinion gains some ground. This could indicate that how much public opinion “matters” to politicians, is exactly how much the politicians let it matter. Of course, as the Iraq Invasion case showed, politicians that are influenced by the elitist school of public opinion and go against a stable opinion majority, may pay a price for doing so, such as loss of political power.

Conclusion

This study asked whether public opinion or pressure from a military ally weighs more on politicians when the two clash. To answer this, we looked at two cases from the Japanese point of view: The Gulf War, and the Iraq Invasion, which had different policy outcomes. We found that the answer to the research question depends on two intertwining factors: Whether a state is influenced by a strong internalized pressure to support their ally, and whether its negotiators have preferences that are similar to their ally’s. If the factors above are fulfilled, then pressure from a military ally weighs more than public opinion. If not, then public opinion weighs more.

This thesis also finds that public opinion can be used as a possible actor on the domestic level that can ratify agreements in two-level games theory, something which previous two-level games research have not done before.

Another dimension to the conclusion is whether it also has normative value for politicians. A normative point one could draw from this study is that going against a stable public opinion majority may result in a loss of, or diminished, political power. If there are few cushions to fall back on from a political career, such as in the Japanese system, then incumbent politicians might be well advised to examine long-term trends in public opinion before going through with controversial decisions.
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