Preparing for Black Swans:
A Comparative Case Study of Domestic Security Structures
Established after the Cold War

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A black swan is a highly improbable event with three principal characteristics: It is unpredictable; it carries a massive impact; and, after the fact, we concoct an explanation that makes it appear less random, and more predictable, than it was (Taleb, Nassim 2007).
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Any errors and imperfections in the thesis is my responsibility alone.

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Abbreviations

NCC  Norwegian Crisis Council (Regjeringens Kriseråd) (Norway)
GSC  Governmental Security Committee (Regjeringens Sikkerhetsutvalg) (N)
Dir. CP  Directorate for Civil Protection (Direktorat for Samfunnssikkerhet) (N)
CSU  Crisis Management Unit (Krisestøtteenheten) (N)
NSC  National Security Council (United States)
HSC  Homeland Security Council (US)
US NSS  National Security Staff (US)
DHS  Department of Homeland Security (US)
FEMA  Federal Emergency Management Agency (US)
British NSC  National Security Council (Great Britain)
NSS  National Security Strategy (GB)
SDSR  Strategic Defence and Security Review (GB)
DEMA  Danish Emergency Management Agency (Denmark)
CMG  Crisis Management Group (Kriseberedskabsgruppen) (D)
Introduction

At the beginning of the Cold War the definition of security had a clear military dimension. Military readiness was “the sacred cow for states”, as Betts (1995:3) put it. The United States responded to the new international bipolarity with the National Security Act of 1947, establishing a new national security structure including, among other bodies, the CIA and the National Security Council (NSC). Being prepared was defined as being militarily prepared.

At the end of the Cold War the collapse of the Soviet Union changed the bipolar system and altered the security environment. States were now “rethinking security” (Buzan 1997; Comfort 2002). And their “rethinking” led them to new security strategies. According to Buzan (1997) states now defined security more broadly than before. Also, continues Buzan, they perceived security and security concerns collectively.

The focus of this thesis is how states have responded to the new security challenges of the post-Cold War world. Denmark established the Danish Emergency Management Agency (DEMA) in 1993, and additionally added the Crisis Management Group (CMG) within the executive power in 2001; the USA added a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2002; Norway formed a Crisis Council (NCC) in 2005; Great Britain established a brand new National Security Council (NSC) in 2010. All were responses to perceived threats and dangers of the post-Cold War world. But if they all are reactions to the same post-Cold War security environment, why do they vary so greatly in terms of form and function? What are they designed to guard against? What do these new security structures really represent? These questions may be boiled down to the following overarching research question which will guide this thesis:

What has determined the new strategic security structures of states after the Cold War?

The strategic security structures in question are bodies or agencies within the executive branch of government, responsible for the strategic security strategies and crisis preparation concerning national security. The term ‘strategic’ is here defined in narrow terms, and refers to the usage of all national resources available when faced with a crisis or challenge. Thus, the term does not refer to strategic in terms of strategic planning. Through a comparative case study, this thesis aims to analyze how states have changed their internal security structures in response to changes in the international system. The analysis is based on a neoclassical realist two-step approach: The first step will discuss how systemic pressures affect the domestic
security structures of states. The second will investigate how domestic variables help shape the distinct character of these structures.

The New Security Structures
This thesis was motivated by the observations of how different countries reacted in similar ways to the new threats that emerged in the post-Cold War World, yet ended up with widely different security structures: Denmark’s DEMA was established in 1993; after 2001, however, a new executive body was established; the Crisis Management Group (CMG) (Beredskapstjønsten 2012). The Norwegian authorities briefly discussed the establishment of a new Department of security in the early 1990s, but decided against it; several years later the government established the Norwegian Crisis Council (NCC) in 2005. The USA established a new department of Homeland Security (DHS) immediately after the terror attack of 9/11. The British government established the British National Security Council (NSC) in 2010.

This evolution of security structures in different countries at approximately the same time signals an increased preoccupation with new forms of national security. Why? For while the United States established security structures in 1947 as a response to changes in the international system, comparable structures were not established in the European cases at the time. Such establishments happened only at the beginning of the twenty-first century. Is it reasonable to claim, with Buzan (1997), that the new European security structures represent a shift in security thinking? Does this “rethinking” mean a shift towards collective approaches (as Buzan forecasted) or not? What security challenges are they actually preparing for? Do they largely prepare for the same threats or for different ones? And why are the bodies differently structured if they prepare for similar threats? Why do some countries populate their bodies with a mixture of civilian and military members, whereas others – like Norway – fill its security structures with exclusively civilian personnel? This leads to the thesis’ second research question:

*How can the character of the Norwegian security structure best be explained?*

Explaining Security Structures
Theory will always simplify the political reality. Theorizing means to deem some factors as more important than others (Waltz 1990: 26). Realism has long been a standard approach in security studies. Classical realists deem states, national interest and power to be the most important factors in international-relations and security analysis. Unfortunately, classical
realism also tend to base its arguments upon a peculiar theory of human nature as self-serving and power hungry (Hobbes [1651] 2000: 364; Morgenthau 1973). Realisms’ critics have pointed out, first, that this assumption is not a satisfactory base for a scientific theory and, second, that a fixed and universal human nature cannot explain variations in security conduct (Nye 1988).

Structural realism (Waltz 1979; 1990) sought to amend these shortcomings and place realist theory on a sounder footing. It deemed the most important factor in International Relations (IR) analysis to be the distribution of capabilities of states across the international system. Structural realism, then, is a systems level analysis. This did put realist theory on a more solid, scientific footing. But, it did not solve realism’s problems with explaining variance. The problem of structural realism is that its analysis pertains to the systemic level only. It is incapable of explaining intrastate variance (Jervis 1976: 217-271). Thus, structural realism cannot explain interstate variance either because all systems change is ultimately engendered by events within individual states – as when revolution in France caused the international system to change towards the end of the 18th century, or when the collapse of the Soviet Union altered the nature of the international system at the end of the 20th.

Many authors recognized that structural realism was a better theory than classical Realism, but nevertheless reached back to classic arguments in order to solve the problem of variation. The result originated in the early 1990s and was labeled neoclassical realism (Schweller 2004:164). Its strength is its focus on both the international system and on the actors’ perceptions of the pressures and problems of the system (Vasquez 1998: 194). Neoclassical realists see the foreign and security policy of states primarily as a response to changes and pressures of the international system; but how the individual state choose to respond to those changes and pressures is conditioned by domestic factors (Reichwein 2012:48).

As stated above, neoclassical realism pull from the strength of both the classical realist and the structural realist approach, and thus occupies the middle ground between these two. However, while neoclassical realism clearly ‘brings the state back in’ it does not specify which factors or variables which are most important in order to understand state variation, rather different neoclassical realist studies emphasizes different factors as the most important. Three variables will guide the comparison of the domestic security structures in this thesis: the degree of change, the power characteristics, and the definition of security. These variables are presented in chapter 1. They are chosen because they help explain how changes in the international security environment are transmitted to domestic agents and agencies.
This study applies a neoclassical realist two-step approach. Step 1 asks: how do different states structure their intrastate security structures in response to systemic pressures? The systemic pressures will here refer to the changes after the end of World War II (1945), the end of the Cold War (1991), and the perceived changes after the terrorist attacks on the USA 11. September 2001. Step 2 of the analysis aims to move beyond the comparison of the internal security responses, and to address the Norwegian case more specifically. It will ask: why is the Norwegian Crisis Council (NCC) structured the way it is?

To use levels of analysis to structure the discussion is of particular value in order to arrange and analyze the information and to, make the analysis more comprehensible.¹ This thesis will start – as will all neoclassical realists analyses – at the systemic level and discuss changes or “events” in the international system (in Chapters 2 and 3). Next the attention shifts to the state level – to the internal affairs of states – and to the way politicians and other agents perceive the events and begin to react to them (in chapter 4). Finally, the discussion zeroes in on the Norwegian case and seeks to explain – through historical and cultural explanations – the specific characteristics of the Norwegian security structure (in chapter 5).

Previous Research: A History of Changing Definitions of Security

Several scholars have in recent years discussed peace and stability in the Western world. The most visible among them are represented by the huge array of democratic peace studies (Doyle 1983; Russett 1993; Rummel 1997; Levy & Ranzin 2004). Empirically, it is a fact that wars in the Western part of the world have become rare (Russett 1990). However, the stability and peacefulness might be hugely exaggerated. Several scholars have claimed that the conditions are not as stable and peaceful as indicated (Layne 1994; Schmitter & Karl 1991).

The scholarly focus on the peace and stability in the Western world is accompanied by a new line of security studies which address a broadened security agenda and new concepts like “securitization” (Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde 1998; Buzan & Wæver 2003). They point to new threats and challenges which face the Western world. Instead of the narrow and “traditional” concept of security represented by the military obsession during the Cold War, they widen the scope of security to include “any public issue” (Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde 1998: 23). How do the dual scholarly focus on both peace and stability studies, and the new “security agenda” coincide? The answer lies in the changing definition of security. Wars

¹ Pioneer work on conceptualizing levels of analysis; Waltz (1959), Singer (1961), and more specifically for foreign policy behavior Allison (1969).
might be rare, but the definition of security is no longer limited to the threats of war. Threats and challenges may manifest themselves differently. This may cause states to revise their definition of security.

Buzan (1991; 1993; 1997) claims that the end of the Cold War led to important changes in interstate relations. The bipolar system was replaced with a multipolar structured international system. In this system a security community among the leading capitalist powers would emerge; which meant that states no longer expected, nor prepared for the use of military force in their relations with each other.

Contrary to Buzan’s (1991) collective security expectation, the fact that several states have established new security structures in the twenty-first century do imply that states amplified their security preparedness independently, despite Buzan’s predictions of an international security community. These new structures were established after major international events. Taleb (2007) claim that the importance of ‘highly improbable, massive impact events’ – the Black Swan Events. Donald Rumsfeld (2002) similarly claims that states have problems with explaining and preparing for the ‘unknown unknowns’. Do these “new” events reflect a new security agenda which is “bringing back” the importance of political realism? Is there a new security agenda afoot which is forcing states to prepare more in terms of militarily readiness for events of Huntingtonian cultural clashes (Huntington 1996)?

**Contribution**

There has not been much scholarly focus on changes within the security structures of states, especially in a European context. International relations scholars have been occupied with the international system, and have therefore treated internal security structures as preordained. Scholars who analyze domestic politics have also ignored the study of security structures – maybe because it has been regarded as too “foreign”? Foreign policy scholars have focused more on the rationale behind state action, and balanced foreign policy means with ends. Therefore, discussions of security structures may have fallen out of the scholarly ambit, and the structures taken for granted rather than explored. The few studies that do exist, tend to focus on the security structures of single cases – such as Dyndal (2010) and Lango, Lægreid and Rykkja (2011), which both discusses crisis management in Norway. No thorough comparative studies seem to exist. The aim of this thesis is to compare several cases and to show that security structures are not “a given”, rather they are results of decision-makers’ perceptions and politicians’ considerations of the political reality.
Comparative studies of internal strategic security structures are rare – if not entirely absent – in security studies. However, the fact is that several countries established new structures within the same narrow period of the post-Cold War era – some in the immediate wake after the end of the Cold War; others after the terror attacks on USA 11, September 2001. Therefore, more attention should be devoted to how the international security environment triggers policy reactions within individual states. This could help illuminate how states – of different size, ambitions and traits – interpret its environment.

Structure of the Thesis

The thesis will consist of three main parts. The first part, Theoretical Framework and Method, presents the neoclassical realist framework which informs the approach of this thesis and the comparative method which guides the investigation.

The second part, Systemic Effects and State Interpretations, consists of four chapters. The two first chapters – chapter two and three – show how historical “events” affects the domestic security strategies and structures of states. The next chapter – chapter four – compares the security structures of the four cases, the USA, Great Britain, Denmark and Norway. Chapter five shifts the attention to the characteristics of the Norwegian NCC: its ad hoc structure and composition. It will argue that the NCC is established and functions in predominately natural disasters, and that its civilian and bureaucratic composition is based on the established institutions and the specific historical experiences with use of the military for internal purposes.

The third and final part ties the findings together in a Conclusion in chapter six. It argues that – from the perspective of neoclassical realism – changes in the international system motivate changes in the domestic security structures. But whereas international changes may motivate decision makers to discuss the need for new security measures, it tend to be specific events – often of a shocking nature – which more directly cause such reforms to be implemented. The new security structures established after 2001 are new organizational bodies, but they do not represent changes within the internal institutional framework. Rather it reflects the decision makers’ perception of its security environment manifested in the preexisted institutional framework. Additionally, the traditional or old security structures do not seem to be replaced by the new ones; rather new structures are largely added onto the old. This suggests that the old security thinking still pertains and that a new definition of security do not really replace the old ones.
Part I

Theoretical Framework and Applied Method

This first part of this thesis consists of a single chapter, which presents both the theoretical framework of the analysis and the method used.

It begins with an account of the agency-structure problem – an inherent challenge in all foreign and security policy research. It then presents neoclassical realism in its theoretical context, and sets out the two-step neoclassical realist framework for explaining domestic security structures, an approach influenced by the neoclassical realism of Rose (1998) as well as by classical foreign policy research (in particular; Allison & Halperin 1972; Krasner 1972). However, the thesis does not aim to explain state behavior as the above mentioned scholars have done. Rather it aims to explain the characteristics of states’ security structures. Next, the focus will be institutional and organizational change, and how these are intertwined but differ.

Finally, this part presents the historical comparative case study method which guides the investigation. The main variables which guide the comparison are degree of change, and the power characteristics, and the definition of security.
Chapter 1
Domestic Security Structures: External Pressure and Internal Determinants

Where Should the Analysis Start?
Several scholars have pointed to the inherent agency-structure problem in foreign and security policy analysis (Carlsnaes 1992; Hollis & Smith 1986; Hudson 2005). Foreign and security policy is in a peculiar situation because it does not – as International Relations does – place itself within either the “actor” or “system” part when it tries to explain state behavior; rather it intersects both of these realms (Rose 1998). It is important to specify which part of the relationship, or level of analysis, one is focused on, and whether the aim is to explain the phenomenon through both realms or not.

In this thesis the framework of analysis is guided by neoclassical realism. Its point of departure is how systemic pressures affect states, the systemic level. However this connection is indirect as the systemic pressures are translated through the intrastate context, and thus the analysis funnels down to the intrastate level – the domestic or internal level – in order to explain the characteristics of the Norwegian NCC. The structure of the international system is maintained through states’ perception of it.

A ‘School of Neoclassical Realism’?
Early neoclassical realist studies were mainly occupied with investigating how systemic pressures were mediated through domestic variables, and predominately studied the rise and fall of great powers. Snyder (1991) attempted to bridge the gap between external and internal affairs in Myths of Empire, but ended up with an account of predominately domestic affairs. In From Wealth to Power, Zakaria (1998) similarly examined the rise of American power. A more recent contribution is a study of the expectations of six rising and declining great powers by Taliaferro (2006: 470). Schweller’s Unanswered Threats (2006) finds that despite systemic incentives, external balancing strategies are determined by four internal factors: elite consensus, elite cohesion, social cohesion and the incumbent political regimes’ vulnerability to the opposition (Schweller 2006: 128-130). Kunz & Saltzman (2012) similarly study

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2 Hollis & Smith (1986: 286) claims that the agency-structure problem is not unique to the study of foreign policy, but that this matter for the theoretical understanding of politics at large. How systemic factors restrain and/or enables the agent/s is a matter of systemic analysis in all political analysis.
internal political constraints and leadership perception in order to explain the external behavior of states.

Toje & Kunz (2012) claim that there is no such thing as a unified ‘school of neoclassical realism’. What in fact actually exists is an ensemble of studies which incorporates the systemic, state, and domestic levels in order to explain foreign policy. It therefore seems that although several neoclassical realist studies have appeared, neoclassical realism has theoretically not yet found its role.

This thesis also investigates how external pressures are interpreted and expressed. But the approach differs in that it does not aim to analyze foreign and security policy behavior, rather it aims to explain the characteristics of the countries’ security structures.

**Neoclassical Realism Applied**

The neoclassical realism framework applied in this thesis is predominately influenced by Rose (1998). His contribution to neoclassical realism is a framework that helps us understand how states perceive systemic pressures: the framework incorporates the structural realist outside-in perspective, with the inside-out perspective found in constructivist theories. The framework is depicted in figures 1 and 2.

**Step 1: Systemic Factors and the Establishment of Internal Security Structures**

Step one investigates whether international “events” at the end of World War II (1945), at the end of the Cold War (1991), and after the terrorist attacks in New York (2001), have led to changes in domestic security structures. In figure 1 below, both a structural realist (A) and the neoclassical realist (B) explanation model is presented to show how the two approaches differ.

*Figure 1: Structural Realism and Neoclassical Realism compared*
Line A in *figure 1*, indicate how structural realism recognizes systemic pressures – here called “events” – as an independent variable, and state behavior – here called “security structure” – as the dependent variable. Systemic pressures affect state behavior. But, the relationship is depicted as direct. Line B in *figure 1* suggests how the neoclassical realist approach is different: an intervening variable – here called “state perception” – is added. Thus the relationship between international “events” and state behavior, then, is indirect. Impulses from the international system are mediated by intervening variables at the state level (Rose 1998).

As Rose (1998) - and Allison & Halperin (1972) and Krasner (1972) before him – explains the maker of policy, the government, cannot be reduced to one calculating decision maker. In order to explain foreign and security policy structures, one must rather understand governments as a “conglomerate of large organization and political actors” (Allison & Halperin 1972: 42). Therefore the internal properties of the state – its structure and context, the people in positions, and the interests and values which they represent– all affect domestic perceptions of the international system, and influence decisions and action. Thus, in order to be able to understand the security structures of different states, a close examination of the context within which the actors operate is crucial.

*Step 2: Explaining Intrastate Security Structure Characteristics*

The second step in my analysis shows how internal properties shape the state response to the international system. Domestic context and internal structures affect state perception of the international system (Rose 1998). Depicted in *figure 2* below, such perception is in turn shaped by domestic forces – custom, history, wealth, government composition, values and culture…, in short by national institutions. The perception of the system occurs within the government of the different states, and are manifested either through a debate concerning the need for change, or actual structural change.

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3 Waltz’ structural realism (1990; 1993), and Allison’s Rational Policy Model (1969) both argues this approach.

4 While Mandelbaum (1988: 6) claim that domestic variables are “most pronounced when the power of the international system is least decisive” and that otherwise systemic pressures are the most important, this thesis puts more emphasis on the systemic pressures in the way in which they are perceived by states, and the way in which they shape state-structures, exemplified in *figure 2*. The states’ specific history and culture shape state responses.
To sum up, this thesis compares the strategic security structures within the executive branch of the four states – the USA, Great Britain, Denmark, and Norway. While step 1 can account for state initiatives to discuss the posture of their internal security structures and even to change them, step 2 helps explain how discussions is conducted and how changes are, in fact made.

**Bringing Power Back in**
Toje & Kunz (2012) boldly claim that neoclassical realism “is bringing power back in”. Systemic incentives are not enough in order to explain state behavior, rather internal characteristics of power is essential. Power in this thesis, refer to two factors: the power of the actors included in the security structures, and second, the power which the different security structures have relative to the government.

To set the security agenda – to define threats and state vulnerability – is an expression of power. Stone (2002) claims that power is based on the strategic control of information. Political conflict is never simply over material conditions and choices, she continues, rather it is about defining what is legitimate. To create security structures is also, in a way, to set boundaries. It defines who are in and who are out. Therefore it defines which actors that have the legitimacy to participate in the creation of security policy and strategy, and consequently, those that are not included (Stone 2002: 355).

**Organizations and Institutions: Change?**
This thesis aims to explain structural change within states’ strategic security structures. In order to do that, a definition of organizations and institutions, as well as what leads to change must be theorized. Therefore this thesis adds insight from new institutionalism in order to understand structural change. While Lango, Lægreid & Rykkja (2011:169) juxtaposes organizations and institutions in their analysis of the security structures in Norway, this thesis
rather recognize Douglass C North (1990) separation between these two. An organizational change is not necessarily an institutional change, despite them being mutually dependent. North defines institutions as ‘the rules of the game’ in a society. Institutions are carriers of values and thus possess an intrinsic identity. Institutions reduce uncertainty by providing an institutional framework which gives structure to everyday life (North 1990: 3). Institutional change shapes the way societies evolve through time and hence is the key to understand historical change (North 1990: 2-3).

Organizations are in this thesis the executive security structures established after the Cold War in each country. The organizations are groups of individuals which are bound together by some common purpose – here to produce security strategies or routines of crisis management. North (1990) claim that these organizations are established and functions by limits and constraints offered by the institutional framework. Therefore organizations and institutions are closely intertwined. Organizations are the product of constraints and opportunities set by the institutional framework (North 1990: 5). Institutions are created by individuals, but they also constrain human endeavor.

Organizations are created to take advantage of the opportunities which the institutional framework creates, and as the organizations evolve, they also alter the institutions. Institutional change – according to North (1990: 7) – is thus shaped by the lock-in that comes from the dual relationship between institutions and the organizations that have evolved as a consequence of the incentives provided by those institutions, and second, the feedback process by which individuals perceive and react to changes in the opportunity set.

The security structures in this thesis are not merely seen as instruments for creating security policy, but also as an organizational expression of the institutional framework. In an instrumental perspective, change is seen as a rational adaption to new circumstances and challenges. This rationality is as best regarded limited or bound in the institutional perspective (Simon 1991). As Lango, Lægreid & Rykkja (2011: 170) notes institutions “are seen more robust and change is usually incremental. Moderate changes will meet less resistance than major reforms”. Krasner termed change as ‘path dependent’. This means that the created institutional framework to a large extent constraints later possible choices (Krasner 1988).

Power in this thesis, do not refer to the actual individuals in positions within the security structures, but rather the positions present in the security structures.\(^5\) Krasner (1972:

\(^5\) To focus on individuals in the strategic security structure, and the “political game” between and within these, would produce a valuable analysis, if it could be easily applied. However, in reality, reliable sources about what is “going on” in strategic security structures are hard to come by. Foreign and security politics is outside
162) criticizes this strategy because it “implies political non-responsibility”. However, while Krasner (1972) analyses actual behavior or policy – the individuals responsible for specific decisions and actions – the aim here is to explore the reasons why the structures differ, not to explain responsibility or non-responsibility for actions.6

**Security and Crises**

Central to the topic of this thesis are the concepts of security and crisis. In terms of security, neoclassical realism argues that systemic factors alone cannot create accuracy in explanations of state action. Decision makers observe their security environment, and perceive it as either malignant, or benign. Therefore, whether security is scarce in the international structure is a matter of state interpretation (Rose 1998: 4). Security is therefore a defined standard which is intuitively desirable. Security is defined by the political decision-makers – constrained by their institutional framework – and consequently, security is “whatever the elite says it is” (Barnett 2001: 29).

In this thesis security refers to national security.7 Crisis refers to national crisis – an unexpected and dramatic event – which is perceived to infer severe strains for the citizens of the nation and for the conduct of foreign- and security policy (Dyndal 2010: 14). The aim here is not to present an ideal or “right” definition of security, but rather to analyze whether states define security and threats similarly.

**Method**

In what follows the method is presented, with the focus on the problems intrinsic in the broad framework offered by neoclassical realism. Thereafter, the focus will be on the cases selected and the comparative historical case study; the main variables for explanation; as well as the problem with selection bias and over-determination.

**Neoclassical Realism: A Methodological Challenge?**

6 For a discussion about individual versus role in foreign policy, see Hollis and Smith (1986), Allison (1969), Allison & Halperin (1972), and Hollis and Smith (1986). “Individuals in positions” vs. “positions vacated by individuals” (Hollis & Smith 1986: 276).

7 “National security is a consequence of the emergence of the territorially defined and military capable sovereign state as a law unto its own.” “National security is thus the product of particular, relatively recent historical circumstances; it is neither a timeless nor a universal truth” (Barnett 2001: 26).
Although neoclassical realism offers a more nuanced description of both systemic pressures and intrastate factors, to embark on such a complex explanation is not without complications. Because neoclassical realism uses both outside-in and inside-out explanations, it has been criticized for trying to explain away the anomalies of structural realism through “whatever tools (…) necessary to plug the holes of a sinking ship [structural realism]”. The result is a theory which suffers “paradigmatic incoherence and indistinctiveness” (Rathbun 2008: 295).

The broad framework provided by neoclassical realism could lead to problems because when one adds too many variables one can end up with a situation where the analyst is unable to explain anything. As Waltz (1990) claims in order to explain, one must simplify. Especially adding “constructivist” variables as national culture makes explanation more complex. Toje & Kunz (2012:6) argues that the neoclassical realism approach heavily relies on case studies. Rose (1998) notes that this approach demands great insight in the cases’ context in order to be able to explain.

Neoclassical realism is placed in the middle of the spectrum between naturalism and constructivism. According to Moses & Knutsen (2007) naturalists claim that there is an “objective reality” which exists independent of the actors, and true knowledge about this reality can be accessed. Constructivism, on the other hand, put perception of the “objective reality” at heart, and recognizes the significant “role of the observer and society in constructing the patterns” (Moses & Knutsen 2007: 8-11). Neoclassical realism does not explicitly deny the existence of an “objective reality”, but argues that in the final account it is the decision makers’ perception of the reality that matters. Instead of embarking on a project of revealing the “true objective reality”: emphasis is how the reality is mediated through at the institutions at the domestic level, and thus becomes real to the actors.

Cases
The actors in this study are decision makers in four states: the USA, Great Britain, Denmark and Norway. The objects observed are the strategic security structures they discuss or establish: In the case of the United States, The National Security Council (NSC) and Homeland Security Council (HSC). And in the case of Great Britain, War Cabinets and, more recently the British National Security Council (British NSC). In the case of Denmark, the Crisis Management Group (CMG). And in the case of Norway, the Norwegian Crisis Council (NCC).

The rationale behind the selection of cases is based on the specific aim of the thesis, viz., to discuss the characteristics of post-Cold War security structures. In particular the
structure that have emerged in Norway – the NCC. All the countries selected are liberal democracies, and they are all members of NATO. The US NSC is the oldest and most stable of the security structures, and will serve as a benchmark during the comparison. The British and Danish cases are selected because Great Britain and Denmark are countries that are similar to Norway and that Norwegians often compares themselves to. The security structures of Britain, Denmark and Norway are, at the outset, very similar. There are however, differences that will serve as useful contrasts to the Norwegian case. Another reason for the case selection is my linguistic limitations: which reduces the possible cases to countries with Scandinavian and English languages.

Despite the Norwegian isolation and neutrality policy doctrine prior and during WWII, Britain served as a security guarantor in events of attacks and events which would compromise Norwegian sovereignty. Norway’s relation to Britain was termed as “special” (Riste 2005). This “special” relation in security policy was later replaced by the “special” US-Norwegian relationship. Norway has relied on military assistance forces from both Britain and the United States. Denmark has pursued a very similar policy (Ørvik 1966).

Mandelbaum (1988: 4) has claimed that the security policy of weak states is comparatively different to that of stronger states. However, to try to determine exactly who are weak is more complex: as he writes “most states have been neither very strong nor exceptionally weak” (Mandelbaum 1988: 4). According to Hey (2003) the majority of literature on small states is too dedicated in their attempt to find the core definition of smallness. Hey (2003) instead argues that a core and robust theoretical definition of smallness is not needed in order to use it as a variable to explain state behavior.8

Although Norway and Denmark can be categorized as small or medium powers, some scholars have claimed that despite their size, they are “punching above its weight” in international relations (Toje 2010). Denmark has pursued active participation in collective military efforts, and Norway has pursued a more active normative foreign policy. Britain, on the other hand, has been accused to trying to play a world-power role, although its resources imply a status as a middle or small power (Frankel 1968: 491). The strength of Britain is

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8 Variables often used to define «smallness»: territorial size, population size, degree of influence on the international arena (Hey 2003: 2). It seems plausible to suggest that the United States and Britain – which have both served or are serving as security providers – are stronger states relative to that of Denmark and Norway. However, the strength of the states is not static, rather it changes, and states’ perception of state strength also changes. Nevertheless, the United States – in terms of military reach and breadth – is a major power, while Norway and Denmark is comparatively weaker and more reliant on others for security guarantees (Posen 2006).
disputed, because while its role as the major world power seems gone, the power it wields in several regions of the world is still significant (Posen 2006; Tugendhat & Wallace 1988).

In addition to relative comparability in strength Norway and Denmark are both Nordic and Scandinavian countries, with an intertwined history. Shared history and geography could imply a certain security strategy: evident in the membership of the Western alliance. It could thus be expected, again, that the security structures of Norway and Denmark are fairly similar.

Ørvik (1972) debates the existence of a “security community” in the Nordic countries. As several foreign scholars have claimed there is a specific “Nordic response” to security matters, Ørvik claims that the regional differences are large. He argues that the Nordic countries are unusually homogenous: “no large dissident ethnic groups, no irredentist claims, no deadly competition in any field” (Ørvik 1972: 70). At the outset a security community might seem to be in existence, but Ørvik (1972: 70) accounts for the stability in the region by claiming that “their mutual expectations could be fulfilled by means other than force”.

Additionally, the historical context of Denmark as an “ex-imperialist” and Norway as an “ex-colony” might produce differentiated strategies (Ørvik 1972: 80). In terms of foreign and security policy: Norway was ruled as a part of Denmark for 400 years. An additional century of home rule under Sweden tellingly shows that Norway is a relative recent international actor compared to Denmark. Østergaard (2000) argues that Denmark cannot be regarded as a typical ‘small state’ because of its historical supremacy it exercised together with Sweden in Northern Europe from the late middle ages onwards.

The aim in this thesis is to compare the security structures of four countries. But can the European security structures be compared with the security structures of the US? And can internal state security structures really be compared at all? Needless to say, the foreign and security policy of a country is unique. However, according to political realism, the ultimate end or goal of all countries is survival, understood as territorial and political sovereignty, and integrity (Hobbes [1651]2000: 369; Waltz 1979: 91,126). Therefore, if the underlying end is similar, it is therefore worthwhile to explore whether the means pursued by different states are also similar. To compare the security structures of different states is valuable, because it can have implications for understanding the strategies and policies pursued by different states.

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9 From 1536-1814 Norway was annexed in a Danish Union.

10 This could also be the case for especially Sweden, and potentially Finland. However, Sweden has opted more towards a neutrality doctrine, while Finland has lived “in the shadow of Russia” (Frankel 1968: 483).
Comparison: Time and Structure

The security structures are compared along two dimensions: time and structure. There are three points of time involved here: the time period that followed World War II (discussed in chapter 2), the period that followed the end of the Cold War (discussed in chapter 3), and the time period that followed the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the USA (also discussed in chapter 3). The aim here is not to account for the general evolution of intrastate security structures from 1945 to today, but instead investigate how the state apparatus of four countries have reacted to these major “events”. The systemic pressures which are analyzed are perceived changes in the world order. The structure dimension refers to the comparison of the different security structures of states. They will be compared with three variables in focus: structural change, power characteristics, and domestic definition of security and crisis.

The comparison will be carried out by way of a comparative case study. The choice of method is based on the research question as well as the framework provided by neoclassical realism. In order to be able to investigate both systemic pressures and domestic reactions, an in-depth comparative case study is the natural approach. Lijphart (1971:682) define the comparative method as one of the “basic methods” of “establishing general empirical propositions”. In an area in which not much research has been conducted, an in-depth comparative case study could be productive, because it can reveal insights which other methods overlooks. It can produce ‘thicker’ explanations, while other, quantitative methods rather can test relationship between variables, and produce ‘thin’ explanations. Yin (1981: 59) sees comparative case studies as a strategy, rather than a method. Comparative case studies do not intuitively imply a certain type of method. Rather the comparative case study simply implies that several cases – more than one – are compared.

This method used in this thesis cannot be placed within any of Mills’ categories of method (Mill 1987). All the cases have a particular phenomenon in common – the establishment of new security structures in the twenty-first century – and the aim is a comparison of these, in order to show how they differ, and at last investigate why the Norwegian security structure differs from the others. Thus the method starts with a

11 When using the term world order, it refers to state perceptions of a new structure of the international system in terms of polarity and distribution of capabilities. The focus in this thesis is very “Western”: the cases are all liberal Western democracies, and they are all economically developed. Thus, world order, or a new world order describes a narrow definition of both the terms world and order: from the perspective of these wealthy Western states. World order do not refer to the entire world, and does not offer a description of world order in the critical manner in which Chomsky (1994), and/or also Wallersteins (1987) world system analysis, describes world order and the class struggle within it.
comparison of these domestic security structures – in order to show how the Norwegian structure differs – and then the focus shift towards explaining the particular Norwegian case.

This study could be termed a ‘theory-confirming’ case study. Its aim could be said to test the assumptions of neo-classical realism through a discussion of states’ security structures (Lijphart 1971: 691). However, it is not intended as a test in a strict sense of the term, because the aim is not in itself to test neo-classical realism, but rather to use neo-classical realism as a framework or approach to compare and study security structures. Because the framework provided by neo-classical realism is broad, to confirm or discredit it is difficult. Rather the framework could serve as level-of-analysis guides, which starts at the systemic level and then funnels down to the state level, with focus on how intrastate structures perceive the environment in which it operates and react to threats and dangers it represents.

Variables
In order to organize the comparison in chapter 4, three main variables will guide the comparison. The neo-classical realist framework does not suggest which variable that could explain state behavior. Rather neo-classical realism consists of a collection of studies, which all state that different internal determinants shape how states respond to the international system. As Toje & Kunz (2012) claim: they are bringing power back in. However, exactly which variables or internal determinants which are most important are not specified. The aim of this thesis is to investigate what determines internal security structures, or what has determined the post-Cold War security structures. The variable which guides the comparison is structural change, power characteristics, and definition of security. These variables are chosen because they could reveal how changes or events at the international system is translated in the domestic security structures. These variables can reveal how deep events in the international system manifest itself at the internal state level. In the following the variables will be briefly presented and explained.

Structural Change. The aim is to see how systemic pressures are perceived and manifested through change in the security structures at the domestic level, therefore a variable which explains structural change is necessary. The expression of change is explained through changes in pre-existing strategic structures or the establishment of new structures. The comparison will follow North’s (1990) differentiation between institutional and organizational change.

Power Characteristics. In order to figure out the differences in state response to the systemic pressure, the characteristics of power within the structures is explored. This variable
is influenced by Allison’s (1971) term “intra-governmental balance of power”, and Freedman’s (1976: 447) term “power structure”, and it here refers to the characteristics of the limited group of actors included in the security structure, as well as the security structures’ power relative to the government.

**Definition of Security.** The last variable is chosen because it enables an investigation on whether states really are “rethinking security” as Buzan (1997) forecasted, and how states perceive their security environment. The definition of security and crisis is important because it allows insights into how the state apparatus justify structural change, and also how they perceive the international security environment (Rose 1998). The states’ definition of security will also reveal whether states perceive its security environment similarly. Who do they aim to protect? Against what kind of threat are they designed to protect? These questions will guide the comparison.

**Sources**
The main sources in this thesis are documents. The documents represent the empirical evidence for understanding changes within the cases, and the historical context they were made in. The thesis relies on primary sources to the extent that they can be found. However, these are not always easily available. Due to the sensitivity and lack of transparency in the security strategies and policies of states, the explanations and observations is on several instances reliant on secondary sources. Governmental records from the late 1940s on security policy have largely been released. But sources on post-Cold War events are harder to come by.

The documents used are of a wide variety of types. In order to explain the composition and function of the new security structures the analysis relies on official laws, White Papers, Commission Reports, leaders’ explanations in speeches and press releases. Additionally, it has been necessary to also include historical records, official government websites, and media sources due to the lack of transparency in security issues.

**Comparative Case Studies: Challenges**

Case selection is one of the great strength of case studies, but it also reveals some problems (Moses & Knutsen 2007: 5). One problem is associated with selection bias and over-determination. It can occur in case studies were only a few cases are included. These problems reduce the method’s ability to make generalized statements about the connections observed (idem). Another challenge is over-determination. This refers to the ability of the
analyst to generalize from the observations in the sample to the entire population. This, however, is not a problem here.\textsuperscript{12} Besides, the goal in this thesis is not to make generalizable statements about all states, but rather the conclusions is limited to the states included, as neoclassical realism explains how intrastate characteristics will depend on characteristics of the specific state.

\textsuperscript{12} According to Lijphart (1971: 863) the principal problem in comparative case studies is based on the fact that it includes “many variables, [and only a] small number of cases”. He suggests some solutions to these problems: first, increase the number of cases as much as possible; reduce and combine the variables; focus on “comparable cases”; focus on key variables. Due to time and space considerations the number of cases is limited to four. The emphasis is further on three main, and key, variables. The cases are comparable because they are a result of the same security environment. Thus, Lijpharts suggestions have been taken into consideration.
The second part of this thesis consists of four chapters. The first of them, chapter 2, presents the security structures and strategies that were established in four Western countries – the USA, Great Britain, Denmark and Norway – in the wake of World War II and that lasted throughout the Cold War era. Chapter 3 then explores how these strategies and structures were affected by the end of the Cold War era – first by the collapse of the Soviet Union, and then by the terrorist attack on the USA on 11 September 2001.

Both chapters are guided by the first basic tenet in neoclassical realism, viz, by the proposition that state behavior is conditioned by international events – that states react to changes in the international system, and that their behavior is conditioned by restraints and opportunities of that system.

Chapter 4 moves the analytical attention away from the system and towards the domestic affairs of the four cases that are discussed here. This move is guided by the second tenet of neoclassical realism: that although states seek to adapt to the changes in the international system, the way in which they in fact respond is conditioned by domestic factors. Chapter 4 compares the four cases – the USA, Great Britain, Denmark and Norway – in order to identify the similarities and the differences in their national security behavior; particularly with respect to their discussion and establishment of national security structures.

Chapter 4 shows that in terms of type of structure and composition of actors in it the Norwegian NCC differs from the others. Therefore, the final chapter in part two, chapter 5, investigates the characteristics of the Norwegian security structures. It emphasizes inside-out explanations of the structures: the specific institutional framework and history. Why was the NCC created? And why is the composition of actors limited to bureaucratic personnel?
Chapter 2
Strategic Security Strategies and Structures in a Bipolar World

Chapter 2 investigates how the four states responded to the bipolar structure of the international system after the end of World War II. The chapter starts off with an account of the historical context of 1945, before turning the attention to how the states responded.

Context 1: A Bipolar World, and US Realization of Great Power Status
The British efforts made during the World War II, and the current need for investment at home, signaled that their world-power status were in decline when WWII came to an end. Meanwhile, in the USA, President Truman realized the emergence of an “open slot” in the great power vacuum, which the USA could potentially fill. Therefore, financial aid was offered to the “free peoples” of the world – first through the Truman Doctrine and later the Marshall Plan. This was a strategy that enabled states to survive the pressures they were under, and with American support, to resist “attempted subjugation by armed minorities, or by outside pressures” (Roberts 2007: 957). Truman claimed that “great responsibilities have been placed upon us” and that US leadership was quintessential in order to ensure peace. Failed leadership would endanger the welfare of the US (Truman 1947). Thus the US reversed its return to isolation, and instead opted for what Roberts (2007:957) phrases as an “enormous break with the historic traditions of American foreign policy”: the decision to contain Soviet Power. The Cold War became a reality.  

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13 Polarity refers to the relative distribution of power, and thus security – in a traditional realism sense – within the international system. The distribution of power is referred to either as unipolar, bipolar, multipolar, or a hybrid of these (Clark 2011: 549). The debate of the previous and current state of polarity in the international system is a recurring debate, but differs as to whether polarity is measured in terms of military, economic, political, or cultural strength. The state of polarity in the international system is important because it defines and constraints state interactions and relations.

14 The Marshall Plan should also be regarded as a political program: determined participation in a comprehensive organized cooperation, shaped in line of free trade. “Political strings” were attached to the economic aid dimension (Riste 2005: 193). This plan met resistance. The Russians forbade their satellites to participate. When Western Europe established the Organization for European Economic Cooperation to handle the Marshall Plan, the Russians replied with organizing their own half of Europe in a Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon), a “window- dressing for the Soviet integration of the command economies of the east” (Roberts 2007: 976).

15 Garthoff (1998: 56-57): “The Cold War is now established as a specific episode in history. Although there is room to debate precisely when the Cold War began and ended (…), there is a general consensus that it began in 1946-7 and ended in 1989-90”.

22
The Cold War created a bipolar structure of the international system, in which two blocs of states – one led by the United States and the other by the Soviet Russia – fought through a “succession of crises to achieve their own security by all means short of war” (Roberts 2007: 976). It represented a dual systemic struggle (Booth 1998: 31). At a key meeting held in the US on February 1947, Undersecretary Dean Acheson stated that “only two great powers remained in the world (...) [the] United States and the Soviet Union”, and the only way to protect the security of the US was “to take steps to strengthen countries threatened with Soviet aggression or communist subversion” (as quoted in Jones 1955: 141).

The bipolar international system affected the US policy the next thirty years. The experience from WWII; Truman’s realization of the potential US power preponderance; and the onset of the Cold War antagonism affected the US strategy and its security structures. The US response to the international system is expressed in: The National Security Act of 1947.

The US Response and the NCS
In the latter part of World War II the Roosevelt administration created the State- War- Navy Coordinating Committee to facilitate cooperation between the State Department and the military services.16 The postwar replacement of this committee came with the Truman administration and the National Security Act of July 26, 1947. The aim of the National Security Act was to “provide a comprehensive program for the future security of the United States” (National Security Act 1947: 5). Prior to the establishment of the NSC the United States had a divided approach to foreign policy: during wars the Navy and the War Department were preeminent, but in peacetime the military “was expected to once again take the back seat to the State Department” (Brown 2008: i).

The National Security Council
The National Security Act of 1947 established several new internal security structures: the National Military Establishment (which two years later became the Department of Defense), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the National Security Resources Board, and the

16 During WWII the US government experimented with various arrangements in order to promote high-level policy coordination. According to Brown (2008: i) their strategy was influenced by British strategies, as a result of close wartime cooperation between the two. The most important innovation was the U.S. Joint chief of Staff (JCS), created to facilitate cooperation with the British Chief of Staff. Army Chief of Staff George Marshall viewed this establishment as a considerable improvement, but later complained because he thought “the American service chiefs were at a distinct disadvantage in discussions with their British counterpart because British officers “are connected up with branches of their Government through an elaborate but mostly knit Secretariat. On our side there is no such animal and we suffer accordingly…” (Brown 2008: ii).
National Security Council (NSC). Brown (2008: ii) claim that the NSC was the “keystone” of the new security architecture, and a means to institutionalize the relationship between those responsible for foreign policy and those responsible for military service.\(^\text{17}\)

Zegart (1999: 55) put less emphasis on the actual establishment of NSC, and claims that the National Security Act is more concerned with the problematic state-military relationship: the NSC was a by-product and “never a bone of contention”. According to this view the NSC was not created because of an ideal vision of how foreign policy making should be made, “[n]ational interest was not a paramount concern” (Zegart 1999: 56). Rather, it was the result of the power struggle between the military service and the State Department, and represented the need for military unification. However, whether or not the NSC was a by-product or the keystone of the new foreign and security policy making architecture, it was nevertheless a product of the bipolar structure and the US position within it. It not only represented an organizational change, but also an institutional change: a unified civilian-military approach to security issues.

Dwight D. Eisenhower – the US President from 1953 – was “profoundly convinced that an orderly system for strategic planning was essential for the Cold War” (Bowie 2001: 152, italics added).\(^\text{18}\) Although the importance of the NSC has later varied under the different Presidents, the entity has remained. And in events of crisis, albeit under a different name, the same positions and actors were included in the security and foreign policy decision-making as was initially subscribed by the National Security Act of 1947 (Brown 2008).\(^\text{19}\)

Security was during the Cold War period perceived as the degree to which the US government could promote its interests and maintain its power abroad, which could reflect the strategy of a strong power. Security was in this era intertwined in the US-Soviet antagonism. In the Cold War, Britain shared the US perception of the Soviet threat, as the two major powers opposite to the Soviet Union.\(^\text{20}\) According to Tugendhat & Wallace (1988): “the

\(^{17}\) The aim of the NSC was to coordinate foreign policy and defense policy “and to reconcile diplomatic and military commitments and requirements” (Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs United States Department of State 1997).

\(^{18}\) Eisenhower claimed that the NSC created by Truman lacked such an organized system and a coherent strategy, and thus reorganized the NSC through The Cutler Plan (Bowie 2001: 152).

\(^{19}\) After the discovery of the Cuban missile sites, John F. Kennedy established EcComm; Lyndon B. Johnson included the original members of the NSC in his Tuesday lunch meetings (Brown 2008: 42).

\(^{20}\) The power of Britain was in many respects a result of the influence it wielded in three distinct areas of the world: the Commonwealth; the special relationship with the US; and Britain’s close relationship with Western Europe (Coxal, Robins & Leach 2003: 412).
Soviet threat [was perceived] as the main source of international insecurity (…). And the Atlantic Alliance therefore remained the essential framework for British and West European security” (Tugendhat & Wallace 1988:26-27). The US-Soviet antagonism established a stable framework for Britain’s foreign and security policy (Tugendhat & Wallace 1988: 62).\(^\text{21}\)

In terms of security structures, Britain did not establish any new entity for strategic security management, but relied on the Cabinet, and also established ad hoc War Cabinets.

**The British Response**

“How do you run a war?” “(…) First, you need a small War Cabinet; second, it’s got to have regular meetings come hell or high water; thirdly, you don’t want a lot of bureaucrats hanging around” (Hennessy 2000: 104).

In a conversation between Margaret Thatcher and a representative for the Air Ministry Frank Cooper prior to the Falklands War - portrayed by Hennessy (2000) - the importance of the War Cabinet in effective war management is explicit. To establish a War Cabinet is the result of the need for an effective and unified strategy in the event of war. The first War Cabinet was established in 1916, but dissolved in 1919 on the premise that “they should not expect a ‘great war’ in the next 10 years” (BBC 2001).\(^\text{22}\)

In 1939 Neville Chamberlain announced his War Cabinet, and he even built the Cabinet War Room, situated nearby Downing Street (The Daily Telegraph 1939; BBC 2001).\(^\text{23}\) Prime Minister Winston Churchill also formed a small War Cabinet during WWII in order to ensure efficient execution of the war effort (War Cabinet 49 1941; War Cabinet 97 1941).\(^\text{24}\)

The function and existence of a War Cabinet has varied. It cannot be directly compared to the US NSC in that it is a war-time structure. It deals solely with the war efforts: preparation for war, or civil preparedness for attacks, and is dissolved when the threat of war or the war ends. The War Cabinet is more an ad hoc reactive agency responding to current

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\(^\text{21}\) The use of the term"security policy” in a British sense could be misleading, several have claimed that Britain has until recently lacked a clear security policy or a grand strategy (Oral Evidence taken before the Defense Committee 2011).

\(^\text{22}\) In 1916 the first, three-man, War Cabinet was formed by David Lloyd George, which in addition to himself consisted of the Lord President of the Council and the Chancellor of the Exchequer (British Prime Minister Office 2011).

\(^\text{23}\) The Cabinet War Rooms was closed after Japan’s surrender (BBC 2001).

\(^\text{24}\) Churchill’s War Cabinet was not only concerned with the specifics of the war effort of the military services, but was also concerned with the war-time emergency preparedness in Britain (War Cabinet 97 1941).
British war involvements. This does not mean that War Cabinets is always established when faced with a war or threat thereof: while War Cabinets were formed as a means of effective wartime effort in: the First World War, Second World War, The Falklands War, the Gulf War and the invasion of Afghanistan. War Cabinets were however not formed during the Korean War and the Suez Crisis (BBC 2001; Coxal, Robins & Leach 2003: 195).

Structural reorganization is in Britain a result of military engagement in war efforts. Threats of war lead to the establishment of War Cabinets. The end of WWII did not lead to institutional changes within the British security architecture. Rather War Cabinets were temporal organizational solutions to deal with war involvement.

Civil Defense

However, despite lack of institutional change, the end of WWII did generate a discussion of the current level of civil defense. Discussions of civil defense, and especially defense from airborne attacks occupied much attention during and after the First World War, and also during, and immediately after the Second World War. However, it dropped of the Cabinet agenda by the 1960s (Cabinet 1928; Cabinet 1938; War Cabinet 309 1940). The War Cabinet Memorandum of April, 1945 state that: “in view of the general shortage of manpower it should not be justified (…) maintaining the Civil Defense Services on an operational footing”, the further plan should therefore be to “wind up the whole war-time organization” (War Cabinet 1945; War Cabinet 51 1945). Civil defense was downplayed as the direct threat of war against Britain was removed in 1945. However, a discussion of the future of the civil services emerged (War Cabinet 1 1945).

The end of World War II generated a discussion of the need and breadth of a civil service in war-time versus peace-time (Cabinet 1953). The first period after World War II Britain remarkably reduced its defense spending, but after the Korean War in 1950, the defense spending dramatically expanded (Statement on Defense, 1957). In the Statement on Defense, 1957 maintaining security is defined in terms of upholding its collective and integrated defense with its allied partners. The “overriding consideration in all military planning must be to prevent war rather than to prepare for it” (Statement on Defense, 1957: 249, italics added). In a Cabinet note in 1957 this is further exemplified in that “[p]assive

25 «From the domestic point of view, our weakness in the air was the cause of great anxiety (…)we should add depth as well as length (…) in order to give the country some real measure of the steps we were taking, to express the position in terms of money. The figure stated should not be of such a nature as to provoke undesirable repercussions in Germany, but should give reasonable assurance so far as this country was concerned” (Cabinet 1938).
preparations (…) must take second place to active measures to prevent [nuclear war] (…) civil defense must as far as possible be curtailed” (Cabinet 1957: 145).²⁶

The British security strategy seems fragmented. Challenges were dealt with by a case-to-case approach, rather than a permanent security strategy, exemplified by the War Cabinets. However, security had a clear military dimension, and the focus was rather on active military engagement abroad, then passive internal preparations. How did the end of WWII affect the security strategy of smaller states?

**The Norwegian and Danish Response**

Mandelbaum (1988) and Riste (2005: 130-134) both claim that being small might lead to similar security strategies because it will reflect their relative position – their weakness – in the international system. During the Cold War, both Norway and Denmark externally searched for security guarantees from the great powers, and also experimented with a Scandinavian regional security structure.²⁷

Both Norway’s and Denmark’s defense posture were accordingly built on the principle of allied help if attacks would occur: emergency preparedness was based on limited national defense and allied guarantees (Ørvik 1966: 383-387). In Norway and Denmark the concept of total defense emerged in 1946 (Indenrigsministeriets lufværnsudvalg 1946; Flakstad 2010: 315-316; Christensen 23.06.1945; Høydal 2007: 8). The total defense is the military doctrine which combines all national resources, civilian and military, and aims to preserve the national interests, values, territory, society and population. The Norwegian Defense Ministry claimed that “adequate defense cannot be improvised” in the events of attack, and “responsible authorities cannot disregard the fact that there exists today a certain tension between the great powers” (as quoted in Riste 2005: 195-196). The total defense – in both Norway and Denmark – was predominately concerned with the threat of war (Indenrigsministeriets lufværnsudvalg 1946; Lango, Lægreid & Rykkja 2011: 173).²⁸

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²⁶ Due to economic constraints, in the period after the Suez crisis, governments continued downscaling defense commitments and capabilities (Cabinet Conclusions 1967; Cabinet Conclusions 1968; National Archives 2011).

²⁷ Ørvik (1966: 380) claimed that the Nordic region lacked a centralized source of authority and coordination, and that the Nordic states rather had “moved independently” in major security matters (Ørvik 1972).

²⁸ In Denmark the end of WWII led to major reorganizations within the military service (Wolden 2007). In Norway the discussion of civil defense also led to the establishment of a directorate of Civil Protection in 1970 under the auspices of the Ministry of Justice (Hansvoll 2011; Lango, Lægreid & Rykkja 2011: 173).
The Danish government was in the initial years after the end of the Cold War occupied with rebuilding the Danish Defense, exemplified in the Defense Commission in 1946 (Henneberg 2004).29

When it comes to the executive management of crises and disasters the Norwegian government established the Governmental Security Committee (Regjeringens sikkerhetsutvalg) (GSC) in 1949 (Klevberg 1996; Lund-rapporten 1995-1996). The members of the Committee were initially the Cabinet members, and the issues discussed predominantly concerned foreign policy issues, but also issues concerning internal security.30 However, it seems that the approach to security issues was ad hoc, and assesses case-by-case. Therefore it does not really resemble the NSC, it functioned when a certain security concern was on the agenda, but otherwise was not visible.

To sum up: During the Cold War, security was in the two larger countries – the USA and Britain – defined in terms of the power they wielded abroad. Their actions abroad would in turn ensure their security at home. In Denmark and Norway security was defined in terms of allied guarantees of territorial protection in the event of war or attack. In the USA clear institutional change is observed, while Britain had a more ad hoc approach to crises management. Norway changed its security architecture, while it seems that Denmark did not. However – in terms of definition of security – a clear military dimension is present in all the states’ security strategies. The Cold War antagonism defined the states’ security strategies. Thus, as Howard (1987: 186) asks:”What happens if there is no longer a Soviet threat?” Stay tuned…

29 Whether the executive branch changed or altered it security architecture in this period has been difficult to assess. It thus seems that Denmark were more occupied with re-building its military than on governmental reform (Henneberg 2004).

30 The composition of the Committee has varied in accordance to different governments, but it usually consists of the following main members: the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defense, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Justice and Emergency Preparedness, and the Ministry of Finance. The Intelligence Service (PST) have also participated in this body. The documents which are discussed and the reports are secret (Frisak 2010: 8).
Chapter 3

Strategic Security Structures after the Cold War: A New World (Dis)Order

This chapter is organized the same way as the preceding chapter. It investigates the changes in the security strategies and structures within the four cases as a response to two international “events” – in this case, two events – the end of the Cold War and the terrorist attack on New York and Washington September 11 2001. The observations will be summed up in figure 3 at the end of the chapter. Chapter 4 will compare the executive security structures which emerged after 2001.

Context 2: A New World Order

The collapse of the Soviet-Union produced a triumphant USA. They had achieved “victory without war” as Kissinger put it (1994: 22).\(^{31}\) Fukuyama (1992) presented his noted *End of History* thesis, which argues that as liberalism saw now contenders, peace and stability was now a reality. Similarly, Booth (1998:45) echoed that the Cold War was “cosmically threatening and locally dangerous”, and that its end marked international hope. However the acclaimed peace and security proclamations were questioned by others. Mearsheimer (1990) termed it a “shallow construction”.

Mearsheimer (1990) claimed that the Cold War represented a “long peace” and with the article “Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War” (1990) he argued that the dismantlement of the bipolar order returned the international system into the “untamed anarchy” which existed between 1648 and 1945 (Mearsheimer 1990).\(^{32}\) He claimed that the stability of the bipolar system had reverted into a multipolar system, a system which had “created powerful incentives for aggression in the past” (Mearsheimer 1990). Robert Kaplan pointed to the problems ahead in the *Coming Anarchy* (2000), and Huntington (1993; 1996) claimed that the *End of History* thesis proclaimed by Fukuyama (1992) was unfocused. Instead of ideological conflicts, future conflicts would surface along cultural demarcation lines.\(^{33}\)

\(^{31}\) By the 1990s signs of disintegration multiplied. The 8\(^{th}\) of December 1991 Russian, Ukrainian and Belarusian leaders met at Minsk: the dissolution of the Soviet Union was announced. It was replaced by the *Commonwealth of Independent States*. This was later confirmed at Alma- Ata December 21\(^{st}\) 1991 (Robert 2007:1146).

\(^{32}\) Peace of Westphalia in 1648 and until 1945 and the US-Soviet antagonism.

\(^{33}\) Kaplan (2000) claims that the future world is bifurcated; in which the African continent represents a “brutish” Hobbesian state of existence, while relative order exists in the rest of the world.
Kissinger (1994: 23) claimed that the collapse of the common external threat led to a process in which “each country perceives its perils from its own national perspective”. Each state tried to adapt their internal relations to the new setting (Jørgensen 1997: 3). Thus the states which prior to the fall of the Soviet threat had “nestled under American protection”, now felt compelled to assume greater responsibility for their own security (Kissinger 1994: 23). Kissinger (1994: 19) further argued that what was new about the emerging world order was that, for the first time, the US could neither withdraw from, nor dominate the world. New major powers were rising, and the relative strength of the US was contested. In an international system with several potential great powers, international order would “have to emerge (...) from a reconciliation and balancing of competing national interests” (Kissinger 1994: 805).

The fall of the Soviet Union changed the international system. The following passages will shows how the fall of the Soviet Union affected states more towards a discussion of internal security strategies, which differs from the post WWII military security focus.

**Response: The United States**

The NSC which was created as a response to the start of the Cold War remained also after its end. However, while the NSC remained, it was in the initial period after the collapse of the Soviet Union less important. Rather, the focus was on internal security. Internal crises management through the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) were placed on the security agenda (Roberts 2008: 4). FEMA was established in 1969, but in its initial years it experienced many challenges, and the organization suffered from a fragmented structure. In 1993 President Clinton nominated James L. Witt as the new FEMA director, and FEMA was subjected to major reforms which streamlined disaster relief and recovery operations. The end of the Cold War – the changed security environment – enabled Witt to redirect resources to FEMA and its disaster relief programs (FEMA 2011).

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34 Kissinger (1994: 23-24) claimed that the post-Cold War world would contain at least six major powers – the US, Europe, China, Japan, Russia, India – and additionally a multiplicity of medium-sized and smaller countries.

35 Prior to 1950, nonprofits, churches, and volunteer organizations responded to disasters on an ad hoc basis: and only a few such state or local institutions with full time staff existed until the federal government intervened.

36 Early disasters included the contamination of the Love Canal, the Cuba refugee crisis and the accident at Three Miles Island nuclear power plant. Later the Loma Prieta Earthquake in 1989 and Hurricane Andrew in 1992 generated major national attention to FEMA (FEMA 2011).
President Clintons’ focus was not primarily on NSC and its functions; rather what occupied him was economic transformation: a predominately internal focus (Brown 2008). The same tendency is not observed in Britain, where its alliance commitments still dominated its security strategy.

Response: Great Britain
The British response to the changes in the international system is exemplified through the debate about its external alliance commitments. The threefold commitment to the US, the EU and also to the Commonwealth was greatly discussed (Coxal, Robins & Leach 2003: 412).

The end of the Cold War provided stimulus for further change in the European cooperation and British engagement. Fractions in Britain resisted further Europeanization, on the basis of protecting its sovereignty, but also because of its membership in NATO. Bache & Jordan (2006: 4) describes Britain’s relationship with the EU as “awkward”, “reluctant”, and “semi-detached”.

The focus in British security strategies was more concerned with its external strategy than internal preparedness. Britain relied on the Cabinet, and no organizational or institutional changes are observed. How did the smaller NATO states respond to the end of the Cold War?

Response: Denmark
According to Innset (2008) Denmark was a “footnote country” in NATO during the Cold War. However in the wake of the Cold War this was replaced by military activism as the core of Danish defense policy. Therefore instead of military marginalization as the “threat image” changed, Denmark militarized its foreign policy. The military was actively used to promote Danish international interests, while its territorial defense was renounced (Innset 2008).

A debate of the proper crisis management surfaced in 1991. The Ole Asmussen Commission, led by the Ministry of Justice, presented its conclusions about the future role of the crisis management. It suggested the establishment of the Danish Emergency Management Agency (DEMA), which was formalized in 1993 and was placed in the Ministry of Internal

37 Britain was initially reluctant to join the EU. This is by Bache & Jordan (2006: 5-6) explained by its ‘special relationship’ with the US, but also its commitments to the remnants of its Empire and the evolving commonwealth of independent states. Britain became a member of the EU in 1973 after its third application.

38 Participated in Afghanistan and Iraq (Innset 2008).

39 Has a strategy of 2000 deployed soldiers at all time (Innset 2008).
Affairs (Beredskabsloven [1992]2000). The end of the Cold War thus established an emergency preparedness organization, and also sought to institutionalize emergency preparedness.

**Response: Norway**

In Norway, the end of the Cold War also resulted in discussion of the need for reorganization. The view on crisis management changed from the predominately military dimension in the Cold War to the prevention and management of potential peace-time crises. Emphasis was put on securing the society: the safety of the population, securing central societal functions and infrastructure, in a period where the *existence of the state* was not threatened (St. meld 24 [1992-1993] 1993; Flakstad 2010: 316; Innset 2008).

In the period from the early 1990s to the 2000s the government initiated several commissions which discussed the need for better security preparedness (St. meld 24 [1992-1993]; NOU 24 2000; NOU 6 2006). *The Buvik Commission* (1992), the *Vulnerability Commission* (2000), and the *Infrastructure Commission* (2006) all proposed radical reorganization in the current security architecture in Norway. The most notable was the proposition of the establishment of a separate Ministry of Internal Security, and a new preparedness act. These Commissions recognized that the current security strategies lacked a superior organizing principle – it was based on ad hoc strategies – in the response to crises.

The discussions about whether a separate ministry should be established were in many way based on whether societal security should be regarded as a separate policy field, or whether it should be integrated in the already established Ministerial architecture (Lango, Lægreid & Rykkja 2011: 173). However, the government did introduce three important principles for crisis management: responsibility, decentralization, and conformity (St.meld 24 [1992-1993]). Prior to the introduction of these principles the emergency preparedness sector was based on the principle of total defense which was introduced in 1969, and were predominantly based on the Defense forces’ threat assessments (Høydal 2007).

To sum up: after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War a similar discussion occurred in all four states. What should be the post-Cold War security strategy? In the USA and Denmark, internal crisis preparedness organizations – FEMA and DEMA - respectively gained leverage or were established. In Great Britain the security debate circled around whether it should commit more to enhanced security cooperation with either the EU or
the US, coupled with its Commonwealth commitments. In Norway the security debate culminated in a discussion of its internal security in peace-time and war-time, in which organizational changes did not occur. However, the institutional framework for crisis management was changed with the introduction of three new principles of crisis management. Therefore, the perceived change from a bipolar structure to a potential uni- or multipolar world affected states, either through the placement of security on the agenda, or through organizational changes. The general trend seems to be the perception of no direct military threat of war. However, later “events” changed this...

**September 11: A New World (Dis)Order?**

The shift from a bipolar (Cold War) to a unipolar or potentially multipolar (post-Cold War) structure of the international system marks a shift in the international system, which led to alterations or discussion of the posture of states’ security structures. How did the terrorist attacks on USA September 11 affect states? Was it perceived as a change in world order?

Dunne (2007: 347) states that 9/11 marked a “new world order”. Roberts (2007) reply that the “event” did not drastically change the structure of the system. But that the effect of the attacks was galvanic, and it made explicit what earlier had been implicit. It contributed to enhance the visibility of new threats on the international arena, and thus created – for some states – a clear adversary. Therefore, rather than a *new world order*, a *new world disorder* appeared (Coxal, Robins & Leach 2003: 410) The new threat perception gave certain states a clearer and more directed security policy through the war against terrorism. However, in accordance with neoclassical realism, it is not the “objective reality” that determine state action, but rather decision makers’ perception of the security environment (Rose 1998). Did the states’ decision makers perceive 9/11 as a clear change in their security environment?

A significant effect of 9/11 was the decision by the US and main ally, Britain, to invade Iraq in 2003. Prior to the terrorist attack, such an invasion was difficult to envision: a pre-emptive attack against a sovereign country based on *suspicions* of weapon acquisitions was a hugely dubious, perhaps even an illegal act (Roberts 2007: 1175).  

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40 A divided perception of participation in the US «Coalition of the Willing».

41 The Peace of Westphalia established the modern statehood, and by implication a normative structure for the exercise and limits of political power. The UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights modified aspects of the Westphalian Constitution, but it remains the “founding covenant of world politics” (McGrew 2011: 24).
Several scholars claimed that the Huntingtonian cultural clashes were now becoming a reality (Huntington 1993; Huntington 1996; Lantis 2002: 104). Threats were no longer defined as states, rather civilizational demarcation lines would serve as the “conflict-inducers” of the 21. Century. The additional terrorist attacks in Western Europe – Madrid, London – might have reinforced these demarcation lines. How did the cases respond to these “events”?

Post 2001 US Responses: The HSC
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Homeland Security Council (HSC), was established as a separate White House entity after the terrorist attacks in September 11, 2001 (Department of Homeland Security 2012; White House 2011). Why did the US – already equipped with both an internal and external security structure through the NSC and FEMA – establish a new council?

In the post 9/11 era, Bush claimed that the “changing nature of threats” required new governmental structures to protect against new and invisible enemies. He further claimed that “[t]oday no single government agency has homeland security as its primary mission” (Bush 2002: 2). Therefore, due to what he conceived as structural deficits, he established the Department of Homeland Security. He recalls it as the “most significant transformation of the U.S. government in over a half-century” (Bush 2002: 2). He further emphasizes that DHS “would make Americans safer” (Bush 2002: 2). Structural changes would increase homeland security. Accordingly, “history (...) teaches us that new challenges require new organizational structures“(Bush 1993: 6). During the Cold War, the US created a national security strategy which enabled the US to “deter and defeat the organized military forces”, and “emerged victorious from this dangerous period (...) because we organized our national security institutions (...)” (Bush 2002: 8). Again, structural changes are perceived to increase security.

A similar view was forwarded by the Obama Administration, which also sought to change the NSC characteristics. As National Security Advisor James L. Jones states:

The world that we live in has changed so dramatically in this decade that organizations that were created to meet a certain set of criteria no longer are terribly useful (De Young 2009).

The events of September 11 had organizational as well as institutional impacts on the US security architecture. A clearer focus on homeland security and the prevention of terrorism

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42 Accordingly, new NCS directorates “will deal with such department-spanning 21st-century issues as cybersecurity, energy, climate change, nation-building and infrastructure” (DeYoung 2009).
emerged with the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security, and the Homeland Security Council. From being primarily focused on external security policy through the NSC, and internal security management and prevention of natural disasters through FEMA, September 11 brought a severe focus on internal terrorism prevention, and thus the HSC enters. Also in Denmark, did the 9/11 terrorist attacks lead to organizational changes…

Post 2001 Responses: Danish Preparedness

In the yearly New Year’s speech by the Danish Prime Minister January 1, 2001 the focus was on internal matters and the only external focus was the short mentioning of EU (Nyrup Rasmussen 2001). However, the 9/11 lead to a redefinition of security, in which external regards was juxtaposed with internal ones. In the Prime Ministers Opening Address to The Danish Parliament in October 2001 he states that:

There are points of time in history when events in an instant eradicate the world’s agenda and replace it with a new one. (…) Tuesday 11 September was such a day. (…) The attacks in New York are not merely another terrorist action. They are not merely an attack on cities in the USA. They are a ruthless assault on everything we represent: the freedom of the individual, the security of the many, our common security, everything that gives meaning to the word ‘democracy’ (Nyrup Rasmussen 2001: 1).

This “new world order”, he says, must lead to a “thorough analysis of Denmark’s (…) foreign policy and security policy” (Nyrup Rasmussen 2001: 2). The Danish response was twofold: the active fight against terrorism, as well as changes in domestic security structures.

Prior to September 11, DEMA was more focused towards natural disasters and fires, and confined to the Ministry of Internal Affairs. After September 11 2001 the focus generally shifted towards the emergency preparedness and its relation to the military services in the event of terrorism. Discussions led to the inclusion of DEMA in the Ministry of Defense. In February 2001 an Act passed by Parliament formalized the new aims of the Danish Defense Force (Danish Defense 2011a). The Defense Force was to cooperate with, and support the other parts of the total defense.43

In 2002 the government presented a political agreement concerning the emergency preparedness in the post-9/11 era (Politisk aftale o redningsberedskapet efter 2002). The

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43 The total defense is a cooperative strategy between the Defense, the Police, the Emergency preparedness agencies and the civilian sector, which together represents the four components of the total defense. In the event of a catastrophe, crisis or war, these four components were to work together to ensure effective use of resources, as a strategy to coordinate unified civilian and military efforts (Danish Defense 2011b).
political parties collectively asserted that the new threat environment should result in a reordering of priorities. The political parties all agreed that Denmark should strive for a unification of the different parts of emergency preparedness, thus a more holistic approach to the intrastate security structure (Politisk aftale om redningsberedskapet efter 2002: 1).  

The Danish national strategic security structures are comprised of three levels which coordinate emergency management. The third level, The Crisis Management Group (CMG), was established after 2001 (DEMA 2011; St. meld 37 [2004-2005] 2005). This crisis management group specifies on the combat of and the preparation for terrorism. Thus, the post 9/11 era had clear organizational as well as institutional implications for the Danish security structure. A changed perception of security was institutionalized and new structures were added, authority was re-allocated, in line with the notion of a broadened security agenda. Also in Norway clear changes occurred.

Post 2001 Norwegian Responses: the NCC

Prior to the establishment of the Norwegian Security Council (NCC), and in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on USA 2001, Norway released a White Paper to the Storting called “Societal Security: The road to a less vulnerable society” (St. meld. 17 [2001-2002] 2002). The aim of the report was to further develop the total defense and the recognition of the degree of vulnerability: both in terms of natural disasters, accidents, and man-made events. The vulnerability was connected both to the individual and the collective society, but the report is in its majority concerned with the vulnerability of critical infrastructure. Security is defined in terms of societal functions of material and systems within the society (St. meld 17 [2001-2002]: 3).

After the tsunami in Southeast Asia a new White Paper to the Storting was released, which focused on the Norwegian security structures (St. meld 37 2004-2005). Prior to the tsunami, and during it, the Government had the strategic responsibility for the crisis

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44 The political agreement was valid from 2003-2004.

45 The first level: The Government Security Committee which consists of the Prime Minister (chairman), the Minister of Economic and Business Affairs, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Defense, and the Minister of Justice. The second level: The Senior Officials’ Security Committee, consists of the permanent secretaries of the above-mentioned ministries, the Head of the Defense Intelligence Service and the Head of Security Intelligence Service. The Defense Chief and others may be included.

46 An earthquake and a following tidal wave hit South and Southeast Asia December 26 2004. The disaster lead to the loss of over 220 000 people, of which 79 Norwegians were identified, and 5 were missing (St. meld 37 2004-2005:5).
management. As a result of public criticism about lack of communication to the affected parts in the initial phase of the disaster, the Government established an independent commission to evaluate the management of the crisis. The organizational results – the structural change – of the report was the establishment of the NCC in order to promote the crisis coordination ability; a clarification of the responsibility of the leader department in crisis management; and the establishment of a Crisis Support Unit (CSU) (St. meld 37 2004-2005; Justis og Politidepartementet 2005).

The Norwegian Crisis Council (NCC) – established in 2005 – therefore came as a result of the tsunami in Southeast Asia, and the terrorist attacks in New York and Madrid (St. meld 37 2004-2005). Therefore, it is a result of a perceived change in the international security environment (The Ministry of Justice and Defense 2011; PST 2002; 2010; 2011). However, although the NCC was a new organizational ad hoc structure, it did not change the institutional framework for emergency preparedness. The principle of responsibility, decentralization, and conformity remained the bedrock of the new organizations.

Post 2001 Response: Great Britain

Post-9/11 the British foreign policy was again, in alliance with US, and as in the Cold War period, clearly structured towards an enemy: the “war on terrorism” (Coxal, Robins & Leach 2003: 410-411). The British security policy in the twenty-first century has been twofold: first, increased homeland protection and increased civilian defense. The second priority includes preemptive military action against rogue states that pose a military threat, allied with the US. This twofold approach could create a priority-problem for Britain: what is the key priority?

The Answer: NSC?

The British National Security Council was established in 2010 (British Prime Minister’s Office 2010). In Britain structural change have been infrequent, and reliance on the functions of the Cabinet large.

The post 2001 strategy for Britain marked a change in the discussion of security threats in Britain (Dunne 2007: 347). According to a speech given by Prime Minister Tony Blair in 2001: “(…) the events of September 11 (…) marked a turning point in history”. New dangers have risen, he continues, which represents “a new situation”. Furthermore, “every

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47 The British Government published a Strategic Defence and Security Review: Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty (2010) which explain how they will equip their armed forces, their police and intelligence agencies to tackle the threats they face.
reasonable measure of internal security is being undertaken”. He also claims that 9/11 is “bringing Governments and people to reflect, consider and change”. Thus, amidst the event of terrorism, also a “power of community” is in emergence in order to tackle the “world’s new challenges” (Blair 2001). Therefore, although a heightened internal security focus and intrastate security structural change, security is still defined and perceived through the active engagement externally with allied partners.

**The Aim of the Chapter: Systemic Pressures and State Interpretation**

The aim in this chapter is to analyze how changes in the structure of the international system were perceived and manifested either through organizational, institutional change, or discussions thereof.

The end of WWII led to a change in the organizational and institutional framework in the US security architecture: a unified military-civilian approach. The end of the Cold War did not alter the organizational arrangements established in 1947. However, after the terrorist attacks in 2001, the US established a new department, the DHS and a new council the HSC. However, the NSC still remained. However, this organizational add implied a reallocation of responsibility, and thus an institutional as well as organizational change.

In Britain an ad hoc approach to crises and security challenges defines its security “strategy since the end of WWII. It relied on the Cabinet, and additionally established War Cabinets to deal with war efforts. Thus, the British NSC emergence in 2010 marks a wish for a new approach to its security policy.

In Denmark and Norway from the end of WWII they relied on their total defense which was predominately defined in military terms. The end of the Cold War did lead to a change in both countries, in which Denmark added the DEMA organization, while in Norway the important institutional principles for emergency preparedness were introduced. After the terrorist attacks in 2001, Denmark added an executive body – the CPG – and thus institutionalized terrorism preparedness. In Norway organizational changes did not occur until after the tsunami in Southeast Asia in 2005, were several Norwegian tourists were affected.

The Danish responses to the systemic pressures resemble the US responses. The United States established FEMA and Denmark established DEMA in the post-Cold War period. After 2001, both countries established a body which was aimed at preparing for terrorism. The Danish security commitments in NATO, and its focus on military activism as a core of its foreign policy might have resulted in a close connection to the US. The Danish defense strategy thus reflects a US defense strategy, and could represent a small states’
bandwagoning strategy towards a larger power. However, the interesting point is that the Norwegian strategy seems to differ. While Denmark adopts a defense strategy, Norway seems more reluctant, and rather focuses on what they cannot do. These two small states’ strategies differ.

In terms of organizational change, the mere passage of time, or the historical “events” did not in themselves lead to changes in the security structures. Indeed, these “events” did lead to a discussion of security in all the cases. However, while the historical “events” lead to discussions of security, shocks and crisis – which either hit them directly or indirectly – led to clear structural changes in all the cases, exemplified in figure 3 below. All the cases established new structures. Therefore it might seem plausible, as observed also Zakaria (1998) and Levy (1994), that the “motor of change” are shocks, major events, rather than systemic pressures in itself. The next chapter will pick up on this argument.

Figure 3. Changes in Executive Security Structures in Relation to International “Events”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Aftermath World War II</th>
<th>Aftermath Cold War</th>
<th>Aftermath 9/11</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>NSC</td>
<td>FEMA*</td>
<td>HSC</td>
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<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>War Cabinets</td>
<td>War Cabinets</td>
<td>British NSC</td>
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<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>DEMA*</td>
<td>CMG</td>
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<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>GSC</td>
<td>Dir. CP*</td>
<td>NCC</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

* FEMA, DEMA and the Directorate for Civil Protection are all important changes within the security structure; however, these are changes in the security structures at a hierarchical lower level than the other organizational structures.

The focus on internal security from “new threats” does not coincide with Buzan’s (1997) and Comfort’s (2002) increased focus on collective security and the security community. Rather, it seems that states see their allied security guarantees as functional in the event of war or threat thereof – conventional security definition of territorial integrity – but that the new threats have to be dealt with through domestic security structures. Thus, the states have to unilaterally prepare for threats, due to the nature of the new threats, “bringing the state back in” (Rose 1998).

The implications of changes in the international systems and its effects on states, has been thoroughly stated. But does the fact that all the European cases as well as the USA added
security structures in the aftermath of the terror events of 2001 – as a reaction to the same security environment – imply that their approach towards crisis management in the twenty-first century is similar? Is the US, British, Danish and Norwegian definition of security similar? In the next chapter the four security structures will be compared according to the following variables: degree of change, power characteristics, and definition of security.
Chapter 4
Domestic Security Structures Compared

Neoclassical realism regards state behavior and security policy primarily as a response to the constraints and opportunities in the international system. However, how states chose to respond to the systemic pressures is conditioned by domestic factors. The previous two chapters – chapters 2 and 3 – have shown how systemic pressure affected the security strategies of the USA, Great Britain, Denmark and Norway. This chapter will direct attention towards a comparison of the states’ response to the systemic pressures, and especially whether the new security structures which were established after 2001 are similar. It will show that although internal changes were affected by international events, discussions and actual establishment of new structures were shaped by domestic factors – affected by factors peculiar to the individual country. The comparison will be organized by the following variables: the degree of change, which also will focus on how shocks and disasters lead to change; the power characteristics; and their definition of security.

Change and Continuity: How Much Change is Change?

Events and changes in the international system lead to decision makers’ reassessment of its perception of security and threat, thus either leading to a “thickening or refuting” of the current definition of security. All the countries included in this case study changed their domestic security structures in the aftermath of 2001. Change here refers to the establishment of the US HSC, the Danish CMG, the Norwegian NCC, and the British NSC: all of which represents formal changes in the intrastate security structure. However, did this organizational change also represent an institutional change?

As presented in chapter 1 and with support from North (1990): organizations are groups of actors which are bound together by a common purpose. In this thesis an organization is an expression of a specific security strategy created by the decision makers, thus an instrument to achieve a defined goal. However, this strategy is restrained by the institutional framework. The institutional framework is the underlying values and culture, the “rules of the game, which guides cooperation and processes, and the organization is a result of the opportunities within this framework (North 1990: 7).

The US HSC, the Danish CMG, the Norwegian NCC, and the British NSC all represent organizational change. They are established as a means in order to cope with the
new security environment. However, the question is whether these also are expressions of institutional change? Did these new organizations change the “rules of the game”?

In the USA, the establishment of the HSC represented an organizational change, in which the aim was better coordination and preparedness for terrorism. However, the composition of members in the HSC is similar to the NSC: it is chaired by the President, and is composed of both civilian and military actors. The two councils even have a combined staff, the National Security Staff (US NSS) (Hsu 2009). According to the *Homeland Security Act of 2001*, the NSC and the HSC can also have combined meetings. Other than the compositional differences with the inclusion of several homeland officers in the HSC, a glimpse at the current HSC and NSC reveals that the majority of the members are members or regular attendees of both these bodies (National Security Act 1947; Homeland Security Act 2001). Therefore the establishment of the HSC does not represent a new way of strategic thinking. And it is not an institutional change in the manner in which North (1990) defined institutional change, rather an extension of already established procedures, therefore reflecting relative continuity.

The British NSC represents an organizational, as well as a potential institutional change. During earlier crises – defined as threats of wars and engagement in wars – a civilian-military War Cabinet has been created. In terms of compositions of actors the British NSC could be defined as a twenty-first century permanent War Cabinet, and not clearly an institutional change. However, the potential institutional change is not the establishment of the British NSC per se, but rather the establishment of a security strategy in the NSS and the SDSR.

In Britain, the *National Security Strategy* (NSS) and the *Strategic Defense and Security Review* (SDSR) together represent the Government’s strategic decisions about defense and security (British NSC 2012a). The creation of the NSS and the SDRS is a new approach to security thinking in Britain – the NSS dates back to 2008 and the SDRS in 2010 (SDSR 2010). These represent an attempt of a holistic approach to thinking security, through annual reports which reviews the definition of security and threat. Therefore the British NSC could be a “methodology to create a strategy” instead of a strategy in itself (Oral Evidence taken before The Defense Committee 2011). No similar grand strategy document has earlier been present in Britain.48

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48 Professor Michael Clarke and Professor Hew Strachan both claim that the ambitious *Grand Strategy* – offered in the SDSR – lacks a congruence between the resources available and the ambitions presented, thus it fails to think security in the holistic way it itself emphasizes. Professor Clarke claim that the “NSS would have us do a
Prior to this, a collective body for considering the security strategy has not formally existed, thus the establishment could represent an attempt of institutionalizing strategic security thinking. As Professor Hew Strachan puts it: “there isn’t-and hasn’t-been much strategic thinking in this country” (Oral Evidence taken before the Defense Committee 2011). Therefore the NSC together with the SDSR and NSS could imply an institutional change as well as organizational changes.

In 2005 the Norwegian NCC was created, but during earlier crisis – after 9/11 and in connection with the Iraq contribution – the Government established a departmental group to coordinate the activities with the affected actors (St.meld 37 [2004-2005]). To establish the NCC was therefore more a formalization of the informal response in the event of a crisis. The three main principles – responsibility, decentralization, and conformity – is still the institutional framework which undergirds the emergency preparedness structures. Thus, the NCC is an organizational expression which does not alter or change the institutional framework established earlier. Similarly, in Denmark, the establishment of the CMG is also an added organizational expression of the already established security institution.

The change in all the new structures is therefore not that it represents a new way of “thinking security” or a clear institutional change, but rather organizational expressions of the perceived changes in the security agenda. All the new structures represent an expression of the new threats. But if it does not represent an institutional change….

Why Create New Formal Structures?

The new security structures represent a formalization of previously informal strategies in Norway and Denmark, and more permanently in Britain and the US. Why are states inclined to create new security structures? A bottom-up explanation might be the people, and the importance of the people in democracies (Risse-Kappen 1991: 480). The four cases included in this thesis are representative democracies. This implies that the people through the cast of a vote select their representatives, who in turn create the political means and ends. Thus, in order for the political regime to be reelected they need to be attentive to the public will. Therefore, to create domestic security structures may indicate that the government is in control, and thus create social order. As Pearson & Mitroff (1993) claims, security strategies

little bit more of everything with rather less resources”, while Professor Strachan adds that “[t]here is a never-never world there fed by the hope that it might come back into shape again” (Oral Evidence taken before The Defense Committee 2011).
will affect how leaders will be perceived, and in turn affect the durability of their power. In democracies crisis preparedness is important for the incumbent government, as it might impose severe strains on the economic, psychical and emotional situation and public support. The politicians must: “consider how they might be labeled or perceived” through their preparation strategies (Pearson & Mitroff 1993: 56).

The establishment of new intrastate security structures – the HSC, the NCC, the CMG and the British NSC – does therefore not necessarily represent a functional change. Rather it could show reassurance of the political regimes’ capability, and thus its legitimacy of power. As Lipset (1959: 77) states: the legitimacy of the current is based on “the capacity of the system to engender and maintain the belief that the existing political institutions are the most appropriate ones for the society”. In democracies, it seems evident that after the occurrence of a crisis – either internally or abroad – there is almost a reflexive tendency for the political elite to establish commissions, councils, present White Papers and reports, in order to reassess the current level of preparedness and evaluate their response. Which brings the discussion over to the next element: if states initiate change after the event of crisis, what effect does this have on actual state of preparedness?

**Constantly Preparing for the Last Crisis?**

Roberts (2007: 993) writes that “the world is one like never before”. Increased globalization has accordingly created a situation in which:

> Almost anything that happens anywhere in the world can now in principle rapidly produce effects elsewhere; more and more, even if not yet all, political leaders seem to recognize this, whether they are prompted to do so by ideology, calculation or simple fear (idem).

This thesis suggests that it is not any event which accentuates change, rather states mainly respond to shocks and crisis. And, the specific characteristic of the actual shock or crisis affects the posture of the new security structure. Decision makers learn from shocks – from Roberts’ fear – which in turn affects that nature of preparedness for future crisis. Levy (1994: 279) claims that political leaders learn from historical experience. The focus is here on governmental learning from international events. While Levy (1994) claim that states are “fighting the last war”, observations in this thesis suggests that states are constantly preparing
for the last crisis. Thus, the last crises define the preparedness posture for the next crisis, and the posture of the emergency preparedness structures is therefore bound by history.49

To prepare for the last crisis contradicts Pearson & Mitroff’s (1993) fundamental argument in crisis management: the “holistic approach”. The chance that the next crisis will be similar to the last crisis – that the same crisis will reoccur – is tiny. Crisis preparedness does not accumulate wealth; it can only reduce the wealth degradation in times of crisis. Broad internal crisis preparedness is a costly project, and in times of perceived stability, the government might have problems justifying high levels of resources allocated to security preparedness. Additionally, in the event of a crisis or shock, the political regime might have problems justifying why they are not allocating more resources to the specific sectors. Therefore, why decision makers learn from shocks and crisis might be because of the legitimacy of their authority. It is difficult for decision makers to explain to the people why they are not “doing anything”. Therefore, the democratic principle might explain the reflexivity of democracies to “change something” after crises and shocks.

Observations of How Shocks and Conflict Lead to Structural Change

As noted above, external conflicts, shocks, attacks, crises and catastrophes leads to state responses. The NSC was established in 1947 because of internal military-civilian conflict (Brown 2008; Zegart 1999). FEMA was established after the Hurricane Diana catastrophe in 1955 (Roberts 2008). Natural disaster relief was put on the agenda. This does not necessarily mean that the risk of natural disaster was higher than earlier. The establishment of the DHS and HSC in 2001 put internal terrorist prevention on the top of the security agenda, while natural disaster preparedness was downplayed. Therefore, as: “Hurricane Katrina approached the Gulf Coast in late August 2005, homeland security officials were preoccupied with preventing another terrorist attack” (Flynn 2010, italics added).

Although less resources were allocated to natural disaster preparedness in the post 9/11 period, this did not mean that the risk of natural disaster had diminished. Rather, the allocation of resources was based on the last occurring crisis: the September 11 terrorist attacks of 2001.

In Britain the creation in the NSC itself was established in the response to the British engagement in Afghanistan, and thus the military dimension in it is striking (Oral Evidence

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49 Being prepared is thus defined as ‘path dependent’. This term is influenced by Krasner (1988). He claimed that changes in institutions are dependent on constraints created by earlier changes. Changes in security structures are in the same way dependent on how the structures functioned in the last occurring crisis.
taken before the Defense Committee 2011). The agenda of the first British NSC meeting was the military situation in Afghanistan, although “it was also briefed on the UK’s wider strategic and security position” (Reynolds 2010).

In the Nordic countries similar tendencies are observed. In Denmark in 2004/2005, and as a response to the Chinese ship *Fu Sang Hai* which in May 2003 sprung a leak outside Bornholm – leading to a large oil spill – a series of commissions was set down in order to prevent and prepare for similar accidents (Arboe-Rasmussen 2007) Another event which impacted the posture of the emergency preparedness was the firework accident in Seest in 2004. The readiness of the current communication system was criticized; it was claimed ineffective and in need of upgrades. This in turn led to a reassessment and restructuring of the communication lines between the different actors (Arboe-Rasmussen 2007). The hurricane in 1999 also led to internal structural changes (Brødsgaard Larsen 2008: 30).

In Norway an example could be the Soviet atomic power plant accident in Chernobyl in 1986, after in which the readiness of the Norwegian emergency preparedness for these catastrophes was reassessed (Dagsrevyen NRK 29 April 1986). The direct result was the procurement of new measuring devices and the establishment of several laboratories, in order to be able to notice similar accidents at an earlier stage in the future (Norwegian Protection Radiation Authority 2009). Additionally, the Chernobyl accident also led to an evaluation of the information preparedness for these kinds of accidents, and the establishment of the “Crisis Information Unit” (Kriseinfo) (Brygård 2006). Also, the *Elektron* event in 2005 made the conflict between the civilian-military sector visible for the public eye, and the event lead to a reassessment of the power-sharing between the Coast Guard and the Police (Finseth 2010: 297-307).

A more recent example is the attack in Norway on the government offices in Oslo and the island of Utøya on 22 July 2011, which received massive attention, in which the current posture of emergency preparedness was publicly criticized (Olsen 2011). A specific “22 July Commission” was established in order to “carry out a broad and independent evaluation of the response (…) in order to identify lessons learned” (Sverdrup 2011). In the *Council of State* of November 11 2011, it was also decided that the additional resources would be given to the emergency preparedness, and that “in order to vizualise these changes (…) the Ministry of Justice and the Police from 1 January 2012 would change name to the Ministry of Justice and Emergency Preparedness” (Office of the Prime Minister 2011).

Although the above observations are limited in scope, it seems plausible that conflict, shocks and crisis is “the motor of change” (Levy 1994; Zakaria 1998). However, the attentive
reader might differentiate between the actual cause and the actuating cause of change. However, it seems plausible to suggest that decision makers are always seeking to avoid the failures of the past, and therefore are in principle constantly preparing for the last crisis. According to crisis management literature, learning can be attributed to be the last phase of crisis management: it “refers to adequate reflection and critical examination of the lessons learned from experiencing (...)” crises (Pearson & Mitroff 1993: 54). This could explain the reflexive tendency – observed in the four democratic states discussed in this thesis – to establish commissions, produce papers and suggest changes in the aftermath of a crisis.

Conflicts induce learning. However, in preparing for unforeseen events – or Black Swan events as Taleb, Goldstein & Spitznagel (2009) call them – it seems plausible that an exaggerated focus on a certain sector or type of event would make the overall preparedness less capable of coping with a wider variety of events. Taleb, Goldstein & Spitznagel (2009: 1) state that it is a mistake to use hindsight as foresight because: “past events don’t bear any relation to future shocks. World War I, the attacks of September 11, 2001 – major events like those didn’t have predecessors”. Therefore, when using the past event as a template for future events, this limits the overall level of preparedness. Also, when always preparing for the “worst-case-scenarios” – the 9/11 or the recent Utøya in Norway – it could make the emergency preparedness less able to cope with more usual challenges and events.

**Power Characteristics**

The actors included in the different structures are important because it can reveal how states internalize its security environment: which actors must be included in order to cope with the new security challenge? Additionally, it is interesting to see whether the power the structures entail in the different cases is similar.

The NSC and the HSC are bodies within the executive office of the President, which is established and functions as advisory councils to the President (National Security Act 1947; Homeland Security Act 2001: sec 901-902). The power, usage and composition of the NSC has changed in accordance with changing administrations, which reflects the power that the executive power – the President – holds in the US (Krasner 1972; DeYoung 2009). Therefore, the power of the HSC and NSC depends to a large extent on the President, and the individuals which he ordains office in addition to the statutory members.
The British NSC is a *Cabinet Committee* which means that they can make collective decisions that are binding across Government (Cabinet Office 2010). The British NSC routinely meets, and is chaired by the Prime Minister (British NSC 2012d). The British NSC is a new formal structure for security thinking, and its actual position within the government has been widely discussed. However, the decision making power is subscribed to the Cabinet as a whole, and in times of major controversy and crisis. Professor Hew Strachan claims that the British NSC “might function as a War Cabinet”, and that in terms of power and decision making, it would “act in a subordinate fashion to the Cabinet” (Oral Evidence taken before the Defense Committee 2011).

**Power in Adhocracies**

In this thesis the executive bodies for security and crisis coordination has been termed “strategic security structures”. And a differentiation between organizational and institutional change has also been presented. However, the term structure could be more specified. In Norway and Denmark, the structures observed are not permanent, rather they are establish on an ad hoc basis, in the event of extraordinary events. Therefore the structures could be termed adhocracies.

The planning and daily preparedness strategies are executed by the DEMA in Denmark, while the Ministry of Justice and Emergency Preparedness has the same responsibility in Norway. As in Norway, and contrary to the US and Britain, the Danish emergency preparedness also functions in accordance with the principle of ministerial responsibility: which means that the sector which is most affected of the catastrophe or crisis, “owns” the crisis (St. meld 37 2004-2005; Brødsgaard Larsen 2008:33; Beredskabstyrelsen 2012). Therefore the nature of the crisis determines who has the overall coordinative power.

The US NSC and HSC, as well as the British NSC, are permanent structures, and the power allocated prior to the crisis, which means that the power is distributed prior to their meetings. In the Nordic cases the crisis will determine who has the overall coordinative responsibility. However, although the British NSC has a clearer formal structure than the Nordic cases – not depended on the actual crisis – Defense and Diplomatic Editor of the

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50 *The Cabinet is the supreme decision-making body in the British government:”dealing with the big issues of the day and the Government’s overall strategy. Cabinet Committees reduce the burden on the Cabinet by enabling collective decisions to be taken by a smaller group of Ministers (Cabinet Office 2010).*

51 *The British NSC is new – established in 2010 – and has yet to show its organizational traits, however, it meets regularly, power is allocated, and thus it is in the interception between an organization and an ‘adhocracy’.*
Financial Times, James Blitz claim the importance of the “individual representation” in defining the direction and power of it (Oral Evidence taken before the Defense Committee 2011). Thus in the US NSC, and HSC, as well as the British NSC, the individuals involved are pivotal for its function.

The Norwegian and Danish adhocracies are more similar to the British War Cabinets, than the British NSC and the US NSC and HSC. The differentiation between the permanent US and British structures, and the Danish and Norwegian adhocracies complicate the comparison, because they are based on different strategies: the British and American structures function in crisis as well as ‘non-crisis’ periods.

In Norway and Denmark, in order to activate the strategic security structures, respectively “complex crisis” or events which have “political implications” must occur. In Norway these events will lead to the activation of the NCC, while in Denmark such events will activate three levels of crisis preparedness.52

Composition: Actors in the Security Structures

In figure 4 below the statutory, non-statutory and additional regular attendees in the security structures are presented. Norway differs from the other countries. The United States, Britain and Denmark have representatives from both the civilian and the military services. As Stone (2002) accentuated, the boundaries of which actors that are included and excluded is the result of political considerations, and could give insights in different groups’ acceptance and legitimacy as actors in the security structures. Norway does not – contrary to the other countries – include military or intelligence personnel in the NCC.

The US NSC and the HSC are both included here, because prior to the establishment of the HSC, the NSC functioned as the main body for security concerns.53 Both the US NSC and HSC are composed of members from both the civilian and military services, as well as the intelligence services (National Security Act of 1947: 8; Brown 2008: 6).

52 The Governmental Security Committee: the Prime Minister, The Minister of Treasury, The Minister of Foreign Affairs, The Minister of Defense, The Minister of Justice. The Civil Sector Group for Security: The Secretary Generals of all the above mentioned ministries, as well as the Directors of the Intelligence Services. The Crisis Preparedness Group: Representatives from the above ministries, as well as from the Ministry of Health, The Defense Command Denmark, the Police, and the DEMA (Beredskabsstyrelsen 2012).

53 The statutory members of both the NSC and the HSC is based the National Security Act (1947) and the Homeland Security Act (2002), the other non-statutory members are based on Brown (2008), and the current Obama Administration (Hsu 2009).
The composition of actors in the British NSC is similar: it, too, has a mixture of civilian and military members (National Security Act 1947; Homeland Security Act 2002; British NSC 2012a).

**Figure 4: Actors in the Executive Security Structures Compared**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Chair</th>
<th>Statutory civilian members</th>
<th>Non statutory civilian members</th>
<th>Military services</th>
<th>Intelligence services</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>US NSC</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X*</td>
<td>X*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US HSC</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X*</td>
<td>X*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British NSC</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X*</td>
<td>X*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Danish Total Defense</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X*</td>
<td>X*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norwegian NCC</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* non-statutory members

The Danish and Norwegian security structures are different from the Anglo-American ones; as they are both adhocracies, and not permanent structures. However, in terms of composition of actors, the Danish structures are more similar to the US and British. As shown in *figure 4* above, the Danish structures also has military presence. A crisis with “political implications” in Denmark will activate three levels of crisis preparedness: the Governmental Security Committee, the Civil State Official Group, and the Crisis Preparedness Group (Beredskabsloven [1992]2000: §5). Included in the latter of these groups is the Director of the Intelligent Services and the Defense Command Denmark (Beredskabsstyrelsen 2012). Norway, and the NCC, therefore stands out with its bureaucratic NCC.

In all the cases, and during different wars, military actors have to a higher or lesser degree been included in the management of war efforts. But as the wars have ended, the military has often played second fiddle to the civilian branch. In Britain, different *War Cabinets* were established for the daily management of wars, but dissolved as the wars ended. However, the US NSC and HSC, as well as the new British NSC and Danish total defense, operates with a permanent military presence both in war- as well as peace-time. In Norway the emergency preparedness is the responsibility of the Ministry of Justice and Emergency Preparedness, the Police is responsible for internal crime and terror prevention, while the
Military is included only in times in which the Police force is unable or lacks resources, and under command of the Police (Bistandsinstruksen 2003).

In the Nordic countries, military presence is clear in Denmark, but in Norwegian security structures, the bureaucratic personnel dominate. In the Nordic countries the nature of the military services is different than that of US and Britain. The military in Norway and in Denmark is dually based on a professional and public army through conscription, while conscription has been dismantled in US and Britain (Riegert 2010). The abolishment of the compulsory military service in several countries is a relatively new phenomenon: during the Cold War and into the 1990s it existed in nearly every European country (Jehn & Selden 2002). Britain and the US have an all-volunteer military. The military presence in the US, British, as well as the Danish structure could be explained by the strategy of military-civilian unification. The focus will now shift over to the strategic security structures’ definition of security and crisis, before the attention will, in Chapter 5 shift back again to investigating the specific composition of the Norwegian NCC.

**Definition: Security and Crisis**

In figure 5 below, the new strategic security structures established after 2001 are compared. The different columns show who they aim to protect, where they protect, and what they aim to guard against.

**Protection of Who?**

As shown in figure 5, the HSC, the British NSC and the NCC is occupied with the protection of its respective population. Denmark differs. Rather than the protection of Danes; it is preoccupied with the protection of individuals defined in universal terms. The Danish Emergency Preparedness Law (Beredskabsloven [1992]2000) states that the role of the sector is to protect: the individual, property, the environment in the event of crisis and catastrophes, including war or threats thereof.

A similar tendency is found in the Norwegian White Paper released in connection with the tsunami in 2004 – the event which created the NCC. The definition of security and threat was more directed towards the individual, while earlier reports to a larger extent were preoccupied with material infrastructure. The individual affected by the crisis was the point of departure of which security was defined. However, the definition of individuals is more narrow: not the individuals in a universal sense – as in Denmark – but rather Norwegians, either in Norway or abroad, with special focus on “Norwegian travelers” (St. meld 37 [2004-
The British NSC similarly claims that the aim is to protect “our people, economy, infrastructure, territory and ways of life from major risks that can affect us directly” (British NSC 2012a italics added). The US HSC also focuses on the American people (Homeland Security Act 2002).

Additionally, in the aftermath of 2001, the Danish Prime Minister claimed that Denmark, as a committed member of the “world community” must promote the importance of the protection of values “We have to fight (...) to defend (...) our democracy and our freedom” (Fogh Rasmussen 2001: 6, italics added). Similarly, the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affair stated that: “the fight against terrorism is ultimately the struggle over values (Støre 2006a: 4), however this was presented in the foreign policy strategy for combating terrorism. Therefore, it is not only the individuals which need protection, also the democratic values and way of life. Similar argumentation is found in all the states. But while Denmark focuses on values and protection in a universal manner, the other countries’ security structures do so in relation to their own people. This does not mean that the US and Britain recognize values as unimportant, but they identify it rather as a byproduct, because by supporting these values, they are supporting their own goals and objectives (British NSC 2012; St. meld [37 2004-2005] 2005; Homeland Security Act 2002).

**Protection Where?**

Who the new internal security structures aim to guard, is closely intertwined with where they aim to operate and protect. With Denmark’s universal approach to the protection of the individual, the area of operation is not limited to a confined territory. The *Danish Emergency Preparedness Law (2000)* even states that the Minister of Defense can determine to deploy the emergency preparedness sector abroad – during peace time – in the event of catastrophes which could bring about severe injury or threat thereof of individuals, property or the environment.

The US HSC is confined to the US territory, whilst the preexisting NSC is concerned with foreign policy. The NCC and British NSC is not confined to any specific territory, but confined to the protection of its own people or interests internally or abroad (St. meld 37 [2004-2005] 2005; British NSC 2012a).

**Protection from Whom?**

In the previous part, the focus has been on how the states define security with reference to who they aim to protect, and the geography of their activities. A similar important question –
which in several states is the reason for the establishment – is who the individual, societal functions or values need to be protected from? Is there a defined adversary? As Barnett (2001:30) claims; “national security discourse is engaged in the identification of Others”. The Others are defined as a threat to the cohesion and purposes of the state.

*Figure 5: Strategic Structural Changes and the Definition of Security after 2001*

<table>
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<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>CPG (2001)</td>
<td>Individuals</td>
<td>Denmark and abroad</td>
<td>Terrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>British NSC (2010)</td>
<td>British interests and Brits</td>
<td>Britain and British interests</td>
<td>Terrorism, natural hazards, international military crisis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>HSC (2002)</td>
<td>Americans</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Terrorism,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>NCC (2005)</td>
<td>Norwegians</td>
<td>Norway and Norwegian interests</td>
<td>Natural disasters, terrorism</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The definition of someone or a group as “the Others” could justify specific strategies abroad, but also justify extraordinary procedures internally (Barnett 2001: 30). To define the assessment of threat, and define adversaries, is according to Stone (2002) and expression of power.

The Danish Prime Minister emphasized in 2001 that Denmark did not face a “direct threat”, but that “we must not be naïve”, since we “now inhibit a different world” (Nyrup Rasmussen 2001a: 3). He also state that Denmark does not “face a war between countries and continents” but rather that Denmark and the “global community” are faced with “a new, global threat which we can only fight and prevent through concerted efforts” (Nyrup Rasmussen 2001: 1). Therefore, Denmark does envisage a threat, but it is not directed towards the Danish territory, but rather toward Denmark as a member of the “global community”. This fit well with Buzan’s (1991) notion of security community. The Danish PM further defines terrorism as something that springs from: “religious, political and cultural forces” (Nyrup Rasmussen 2001b: 3).
The British response differs. The British NSC claimed that: “[t]errorism is a real threat to the UK” (British NSC 2012c). Thus the British NSC more boldly displays a direct threat, and it is termed as: “Severe, meaning that an attack in [Britain] is highly likely” (British NSC 2012c). While Denmark aims at actively fighting terrorism “in concerted efforts”, Britain seeks to “reduce the likelihood of risks affecting the UK or British interests” (British NSC 2012a). Both Denmark and the British strategy emphasize an “active fight” against terrorism through military means, but while Britain see the threat as directly directed towards Britain, Denmark perceives the threat only indirectly due to its part in the ‘global community’.

The US HSC is designed after, and the direct result of a terrorist attack. Terrorism functions as the defining principle for its existence. The Norwegian NCC was a result of both the terrorist attacks in the US, Madrid, London and Bali, but also the natural disaster in South Asia in December 2004. Therefore, the focus is not on the threat itself, but rather how the new structures could “coordinate complex crisis events”. However vaguely, the White Paper after the natural disaster in South Asia do claim that the work with the societal security must to a greater degree regard the potential threat from non-state actors, recognized as terrorism and organized crime (St.meld 17 [2001-2002]: 8).

To sum up, chapter four has shown that although new organizational bodies were established in the post 9/11 era, clear institutional change, is not evident, except in Britain were it represents “the start of strategic thinking” in a periodically manner. Otherwise the new structures are moreover a formalization of earlier informal procedures for dealing with security issues. The new element – which all the states show – is the recognition of the threats of terrorism and natural disasters. States therefore perceive their security environment as changed, and they manifest the change in new agencies. The states included here – small or big, weak or strong – seem to recognize that they must prepare for the new threats on their own. The new security environment is ‘bringing the state back in’.

But while the US, British and Danish structures include both military and civilian personnel, Norway does not. Why? The next chapter more specifically focuses on the Norwegian security structures, answering the second research question: How can the character of the Norwegian security structure best be explained?

54 “Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia currently pose the greatest risk to the UK and the UK interests” (British NSC 2012c).
Chapter 5

Preparing for Black Swans: The Establishment of Norway’s NCC

Chapter four showed that the Norwegian security structure differs from the other three countries when it comes to composition. Additionally, the NCC is – as the Danish CMG – an ad hoc reactive structure which is summoned when the “traditional” or everyday structures are unable to cope due to the magnitude or severity of a crisis, or because an overall coordination is needed. In “smaller crises”, the coordination is maintained by the Ministry which is most affected by the specific crises – the leader department “owns” the crisis (St. meld 37 [2004-2005] 2005: 30-33). It is therefore a governmental strategy for preparing for extraordinary events. These events are ‘low-probability, high-impact events’ which Taleb, Goldstein & Spitznagel (2009:1) call ‘Black Swan Events’, Rumsfeldt (2002) similarly calls them the ‘unknown unknowns’. The NCC is a means for coping with Black Swan Events.

This chapter will focus on these two peculiar elements of the NCC: the ‘low-probability, high-impact’ Black Swan Events which it is meant to address, and potential explanations of why its composition is based exclusively on civilian and bureaucratic personnel. The discussion will start with an investigation of when the NCC has, in fact, been assembled in the past. Next the chapter will present three potential explanations for why the NCC has a bureaucratic nature: first, Norway as a small state, second; Norway as a reluctant reformer, and third; Norwegian aversion to the military as a result of historical experience.

The NCC: What Sort of Black Swan?

The White Paper released after the tsunami in South Asia, claimed that all the Ministers can initiate and summon the NCC, based on a precautionary principle, and therefore that the threshold for assembling the NCC should be low (St. meld 37 [2004-2005] 2005: 31). However, how low is this threshold? Which crises are defined “complex” where in which the NCC convene?

The NCC does not have an official register or list – to my knowledge – of the crises that have resulted in a coordinated NCC response. Therefore in the following an attempt of tracing when it has been assembled is presented. According to Gjerstad & Skard (2011) the

55 In Appendix 1, attachment 1 shows the structure of the NCC.

56 Derived from Karl Popper (1957: 27) “no matter how many instances of white swans we may have observed, this does not justify the conclusion that all swans are white.”
NCC has two fixed meetings every year, and the aim is also that it should be able to assemble quickly in the event of a crisis. The observations are based on governmental reports and media sources, both from the printed press and web sources.\(^\text{57}\) The list may not be complete, but rather show when the NCC has been publicly visible.

In figure 6 below, the observations of the situations in which the NCC has been convened is summarized from its inception in 2005 until 2011. Figure 6 show that since 2005, the NCC has convened – publicly – thirteen times. Of these occasions, the majority concerns natural disasters. Of the man-made crises most of them happened abroad; only one of them happened in Norway.

\[
\text{Figure 6: NCC Crises Management Since 2005}\quad 58\]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Natural disasters</th>
<th>Human induced disasters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Legionnaires disease outbreak</td>
<td>London Bombings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Legionnaires disease outbreak</td>
<td>Lebanon Bombings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Avian influenza outbreak</td>
<td>Afghanistan: Hotel Serena: Norwegian kidnapped</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Froland forest fire</td>
<td>Afghanistan: Hotel Serena: Norwegian kidnapped</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Swine influenza outbreak</td>
<td>Tønsberg: Volcanic eruption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Iceland: Volcanic eruption</td>
<td>Tønsberg: lightning strike</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Tsunami warning</td>
<td>Hurricane Dagmar</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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The NCC has mainly responded to natural disasters. Hence, it resembles the US FEMA, or Danish DEMA, more than the US HSC, British NSC, or Danish CMG. Thus it seems as though the NCC is designed to respond to the same Black Swan Event which originally created it: the massive natural disaster in Southeast Asia. If the NCC only convened thirteen times during the first seven years of its existence, then it seems plausible to suggest that the threshold for summoning it is quite high, and that this mainly happens when faced with a

\(^{57}\) In order to find out which crisis which have led to the summoning of NCC *Retriever Research* have been utilized. “Retriever Research consists of both the digital print archives ATEKST and Mediarkivet, in addition to Retrievers own web archives (Retriever 2012).

\(^{58}\) Sources: Ministry of Justice and the Police 2005; Ministry of Justice and the Police 2007; Ministry of Justice and the Police 2008a; Ministry of Justice and the Police 2008b; Frisak 2011; Tjersland & Ertzaas 2005; Støre 2006b; Herzberg 2006; Johnson, Vikás, Johnsrud, Brandvol, Skevik, Widerøe, Johnsen, Ruud, Norman, Sævereid, Nielsen, Strand, òrtesvåg, Solberg 2009; Moe & Hafstad 2009; Valderhaug; Mauren, Barstad & Letvik 2011; Nordlys 2011; Halvorsen 2011)
major natural disaster. Of the security structures analyzed in this thesis, the NCC is the one that is most directed towards the management of natural disasters. The larger states – US and Britain – moreover focus on terrorism and man-made events, and they regard these threats to be direct. Norway and Denmark do not recognize them as direct. This may be because as small powers, they do not perceive themselves as targets the same way that the stronger states do. Small states therefore, to a larger extent prepare for natural disasters, while the larger states prepare more for man-made disaster.

The situation in which the NCC received most attention was during and after the 22, July 2011 shooting spree at Utøya. In order to see how the NCC reacted when faced with a major internal security crisis, a quick glimpse at the Utøya event is presented. However, it represents a rare incident in Norwegian crises management as it is domestic and exceptionally severe. Thus it cannot explain how the NCC reacts in all crises, but how they reacted in this crisis. The focus is on when the NCC assembled.

According to a letter from the Secretary General at the Prime Minister’s Office, the first twenty-four hours after the event, the Prime Minister and the involved Ministers had contact regularly. During the first twenty-first hours two coordinative meetings were held between the Prime Minister and the ministries involved. The first meeting between the Prime Minister, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Justice and the Police and the Defense Minister occurred on the evening the same day (Frisak 2011). Additionally, present at the meeting were the leader of the Norwegian Police Security Service (PST) as well as the Assistant Police Director, bureaucratic personnel from the Prime Ministers Office, and other involved ministries (Frisak 2011). A new meeting was held the next day July 23, 2011 with the involved ministries in the Prime Minister’s home.

So what about the NCC? The NCC was formally assembled July 23, 2011 (Frisak 2011). However, despite the formal meeting July 23 2011, all the members of the NCC had already been included in the meeting the day before and the meetings even included members from the intelligence services (PST). Therefore, when faced with the major crisis which “July 22” represented, the initial reaction was not to formally assemble the NCC, but rather to assemble all the involved actors (Prop. 1 S [2011-2012]: 11). It seems that the NCC is more a network of communication, which shows which actors should, or must be included in a crisis.

59 July 22 2011 the governmental building in Oslo was struck by a bomb, in which 8 people were killed. Later that day additionally 69 people were killed at the Utøya Island.
The NCC is “often” summoned in the aftermath of a crisis, and is often responsible for discussing and creating the political response to involved actors and to the media, as well as coordination between different ministries. Additionally, the NCC has participated in strategic “drills” in order to make the response in the event of an actual crisis more effective, in respectively 2006, 2007, 2008, which accordingly “shows that the government is prepared” (Innst. S. nr. 300 [2008-2009]; Prop. 1 S [2009-2010]: 54; Brustad 2007; Lillesund 2008; Krossli 2007). The NCC have been assembled often when events have gained massive public attention, and a coordinated and political response has been needed, as in the Froland case, Swine influenza case, London Bombings, the kidnapped Norwegian, case and the tsunami warning. Therefore media and public attention might effect when the NCC is summoned just as much as the leader ministry summoning it.

The Composition of the NCC

Internal security structures should not be regarded as given, preordained or static. They are the result of political considerations of the security environment, and also a result of the internal political struggle for resources, positions and thus power to prioritize certain interests and actors at the expense of others (Ferman 2010: 27). The composition of actors included show those that have legitimacy of participation, and those that does not (Stone 2002).

The classical element in neoclassical realism is its emphasis on power and state-society relations. Analysis of state behavior must also “examine the strength and structure of states relative to their societies” argues Rose (1998: 2). Therefore states with different structures are likely to act differently. The Norwegian NCC differs from the other cases in that it consists of civil and bureaucratic personnel only. The NCC is a response to the same security environment as the other cases. But its composition of actors is different. Why? Three explanations will be presented: the small-state explanation, the ‘Norway-as-a-reluctant-reformer’ explanation, and the historical explanation.

But, before further discussing the composition of the NCC, it should be noted that although the NCC does not have military or intelligence services present, the Governmental Security Committee (GSC), which was established in 1949, can include military and civilian members, at least the intelligence services has often participated. The GSC is responsible for discussing issues of defense- and security-political character. The composition of the

60 For example the NCC was assembled six days after the start of the Froland fire, and only as a result of the expressed need for extra resources. The Minister of Justice and the Police received criticism for the ineffective reaction (Agderposten 2008).
Committee can vary in accordance to different governments. The documents which are discussed and the reports are secret. The GSC meetings, and other governmental conferences, are not regulated by the Constitution or other laws, and the GSC cannot make formal decisions (Frisak 2010: 8). However, the fact that the GSC can have military and intelligence presence, and has included the intelligence services in the past, does not explain why the NCC does not.

The Small State Mentality
The fact that the composition of the Norwegian NCC differs from Britain and the US could be explained by a systemic explanation: Norway’s relative weakness as a small-state. Both Britain and the USA are or have been larger military powers, which could explain their mixture of military and civilian personnel in their security structures. Their ambitions abroad, as well as their experience with the use of the military could explain the military presence.

For smaller and/or weaker states, it could be evident that their history as security seekers, and reliance on alien military guarantees, might have prevented the development of experience and use of the military. In an analysis by Frankel in 1968 he writes that

The Norwegians obviously cannot really regard themselves as having ever been in full command of their destinies; (…) repeatedly caught, powerless, in a whirlpool of international power politics (Frankel 1968: 485).

However, this explanation lacks leeway due to the Danish inclusion of military representatives in their security structures. Therefore, the explanation might be more founded in a specific Norwegian perspective than a Nordic response or small state strategy as Ørvik (1972) and Mandelbaum (1988) & Riste (2005) argues. The reason for Norway’s specific composition and aversion of military inclusion might be explained by the specific Norwegian institutional framework, and its history and military experience.

A Careful and Reluctant Reformer
The NCC is a new organizational expression of the larger institutional framework which was established after the Cold War, and is defined especially by ministerial responsibility and

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61 The GSC usually consists of the following main members: the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defense, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Justice and Emergency Preparedness, and the Ministry of Finance.

62 The meetings are also secret, exemplified by the letter from the July 22 Commission to the government, which asked for access to the GSCs reports, “if they were assembled” in the Utøya event (Frisak 2011).
decentralization of power. The structural change reflects decision makers’ perception of a broadened security agenda, but it does not change the “rules of the game” and it is not an institutional change (North 1990).

The NCC is an extension of the already established institutions of emergency and crises management. Christensen & Lægreid (2007) characterize Norway as a reluctant reformer. The Norwegian internal security structure is characterized by an “extensive division of responsibility” (Lango, Lægreid & Rykkja 2011: 168). The principles of responsibility, decentralization and conformity have largely been a firm determinant in allocating responsibility for crisis management.

The fragmented Ministerial system and the principle of responsibility have led to strong opposition against a stronger centralized authority (Høydal 2007). The White Paper after the Tsunami in South-East Asia established the NCC and the Crisis Support Unit (CSU). However, the initial proposal was to establish a permanent NCC in the Prime Minister’s Office. This proposal was rejected, and the result was rather the ad hoc NCC structure (Lægreid, Lango & Rykkja 2011: 176). Despite the establishment of the NCC the constitutional and ministerial responsibility still rests within each Ministry. Therefore it seems that the principle of ministerial responsibility is strong, and the resistance of a superior crisis agency equally strong.63

It has been easier to establish new ad hoc agencies which reflect the preexisting institutions, than it has been to dismantle old ones, or to reallocate the responsibilities from one sector to another. Lægreid, Lango & Rykkja (2011: 179), and Christensen & Lægreid (2007), claim that organizational changes after the Cold War have been rather discrete. The institutional framework has thus remained unaltered. Krasner’s (1988) path dependency could explain this tendency: The already established principles for crisis coordination have remained, and changes occur within the already existing framework. The past decisions determine the future possibilities.

However, when organizational changes – even though they have not represented institutional changes – have occurred it has been after major accidents and disasters. Major disaster which affected either Norwegians or Norwegian interests directly has increased the propensity for change. Large changes did not occur in Norway after the terrorist attack on USA in 2001. Rather, the establishment of the NCC and the CSU were established in the

63 In the three main Royal decrees which have changed the security sector the principle of responsibility is prominent (Kgl. res 16. september 1994; Kgl. res. 3. november 2000; Kgl. res. 24. juni 2005).
wake of the tsunami in Southeast Asia, where in which several Norwegian tourists were directly affected. Incremental change has – as stated by North (1990: 8) – been the result from decision makers’ perception that they could do better by altering the preexisting organizations at some margin.

The reason why clear changes have been rare might be due to the fact that Norway – until recently – have been sheltered from large internal disasters (Lango, Lægreid & Rykkja 2011: 169). As Levy (1994) and Zakaria (1998:11) both claims, state leaders are bound by history, and they learn from direct experience. The experience from actual events which do not fit the established structures and traditional divisions between ministries and actors, might lead to change. Additionally events might reveal whether central actors lack competence, resources or strategies for crises management.

The Historical Explanation: History as Past Politics

Huntington (1964) termed the military branch as a problem, and “taming the military” was important to keep this sector in check. The military branch needed to be separated from the society. It is a perennial concern. Already Machiavelli ([1512] 2000: 291) was concerned with the role of the military because states should focus on the “constant readiness of war”. States – which in Machiavelli is personified in The Prince – should both in peace-time and war-time not discredit the importance of constant readiness for war, or here extended to crises.

The question is therefore whether the military and civilian sector should be clearly separated, or whether they should interact more closely. Maaø (2010: 81) states that the American military system follows Huntington’s argument: that the military is a separate entity, a professional military. The same principle could be extended to the British professional military. Denmark and Norway on the other hand, has a public army through conscription. However, while military advisors are granted entry in the strategic security structures in the US, Britain and Denmark – which may seem to contradict Huntington’s separation principle – they are not included in the Norwegian NCC.

Both the Norwegian and the Danish Constitution claim that the every citizen is “obliged” to protect its country by serving in the military (Den Norske Grunnlov 1814: § 109; Danmarks Riges Grundlov 1953: §81). Conscription has been seen as a nation building instrument. The defined people shall share the burdens of the protection of the society they are a part of from external adversaries (Maaø 2010: 85). Therefore, while the US Constitution focus on individual liberty, the European constitutions point to the benefits that citizens can
expect from the state, and also what they in return are required to do for the state (The US Constitution 1787; Jehn & Selden 2002).

Norway and Denmark are both small countries, they both conscription. But Denmark does include the military services in the security structures, while Norway does not. Therefore, rather than a ‘small-state’ or a ‘Nordic explanation’, a specific ‘Norwegian explanation’ seems evident. Heieraas (2010: 92-93) claim that specific historical examples of controversial use of the military in internal peace-time situations have led to an ingrained distrust in the military sector. Especially, the ‘Menstad event’ in 1931, but also the ‘Ådalen event’ in 1931, and the ‘Alta event’ in 1979, have created distrust in the military. These are examples of the use or potential use of the military services for internal purposes – against its own people – which may have created a culture of skepticism towards the military.

According to Haslum (2010) a differentiation between the use of civilian and military capabilities for internal use do not exists in Denmark. Additionally, cooperation between the police and the military does not have to be accepted at a political level (Beredskabsloven [1992]2000). Denmark, Haslum (2010) continues, has no historical experience similar to the “Menstad Event”, or the Swedish “Ådalen Event”. Both Norway and Sweden restricts the use of the military for internal purposes, while the same restrictions are not as strict in Denmark. The historical argument is based on experience-based knowledge of how the military force could have or have been utilized in certain historical events, and especially negative experience with granting the military power. The institutions are bound by history.

These historical examples portray the discussion of the operational and tactical use of the military for internal purposes. Less attention has been granted the inclusion of military

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64 The event in Ådalen is an example from Sweden, but it received massive public attention and condemnation in Norway. In Ådalen the military force opened fire towards workers on strike, and the event resulted, among other things, in the decision that the military force were not allowed to use force against “its own” people (Heieraas 2010: 92-93). In Norway the “Menstad Event” is comparable to the “Swedish Ådalen”. Workers on strike were provoked and claimed strike-breaking when the chief executives of Norwegian Hydro and Union & CO inserted workers on contract protected by the police and military forces. Although the military did not actively use force against the worker, it still represented a possibility, which caused public condemnation. Defense Minister Vidkun Quisling sent guards and four naval vessels to secure order. In the “Alta event” in 1979: the civilian-military relationship was again placed on the political agenda. The Sami people and environmentalists’ demonstration against the Storting’s decision to build out the Alta-Kautokeino water system for the production of electricity, became a political headache. More than the portrayal of violence against its own people, the “Alta event” is significant because it fronted the discussion of the constitutional foundation for the use of military force towards the Norwegian people (Heieraas 2010).

65 According to Heieraas (2010) two principles was established after the Alta event in 1979: in war-time efforts the Defense force has the main responsibility for the execution of power; and in peace-time the Police Force has this responsibility.

66 The strategic levels coordinate and collect information and manage the overall strategy, while the operative levels refer to the actual resources which are used in the crisis management (Brygard 2006).
advisors in strategic security structures in Norway. As Knutsen (2010) claims the role and capability of the military sector has been downplayed due to the scholarly focus on peace rather than war and military capabilities. This could also explain why military personnel are not included as advisors or as members of strategic security structures.

The historical explanation of keeping the military ‘at arm’s length’ due to past historical experience must be connected to politics. History is selection. It is not necessarily what happened or the objective truth. History creates standards for inclusion and exclusion, and these are politically constructed (Stone 2002). Scott (1989:681) state that: “What we now as history is, the fruit of past politics; today’s contests are about how history will be constituted for the present”. History is past politics.

Traditionally, in liberal states to maintain a large standing army has been discredited, but somehow legitimised by its role in protecting the territory (Bjørnstad 2011). However, the military must be controlled and tamed. Kjeldstadli (1999: 68) claim that class struggle have been used as a historical instrument to create and develop the national identity in Norway. Kjeldstadli (1999: 70) further claim that two major movements have occurred in the Norwegian modern history; ‘the peasant movement’, and the ‘class struggle movement. Therefore, to keep the military ‘at arm’s length’ might have underpinned the class struggle movement and thus created a sound argument against capitalist’s control of power. The historical “Menstad event” is only important because it is defined and repeated as important, and used for politically purposes. In the ‘Menstad event’ actual military force was not used against the workers on strike, but it rather represented the potential use of force against its own inhabitants (Heieraas 2010). As a political argument it has gained leverage in retrospect and in comparison to how the military can be used internally.

**To sum up**, the Black Swan is natural. Or rather the Black Swan Events which the NCC is created to prepare for, and has predominately dealt with, are natural disasters. The fact that the NCC is largely directed towards these types of events, might explain why it does not include military personnel. The disasters which it prepares for are not of a military character. However, it is still interesting to explore why it does not include military personnel, and three explanation was therefore briefly presented; Norway as a small state, Norway as a reluctant reformer, and a historical explanation internal military experience.
Part III

Conclusion

Through a neoclassical realist framework this thesis has investigated how states have changed their domestic security structure in response to changes in the international system. The analysis started with the focus on how the international events in 1945, 1991 and 2001 affected states’ internal security strategies and structures. This represented the first step in the neoclassical two-step approach, and it showed that changes in the international system lead to internal discussion of their security strategies and structures, or actual change.

Next the attention shifted towards a comparison of the structures which were established after 2001. Hence, what the actual domestic response was. The comparison revealed that the Norwegian structure differs – in terms of composition and its ad hoc structure – from the others. The comparison also showed that all the structures are new organizational bodies, but they do not necessarily represent a new institutional framework, expect in the case of Britain. Thus, they do not as North (1990) puts it: change ‘the rule of the game’; they are not a new way of thinking security. Rather they are a formalization of already existing informal procedures. International pressures manifest itself in domestic security structure within the pre-existing institutional framework, which explains why state responses to the same security environment differ.

The last chapter of the analysis, focused on what crises the NCC is preparing for, as well as presenting three explanations of the composition of the Norwegian NCC.

In the following, and final chapter, the two research questions will be presented, and the findings summed up. The chapter will also present theoretical considerations, as well as some suggestions for future research.
Chapter 6: Conclusion

Research Question I
What has determined the new strategic security structures of states after the Cold War?

First, security in the post-WWII world, and during the Cold War, was intertwined in the US-Soviet antagonism. The bipolar structure of the international system and the existence of a clear adversary determined how states were thinking security. The smaller states sought security guarantees from the great powers, while the great powers perceived security as the level of influence they could wield abroad. As Betts (1995) claimed, the military dimension was the “sacred cow”.

In the wake of the Cold War, the international system changed from a bipolar system to a potential uni- or multipolar one. The United States were the dominating power, while several smaller powers also experienced growth in wealth. The security environment was not directed or structured – as it was during the Cold War – against a clear threat. States thus redefined their security strategies, and also the existence of collective security alliances was redefined. Smaller states moreover had to take more responsibility for their own security, as their strategic importance as part of a bloc disappeared. In this period states had a more internal security focus, strictly because there was no unified and clear external threat. The US established FEMA, and Denmark established DEMA.

In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on USA 11 September, 2001 the perception of a clear threat became evident. Although a threat was identified, the specific characteristics of the threatening actor were unclear, invisible and unpredictable. States now faced a fragmented security environment. The result was that all the countries established new security structures. Structural changes were therefore the means in order to make the security environment safer. The fragmented security environment created a situation in which all the states moreover had to prepare for their own. While the collective security alliances – NATO – still is regarded as important in threats of war or war engagement abroad, the new security issues demanded that every state prepared on their own. The new security environment in many ways brought the state back in, if the state has ever really been “out”.

Therefore, the international security environment generally, and the identification of a clear adversary specifically, are systemic pressures which determine internal security structures.
However, systemic pressures do not easily alter already existing institutions at the
domestic level. Rather, systemic pressures lead to discussions of change. The changes that do
occur are moreover adjusted to the preexisting institutional scheme. While organizational
expressions change, the institutional framework which defines “the rules of the game” is a
product of history, norms and culture, and is not easily altered. What more generally leads to
change is continuous debate over a long period. And, if this continuous debate is accompanied
by a major shock – either internal or external – the result might be a fast(er)-track to reform.

Black Swans lead to change. Decision makers seem to learn from history, and
especially of dramatic and unforeseen disasters. If a crisis directly leads to major devastation
and human loss internally or towards its own inhabitants abroad, then the likelihood of
structural change elevates. States are constantly preparing for the last crisis. This is in line
with neoclassical realism: states respond to the uncertainties in the international anarchy
(Rose 1998). They thus react instead of act. State leaders are bound by history. Or they are –
as Taleb, Goldstein & Spitznagel (2009: 1) – put it ‘fooled by history’.

All the cases have an increased focus on terrorism after 9/11. But while the US and
Britain regards the threat direct, Norway, and especially Denmark perceive it as indirect. The
new structures all have a broader definition of security then the Cold War territorial and
military definition. The observations could support Buzan’s (1997) proposition that states are
rethinking security. And it is noteworthy that the smaller states do not perceive terrorism as a
direct threat. Norway prepares more in terms of natural disasters, while larger states focus
more on man-made disaster. The security environment for smaller and larger states is
therefore perceived differently.

Britain has an overall military and ad-hoc approach to security issues. Until recently
they have not had any tradition for establishing grand strategies or for “thinking security”. The
US also has a stark military dimension imbedded in their security strategy. This could
reflect how stronger states think security. Therefore, it is more striking that Denmark also
seems to think security in military terms. And with military activism at the core of their
foreign policy, it seems to echo an American strategy. Norway, on the other hand, differs. The
military is not included in the same way as in the three other countries.

So how are states thinking security? Buzan’s (1997) rethinking of security could rather
be that several actors are included and are expected to “think security” because of the
fragmented security environment. Additionally, the definition of security is not clearly
changed, rather it is broadened. It seems easier to add new organizational expressions which
fit into the preexisting institutional scheme, rather than to change the institutional scheme and dismantle older structures.

The rethinking of security, or rather the more broadened security thinking within states nevertheless represents an increased focus on security. For Norway and Denmark which have been occupied with security through its security alliances and commitment abroad, this have represented a reordering of resources. The new security environment has led to a more state-centric focus, rather than the collective security focus forwarded by Buzan (1997). The new security threats cannot be prepared for through collective alliances, rather each state has to prepare for threats themselves. In political realist sense; states must rely on self-help to protect themselves in an insecure environment (Hobbes [1651]2000: 369; Waltz 1979: 91,126). As Mandelbaum claim (1988) the universal problem with insecurity and security scarceness must be dealt with by states on their own, through different strategies of self-help. To be prepared for the new security threats has become high politics. Despite increased interdependence in state relations the perceived proliferation of new security challenges and actors imply that: “the state is still fundamentally self-serving” (Barnett 2001: 29).

So, what has determined the domestic security structures in the post-Cold War world? Changes in the international security environment have lead to domestic change. However, preexisting internal institutions have determined how states have responded, and can explain the specific characteristics of their response. The new security structure in the post-Cold War world is also determined by the severity of the last occurring Black Swan Event.

Research Question II

*How can the character of the Norwegian security structure best be explained?*

The NCC has been assembled on average, to coordinate two crises a year since 2005 and it has predominantly been summoned to cope with natural disasters. Thus, the Black Swan Event which initially created it – the tsunami in Southeast Asia, has also defined its existence.

The tsunami in Southeast Asia has therefore determined the characteristics of the Norwegian NCC. It was established to cope with these events. Thus, it seems that the terrorist events of 2001 did not really affect Norway as much as it did in the other countries; rather a natural disaster was the actuating cause of the establishment. Although terrorism is presented as a threat, it is more an indirect threat. Norway is a small state, and the small-state status could explain why terrorism is not recognized as a direct threat. However, Denmark is also a small state, and while they do not regard terrorism direct, they still recognize or perceive their activism in the war against terror important as a member of the ‘global community’. Also, the
US, Britain and Denmark are moreover preparing for the clashes of different cultures, through its terrorism emphasis. Norway differs. The Black Swan Events that Norway prepares for are natural disaster, while the three other countries moreover prepare for man-made Black Swans. Therefore the lack of the military services in the NCC could in fact be because they are preparing for natural disasters, and not terrorism, as the other countries do. Norway does not prepare for events which would necessitate the use of the military in the same way that the three other countries do.

In response to the same security environment, Norway differs. Both in terms of the natural disasters it prepares for, and in terms of the composition within the established NCC. The NCC reflects state leaders’ perception of a changed security environment, which is manifested within the already established institutional framework. The principles for the management of security issues have not changed since the end of the Cold War – the principle of ministerial responsibility and decentralization of authority defines the institutional framework. Neither the tsunami nor the terrorist attacks changed this.

There are several reasons why Norway differs. Norway is often described as a reluctant reformer. It seems that Norway is especially path dependent and has been immune to revolutionary changes within its security structures. The institutional framework which was established after the Cold War – especially the principle of ministerial responsibility – has hindered change.

Norway is a small state, and its lack of experience as a military power and international actor could explain why the NCC does not include the military or intelligence services. Also the experience is has with the use of military for internal purposes has created skepticism. The historical experience from especially Menstad, but also Ådalen, and the Alta event might have created a culture for military distrust. However, history is not told on its own, it is not objective. Rather these historical experiences have been told and used for political purposes: history is past politics.

When focusing on the preparedness for Black Swan Events, it should be noted that being prepared for all types of crises is impossible. Domestic security structures cannot have clear and well-defined standard operating procedures, because the situations they are preparing for are not “standard”. However, in times of crisis, it is necessary to have a clear chain of command, or network of communication in order to minimize the risk of “ sluggishly or inappropriately” management of events (Allison & Halperin 1972: 56). Therefore, does the inclusion of the military services, as well as the intelligence services lead to more effective coordination? Or does the inclusion of more actors hinder the effective conduct of security
and crisis management? Since military personnel is excluded, in the event of terror it seems that the conflict between the Ministry of Justice and Emergency Preparedness and the Ministry of Defense about who “owns the crisis” is fought on a lower and operational level. The potential inclusion of military personnel in strategic security structures might reduce the lower level “war about terror”, and thus rather replace it with the “war against terror” (Egeland 2004: 30)

Lægreid, Lango & Rykkja (2011:181) claim that: “if responsibility is not placed, the result is often damaging blame games” after major events. Different departments have different procedures and are accordingly not similarly prepared for disasters. In the aftermath of a crisis ‘playing the blame game’ could be particularly cruel. Accordingly, again, Lægreid, Lango & Rykkja (2011:182) claim that “politicians have a tendency to avoid blame, while administrative leaders leave office”. Therefore, due to lack of pre-established lines of responsibility, the default learning could be reduced to pointing the finger, and placing the blame, rather than changing “the rules of the game” (North 1990).

To sum up, the crises which the NCC prepares for are basically natural disaster. The ad hoc structure of the NCC is an expression of organizational change as a response to international Black Swan events, but these changes have not changed the institutional framework. The composition of the NCC is explained by how political groups and fractions present and use history for political purposes.

Neoclassical realism offers a framework which could produce thicker explanations of both systemic pressures and internal determinant. However, the framework is broad, and maybe too broad. Classical realists claim that characteristics within the human nature could explain state behavior, while structural realists focus on the structure of the international system and the distribution of power capabilities, as the most important factors. But what explanatory variables does a neoclassical realist emphasize? There is no clear answer. Neoclassical realism does not subscribe any factor or variable more important than other, rather the collection of neoclassical realist studies claim to “bring power back in” and applies different internal variables for explaining state variation. The focus is both on systemic pressures and internal determinants, without specifying the relationship. Waltz’ (1990) claimed that theory should simplify the political reality. Neoclassical realism organizes and structures the analysis, but it does not simplify it, rather the approach reflects the perception of a political reality that cannot be simplified, rather it must be organized. It claims that explanations of state behavior cannot exclude either the systemic pressures, or the internal determinants: it
thus reflects a distance from Waltz’ reductionist argument. Therefore, rather than a theory, neoclassical realism could represent a framework of levels of analysis. It thus resembles Waltz’ (1959) levels of analysis or Allison’s (1969) threefold approach to the study of foreign policy. In order to use the neoclassical realist approach to explain state behavior, one should bear in mind that it does not offer a theoretical explanation of observations, rather it structures the explanations. To be able to explain relationships between variables, the neoclassical realist framework must be supplemented by other theories.

The aim of this thesis has not been to present generalizeable conclusions as to what defines all new security structures, or what type of security definition is the ‘correct twenty-first century definition’. Rather it has shown that state leaders’ perception of security affects how states respond, and that their established institutional framework refrain rapid change. Therefore to present generalizable statements is difficult; rather the internal institutional framework should be analyzed in order to understand state variation in response to the same systemic pressures.

Problems with available and released documents plague security studies. Most documents on security policy are secret. The findings are based on those documents which are not regarded sensitive, and therefore released. It is thus important to be aware the limitations due to the lack of available resources. The problems have mainly been the lack of available and released documents after the end of the Cold War, and more so in Denmark than in the other countries.

Further Research
It would be interesting to study whether the new structures, and the internal focus on security preparedness and crisis prevention also has led to a greater willingness to the use of force, or acceptance for the use of force? Externally this might be evident in the “War Against Terror”, but whether a higher level of internal acceptance of violence has developed is unclear.

Additionally, it would be interesting to test the hypothesis that shocks leads to change, and especially when it involves direct human loss or material degradation directly. The NCC was created in the aftermath of the tsunami in South East Asia, where in which several Norwegian tourists was affected. It would therefore be interesting to see what changes that will occur after the July 22 Commission presents its report. As Lango, Lægreid and Rykkja (2011: 184) claimed earlier: “any changes within the field will take time, or may possibly require the effects of a major and path-breaking disaster hitting Norway more directly”.

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Appendix 1

Attachment 1: Structure of the NCC

(Source: Knudsen 2008)