Urban services and governance

The case of solid waste management in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

Thesis for the degree of Philosophiae Doctor

Trondheim, April 2013

Norwegian University of Science and Technology
Faculty of Social Sciences and Technology Management
Department of Geography

Camilla Louise Bjerkli
NTNU
Norwegian University of Science and Technology

Thesis for the degree of Philosophiae Doctor

Faculty of Social Sciences and Technology Management
Department of Geography

© Camilla Louise Bjerkli

ISSN 1503-8181

Doctoral theses at NTNU, 2013:127

Printed by NTNU-trykk
SUMMARY
This thesis explores the management of solid waste in Addis Ababa, with the objective of understanding the underlying reasons for the poor solid waste management situation that the city is faced with today. Accordingly, governance and urban political ecology are used as a theoretical framework. Governance was chosen because currently it dominates the development discourse and governance policies are implemented by governments aiming to improve urban services, whereas urban political ecology is used to explore how governance processes operate within solid waste management in the city. In order to understand the reasons for the decisions and actions that have taken place within solid waste management and to understand better the present-day situation, I focus on exploring actors’ subjective views, the nature of the power relationships between them, and politics at various scales.

An ethnographic approach is used to explore the subjective perspectives of the actors involved in solid waste management in Addis Ababa. The main method used was semi-structured interviews, which were designed to collect the subjective views of the participants involved and identify conflicting interests. In addition, personal observations and document and newspaper reviews were used. The methods were used to compare the subjective views and official norms with my observations made in the field. The analysis of data started in the field, using constant comparative method, whereby all interviews were compared within a group of actors and between groups of actors and then related to the research context. This was considered a logical way to make sense of and order the information in order to confirm or dispute it, and was also one of the techniques used to ensure the reliability of the data collected.

The main findings of the study are described in the five articles that are attached to this thesis. All of the articles address the formal rules, regulations, and policies officially adopted to improve solid waste management in Addis Ababa. The official rules and regulations are compared with the findings of a detailed study of how they are adopted and implemented, by focusing on the various actors’ subjective views and agendas and how these are acted upon based on the distribution of power between them. The articles address different aspects of solid waste management, including attempts to enter into partnership with the private sector (Articles 1 and 2), attempts to plan a new solid waste management system (Article 3), the relationship between the city administration and the informal recycling sector (Article 3), international organizations’ involvement in improving solid waste in the city (Article 4) and how dominant discourses such as neoliberalism and good governance have affected solid waste management in different African cities (Article 5). The articles show how power and
politics affect the way that solid waste is managed in Addis Ababa, and I argue that the promise of good governance has not resulted in the official goals being attained, but rather a rhetorical use of policies and reforms. The Ethiopian Government has adapted good governance policies to suit its own interests and agendas, and this has not led to improved governance and a more efficient management of solid waste in the city. This thesis contributes to an understanding of the underlying reasons for the poor solid waste management in Addis Ababa today, and the identification of aspects and strategies that should be in place in order to improve solid waste management and to achieve more equitable development among the various actors involved. I conclude by arguing for a more critical approach in studies of urban services, where the focus should be on both the politics and power relationships among involved actors and on the politics of scales.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The work connected with this doctoral thesis was challenging and many people provided help, guidance, and support. Hence, I have many people to thank for making the process easier for me. First and foremost, I am deeply grateful to my supervisor Associate Professor Axel Baudouin for the tremendous support he gave me throughout the preparation of this thesis. I thank him for all the time he spent discussing the various theoretical and empirical questions and challenges that arose. His inspiring discussions and comments enabled me to develop a more critical and deeper understanding of the research topic. He is the main person to be thanked for always believing in me, and this mattered at times when I doubted myself and my work; he encouraged me and enabled me to find the energy to continue.

Special thanks are due to my interpreter and friend, without whom I would not have been able to carry out my fieldwork. I am deeply grateful for his assistance and time spent on our many interesting discussions, which have given me a deeper understanding of the various topics in focus. He patiently tried to answer all of my questions, and helped me to have a better understanding of the Ethiopian culture, for which I am deeply grateful. I am also thankful for all the creative recommendations he made at times when the research process seemed to have ground to a halt and for encouraging me to find new ways to navigate the obstacles I faced.

I am deeply grateful to my friend, who has been involved in pre-collection of solid waste for many years, and was willing to share his thoughts and experience with me. Our many interesting discussions over the years have provided me with a deeper understanding of the topics discussed in this thesis. In addition, I extend my thanks and appreciation to Yared Getaneh for ensuring that I had access to information, documents, and reports that otherwise would have been difficult to access. I thank him also for discussing the topics with me. Last, but not least, I am grateful to all of the participants in the study, who graciously shared their views, thoughts, and experiences, and used their valuable time to discuss the topics with me.

Thanks are due to the GDRI (Groupement de Recherche Internationale) for providing economic support that enabled me to participate in the workshops on ‘Governing cities in Africa’, which were interesting and educational experiences. Special thanks are due to the co-authors of the book chapter that came out of these workshops, namely Jeremy Grest, Hélène Quéné-Suarez, and Axel Baudouin. I experienced our collaboration as both inspiring and informative. As the thesis includes five articles, some of which have been published (Article 1 is published in Africa Studies Quarterly and Article 2 is published in the Journal of Urban
and Regional Research), I wish to thank the anonymous reviewers for their constructive comments that helped to improve the articles.

I received a great moral support from my colleagues. Accordingly, I thank Associate Professor Winfried Ellingsen for constructive comments during my final seminar, which helped me during the last phase of the writing process. Special thanks are due to the Globalization Research Programme at NTNU, for providing financial support that enabled me to conduct fieldwork over a longer period time than first thought possible. I am also grateful to Dr Yirgalem Mahiteme and Dr Degefa Tolossa at Addis Ababa University for providing both support and materials during the fieldwork sessions. I am deeply grateful for the support and encouragement I received from Professor Ragnhild Lund at various stages of my research. Also, I am grateful to Professor Haakon Lein for providing useful suggestions and recommendation on relevant literature. I thank Catriona Turner for reading through the thesis and my articles and improving the language and readability, for which I am deeply grateful. Not least, I appreciate Berit Nilsen for all our coffee breaks, which made the days spent in the office much more pleasant. In addition, I thank Berit for listening when I needed to air some of my thoughts and for giving me constructive and useful comments. Any errors that remain in the thesis are my responsibility alone.

Lastly, I offer my thanks and appreciation to my family for believing in me and for their moral support throughout. Especially, I thank my sister for visiting me in Addis Ababa during my time in the field and providing encouragement.

Camilla Louise Bjerkli, Trondheim, 9. October 2012
## CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SUMMARY</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONTENTS</td>
<td>vii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS</td>
<td>xi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PART ONE: INTRODUCTION</strong></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1 APPROACHES TO SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT IN AFRICA</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2 PREVIOUS STUDIES AND CURRENT DEBATES WITHIN SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2.1 RECOGNIZING THE INFORMAL RECYCLING SECTOR AS A POTENTIAL PARTNER</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2.2 PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS (PPPs) IN SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2.3 REFUSE AND THE PROMISE OF GOOD GOVERNANCE</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3 STUDIES OF SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT IN ETHIOPIA</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND QUESTIONS</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.5 CHOOSING FIELD SITES AND DELINEATING THE STUDY</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PART TWO: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK</strong></td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1 GOVERNANCE AND THE PROMISE OF DEVELOPMENT</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2 POSITIONING URBAN POLITICAL ECOLOGY IN THE FIELD</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2.1 URBAN POLITICAL ECOLOGY AND URBAN METABOLISM</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2.2 POLITICS AND POWER IN URBAN MANAGEMENT</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2.3 SEEING INFORMALITY AS TECHNOLOGIES OF POWER</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2.4 THE ‘POLITICS OF SCALES’</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3 A THEORETICAL COCKTAIL</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4 SOME THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND CHOICES</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PART THREE: BACKGROUND TO THE RESEARCH CONTEXT</strong></td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1 THE ESTABLISHMENT AND DEVELOPMENT OF ADDIS ABABA</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2 THE ORGANIZATION OF ADDIS ABABA CITY ADMINISTRATION</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3 THE SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT SITUATION IN ADDIS ABABA</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3.1 WASTE GENERATION AND COMPOSITION</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3.2 THE ORGANIZATION OF SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT, 1994–2011</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3.3 SOLID WASTE SERVICES PROVIDED TO HOUSEHOLDS, 1994–2011</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3.4 STORAGE AND TRANSPORTATION OF SOLID WASTE</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3.5 THE REPI DUMP SITE</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3.6 REGULATIONS GOVERNING SOLID WASTE</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4 THE INFORMAL RECYCLING SECTOR IN ADDIS ABABA</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4.1 MÄNN ALLEH/ALLESH TĀRA</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ARTICLE 4: Bjerkli, C.L. (not published). Questioning the contribution of international organizations to urban services: The case of solid waste management in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.


APPENDIXES

LIST OF TABLES

TABLE 1: Example of open coding of one interview and new questions that arose. ................... 86

LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURE 1: Location of Addis Ababa, Addis Ketema Sub-City, and the studied kebeles. ............ 14
FIGURE 2: Analytical framework for studying solid waste management. ................................. 34
FIGURE 3: The solid waste system in Addis Ababa. ................................................................. 36
FIGURE 4: Overview of the selected locales and the actors that interfere in them. ................. 37
FIGURE 5: The physical growth of Addis Ababa from 1886 to 2003. ...................................... 40
FIGURE 6: View of the city towards Churchill Road and Mexico and a low-income neighbourhood in Addis Ababa................................................................. 41
FIGURE 7: Solid waste disposed in rivers running though the city. ......................................... 42
FIGURE 8: Organization of the various departments within AACA ........................................ 44
FIGURE 9: Waste thrown in the street and in the river in Addis Ababa. ................................. 46
FIGURE 10: Used toilet, tiles and doors for sale. ................................................................. 48
FIGURE 11: Organization of solid waste management within the Health Bureau of AACA ...... 49
FIGURE 12: Organization of solid waste management within the SBPDA of AACA ............... 51
FIGURE 13: Boards outside the Solid Waste Management Agency showing the vision, mission, and ethical principles of the agency. ......................................................... 53
FIGURE 14: Pre-collectors at work....................................................................................... 54
FIGURE 15: Pre-collector collecting waste and transfer the waste into municipal containers. ... 55
FIGURE 16: Containers located on main roads in Addis Ababa. ........................................... 56
FIGURE 17: New trucks bought by the city administration in 2010 and trucks transporting containers back from Repi................................................................. 56
FIGURE 18: Location of the dump site Repi. ................................................................. 57
FIGURE 19: Aerial photo of Repi....................................................................................... 58
FIGURE 20: Scavengers working at Repi........................................................................... 58
FIGURE 21: The organization of the informal recycling system and all involved actors......... 61
FIGURE 22: Scavengers for items at Repi and sorted plastic bags stored for sale. ......................... 63
FIGURE 23: Forager searching the riverbed and container for valuable items............................ 63
FIGURE 24: Qorqoro alleh at work.......................................................................................... 64
FIGURE 25: Wholesaler specializing in old shoes and in plastics.............................................. 65
FIGURE 26: Electrical stoves and kitchen items made of recycled metal. ............................... 66
FIGURE 27: Korkoro tära – an area in Männ alleh/allesh tära specializing in plastic waste....... 67
FIGURE 28: Pictures showing the main road through Männ alleh/allesh tära............................ 68
FIGURE 29: Location of the different tära for waste materials in Männ alleh/allesh tära . ....... 69
FIGURE 30: Pictures showing sandals and ropes made of old tyres, repair of old luggage and old bikes. ................................................................................................................................... 70
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AACA</td>
<td>Addis Ababa City Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAEPA</td>
<td>Addis Ababa Environmental Protection Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFD</td>
<td>Agence Française de Développement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BPR</td>
<td>Business process re-engineering</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBO</td>
<td>Community-based organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCM</td>
<td>Constant comparative method</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPA</td>
<td>Environmental Protection Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPRDF</td>
<td>Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISWM</td>
<td>Integrated solid waste management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoFED</td>
<td>Ministry of Finance and Economic Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSSE</td>
<td>Micro- and small-scale enterprise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>Public-private partnership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAP</td>
<td>Structural adjustment program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SBPDA</td>
<td>Sanitation, Beautification and Park Development Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDPRP</td>
<td>Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNEP</td>
<td>United Nations Environment Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPE</td>
<td>Urban political ecology</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PART ONE: INTRODUCTION

In Addis Ababa solid waste management during the last 10 years has undergone several reforms and organizational changes in line with neoliberal and good governance policies, with the aim of improving the urban services provided in the city. Today, the service provided has not changed for the better. This study aims to explore and give a critical view of solid waste management in Addis Ababa in the period 2004 to 2011, to understand better the reasons for the weaknesses in the services provided. The study is framed within governance and urban political ecology perspectives and my aim has been to provide a detailed study of the various formal and informal actors’ involved in solid waste in Addis Ababa, as well as their agendas and actions within the city. In particular, I focus on the interactions between actors, seen in light of the distribution of power. This is done in order to analyse how the governance process operates in the local context and hence to understand better the solid waste situation confronting the city administration today.

This thesis comprises an overview and a collection of five articles that can be read independently. The articles deal with the empirical findings of the study and are mostly empirical in nature. The overview therefore serves as the main theoretical framework for the study, whereas the articles can be seen as the empirical findings. Accordingly, the thesis is organized into two main sections: the overview and the articles. Readers are recommended to start by reading the overview, then read the articles, and thereafter return to the final section in the overview, which gives a synthesis of the articles and presents the conclusion of the thesis. Since the articles have been written to be read independently, there are some unavoidable repetitions in the articles and the overview due to the need to provide readers with contextual background information and to ensure continuity between the parts of the thesis.

The overview is organized in five sections: an introduction (i.e. this introduction); presentation of the theoretical framework; a description of the research context; description of the methodology; and a synthesis of the five articles. I start the introduction (Part One) by describing the main approaches to the management of solid waste in Africa. I include a discussion of the various debates in the field, before positioning the study and presenting the objectives and research questions. The aim of the theoretical framework section (Part Two) is to discuss the main concept and theory used in the study, namely governance and urban political ecology. I also clarify my understanding of governance and urban political ecology, and present an analytical framework for how they are combined and used in the study, simultaneously relating them to solid waste management in urban areas in Africa. I regard the
research context as important for gaining a broader understanding of the findings in the study and therefore a description of the research context is included. Part Three focuses on a description of the organization of city administration in Addis Ababa as well as the official policies and reforms, and a detailed description of the formal and informal solid waste management systems in the city. Part Four, the methodology section, describes how the research was conducted, including the process of collecting and interpreting the data. Finally, in Part Five, I present a synthesis of the five articles included in the research. I briefly describe the articles and explain how they are interrelated. Thereafter, I discuss the main findings of the research in relation to the theoretical framework. I conclude by referring to the minimum conditions that I consider have to be in place in order for the management of solid waste in Addis Ababa to be improved.

1.1 APPROACHES TO SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT IN AFRICA

African cities are faced with increased generation of solid waste and solid waste has become one of the most serious challenges facing urban governments (Hoornweg & Bhada-Tata, 2012; UN-Habitat, 2010a, 2010b; World Bank, 2004; Kpundeh & Khadiagala, 2008). The situation is characterized by a low collection rate and poor disposal of solid waste, resulting in large amounts of waste accumulating in urban environments, thrown away either in rivers or in open spaces. Such insufficient handling of solid waste is polluting the urban environments and making the cities unhealthy places for the citizens. Today, the generation of waste per capita is low compared to cities in other parts of the world. However, with the urbanization processes taking place, improvement in living conditions and the adoption of modern lifestyles, problems related to solid waste management are becoming more serious and will increase in the years to come (Hoornweg & Bhada-Tata, 2012).

The approaches to dealing with solid waste have changed the last 50 years (i.e. since the early 1960s). In the 1970s and 1980s the main responsibility for providing solid waste services rested upon local governments. The most common approach was a technical ‘end of pipe’ approach, including collection, transportation, and disposal of solid waste. With the growth of cities, the amount of waste generated also increased and solid waste was increasingly becoming a problem related to citizens’ health and pollution of urban environments. This situation was worsened by the lack of proper urban planning, resulting in the prevalence of slum areas that made access to many of the neighbourhoods difficult, and in turn leaving large parts of the cities without access to solid waste services. The poor solid
waste services were also due to lack of resources, the lack of ability to pay for such services, and low awareness among the citizens.

During the 1980s it was acknowledged that most local governments were not able to provide sufficient solid waste services, due to lack of resources, lack of institutional capacity, and inefficiency in terms of bureaucracy (Myers, 2005; Post, 2004). There was increased awareness of the poor urban services and the state was seen as the main obstacle to improving the services provided. Neoliberalism was established as the dominant political and ideological approach to development and improvements to urban services. The main aim of the neoliberal ideology was to privatize public services, according to the belief at the time that the private sector and the free market were the most cost-efficient ways to provide urban services. The implementation of neoliberal policies and reforms led to significant reorganizations of the state institutions and their responsibility, where the emphasis was on the market and the retreat of the national state in line with neoliberal ideas. Within solid waste management, the neoliberal policies and structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) led to the involvement of private actors in the provision of urban services in many cities (Batley, 1996; Baud, Grafakos, & Post, 2005; Myers, 2005; Post, 2004). However, the results of the policies and programmes were disappointing. In many cases, they resulted in growth in the informal economy and increased inequality between urban citizens in terms of services provided, excluding those unable to pay for solid waste services. Thus, neoliberal policies had reshaped and restructured institutional infrastructure, norms, and regulations, but had failed to produce a coherent basis for development and growth. It was argued that the neoliberal ideology rested upon a utopian vision of a perfect market and a society rooted in an idealized conception of competitive individualism. In most cases, there was a big gap between the ideology of neoliberalism and everyday practice (Grindle, 2007).

As a response to the unwanted results of SAPs, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) introduced governance as a new concept in the development discourse. If states were no longer able to provide adequate urban services, they were to be held responsible for promoting good solutions in partnership with non-state actors, in order to improve the provision of urban services. This led to a focus on the involvement of new actors within solid waste management, and recognition of the possibility of using urban services such as solid waste management to create jobs among the unemployed within cities and thereby reduce poverty (Schübeler, Wehrle, & Christen, 1996; Thomas-Hope, 1998; World Bank, 2004). The involvement of new actors such as community-based organizations (CBOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the creation of micro- and small-scale
enterprises (MSSEs) and cooperatives led to new roles and responsibilities among the actors involved in solid waste management. The focus therefore changed, and governance and subsequently ‘good governance’ were introduced in order to improve the capacity of governments and to reorganize governmental institutions with the aim of improving their accountability, transparency, legitimacy, and adherence to laws. In this way, it was hoped to bring the governance processes closer to the people and improve the level of participation of non-state actors. Good governance has led to new ways of managing urban services, with the aim of improving the services provided, and it remains to be seen whether good governance will result in improved service provision in urban areas (Hoornweg & Bhada-Tata, 2012; Van de Klundert & Anschütz, 2001; Myers, 2011; UN-Habitat, 2010a).

The next section presents an overview of the literature related to solid waste management in urban areas in developing countries. The focus is on the relevant debates within the field, in order to identify gaps within the literature where I consider that more emphasis should be given and where my research will contribute to fill such gaps.

1.2 PREVIOUS STUDIES AND CURRENT DEBATES WITHIN SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT

In recent decades solid waste management has been given more attention due to both the increased visibility of solid waste in urban landscapes and increased awareness of the negative effects that poor management of solid waste have on urban environments, the image of cities, and public health. A broad body of literature can be found on solid waste management and there is agreement that solid waste management is complex and has technical, social, political, and economic aspects that need to be taken into consideration. My aim is not to examine the various approaches to solid waste management, but rather to focus on the literature that deals with how the management has been approach over the years and studies related to service provision in urban areas. It is possible to identify three main areas of interest that dominate the studies: exploration and description of the informal recycling sector and its contribution in the management of solid waste; the involvement of non-state actors in providing solid waste services; and the provision of solid waste services seen in the light of good governance. The literature clearly reflects that neoliberal and good governance policies have affected how solid waste is managed locally. In the following section, I give a brief description of the main debates within the three areas, with emphasis on their contribution to the topics.
1.2.1 RECOGNIZING THE INFORMAL RECYCLING SECTOR AS A POTENTIAL PARTNER

Solid waste is seen as a valuable resource for many people that make a living by collecting waste for reuse and recycling. It has been estimated that as much as 1% of the urban population in developing countries depends on waste collection for reuse and recycling as part of their daily livelihood (Medina, 2007). In most cities in developing countries, the informal recycling sector has developed highly organized systems for the collection, trade, and recycling of solid waste. There is a broad body of studies focusing on describing and exploring the organization of and activities performed by the informal recycling sector (Gutberlet, 2010; Kaseva & Gupta, 1996; Nzeadibe, 2009; Ojeda-Benitez, Armijo-de-Vega, & Ramirez-Barreto, 2002; Sembiring & Nitivattananon, 2010; Troschinetz & Mihaelcic, 2009). DiGregorio (1994) describes the organization of the informal recycling sector in northern Vietnam and provides a broader understanding of the way the sector is organized and the various activities involved. Medina (1997, 2007) also explores the sector, but in most of his studies the main focus has been on the role of the informal recycling sector and its impact on solid waste management overall. He has shown that the informal recycling sector contributes to improved solid waste management by reducing the quantities of waste needed to be collected, transported, and disposed of, by supplying industry with raw materials at a low cost, by reducing the demand for raw materials needed to be imported from abroad, by supplying the market with recycled products at a lower price, and by creating jobs and livelihoods for urban citizens (Medina, 2007). Many other studies have been conducted in line with Medina’s approach (Kaseva, Mbuligwe, & Kassenga, 2002; Samson, 2009; Scheinberg, Spies, Simpson, & Mol, 2011), and have contributed to our understanding of the reasons for people’s involvement in the sector, the varieties of activities they undertake, and their contribution to overall solid waste management in cities.

There has been a growing focus on the relationships between the informal recycling sector and local authorities, where studies have shown that in many cases the informal recycling sector is repressed, neglected, or ignored by city officials (Medina, 2007). For example, Samson (2009) shows that the informal actors in different cities in South Africa had been denied access to a municipal landfill and thereby denied the right to make a livelihood. Many researchers and international organizations have therefore called for recognition and support of the informal recycling sector (Imam, Mohammed, Wilson, & Cheeseman, 2008; Medina, 2007; Nzeadibe, 2009; Samson, 2009, 2010). Their emphasis has been on the positive role played by the informal sector, and hence there has been a call for policies aimed at
recognition and formalization of the informal recycling sector, and entering into partnerships with them as a strategy to improve overall solid waste management in cities (Baud, Grafakos, Hordijk, & Post, 2001; Medina, 2000; Sembiring & Nitivattananon, 2010). It is clear that if partnerships are successful, the outcome will be advantageous to both sectors and result in increased waste collection and recycling rates, create employment, and increase environmental awareness and social responsibility. However, studies have shown that implementing partnerships has not been easy (Post, Obirih-Opareh, Ikiara, & Broekema, 2005). Baud et al. (2005) show that partnerships can be challenging due to the informal nature of the sector, the informal sector’s lack of organization, hostile attitudes towards informal actors, and lack of trust between the actors. This has led to studies focusing on the issue of public-private partnerships (PPPs) within solid waste management (Azam & Mansoor, 2004).

1.2.2 PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS (PPPs) IN SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT

A growing number of scholars and international organizations have, in line with neoliberal policies, focused on the role of non-state actors in service delivery. There is growing support for policies aimed at entering into partnerships with non-state actors, in the belief that the best outcome for both sectors will be gained by combining the efficiency and experience of the business world with public interests (Azam & Mansoor, 2006). Brinkerhoff (2002: 14) defines partnership as:

a dynamic relationship among diverse actors, based on mutually agreed objectives, perused through a shared understanding of most rational division of labor based on the respective comparative advantages of each partner. This relationship results in mutual influence, with a careful balance between synergy and respective autonomy which incorporates mutual respect, equal participation in decision making, mutual accountability and transparency.

Based on Brinkerhoff’s definition, mutuality is understood as an important concept in efforts to achieve good partnerships. According to Nabeel (2004), mutuality means that all partners have an opportunity to influence shared objectives, have a mutual dependency, and mutual rights and responsibility. However, these conditions rarely exist in the real world, where there is distrust, mutual disrespect, and self-interest, as well as conflicting objectives and unequal power relations among actors, and are some of the problems reflected in the studies conducted to date.
Most published studies of solid waste management have focused on the relationships between the actors in PPPs and the role of non-state actors in solid waste management. The emphasis has been on exploring the service given by non-state actors and identifying obstacles, with a view to improving partnerships and services (Azam & Mansoor, 2004, 2006; Baud et al., 2001, 2005; Baudouin, Bjerkli, Habtemariam, Frank, & Chekole, 2008; Henry, Yongsheng, & Jun, 2006; Kaseva & Mbuligwe, 2005; Van de Klundert & Inge, 1995; Massoud, El-Fadel, & Abdel Malak, 2003; Oteng-Ababio, 2010; Post, 1999; Post et al., 2005; Zelalem, 2006). The studies show that more or less all cities have undergone changes in how they manage their waste and where non-state actors such as the private sector, informal actors, CBOs, and NGOs have been included in order to improve the services provided. The studies have also given us an understanding of the varieties of partnerships that exist between state and non-state actors. Several studies have shown that the nature of partnerships is not as idealistic as defined by Brinkerhoff (2002). Baudouin, Bjerkli, Zelalem, & Yirgalem (2010) show how the relationships between the informal recycling sector and the city administration have shifted from neglect to control, relating them to the changing political situation in Addis Ababa. Post et al. (2005) and Baabereyir (2012) show how privatization has resulted in the exclusion of some actors and uneven service delivery due to the ability of some to pay for solid waste services. In cases where high-income areas are provided with better services than poor income areas, it has resulted in increased inequality among citizens regarding access to service delivery. Thus, the studies have revealed that it is not easy to arrange PPPs, due to lack of trust between the various actors, ignorance on the part of some actors, differing interests, and the fact that the implementation and outcomes of PPPs are closely related to the context in which the partnerships occur (Baud et al., 2005; Post et al., 2005). Whereas most studies conclude that the involvement of non-state actors has resulted in improved solid waste management in terms of the amount of waste collected in cities, there is still a long way to go in order to achieve successful partnerships (Halla & Majani, 1999; Kaseva & Mbuligwe, 2005; Massoud et al., 2003). Most studies focusing on PPPs refers to lack of good governance as the main obstacle to successful partnerships. Post et al. (2005) argue that highly centralized governmental structures have resulted in needs on the ground not being taken into consideration when plans and decisions are made, leading to lack of accountability and lack of trust towards government. Further, Azam & Mansoor (2004) argue that a weak legal framework and lack of capacity on the part of government, makes it difficult to integrate non-state actors and to manage such new networks of partnerships efficiently.
1.2.3 REFUSE AND THE PROMISE OF GOOD GOVERNANCE

Studies with a governance approach to solid waste are gaining increased attention. Most studies have examined either the way neoliberal and good governance policies have affected solid waste management in cities or how a poor solid waste management can be explained due to lack of good governance. Examination of the literature related to governance shows there is agreement that the various aspects of good governance are critical for improving the solid waste services provided in cities, including accountability, transparency, the rule of law, legitimacy, and increased capacity of governmental institutions (Adama, 2007; A. Allen, Hofmann, & Griffiths, 2008; Bhuiyan, 2010; Davies, 2008; Kironde & Yhdego, 1997; Manga, Forton, & Read, 2008; Njeru, 2006; Onibokun, 1999). Onibokun (1999) explores solid waste management in Abidjan, Ibadan, Dar es Salaam, and Johannesburg from a governance perspective, and through four case studies shows how solid waste management has been privatized and reorganized as a result of neoliberal policies. Despite the structural changes, the uneven distribution of resources for service provision has persisted and resulted in exclusion of the urban poor. Onibokun concludes that lack of governance is the root of most problems within solid waste management in all four cities. In referring to highly centralized government structures where local governments are dependent on central government for revenues and resources and where there is a lack of qualified employees due to upward accountability. Myers (2005) gives a detailed and critical analysis of the United Nations Sustainable Cities Programme in Dar es Salaam, Zanzibar, and Lusaka. He also shows how neoliberalism, sustainable development and good governance have led to new ways of managing solid waste in the three cities. Further, Myers shows that privatization of waste services has led to increased segregation of poor areas due to the inability of the poor to pay for waste services, and that the promotion of good governance has led to the opposite of what it promises. He argues that the authoritarian nature of the state and the political culture within the cities has persisted, thus preventing any improvements in solid waste management. He concludes by arguing that political culture and power relationships are closely related to the management of urban services such as solid waste.

The studies conducted in these three areas have contributed to our understanding of the complexity of solid waste management and the fact that solid waste has become an important issue due to the implications for public health and urban environments. It is also acknowledged that solid waste is an important source of income for many urban poor and the sector is seen as having the potential to create even more jobs in order to reduce poverty.
Further, there is agreement that improved solid waste management cannot be achieved by municipalities alone but needs to be done in cooperation with non-state actors (Azam & Manssor, 2006; Post, 1999). There is growing agreement that the services provided are closely related to the governance processes locally, arguing that the way governance is adopted and implemented in the local context is affected by conflicting interests, power relationships, culture, and politics that affect the implementation of reforms and policies. Studies have shown that there is growing inequality among citizens, whereby some actors (usually the elite) are treated as potential partners, whereas other actors (usually the poor) are ignored and excluded from participation in development processes (Devas, 2005; Myers, 2005; Post et al., 2005; Baabereyir, 2012). This has led to a debate and the notion of ‘the right to the city’, where the focus is on understanding the reasons for the uneven development and identifying strategies to achieve more equal development for all citizens (Brown & Rakodi, 2006; Parnell & Pieterse, 2010). There is an agreement that solid waste is complex and the strategies to improve solid waste management should extend beyond merely technical approaches. The main focus today is on different aspects of good governance, such as accountability, transparency, rule of law, legitimacy, and responsiveness, in order to improve the partnerships and the capacity of both local governments and service providers in order to achieve more equitable and improved solid waste services in cities (UN-Habitat, 2010a, 2010b; World Bank, 2004). Although the idealistic aim of governance is widely known, how the processes operate in practice is poorly understood. In order to be able to understand how the governance processes operates within solid waste management in a given context, a critical approach to the governance processes is required. The focus should therefore be on the power relations among the actors involved in order to understand the decisions taken and the service provided, and the reasons behind them.

1.3 STUDIES OF SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT IN ETHIOPIA

The available studies of solid waste management in Ethiopia are limited to Addis Ababa. One of the first studies was carried out by Norconsult in the 1980s and dealt with waste generation using a technical approach to the management of solid waste in the city (Norconsult, 1981, 1982). Since then, limited research has been conducted on solid waste, and mainly by Addis Ababa City Administration, local NGOs, and students preparing master’s dissertations (Aklilu, 2002; Selamavit, 2007; Bjerkli, 2005; Enda Ethiopia, 1999; ILO, 2007, 2008a, 2008b, 2008c, 2008d, 2009; Melaku, 2008; Kinfe, 2002; Mesfin, 2006; Samuel, 2006;

The studies of solid waste management in Addis Ababa to date have had a relatively narrow focus. Most of them tend to focus on the technical dimensions of the municipal solid waste management, such as estimating the amount of waste generated (Aklilu, 2002; Melaku, 2008; Mesfin, 2006; Samuel, 2006; Yared, 2007), or systems that should be put in place (e.g. new sanitary landfill, transfer stations, composting sites, new trucks and containers, data on waste generation, and waste composition) in order to improve the capacity of the management in the city (Escalante, Rymkiewicz, & Kranert, 2011; Kinfe, 2002; SBPDA, 2004c, 2004d, 2004e; Tadesse, 2004; Tilahun, 2009). Regassa, Sundarana, & Seboka (2012) show that the city suffers from poor solid waste management and refer to lack of data on waste generation, lack of recycling activities, lack of proper transport schedules, a poor sanitary landfill, and a low level of awareness among the citizens as the main obstacles. However, Regassa et al. do not explain why the problems have occurred or the reasons behind them. Although I agree that the above-mentioned problems should be dealt with as a matter of urgency, it seems too naive to believe that adopting technical recommendations would result in improved solid waste management in the city. Solid waste management is complex and, as shown in the literature review in the preceding section, has technical, social, economic, cultural, and political aspects.

Some studies have followed the neoliberal discourse, and attempted to explore households’ willingness to pay for solid waste services as well as the role of the private sector in the provision of solid waste management in Addis Ababa (Aklilu, 2002; Selamavit, 2007; Solomon, 2006; Zelalem, 2006). These studies conclude that households are willing to pay for solid waste services and that the private sector has contributed to improve the waste situation in the city, but in order to improve the current situation more resources, improved technology, and increased awareness among the citizens are needed.

Another field of research, mainly conducted by local and international NGOs, has explored the organization of the informal recycling system, indentified the various actors and activities carried out by the sector, and focused on making recommendations on how to formalize the informal actors in order to improve the service provided and the working conditions of informal workers (Bjerkl, 2005; Enda Ethiopia, 1999; Escalante, et al., 2011; IGNIS, 2009; ILO, 2008c).

Most studies have focused on the technical aspects of the management of waste and followed the dominant discourses, such as privatization and participation, in line with
neoliberal policies. All such studies have tried to adopt the dominant discourses in Addis Ababa and as a result they have overlooked the social and political realities of solid waste on the ground. Very few studies take into consideration the broader historical, social, and political context. By ignoring these issues the authors are not able to understand the underlying reasons for the current solid waste situation, explain why these problems have occurred, and find solutions adapted to the local context. Although it is widely known that solid waste is inefficiently managed in Addis Ababa, the underlying reasons are poorly understood and a more critical approach to solid waste is needed in order to gain a deeper understanding of the reasons for the current situation.

1.4 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND QUESTIONS

Why is the management of solid waste management in Addis Ababa not improving? My interest in answering this question emerged after completing my master’s degree on solid waste management in Addis Ababa, in 2005. Given my background in geography and industrial ecology, I was interested in exploring and identifying obstacles to improvements to the solid waste situation in the city. However, I had never spent time in an African city and had limited knowledge of Ethiopian history, culture, and ‘ways of doing’. Despite this, I thought it was possible to find a solution to the problems by conducting a material flow analysis of how waste flows in the city and identifying the obstacles, such as lack of containers and trucks. During my fieldwork I realized that I was making the same mistakes as many others had before me, due to the mistaken belief that adopting a Western approach and technology could solve Addis Ababa’s waste disposal problems. However, after spending time in the city I became more familiar with Ethiopian culture and started to question the management. For some time I was quite confused, because I was presented with ambitious plans and reports that were in line with current solid waste management practice internationally, but nothing really seemed to materialize on the ground. However, I became increasingly more aware of the gap between what was officially promoted and what was actually done, and this aroused my curiosity concerning the underlying reasons. This narrative reflects my own evolution in understanding solid waste management in Addis Ababa and the awareness was the main reason for my interest in conducting the research for this thesis.

As discussed in the preceding section, good governance has become a ‘recipe’ for how governments should manage urban services. The literature review shows that most cities in Africa have undergone reorganization and implemented policies to improve governance and
urban services. However, the literature also shows that despite governments having adopted
good governance policies, there have been few success stories. Rather, most studies refer to
lack of good governance as one of the main obstacles to improving solid waste management,
comparing the realities found on the ground with a normative view of partnership and good
governance, and identifying the gaps that should be filled in order to improve service
provision. Some researchers have called for a more critical approach to be applied and for
studies of how the governance processes operate within urban services (Batley, McCourt, &
Mcloughlin, 2012; Blundo & Meur, 2009). There is a need to ask why good governance
policies are selected in the first place, how they are adopted and implemented, how they
operate in a given context, and what is the outcome of the processes. Bringing politics into
our understanding can lead us to new understandings of the reasons for weak urban service
provision and enable us to identify obstacles to improvement (Batley et al., 2012).

The research presented in this thesis aims to contribute to the current debate on the
provision of urban services seen in a governance perspective. In order to understand the
underlying reasons for the provision of solid waste disposal services, my aim is to explore
official norms and regulations within solid waste and to compare these with the results of a
detailed analysis of the governance processes and everyday practice within solid waste
management in Addis Ababa. The purpose is to understand the ways in which decisions are
made, the way practice is organized, who are considered partners in the processes, and the
relationships between actors involved. I therefore focus particularly on exploring the
complexity of actors’ subjective views and agendas, and the distribution of power between the
actors. I examine how these aspects are negotiated in the local context and how the processes
have affected solid waste management in the city.

Based on the research objectives, I aim to explain and answer the following research
questions:

1. What kind of administrative reforms and policies have been implemented since the
   start of the 21st century within solid waste management in Addis Ababa? What have
   been the underlying reasons for these reforms and policies and how has their
   implementation and the outcome affected solid waste management?
2. How does governance operate within solid waste management in Addis Ababa, and in
   what way does this affect the management of solid waste in the city?
3. What preconditions are needed in order to have successful partnerships and an
   improved solid waste management service in Addis Ababa?
1.5 CHOOSING FIELD SITES AND DELINEATING THE STUDY

I chose to conduct my research in Addis Ababa. The main reason behind this choice is that it would build onto work carried out in Addis Ababa in 2004 for my master’s degree. In order to narrow the field of study, I chose to focus on waste generated by households and selected Addis Ketema Sub-City and three *kebeles* (01/03, 10/12, and 13/15) within the Sub-City (Figure 1). The reasons for choosing Addis Ketema Sub-City were that this Sub-City has the highest population density and it is where Männ alleh/allesh tāra, an informal market for waste, is located. The three *kebeles* were selected on the basis of their socio-economic conditions, whereby *kebele* 01/03 is characterized by middle-income households, *kebele* 10/12 is characterized by commercial activities and low-income households, and *kebele* 13/15 consists mainly of poor income households.

---

1 A *kebele* is the smallest unit of administration in Addis Ababa
FIGURE 1: Location of Addis Ababa, Addis Ketema Sub-City, and the studied kebeles.
PART TWO: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This study is framed with a governance and urban political ecology perspective (UPE). The concept of governance is central, since most cities have claimed to have adopted and implemented good governance policies to improve urban services. I therefore describe the concept as it is understood and promoted by various actors, and summarize by presenting my own understanding of and approach to the concept. Thereafter, I describe urban political ecology and argue why I consider that it provides a good theoretical framework for studying solid waste management in light of the governance processes taking place. Finally, I present an analytical framework, where I describe and argue how the various aspects within UPE and the concept of governance are seen in relation to each other and serve as a framework for my study of solid waste management in Addis Ababa.

2.1 GOVERNANCE AND THE PROMISE OF DEVELOPMENT

As a response to the failure of neoliberal policies and SAPs, the concept of governance was introduced in the development discourse as a way to promote development. The concept was first introduced by the Word Bank in the belief that governance could ensure the implementation of neoliberal policies. Governance was based on the argument that the ways in which state institutions worked were the main obstacle to the efficient management of urban services (Mkandawire, 2007; World Bank, 1992). The reappearance of the concept of ‘corporate governance’ and its generalization in the development discourses in the 1990s led to multiple new definitions. Since then, governance has been a central concept at many levels and in many areas, such as global and local governance, and urban and rural governance, and when the term is used in a normative way there is even ‘bad governance’ and ‘good governance’. To date, there is no commonly agreed definition of governance. The World Bank (1992: 1) defines governance as ‘the manner in which power is exercised in the management of countries’ economic and social resources for development’, whereas the United Nation Environmental Programme (UNEP) defines governance as ‘the exercise of political, economic and administrative authority to manage a nations affairs. It is the complex mechanisms, processes, relationships and institutions through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, exercise their rights and obligations and mediate their differences (UNEP, 1997b: 9)’. Common to most definitions of governance is the fact that governance is distinct from the concept of government. The use of the term implies that power is not limited to formal authorities and institutions, but also non-state actors (the market and civil society)
have a right to participate in decision-making and the provision of urban services. The use of the concept also means that governance is not a simple frame of action but a process, since decisions have to be made based on complex relationships between actors (Bevir, 2009). With governance, the role of the state is to steer the organization of urban services, to apply certain techniques in the management of urban services, and to monitor the services provided. By contrast, non-state actors should deliver the services and be able to participate in the decision-making processes.

All definitions of governance make use of more or less the same elements or principles, including accountability,\(^2\) rule of law,\(^3\) transparency,\(^4\) legitimacy,\(^5\) and responsiveness.\(^6\) All of the principles are related and interdependent. Hence, transparency is a precondition for accountability and responsiveness is not gained without legitimacy. Further, all of the principles are constituent of a democratic regime. In other words, governance is not sustainable without effective democratic institutions.

Governance has lead to administrative reforms of states, focusing on institutional arrangements to reduce bureaucracy and make the states more efficient in their new role as managers of networks of actors and partnerships involved in the provision of urban services, in line with the principles mentioned above (Pierre & Peters, 2000; B.C. Smith, 2007). This is achieved by placing emphasis on the decentralization of governmental institutions, to give more power to lower levels of government and share power with non-state actors as a way to ensure legitimacy and increase accountability and transparency (Cavill & Sohail, 2004). There is consensus that decentralization is an essential part of governance. Successful decentralization has shown to improve the efficiency and responsiveness of public sectors, because it is seen as more responsive to local needs due to politicians being more accountable when decisions concerning the management of urban services are made by civil servants that are closer to populations at the local level (B.C. Smith, 2007). Further, participation with

---

\(^2\) Accountability implies that those responsible for making decisions can be held accountable to those they govern. By strengthening the accountability of governmental institutions, it is believed that both social and economic development will benefit (Bevir, 2009; Devas, 2004).

\(^3\) Rule of law means that legal frameworks should be fair, enforced impartially, and based on democracy in order to achieve political and economic development, where decentralization is a way of reforming institutions in order to strengthen the rule of law (Bevir, 2009; B.C. Smith, 2007).

\(^4\) Transparency refers to the free flow of information, whereby processes and information are accessible to those wanting to understand and monitor them (Bevir, 2009; B.C. Smith, 2007).

\(^5\) Legitimacy refers to participation and the rights of all citizens to participate in decision-making processes, either directly or indirectly through legitimate institutions that represent them (Bevir, 2009; B.C. Smith, 2007).

\(^6\) Responsiveness refers to public institutions’ responsibility to be responsive to all citizens and that public leaders should have a long-term perspective when it comes to development. To achieve this, decentralization is essential, both to bring governance processes closer to the people and to improve the efficiency of public institution that aim to meet the needs on the ground while making the best use of available resources (Bevir, 2009; B.C. Smith, 2007).
private actors is seen as a more efficient way to manage urban services, as the strengths of private and public sectors are combined. In this view, PPPs bring together the political access and long-term stability found in the public sector and the efficiency in the private sector (Bevir, 2009). There is also emphasis to entering into partnerships with actors within civil society in order to empower them and afford them equal access to development and decision-making processes. One justification for such partnerships is that participation can empower the poor and increase their participation and legitimacy, and democracy (Davies, 2008; Devas, 2004; Myers, 2011; Schalkwijk, 2005). Partnerships have been viewed also as a strategy to include civil society in governance processes, to create employment among the urban poor, and to create opportunities to formalize actors operating in the informal economy as a strategy to reduce poverty and promote development (Devas, 2004).

However, the literature reveals that each organization, including the World Bank and the United Nations, seems to create its own wish list of reforms, practices, and outcomes (Bevir, 2009). The World Bank’s definition of good governance has more or less transferred the concept of corporate governance into the development discourse (World Bank, 1992). This approach to governance calls for sound and efficient management, where bureaucracy is seen as the main barrier to development. The World Bank’s use of good governance is technical in nature and aims to have a more efficient and open administration, with the use of the free market, the rule of law, and equity, and it rarely mentions poverty or the poor. The bank’s concept of civil society is narrow and limited to the private sector and NGOs, and it is only recently that more emphasis has been given to public goods and social capital (Bevir, 2009). Multinational development agencies such as UN-Habitat and UNDP have centred their definitions of good governance as the key to poverty eradication and attaining the Millennium Development Goals (Hoebink, 2006; UN-HABITAT, 2002a, 2002b; UNDP, 1997a). As a consequence, the issue of participation is related to broadly-defined civil society with a focus on human development, social justice, and the fight against corruption. UN-Habitat’s and UNDP’s definitions of civil society include both formally organized and informal structures, and even individuals (UNDP, 1997a: 52). The multiple interpretations of governance have led to much ambiguity, particularly related to the concepts of participation and civil society (seeTextbox 1 for a discussion on the term civil society). For neoliberal politicians, participation has nothing to do with popular or democratic participation, but is understood as the right of consumers of services to participate in cost-sharing and to pay for privatized services such as solid waste management. This understanding is far removed from participation understood as
the right of any citizen (men, women, and even children) to be heard, and to contribute to the making and follow-up of decisions and policies concerning them.

TEXTBOX 1: DEFINING CIVIL SOCIETY

Governance refers to the management of public affairs in partnership with non-state actors such as the market and civil society (Masterson, 2006). However, the use of the term civil society is understood and used differently by different actors, and has become a fuzzy concept and difficult to define due to its historical roots and the varied approaches to the concept in recent years (Heinrich, 2006). Originally, civil society referred to a society governed by law under the authority of the state (Gallaher, Dahlman, Gilmartin, Mountz, & Shirlow, 2010). With the shift from government to governance, the understanding of civil society has changed and it is now common to view civil society as ‘the arena in society between the state, the market, and the family where citizens advance their interests’ (Heinrich, 2006: 214). It is difficult to separate economic interests defined as the market with social forces referred to as civil society. In Heinrich’s definition, interests could relate either to social interests or to economic interests. If the interests are motivated by economy, they should be excluded from civil society since they belong to the market. The relative boundaries between state, civil society, family, and market vary significantly from time to time and from place to place. In order to understand the structure, function, and size of civil society in a given context, that society should be understood in relation to the state, culture, norms, and regulations that guide actors’ behaviour and the power relationships between them (Swyngedouw, 1996; 2000). The definition of civil society needs to be a loose in order not to exclude certain individuals or activities, but should be defined more specifically when it is related to the culture and structure of a particular place. In this thesis, civil society is understood as a social space for citizens’ actions outside the direct control of the state, where social power are contested and struggled over, and where citizens express themselves and claim their rights and access to social goods.

It cannot be denied that the core elements of good governance, such as legitimacy, responsiveness, accountability, transparency, and the rule of law, are relevant elements that, if respected, could improve urban services and the functioning of societies to the benefit of all (Grindle, 2010). However, the use of good governance by donors and international organizations imposes a technical recipe for what governments should do to improve their governance and refers to ‘what should be’ and not ‘what is’ (Grindle, 2004, 2007, 2010; Hoebink, 2006; Hufty, 2009). By focusing on what should be and not what is, donors and international organizations seem to ignore the possibility that governments may misuse their projects or in some cases even promote ‘bad governance’. In many cases, donors and
international organizations fail to create a deeper understanding of how the governance process operates in local contexts. The technical approach to governance also gives a false sense of political neutrality, as it portrays development without politics. As Grindle (2007) argues, with good governance it is easier to criticize governments without explicitly criticizing them for lack of democracy. This has led to the rhetorical use of governance, whereby discussions of core issues such as lack of democracy in development are avoided. Although international donors continue to promote and use good governance in a normative and technical way, it may asked why good governance policies, even when adopted and implemented by many governments, have not materialized on the ground with the expected results. Studies have shown that there is a big gap between the official aims of the policies and the actual practice, arguing that the implementation of good governance policies is a political process influenced by power relations and institutional pluralism and these are aspects that should be studied (Crawford, 2009; Hufty, 2009; Myers, 2011; Schalkwijk, 2005).

The adoption and implementation of good governance policies is a political process and should be analysed as such (Batley et al., 2012). Grindle (2004) calls for more empirical research, in order to go behind the normative and technical approach to governance and critically analyse the reasons for adopting good governance policies, as well as their implementation and outcomes. Hence, in order to explore forms of adoption and resistance to the policies and ask why they occur, the aim should be to understand how governance processes operate in particular contexts. Good governance is a central and relevant concept, because it is concrete and is promoted, adopted, and implemented by international donors and governments, in turn this has led to the reorganization of governmental institutions and the implementation of policies designed to make governments more efficient in the execution of their duties and more accountable to their citizens (Myers, 2011). Governance refers to the process of management and decision-making, and offers a framework for understanding how decisions are made and identifying what actors are involved in the management of urban services. Hence, it can help us to explore the various techniques and forms of power exercised within the governance processes. Governance includes a wide range of actors and institutions, and it is the relationships and interactions between them that determine what happens in cities. The relationships between actors are not equal, and governance as a process involves the power relationships among different actors (Swyngedouw, 1996). More emphasis should be placed on the power relationships between actors and examining who is involved and who is excluded from the governance processes (Blundo & Meur, 2008; Devas, 2004; Heynen,
While it has been observed that most governments have apparently adopted good governance, it remains to be seen whether the declarations of good governance policies (capacity building of administrations and the redefinitions of the mandate of public agencies) turn out to be a reality and a genuine or partially genuine commitment to good governance, or whether they are mostly rhetorical, i.e. the formulation and use of a new ideology to conceal the realities of human exploitation and the misuse of power. This uncertainty is discussed further in Articles 2, 3 and 4).

Further to what I have explained thus far, my aim is to go beyond the normative use of good governance and study the everyday practice of governance within solid waste management in Addis Ababa. My objective is to understand why good governance policies are adopted, who is considered a partner, and the implementation of the policies and their effect on the provision of urban services. By focusing on the governance processes within urban services, I am able to explore individual agendas and interests, how these are acted upon in the local context, and to follow these over time and link them to the larger political context as well as to actors and agendas at other scales. In the next section, I give a description of UPE, which in my opinion is a good theoretical framework for studying governance processes within urban management, where the main focus is on politics and power relations between actors at various scales.

2.2 POSITIONING URBAN POLITICAL ECOLOGY IN THE FIELD

Urban political ecology has emerged from political ecology. Political ecology was developed in the 1980s as a means to critique the discourse on the ‘limits to growth’ and sustainable development, where population growth and poverty were seen as the main reasons for the degradation of the environment, and a reduction in population and economic growth was seen as the main solution to achieving more sustainable management of natural resources (Bryant, 1998).

Inspired by cultural ecology, political ecology held that the physical environment and society had to be seen in a dualistic relationship which shaped both ecologies over time. By focusing on the relationship between nature and society one could gain a better understanding of cultural practices and the reasons behind environmental change (Walker, 1998). In contrast to cultural ecology, political ecology viewed cultural practices in a given context, not as isolated but as linked to events taking place at other scales. The emphasis was therefore on attempts to link environmental change to a broader political economy at various scales.
(Neumann, 2005; Robbins, 2004). The foundation for political ecology was laid by Blaikie & Brookfield (1987) in their study of the political economy of soil degradation in developing countries. Their publication brought politics into studies of environmental change and development (Benjaminsen & Svarstad, 2010).

In recent years, political ecology has evolved in various directions and fields, of which UPE is one. Both political ecology and UPE can be used to study the relationships between nature and society, in order to explain environmental changes and link them to political and economical processes across different scales. However, studies conducted within political ecology have focused on rural areas in developing countries, where the main focus has been on soil degradation, deforestation, conflicts regarding access to natural resources and protected areas, and how dominant narratives have affected decisions concerning environmental conservation in particular contexts (Benjaminsen & Svarstad, 2010). UPE has focused on urban areas and has been used by researchers to argue that despite the fact that more than half of the world’s populations now live in urban areas, urban environments have often been neglected in rural studies (Heynen et al., 2006). Most studies conducted within UPE have focused on control and access to resources in cities and how this has led to unequal distribution of resources among their citizens (Keil, 2003; Loftus, 2007; Swyngedouw, 2004b). Whereas political ecology has a third world focus, research using UPE has tended to focus on developed countries. Further, political ecology tends to be used to study ongoing conflicts over resources, whereas to date UPE has not studied such conflicts but has been used by researchers more concerned with analyzing potential conflicts (Zimmer, 2010). Although these differences are not significant, they differ significantly in their view of the relationship between nature and society. Whereas political ecology sees physical nature and society as two separate spheres that are in a mutual relationship to each other, UPE sees nature and society not as separate spheres, but rather as welded together and a product of what is referred to as ‘urban metabolism’, in line with N. Smith (1992) and Harvey’s concept of the production of nature (Harvey, 1996). This approach to nature and society is examined further in the next section.

2.2.1 URBAN POLITICAL ECOLOGY AND URBAN METABOLISM

UPE is a critical theoretical framework that links specific analyses of urban environmental problems to larger socio-ecological conditions (Keil, 2003). Heynen & Swyngedouw (2003: 914) state: ‘urban political ecology is to enhance the democratic content of socio-
environmental construction by identifying the strategies through which a more equitable
distribution of social power and a more inclusive mode of environmental production can be
achieved.’ In other words, the purpose of UPE is to examine critically the production of urban
environments by identifying actors and their agendas, and exploring power relations within a
given context. In this way it should be possible to understand the underlying reasons for
uneven development and come up with strategies to achieve a more equitable distribution of
resources among urban citizens and to improve democracy. With regard to the governance
processes taking place in urban management in Africa today, UPE can be used an approach to
critically examine how the processes operate in a given context, and the actors involved and
the power relationships between them, in order to understand and identify strategies that could
contribute to improved governance of urban services.

To understand UPE as a theoretical approach it is essential to know how it views the
relationship between nature and society. Within a UPE perspective, cities are not seen as
separated from nature but as a social and political outcome of the interaction between physical
nature and society (Heynen et al., 2006; Kaika & Swyngedouw, 2011; Swyngedouw, 2006,
2009). Thus, instead of seeing cities as a second type of nature or a constructed nature,
Harvey (1996) states that there is nothing unnatural about New York city, arguing that human
activities cannot be seen as external to physical nature but as part of it. Swyngedouw (2006)
uses the metaphor ‘urban metabolism’ to describe the relationship between physical nature
and society. In contrast to the traditional view that emphasizes the dualistic relationship
between nature and society, Swyngedouw tries to overcome this binary view of the distinction
between the two. Thus, rather than seeing physical nature and society as two separate spheres,
urban environments should be viewed as both social and natural, where social processes are
seen in a historical-geographical production process of physical nature and society welded
together, and where the outcome is physical, social, economic, political, and cultural. In using
the term urban metabolism, Swyngedouw (2006:107) adopts Marx’s approach to the
relationship between the physical nature and society, and cites Marx as arguing as follows:

Labour is, first of all, a process between man and nature, a process by which man, through his
own actions, mediates, regulates, and controls the metabolism between himself and nature ...
Through this movement he acts upon external nature and changes it, and in this way he
simultaneously changes his own nature.
In this relationship, physical nature is seen as the foundation (a historical product), whereas social relations encounter physical nature and change it, and in this way humankind also changes its own nature (Swyngedouw, 2009). Hence, a change in the nature cannot be distinguished from either physical nature or the social world, but should be seen as both social and natural. The metabolic process is continuous and environmental change is tied to specific historical and geographical places and their social, cultural, political, and economic conditions (Heynen et al., 2006; Heynen & Swyngedouw, 2003). The management of solid waste serves as a good example of this view of the relationship between physical nature and society, as raw materials are extracted from nature by social work, and transformed into products that are consumed by social actors. Our consumption patterns and what we regard as waste are affected by our culture and level of income. This in turn affects the amount and type of waste produced and disposed of in nature. As a consequence of our actions (production and consumption), we are faced with an increased amount of waste which if not managed properly will contaminate urban environments and can become a breeding ground for insects and vermin, which in turn will affect public health. The way waste is managed in a given context (i.e. collected for disposal, reuse, or recycling, or simply disposed of in nature), depends on the actions taken by actors within society and is structured by culture, economy, and politics. The way we chose to deal with the solid waste will always have an impact on the urban environment and society. The solid waste situation in the local context should also be seen in relation to other scales, of which the promotion of good governance in developing countries is a good example. Solid waste should therefore be seen as a product of physical nature and society and an outcome of urban metabolism, which results in a continuous production of new urban natures. All of these processes take place in the realms of power in which social actors (at various scales) strive to create and defend their own agendas. In order to understand how urban metabolism works and to understand the production of, for example, solid waste management, attention should be given to the evolution of political structures, economic agendas, and cultural conditions (Bulkeley et al., 2003; Swyngedouw, 2006).

2.2.2 POLITICS AND POWER IN URBAN MANAGEMENT

When perceiving an urban environment as a metabolism it is necessary to understand how the metabolism works, in order to explain the production of the urban environment. Among geographers there is agreement that our knowledge of the world is always situated, contingent, and mediated, which means that people’s knowledge about physical nature and
society is not a reality but a representation of it (Morse & Stocking, 1995; Robbins, 2004). From a UPE perspective, the focus is on a given phenomenon (e.g. solid waste) and on actors’ observations and thoughts about that phenomenon, where the various social constructions are related to the study of the phenomenon in order to explain how social constructions and actions result in the production of a particular urban environment. A UPE approach can be used when the aim is to understand actors’ social constructions and how power relations between actors operate, in order to explain the production, maintenance, and recreations of a phenomenon within a city (Zimmer, 2010).

UPE provides a theoretical framework that enables more emphasis to be placed on the interactions between physical nature and society by questioning the reasons why decisions are made and action are taken based on the distribution of power within a given context. The main focus is therefore on politics – not merely politics in itself, but how power is distributed and used among actors (Grove, 2009). Politics refers to practice and processes where power in its various forms is exercised and negotiated among actors to satisfy their own interests and agendas (Agnew, 2002). UPE explicitly recognizes that the material conditions (resources) within urban spaces are controlled by the elite, resulting in a marginalization of the urban poor (Heynen & Swyngedouw, 2003). Such power relations are seen as created by the social, political, economic, and cultural structures and processes that constitute the urban environment in a specific place (Grove, 2009). Thus, the focus should be on these uneven processes in order to understand the production of urban environments, not necessarily because some actors’ interests are more sustainable than other actors’ interests, but due to the concern that some groups of actors can exclude others from gaining access to resources, which results in unequal development.

Within geography, the study of power has been important for understanding people’s experience of a phenomenon, social differences within society, and the reasons for uneven development (Panelli, 2004). Power occurs in varied ways, and consequently this has led to various approaches and ways of seeing power. In the broadest sense, power can be seen as the ability to achieve a desired outcome (Tew, 2002). However, to be able to study power it is necessary to identify and be able to distinguish different types of power (Engelstad, 2005). To argue that a person exercises power over another person can be compared to arguing that a car is made up of atoms, as neither approach provides insights or an understanding of what processes are at work (Gallagher, 2008). For this thesis I have chosen to use Allen’s (2003b) categorization of power, which refers to power as capacity, a medium, and technology.
Power as a *capacity*, sees power as the ability to decide and control how things should be organized. Power is seen as a property that is held and can be delegated or distributed. It is viewed as an object that some actors have, and actors that hold power have the ability to force other actors to act against their will. The state is a good example of this approach to power, as it will have power to make decisions regarding organization, whereas citizens are seen as lacking power. This approach to power is in line with both Weber’s view of power, where some individuals or institutions have power and are able to exert their own will in society even when others try to resist it (Weber, 1971), and Marx’s view of the capitalist relations of control and the reproduction of uneven social structures (Engelstad, 2005). The view of power as capacity holds that the distribution of power is unequal and that some have more power than others and have better opportunities to satisfy their interests according to class, gender, and ethnicity (Allen, 2003a). When those in possession of power have their interests satisfied it can result the marginalization of others who have limited possibilities. This conception of power is still influential in geography, especially in authoritarian societies where control dominates and influences how power is exercised (Allen, 2003b). However, power as a capacity held by the elite to control the powerless does not mean that those without power are not able to react or resist the power relationships which they are part of. Power as capacity is therefore only potential power and cannot enable actors to secure certain outcomes or realize certain objectives, as there are always opportunities for resistance among those seen as powerless (Tew, 2002).

Power as a *medium* sees power related to resources (e.g. economy, knowledge, and collective resources) that can be mobilized in order to achieve a desired outcome. In this regard, power is viewed as power to do something. The notion of power as a medium is in line with Giddens’ (1987) view of power as resources that enable things to be done. In this view, power itself is not seen as a resource, but as something that is mobilized and produced through social interaction. Power as a medium thus refers to a range of social interventions and practices that actors adopt, and can be viewed as collective actions of a group of actors to achieve collective goals, to challenge or resist dominant power structures, or to prevent a decision being made. Power as a medium does not view power as held within an institution, but as existing in all social interactions. It can therefore occur in a variety of ways, and studies of power should therefore focus on identifying how power is produced through peoples’ relations and actions (Allen, 2003a).

Power as *technology* views power as something that works on and through subjects. Power is seen a series of techniques of practice and draws on Foucault’s work on the
circulation of power and how power is exercised and practised within a given society (Allen, 2003a). According to Foucault, people regulate their behaviour according to social norms (e.g. how to act in schools, in hospitals, and in prison). Power should therefore be seen as something that works through people’s acceptance of how they should act within a given context (Foucault, 1982). This means that power exists in all kinds of social relations and is seen as a mode of action and a set of practices, and hence is omnipresent in society, where actions upon actions are an ongoing process.

In contrast to power as the capacity to make decisions, power only exists when it is put into action and is continuously practised between individuals and therefore cannot be viewed as an object or a property. This does not mean that this approach to power ignores the state and its role in exercising power, but that the state is not the source of power. Rather, the state is a set of relationships between subjects within the institutions that make up the state, where power is exercised over other power relations. As power is seen as relationships between individuals, these power relations are always contextual and specific and cannot be understood without taking the local context into consideration (Gallagher, 2008). The power relationships will also vary according to the nature of the relationships, i.e. they are affected by class, gender, age, and ethnicity.

Further, an action is always calculated to satisfy a series of aims and objectives. However, this does not mean that the outcome of an action will be in line with the aims or objectives of an individual subject. Even though one might have good intentions and act according to a desired goal or outcome, the outcome might not be as intended. The complexity of the social world means that social actions always have unintended effects, and according to Foucault the intention behind an action is therefore irrelevant. The analysis of power relations and the outcome of these processes is worthy of study (Bevir, 1999). Power as technology is also seen in relation to scales, where power is seen as nested relations through scales. Power exercised at a larger scale depends upon power exercised at smaller scales, and power exercised at smaller scales is made possible by power relations at other scales (Crampton & Elden, 2007).

I have used the three approaches to power described above (i.e. power as capacity, a medium, and technology) due to their relevance. These approaches to power have different epistemologies and views on how power operates. Using these approaches to power does not mean that they are mutually incompatible. Power as a capacity and power as a medium are used to identify strategies used by the actors, whereas power as technology is included as an approach to study power and combine the two first approaches in order to understand how power operates in a given society and how people regulate their behavior based on social
norms. The use of power as a capacity and medium does not mean that I view power as something waiting to limit the actions of others. Institutions and resources are seen as abilities that can be mobilized in order to increase possibilities to achieve certain outcomes. Therefore, in order to study power, it is necessary to understand the social norms that guide individuals. In that way, it may be possible to identify individuals and their position within society, their access to different kinds of power (capacity and a medium), and their relations to other actors. As mention above, the ability to act towards a certain goal does not mean that the goal will be achieved. Instead, there are several possible outcomes of power relationships, and the ability to exercise power informs very little about how power is exercised in relationships. Furthermore, it is not possible to know an outcome just by identifying potential power. In my opinion, the focus has not been on defining power or studying power in itself, but rather on identifying the various forms of power relationships that exist between actors. Hence, in order to understand the actions and decisions taking place within solid waste management in Addis Ababa, I have studied the various strategies used by actors to achieve their goals, and how other actors act and react to such power relationships. My focus is therefore on exploring how the power is distributed, the agendas behind actions, the strategies used, and the outcomes of the power relationships.

2.2.3 SEEING INFORMALITY AS TECHNOLOGIES OF POWER
The term informal economy\(^7\) flourishes in the literature and is commonly used to discuss a variety of economic activities carried out by the urban poor. The concept has been approached and explored by many researchers. Some have adopted a dualist approach, seeing the informal economy as separate from the formal economy and consisting of small-scale activities performed by the urban poor (ILO, 1972). The concept has also been explored using a structural approach, in cases where the informal economy is seen as subordinate to the formal economy in order to reduce costs (Portes, Castells, & Benton, 1989). Others have used a legalist approach, where an informal economy is seen as a response to the formal regulation of economic activities (de Soto, 1989). Thus, approaches have different views on how the informal and the formal economy are linked, and the former has been given different meanings, depending upon the approach used (Chen, 2007; McNeill, 2004).

\(^7\) The term informal economy is used in order to avoid any confusion regarding reference to a specific sector but rather to economic activities across different sectors. The term informal economy also emphasizes the existence of a continuity from the informal to the formal ends of the economy and the interdependence between them, and therefore acknowledges that there are varieties of degrees of informality (Becker, 2004; Brown, 2006).
The concept of informal economy has been debated, discussed, and criticized regarding its various definitions and understandings, and for what it does not capture. However, the concept still continues to be used and has proved to be useful for policymakers and researchers due to the fact that the informal economy refers to a large share of the economic activities taking place in urban areas and are an important source of livelihood for the majority of the urban poor. The popularity of the concept has varied over the years, but today it is gaining increased attention due to the fact that the informal economy has increased and become the norm in most African cities (Jutting & Laiglesia, 2009; McNeill, 2004). The informal economy has therefore gained increased attention from international organizations that recognize the potential to formalize informal actors as a strategy to reduce poverty in line with good governance policies (UN-HABITAT, 2002a).

Most definitions of the informal economy define it in terms of economic activities that are not registered and regulated by a government and operate outside the formal system (Brown, 2006; McNeill, 2004; Portes et al., 1989). Other definitions refer to certain criteria, such as low entry requirements in terms of capital and professional qualifications, and operating on a small-scale, on a family-basis, in open spaces, using local materials, and often using labour-intensive technology (Hansen & Vaa, 2004; ILO, 1972). Such definitions of the informal economy exclude those who do not operate in open spaces, and those whose activities are not registered but who have capital to invest in more advanced technology. The question that arises is where do we place or how do we define those that do not fit into any of these definitions. There is agreement that we have to move away from such narrow definitions of the informal economy (Lindell, 2010). Thus, there are different reasons for informality and different forms of informality, which should be seen in relation to the context in which it finds place. If this definition were to be applied to the pre-election time April 2010 in Addis Ababa, the informal economy would most likely be described as having been small. At the time, the informal actors such as the shoeshiners and street vendors were forced to register and pay taxes to the kebeles and to become members of the ruling party in order to be able to continue their activities. This shows that the informal economy is a process that can change over time and should be seen in relation to the state. The shifting character of the informal economy and its relation to the state requires a definition that is not too narrow or rigid. In this regard, informality is understood to consist of economic activities that are not registered and those that practise them do not pay tax. There is a need for a more specific definition of the informal economy in relation to a context at a given time, as the informal economy differs
from place to place and from time to time. The emphasis should be less on the distinction
between the informal and formal economy, and more on the relationships between them.

Beyond the question of defining the informal economy, the political dimension of the
activities is poorly understood. Lindell (2010) calls for more focus on the political aspects of
activities in the informal economy and the agencies of the informal actors. It may be argued
that the notion of informality is not important in order to understand the production of urban
services in a given context, arguing that informality is just a question of articulating informal
with formal activities and that the dominant structure of uneven development and the
disempowerment process of the poor will continue. However, informality might not be of any
relevance if we study informality on a macro-scale. However, on the micro-scale, informality
is a fact and a result of the failure of the state. Since the introduction of neoliberal policies and
the rolling back of the state, the informal economy has generally increased as rules and
regulations have regressed to make place for unregulated activities. Informality has developed
as a response and strategy for dealing with the dominant power structures and can be seen as a
way of claiming access to resources and to cities. In line with Lindell (2010), I view
informality as a political process. The informal economy is a system of social organization
involving social structure, social relationships, and a set of norms and rules that guides
individuals or group of actors engaged in the informal economy (AlSayyad, 2004). Informality
shapes social relations and is part of the culture, history, norms, and rules both
within and outside the state. Bayat (1997) refers to informality as a ‘quiet political strategy’.
Informality is seen as everyday practices of urban actor’s attempts to address their needs
rather than as actors’ collective action to claim their rights in civil society (Bayat, 2004). Informal
activities have a considerable impact on politicized urban environments and in many
cases they are used as a strategy by formal and informal actors in cities in the negotiation of
their agendas and interests (Lindell, 2010). Informal actors use informality as a strategy to
attain their goals, such as making a livelihood and as a reaction to the established power
structures and ongoing marginalization process. In some cases, governments have even used
informal actors as potential voters in pre-election times (Mitlin, 2004).

In order to have a better understanding of the way that power operates in a given context,
informality can be used as an empirical concept to refer to a group of actors, and in turn
facilitate an understanding of the nature of the relationships, the reasons behind decisions, and
the actions taken by the various actors trying to fulfill their agendas. To avoid using the
concept, it is necessary to overlook the contexts in which actions find place. The informal
economy is a product of its historical and social networks, it is structured based on its own
practical norms (where different norms exist within the informal and formal economy) and rules that have developed over time (Jean-Pierre & Sardan, 2008). In order to study power relationships between actors, it is also necessary to understanding where they have come from, where they are, and where they are headed and relate their actions to the practical norms that guide their behaviour. Including informality in our research can help us to relate actors and their actions to culture and practical norms (further described in Section 2.3) in a given context and to better understand the reasons for them.

2.2.4 THE ‘POLITICS OF SCALES’

Within geography, scales have proved important when studying phenomena. In cartography, scales refer to the information on a map and to geographical resolutions at which a given phenomenon is studied (Dahlman, 2010). In this regard, scales are viewed as a mathematical expression of the relationship between the map and the real world, expressed as a ratio of map units to real world units. Conventionally, these levels are referred to as local, national, regional, and global scales where a particular phenomenon is framed geographically (Agnew, 2002). Scales also relate to methodological concerns and units of analysis, and are closely related to the object of study. Further, scales have been important for explaining spatial relationships and analysing given phenomena seen in relation to processes finding place between local and global scales (Agnew, 2002; Gallaher et al., 2010). These approaches to scales are seen as hierarchical and have been criticized for making us look at the world in a pre-given way, assuming that relationships are hierarchal and where higher scales are assumed to have more power than lower scales (Taylor, 1982). The hierarchal approach to scales has been called into question by the emergence of global networks that operate across scales such as neoliberalism and the discourse of good governance. These new networks of arrangements have resulted in a relatively more vertical arrangement of structures and relationships that has changed the hierarchical view of scales as objective and fixed to a view of scales as constantly produced and reproduced units in networks of relationships (Neumann, 2009). The vertical approach to scales has been challenged by, for example, Marston, Jones, & Woodward (2005), who argue that the hierarchical limitations of scales cannot simply be solved by adding a vertical approach to scales. They suggest a flat alternative that does not rely on the concept of scales but an approach where practice, events, and processes are located in sites across space. Martson et al.’s flat ontology of scale has been commented upon by many, who have argued that by abandoning scale one loses the holistic approach which is the core existence of geography and essential in order to understand the complexity of the social
world (Collinge, 2006; Escobar, 2006; Hoefle, 2006; Jonas, 2006; Leitner & Miller, 2006). Further, Neumann (2009) argues that scales are not ontological but epistemological. The focus should be on the practice of social actors, not on scale itself as an analytical category. The attention should therefore be given to power relations between actors to better understand the capacity of scales and the relationships between them (Moore, 2008).

Today, it is acknowledged by many that scales are socially constructed, historically contingent, and politically contested. Scale is not an existing entity waiting to be discovered, but is produced through geographical structures of social interactions between places (Jones, Jones, & Woods, 2004). N. Smith (1992) has argued for the politics of scale, on the basis that scale is a political act in itself and a practice by state and non-state actors which has resulted in the creation of scales. The politics of scales are therefore defined by those who participate in them. With the use of the urban metabolism metaphor, Swyngedouw (2006) has contributed to the debate on the politics of scale and introduced physical nature into the debate, showing how power through scales affect the production of the urban environment. Thus, the focus should not be on any particular scale, but on the dynamics of the production of scales as a result of power relations between actors at various scales (Heynen & Swyngedouw, 2003; Swyngedouw, 2000, 2004a). As described earlier (in Section 2.2.1), urban metabolism is constantly produced; therefore, scales are never fixed, but are constantly redefined, reconstituted, and restructured in terms of their content, importance, and interrelations. According to Swyngedouw (2000), this continuous reorganization of spatial scales is an integral part of social strategies used by actors to combat and defend control over resources and the struggle for power, and will affect the production of urban environments. Scale should be seen as created and a result of the power relationships that lead to networks of relations between actors at various scales. Scales are therefore arenas where power is performed between actors or groups of actors. Such power relationships can change the importance and role of certain geographical scales, such as regional or national scales, and can create entirely new scales for negotiations. The scale redefinitions will affect power relationships between actors by strengthening the power and the control of some actors while disempowering others (Ekers & Loftus, 2008; Swyngedouw, 1996, 2000). These power relationships are important and reflect the scale capabilities of individuals or social groups to contribute actively to the process and production of an urban environment and to ensure that their interests are heard. This is demonstrated in cases where informal actors have organized themselves into international organizations in order to have their interests heard and have been able to empower themselves (Lindell, 2010).
Scales are essential in studies of power, including studies of the way in which power operates between actors among scales. Hence, the way power is distributed within a given society should not be seen in isolation from power relationships at other scales, but as embedded in different configurations of power relationships between the local and the global scale (Foucault, 1982; Swyngedouw, 2006). A good example is governance as an ideology, where governance has been promoted across scales, and ideas have flown between places and countries, and reform processes created in one place have affected institutions, policies, and management of urban services in other places. As discussed in the preceding section (2.1), the promotion of good governance policies has led to reorganizations of governmental institutions, new policies, and the involvement of new actors in the performance of urban services. This has resulted in a rescaling of states’ affairs and their management of urban services – upwards towards international organizations and downwards towards local non-state actors. Projects supported by international organizations often result in the rescaling of governance processes and can create new arenas for negotiations between the partners involved in the projects. This constant reconstruction process of scales affects the social power relationships among actors, depending upon who is seen as a partner, who is involved in the processes, and who is not recognized as a partner. Moreover, it will strengthen the power of some actors and disempower others (as further discussed in Article 4). This shows the importance of drawing attention to the production of scales and how this in turn affects the production of urban environments. If scales are not taken into consideration, it will not be possible to gain a complete understanding of the activities finding place in local contexts and therefore attention should be on the production of scales in order to understand the underlying reasons for actions taking place at the local scale.

2.3 A THEORETICAL COCKTAIL

In the preceding section, I have argued that governance is a central concept with regards to studying the provision of urban services. The way it has been promoted by international donors and adopted and implemented by governments has affected the way cities are organized and governed. Governance is therefore directly involved in decision and management processes regarding the provision of solid waste services within cities and is an important concept for understanding the underlying reasons for the decisions made and current practices in this regard. I have also argued the need to shift from a normative to a more analytical approach to governance. There is agreement among researchers that there is
often a big gap between the idealistic aims of good governance policies and how such policies are put into practice and operate in local contexts (Blundo & Meur, 2008; Osterveer, 2009; McCourt & Gulrajani, 2010; Batley, 2012). Further, I have argued that UPE offers a good theoretical framework for studying governance processes and the provision of urban services. Accordingly, the management of solid waste should be seen not merely as a technical issue, but as a production process affected by the actors involved, their agendas, and their interactions based on the distribution of power and politics at various scales. Within UPE, the concept urban metabolism is frequently used to describe how physical nature and social processes interact and result in the production of urban environments. I deem the use of the concept urban metabolism useful in order to show how physical nature and society has to be seen as a whole and not viewed as two distinct spheres. However, I have struggled to relate the various aspects of UPE to each other in a constructive way. Very few researchers, if any, have come up with an analytical framework for how to adapt the theoretical framework in practice, and how to relate the different aspects such as power, politics, scale, culture, and history to each other. My attempts to make use of political ecology’s ‘chains of explanations’ proved unsuccessful because although the approach offers a pre-given hierarchical ordering for studying relationships between scales, it did not reflect the chaotic reality I found in the field, nor does it not allow for various scales that may be created by social interaction between actors at various levels (Robbins, 2004). Scales are not only places where action takes place but also a product of social relationships, where scales should be seen as subjective and not preconfigured (Haripriya & Kull, 2009; Swyngedouw, 2000). I therefore suggest an alternative analytical framework for combining the concept of governance and UPE in studies of solid waste management. The analytical framework is inspired by Hufty’s (2009) article on the governance analytical framework. I consider that the framework presented by Hufty has proved fruitful for approaching solid waste management as a governance process in specific locales in order to understand the continuous production of solid waste management, how power is used and negotiated among actors, as well as the reasons behind these processes. The various aspects of UPE such as actor’s subjective views and agendas, politics and power, culture and scales are organized into five analytical categories: problems, actors, norms, locales, and processes. Figure 2 shows an overview of the different categories and how they are linked to each other (modified from Hufty 2009).
FIGURE 2: Analytical framework for studying solid waste management in a UPE perspective. ‘Actors’ refer to the actors included in solid waste management (government, private, informal, and civil society). ‘Problems’ refers to the various issues at stake seen from the perspective of various actors. Collective actions lead to the formation of norms, which guide actors’ behavior. The actions taken result from the interactions between the actors on the basis of their subjective views, and culture and norms in the local context, referred to as a ‘locale’. Locales consist of physical interfaces were problems, actors, and norms converge and the outcome leads to the production of solid waste and can be compared to what in UPE is called urban metabolism.

Using this analytical framework, the first task should be to identify the actors involved and try to give a description of the actors and their background such as their class, gender, economic status, activities, and role within solid waste management. The problems refer to the issues at stake seen from the perspective of the various actors. At this stage it is essential to explore the actors’ views of the phenomena under study. What is seen as a problem can vary depending on the different actors involved in solid waste management. It is therefore essential to be aware that a problem is socially constructed. UPE holds that although there is a reality, there are social constructions of that reality based on actors’ background and experiences (Grove, 2009). The emphasis should be on trying to deconstruct and reconstruct the problem facing each actor, relating it to the local context and the actor’s background and to where they are and where they are headed. It is at this point that power struggles between various actors find place. The ability to explore the subjective views and agendas depends on the context, methodology, techniques used, and the relationships between researcher and participants. In some cases the political context can make it difficult for a researcher to gain access to and the trust of various actors, and hence to understand their views and agendas. The proposed alternative analytical framework is discussed in more detail in the methodology section (Part Four).

The next step is to explore norms. Norms are based on values and shared beliefs concerning what is regarded as right and wrong. This includes guidelines for what one should
think, and do or not do, and hence influences the behaviour of actors. Further, norms are continuously produced by social interaction over time within a given context, are closely related to power relationships, and a natural part of urban metabolism. In everyday practice we are confronted with a pluralism of norms, ranging from formal to informal norms. Such norms can be social, professional, or practical. Social norms are not explicit, but are embedded in ideologies and can be applied to a society as a whole. Professional norms are defined and formalized through laws and regulations, procedures, and organizational structures. Practical norms are not official norms but are accepted by all members of a society. The production and use of the three types of norms leads to a pluralism of norms and situations where the norms coexist and guide actors’ behaviour (Jean-Pierre & Sardan, 2008). Hence, in order to understand various actors’ behaviour, it is important to explore the various forms of norms that exist in a given context and the type of activity to which they apply, as different type of norms can exist within the formal and informal sectors. Further, it is important to explore who formulates the norms and how the norms are put into practice. Norms can be produced at different scales and transferred to other scales. Norms can be created at the national level and then transferred to the local level. Alternatively, in the case of good governance, norms are created at the global level and then transferred to the national and local scale. At each scale there is reaction, rejection, or internalization and adaption to the norms. It is therefore essential to analyse norms at different scales as well as how they are transferred, adapted, or rejected at another scales (Hufty, 2009).

The locales are a category where actors, problems, and norms are nested together. A locale refers to space and time-specific event in which actors negotiate. The focus should be on exploring the actions taking place within a locale, exploring and identifying how power (as capacity, a medium, and technology) is used by the actors in the locale, the nature of their power relationships, the link between the power relationships and processes at various scales, and the outcome. In my study, locales refer to the various stages of solid waste flows in Addis Ababa, from the generator – in this case, the households – to the containers, the municipal landfill, and the local waste market, Männ alleh/allesh tära. Each of these stages is referred to as a locale, where the governance processes operate and where interactions and struggles between the various actors occur. Figure 3 shows an overview of the solid waste stream and the organization of solid waste management in Addis Ababa. The boxes shaded grey refers to the case study locales.
FIGURE 3: The solid waste system in Addis Ababa, showing the waste stream from the households to the landfill site at Repi, the various stages in the reuse and recycling process, and the various actors’ involved at various stages. Grey-shaded locales are those selected as case studies.

In each of the locales, there are also actors that interfere in the processing of waste but are not physically involved in the processing. The city administration interferes through having overall responsibility for solid waste management, and donors are involved through research and projects designed to improve the service provided. Figure 4 shows the various actors’ involved in each of the locales selected for study.
The final step is to look at all the categories (actors, problems, norms in the locales) as a process, putting them together and seeing them in a historical aspect as well as linking them (actors and power relationships) to various scales or exploring the creation of new scales. In my case, five periods of fieldwork resulted in all of the studied locales being repeatedly analysed in order to identify the direction of the development of a particular locale over time. The reasons for emphasizing the local scale concerned methodology and the ability to conduct a grounded empirical study of solid waste management in Addis Ababa. It is also easier to observe and study at the local scale how power relations materialize. By adopting this analytical framework, it is possible to identify conflicting interests and sequences, which in turn make it possible to evaluate the direction in which processes are evolving, understand the production of solid waste management in Addis Ababa, and identify factors that promote change.

2.4 SOME THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND CHOICES

Urban political ecology can be seen more as a theoretical framework than a uniform theory. I find UPE to be a good framework for studying solid waste management with a critical approach to what is happening in Addis Ababa. It has allowed me to focus on important aspects such as power and politics across scales that other approaches would have failed to address. However, UPEs is a complex framework that takes many aspects into consideration.
I therefore chose to focus on some aspects more than others. Accordingly, in my theoretical framework, I have chosen to emphasize some aspects more than others. The main emphasis is more on power and scales than history and culture, because history and culture are given a broader place in my empirical work, where reviews of documents were important for understanding both the history of solid waste management and the political history in Addis Ababa. Further, culture is emphasized through the relatively long period of time spent in the field, to gain familiarity with the culture and the ‘ways of doing’, as well as to understand better the actions taken by the various actors.
PART THREE: BACKGROUND TO THE RESEARCH CONTEXT OF ADDIS ABABA

This provides background information on Addis Ababa and the solid waste management situation in the city. I start with a description of the historical development of Addis Ababa and then briefly describe the socio-economic situation in the city. In addition, I describe recent and current organizational changes within Addis Ababa City Administration (AACA). Although it would be useful to include a section on the political culture, this is not done because it is described and discussed in the five articles. A description of the municipal solid waste management system and the informal recycling sector in the city is given, to provide readers with a more in-depth understanding of the solid waste situation in the city and to understand better the local context under study.

3.1 THE ESTABLISHMENT AND DEVELOPMENT OF ADDIS ABABA

Addis Ababa was established as the capital of Ethiopia in 1989, when Emperor Menelik decided to relocate there from his palace at Entoto, on the top of the escarpment of present-day Addis Ababa (MEDAC, 2000). The city is characterized by a rugged topography, with an altitude of 3000 m above sea level in the northern part of the city, whereas the southern part is flat and lies at an altitude of c. 2000 m above sea level. The earliest settlements in the city developed around the king’s palace, with camps allocated to high-ranking officials and warlords, spread around at various distances from the palace. Vacant spaces separated the dignitaries from those of their subordinates, and the first settlements within the city were characterized by many small villages (Yirgalem, 2008). Over the years, the growth of the city has led to a gradual infilling of the vacant spaces, resulting in the emergence of a residential structure where the wealthy lived side by side with the poor. The mixed residential structure of poor and rich living in proximity still exists to today. However, in the last three decades a few predominantly high-income residential areas have emerged, first in the areas of Bole and Mekanisa, the site of the former airport. A new upper-middle class residential area is currently developing on the eastern peripheries of the city. The western part of the city is occupied more by administrative services, including the headquarters of administrations and palaces. By contrast, the eastern part is dominated by business activities, such as those in Merkato, the biggest market in the city.

Ethiopia is the second largest country in Africa, with almost 80 million inhabitants (CSA, 2009). The country is also one of the least urbanized countries in Africa, with only 16% of its
population living in urban areas (UN-HABITAT, 2008a). Today, Addis Ababa has a urbanization rate of 6% and is one of the fastest growing cities in East Africa (UN-Habitat, 2008b). The growth of the city has accelerated dramatically since the mid-1970s, driven mainly by unemployment, poverty, and declining agricultural productivity in rural areas and improved income and employment opportunities in the city. In 1910, the city had 70,000 inhabitants, by 1961 the total had increased to 443,000, by 1984, the population was 1,412,575, and in 1994 the population reached 2,112,737 (UN-Habitat, 2008b). It is estimated that today Addis Ababa has c.4 million inhabitants and is still growing rapidly (3.8% per year) due to immigration from rural areas (40%) and its own natural increase (CSA, 2003). It is projected that the population will reach 5.1 million by 2015, resulting in Addis Ababa becoming home to 30% of the urban population in Ethiopia (UN-Habitat, 2008b). With this fast urbanization, the city has also shown extensive physical growth over the years (Figure 5). In the 1920s, the area covered by the city was estimated to be 33 km², by 1984 it had grown to 224 km², by 2003 it was estimated to be 527 km² (CSA, 2009).

![Settlements from 1886 to 2003](Yirgalem, 2008)

FIGURE 5: The physical growth of Addis Ababa from 1886 to 2003 (Yirgalem, 2008).
The physical growth and development of the city have been affected by the lack of efficient urban management. Since the Italian occupation in the period 1936–1941, six master plans have been prepared for Addis Ababa, but none have been implemented and this has resulted in spontaneous urban growth and development in the city (Yirgalem, 2008).

Visitors to Addis Ababa today may be impressed to find that a new ring road has been completed and high-rise apartments, offices, and hotels dominate the main streets and central areas of the city. New houses and factories are rapidly emerging both within the city and in its hinterland. Villas dominate in middle-class and wealthier areas, whereas in several parts of the city blocks with low-cost housing have been built. The city fringe is expanding to the south-west of the city and the road to Nazareth is becoming the main industrial road in Ethiopia. Visitors to the capital may have the impression of a well-built and spacious city, yet the buildings and roads overshadow the real situation in the city, giving a misleading impression and hiding the low-standard housing and urban infrastructure.

FIGURE 6: View of the city towards Churchill Road and Mexico and a low-income neighbourhood in Addis Ababa.

Due to Addis Ababa’s function as the capital city, the seat of the Ethiopian Government, the African Union, and various international organizations and embassies, over the years the city has been given the majority of social and economic infrastructure. Despite construction activities in recent years to provide housing, commercial buildings, and new roads, the urban services and infrastructure cannot cope with the city’s rate of development. There is an urgent need to build or upgrade an almost non-existent sewage system, as 95% of the residents have no access to a sewer or drainage line (AAWSSA, 1999). Access to water is limited, and 47% of the households have no direct access to portable water. The existing water infrastructure is in a poor condition, with an estimated 35% of the water entering the distribution system not
reaching consumers (AAWSSA, 2008). The municipal bus transport is inadequate and a more flexible and expensive private minibus system has taken over responsibility for most of the transport in city. Air pollution is a serious problem, created by both car traffic and the use of traditional fuel sources. Solid waste is not properly managed and is disposed of in the rivers running through the city (Bjerkli, 2005; SBPDA, 2003). The situation is worsened by the fact that new residential areas are constructed before any infrastructure is in place (Yirgalem, 2008).

Today, a growing socio-geographic segregation is at work, where the poorest segments of the population are forcefully relocated to the urban fringe. Unemployment in the city is increasing and has reached 31.4%, and is expected to increase further due to the fast growing population in the city (UN-Habitat, 2008b). This is further reflected in the increase of informal employment, which has now reached 69% (Fransen & Dijk, 2008). Moreover, the cost of living in the city has increased dramatically since 2004. This is mainly due to the devaluation of the Ethiopian birr, which has resulted in an almost doubling of prices of everyday products such as bread, gas, charcoal, water, and vegetables, making it harder for the majority of Ethiopians to make ends meet.

FIGURE 7: Solid waste disposed in rivers running through the city.

3.2 THE ORGANIZATION OF ADDIS ABABA CITY ADMINISTRATION

Addis Ababa is the capital of the federal government of Ethiopia. Since 1997, the city government has been designated a considerable degree of self-rule compared to other cities in the country. This is also the case for Dire Dawa, the other chartered city in Ethiopia.
government administers its own affairs and reports directly to the federal government. This has given the city a considerable degree of self-rule compared to other cities in Ethiopia.

Ethiopia has a long history of a highly centralized government, both under Emperor Haile Sellassie and during the Leninist military regime led by Mengistu Haile Mariam, commonly referred to as the Derg in Amharic (Poluha, 2004). The first changes in the structure of the Addis Ababa city administration after the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) came to power in 1991 were introduced in 2003. This was part of a national decentralization process under the District-Level Decentralization Program and as part of the Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Program (SDPRP) supported by donors and officially introduced to give more power to lower levels of government, to strengthen their institutions, and to improve the delivery of urban services. When the SDPRP was implemented, the former city council and its executive organs were dissolved on the grounds of inefficiency and lack of good governance. Prior to the administrative reform, the city had been divided into six zones, consisting of 28 woredas (districts), which in turn were divided into 328 kebeles (subdistricts). After the reform, the woredas were renamed sub-cities and reduced to 10, which were further divided into 99 kebeles (the smallest administrative unit). In 2010, the 99 kebeles were further reorganized into 102 woredas.\(^9\)

AACA consists of a council that is elected for a period of five years and is responsible for the administration of the city. The main function of the council is to make municipal laws and approve the annual budget. Under the city council, there is an executive committee of 15 members drawn from the city council and are responsible for the day-to-day management of the city. The executive committee is further divided into three subcommittees respectively responsible for the economy, social affairs and administration. The subcommittees each have five members, all of whom report to the executive committee. The executive committee is accountable to the residents and the prime minister of the federal government. The AACA has a cabinet with executive power, led by a mayor. As Figure 8 shows, under the mayor, there is a city manager, and a deputy city manager who is responsible for the nine agencies within the administration: the Land Development and Administration Authority; Infrastructure Development and Construction Authority; Sanitation, Beautification and Park Development Authority; Road authority; Fire and Emergency Service; Code of Enforcement Service; Housing Agency; Acts and Civil Record Service; and the Sewage and Water Authority.

\(^9\) In this study the word kebele is used in reference to the smallest administrative unit in the city. The reason for this is that the reorganization took place while I was conducting my research and most citizens in Addis Ababa still continued to refer to kebele and not to woredas.
The sub-cities are organized in a similar fashion to AACA, with an elected committee, a Sub-City manager, and nine different agencies which are mandated to administer matters under their jurisdiction and provide support for the kebeles. The kebeles are given power to administer local matters, such as the preparation of budgets and plans and the collection of taxes. They are also responsible for the provision of municipal service fees, recruitment services, education, food assistance, health care, and credit. In addition, the kebeles run the community social courts and local prisons. Today, the kebeles are officially the main level targeted for development within the city.

The restructuring of AACA in 2003 improved the management of urban services in the city (Yirgalem, 2008). The achievement in transforming AACA under Mayor Arkebe is seen as a turning point in the history of its performance. There may several reasons for the implementation of the reform and for AACA’s improved performance. Yirgalem (2008) discuss the reasons for the achievement by questioning whether there was a genuine commitment to addressing the increasing socio-economic problems facing the city, or whether it was politically motivated by the fact that the deteriorated state of the city had become an
embarrassment for the government, particularly when hosting regional heads of states such as during meetings in the Africa Union. Yirgalem also question whether the decentralization process intended to gain more control over civil society. However, the results of the reform were only temporary. Since the national election in 2005, AACA has returned to its former state of inefficiency and unstable administration (Yirgalem, 2008). Article 2 gives an example of how the decentralization process has affected the management of solid waste between 2004 and mid-2011.

Parallel to the decentralization process, several other reforms have also been implemented to further promote an efficient city administration and improve good governance. One of the reforms is the National Capacity Building Program. This programme is designed to increase the capacity of the government, but with emphasis on the kebele level as a means of empowering local communities in order to promote democratization and improve service delivery. As part of this programme, in 2004 AACA and the Ministry of Works and Urban Development adopted a business management strategy called business process re-engineering (BPR). The aim of the reform was to improve service delivery and capacity within state institutions by reducing the bureaucratic structures and procedures, removing non-performing civil servants, and increasing the capacity of the remaining civil servants. The reform resulted in the reorganization of most agencies within AACA, in order to reduce bureaucracy and ensure that the city administration would be more efficient. Studies have shown that since the implementation of BPR, the level of bureaucracy has been reduced and has led to increased efficiency (Getachew & Common, 2006). Prior to the introduction of BPR, applicants for a license to register a company had to go through 14 steps and wait for at least 8 days, whereas since the implementation of BPR the procedure has been reduced to 6 steps and the average waiting time reduced to 39 minutes (see Appendix 1 for reductions the time taken for procedures before and after the introduction of BPR). In addition to reducing bureaucracy in the city administration, the BPR strategy also involved re-evaluation of the officials working within the administration. The evaluations were made in 2009 in Addis Ababa, and all officials had to reapply for their jobs according to a grading system (see Appendix 2). A search undertaken during fieldwork revealed that 50–70% of the criteria were based on behaviour. Many have argued that the Ethiopian Government has used BPR as an opportunity to put loyal people in the ‘right’ places and to purge those who are not loyal (Human Rights Watch, 2010). Several informants such as former high-level party members and interviews with civil servants also confirmed that evaluations based on loyalty to the ruling party were commonly used before the introduction of BPR.
Both the decentralization process and BPR have officially been adopted and implemented to give more power to the lower levels of administration and have resulted in institutional reorganizations and a high turnover of civil servants. The structural changes, how they are implemented, and their outcome for the management of solid waste are discussed in more detail in Articles 2, 3, and 4.

3.3 THE SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT SITUATION IN ADDIS ABABA

Visitors to Addis Ababa rarely have the impression that the disposal of solid waste is a serious problem in the city. The main streets and avenues appear quite clean and street sweepers can be seen cleaning the main roads. Whenever there are big meetings, such as the African Union summits, the city is even cleaner. In addition, in high-income areas such as Bole and Mekanisa (the site of the old airport) the solid waste situation seems to be much better than in relatively low-income areas. However, upon entering most neighbourhoods, the picture is quite different and it is clear that solid waste is an increasing problem in the city (Bjerkli, 2005; SBPDA, 2003; Tadesse, 2004; UN-Habitat, 2008b; Yirgalem, 2001; Zelalem, 2006). The solid waste situation in Addis Ababa is characterized by increasing waste generation due to increased levels of consumption, growing immigration from the rural areas, and the city’s own demography. Further, the poor solid waste situation is worsened by the lack of technical and institutional capacity to deal with the increasing generation of waste in the city. Waste accumulates in the urban environment, causing bad odours and clogging the drainage channels, and accumulations of waste have become breeding grounds for insects and vermin which pose a threat to human health and the urban environment (ILO, 2009; Kinfe, 2002; ORAAMP, 2002; SBPDA, 2003).

FIGURE 9: Waste thrown in the street and in the river in Addis Ababa.
3.3.1 WASTE GENERATION AND COMPOSITION

Addis Ababa City Administration operates with data on waste generation and composition that were compiled by Norconsult in 1982. Given that the data are 30 years old, they are no longer representative for the current situation. The Sanitation, Beautification and Park Development Authority (SBPDA) estimate that currently the generation of waste per capita per day is 0.221 kg, which is equivalent to a total of 217,795 tons per day for the city as a whole, based on the population census for 2008. The composition of solid waste in Addis Ababa is similar to that of cities in other developing countries, which also have a high percentage of organic materials. Based on the study conducted by Norconsult in 1982, it is estimated that 70% of the waste was organic, 15% paper, and 15% plastic and metals. However, these data are highly questionable, and do not give a representative picture of the waste generation and composition in the city. Addis Ababa has grown rapidly in recent years, and its population and physical size have more than doubled since the study was conducted (in 1982). Moreover, the consumption habits have changed as a result of the growing middle-class. New products have entered the market, and especially plastic and electrical items have increased compared to 30 years ago, in the early 1980s. Enormous construction activities have also taken place in the city in the last 10 years (i.e. since the early 2000s) and it can be assumed that the amount of construction waste has increased dramatically compared to when Norconsult’s study was conducted. In addition, most of the inorganic materials are reused and then sold or given away for further reuse or recycling by the informal recycling sector operating in the city, and are not even entering the municipal waste stream (Bjerkli, 2005).

According to the SBPDA, 71% of waste is generated by households, 10% is disposed of in the streets, 9% is generated by commercial institutions, 6% by industries, 3% by hotels, and 1% by hospitals. The estimation was made based on the research conducted in 1982 and is not representative of the current situation in the city. For example, in the last 10 years (i.e. since the early 2000s), the city has experienced a huge growth in the number of hotels, commercial institutions, and industries, and the recent construction activities are likely to have resulted in an increase in construction waste that has not been taken into consideration by SBPDA when estimating the amount of waste generation and composition. By contrast, although the demolition of neighbourhoods (such as Arat Kilo in 2010, in line with the current master plan for the city) has generated large amounts of waste materials, some of the waste has been sorted out and sold for reuse. Despite this, some types of waste, such as cement, are not taken into consideration in the city planners’ budgets for waste disposal.
3.3.2 THE ORGANIZATION OF SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT, 1994–2011
The way that solid waste has been managed and the service provided in Addis Ababa has changed during the last 18 years. The institutional organization of solid waste and the service provided since 1994 can be subdivided into three periods: waste generated though health care, when the responsibility for disposal fell under the Health Department; waste associated with beautification, when the Sanitation, Beautification and Park Development Authority (SBPDA) had main responsibility for its disposal; and today, when the Solid Waste Authority has the main responsibility for managing waste disposal and the main focus is on integrated solid waste management (ISWM) and recycling. In this section, I describe how solid waste management has been organized and the reasons behind the reorganizations of the Solid Waste Authority.

From 1994 to 2003, solid waste management was organized under the city health bureau in the Department of Environmental Health Care. Seemingly, in the organizational structure of Addis Ababa Health Bureau (Figure 11), solid waste management was overshadowed by many other activities carried out by the bureau. The long bureaucratic chain also made it difficult to coordinate the different actors and hindered efficient mobilization and use of resources (SBPDA, 2003, 2004b).
FIGURE 11: Organization of solid waste management within the Health Bureau of AACA.

As part of the national decentralization process in 2003, responsibility for solid waste management was reorganized so that it came under the Sanitation, Beautification and Park Development Authority (SBPDA). As part of the reform, departments responsible for solid waste disposal were also established at Sub-City and kebele levels with the aim of
decentralizing the services and increasing their efficiency. At central level, the SBPDA was organized under two executive managers: a General Manager and a Deputy Manager. Under the two managers jointly, there were three departments: the Planning, Research and Coordination Department, the Operations Department and Park Development, and the Administration Department. In addition, there were five sub-departments: Landfill Administration; Planning and Research; Training, Public Education and Support; Solid Waste Administration; and Transportation Administration and Maintenance. Further, in each Sub-City and kebele, one person was appointed to be responsible for solid waste (Figure 12). The responsibility of SBPDA was to act as a regulatory and policymaking body to set standards, coordinate activities among sub-cities, deal with cross-cutting issues, deliver technical support and capacity building, manage the city’s dump site, run public awareness programmes, and conduct research. The sub-cities were responsible for the daily operation of activities within solid waste, such as collection and transport. In addition, they were responsible for conducting campaigns and undertaking activities related to composting and recycling. Each Sub-City had its own budget and was responsible for ensuring long-term management of solid waste, and implementing programmes and regulations, as well as monitoring and evaluating them. The kebeles were responsible for the daily operation of solid waste management in their neighbourhoods, control, and reporting to the sub-cities the services provided.
In 2009, the SBPDA was reorganized in line with business process re-engineering (BPR). The agency changed its name to the Solid Waste Management Agency and Landfill Project Office. Compared with the previous organization of the agency, the structures were more or less the same. The main change was that the Park and Cemetery Department was taken out and established as an independent agency. Further, the reorganization aimed at giving even more power to the sub-cities and the kebeles. I was unable to obtain any detailed information about
the organization structure and the new roles and responsibilities of the various levels of the administration, despite several attempts.

The way in which the management of solid waste has been organized and approached over the last 18 years (i.e. since 1994), seems to have been affected by the current discourse on waste in the international agenda. This is clearly reflected in the names of the agencies responsible for waste at given times. The reorganizations are also in line with the official claims of good governance to improve urban services and increase the accountability and efficiency of the city administration, and are a consequence of national ‘commitments’ in line with the SPRSP and BPR to decentralize and make the city administration and urban services more efficient. This has resulted in an institutional restructuring of the waste authority and changes in roles and responsibilities. A comparison of the structural changes of the agency in the three different periods reveals that the city administration has decentralized responsibility for solid waste down to Sub-City and kebele levels. The Solid Waste Management Agency has also become more specialized, at least on paper; it focuses only on solid waste, is not seen as part of the Health Bureau, and does not have responsibility for areas such as park and beautification. Currently, the various tasks within solid waste are organized under different departments, such as the Planning Department and the Implementation and Operation Department, which reflects how solid waste management has gained more attention in recent years. However, more than structural changes are needed to improve the management, and Article 2 describes and shows how the various organizational changes within AACA have been adopted, implemented and affected solid waste management in Addis Ababa.

In line with the structural changes of the waste agency, the official visions and ethical principles have also changed. Visitors to the Solid Waste Management Agency today will be confronted with a sign listing the visions of the agency (Figure 13). The agency’s visions and ethical principles also confirm the city administration’s official focus on good governance. However, they include the principle ‘loyalty’, which is not included in good governance but is shown in the five articles forming part of this thesis to be one of the most important principles to which the agency is committed.
3.3.3 SOLID WASTE SERVICES PROVIDED TO HOUSEHOLDS, 1994–2011

As in other cities in Africa, the solid waste situation in Addis Ababa has been affected by the urbanization process and the expansion of the city. Further, the high prevalence of low-income neighbourhoods has made it difficult for the refuse collection trucks to access large parts of the city. The solid waste services provided in Addis Ababa have also changed from being seen as solely the responsibility of the city administration to also involving non-state actors, in line with neoliberal policies.

Between 1994 and 2003 there were mainly two types of collection system offered by the city administration. One system was a door-to-door service offered to households located close to the main roads. Shortages of vehicles and frequent breakdowns made it difficult to keep to schedules, resulting in a poor and inefficient collection system with irregular and few collection times. In addition to the door-to-door service, waste was also collected via municipal containers placed near the main roads. Hence, many of the households’ members had to walk long distances in order to dispose their waste in the containers. Due to lack of containers and collection trucks and frequent breakdowns of the trucks, it was common to see
containers overflowing with waste. As a consequence, people commonly resorted to either burning or disposing of their waste in nearby rivers or on open plots of land (Bjerkli, 2005; Zelalem, 2006). During this period the informal sector saw the opportunity to start offering to households a waste collection service either once or twice a week for a monthly fee of 10–15 birr.10

In 2003, the informal pre-collectors operating in the city were formalized. The formalization was part of micro- and small-scale enterprise (MSSE) development in the city and in line with SDPRP supported by international donors to privatize and improve urban services and create employment among the urban poor (ORAAMP, 2001; SBPDA, 2004a). (see Appendix 3 for a copy of the newspaper article reporting the agency’s perspective). In addition to the pre-collectors, the container system continued to be offered to those living along the main roads. However, the containers were placed within neighbourhoods and controlled by officials from the kebeles, in order to ensure that the MSSEs disposed of the waste in a proper manner. In this period (2003-2005) the solid waste situation improved, but the services provided were offered only to those who could pay for them, thus leading to segregation in service provision among the citizens. In addition to the container system and the door-to-door collection by MSSEs, the city administration also employed 1137 street sweepers in 2003 (SBPDA, 2004a). However, the street sweepers only cleaned the main roads and avenues, leaving most of the city without access to the service.

FIGURE 14: Pre-collectors at work (ILO, 2009)11.

10 1 Ethiopian birr is equal to USD 0.06. The Ethiopian birr has been devaluated the recent years and since 2008 the value has declined by almost 45%.
11 The photos accredited to ILO, were supplied by ILO in 2009.
In 2009, the MSSEs were reorganized into cooperatives in line with BPR. The cooperatives were employed by the kebeles and were paid according to the amount of waste collected per cubic metres. The reorganization was intended to improve service, increase employment levels, and collect waste fees through the water bill system. The introduction of the new system meant that everybody had to pay and everybody should get the service. According to the Solid Waste Management Agency, the implementation of the new system was successful: it had improved the amount of waste collected in the city and contributed to the employment of almost 13,000 waste collectors organized in 520 cooperatives. A critical approach to the development of the solid waste service offered in the city from 2004 to mid-2011 is discussed in Article 2.

3.3.4 STORAGE AND TRANSPORTATION OF SOLID WASTE

Over the years there have not been enough containers for waste collection in Addis Ababa and the condition of many of the containers is poor, as shown in Figure 16. In 2003, the municipality had 512 (8 m³) f containers, which meant that one container served c.7500 households. By 2007, the number had increased to 587, but this did not make any significant difference in terms of improving the collection capacity (SBPDA, 2003). According to an article in Addis Fortune, the municipality bought 1000 new containers in 2011 (Appendix 4). Based on the newspaper article the new containers did not seem to be compatible with the existing collection trucks, and interviews revealed that they had been bought because the local government had money left from a World Bank project. When I returned back to Addis Ababa in November 2011, none of the containers was to be seen in the city and none of the new officials had heard about them.
From 1994 to 2003, the city administration had the main responsibility for the transportation of solid waste. According to the ILO (International Labour Organization), the Solid Waste Management Agency had 77 trucks in 2003, 72 in 2004, 70 in 2005, and 60 in 2006. From 2003 to 2010, the number of trucks decreased in the city, due to their age. Frequent breakdowns and maintenance requirements resulted in many of the trucks being out of service; in 2004, out of a total of 72 trucks, only 36 worked daily). However, in 2009, in line with BPR, the responsibility for maintaining and running the trucks was given to the sub-cities in an attempt to improve the efficiency of the transportation of waste. Further, the agency bought 44 new trucks in 2010, and implemented three shifts in 2010 instead of two under the previous system (06.00–14.00 hours and 14.00–18.00 hours). Today, the trucks should run continuously (i.e. 24 hours per day) and this has improved the capacity of the transportation of waste in the city (ILO, 2009; SBPDA, 2004c, 2004e).
3.3.5 THE REPI DUMP SITE

The current dump site at Repi covers an area of 25 ha and is located in the south-western part of Addis Ababa, in Kolfe Keraniyo Sub-City, c.13 km from the city centre. Repi is the only dump in Addis Ababa and when the site was established in 1964 it was located on the outskirts of the city. With the growth and expansion of the city, the site has become surrounded by settlements and currently it represents a threat to human health and the environment (Figure 18 and 19).

FIGURE 18: Location of the dump site Repi.
Today, the dump is full and is improperly managed. There is no drainage to capture leakages or runoff. Further, the dump is not enclosed by a fence and is not covered with soil on a daily base. Due to lack of a weighbridge, the amount of waste disposed on the site during the years has been poorly recorded (Yirgalem, 2001). In 2003 there were four bulldozers, but only one was working (SBPDA, 2003). Further, the road leading to the site is in a very poor condition and becomes almost unusable during heavy rains. Hence, on some days no waste can be collected from the city. Currently, the dump is also a work site for c.500 scavengers, who make their livelihood by collecting waste both for their own consumption and for resale.
Over the years, few investments have been made in solid waste management in the city and very little has been done to invest in new equipment and resources, such as refuse collection trucks, containers, and landfill sites. This has resulted in a deterioration of the solid waste system and the service provided. However, today more efforts seem to be made to improve the management of solid waste in the city, and this is further discussed and analysed in Articles 3 and 4.

3.3.6 REGULATIONS GOVERNING SOLID WASTE

Today, there are several laws and regulations concerning the management of solid waste in Addis Ababa. At the national level, the Environmental Protection Authority (EPA) has the main responsibility for implementing laws to protect the urban environment and the management of solid waste. In 1997, EPA in collaboration with Ministry of Economic Development and Cooperation published an environmental policy for Ethiopia, which included aspects of solid waste management (EPA, 1997). However, the first national policy for solid waste was not published until 2007. The aim of the policy was to ‘enhance at all levels capacities to prevent the possible adverse impacts while creating economically and socially beneficial assets out of solid waste’ (FDRE, 2007: 3525). The policy includes collection, transport, and disposal of solid waste. It refers primarily to the obligations of urban administrations to ensure the proper planning, implementation, and monitoring of solid waste. The focus is on city administrations’ responsibilities and on decentralizing responsibilities to the lowest levels of administration in order to fulfil the obligations. In the third part, the proclamation focuses on regulations to manage waste glass, plastic bags, used tires, food, household waste, and construction waste in a sustainable manner and with focus on proper handling, segregation, reuse, and recycling. Part 4 deals with transportation and disposal of solid waste, where the focus is on technical inspection of vehicles used for transporting solid waste as well as ensuring proper management of disposal sites in line with the environmental regulations. In 2004, the city administration published a solid waste regulation – the Waste Management Collection and Disposal Regulation of the Addis Ababa City Government (AACA, 2004) – which serves as a framework for how individuals and private enterprises should manage and dispose of their solid waste in a sustainable way.

Despite all the regulations being good in theory, few of them are adapted by the city administration and citizens and very little is done to enforce them. In most cases, it is also difficult for citizens to follow the regulations, because they do not have access to a proper
solid waste system that allows them to manage their waste in line with the regulations. The claim that households should segregate their waste seems meaningless when the city administration has not established any formal system for the collection of segregated waste. It is also meaningless to argue that every person is obliged to dispose their waste in a sustainable way when some have to walk 1 km in order to do so and even then often arrive to find that the container is already overloaded. Hence, there is a big gap between what the regulations require and the reality on the ground, and this makes it difficult for the city administration and citizens to follow the regulations.

In 2004, the SBPDA developed a list of targets and strategies for improving solid waste management in the city, in line with the above-mentioned policies and regulations (Appendix 5). However, by 2011 none of the targets had been meet. Today, the laws and regulations seem to exist only on paper and are rarely followed up. One of the reasons for the lack of ability to follow up the regulations and implement them is that they are not adapted to the realities in the city and the culture within the city administration. This point is discussed further in Articles 2, 3, and 4, were I argue for the reasons for the low level of efficiency within the city administration.

3.4 THE INFORMAL RECYCLING SECTOR IN ADDIS ABABA

The informal recycling system in Addis Ababa is similar to other informal recycling systems found in urban areas in developing countries. It consists of different actors who are involved in activities related to the collection, trade, reuse, and recycling of waste. The system is highly organized and consists of eight levels and nine different groups of actors: households, foragers, scavengers, Qorqoro alleh,12 pre-collectors, wholesalers, middlemen, small-scale craftsmen, and local industries.13 Figure 21 shows an overview of the organization of the informal recycling system and the actors involved.

---

12 *Qorqoro alleh* is the local name for itenant junk buyers.
13 Some actors operating in the informal recycling system were not included in the study, namely foragers, middlemen, rural traders and representatives of local industries. The reason behind this choice is that the foragers seem to be randomly and irregularly involved in the collection of solid waste. Further, the rural traders and factories are seen as important actors but are not directly involved in the management of solid waste in the city and therefore not included in the study. However, some interviews were conducted with factory owners in order to explore their views, although emphasis is not given to their role in the system.
At the bottom of the hierarchy there are the scavengers who collect waste materials from the municipal landfill. It is estimated that today there are c.500–600 on-site scavengers who make a living from collecting waste materials for their own consumption or for reuse or recycling. Most of the scavengers are individuals who live in the village nearby. However, the scavengers also include a group of boys who live at the site and claim that the site belongs to them. They are different from the average scavenger and are organized by one boss who is in charge of c.20 boys (Textbox 2). Each scavenger usually specializes in collecting one type of material, such as grass to feed animals, plastic sheets for fuel or sale, and old shoes. The materials collected for reuse and recycling are stored either at the site or in the village nearby.
The most common practice is to store the materials until there is a large enough amount to sell to middlemen or to rent a truck and transport the waste to Männ alleh/alleš tāra.

**TEXTBOX 2: GROUP OF BOYS OPERATING AT REPI**

Boys have been operating at Repi for the last 25 years (i.e. since the late 1980s) and the current boss has lived on the site for 15 years. He not only became the boss but also the caretaker of what he calls his children, which are 17 boys who either live at the site or come to the site and spend their days there. The boys collect items for recycling at the site and often accompany the drivers of the municipal trucks, especially if they are collecting waste from the Sheraton Addis hotel or other institutions where they assume they can find valuable items. This enables them to sort out the materials before they reach the landfill and secure the best items, and they proudly showed me the bed sheets and plates from the Sheraton Addis hotel. The boys give all salvaged materials to the boss, who sells them to middlemen that visit the site. In return, the boss is responsible for taking care of the boys, and providing them with food and clothes. The income varies between 500 and 1400 birr per day. The boys live from day to day and do not have any saving system like ekub but instead spend any money they have or find another way manage without it.

Interviews with the boys and the other scavengers indicated that there were no problems among the scavengers and the boys. However, the boys regarded the sites as theirs and controlled who was entitled to enter the site. This was evident from the stories told by the boys. For example, when the municipality was working on a methane project, representatives asked the boys to watch the equipment. The boys required 150 birr per day for this service, which would cost 20,000 birr in total, and therefore the municipality decided to drop the project. Some years later the municipality tried to start a similar project but according to the boys, hyenas came and destroyed the pipes they had installed. The boys were laughing when telling the story, but the incident shows the power that the boys exercise at the site and that not only the municipality but also other people try to access the site, such as myself.

At the time when I conducted my fieldwork, no one had contacted the boys with offers of support. When I asked them whether they had thought about the possibility of organizing themselves, they replied that it would be pointless because they would not receive support from the municipality and even if they were to become organized the government would take any money they were supposed to have.
At almost the same level as scavengers there are foragers, who collect materials from the municipal containers and the streets. My reason for ranking foragers slightly higher up in the system is based on the quality of the materials collected. It is common for foragers to scavenge municipal containers for valuable items by living on the site and occupying the containers and claiming the rights to materials disposed in them or they scavenge the rivers flowing through the city in hope of finding valuable materials such as metals.

At the next level, one finds the Qorqoro alleh, who buy materials mainly from households and to a limited extent from the foragers, pre-collectors, and dorojes\(^\text{14}\). The Qorqoro alleh differ from the foragers and the scavengers because they buy materials before they enter the waste stream. The quality of the materials they collect is therefore higher than that collected by foragers and scavengers. Moreover, the Qorqoro alleh have a strong upward link in the system to the wholesalers who operate in Männ alleh/allesh tära. Their close connection with

\(^{14}\)The local name for a group of criminal street boys.
the wholesalers is mainly based on their ethnic background as members of the Gurage ethnic
group. It is estimated that currently c.3000 Qorqoro alleh operate in the city, all of them male,
and dominated by young boys in their twenties (Bjerkli, 2005). Most of the Qorqoro alleh
have a contract with a wholesaler in Männ alleh/allest tära who gives them money each
morning to buy materials. This forces the Qorqoro alleh to sell the materials they buy to the
same wholesaler. If a Qorqoro alleh collects materials that their wholesaler does not buy,
there is the option of selling them to middlemen who contact the Qorqoro alleh, wholesalers,
and small-scale craftsmen.

FIGURE 24: Qorqoro alleh at work.

The pre-collectors participate in the collection of solid waste from households. They are
involved in the collection of materials for recovery to some degree, though sorting out
materials from the waste they have collected. The pre-collectors sell their materials to the
Qorqoro alleh or go to Männ alleh/allest tära in order to sell the materials directly to a
wholesaler. The wholesalers constitute the main link between the various actors. Most of the
wholesalers are located in Männ alleh/allest tära, the main centre for trade and reuse of waste
materials in the city. In recent years, other areas have developed around the city for trade of
waste materials, including Kera, Saris, and Megenagna. However, the scale of activities in

15 The pre-collectors started to become involved in collection of waste materials for reuse and recycling in
2000, when they saw the opportunity to offer waste collection services to households.
these areas is small compared to those in Männ alleh/allesh tāra and therefore they were not included in the study.

FIGURE 25: Wholesaler specializing in old shoes and in plastics.

The *middlemen* form the link between the informal and the formal actors, making contact with factories. With regard to the intermediaries operating between the wholesalers and the factories, I was not able to confirm how common or widespread their position is within the system. I found that there were some intermediaries operating within the system, but not how many and whether it was common to use them or more common to make agreements with the factories directly. The results of my fieldwork confirmed that waste materials collected in other cities are transported to Männ alleh/allesh tāra, and traders from rural areas travel to Männ alleh/allesh tāra to buy materials wholesale for further sale in rural areas. Ranked above the wholesalers are the *small-scale craftsmen*, who are mainly located in Männ alleh/allesh tāra and make use of waste materials to produce local items such as electrical stoves, large metal plates used to wash clothes, shoes, and cooking equipment, and to repair broken items such as luggage, old toys, and old shoes. In addition, there are *rural traders* and *industries* who buy waste for recycling.
3.4.1 MÄNN ALLEH/ALLESH TÄRA
When Ethiopia was under the occupation by Italy (1935–1941), the Italians relocated 90% of the local population in Piazza (the main market area for the local population) to Addis Ketema (Amharic for ‘the new city’), and Merkato developed as the main market for the local population in the city. For many years, Merkato has been known as the commercial centre of the city and is often referred to as the largest open market in East Africa. Merkato comprises different täras (market centres), including Männ alleh/allesh tära. The meaning of the Männ alleh/allesh tära in Amharic is ‘What have you got?’ Hence, the name is very appropriate because in Männ alleh/allesh tära there are hundreds of shops that collect, convert, and resell waste materials and it is possible to find almost anything one is looking for.
One asphalt road passes through Männ alleh/allesh tāra, which is good enough to be used by cars. The area is so crowded that people have to watch every step they take: people with several cubic metres of loads on their bowed heads run straight ahead yelling in Amharic that others have to move out of the way; cars travel in all directions, using their horn to warn people to move out of the way; donkeys with huge loads on their back trot along without paying any attention; and women and young boys sit on the ground selling e.g. vegetables or old shoes.
FIGURE 28: Pictures showing the main road through Männ alleh/allesh tära.

Visitors entering Männ alleh/allesh tära for the first time may find the experience difficult, but also exciting. One does not know what to do with oneself, because there is almost no space for you, yet it is an amazing experience to see all the activities, sense the busy atmosphere, and see the huge hills of used plastics, metals, shoes, electrical items, tires, and glass. When walking around the small shops visitors are sometimes amazed by the creativity involved in items made out of waste materials, and if they listen carefully, there may find that the sound of the metalworkers is like music to their ears (Melaku, 2011). Männ alleh/allesh tära appears messy and crowded, and the impression is not one of a well-organized area. On closer inspection, however, the area is highly organized in terms of the types of activities taking place. Each of the main täras is named according to the dominant type of activities related to waste practised in them.

16 This is evident in a video of Melaku Belay, an Ethiopian dancer who dances to the rhythms of the metalworkers in Männ alleh/allesh tära.
The main täras for the trade of waste materials in Männ alleh/allesh tära are Chid tära, Korkoro tära, Kulf tära, Termus and Barrel tära, and Barabaso tära (Figure 29). The types of materials vary and range from scrap metals, plastics, barrels, bottles, corrugated iron sheets, and clothes that can be reused. Visitors can see young boys and men sitting while they repair old shoes that have been collected from throughout the city, whereas a few metres away...
someone may be making metal stoves for charcoal, of a type that is commonly used in 
Ethiopia for coffee ceremonies and cooking. Used metal containers that originally held paint 
or food are cut and made into plates that can be used to make either charcoal stoves or other 
kitchen items. Old oil containers are cut up and made into washing containers. Plastics 
containers are usually collected and washed for reused or sold to plastic factories. Old brake 
plates are used to make chairs, and old luggage and toys are repaired and then sold again. 
Barabaso, an area located on the edge of Männ alleh/allesh tära, specializes in vehicles tyres 
that are longer usable on vehicles. The tyres are converted into shoes known as barabaso. 
Tyres are also cut to long ‘ropes’ that are commonly used for horse-drawn carriages in rural 
areas of Ethiopia.

FIGURE 30: Pictures showing sandals and ropes made of old tyres, repair of old luggage and old bikes.
PART FOUR: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Methodology is much more than a systematic way of collecting, analysing, and interpreting data. A researcher’s choice of methodology reflects how they see the world, and their personal experience and understandings of the actions taking place within their research context. Methodology also concerns the role of a researcher and their relationships with any participants. In my case, it is linked to how I decided to carry out the research and how I considered and constructed the information given to me. Here, in Part Four, I start by arguing the case for my choice of methodology and the methods I used. I also give a brief overview of my interviewees and how I selected them. Further, I elaborate on the interpretation of data analysed during fieldwork, reflect upon myself as a researcher and the research context, and explore my relationships with the participants. Thereafter, I describe how I analysed the data, in order for readers to understand how I constructed and made sense of the data collected during and after fieldwork and to increase the validity and reliability of the data collected. Finally, I reflect upon the ethical choices that emerged during the research process.

4.1 AN ETHNOGRAPHIC APPROACH

The choice of methodology was closely related to my objectives and to my theoretical framework urban political ecology. My aim was to understand and explain the underlying reasons for the solid waste services provided in Addis Ababa. Since my focus was on exploring actors’ subjective views and agendas and how these are negotiated in the local context, I chose an ethnographic approach in my study. The aim of an ethnographic approach is to understand the world more or less as it is experienced and understood in everyday life by the people under study (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1996). I see the social world as dynamic and constantly constructed through the intersection of cultural, social, and political processes at various scales (Creswell, 2007). In line with UPE, I believe that each person has their own social constructions of reality; in my case, the reality concerns solid waste management. Further, I believe that social constructions are not seen as equally important within society, due to the distribution of power and how power circulates in a given context. My focus has therefore been on the stories told by the participants involved in solid waste management, in order to understand their lived experiences and how their subjective views have been linked to their actions. This was done in order to identify the causes of and reasons for actions and decisions made within solid waste. My emphasis was therefore on obtaining first-hand empirical knowledge about solid waste management, in the belief that experience is the best
way to understand social behaviour (Crang & Cook, 2007). Ethnography is rooted in phenomenology, where the aim is to identify the subjective experience of people in order to understand and describe their world in relation to a particular phenomenon, which in my case is solid waste management. However, in order to understand a person’s experience, one also has to see that person as part of a larger context and the interaction between them and their social world. It is only through social interactions that meanings are established and learned (Owens, 2007: 301). Ethnography is therefore an approach that involves the collection of subjective facts, and the interpretation of meanings, functions, and consequences of human actions and cultural practices and how these are implicated in the local context (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1996).

In the next section, I describe my research design, and argue the case for the methods chosen. In addition, I describe the process of selecting and gaining access to participants included in the research.

4.2 RESEARCH DESIGN

The research was based on five sessions of fieldwork conducted in Addis Ababa. The first session was carried out between September and December 2009, and was followed up by fieldwork in March–April 2010, October–December 2011, April 2011, and October–November 2011. My presence in the field over a relatively long period of time was part of my theoretical approach. I wanted to follow developments within solid waste management and the also implementation of policies and their outcome. The long period of time spent in the field also proved essential for my understanding of the solid waste management, and enabled me to become more familiar with the local context and the participants.

4.2.1 SELECTION OF METHODS

The main method used in the study was semi-structured interviews. Through the interviews, I was able to gain information about the participants’ subjective views and thoughts. However, other methods such as personal observation, participation in workshops and seminars, document and newspaper reviews, and field notes were also used. It was essential to combine the methods in order to collect different types of information and to compare and cross-check the data collected. The different methods have distinctive strengths and potential and were been combined to understand better the social complexity of solid waste management in Addis Ababa. The purpose of combining the methods was not to answer one specific research
question or to analyse a specific part of the data collected, but rather to facilitate the analyses done in the field. In this way I was able to confirm and cross-check information collected through semi-structured interviews and to gather additional information about the solid waste situation that I was not able to collect through interviews (Moran-Ellis et al., 2006). A description of the methods used and my aim are described in the following subsections.

Semi-structured interviews were the main method used and were conducted with all actors involved in the research, with the purpose of collecting their views on solid waste management. The reason for choosing semi-structured interviews was that I had certain main topics that I wanted to discuss with the participants (see Appendix 6 for the interview guides). At the same time, I wanted to be open to other information and aspects that could come up during the interviews, i.e. that I had not thought about in advanced or was not aware of (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009). As the research progressed, I realized that I needed to hold several interviews with some of the participants. Although prior to undertaking the fieldwork I had not planned to do this, I became aware of the importance of talking to some of the participants several times, for three main reasons. First, I wanted to gain an understanding of the participants’ situation over time and then relate their views and actions to decisions or events that had occurred in the local context in order to have a better understanding of the reasons for them. Second, several interviews were conducted with some participants in order to confirm or dispute information provided by other participants. Third, I wanted to gain more trust from some of the participants involved in the research. I did not plan to hold a fixed number of interviews with each group of participants, but continued to arrange interviews as long as I felt that this was necessary in order to obtain more information. As the research progressed, new knowledge about the topic led to new participants, and this contributed to a fuller understanding of the subject under study. The interview process was stopped when I considered that I had reached saturation level and no new information seemed to emerge. I conducted 175 interviews in total. An overview of the interviews, my aims, and the constraints to the interviews is listed in Appendix 7.

Observations were made every day during fieldwork. Upon my return to Addis Ababa, I first walked around in the city and observed the solid waste situation. Solid waste management is one of the most visible urban services and can provide much information about what is going on in the city as well as being a good indicator of local governance. While walking, I observed the amount of waste in the streets, rivers, and open fields and whether the refuse containers had been emptied or were overflowing with waste. In this way it was possible to observe whether there had been any change in the solid waste situation in the
city compared to the situation during my previous visit. I found observation to be essential for gaining an understanding of the everyday practices of solid waste management and in order to compare my personal observations with the narratives of the various participants (Bailey, 2007). I also participated in workshops arranged by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)\textsuperscript{17}, the Ministry of Urban Affairs\textsuperscript{18}, and Addis Ababa City Administration\textsuperscript{19}. During the workshops, my emphasis was on observing their views and listening to their arguments, and also to collect general information about the solid waste situation in the city.

Newspaper reviews were conducted for two newspapers, namely the Addis Fortune and Ethiopian Herald, published between 2004 and 2011. The reason behind their selection was that both of them are English newspapers and therefore I was able to perform the reviews without the assistance of an interpreter. There were three main reasons for conducting the reviews. First, I wanted to explore the image of solid waste presented in the media and compare it to what was observed and said during interviews. Second, I wanted to see whether there is a link between events in the city, such as the millennium celebrations, and the frequency of solid waste articles. Third, I wanted to collect additional information about solid waste management in the city. The relevant newspaper articles I found are listed in Appendix 8.

In addition to the above-mentioned sources, I intended to read through municipal documents in order to collect background information on the solid waste situation in the city. However, in practice it was quite difficult to access such documents from the city administration. The only document I was able to view was a PowerPoint presentation from 2010. I experienced the same problem in Addis Ketema Sub-City, when I asked about reports on solid waste. However, the experience was not just limited to the Solid waste Management agency. When I tried to obtain from the Planning Department a copy of a local development plan for Mānn alleh/allesh tāra, I was informed that the report had disappeared. Similarly, at EPA, I was informed that the person responsible for the documents and reports was not available. When I visited a project office established for collaboration between AACA and the Agence Française de Développement (AFD), I was told that the reports were not official material. However, because I had carried out my master’s degree in Addis Ababa in 2004, I

\textsuperscript{17} Training workshop on Integrated Solid Waste Management (ISWM) based on 3R organized by UNEP (22-24 February 2010).
\textsuperscript{18} Ethiopian Landfill and Solid Waste Management workshop arranged by Ministry of Works and Urban Development (25 October, 2009).
\textsuperscript{19} Panel discussion about the national cleaning day arranged by Addis Ababa City Administration (24 October, 2009).
already had copies of some reports on solid waste dating from 2002 to 2004 that I was able to use. It should be mentioned that the ILO was the only organization willing to give me a copy of their studies and reports conducted on solid waste in the city.

During fieldwork I always had a field notebook with me, in which I recorded my observations and thoughts about possible understandings or misunderstandings of a situation or an interview, and how participants had acted or reacted during interviews. Throughout the research process, any new questions and new thoughts or relationships that came to mind were written down with a view to exploring them later. While the notebooks were important during fieldwork they were equally important at a later stage in the research process, as reading them helped me to ‘return’ to the field and remember details and feelings and recollect details of the data collection (Bailey, 2007; Emerson, Fretz, & Shaw, 2011).

4.2.2 SELECTION OF INSTITUTIONS AND GROUPS OF ACTORS

Before going to the field I had not planned to interview a fixed number of participants, although I had selected institutions and groups of participants based on my knowledge gained during the preparation of my master’s thesis and my theoretical framework. Representatives of the following institutions and organizations were selected for interview.

Addis Ababa Environmental Protection Authority (AAEPA). AAEPA is responsible for the overall environment in the city and is involved in research, planning, and pilot projects concerning solid waste management. I selected two representatives (and one follow-up interview) of the authority in order to collect background information about solid waste in the city, the official norms and regulations, and AAEPA’s views on the solid waste situation and future plans regarding solid waste management. Addis Ababa City Administration (AACA). The Solid Waste Management Agency in Addis Ababa comes under the AACA and has the main responsibility for the overall solid waste services provided in the city. I selected five AACA representatives for interview (and eight follow-up interviews) in order to gain more information about its role and responsibilities, the current solid waste services, its views on the current services, and its plans for solid waste management in the future. Sub-City. Each Sub-City has a solid waste department responsible for solid waste management in the Sub-City. The departmental manager of Addis-Ketema Sub-City was therefore interviewed on four separate occasions in order to collect information about his views, role, and activities carried out at Sub-City level.
Kebeles. Each kebele has a solid waste department responsible for solid waste services. The solid waste manager of the selected kebeles was therefore interviewed in order to collect information about his views, role, and activities carried out at kebele level. In total, I conducted seven interviews with the various solid waste managers. Micro- and small-scale enterprises (MSSEs). MSSEs operated as pre-collectors until 2009, when they were forced to reorganize themselves into cooperatives. I interviewed three former representatives (managers) of the MSSEs (and five follow-up interviews) and the cooperatives in order to collect information about their views and experiences regarding their work and the reorganization process they have undergone. Households. Members of households were interviewed in order to explore households’ opinions on the solid waste services provided and how the new provision of services compares to the services provided earlier. The information collected through the interviews with 20 households in Addis Ketema Sub-City was included to increase the reliability of the study, with the aim of identifying whether the provision of services had improved or decreased following the implementation in 2009 of a new regulation in line with BPR. Scavengers. Currently, there are c.500 scavengers who make a living by collecting waste from the municipal landfill, for their own consumption, reuse, or recycling (ILO, 2009). I interviewed five scavengers (and three follow-up interviews) that operated at Repi, in order to explore their views, agendas, activities, and role related to solid waste management. Qorqoro alleh. Young boys who go from house to house to buy reusable or recyclable items, which they sell to wholesalers operating in Männ alleh/allesh tära, are known locally as Qorqoro alleh. In total, 30 Qorqoro alleh were interviewed (and 6 follow-up interviews) in order to explore their views, agendas, activities, and role related to solid waste management in the city. Wholesalers. Waste items for the reuse and recycling trade are purchased by wholesalers who form the central link between the actors operating in the informal recycling system in Addis Ababa. In common with other actors in the informal recycling system, I selected six wholesalers for interview (and four follow-up interviews) in order to explore their views, agendas, and activities related to solid waste management. International organizations. Several international organizations have been involved in solid waste management in Addis Ababa. I aimed to explore their activities, views, and agendas by interviewing representatives. A total of eleven interviews were conducted with participants in international organizations. Local NGOs. Many local NGOs are involved in solid waste management. For my case study, ENDA Ethiopia is the main NGO, not only in terms of the length of time it has been involved but also because it has been involved in most projects concerning solid waste in the
city. I conducted eleven interviews with representatives of ENDA Ethiopia and other NGOs in order to explore their views, agendas, and activities related to solid waste management. For a more detailed overview of the interviews see Appendix 7.

The participants involved from AACA, Addis Ketema Sub-City, and kebeles were selected purposively. This was also the case for some of the international organizations, MSSEs, cooperatives, and local NGOs involved in solid waste management. However, some of them were selected using the snowball technique because I was unaware of them as potential actors before going to the field (Bailey, 2007). They were therefore included as the research progressed. With regard to actors operating in the informal recycling sector, all were selected randomly using the snowball technique. In some cases, it was a challenge to access participants, particularly the scavengers and wholesalers. During fieldwork several attempts was made in order to approach them, as described in Textbox 3.

**TEXTBOX 3: ATTEMPTS TO ACCESS SCAVENGERS AND WHOLESALERS**

*Scavengers:* The easiest way to access the scavengers would have been to go through the city administration, since it controls the dump site and is familiar with the people who make a living from the site. However, approaching the scavengers through the local government would, from the outset, have destroyed my relationships with the participants. Given the tense political situation in the city at the time when I conducted my fieldwork and my previous experience of accessing the scavengers, I was concerned that I could be viewed as someone from the municipality and I was not willing to take this risk. My focus was therefore on ensuring a positive first meeting with the participants. My first attempt to access the scavengers was with my interpreter, when we decided to visit the dump site. When we stopped our car, we were immediately surrounded by boys who occupy the landfill and it was clear that we were not welcome. The first question I was asked was ‘What do you want?’ It became apparent that I was not the first person who had tried to contact them when one of the boys said ‘We are not monkeys. You guys just come here to take pictures of us and ask us questions. You take what you want and you disappear.’ After trying to explain who I was and what my interests were, they told me that I could enter the site if I paid 1000 Ethiopian birr for one interview. I then decided to leave and wait for another opportunity to access them.

A few weeks later, at a seminar I came in contact with a local NGO representative who had been working on a methane gas project at Repi and that person was willing to accompany me to the site. The person knew the ‘boss’ and arranged a meeting between us. When we arrived at Repi, we received more or less the same greeting as I had on the previous occasion. It turned out that the previous ‘boss’ was no longer present. A new boy had taken his place and we were asked to leave. However, I was able privately to arrange meetings with the previous boss and held four informal interviews with him in the city. Still, I wanted to access the scavengers at Repi in order to gain information from other scavengers elsewhere.
During my next fieldwork session, I decided to contact an NGO who ran a school close to Repi. My hope was to be introduced to a student with some form of relationship with the scavengers. I talk to the school principal and asked him whether any of the students collected waste at the landfill or had done in the past. I was fortunate to make contact with one boy who made a living as a scavenger and was willing to introduce me to other scavengers. Upon entering Repi with the boy, again the boys that occupied the site clearly indicated that they were displeased to see me and acted aggressively. Nevertheless, they allowed us to walk around and talk to the other scavengers. The scavengers who were willing to talk to me were clearly slightly stressed and the atmosphere was tense.

Also the wholesalers were difficult to access. I knew that they had organized themselves into associations, but had no idea of their locations. Therefore, I went to the Chamber of Commerce in Merkato to ask for the names of some of the associations and any contact information. I was provided with contact information for one man, who telephoned to arrange for a meeting. However, he failed to turn up, and instead sent another man to meet me. I did not reflect much upon the change of plans at the time, but as research progressed I experienced such behaviour several times with other participants. Given the tense political atmosphere in the city at the time when the fieldwork was carried out, it may have been a strategy to check first that it would be safe to talk to me. The selection of other wholesalers was done using the snowball technique. Some of the participants seemed quite reluctant to meet me and give information about other participants. Most of them seemed to fear what could happen if they talked to me and were clearly sceptical of me and my agenda. I developed the feeling that they did not want to place some of their friends in the same position. In some cases, it was plain that they did not want to talk to me and adopted different strategies to avoid me, most often by not answering my phone calls or showing up at prearranged meetings. In one case, one of the participants showed up at a meeting only to tell me not to try to contact him ever again. As research progressed some of the wholesalers also realized that they were not going to gain any benefits from talking to me and then seemed even more reluctant to be interviewed. At the end of my last fieldwork session, I contacted one of the participants who I had frequently met and had developed a good relationship with, and asked him about his first impressions of me. He responded: ‘We thought you were an investor interested in Männ alleh/allesh tära. We were therefore not sure if we could trust you, but we decided to meet you and check things out. You know, we can never be sure that you are telling us the truth and that there is another reason for contacting us.’ After having met a few of the wholesalers, I sensed that some of the new interviewees already knew about me. I had the impression that the interviewees had talked to each other about me, because they seemed prepared for my questions, knew who I was, and were aware of my agenda. My suspicions were confirmed when I arranged a meeting with one participant, and upon asking where we should meet, he replied ‘We can meet at the same place you were asking about Korkoro tära last week’.
The selection of scavengers and wholesalers in the two cases presented in Textbox 3 was random. The cases also show how the political context had made the participants sceptical of strangers and their agenda, and in some cases had resulted in them being reluctant to become involved in the research. In both cases, some of the participants also had their own agenda, including the hope of payment or other benefits such as a good contact, and did not only become involved to give me information (as further discussed in Section 4.6, on ethical reflections). In the case of the scavengers, it is possible that if previous researchers had not fulfilled their promises and it may explain the reluctance to participate. Also, the dominant view of the scavengers within society has affected their own view of themselves and could explain their unwillingness to be involved in the research. These two cases show how the political context, participants’ agendas, and their views of me as a researcher affected my access to them and also information they provided (Bailey, 2007). In the next section, I explore how the research context, the use of an interpreter, actors’ agendas, and power relationships affected the information collected and the research process.

4.3 ‘TRIPLE HERMENEUTIC’: THE EFFECTS OF USING AN INTERPRETER

Because I did not speak the local language I had to use an interpreter during some interviews.20 I chose to use the same interpreter as I had used during the research for my master’s degree. My reasons for choosing him were that we had a good relationship, I trusted him, and he was familiar with the research topic and my interests. Since the political atmosphere in the city was tense, it was important for me to have an interpreter with a personality that made people feel relaxed. The interpreter was a man in his early thirties and without a formal education. However, I regarded him as a reflective and engaged man. He was down to earth, a good listener, and did not interrupt the participants when they talked. He was also good at breaking up a formal and tense atmosphere by telling a joke or discussing a current topic of conversation. In addition, he was very observant and during interviews he helped me to decode words such as ‘bee’, which in Addis Ababa refers to the ruling party, as well as words frequently used by the ruling party, such as ‘transformation’, which could indicate that participants were member of the EPRDF. As Clark & Michailova (2004) point out, the roles of my interpreter were not just a decoder of words and an interpreter of

20 The use of my interpreter was mainly with participants involved in the informal recycling system, the cooperatives, and officials at sub-city and kebele level.
interviews; he was also my local and cultural guide, who explained local customs and everyday practices, and a person with whom I could discuss my findings and thoughts.

As a result of the political atmosphere in Addis Ababa, I chose not to use a tape recorder and in some cases not even a notebook during the interviews, mainly to avoid scepticism on the part of participants who did not know whether they could trust me or my intentions (as shown in the case of the wholesalers). After interviews, my interpreter was a valued discussion partner regarding what the participants had said and to ensure that we shared the same understandings of the interviews, including the different meanings of what had been said and how participants had acted during the interviews.

The way we see the world is based on social constructions, and in my case the data I collected represents the world seen by the participants involved in my research. However, the kind of information they chose to impart was affected by the context, my interaction with them, and their attitude towards me. The interviewees were responsible for information collected and translated by the interpreter. In turn, the interpreter was selective and analytical in his translation. Thereafter, I analysed the information and attributed meaning to it. Thus, the information was constructed and given meaning in three phases, and hence was selective by nature. It may have therefore have been a case of a triple hermeneutic rather than a double hermeneutic (Giddens, 1987). However, I would argue that even though I did not record the interviews, the data collected were cross-checked, followed up, and analysed throughout the whole process of data collection, in order to increase the validity and reliability of the information collected. Further, I consider my data to be reliable and valid because I used a range of techniques to validate them. In my opinion, the approach was the best way to deal

---

21 The tense political situation in the city is evident from the following quotes from two informants:

‘Ohh … I would never talk about politics anymore … not even with my family and neighbors because you never know anymore … the brother of my best friend has become a member now. I know it, but he is too ashamed to tell us … but he comes here and acts like nothing has happened … we know, so we don’t talk, so he has nothing to report. You know … even the children of my neighbors are told to go out in the street and observe. The reason I know is [that] on the Election Day they were standing on the corner right over there already at five [o’clock] in the morning … usually they are not up and out before eight [o’clock], so what were they doing standing at the corner just doing nothing?’

‘They came from the kebele and asked me how many election cards I had in my house and controlled the number of people and rooms in the house. Before leaving, they asked me what kind of party I was going to elect for in the coming election … I was afraid … you know the house I live in belongs to the kebele … so you never know what will happen if I do not support them.’

80
with data collection in a highly politicized context, although the outcome of the work is clearly limited in space and time.

4.4 POWER RELATIONS IN THE FIELD

Many have argued the importance of reflecting upon power relationships in the field and how they affect any information collected. In this section, I reflect upon me as a researcher, my relationships with the participants, and the process of collecting and analysing data collected in the field.

4.4.1 THE ROLE OF A RESEARCHER

During my research I was primarily an ‘outsider’ – a person who does not share the same characteristics as their participants, such as gender, ethnic background, language, and experiences (Dwyer & Buckle, 2009). As a young Norwegian female PhD student, my way of seeing and understanding the world was quite different from the participants involved in the research.

During my final session of fieldwork, I asked my interpreter to record in writing some of his thoughts and how he had experienced me and the research process. The following passage is quoted directly from his text:

The first time I know what for she is here, I thought, what kind of education is it and she is too young I said to myself. In the first place the research she is doing was funny to because I am expecting all researches will be in terms or titles of, like: medical things, agriculture, new technologies, etc. After days and years of hard working she shows me that my assumption was wrong. And also through her work she teaches me never to give up before I get what I’m up to. The good thing is she is my good friend and employer, the best thing I see is although we speak different languages and we had different skin colours we both can’t see the difference because there was no any difference!

The quote provides insight into my interpreter’s view of me and my work. First, I did not fit with his expectations of a researcher: I was too young and my research topic was far from what he considered to be research. He also pointed out that I never gave up before had I found the information that I was after. At times when I was unable to follow the logic and understand the contradictions in the participants’ narratives, this personality trait proved important for enabling the research to continue and progress. It took me some time to
understand the actors’ agendas and actions, especially because I was unfamiliar with their ‘ways of doing’ in the study context. In the above quote, my interpreter also makes the point that even though I was an ‘outsider’ with very different characteristics from his, ultimately we proved to be very similar. This is in line with Dwyer & Buckle’s (2009) argument that researchers are neither purely outsiders nor insiders. As we engage with our participants we are in some way or another involved and distinguished from them. Dwyer & Buckle (2009) talk about the space between, where the two positions cannot be conceived as absolute but as constantly changing, moving between the two positions. Being an insider or an outsider has benefits and limitations. One has to adapt to a different way of doing research and different techniques depending upon one’s position. In both cases, it is important to reflect upon the data collected and the social relationships that found place, and any misunderstandings that might have occurred.

4.4.2 SUBJECTIVITY, AGENDAS, AND POWER RELATIONSHIPS
I found the process of collecting and analysing data interesting and challenging, and it also enabled me to develop a deeper understanding of the context, and reasons for the participants’ actions and interactions. It is not easy to explore people’s views and agendas. Societies are much ‘messier’ in practice than the theories about them. People are complex, ambivalent, and inconsistent. The ability to engage with the messy world is seen as the most valuable contribution to ethnographic research. Researchers should not take a naïve stance and assume that what they are told is the truth. Instead, their research must involve a struggle to produce intersubjective truths, in order to understand why so many versions of an event are produced (Clark & Michailova, 2004).

Research participants make sense of the actions taking place around them and engage in the actions based on their culture, social class, experience, and their private interests. We cannot understand a person’s narrative or action without seeing it in relation to the context that the participant is part of (Wertsch, 1991). People have different experiences and act in the world at multiple points, times, and places. All these experiences and actions are rooted in gender, class, and ethnicity, and have to be understood in relation to a participant’s history. In order to understand a person’s narrative it is not enough to identify where people are (both socially and spatially), one must also question where they are coming from, going to, and where on these paths the research encounters have occurred (Crang & Cook, 2007). Further, a person’s identity can be understood as an assemblage of thoughts, feelings, and memories that
might not always fit together. In most cases, people’s views and thoughts are pragmatic, and in a state of flux and should be seen in relation to the context that they (people) are part of. The task for researchers is to recognize and come to terms with participants’ partial and situated subjectivity, in order to gain a deeper understanding of their narratives (Crang & Cook, 2007). The stories told can therefore not be seen as an absolute truth, but as constructed by the social actors themselves. Few people are completely honest or consistent in what they say in different contexts. On reflection, I have realized that some of the narratives presented during meetings with participants cannot be completely reliable. On some occasions the interview context affected the information given to me. For example, when kebele officials observed some of the interviews, the participants indicated that they had given what they thought was the ‘correct’ answer. On other occasions, the participants’ narratives changed, especially in the case of civil servants, whose narratives shifted from idealistic stories when they were employed by the city administration to a friendlier attitude and more honest answers after they had lost their jobs. The differing responses also reflect their agendas and position at the time, which varied from being committed to assisting me to trying to obtain some benefits in return. From the kebele level up to minister level, participants asked about the possibility of receiving, for example, scholarships and doctoral degrees. This shows how agendas are always changing and that participant are not always consistent regarding their narratives. This awareness enabled me to reflect upon the research process, the way the research was carried out, and the choice of methods used to try to uncover some of the messy realities in the field. However, in order to reflect, it was essential to be in the field over time and to identify where the participants were and where they were heeded. In the next section, I describe the research process in more detail and explore how it was shaped by power relations, actors’ agendas, and the local context. The purpose is to discuss how I dealt with power relations and changing agendas and how I dealt with the gap between the narratives presented to me and the practice I observed on the ground.

4.5 MAKING SENSE OF THE DATA – THE PROCESS OF COLLECTING AND ANALYSING DATA

Staeheli & Lawson (1994) argue that the relationships between a researcher, their participants, and the participants’ narratives will affect the information generated from them. Researchers cannot avoid the power relations that exist between themselves and their participants and therefore they should be more aware of these processes in the field. Researchers are also in a position to name categories, control information about their research agenda, and define
interventions. Such choices should be made more explicit in research, in order for others to understand the production of the data collected and to increase the reliability of the research (Crang & Cook, 2007; Flick, 2007; Harrison, MacGibbon, & Morton, 2001), and I intend to do this in this section.

The research process was not a straightforward task but was developed over time. During fieldwork, I soon realized that there was always an agenda behind the stories told to me and that part of my job was to understand why the stories were told. I therefore had to be flexible, patient, and adapt to a variety of different roles. By choosing a qualitative methodology, I had the flexibility to change focus during the research process (Hay, 2000). The research design was not rigid and was modified as my understanding of the topic changed, and new aspects were included that I had not previously considered. Sometimes I felt more like an investigator, lifting all the stones I could find in order to see whether there was anything of interest underneath. At every step of my fieldwork it was important to relate the information to the research context, the participants’ background, and my own relationships with the participants, in order to analyse the information and to be able to look for new understandings, relationships, and aspects. An essential part of the analysis done in the field in order to construct and make sense of the information was triangulating the information collected and not taking anything for granted. The more information I collected about a topic, the more I realized how complicated the social world is and at some point the complexity seemed infinite. For this reason, I used the constant comparative method (CCM), an approach used in qualitative research to analyse data, whereby collected data are compared continuously with previous data collected (Postholm, 2005). During the whole research process each interview was analysed and then compared with all other interviews. From the first interview and throughout the whole research process this led to new information, new questions, and new participants, in order to clarify issues, understand contradictions, to confirm or dispute information, and to try to understand the logic behind the data collected. This resulted in a continuous development of my understanding of the topic under study. In order for readers to understand and to judge the validity and reliability of my research, I adapted Boeije’s (2002) suggestion for how to conduct CCM. In the following subsections, I show how I analysed one interview, then interviews within a group of actors, and then between groups of actors. Further, the participants’ narratives are related to my own observations in the field and information collected through document and newspaper reviews, in order to evaluate the reliability of the information given to me. I have chosen to present the process of analysis by using one example of how I analysed an interview with a participant.
from AACA. I show how I used open coding and how the analysis led to the integration of new actors and to new questions. Thereafter, I compare the subjective views and narratives told by participants within the municipality and then between different groups of actors involved in solid waste. However, when data were collected and analysed in the field, there was much more across different groups of actors and the process was not as linear as presented here.

4.5.1 ANALYSING SINGLE INTERVIEWS

Following an interview, my first action was to discuss the interview with my interpreter. It was vital for me to spend a lot of time with my interpreter for three main reasons. First, given my interpreters knowledge of the spoken language it was easier for him to read the body language of the participants (e.g. whether they were nervous, arrogant, sceptical, or reacted to some of the questions). Second, since I chose not to use a tape recorder and in some cases did not take any notes during interviews, he helped me to memorize what was said, and hence I could be certain that my notes taken after the interviews were complete. Third, since he was Ethiopian and an insider, I found it helpful to discuss with him what had been said by the participants. Our discussions enabled me to reflect upon the information collected, to see it from different perspectives, and relate it to the context. After an interview, I needed to question whether some aspects needed to be explored further, whether new questions had arisen, and whether I should include new participants. All interviews were analysed using open coding, to determine what exactly was said and to label each quote with a code. My aim at that stage of the analysis was to find the core message of the interview, to reduce the information into codes and sub-codes, and to relate the information to the context and to my theoretical framework (Creswell, 2007). Table 1 shows an extract of part of my records of an interview with one participant from the city administration and how I coded the information. It also lists some of the new questions that rose after the interview, which led me to involve new participants and aspects in the research process.
### TABLE 1: Example of open coding of one interview and new questions that arose. The transcript is my own notes taken after the interview.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actors</th>
<th>Transcripts</th>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>New questions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>City administration</td>
<td>Our future plans for solid waste is that we want to apply the best technology available to our system. One of these is a new GPS system that we are planning for. This means that I can sit in my office and control the trucks operation in the city. A computer system where all the trucks are registered and I can see where the trucks are, how many trips the trucks has taken... We are also working on a ISWM plan that will be finished within three months and we have also planned to close Repi the old landfill within a few months and to construct a new sanitary landfill. We will also construct four transfer stations in the city in order to make the transportation more efficient. When the transfer stations are in place we will start sorting out organic materials there. The first years, this will be done manually and by time other materials will be sorted out. Have you thought about entering partnership with the Ḍorgoro alleh and the wholesalers in Männ alleh/allesh tära when you will start with source separation? No, they are an un-modern system and we want to establish a good system for reuse and recycling. They will be allowed to continue to work but will not be included in our system.</td>
<td>Modern, high-tech, control, ISWM plan, new landfill and transfer stations, source separation, ignorance of the informal actors, traditional</td>
<td>How will the new system affect the current system? Try to get the ISWM plan. Talk to those who has worked with the plan – how has the process been what are the main findings and plans? Talk to those responsible for Repi – what will happen to the scavengers? Talk to the scavengers – what is their view and have somebody given them any information about the closure of Repi? Talk to official at higher levels about future plans within solid waste – why isn’t the informal recycling sector taken into consideration? What will happen to the informal recycling sector if they implement the new system? Which of the systems will be most efficient?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In some cases the information from interviews was not used due to the interview setting. For example, when I conducted interviews with representatives of the cooperatives, I had planned to hold them a quiet café, where I thought we would not attract too much attention from people around us. However, when we started to walk towards the café nearby the kebele building, one person from the kebele came and told us that the kebele manager would not allow us to do the interview outside the kebele office. Upon entering the kebele building, I headed for an open room in the middle of the building. However, I was told that we were not allowed to sit there either, but instead had to hold the interviews in the manager’s office. Consequently, the interviews were conducted under the observation of the kebele manager and three other kebele officials. During the interviews, I sensed that none of the participants were honest but gave me ‘official’ answers. Although I finished the interviews as intended, I did not ask all of the questions I had intended to ask. I was concerned about the reaction of the kebele officials and did not want to put the participants in a difficult situation. Although the data collected through these interviews were not used in my analysis, the event was an experience of the type of control that the kebele officials have over the cooperatives and gave me a more in-depth understanding of the way power is distributed and used by actors in the city.
4.5.2 ANALYSING INTERVIEWS WITHIN A GROUP OF ACTORS AND BETWEEN
GROUPS OF ACTORS

When conducting new interviews, the same procedure was followed as described in Section 4.5.1 above. All interviews were then compared with previous interviews conducted with participants within the same group of actors. I considered whether any new aspects to the topics, whether there were any contradictions among the information collected, or whether there were different meanings represented among the actors within the group. The process of comparing the interviews helped me to identify common views and information that differed between the participants. The interviews with representatives of the city administration serve as an example of how I compared the information given to me by the participants in one group of actors, how this affected the research process, and how I constructed the information.

Common to the city administration participants’ narratives was that everything seemed to be working well within solid waste management in the city. However, when I related this information to my own observations in the field, I found that it was contradictory. This resulted in some confusion at the beginning of the fieldwork and I often wondered how I could establish the truth when information given to me clearly did not fit with what I had observed on the ground. Also, when discussing plans for the future, I was given different information depending on who I was talking to. Since I was unable to access any reports on solid waste in the city, it was difficult to identify what source of information on plans was most reliable. This led to interviews with other participants, in order to confirm some of the plans that I had been informed about, such as the Minister of Works and Urban Development, EPA, the ILO, the AFD, and the city manager. After several interviews, I was able to rely upon one account more than others. Further, the plans presented to me did not correspond to what is seen as technically the best way to approach waste. This left me confused and I had to start to question the plans.

During interviews with officials, it became clear that most of them had limited knowledge related to solid waste management. In order to understand the participants’ background and whether they had any experience or education related to solid waste, I asked them about other officials and participants and soon discovered that only a few of them had any formal education or experience relate to the management of solid waste. Moreover, my experiences in the field showed that it was difficult to have an overview over who was responsible for

---

22 An example is given in Article 3 where I describe how some officials informed that organic waste collected from households was to be sorted out for composting at the planned transfer stations. That would lead to contamination of the organic waste and in turn to low quality compost.
what within the city administration because the turnover was high at all levels. As a consequence, I found it difficult to identify various participants’ roles and responsibilities and to obtain the contact information for relevant persons. In addition, it was difficult to have continuity in my relationships with most of the participants within the city administration. My presence in the field over a relatively long period of time proved essential for identifying and understanding the underlying reasons for the narratives and behaviour of the participants. My relationship with one of the participants serves to illustrate this point quite well. During the first interview with one civil servant I was more or less told ‘fairytales’ about the solid waste situation in the city and in an interview with the same participant one year later the narrative had changed, as the notes from my field diary show:

You know Ato … has not even completed his first degree, so he got the job only because of political reasons. That’s the problem ... politics comes first and because he doesn’t have any education it is difficult for him to take a decision because he don’t know what is best for solid waste in the city and they don’t listen to us professionals. That’s the problem with Ethiopia, it is only politics. There is a misuse of human resources and we are not able to use our skills and we have to do what they say. It’s all about politics and control.

I had not anticipated that he would impart such information, and therefore started to think about the reasons for the sudden change in behaviour. After the interview, I started to talk to other participants within the municipality and soon realized that the participant had just lost his position, which may explain why he felt that loyalty to the party was no longer important. This information also revealed that the poor level of knowledge among officials was a result of the political culture within the city administration, where loyalty to the party is the most important criterion for employment and not knowledge, education, or any other experience.

As a result of the process of going back and forward to confirm and dispute information and relate it to the context, I was able to figure out the contradiction in the information given to me. Given the political culture characterized by upward accountability, I realized that officials would never question orders given from the top. They would never admit to failure or reveal that there are problems or lack of knowledge, but instead adhere to the success

23 It seemed as though his agenda had changed. By being honest and telling me what he thought I wanted to hear, he was hoping to benefit personally. During the interview, questions about studying for a doctoral degree in Norway came up, and his attitude towards me changed from being authoritarian to suddenly inviting me for Sunday dinner with his family.
stories through fear of being fired. The city administration participants’ narratives were therefore idealistic stories about the solid waste situation, and are part of the reason why I had trouble identifying the logic in the information I received, because it did not match the situation I observed on the ground. My suspicions were also confirmed during several interviews with civil servants over time.

There were many groups of actors involved in the research, and I although I do not discuss all of them here, one example serves to show how I analysed the information provided by representatives of the city administration and the wholesalers. From the interviews, it was clear that their views and agendas relating to solid waste management differed and were conflicting. I was therefore able to identify possible areas of conflicts between the two groups of actors. Due to my awareness of the city administration’s views and agendas, it was easier for me to understand the views, agendas, and actions of the wholesalers. Through the wholesaler’s narratives and their experiences of their relationships with the city administration, the wholesalers confirmed the bureaucracy and high turnover rate of officials within the city administration. By comparing the information given to me by the different group of actors I was able to cross-check the narratives and increase the reliability of the results. This was just one example of how I analysed and compared interviews and how I related the information to the context in order to understand the narratives and to identify the participants’ positions in terms of their agendas and power in the field.

4.5.3 CODING AND ANALYSING DATA AFTER RETURNING FROM THE FIELD

According to Bailey (2007), analysing data means breaking down the data collected into components, in order to interpret the meanings and place them in context. As described in section 4.5, my analysis started already in the field, when I tried to identify meanings and understand the information given to me. When I returned to my office in Norway, I started to read through my records of the interviews and the analyses done in the field, and enter the open coding into Excel. I then read through my interviews and field notes one more time and coded the data. As Bailey (2007) argues, at this stage in data analysis it is important to reduce the amount of data collected. By doing this, I found it easier to identify the different categories among the actors, whether there were any relationships between them, and whether there were any similarities or differences between the actors (Gibbs, 2007). At this stage, I used axial coding (Creswell, 2007), whereby categories developed in individual interviews were compared and related to each other. When doing this, I tried to relate phenomena to each
other, to key events, and to contextual factors, in order to identify a storyline by relating the
different categories to each other and to the research context. I also started to read through my
field diary, looking for reflections and thoughts that could be linked to some of the categories.
This enabled me to identify any relations between attitudes, strategies, behaviour, and
decisions taken by the various actors. The final stage in my analysis of the data was to relate
the coding of the data to my analytical framework. Organizing my data in line with the
analytical framework allowed me to see the production of solid waste at the various locales
over time more clearly and to understand the underlying reasons for the development.

4.6 ETHICAL CHOICES AND REFLECTIONS

Doing fieldwork involves interfering in the lives of the participants involved research. As
Kvale & Brinkmann (2009) argue, this affects the participants in several ways, and therefore
doing research is an ethical and a moral issue. According to Hay (2000: 25), ethics is about
‘the conduct of researchers and their responsibilities and obligations to those involved in the
research’. Research should therefore be founded on the expectations that it will not harm the
participants. At best, research should give something back to the participants. However, in the
field it is not always easy to ensure that ethical principles are upheld. As I have outlined in
this section on methodology (Par Four), fieldwork involves interaction between researcher
and participants, and in such relationships there are always expectations and struggles over
the power that influences the interactions (Hay, 2000).

Ethics usually refers to informed consent, privacy, and confidentiality, and the avoidance
of any actions that could harm participants. Informed consent means that participants agree to
be involved in research and that they understand what they are agreeing to (Hay, 2000;
Silverman, 2011). All the participants involved in my research were informed about the aim
of the study, the topic, and why I wanted to include them in my study. In addition, I informed
them that that their participation was voluntary and that they could withdraw at any time
(Bailey, 2007). However, my experience of informed consent proved not to be
straightforward. Even though the participants had been informed about the aim of the research
and why I wanted to talk to them, it was clear that some of them did not trust me and were
clearly sceptical of me and my intentions. In other cases, the participants had first agreed to
participate and later told me not to disturb them any more (as in the case of the wholesalers
described in Textbox 3). Some of the participants also tended to avoid me after our first
meeting (i.e. the time when they agreed to become part of the research) by not answering my
phone calls and not showing up at meetings. During the research process the informed consent change with time and as research progressed, with the result that some of the participants initially agreed to participate but later decided to withdraw from the research.

Confidentiality means protecting participants, not revealing private information, and ensuring that it is not possible for participants to be identified. In my case, confidentiality was important due to the political context in Ethiopia. Some participants were fearful of becoming involved and being honest, due to the possible consequences it could have for them. Some of the officials within the city administration placed themselves in a situation where, if they were identified, they could lose their job due to not being loyal. Hence, in this thesis I do not mention any names or personal characteristics, and the participants are only referred to collectively as groups of actors. However, as a researcher one never has full control over the research context. In the field, there is likely to be many people who observe who one is talking to, and in my case I was never completely sure whether anyone had observed me with a participant and informed others about it. Such ethical and moral questions arose throughout the research process and changed in nature depending on the participant and the research context. I had to address the questions every day, in order to evaluate whether or not I would have to exclude certain participants.

Also reciprocity is a central issue when doing fieldwork in developing countries, and is a debated issue because it involves moral issues about what is right and wrong. The practice of offering gifts or paying participants can affect local expectations, power, inequality, and personal discomfort, which in turn presents ethical and moral dilemmas (Hammett & Sporton, 2012). The ethics of paying participants is widely debated, and Van Blerk (2006) argues that researchers cannot expect to interfere in people’s daily life and just take without giving anything in return. Payment is seen as important in order to compensate participants for their personal time. However, it is acknowledge that paying participants might affect the reliability of any information collected, leading to participants only becoming involved in research due to the economic benefits. By contrast, Meth & Malaza (2003) argue that providing participants with some financial benefits might acknowledge the power relations between the participants and the researcher, thus leading to more honest relationships. McKeganey (2001) argues that the practice can lead to a culture of expectations that participation in research involves financial rewards. I experienced this during my fieldwork, when some of the scavengers refused to take part in the study unless they received financial compensation.

24 From my field notes, I estimate that the participants did not turn up at 34% of my meetings.
Also, in my relationships with the Qorqoro alleh, I experienced that some of them expected some kind of payment, as they had heard rumours from other Qorqoro alleh involved in an international research project who were receiving 30 birr per interview. In the case of the scavengers (group of boys), I decided not to pay them for interviews because I consider it unethical to pay 1000 birr and I was also concerned about what the money would be used for. I was uncomfortable about the prospect of contributing to the culture and concerned that the information given to me would not be reliable (Ensign, 2003). In the case of the Qorqoro alleh and the other scavengers, I decided to pay each of them 30 birr for an interview. The main reason for this choice was that I wanted to compensate them for their time and to give something back to them. However, as discussed in previous sections (4.5), I reflected upon the information they provided, in an attempt to increase its reliability.

4.7 THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING IN THE FIELD OVER TIME

My experience showed that research is not a straightforward process, and that it was affected by power relations between me and the research participants, the participants’ agendas, and the local context. The process of collecting data gave me a deeper understanding of Ethiopian society, the accepted behaviour, and everyday life, and proved to be an essential part of my findings. I could not have gain this experience and understanding without have spent as much time in the field. Further, the fieldwork made it possible for me to confirm or dispute the information I received and without it my analysis would have been based purely on assumptions. If a researcher is unable to see developments over time, they lose access to essential information that otherwise may explain the current situation.

During the research process, I also experienced self-doubt and doubts about my findings. On several occasions I questioned whether the solid waste management system in Addis Ababa was really as bad as I thought it was. I asked myself whether I had buried myself in my own views and theories, and was failing to recognize other understandings and underlying reasons. At such times, I returned to my data and tried to abstract my experiences and instead to look for other understandings. It was therefore important for me to return to the field and observe and to discuss my thoughts and understandings with Ethiopians. However, I tried to acknowledge the complexity of representation inherent in transcriptions and to disclose how the transcription process unfolded throughout the research. This in turn, contributed to the reliability of the empirical data collected and analysed, and has affected the rigor or trustworthiness of the overall findings. However, the research presented in this thesis focuses
on the participants’ stories, and therefore the outcome of the research has subjective aspects in terms of my experience and relationships with the participants.
PART FIVE: SYNTHESIS AND CONCLUSION

In this section I present a short summary of the five articles included in Part Seven and the relation between them. I also synthesize the arguments that emerge in the articles, put them into a broader perspective, and see them in relation to my research questions and theoretical framework. I start with a brief summary of the articles and then discuss the main topics that have emerged, before ending with the conclusions of the research.

5.1 SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLES

My aim has been to understand the production of solid waste management in Addis Ababa by focusing on power and politics using governance and UPE as a theoretical framework. In all of the articles my focus has been on exploring the subjective views and agendas of the actors involved and the power relationships between them in order to understand who is included in the governance process and how the process operates and affects the management of solid waste in Addis Ababa. The main findings of the study are presented in the five articles, all of which deal with the issue of solid waste management and governance in Addis Ababa and analyse it in relation to various scales.

Article 125 was written early in the preparation of this thesis and shows the consequences and problems involved in the partnerships between the informal actors and the city administration. The article argue that the political context, which is characterized by political manipulation, poor accountability, lack of opportunities for participation, and lack of trust towards local authorities, has prevented the successful integration of the actors. Article 226 builds on Article 1, but the focus is only on the relationships between the city administration and the pre-collectors from 2004 to mid-2011. The article is framed in a governance perspective, with the aim of exploring how the adoption of good governance policies has been implemented and how governance operates within solid waste management in Addis Ababa. I argue that the city administration has used ‘good governance’ to promote its own interests, such as increasing control over civil society and creating jobs in pre-election times. I show how this has resulted in the exclusion of actors instead of increased participation and in inefficient management of solid waste. Article 327 uses UPE as a theoretical framework and address the relationships between the informal recycling sector and the city administration.

25 ‘Between neglect and control: Questioning partnerships and the integration of informal actors in public solid waste management in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia’
26 ‘Governance on the ground: A study of solid waste management in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia’
27 ‘Power in waste: Politics and conflicting agendas in planning for integrated solid waste management in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia’
The focus is on the actors’ views and agendas and how these are negotiated in the local context. The article shows that the way power is distributed in an authoritarian context is closely related to access to the state. Hence, it is the views and interests of the city administration that are heard, and this has resulted in the exclusion of informal actors. However, I show that the political culture within the city administration is the main obstacle to the city administration’s efforts to reach their goals of a high-tech solid waste management system and has resulted in the informal recycling sector being able to continue their activities. Article 4 focuses on the ‘politics of scales’ and shows how the involvements of international organizations that aim to improve solid waste and empower the poor (pre-collectors and informal actors) has affected solid waste management in Addis Ababa. The article explores four projects supported by international organizations and shows how the governance process and power relationships between the actors have created new arenas for negotiations. This has resulted in a reinforcement of the existing power relationships, and an exclusion of the informal actors that the projects are intended to empower. Article 5 is written as a book chapter and compares solid waste management in four different cities in Africa. The article shows how the promotion of neoliberal policies and governance policies has taken place in all cities. I report that similar trends can be seen and show that solid waste is a political issue across different scales.

Central themes in all articles are governance and the power relationships among actors within these processes. In common with Heynen et al. (2006), this thesis shows that urban environments and in this case solid waste management should to be regarded as a product of ‘urban metabolism’ and the outcome is closely related to how power operates and the politics in a given context. In the following sections, I discuss some of the common themes that have emerged in the articles: waste as a resource, the governance and the politics of solid waste management, and the role of power and culture for understanding solid waste management, all of which have led to the question concerning exclusion and strategies to claim the right to resources in Addis Ababa.

---

28 ‘Questioning the contribution of international organizations in urban services: The case of solid waste management in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia’
29 ‘The politics of solid waste management in Accra, Addis Ababa, Maputo and Ouagadougou: Different cities, similar issues’
5.2 WASTE AS A RESOURCE: DIFFERENT AGENDAS AND CONCERNS

In line with UPE, the subjective views and agendas of actors have been important in order to understand the production of the urban environment in Addis Ababa (Heynen & Swyngedouw, 2003; Swyngedouw, 2006). The various actors’ social background and experiences have been shown to affect their views of waste and also their agendas regarding solid waste management, and show that their views and experiences are socially constructed and should be seen in relation to their social background and experience (Heynen et al., 2006; Keil, 2003). In all five articles, solid waste is shown to be viewed as a resource by the informal actors and recently also by the city administration. In Articles 1 and 2, the pre-collectors are reported as seeing the possibility to start providing a service to the households in order to make an income. As shown in Article 3, the actors operating in the informal recycling sector have consider solid waste a resource for reuse and recycling, and therefore waste is an important source of livelihood for the scavengers, Qorqoro alleh, wholesalers, and small-scale craftsmen. In recent years, solid waste has been viewed as a resource also by the city administration. Article 3 shows how the city administration aims to implement a new integrated solid waste management (ISWM) system, where waste is viewed as a resource for recycling. In the same article, the city administration is reported as having created a new corporative to collect metals and this can be linked to the economic value of collecting metals for recycling. The implementation of the new solid waste system described in Article 2, whereby the waste fees are included in water bills and where cooperatives are paid per cubic metre, is also related to the acknowledgement of waste as a resource.

With the development of the city, solid waste has also become an issue related to modernity. According to this view, solid waste is seen as something negative and associated with a poor and undeveloped city, and its management is closely related to the actions taken by the city administration. Primarily, the image of a modern and clean city is reflected in the name of the waste agency, the Sanitation, Beautification and Park Development Authority. Further, a green and clean city is also reflected in newspaper reviews (Appendix 8) and the various awareness campaigns conducted by the city administration (Appendix 9), where the focus on the cleanliness of the city is readily visible whenever there are meetings such as the African Union summits: street sweepers visible cleaning the main streets and the evictions of beggars show the increased importance of the image of the city. The view of modernity is also shown in Articles 2, 3, and 4, where I describe how the city administration aims to introduce a modern and high-tech solid waste system. However, the view of the modern and clean city is not compatible with the current solid waste situation in Addis Ababa and the informal actors
involved. The planning for a new system is therefore done by ignoring the informal actors, who are seen as traditional, poor, and even socially shameful for the city. The subjective views and interests of the actors within solid waste management are presented in the articles as the basis of the struggles over access to solid waste as a resource, which in turn have affected the actors’ agendas and action taken and how solid waste is managed in the city.

5.3 GOOD GOVERNANCE AND THE POLITICS OF SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT
The overview and the articles have shown that the Ethiopian Government has adopted and is committed to implementing good governance, with the official aim of improving governance and urban services. Articles 1 and 2 show how the decentralization processes and the implementation of business process re-engineering (BPR) has not led to increased capacity, legitimacy, accountability, or an improved responsiveness to the citizens, despite the promises in the good governance policies. The articles show that the political culture has continued to exist within the new structure of the state. This, by adopting good governance policies the Ethiopian Government has been able to hide its real agendas and at the same time use good governance to promote its own interests, namely to secure its power and to increase its control over civil society. Articles 2, 3, and 4 show how the structural changes in the city administration, designed to give more power to lower levels of administration such as the sub-cities and the kebeles, have been used to increase employers’ control in line with the traditional way of exercising power. This has resulted in upward accountability and the persistence of a highly centralized structure.

The creation of partnerships with the MSSEs and later the cooperatives, which are discussed in Articles 1 and 2, have been used in a rhetorical way, as a false increase in employees, whereby the creation of ‘pre-collectors’ in pre-election times in 2005 and 2010 excluded existing actors and created new jobs for 13,000 unemployed persons in the city. In the articles, I argue that this may have been done to show voters that the ruling party was acting in the interests of the citizens. However, the actions were far from the aims of partnerships and instead show the political aspects of governance. The politics of governance is further shown in Article 3, where I describe how the informal actors have been used as ‘vote banks’ in pre-election times, by giving the wholesalers and the Qorqoro alleh promises of support prior to elections, yet the city administration has not follow up their pre-election promises. In contrast to the World Bank’s technical approach to good governance, the articles have shown that governance is not only a technical issue, but also a highly political issue, and
should be treated as such. The articles show the capability of an authoritarian state to implement policies and simultaneously consolidate their own plans and interests, of which the machinery of governance is the most apparent example. By using governance as an analytical approach combined with an UPE approach, I have shown how the focus on actors’ subjective views and power relationships in a given context has been useful in order to understand how the urban metabolism metaphor works and to examine critically the governance process. Comparing this with the official claims of good governance has made it possible to reveal the rhetorical use of good governance by the Ethiopian Government and to understand better how the governance process operates at the local level.

5.3.1 THE RELEVANCE OF POWER AND CULTURE FOR UNDERSTANDING SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT

In line with UPE, the articles shows that by focusing on power relationships and how power is distributed and acted upon it is possible to understand the reasons behind the unequal distribution of resources and the management of urban services (Grove, 2009; Heynen & Swyngedouw, 2003; Heynen et al., 2006). To gain a deeper understanding of how power is distributed and acted upon, it has to be seen as a historical product of the social interaction in a given context over time and in relation to scales. Seen in a historical perspective, the Ethiopian culture has been characterized as hierarchical, where individuals are defined according to their socio-political status such as class, gender, and ethnicity (Poluha, 2004; Vaugan & Tronvoll, n.d). Despite official attempts to decentralize the state and give more power to lower levels of city administration and empower the poor through improved participation, the articles show that the political culture in Addis Ababa is still characterized as authoritarian and highly centralized. Most decisions are still made at the top and implemented down the state’s bureaucratic structures, in line with Weber’s view of power as capacity, whereby the city administration has used its power to decide how things should be organized (J. Allen, 2003a; Engelstad, 2005). This is shown in Article 2, where I discuss how the city administration created a new law that denied existing MSSEs the right to continue to work and forced them to reorganize themselves into cooperatives without first discussing the new regulations with existing actors. In Article 3, this is illustrated in the case where the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MoFED) formed a new law that denied the metal industry the right to buy waste from Männ alleh/allesh tåra and created MetEc to secure the metal market for itself. Article 4, shows further how the government created a new law that restricted members of civil society from engaging in issues related to human rights. Due
to the persistence of the political culture within the society, the Ethiopian Government has been able to use its power to secure its own interests and control actors and their activities by implementing new laws and policies for how solid waste should be organized. Hence, the space for members of civil society to express their interests or claim their rights has decreased in recent years, and there are few possibilities for them to engage in the governance processes and have their interests heard.

The side effect of the political culture is a city administration that is not able to perform its self-appointed tasks. The articles show that almost every time the government has interfered with current activities, they have not consulted or considered the existing actors and the realities on the ground. Evidently, the government is more concerned with implementing its own interests, which in most cases has been modern and high-tech systems that are not adapted to the local context and do not recognize informal actors. In none of the cases described in the articles, have the new laws or systems operate properly. In most cases, the new systems and laws have resulted in even more problems and complications. This is shown in Article 2, where I describe how the creation of new cooperatives leads to even more problems. The city administration was not able to collect money from the clients, not able to pay the salaries of the pre-collectors, and not able to provide enough trucks to transport and dispose of the collected waste. The waste regulations are not adapted to the realities on the ground and therefore not followed by the citizens or the city administration. This has also been the case for the new ISWM plan, which has no foundation in reality, and the new metal corporative has not been able to supply the industry with enough materials. In all cases, the new systems have not been efficient and their inefficiency can be seen in relation to two main factors. First, most decisions concerning solid waste management are made by politicians with limited experience and knowledge of solid waste management. In most cases, the decisions are not adapted to the local context or discussed with the actors involved, and therefore are not adopted by the local actors who instead adopt new strategies to avoid the new structures. Second, the failure of the new system introduced has to be seen in relation to the political culture within the city administration, where civil servants are controlled and evaluated for their loyalty. As pointed out in Articles 2, 3, and 4, in most cases civil servants are employed due to their political alliance rather than based on their knowledge of solid waste. The way power is distributed and delegated is limited due to loyalty, and this has resulted in the distribution of power within the city administration being concentrated at the top and civil servants obeying orders from above in order to secure their jobs. This in turn has led to accountability to the top and limited legitimacy and accountability towards civil
society. This finding is reported in Articles 2 and 3, where I describe how civil servants at all levels (kebele, Sub-City, and city) have obeyed and tried to implement orders from the top without questioning them. As argued in Articles 2, 3, and 4, the side effect of this political culture is a city administration with a high turnover, lack of institutional memory, and lack of capacity to manage the city. This has been argued as one of the main reasons why the city administration in most cases fails to reach its own goals of a modern, high-tech system of solid waste management in the city. Due to the inability of the state to provide an efficient solid waste service to its citizens, informal activities are essential in order for solid waste management to function in the city. As long as the state remains unable to increase its capacity and efficiency or to respond to the needs on the ground, informality will most likely dominate due to the fact that the informal sector has developed a system that works, is adapted to the needs on the ground, and delivers a level of service that the state has not yet been able to achieve.

However, the distribution of power in Addis Ababa should be understood as more than the local context, but as relationships made possible by actions at other scales (Swyngedouw, 2000). As shown in Article 4, the involvement of international organizations aiming to empower the poor and improve the efficiency of solid waste management has resulted in the creation of a new scale for negotiation and in reinforcement of the current power relationships. This in turn has resulted in further exclusion of the informal actors. This finding shows the importance of the ‘politics of scales’ in order to gain a deep understanding of the production of solid waste in a given context, and the marginalization processes taking place and the outcome of this (Swyngedouw, 2000). It also shows that even though intentions may be good, the outcome of actions may not be as intended. This insight is in line with Foucault’s argument that the intention of an action is irrelevant and that the focus should be on the nature of the power relations and the outcome of the processes in the relations.

5.4 EXCLUSION AND STRATEGIES USED TO CLAIM RIGHTS IN THE CITY

In theory, good governance has been promoted to make government more efficient and subsequently to reduce the gap between the poor and the elite. In practice, and as shown in this thesis, the rhetorical use of good governance has increased the gap and reinforced existing power relationships between the actors involved in solid waste management. In line with UPE, the articles have shown that those with access to the state have been able to express their interests and it is therefore their views that have been heard and taken into consideration when decisions have been made regarding solid waste in the city (Heynen & Swyngedouw,
2003). In all articles, I describe how the informal actors have been excluded from participating in the governance processes within solid waste management. They are also excluded from the new plans created by the city administration and in some cases also excluded from their livelihoods, as will be the case of the scavengers when Repi is closed. The outcome of the power struggles among the actors involved in solid waste management has resulted in both inclusion and exclusion of actors, where loyalty to the ruling party and a certain social status are required in order to be included in solid waste management in the city.

Within solid waste management, as in other urban services apparently, power as capacity, whereby the government controls and decided how things should be organized, dominates all relationships. These power structures have existed in Ethiopia for many decades, and continue to dominate the social organization of Ethiopian society. However, in line with Foucault approach to power the state cannot be seen as an object holding power, but as power relationships exercised between individuals within the state and their access to power in terms of their position or rank which is exercised over other power relationships (J. Allen, 2003a). The Ethiopian Government is both authoritarian and weak. Outside the state there are several arenas where power is exercised within more informal structures such as religious groups, the family, places, ethnic groups, the informal economy, and friendships between people. Such informal relationships have shown to be an important strategy adopted by informal actors to deal with the exclusion they are faced with and their struggles over meaning and access to waste and their rights to Addis Ababa. Due to the culture in Ethiopia, people do not openly question new rules or regulations, but accept the reality they are faced with and find new ways of acting in order to continue making a living. In this thesis, I have viewed informality as power as technology, with its own rules and social organization developed over time as a social collective action seen in relation to the state, in order to avoid the established structures of exclusion and control. Article 1, 2, and 3 show how informal actors have adapted to informal ‘ways of doing’ in order to counteract the established structures of control. In Article 2, this is shown where I describe how the cooperatives accepted their denied right to work each day, and started to collect waste from institutions at night in order to earn an income. The informal strategies and practices can be seen as horizontal power structures, in contrast to the state’s hierarchical power structures. Every time the state makes a proclamation and makes a decision, such as creating and implementing new rules and laws for governing civil society, they disturb the existing practical arrangements and structures that have evolved and that are adapted to the needs and realities on the ground. When a new law is proclaimed, the
horizontal power structures within society are immediately put into motion in order to find alternative solutions and new ways of doing in order to be able to continue with their activities. The power relationships can be compared to ‘cat and mouse’ relationships, where power as capacity dominates in most relationships but where informality is used as strategies to escape and evade the structures of control and domination. Sometimes the relationships mean cooperating with the state, if that is what is needed in order to continue with activities, while at other times there is avoidance of the state, depending on the political context at a given time. This has lead to a plurality of norms, ranging from social, official, and practical coexistence. For example, in Männ alleh/allesh tära, wholesalers went from avoiding the state to organizing themselves into associations, to becoming members of the ruling party, and to becoming involved in corruption in order to improve their chances of being able to invest in Männ alleh/allesh tära.

5.5. MINIMUM CONDITIONS NECESSARY FOR IMPROVING SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT

The UPE approach has been criticized for being too destructive and critical of current practice, without giving any suggestions for what should be done in order to improve the current situation and to achieve a more equitable distribution of resources and a more democratic society (Zimmer, 2010). As an external observer in a highly authoritarian society such as Ethiopia, I find it difficult to make recommendations for improving the situation. Regardless, any suggestions for improving solid waste management will be meaningless as long as the dominant power relationships and political culture continue in this context, and therefore it will be up to the Ethiopian themselves to resolve matters. The distribution of power in Ethiopia has been hierarchical and authoritarian for centuries. However, this cannot be seen as a result of the government alone but should also be seen in relation to the production of various norms (i.e. social, official, and practical) that form systems of knowledge and shape the behaviour of the actors. In order for the distribution of power to be changed, changes in social and practical norms need to take place at every level and in every sphere of Ethiopian society (Vaugan & Tronvoll, n.d).

I have taken into consideration Andrews’ (2008) argument that one should focus on evaluating what works, why, and how. Accordingly, in Articles 1 and 2 I describe how Mayor Arkebe showed that it is possible for the city administration to act in the best interests of the people, and where urban services in Addis Ababa improved for some years, despite the political context. There may be many reasons for the success, such as a genuine commitment
to improve the poor condition of urban services and the fact that the poor urban services were becoming an embarrassment to the city administration. A further reason may have been that the ruling party was politically motivated to gain support in pre-election times. Based on my findings, I believe that the minimum conditions for an improved solid waste service in Addis Ababa include a genuine commitment on the part of the government to improve urban services (which has been argued as one of the reason for Arkebe’s achievements during his period as mayor). A further condition, as argued by researchers of most studies of the informal recycling sector, recognition of informal actors is essential. Ignoring informal actors has not solved existing problems, and in most cases ignorance has resulted in conflicts and struggles over resources, often affecting the efficiency of both the existing system and the new system. A third condition is that the political culture of loyalty to the ruling party should be changed. The existing culture is one of the main reasons for poor solid waste management in the city, and in this respect the city administration has been shown to be incapable of performing its tasks efficiently. Only with recognition of and commitment to existing actors and competent people – employed on a long-term basis in order to have continuity in the management of urban services – will a good basis for improving solid waste management in the city be provided. In relation to donors’ and international organizations’ involvement in urban services, a good place to start would be to acknowledge the political aspects of their activities. I consider that they should to be more critical of the facts they are presented with and they should dare to set more requirements or even withdraw their projects if their requirements are not met. By not being critical and by ignoring the realities on the ground, donors and international organizations are unable to reveal the rhetorical use of their projects. As a consequence, and as shown in this thesis, they may even contribute to the opposite outcome to that intended – they may contribute to ‘bad governance’.

5.6 CONCLUSIONS
I started my research by asking why solid waste management in Addis Ababa has not improved despite several structural changes and reforms introduced to improve urban services. In this thesis I have critically analysed the way that governance operates, using governance and UPE as an analytical framework. The study contributes to our understanding of how the governance process works within solid waste management in Addis Ababa. It offers a critical view and reveals the rhetorical use of good governance policies by the city administration, by showing how the Ethiopian Government has used good governance to
promote its own agendas and interests in order to secure its own power. The study shows that by promoting good governance as a technical issue, one ignores that governance can be misused and end up as bad governance. This study of solid waste management in Addis Ababa shows that good governance as advocated by international organizations and the Ethiopian Government has not led to improved democracy or a more equal distribution of resources in urban management. Instead, ‘good governance’ has resulted in more control and increasing inequality between the actors, where the elite benefit at the expense of the poor.

I have shown how UPE can be used as a theoretical framework to study the provision of urban services and in addition I have provided an analytical framework for applying UPE in a constructive way. This approach has proven to be a suitable framework and shows that a critical approach is needed to treat governance as a political issue, not only in order to improve solid waste but also to draw attention to the main obstacles to obtaining a more democratic society for all. A more critical approach to urban services and the ways that governance operates is needed, in order to have a better understanding of the reasons for the uneven development in urban areas today and to be able to identify what is needed in order to improve urban services and obtain a more equitable development.
PART SIX: REFERENCES


tab


PART SEVEN: ARTICLES


ARTICLE 4: Bjerkli, C.L. (not published). Questioning the contribution of international organizations to urban services: The case of solid waste management in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

Between Neglect and Control: Questioning Partnerships and the Integration of Informal Actors in Public Solid Waste Management in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

AXEL BAUDOUIN, CAMILLA BJERKLI, YIRGALEM HABTEMARIAM, & ZELALEM FANTA CHEKOLE

Abstract: The paper addresses the long-standing role of informal actors in solid waste management in Addis Ababa. Large numbers of people make a living through scavenging, waste collection and recycling. The varied and shifting relations between these actors and the local authorities are examined. For the most part, the authorities have largely neglected informal waste collectors. Recently, however, the role of informal actors was recognized and the authorities attempted to establish a “partnership” with informal actors in the waste sector. The paper discusses the consequences and problems involved in this partnership and how it facilitated political dominance and surveillance in a context of authoritarian governance. Informal actors have frequently resisted attempts at taxation and have avoided any collaboration with and control by the authorities. More generally, the paper concludes that political manipulation, poor accountability, lack of opportunities for participation, and the ensuing mistrust among informal actors towards local authorities prevent any successful integration of the actors and their interests in the public management of waste in the studied setting.

Introduction

Informal forms of work are the dominant income activities in many cities in developing countries, providing livelihoods for millions of people. A proportion of these people make a living through activities in the informal waste sector as waste pickers or scavengers, itinerant buyers, and small-scale recyclers. They are often stigmatized and many are poor. In some cases, though, people working in this sector earn non-negligible incomes. Scavenging also stimulates other economic activities by producing raw materials for industry and artisans. Informal waste recycling also has value from an environmental point of view. More generally, the informal waste sector plays an important role in the context of fast growing cities experiencing inadequate formal service provision. In spite of these various benefits, the attitudes of local governments are often characterized by neglect, lack of recognition, harassment, or even attempts to eradicate informal activities.

A growing number of scholars advocate proper recognition and support of the informal sector in solid waste management (SWM). Rouse, for example, states: “There is a need for a
paradigm shift in the way informal sector service providers are viewed … these enterprises are vital parts of the urban services simply responding to and effectively meeting customers needs. There are also calls, in both the academic and donor literature, for policies aimed at integrating informal actors into municipal SWM strategies. Such calls are often underlined by the view that an efficient SWM cannot be achieved by municipalities alone but rather in association with several partners, including private, formal and informal as well as community-based organizations (CBOs). On the ground, however, we have witnessed in the course of our research in Ethiopia serious conflicts in the concrete relationships between authorities and informal operators in the solid waste sector. In some cases, as this paper will show, the conflicts are so serious that informal actors, far from seeking recognition, prefer to “escape” by refusing any contact with the municipality. Alternatively, local authorities totally ignore the contribution of the informal sector. In this paper, we explore the troubled and changing relationships between informal actors and local government in the solid waste sector in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

Categorizing relationships between informal actors and the state

The attitudes of authorities towards informal waste actors reflect cultural perceptions, including those relating to caste, ethnicity, and social class. Social stigmatization is particularly pronounced when it comes to workers in the waste sector. Although governments often view informal waste actors in a negative way, their attitudes and relationships with these actors can vary. Medina classifies these attitudes and relationships, with reference to the waste sector, into four categories:

Repression – Many governments and social groups consider scavengers as backward and a source of shame for “modern” cities. These hostile attitudes lead to repressive policies, punishments, harassment, and attempts at eradication, even to the extent of organized murder: “Approximately 2000 ‘disposable’ individuals have been killed by the end of 1994 as a result of [the] ‘social cleansing’ campaign in Columbia.”

Neglect – In many cases, authorities simply ignore scavengers. They do not take their contribution to waste management into account. In addition, authorities often ignore aspects of sustainable waste management, such as waste reduction, separation, and recycling that are dealt with by informal actors. This lack of recognition or neglect can have quite negative consequences on the lives of individuals in the informal sector. For the informal transport sector, Rouse described how the banning of rickshaw drivers from main roads in Dhaka threatened their activity, yet without solving the city’s transport problems. Not taking into account the consequences of actions affecting the informal sector is also a form of neglect. In Addis Ababa, a “successful” policy for replacing fuel wood with kerosene, gas and electricity, which are supplied by the formal sector, led to a reduction in the use of fuel wood from 80 percent to 13 percent but also to widespread unemployment among informal suppliers of fuel, including transporters and retailers.

Collusion – Collusion is a form of partnership between local authorities and the informal sector, but it is a “criminal partnership.” Political clientelism, corruption, and bribery can flourish between authorities and scavengers, as has happened in Mexico between the ruling party and the caciques (the local bosses of scavengers’
cooperatives). Scavengers have even been used as musclemen by the party during election campaigns. The term “collusion” suggests that participation or partnership are not necessarily positive.

Stimulation – Stimulation ranges from tolerance (slightly better than neglect) to active integration or partnership. Most researchers and even planners agree that the informal sector is a resource. According to Medina, in some countries, such as Indonesia, China (in particular, Shanghai), Egypt, and Brazil, recognizing the economic, social, and environmental benefits of scavenging and recycling has led governments to change their previously negative attitudes towards scavenging. Scavenger cooperatives receive recognition and financial support (Indonesia), scavengers become more or less integrated into the municipal collection system (Shanghai), and they are provided with infrastructure and municipal services (Cairo, Egypt and Korea). In such cases, one could speak of a form of Public-Private Partnership (PPP) with informal actors. Nevertheless, these examples are still relatively few.

There have been other attempts to categorize the relationships between local authorities and informal actors. For instance, DiGregorio uses the categories of eradication, incorporation, accommodation, and collaboration. By introducing “accommodation,” he brings in a more positive relationship than neglect. Incorporation and collaboration correspond to Medina’s stimulation concept. DiGregorio’s notion of incorporation includes both instances where the municipality controls and restricts scavenging to delimited areas, as well as cases of near integration of scavengers, where they become “quasi-public servants.” We consider “integration” too strong a word and prefer to use the term “partnerships,” as it introduces more variability and does not necessarily imply a high degree of formality.

Current international models for urban development place great emphasis on public-private partnerships, as a means of capitalizing on the strengths of different actors in the pursuit of common goals. Such models advocate the involvement of, and collaboration with, the private and community sector in order to solve waste management and other problems. And indeed, it has been noted that the informal private sector and community groups are also gradually being seen as partners by municipalities in developing countries. Official recognition of informal service providers may be seen as a means for supporting employment and combating poverty and social inequality. It may also be a means of avoiding public expenditure for services, a strategy currently pursued by many governments in the neoliberal age. Partnerships may also be driven by political agendas and may constitute a way for the state to extend its influence into the informal sector.

Partnerships can exist between private and informal sector operators, as is the case in Bangkok, Thailand, where the latter engage in informal alliances with both public collectors and construction entrepreneurs, behind the back of an inefficient administration. In other kinds of partnership, such as those between a municipality and the private sector, one can observe unintended but quite common consequences. In Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, when analyzing public private partnerships, Mkwela showed a “classic” consequence of the collaboration of municipalities with the private sector. Proper services are provided to high status areas where customers are able to pay the required fees for waste collection, while low status areas are more or less left to themselves with an improper waste collection. This is quite a common problem with private sector-municipality partnerships in other countries,
such as those where municipalities are unable or unwilling to properly monitor their partners.18

This paper examines how the relations between informal actors and the local authorities in the waste sector in Addis Ababa have changed through time. It shows how they have evolved from total neglect towards authoritarian partnerships for waste collection or continuous neglect for recycling. The paper discusses the consequences of and problems involved in this partnership and how it has facilitated political dominance and surveillance. The responses of informal actors are also presented. With “informal activities” we use the following definition: “…unregistered, unregulated or casual activities carried out by individuals and/or family or community enterprises that engage in value-adding activities on a small scale with minimum capital input, using local materials and labor intensive techniques.”19 Such activities differ from authorized and registered small enterprises—such as the micro and small-scale enterprises which are also referred to in this paper—in that informal activities occur outside existing legal frames. The notion of “informal sector” is problematic and should be viewed as a common-sense notion rather than a concept with analytical value. Among other problems, it is difficult and inadequate to draw a clear separation between a formal and an informal sector given the linkages that often exist between them. Instead, one should think in terms of fuzzy boundaries, the shifting contours of which are a key concern in this paper.

The researchers conducted two to three months of fieldwork and used a range of research methods. They conducted semi-structured open-ended interviews with a wide range of involved actors, including members of private enterprises, NGOs, informal enterprises, government-sponsored enterprises, and administrators at different levels of the city administration (at kebele, sub-city and city levels).20 They complemented their sources with their own observations, including observing scavengers at work and recording the frequency of container collection by municipality trucks. Participant observation was practiced when participating in garbage collection with NGOs, in city cleaning campaigns, or events such as the annual Cleaning Day. Whenever possible, the researchers undertook informal discussions with the people involved. The use of secondary literature was somewhat limited due to the scarcity of publications. A quantitative survey of plastics delivery to the largest market place in the city was also conducted.21 In her research on plastics recycling, Bjerkli interviewed 63 waste collectors across the city and 150 households in the sub-city of Addis Ketema (kebeles 6, 13 and 15). She also conducted interviews with two owners of plastics factories, five municipality employees in charge of solid waste management and the staff of two relevant NGOs: ENDA Ethiopia and GTZ. Zelalem interviewed both formal and informal actors, as well as operators in government-induced micro and small-scale Enterprises (a total of 23 interviews). He also carried out interviews with a few households and with the relevant officials at several administrative levels.22 Yirgalem interviewed forty scavengers operating at the Repi landfill site, as well as employees in small-scale informal industries located in proximity to the landfill site.23

The next section describes the solid waste situation in Addis Ababa and discusses the important role of the informal sector. The different categories of informal actors conducting waste-related activities are presented, followed by a discussion of the relations between them and the local government prior to 2003 and also the ways in which informal actors attempt to avoid the authorities. The paper then analyses the change in governmental strategy towards the informal waste sector between 2003 and 2005, the official justifications, and the hidden
agendas behind its intervention, as well as the outcomes and responses of informal actors to it. The paper ends with a summary of the findings and concluding remarks.

The informalizing waste sector: neglect, distrust, and avoidance

Addis Ababa is a fast growing city with a population of over three million. Among other problems associated with rapid urbanization, the management of solid waste poses a serious challenge. The management approaches and techniques employed by the municipality of Addis Ababa to manage solid waste have been largely inadequate. Compared to other sectors, solid waste management has been given too little attention in terms of resource allocation and establishing effective institutional arrangements. It has been estimated that geographical coverage and frequency of disposal by the public collection system has been far below the existing needs, ranging between 40–70 percent of the total generated waste.24 Thus, a considerable portion of the city and its population is not adequately serviced by the public collection system. In addition, the city is still awaiting the establishment of new and properly built sanitary dumping sites. The current system for waste disposal is unsafe, with high social and environmental costs. The existing solid waste disposal site, the Repi landfill site, is an open landfill site, devoid of any infrastructure. The Repi landfill site does not meet the necessary criteria, not least in terms of minimum buffer distances required for safe waste disposal, between the site and other land use activities, such as settlements, schools and recreation. Communities settled around the landfill are exposed to great health risks due to the high levels of environmental contamination, including ground and surface water contamination.

Informal actors play a critical role in the solid waste sector in Addis Ababa. Activities related to the sector are a source of income for many urban poor. Such activities include waste picking and door-to-door collection, recycling, composting, and reprocessing. The sub-studies conducted on activities at the landfill site and within the plastic waste sub-sector revealed that diverse actors are involved.25 Interviews carried out with a variety of actors involved in these activities make it possible to identify some of the key actors and the relations between them.

Foragers collect materials from municipal containers and from the streets while scavengers collect items at the municipal landfill site. It is estimated that the Repi landfill site supports up to 500 on-site scavengers, including both temporary and permanent ones.26 On the basis of the interviews conducted with individuals in this group, it can be stated that permanent scavengers are mainly young people from the nearby settlements. They are organized into gangs which control the resources collected on the site and whose power is based on seniority and local residency. Newcomers are forced to pay a certain amount of cash or share the collected items with local bullies. Scavengers then sell the recovered items for reuse or deliver the materials to small-scale industry owners and farmers with whom they have arrangements. Some municipal employees are also involved in scavenging.

The qorales—the local term for small-scale unregistered waste collectors—collect or buy items such as plastic materials, tin cans, bottles, scrap metal, and paper directly from the households and to a limited extent from the foragers and small-scale enterprises.27 They deliver these items to the traders, locally called “wholesalers,” operating at Merkato, the largest market place in Addis Ababa. These wholesalers do not comply with governmental regulations, such as those relating to the payment of taxes. Qorales and wholesalers are linked through tightly drawn networks based on ethnic affinities, as both groups tend to
identify themselves as belonging to the Gurage ethnic group. Considerable differences in the income levels were found between the various categories of operators described above, with wholesalers being definitely better off and in an advantaged position in relation to the other groups.28

The above operators are vertically linked, directly or indirectly, to the local recycling industry. Firstly, close to the landfill site, there is a small-scale industry which re-processes waste from the tanneries and carcasses to produce glue, locally called *colla*. There are two private “clandestine” *colla* producers in the area, each with approximately five employees. Five of them were interviewed informally by Yirgalem. The *colla* producers buy carcasses from on-site scavengers and/or gather the waste that tannery factories dump at the landfill site. Secondly, in the plastics sector, wholesalers supply the materials directly to factories located in Addis Ababa.29 Solid waste collection is also performed by a few private registered enterprises and NGOs, whose role is relatively limited.

The informal system for the collection, trade and transformation of plastic and other waste materials appears to be highly organized. The informal plastics recovery system is particularly efficient, in that an estimated high volume of plastic materials (23 tons) is informally collected on a daily basis in the city and recycled.30 This is related to the high local demand for plastic products manufactured from plastic waste, which in turn is related to the low purchasing power of a large part of the urban population. With regard to recycling in of plastics, as of other materials, the municipality has never developed any systematic efforts. Hence, recycling activities are mainly carried out by informal operators.

Despite the important role of informal operators in the handling of solid waste in Addis Ababa, the dominant attitude of the authorities was, until the early 2000s, one of disregard. Although the existence of informal operators in the sector was acknowledged at different levels of the city administration, their significant contribution to waste reduction, reuse and recycling was either unrecognized or ignored. No sound policy or incentives were directed at supporting and developing their activities, nor were there any attempts to integrate them into the formal waste management system.

Informal operators, on the other hand, tried to avoid any contact with the city officials, opting to operate clandestinely due to lack of trust and confidence in the authorities. For example, the small-scale *colla* producers by the landfill site occupy rather inaccessible and hidden locations, mainly to avoid being discovered by government officials.31 The business owners try to avoid any discussion with unfamiliar persons regarding *colla* production and hide from outsiders, instructing their employees not to talk about their activities. Any stranger coming to the site is perceived either as a potential business competitor or as a government agent who is seeking to enforce legal measures against their activities.32 Among the major reasons for these informal operators to work clandestinely are fear of eviction from their location and of unfair, unaffordable taxes.33

In the plastics recovery system, similar secrecy and distrust were found on the basis of interviews with the various kinds of actors involved.34 During fieldwork, Bjerkli found it very hard to talk to people operating in the informal recovery system and obtain information about their activities. Outsiders to the system are not trusted; only those having social relations with others within the system and knowing the rules and norms operating within it can be trusted. For example, it was almost impossible to find out which factories the “wholesalers” sold their plastics to and from whom the factories bought their plastic waste. During interviews, it surfaced that a major reason for this secrecy was that those involved feared that the government would find out about their “illegal” activities. They perceived
that this would result in increased taxes or even in the closing down of their businesses. Their lack of confidence in the government also stemmed from the fact that the authorities do not recognize their contribution and make decisions without consulting the people concerned. Respondents feared that the government would make decisions that would force them out of business. For example, at the time of fieldwork, the government had plans to relocate Menalish Terra (the area within Merkato market where “wholesalers” operate) to a site located far away on the periphery of the city. Since the informal operators could not count on any governmental support and were not consulted about decisions affecting them, many of them felt that they were better off without the government’s involvement. A new strategy by the municipality to introduce micro and small-scale enterprises (MSSEs) into the sector would only deepen these feelings and make informal actors wary of the government’s intentions, as will be further discussed below.

A tentative partnership between the municipality and the informal operators

In the early 2000s, there were increasing concerns about the image of Addis Ababa. When visiting the city, President Khadaffi stated that Addis Ababa was too dirty to be the headquarters of the newly created African Union. This and other pressures apparently had an impact on the city administration. The strategy of the municipal government to tackle the waste problem took an important turn in 2003, when a provisional city government and a new mayor, Arkebe Oqubay, were appointed.

Prior to 2003, the municipality placed small containers in particular locations for waste collection at the housing block level. The municipal trucks emptied the containers irregularly and transported the waste to the Repi landfill. The collection of waste from the households to the containers was either done directly by the households themselves or by informal collectors paid by the households. This system was based on informal and oral arrangements between the informal waste collectors and the municipality. Having formerly ignored the role of informal waste collectors, the city authorities in 2003 initially appeared interested in recognizing and facilitating their work. Government officials apparently recognized that informal waste collectors were capable of collecting more waste than the municipal trucks operators. They realized that they could reduce the cost of waste collection by leaving the door-to-door collection to the informal waste collectors (i.e. the pre-collection stage). The city government withdrew from waste collection at the housing block level practiced earlier by the municipal truck fleets, as reported by Zelalem. It restricted its operations to the transportation of waste from fewer and bigger containers that were placed at readily accessible locations. Informal waste collectors started to organize themselves into small-scale informal enterprises and were to some extent recognized or supported by the municipality.

In a second phase a few months later, however, the new city administration gradually developed an interest in fully controlling the pre-collection component of solid waste management. By the end of 2003, it started to advocate the need for further formalizing the pre-existing informal solid waste collecting enterprises. The government intervened in the sector by institutionalizing it and introducing new actors in the form of micro and small-scale enterprises (MSSEs). These enterprises were organized under an agency, the Micro and Small-Scale Enterprises Development Agency (MSSEDA), with offices at all levels of the city administration (city, sub-city, and kebele). According to Zelalem, this intervention was made without any kind of preliminary consultation and consensus with the pre-existing actors. The newly introduced actors, whose members were selected from among the unemployed by
the local authorities, therefore appeared as rivals to the pre-existing informal enterprises (and even to established formal private waste enterprises). Semi-structured interviews conducted by Zelalem with pre-existing formal private and informal actors, with the new MSSEs, and with kebele, sub-city, and city officials, elicited insights into this intervention and the responses to it.36

The kebele authorities, played an important role in implementing the new strategy. Experiences varied across different kebeles in the city. The MSSEDA officials operating at kebele and sub-city levels adopted three different approaches. The first approach was to dispossess and evict the pre-existing solid waste collection enterprises from their service areas. Secondly, government officials adopted another mechanism by which the pre-existing enterprises were forced to be reorganized under the umbrella of MSSEDA, which in turn meant denying their rights and interests in organizing themselves as independent enterprises. In some cases the pre-existing enterprises were forced to merge with the newly organized MSSEs. Thirdly, in other cases the government officials avoided conflicts and evictions by deliberately organizing and deploying the MSSEs only in areas that were not served by any other enterprise.

The authorities employed various overt and covert means of intervention in areas where pre-existing enterprises were to be evicted. According to informants from private formal and informal enterprises, one of the overt interventions involved issuing official letters signed and stamped by kebele authorities and distributed to each household. The letters gave the impression that the MSSEs were the only legitimate enterprises and urged the households to terminate their contract with the former collectors and to enter into a new contract with the newly institutionalized MSSEs. This led to a systematic eviction of pre-existing enterprises from their established service areas. In other cases, the pre-existing enterprises were directly ordered to leave part or the whole of their service area for the newly established MSSEs. Due to such harsh interventions by the kebele officials, even the private formal enterprises were expelled from their service areas in favor of government-sponsored MSSEs. Similarly, the informal operators were offered few alternatives: at best, to share part of their service area with the MSSEs, or, in the worst case, to leave.37 Another form of intervention used by the government officials to capture clients from pre-existing enterprises was to reduce the service charges to a lower level than those set by the pre-existing enterprises. According to Zelalem, the kebele officials along with the MSSEs promised to deliver their service at lower fees, often below a workable minimum price.

The pre-existing solid waste collectors, particularly the informal ones, responded in different ways to the newly introduced government-sponsored MSSEs, as revealed by interviews with formal and informal operators. They increased the frequency of collection, reduced collection fees, and rendered free supplementary services to improve their competitiveness.38 They used informal networks to gather information, discuss current developments, and strategize how to react to government interventions. Most importantly, almost all of the interviewed pre-existing solid waste collectors, formal and informal, were strongly negative towards the newly integrated MSSEs. Hence, conflicts and hostilities developed as the dominant kinds of relationships between government-sponsored MSSEs and other formal or informal operators. Conflicts became sometimes serious and triggered clashes. One of the interviewed informal operators told how one man was killed in such a fight. There were also instances where in order to be heard the pre-existing actors used conflicts as a strategy to attract the attention of the kebele authorities and other government officials.
Justifications and outcomes of governmental intervention

From the interviews with officials at city and sub-city level it became apparent that the city government justified the need for the above-mentioned interventions in solid waste collection on the basis of two objectives. One objective was to ensure a more efficient and cost-effective solid waste collection by discouraging the more random waste collection activities carried out by the informal sector. The second objective was to generate employment opportunities in the sector through sponsoring MSSEs. These stated objectives were far from achieved and the intervention appeared to be more of a political exercise. The intervention was instrumental in recruiting new party members and ensuring political dominance and local surveillance. In this regard, Bjerkli underlined that the city administration of Addis Ababa was “highly politicized.” Consequently, the result of the interventions was almost entirely to marginalize the pre-existing solid waste collecting enterprises and to disrupt the existing system, even though it was thriving in terms of both the volume of waste collected and the service catchment areas. Some areas were left without any door-to-door collection. Garbage piled up in the streets and along the streams of Addis Ababa. The number of illegal dump sites also increased.

The integration of MSSEs into the pre-existing solid waste collection system has contributed to the emergence of three predominant patterns of change in different city areas. The first is that the MSSEs have expanded at the expense of pre-existing informal and formal enterprises, as the latter were displaced or absorbed into the MSSEs. The second pattern is that both pre-existing and newly integrated actors have been functioning together in the same area with little conflict. A third pattern indicates that the pre-existing actors are on the recovery and reconquering collection areas as most of the MSSEs were dissolved shortly after they were established, as discussed below.

From the interviews, it became clear that the MSSEs faced serious challenges and intense conflicts involving the pre-existing informal and private formal actors. The informal and private enterprises were forced to spend their time, resources, and efforts engaging in a series of conflicts rather than focusing on their actual work. Moreover, the levels of income in both informal enterprises and MSSEs – that is, of the individuals engaged in waste collection across all enterprises – appear not to have increased to a reasonable level. Rather, judging from the interviews it seems that incomes have deteriorated further, mainly due to the prevailing “unhealthy competition” implemented simply for the sake of pushing some enterprises out of business. Most of the enterprises, and particularly those organized under MSSEs, had become weaker in terms of finances, material capacity, and employment stability.

The MSSEs were introduced mainly by the entrenched interests of the kebele authorities. Each kebele had its own target quota and officials were responsible and accountable for ensuring the realization of the intended targets. Their aim was to establish as many enterprises as possible so as to appear as loyal champions in implementing the city government’s program for creating “new employment.” To this end, putting pre-existing enterprises out of operation by offering lower service fees resulted in reducing employment in the pre-existing informal sector. It was a belief held among the interviewed officials that more than 10,000 new job opportunities were created in solid waste collection, but this seems far from having been achieved. In real terms, what the city government did was to institutionalize new enterprises under its auspices while simultaneously evicting the pre-existing actors. It created “new job opportunities” for those organized under the MSSEs,

African Studies Quarterly | Volume 11, Issues 2 & 3 | Spring 2010
http://www.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v11/v11i2-3a3.pdf
while individuals working in the informal enterprises lost their jobs. This can only be described as “fake employment creation.”

Imbalances developed in the spatial distribution of enterprises operating across different kebeles, as some kebeles were oversupplied with solid waste collection enterprises, while others suffered from inadequacies in waste collection. MSSEs were mainly deployed in areas that were already served by the pre-existing enterprises, further contributing to the geographical imbalance in coverage. According to the interviews, MSSEs usually failed to sustain service delivery at the newly introduced collection rates and often dissolved after a short period of operation. This appeared to provide an opportunity for pre-existing informal actors to re-conquer their spaces of operation. But, the earlier slushing of fees by the MSSEs has complicated the situation, as households may refuse to accept newly adjusted collection fees.

**Caricatures of partnerships and unresolved problems**

The authors’ studies of the waste sector in Addis Ababa have shown varied and shifting relationships between the municipal authorities and small-scale operators in the sector. The attitudes of the local authorities towards small-scale operators have ranged from total neglect to authoritarian forms of partnerships that could be characterized as a form of control. The latter kind of relations are absent from DiGregorio’s and Medina’s categorization of relationships between informal actors and the state presented earlier in this article. These forms of control, however, should thus be included as a separate category within such categorizations.

Barriers or resistance to institutionalized relations have been expressed by both governmental actors and informal operators. In the studied setting, the nature of these relationships has reached the stage where, for the most part, informal operators (particularly in recycling) try to avoid any contact with the municipality. The local government is perceived as only interested in trying to impose new or increased taxes on people. In plastics recycling, the activities are run completely by informal actors and carried out totally outside the control of the municipality, which is unaware of and unconcerned about recycling. Many municipal employees were not aware of the magnitude or even existence of the activity. Informal operators have also shown a remarkable level of agency. They have demonstrated an ability to negotiate, a flexibility to adapt to changes, and willingness when necessary to fight for their interests. This was evidently the case when informal collectors had to cope with the threat posed to their activities by the introduction of MSSEs.

The period 2003–2006 under Mayor Arkebe represented a new trend, as for the first time there was an attempt to support and collaborate with groups in the informal sector, which had traditionally been ignored by the authorities. This support was, however, short-lived as the local government soon proceeded to support competing actors, i.e. authorized small enterprises in the sector. This marginalized and threatened the livelihoods of pre-existing local scavengers and waste collectors and disrupted the informal waste collection system. The authorities employed authoritarian methods in order to impose their own political agenda, one driven by social control and opportunities for clientelism. The whole process was dictated by political motives of merely boosting employment figures and aimed at extending local political control. This finding is in accordance with what Bjerkli mentioned as the presence of a “highly politicized” government structure which was dominated by a high degree of upward accountability. The findings show that the authoritarian top-down
approach failed because it did not consider existing informal operators in the sector as possible partners. In planning and implementing development projects it is vital to understand and appreciate the existing service delivery mechanisms by informal entrepreneurs and seek ways of working with, rather than against, existing individuals, businesses, and structures. Ignoring and even undermining the existing informal system, and creating a clientele among another group of unemployed which was supposed to replace the former operators, can thus be described as a caricature of a partnership.

Undoubtedly, problems of competence and capacity in the local government have also hindered appropriate responses to the waste challenge. Among many problems, there is a high turnover of staff in charge of waste management due to politicization and frequent reforms of the administrative structures. Government officials have poor knowledge of the real situation of the informal solid waste sector and the resources for conducting studies on the sector may be lacking. While the difficulties faced by the local administration are important, however, the problem cannot be reduced to one of lack of competence, or lack of the appropriate technology, or of the “right” organizational set-up. The political and governance context is far more important. The outcomes of particular attempts at establishing collaboration with informal actors depend to a great extent on the nature of relationships between the state and/or local administration and other actors in particular contexts. In a way, what we have shown is a municipality temporarily adopting a strategy of collaboration and partnership with informal actors, in accordance with the calls of both donor agencies and some scholars, yet doing it within the framework of an authoritarian political culture that has dominated the history of Ethiopian administration. It is therefore doomed to fail.

According to UN-HABITAT, good governance involves the adoption of an “enabling approach” that allows all actors to be involved in all matters and decisions that affect their activity. In contrast, as Onibokun remarks, in a number of African countries, “lack of good governance is at the root of most of their urban problems, particularly in waste management.” In his view, “Both central and local governments lack democracy, transparency, accountability and cooperation with the public in their operations and processes and in their relationships with civil society.” Others have also pointed to the central importance of the issue of governance in relation to service provision.

In the study setting, the authoritarian methods and the hidden agenda of the local authorities deepened the general mistrust of informal actors. The only realistic possibility for collaboration requires democratic accountability and participatory governance, more precisely a genuine recognition of informal actors and willingness to involve all actors in decision-making. In addition, it requires the provision of support in the form of access to credit, vocational training, and the provision of equipment and social and health services. Only then will informal actors trust the government and achieve some form of “social contract.” Participative governance also requires the strengthening of collective organizations among informal operators in order to facilitate collective representation of their interests when negotiating with other partners.
Notes

1. Demeke (2002) reported that according to the survey conducted by the CSA (the office of statistics in Ethiopia) up to 80 percent of the population in Addis Ababa was engaged in some form of informal income earning activity in 1997.
4. For example, Naas and Rivke (2004); Rouse (2004) as well as Asmamaw (2003), for Ethiopia.
7. For example, in Ethiopia, informal waste operators did not qualify for the Small Scale Income Generating Scheme which was intended to provide micro-credit facilities and training for poor urban dwellers (Demeke, 2002).
20. The lowest administrative unit in Ethiopia.
27. The term qorale is the short form of the Amharic ‘Korkoro yaleh’ (Have you any scrap metal?), which is what the young boys shout when out collecting.
28. The incomes of wholesalers were sometimes as high as 85 USD per day (Bjerkli, 2005).
34. Bjerkli, 2005.
37. Zelalem, 2006, p. 78
40. Bjerkli, 2005.
42. Post et al., 2003.
44. Onibokum, 1999b, p. 240.
45. Onibokum, 1999a, p. 231.

References


ARTICLE TWO

Governance on the Ground: A Study of Solid Waste Management in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

CAMILLA LOUISE BJERKLI

Abstract

This article examines the management of solid waste in Addis Ababa from 2004 to mid-2011. It describes how solid waste management has evolved and how relationships between the informal sector and the local authority have shifted in relation to the political atmosphere in the city. The author shows how good governance promoted by international donors does not necessarily result in improved service delivery on the ground. In line with the principles of good governance, the Ethiopian government decentralized the city’s administration and entered into partnerships with non-state actors in order to improve service delivery. However, these structural changes have not led to improvements in providing services for dealing with solid waste, nor have they improved accountability to or participation by civil society. The study shows that the established ways of exercising power are continuing within the new structures of the city administration, resulting in increased control over the actors involved in the process, and more conflicts and deeper mistrust of the city administration. This, in turn, has prevented the successful integration of the informal sector and provision of an improved solid waste service in the city. The city administration in Addis Ababa claims to have adopted good governance, but in reality it has adapted good governance to suit its own interests and agendas.

Introduction

Solid waste management (SWM) is becoming one of the most serious challenges urban areas in Africa face today. Most municipalities are unable to collect the increasing volumes of waste. SWM is critical for protecting urban environments, public health and the image of cities. A rapid urbanization rate means that the challenges relating to the collection and disposal of solid waste will increase in years to come, and therefore there is an urgent need to resolve the current problem (UN-Habitat, 2010a). In order to achieve improved SWM, international donors place a strong emphasis on the adoption of the principles of good governance. Consequently, development agendas focus on governance, and the United Nations (UN) even uses the term ‘good garbage governance’ in its most recent report (UN-Habitat, 2010b: 9). Public-private partnerships (PPPs) and decentralization have been used as central strategies in efforts to bring non-state actors into SWM in order to make SWM more cost-effective, to create employment and to give

I would like to thank Dr Axel Baudouin for providing me with valuable support and input for this study. I am also grateful to the IJURR reviewers for constructive and useful comments which have contributed to further improving the article.
more power to lower levels of the city administrations. The body of literature that
discusses and analyses the role of the private sector in improving solid waste services is
growing (Post, 1999; Azam and Ali, 2004; Baud et al., 2005; Kaseva and Mbuligwe,
2005; Post et al., 2005; Azam and Ali, 2006; Oteng-Ababio, 2010; Tukahirwa et al.,
2010). Such studies have shown that the private sector is contributing to improved
service delivery in terms of SWM, but argue that the main obstacle that private sectors
face is lack of good governance, such as accountability and transparency, as well as lack
of resources and capacity within city administrations, which prevents these from entering
into successful partnerships with non-state actors. Other studies have shown that, even
though local governments have adopted and implemented principles of good governance,
there have been few positive outcomes at ground level (Onibokun, 1999; Schalkwijk,
2005; Adama 2007; Allen et al., 2008; Davies, 2008; Blundo and Meur, 2009;
Oosterveer, 2009; Bhuiyan, 2010). Schalkwijk (2005) shows how the adoption and
implementation of good governance in Bolivia has not significantly changed
management practices. The Bolivian government lacks the will to change and use good
governance policies to promote its interests, and therefore, concludes Schalkwijk, the
government itself is the main obstacle to development. Although it has been observed
that many governments have ‘adopted’ good governance, it remains to be seen whether
declarations of good governance policies materialize and reflect a genuine or partially
genuine commitment to good governance or whether these are mostly rhetorical — that
is, formulations and use of a new ideology responsible for concealing the realities of
misuse of power on the ground.

This article contributes to the ongoing debate about the way in which some
governments have adopted and implemented good governance policies, as promoted by
international donors. The focus is on SWM in Addis Ababa over a period of 8 years, from
2004 to mid-2011, on good governance and the way in which decentralization and PPPs
have been promoted and implemented by the city administration, and on practice on the
ground. I start by arguing that there is a need to shift from a normative to an analytical
approach to governance. I continue by presenting a review of the political context in
Ethiopia, followed by a historical description of the development of SWM in Addis
Ababa. I analyse everyday practices by linking them to the political context in the
city, with emphasis on the interests of various actors and how these interests are acted
upon in the local context. I argue that the promotion of good governance by international
donors has resulted in the reorganization of the city administration and in changes
to solid waste management on the ground. However, despite these changes, the
established way of exercising power has continued within the new structures of the
city administration, resulting in few improvements to the solid waste disposal service
being provided and an even deeper mistrust towards the city administration among
actors.

From a normative towards an analytical approach to governance

Governance has become a central concept in development discourses, and the promotion
and use of the concept by international donors has led to the reorganization of
government institutions and the implementation of various policies designed to make
government perform their duties more efficiently and to become accountable towards
their citizens (Bevir, 2009). The concept of governance was first introduced by the World
Bank, in the belief that it would lead to the implementation of neoliberal policies. This
introduction was based on the argument that lack of good governance is the main
obstacle to ensuring an efficient urban management that is more accountable and
responsive to its citizens (World Bank, 1992; Mkandawire, 2007).

To date, there is no commonly agreed definition of governance. The World Bank
(1992: 1) defines governance as ‘the manner in which power is exercised in the
management of countries’ economic and social resources for development’. Common to most definitions of governance is that the term governance is distinct from the concept of government. Its use implies that power is not limited to formal authorities and institutions but that non-state actors have a right to participate in decision making. The concept also implies that governance is not a simple frame of action but a process, since decisions have to be made based on complex relationships between actors who all have their own priorities (Bevir, 2009). All definitions of governance entail more or less the same elements, including accountability, participation, rule of law, transparency, efficiency, equity and decentralization, as well as efforts to decentralize governmental institutions in order to give more power to the lower levels of administration, with the aim of improving accountability and increasing the efficiency of public institutions. In addition, the emphasis is on entering into partnerships with non-state actors in order to empower them and give them equal access to development and decision processes (Devas, 2004; Schalkwijk, 2005; Davies, 2008; Myers, 2011).

It cannot be denied that the core elements of good governance, such as accountability, participation, decentralization and transparency, are relevant elements, which, if respected, could improve the functioning of societies to the benefit of all. According to Grindle (2010), the concept of governance has become inflated owing to its popularity and has become one of many buzzwords in development discourses. Donors’ emphasis on governance imposes a technical recipe for what governments should do in order to improve governance, but this recipe is not adapted to the local context (Hoebink, 2006; Grindle, 2007; 2010; Hufty, 2009). The question is why good governance policies, although adopted and implemented by many governments, have not produced the expected results on the ground. Studies have shown that there is a large gap between the official aim of governance policies and the actual practice on the ground, with scholars arguing that the implementation of good governance policies is a political process influenced by power relations and institutional pluralism (Schalkwijk, 2005; Crawford, 2009; Hufty, 2009; Myers, 2011). The World Bank uses the concept of good governance with reference to ‘what should be’ and not ‘what is’ (Hufty, 2009). By focusing on what should be done, donors seem to ignore the possibility that governments might misuse their projects or in some cases even promote bad governance. If we continue to promote good governance and struggle to attain it, what are we struggling towards? Grindle (2004) argues that the expectations of good governance are too high, and points out that there is a need to focus on ‘good enough governance’, with goals that are more realistic for countries to achieve. She calls for empirical research that is more grounded, in order to help us understand what works and what does not work, rather than a focus on the gaps between everyday governance and idealistic goals. Andrews (2008) argues that it would be better to understand the factors that influence what works, and when and how, instead of merely having a list of what should work, that is, to focus on what is rather than on what should be. There is a need to look into the reasons behind the normative use of governance and to critically analyse its implementation and use on the ground in order to gain a better understanding of the outcome of governance policies and the underlying reasons for them. It has been argued that governance is relevant and offers a framework for the analysis of public services, with emphasis on how social actors articulate their views and use governance (Blundo and Meur, 2009). Governance includes a wide range of actors and institutions, and it is the relationships and interactions between such actors and institutions that determine what happens within the context of a city. The relationships between actors in cities are not equal, and governance as a process deals with power relationships among different actors in cities and between scales. Thus, there is a need to emphasize social processes and to focus on power relationships between the actors involved in governance processes at various scales (Devas, 2004; Heynen et al., 2006; Hufty, 2009). The aim of this article is therefore to explore everyday practices within solid waste management in Addis Ababa to promote an understanding of how governance processes operate on the ground through a focus on politics and power relations among the actors involved.
Methodology

This article is based on data collected during three fieldwork sessions conducted in Addis Ababa between 2009 and mid-2011. Data collected in 2004 as part of my master’s degree (Bjerkli, 2005) are also included in the analysis. The data were collected through interviews with various actors operating within SWM in Addis Ababa, including solid waste managers (9), members of cooperatives involved in pre-collection of waste (19), a city manager (1), former managers of solid waste (2), former managers of small-scale enterprises (MSSEs) (3), households (20) and actors in the private sector (2). A total of 56 actors were interviewed and, with the exception of the households and the city manager, follow-up interviews were held with all respondents to collect information on the situation regarding SWM over time and to clarify, confirm or discard information collected from other sources. Data were also collected from newspaper reviews published from 2004 to mid-2011, official documents, workshops and by means of observations.

During data collection, a constant comparative method (CCM) was used, whereby collected data were continuously compared with previously collected data. Accordingly, during the whole research process, the results of each interview were analysed and then compared with those of earlier interviews. From the first interview onwards, newly acquired information led to new questions and to new participants in an attempt to clarify issues, understand conflicting information and confirm or reject information given to me (see Boeije, 2002).

The political context in Ethiopia

Ethiopia has a long history of highly centralized government with authoritarian rulers. During the reign of Haile Selassie, Emperor of Ethiopia from 1930 to 1974, the culture of the city administration was characterized by loyalty to the emperor (Vaughan and Tronvoll, 2002; Kapuscinski, 2006). In 1974, Mengistu Haile Mariam of the Provisional Military Administrative Council (PMAC), called the Derg in Amharic, took control of Ethiopia. The Derg promoted the People’s Democratic Republic of Ethiopia under a new constitution modelled on a Marxist-Leninist state. During the Derg’s rule, Ethiopia experienced a centralized state and during the last years of rule, when the regime was threatened, personal loyalty to the party was essential for survival. Thousands of people were killed for not being faithful to the ruling party in a period referred to in Ethiopia as the Red Terror (Harold, 1994).

The Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) came to power in 1991, when it took over after removing the Derg (African Development Bank, 2009). The EPRDF established a federal state and formed a republican government that it called a democratic multiparty system, in contrast to the Derg’s single-party regime. Since 1991, there have been four national elections in Ethiopia. The first two elections, held in 1995 and 2000, respectively, were dominated by the EPRDF, and although the opposition boycotted both elections it won some seats in the House of Representatives (Vaughan and Tronvoll, 2002). In the run-up to the national election in 2005, the EPRDF appeared willing to allow more open competition to take place between the parties. An unprecedented level of openness was observed in the media and representatives of the opposition parties were permitted to broadcast on state-owned radio and television and allowed to organize large rallies in the capital. Countrywide, the opposition won the election, with one-third of the seats in the House of Representatives, but it had to be suppressed in order for the EPRDF to secure a solid victory of 75% to 85% of the seats (Aalen and Tronvoll, 2009). After the 2005 election, the EPRDF used excessive force when dealing with urban protests against the controversial election, which led to approximately 200 people being killed and leaders of the main opposition party and journalists being detained. In addition, thousands of youths were picked up from the...
streets of Addis Ababa and sent to detention camps without being formally charged. The EPRDF’s low score in the 2005 election led the party to increase its efforts to ensure that such a weak performance would never occur again.

After the 2005 election, the political atmosphere in Addis Ababa changed. People were reluctant to demonstrate and talk freely. In order to gain more control over its citizens, the government employed a carrot-and-stick strategy. The EPRDF made efficient use of the time prior to the 2010 election and increased its numbers of party members from 760,000 in 2005 to 5 million in 2010 (Tronvoll, 2011). People were forced to register as party members in order to secure jobs and/or keep their jobs. To ensure that there were always loyal people employed within the city administration, the party frequently evaluated officials (Human Rights Watch, 2010). Cadres went from door to door and instructed people to collect a voting card and to go to registration centres (see methodology above). They also visited households to register all family members, record the number of rooms and ask for which party the family members were going to vote. Many people feared that they would lose their home if they did not have a voter’s card and did not vote for the EPRDF. The voter registration cards were also compulsory ID cards in certain circumstances, to show support for the ruling party (Tronvoll, 2011). Furthermore, mass registration of street vendors, shoe shine boys and other tradespeople took place. They were forced to register as members of the ruling party in order to be allowed to continue to operate. As a further method of persuasion, party members were given free food and pocket money if they attended party meetings. Thus, for many citizens membership and loyalty to the ruling party became a way of ensuring their daily food supplies. As a consequence, it was possible find that in any given kebele up to one-third of the inhabitants (about 30 to 1,000) were members of the local branch of the ruling party, and this would have resulted in members of the ruling party having most of the control over the local community. In total, 31,926,520 million voters registered out of an estimated 37 million potentially eligible voters (Tronvoll, 2011). The EPRDF won the elections in 2010 with 99.6% of seats in Parliament; the remaining two seats went to the opposition and to an EPRDF-friendly independent candidate, respectively.

Solid waste management in Addis Ababa before 2003
Addis Ababa, the capital city of Ethiopia, is one of the fastest-growing cities in East Africa. Its growth has accelerated dramatically in the past 30 years. In the 10-year period from 1984 to 1994, for example, its population increased from 1.4 million to 2.1 million (Yirgalem, 2008). According to the most recent statistics, Addis Ababa has a population of approximately 4 million and it is projected that this figure will reach 12 million in 2024 (UN-Habitat, 2008). In addition to its rapid growth in population size, the physical city has also grown extensively, more than doubling in size since 1984 to cover an area of approximately 530 km² (UN-Habitat, 2008). Like other African cities, Addis Ababa is facing increasing problems related to waste generation and lacks efficient management to handle this growth. There is only one open dump, established in 1964 — almost half a century ago — which does not have any drainage or top cover. The site reached capacity several years ago (SBPDA, 2003). When the site was chosen, it was located at a safe distance from settlements, but since then the city has gradually extended towards the site and beyond it so that it is now surrounded by residential neighbourhoods (Yirgalem, 2001).

Prior to 2003 there were few developments within SWM in the city. Addis Ababa Health Bureau was responsible for managing solid waste in the city and the municipal system for waste collection was based on door-to-door collections and the use of

---

1 The kebele is the lowest administrative unit in Addis Ababa.
containers. The door-to-door collection service was available to households near main roads, with containers being placed in open spaces close to the main roads. People complained because the trucks did not come at regular intervals, either owing to lack of trucks or frequent breakdowns of existing trucks. There were few containers and the majority of households had to travel long distances to dispose of their waste in a proper manner. People also complained that the containers were often not collected and were then overfull. Therefore it became common practice to dispose of waste in the rivers or open fields. The city administration, in turn, complained about a lack of trucks, high operational costs, lack of awareness among people, and the lack of a proper landfill site (SBPDA, 2003).

In response to the need for better service, in the year 2000 the informal sector offered to collect households’ waste once or twice a week for a fee of 5 to 10 Ethiopian birr (US $0.5–1). The city became cleaner as a result, but the service the informal sector provided was unevenly distributed and favoured well-off areas (SBPDA, 2003; Bjerkli, 2005; Zelalem, 2006).

Decentralization and formalization of the pre-collectors

In 2003, Addis Ababa city administration, under Mayor Arkebe Oqubay, announced a reorganization of the city’s administration. This was part of a national decentralization process under the Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Programme (SDPRP), supported by international donors. The aim was to give more power to lower levels of the city administration and to empower local communities and their institutions to participate in decision making at local level in an effort to reduce poverty, promote good governance and improve public services (Taye and Tegegne, 2007). At the time, it was widely known that the city administration was suffering from bad governance. Arkebe (2005: n.p.) described the situation in the city as follows:

The city of Addis Ababa and its citizens were experiencing poor urban governance as manifested in a highly centralized government system, un-participatory governance, poor service delivery, and lack of transparency . . . Delivery of municipal and public services was often inefficient and non-transparent, while levels of corruption were high in some areas.

The reform was also achieved by dismissing hundreds of civil servants on the basis of allegations of inefficiency and corruption. The city administration was divided into 10 sub-cities, which were further divided into 99 kebeles. The reorganization of the city administration was also marked by changes in the organization and management of solid waste. A new agency was established, the Sanitation Beautification and Park Development Authority (SBPDA). The SBPDA’s main responsibility was the collection, transportation and disposal of solid waste in the city. Compared to the previous system under the Health Department, more power was given to the sub-cities and the kebeles. A solid waste manager was appointed for each sub-city and kebele. The aim was to stimulate more efficient delivery of urban services by promoting decentralization, participation, transparency and accountability, in line with good governance in service delivery.

During the period of reorganization, Addis Ababa’s city administration recognized the potential of the informal pre-collectors operating in the city. The city administration seemed quite amenable to the informal pre-collectors who were registered and had been given licences to allow them to operate as private enterprises without paying taxes. Many private enterprises were established as a consequence of easier access to the solid waste

---

2 One container would serve, for example, 7,500 households (SBPDA, 2003).
3 Most of the time, only 36 out of the 78 trucks were in running order (SBPDA, 2003).
sector and to favourable working conditions. Initially, the system seemed to work quite well, and the SBPDA started to place containers at sites that were readily accessible to the private enterprises. This was done mainly for three reasons: first, the officials recognized that it was possible to reduce the cost of waste collection; secondly, they realized that the informal pre-collectors were more efficient at collecting waste than municipal employees; and thirdly, the partnership with or support of the private enterprises was in line with the government strategy of creating more jobs in the city.

Within a few years, the number of private enterprises within solid waste collection had increased enormously and operational problems relating to areas where waste was collected had started to emerge. The various private enterprises were highly competitive, which resulted in a fall in the prices they charged for their services. In order to cope with the problems, the sub-cities started to divide the kebeles into zones, and in order to limit conflicts between the private enterprises, each enterprise was allocated a zone in which to operate. The problems related to solid waste in the city were subsequently reduced; more waste was collected and the city became cleaner. However, the problem of illegal disposal of solid waste still existed owing to a lack of containers and collection trucks. Apparently there were no resources nor any attempts to improve the transportation situation or to invest in more containers. Instead, the city administration started to control the use of the containers by posting guards from the kebeles. Private enterprises were punished if they failed to dispose of waste in a proper manner. No attempts were made to cover poor households that could not pay for the service, and consequently there was continued segregation in the provision of the service, so that poor households continued to dispose of their waste in rivers or open fields.

The pre-election situation within solid waste management

The situation regarding SWM in Addis Ababa changed prior to the election in 2005. The city administration decided suddenly, and without any preliminary dialogue, to create government-supported micro- and small-scale enterprises. MSSEs were one of the major elements of an urban development package (UDP) that was designed to reduce urban poverty and unemployment (Taye and Tegegne, 2007). The newly introduced actors, whom the local authorities had selected from the unemployed, were regarded as rivals by the established private enterprises. At first, the private enterprises were simply dispossessed and evicted from their service areas, but later the government officials forced the pre-existing enterprises to become reorganized under the umbrella of the MSSE administration, which meant that they were denied their right to organize themselves as independent enterprises. The city administration distributed official letters, signed and stamped by kebele authorities, to households in order to make the newly established MSSEs appear to be the only legitimate enterprises. The administration also urged households to terminate their contracts with the former collectors and to accept a new contract with the new MSSEs. This resulted in the systematic eviction of pre-existing enterprises from their established service areas. The former private enterprises were offered few alternatives; at best they were allowed to share part of their service areas with the newly established MSSEs, alternatively, they had to leave (Zelalem, 2006).

The MSSEs ability to capture clients from pre-existing enterprises was made possible by lowering service charges, often below a workable minimum price, compared to the prices the pre-existing enterprises were charging. The city government defended the implementation of MSSEs by stating that they wanted to ensure more efficient SWM and to generate employment; 13,000 jobs were created within SWM (Ethiopian Herald, 2006: 6). However, the intervention appeared to be a political exercise introduced by the authorities, who were eager to organize as many enterprises as possible in order to appear as loyal champions of the city government’s programme to create ‘new employment’.
The kebeles had their own target quotas, and officials were made responsible and accountable for implementing the quota system in the kebeles. This suspected politicization was confirmed by the fact that immediately after the elections of 2005 the city administration abandoned the active formation of new enterprises. Conflicts and hostilities developed between the former private enterprises and new MSSEs, who were now the dominant service providers. These conflicts were sometimes serious and triggered clashes and hostilities directed at the newly integrated actors. Competitive strategies included increasing the frequency of collection, reducing collection fees and rendering supplementary services free of charge (Baudouin et al., 2010).

In 2006, the city administration ceased its interference with the MSSEs and made no further efforts to deal with existing problems or to improve the efficiency of the SWM system. The situation quietened down and the MSSEs were able to operate as they wished. However, segregation in terms of service delivery, and the provision (or lack of) containers and collection trucks, as well as illegal dumping, continued to be significant problems.

City administration’s new policy to improve solid waste services

In 2009, the city administration introduced a new policy called Business Process Re-engineering (BPR). This policy was part of a national capacity-building programme to improve public services further and was also supported by international donors. The aim of the policy was to increase efficiency within the city’s administration, develop its capacity, cut operational costs and improve public services. The SBPDA was now reorganized into three agencies: the Solid Waste Management Agency, the Landfill Project Office and the Beautification, Park and Cemetery Agency. Thereafter, even more power was to be given to the kebeles, which were to take responsibility for waste collection, whereas the sub-city administration would only play a monitoring role and be responsible for the transportation of waste by truck. The city administration had the main responsibility for the overall management of solid waste and the landfill site. The new SWM policy was aimed at reorganizing the former MSSEs into government-supported cooperatives.4 According to the city administration, these changes were introduced because the previous service had not worked well. The city administration accused the MSSEs of being ‘rent collectors’ or ‘rent seekers’, of handling the waste in an illegal manner, of favouring collection from high-income households, and of only engaging in the sector to earn money, not caring about the cleanliness of the city.5 Conversely, members of the MSSEs blamed the city administration for lack of containers and for not arranging for the containers to be collected. Regardless, these changes and decisions related to SWM in the city had once again been made without consulting the various actors involved, such as the MSSEs and households. As a result of the policy, all managers of the former MSSEs had to reorganize their enterprises and either become members of the cooperatives or cease working altogether. The change in policy resulted in most of the former managers of the MSSEs opting to cease looking for other contracts, and their employees had no other choice than to join the new kebele-controlled cooperatives. One of the previous managers stated:

4 The cooperatives are formal organizations that operate within the bounds of the law. Members elect their own officers to handle finances and undertake administrative activities. The officers are also expected to set up an audit committee to look into their financial records. The uppermost level of authority of a cooperative is exercised by an assembly of all members of that cooperative.

5 The terms ‘rent collectors’ and ‘rent seekers’ have been introduced recently and are used by the ruling party to refer to someone who does not work but earns money by exploiting others. The concepts are also used in a political sense to close doors to those who are not loyal members of the ruling party (interview, 2010).
Today the municipality is taking over solid waste management in Addis Ababa and is destroying the private sector’s initiatives. The private sector had a lot of plans within solid waste but the municipality destroyed it [the sector]. The main reason for the new system is mainly political, in order to control the activities, create employment, and control the money involved in the businesses (interview, 2009).

Under the new policy, the administration of fees for solid waste disposal was included in the scheme for collecting water fees. Under the scheme, the amount paid for solid waste disposal was calculated as a percentage of the total amount paid for water supplies: households connected to a communal water tap were to pay 5%, households with a private water tap were to pay 20% and non-residential consumers were to pay 42.5%. However, many problems were encountered with implementing the scheme because some of the non-residential consumers did not have water taps and were responsible for a lot of waste, whereas others who did have a water tap were producing relatively small amounts of waste. Moreover, the system was implemented before the payment system was in place. Representatives of the kebeles responsible for collecting the waste fees had to go from door to door to collect payments during the first months of the scheme’s operation. During that time, the majority of households refused to pay, thus making it difficult for the kebeles to collect enough money to pay the members of the cooperatives. As a consequence, the workers did not receive their salaries, and the city administration provided no financial support to resolve the problem (interview, 2010). Many employees ceased working because they could not afford to work without pay, and some chose to leave because they had been forced to register as party members in order to be allowed to continue to work.

### An awkward, complicated, bureaucratic wage system for cooperatives

Under the BPR policy, workers who are members of the cooperatives are paid by the kebeles and not directly by the households, as had been the case under the previous system. The government pays the cooperatives 30 Ethiopian birr (US $2.1) per cubic metre of waste collected. In theory, this means there is an incentive to collect as much waste as possible in order to earn more. However, the areas allocated to the cooperatives are limited and some areas that previously had one MSSE operating within each of them, for example, now may have three cooperatives operating within each. Some of the cooperatives claimed that they had only 600 customers but had been promised 1,500. In addition, MSSEs that had previously operated with, for example, six employees, now have to have a minimum of ten to 15 employees. This means that cooperatives have few opportunities to increase their income. Monthly income for members of cooperatives has decreased in comparison to the previous situation, and consequently many workers have opted to leave. However, owing to the high proportion of poor people in Addis Ababa, there is no shortage of potential employees to replace those who opt to leave (interview, 2010). Furthermore, each kebele appears to have its own quota for employment within the waste sector, and the city administration can boast of having created 13,000 new jobs.

After the introduction of the new system, the sub-cities were not able to provide enough trucks to transport the collected waste. When trucks were unavailable, the members of the cooperatives did not receive any pay and therefore they refused to collect waste. According to some of the pre-collectors interviewed in 2010, this happened at least one day per week. One member of a cooperative stated:

---

6 All quotes included in the article are translated from Amharic to English by the author.
7 In the first months after the introduction of the new system in 2009, payment of salaries to the cooperative members was delayed by up to two months.
Our salary will be reduced because we are not able to fill one container. To get a truck tomorrow you have to call the day before, so today I had to call the sub-city, but usually the guy is not around there . . . [T]here is a lot of bureaucracy, but if we pay the drivers, they will come, even if the truck is included in the schedule. If we do not pay him, he will ignore us and give us the service at the end of the day or not prioritize us, and then we have to wait for a long time. So, by paying 30 birrs we will get the service and not be the last one to get the service.

Households complained about the lack of service and the reduction of the number of collections from twice to once a week. In addition, many low-income households were confused by the service and claimed that the system had been implemented without involving them. During fieldwork, it was also revealed that many of the households were not aware that they were paying for a solid waste service that they did not receive.

The current status of solid waste management in Addis Ababa

In May 2010, the Solid Waste Management Agency purchased 44 new trucks, and according to the agency this increased the total number of trucks to 104. The trucks started to run 24 hours per day in order to transport all the waste collected within the city, and initially this seemed to solve the transportation problems; for a few months the system appeared to be working better. However, in March 2011 matters seemed to change again. Respondents said that the agency was only able to collect 4,614,300 Ethiopian birr (US $270,000) per month but needed 5,537,160 Ethiopian birr (US $324,000) to cover the salaries payable to members of the cooperatives. Another respondent said that the dumpsite was full and that the cooperatives had encountered problems with disposal of waste at the site. The extent to which this information reflects the reality of the situation is unclear, but discussions with some members of cooperatives revealed that they had been forced to reduce their number of working days, so that instead of collecting waste to fill one container every day, they now filled ten containers per month. One worker said:

[B]efore, we could collect a lot of waste because we paid the drivers, but we collected too much waste and the kebele said we were not allowed to collect so much waste because our salaries were too high. We were only allowed to collect waste equivalent to 500 birrs [US $30]. The municipality is only after the money. They do not care about solid waste and the cleanliness of the city. A lot of my friends have quit working . . . [I]t is not a good feeling to feel useless and I feel bad when I wake up and have no job to go to. It is not good for me.

To compensate for their lack of income, some workers made private arrangements with hotels and institutions that were not covered by the municipal system and that were expected to pay for waste removal themselves. Although workers were able to secure an income, they had nowhere to dispose of the collected waste legally and therefore they collected it during the night and disposed of it illegally. Thus, the solid waste situation in the city was clearly deteriorating.

Decentralization and PPPs: A strategy to control and secure ruling-party interests

At the entrance to the offices of the Solid Waste Management Agency and other agencies in Addis Ababa, large information boards proclaim the vision and mission of the agency. In the case of the Solid Waste Management Agency, the vision reads (see Figure 1):

Addis Ababa will be a liveable city where it is clean, green, naturally balanced, favourably environmentally suited to the living and working of its people and visitors . . . [The agency’s
The Solid Waste Management Agency’s mission is to cooperate with the public and they intend to do this based on 12 principles of ethical services, which are listed as: integrity, loyalty, transparency, confidentiality, honesty, accountability, serving the public interest, exercising legitimate authority, impartiality, respecting the law, responsiveness and exercising leadership (see Figure 1).

On paper, the vision and principles appear to be good and if applied in practice they would lead to improved SWM in the city. From the history of SWM in Addis Ababa it is apparent that the city still has a long way to go before these principles are respected and put into practice, with the exception of the second principle (loyalty), which has been shown to be the most important principle within the city administration. Since 2004, the city administration has implemented one administrative reform and several policies in order to improve SWM in Addis Ababa. The official aim of the administrative reform and policies has been to decentralize administration and to give more power and accountability to the lower levels of the administration in order to make solid waste management more efficient. On paper, these measures have succeeded in decentralizing the city administration. As a result of the implementation of BPR, the Solid Waste Management Agency is now able to present positive statistics, showing that 82% of those employed within solid waste work at kebele level (interview, 2010). However, interviews and observations in the field revealed that, although most people are employed at kebele
level today, the power to take decisions is still highly centralized. Moreover, officials employed at kebele level and sub-city level not only lack education and experience related to SWM, but also the basic tools for doing their job, such as computers, photocopiester, paper and pencils.

Because loyalty to the ruling party is the single most important criterion for securing a job and keeping it, officials do not take any decisions themselves for fear of making a wrong decision that ultimately could result in them losing their job. It is also common practice among officials not to report problems to top-level management staff and not to question decisions made at the top even if they disagree with them. At the city level, general managers responsible for SWM are employed because of their political allegiance. However, those under the general managers are employed because of their ability and their political allegiance. Interviews with several professionals (after they had terminated their employment or lost their job) confirmed that it is difficult to work professionally within the city administration under the current conditions. All the respondents stated that they were unable to prepare plans for and manage SWM effectively because they had to follow orders from those above or risk losing their job. In many cases, they were unable to act owing to lack of decisions or permission from the top. As a result, high-ranking officials make all of the decisions related to SWM in the city without being aware of the reality on the ground, instead taking decisions based on the ruling party’s interests. Thus, power is still highly centralized within the structures of a decentralized city administration and officials are controlled and frequently evaluated for their loyalty to the ruling party and their interests.

In line with good governance practices, the city administration has also entered into a partnership with the private sector, with the aim of improving solid waste collection and creating employment among the urban poor. The promotion of the private enterprises and MSSEs and subsequently the cooperatives can be described as a caricature of partnership, as these have been implemented mainly to gain control over the actors involved in solid waste collection and not to promote a more efficient system. The interventions appear rather to have been a political exercise to organize as many MSSEs and cooperatives as possible to boast higher employment figures within the city right before the elections in 2005 and 2010. The city administration is not solving existing problems within solid waste but is introducing more bureaucracy, more complexity, and new problems. All of these changes and policies challenge rational thinking and it is hard to believe that these choices are made based on finding the best solutions to dispose of the city’s solid waste. Further support for this assumption is provided by the fact that in the post-election periods following the 2005 and 2010 elections the city administration did not interfere with the work on the ground. Clearly, this contrasted with the principles of good governance. The situation has opened up participation opportunities for loyal party members and has closed all opportunities for those who are not members of the ruling party. It has created job opportunities for party members as well as opportunities for showing citizens that the administration is doing something good for them in the run-up to the election. However, it has destroyed working conditions on the ground and introduced more problems and conflicts between actors than previously. It has excluded many actors who were formerly involved in solid waste management and replaced them with loyal unemployed members who have no experience in managing solid waste.

Conclusions

This article shows that the promotion of good governance policies such as decentralization and partnership with non-state actors has been adopted and implemented by the city administration in Addis Ababa with the official aim to improve solid waste services. The analysis of solid waste management from 2004 to mid-2011
reveals that what is actually being done on the ground challenges the aim of the good governance policies that were being promoted. The adoption and implementation of good governance policies in Addis Ababa have not resulted in an improvement to the management of solid waste, and the city administration is still unable to fulfill its task efficiently. The article shows that there is a large gap between what the city administration is doing and what it should do in respect of the principles of good governance. The implementation of administrative reform and policies has resulted in considerable restructuring of the city administration and major changes on the ground in terms of how solid waste should be managed and which actors should be involved, but it has not resulted in improvements in actual service provision. The deficiencies in delivering solid waste services demonstrate that the real agenda of the government is not to solve the problems concerning solid waste management in the city. The government does not seem to be committed to implementing good governance but is using good governance policies in a rhetorical way to secure its own power and promote its own political interests, particularly in pre-election times. This has resulted in false decentralization, which hides the persistent established ways of control and makes government officials mainly accountable to those higher up in the political system instead of to the citizens. In line with Schalkwijk’s study (2005), this study shows that the government has been the main obstacle to implementing good governance policies and improving SWM in Addis Ababa. The article shows that politics and power are central issues in the implementation of good governance policies and the outcome thereof.

Based on an analytical approach to governance, as suggested by Andrews (2008) and Hufty (2009), it is possible to gain a fuller understanding of actions taking place on the ground and the agendas and power relationships between actors at various scales. In this way, we are able to critically examine everyday practices to reveal the rhetorical use of good governance policies and to evaluate any outcomes.

This leaves us with the question of how to interpret deficiencies in public service. In the case of Addis Ababa it seems to refer to the political culture within the city administration and a lack of commitment to implementing good governance.

In order to be able to evaluate what works and what ‘good enough governance’ is, as suggested by Grindle (2004), it is critical that the Ethiopian government be willing to genuinely commit to the policies it has adopted and to change its ways of asserting control. Without a genuine commitment to change, as shown in the case presented here, it seems meaningless to talk about what works and what is ‘good enough governance’. As long as the culture within Addis Ababa city administration and its political control persist and as long as this political control dominates the relationship between the city administration and civil society it is most likely that there will not be any improvements in the city’s solid waste service.

Camilla Louise Bjerkli (camilla.bjerkli@svt.ntnu.no), Department of Geography, Norwegian University of Science and Technology, NTNU, NO-7491 Trondheim, Norway.

References


Kaseva, M. and S. Mbuligwe (2005) Appraisal of solid waste collection following private sector involvement in...


UN-Habitat (2010a) Collection of municipal solid waste in developing countries. UN-Habitat, Nairobi.

UN-Habitat (2010b) Solid waste management in the world’s cities: water and sanitation in the world’s cities 2010. UN-Habitat, London.


ARTICLE THREE

Is not included due to copyright
ARTICLE FOUR

Bjerkli, C.L. (not published). ‘Questioning the contribution of international organizations in urban services: The case of solid waste management in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia’
Is not included due to copyright
ARTICLE FIVE

The politics of solid-waste management in Accra, Addis Ababa, Maputo and Ouagadougou: Different cities, similar issues

Jeremy Grest, Axel Baudouin, Camilla Bjerkli and Hélène Quénot-Suarez

At first sight, solid-waste management may be considered a technical challenge, but over the last 15 years, it has also become a major political challenge for African cities. Solid-waste management is not studied here in its technical aspects, but rather as a metaphor for a whole range of questions relating to urban governance in Africa, and especially the relationship between local authorities born of the decentralisation process and urban society. These are especially salient in capital cities because they are, simultaneously, both decentralised and the incarnation of central state power. Solid-waste management provides a lens through which to look at the broader power relations behind the technical questions of urban management, which any discussion of the subject must also address.

Waste is a resource for some people and a nuisance for others. Solid-waste management is a complex issue. It is much more than the simple collection and dumping, or destruction, of waste. For many urban managers and politicians, it still only entails waste collection and disposal. In reality, solid-waste management includes waste minimisation, separation, transport, disposal, destruction and recycling. It also includes the people and organisations involved in these processes. Among these actors, those designated ‘informal’ would appear to have a particularly efficient and important role.

This chapter examines the cases of Accra, Addis Ababa, Maputo and Ouagadougou. Each of these cities has different geographical, social and political contexts, but each has had to implement waste-management reforms in response to both social demand and external pressure from international donors. The Ethiopian government launched its Urban Good Governance Package in 2006, aimed at stimulating efficiency in the
delivery of urban services by promoting decentralisation, participation, transparency and accountability. In Maputo the key factor that unlocked the door to improved municipal capacity was a technical cooperation agreement in 2000 between the city and the German Technical Cooperation (GTZ), in the form of the Apoio à Gestão de Résiduos Sóldos Urbanos na Área de Grande Maputo (AGRESU). In Ouagadougou, municipal authorities launched the Schéma Directeur de Gestion des Déchets (SDGD, or Waste Management Master Plan) in 1996 to reorganise waste collection, transportation and storage. This plan was a part of the third urban development plan, the Projet d’Amélioration des Conditions de Vie Urbaines, or the Project for Improving Urban Living Conditions. The Accra Sustainable Programme was launched by the Ghanaian government and the UN, and implemented by the Accra Metropolitan Assembly (AMA) and the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development.

In most cases, decentralisation was a response to the challenge of providing proper services, as well as a way to satisfy donor demands in terms of good governance. This term is commonly used to define what appears to be a new kind of urban management, focusing on negotiations and discussion forums involving all local actors, both political and from civil society. The term is useful for describing the emergence of new non-political actors at the local level and the growing complexities of the new relationships. But it is also an ‘elusive’ concept (Stren 2004: 3–4). On the one hand, good governance describes a new situation, based on decentralisation, participation and public–private partnerships. On the other, it describes an ideal situation, based on transparency and accountability. Furthermore, although it is used in political science, the term is derived from economics, as a mode of management ensuring good order and answering to market rules, especially in terms of the reduction of the role of the state and increased public participation, manifesting itself as ‘the ideologically acceptable side of a theory of economic efficiency towards the poorest’ (Dubresson & Jaglin 1993: 297). The concept should therefore be used with care. In this chapter, the authors use the term ‘good governance’ to refer to the struggle for change in the cities under discussion.

In this context, informality, previously an efficient local answer to garbage collection and recycling, became a challenge to the authorities. They had either to integrate or repress the informal sector in order to prove their efficiency and territorial control to citizens and international donors. This led to a reorganisation of the dynamics of the
local political field and to the emergence of new actors at the local level. Van de Klundert and Lardinois (1995) cite Furedi’s definition of the informal sector:

The informal private sector is unregistered, unregulated or casual activities carried out by individuals and/or family or community enterprises that engage in value-adding activities on a small scale with minimum capital input, using local materials and labour-intensive techniques.

This definition emphasises the small scale – whether social, technical or financial – at which the informal sector operates, with the main point being its existence outside any legal framework. In the definition, being informal does not mean operating without rules, but without the rules of the state. The difference between formal and informal enterprises, however these are constituted, is that the latter are not legally registered and do not pay taxes. This last aspect is one of the main reasons, beyond social prejudice, why administrations often consider informal actors in waste management a nuisance.

It is difficult to draw a clear distinction between the formal and informal sectors. We can talk of a ‘fuzzy’ separation. One reason is that the same actors may be participants in both the formal and informal sectors. The evolution of the informal sector may bring it into the sphere of the formal, because when the informal sector is organised, either as cooperatives or in the form of private companies, it becomes formal somehow.

The informal sector can be considered as the dominant form of the economy in developing countries, providing a livelihood for millions of people who depend on it for survival. In waste management, the informal sector plays several crucial roles, including poverty reduction, economic production and environmental protection. The roles it plays are not reflected in the place given to it in the public arena. This is determined by attitudes and policies rooted in local culture, and originating from both the authorities and the public. Medina (1997) has classified these attitudes in four ways:

- Repression: An attitude commonly adopted by authorities.
- Neglect: When authorities simply ignore scavengers.
- Collusion: A form of ‘criminal partnership’ between local authorities and the informal sector. Political clientelism, corruption and bribery can flourish between authorities and scavengers.
• Stimulation: This ranges from tolerance to active integration. Some countries, namely Indonesia, Egypt and Brazil (Medina 1997: 16–17), recognise the economic, social and environmental benefits of scavenging and recycling.

The comparison between the formal and informal sectors is based on this definition, but one should keep in mind that being informal does not always have the same meaning in the four cities analysed here. Decentralisation reforms implemented in the 1990s gave more responsibilities to local governments. However, in many respects, the newly created local entities were not capable of assuming full responsibility for municipal services, and the accumulation of waste is proof of their failure. Decentralisation aimed at changing the rules of the local political field by introducing new kinds of actors, new practices and new local best-practice discourses. The persistence of inadequate solid-waste management and the surprising neglect of the informal sector may be due to the way decentralisation was implemented, and therefore its reality has to be questioned.

Waste management, the informal sector and governance in Addis Ababa

Monitoring waste management

During the last 10 years, the inhabitants of Addis Ababa, as well as visitors to the city, have witnessed improvements in waste management. The changes in solid-waste management were particularly noticeable after 2003, under the governance of Mayor Arkebe Oqubay. The city became cleaner and numerous small- and micro-scale solid-waste-management enterprises were created. These changes were part of an ongoing local administrative reform. In 2006 the Ethiopian government launched its Urban Good Governance Package, intended to stimulate efficiency in the delivery of urban services by promoting decentralisation, participation, transparency and accountability. In Addis Ababa in 1997, up to 80 per cent of the population were engaged in one or another form of informal activity (Demeke 2002). However, the administrative authorities usually ignore, or are unable to enter into partnerships with the actors in the informal sector. For their part, informal actors may also refuse to become involved with the formal authorities through lack of trust and the belief that it would be detrimental to their activities.
Waste management in Addis Ababa before 2003

Some years ago, most households did not have any waste-disposal containers accessible within reasonable distance (ENDA-Ethiopia 1999). Waste was either dumped – particularly in rivers – burnt or buried in gardens. Before 2003 the geographical coverage and frequency of disposal was far below expectation (Yirgalem 2001: 75). Only 40 per cent of solid waste was collected. The authorities responsible for waste management (i.e. the Health Bureau) did not provide enough containers, nor did they arrange for these to be emptied on a regular basis. No one controlled waste disposal, and no penalties were imposed for mismanagement of refuse. Regulations existed but were never enforced. Potential agencies for waste management were not on the agenda, and apart from municipal employees (truck drivers), the households themselves and informal scavengers, there was neither community nor private-sector involvement. In 1999 ENDA-Ethiopia claimed that ‘informal recyclers have to be encouraged through abolition or reduction of taxes and by providing them space to produce their materials etc. and with other incentives’ (ENDA-Ethiopia 1999: 12).

The Repi landfill site, established in the 1960s, has been the only solid-waste disposal site for the past four decades in Addis Ababa. The site is open, unfenced, with a poor disposal system, and devoid of any infrastructure. It exposes local communities to great health risks. Depending on the season, the Repi landfill site supports up to 500 on-site scavengers (Yirgalem 2001). Small-scale urban farmers make deals with truck drivers to dump organic waste at their farms. Close to the landfill, a small-scale private industry reprocesses waste from tanneries and dead animals to produce glue, known locally as colla.¹

There are many reasons why the informal actors work discreetly: fear of eviction from their area of operation; unfair and unaffordable taxes; competition from other actors; and the very long bureaucratic processes involved in following formal procedures. Although the existence of informal operators in solid-waste management was acknowledged at different levels of the city administration, their significant contribution to waste reduction, reuse and recycling was ignored. Access to credit and other incentives to develop the management of the informal sector were lacking, and the
strategy of informal operators was to try to avoid any contact with the city officials.


The situation surrounding solid-waste collection and the informal sector improved between 2002 and 2005 under Mayor Arkebe Oqubay. This progress, however, was due not only to the new mayor but also to the initiatives of earlier actors. One initiative, before the new administration came to power, was started by a popular musician, Gashe Abera Molla. Together with some NGOs, Molla launched a campaign to clean up the city. Other initiatives were prompted by Muammar Gadaffi’s provocative statement that Addis Ababa was too dirty to become the headquarters of the newly created African Union. This catalysed a response from the city’s inhabitants and administration, leading to better waste management. The heightened role of the media made the population increasingly concerned about the image of the city. Mayor Arkebe (2005) described the situation as follows:

The city of Addis Ababa and its citizens were experiencing poor urban governance as manifested in a highly centralized government system, un-participatory governance, poor service delivery, and lack of transparency…Delivery of municipal and public service was often inefficient and non-transparent, while levels of corruption were high in some areas.

The city was well known for the inefficiency of its administrative authorities. Public servants’ positions were based on loyalty to the ruling party, and they often lacked formal qualifications for the positions they occupied. Staff turnover was high due to the political nature of the patron–client culture.

Arkebe embarked on a huge administrative reform at three levels of administration: city, sub-city and kebele. These reforms involved decentralising services down to the kebele level, and organising community participation, with people’s advisory councils at the three levels. The reforms were achieved by dismissing hundreds of civil servants on the basis of allegations of inefficiency and corruption. This might have been a popular decision had it not been driven by an underlying political agenda, which cast a shadow over the process.
However, even if ‘any policies, programs and budget proposals initiated by the city government [had] to be deliberated by these councils before they [were] proclaimed for implementation’ (Arkebe 2005), the reality of the devolution of power to the people can be questioned, since the people’s councils had no decision-making power.

To improve solid-waste management, the city administration transferred responsibility for it from the Ministry of Health to a newly established municipal department, the Addis Ababa City Sanitation, Beautification and Park Development Agency. Although the informal waste-collecting sector provided a door-to-door primary collection service, this activity had long remained unattractive to government officials, or was simply ignored, until 2003.

In the early period of the new provisional city administration, officialdom was quite amenable towards the informal solid-waste collectors. They found themselves in an advantageous position when the city government withdrew from the primary collection service by placing containers in different locations to facilitate their work. Government officials adopted this arrangement for three reasons. Firstly, the officials recognised that they could reduce costs by abandoning the previous block collection service and concentrating only on transporting containers to the final dumping site. Secondly, they gradually learnt that the informal collectors were capable of collecting more waste than the municipal truck operators. Thirdly, it was viewed as a job-creation opportunity for individuals engaged in the sector on their own initiative. The introduction of government-sponsored micro- and small-scale enterprises (MSSEs) led to a boom in organised registered and taxable informal solid-waste-collecting organisations.

Integration of the micro- and small-scale enterprises

The new city administration gradually developed an interest in fully controlling primary collection (Zelalem 2006). By the end of 2003, it had started to advocate the need to formalise the pre-existing informal solid-waste-collecting enterprises. It did this by institutionalising and integrating MSSEs, placing them under the control of the kebeles without any preliminary consultation with the pre-existing agencies. The local
authorities simply selected new collectors from among the unemployed. These became rivals to the pre-existing informal sector and to the established formal private solid-waste-collecting enterprises. Initially, the latter were simply dispossessed and evicted from their service areas. Additionally, the pre-existing enterprises were forced to reorganise under the umbrella of the MSSE administration, and denied the right to organise themselves independently. In some cases, pre-existing enterprises were forced to merge into the new MSSEs. In others, officials avoided conflicts and evictions by deliberately organising and deploying the MSSEs only in areas not served by other enterprises.

One overt municipal intervention was to issue official letters signed and stamped by the kebele authorities, distributed to all households, in order to make the MSSEs appear as the only legitimate enterprises. Officials also urged households to terminate their existing contracts with the former collectors and to accept new contracts with the MSSEs. This caused a systematic eviction of pre-existing enterprises from their established service areas. The informal sector was offered few alternatives: at best only to share part of their service area with the MSSEs, or to leave (Zelalem 2006: 78). Capturing clients from the pre-existing enterprises was achieved by lowering the service rates below those charged by the pre-existing enterprises, often below a workable minimum price.

Objectives of the interventions

The city government claimed it wanted to ensure more efficient solid-waste collection and to generate employment opportunities. However, the intervention appeared to be more of a political exercise introduced by the kebele authorities eager to organise as many enterprises as possible so as to appear as loyal champions of the city government’s programme for creating new employment. Each kebele had its own targeted quota, and officials were made responsible for its implementation. The exercise seems to have been aimed at recruiting new party members and ensuring local political dominance of the ruling party. Immediately after the 2005 national elections, the municipality abandoned the active formation of new enterprises. Conflict and hostility rapidly emerged as the dominant types of relationships. These conflicts were sometimes serious and triggered
violence directed at the newly integrated actors. Competition strategies included enhancing the frequency of waste collection, reducing collection fees and rendering supplementary services for free (Zelalem 2006). In some cases, the informal waste collectors settled internal disputes through discussions and negotiations.

All in all, the introduction of the government-sponsored MSSEs was to the detriment of the waste-collection service. Officials claimed that more than 10,000 new jobs had been created in solid-waste collection, but this figure seems far higher than what was achieved in reality. Some kebeles were overstocked with solid-waste-collecting enterprises, whereas others suffered from service inadequacies. In addition, the city government interventions were mainly focused on areas that were already served by pre-existing enterprises. Thereafter, the MSSEs usually failed to sustain service delivery at the newly introduced collection rates. Consequently, they often terminated their service and/or were dissolved after a short period of operating. The provisional city government integrated the MSSEs as a way of dismantling the pre-existing enterprises, which were viewed as a nuisance, and the only outcome of this was a disruption of the mushrooming informal waste-collection system. In the period under consideration (2003–2005), the role played by informal solid-waste collection was recognised, and it became obvious to visitors and inhabitants that, at least in the central parts of the town, waste collection had definitely improved.

The 2005 elections

As explained earlier, Mayor Arkebe introduced substantial changes in the municipality and its management between 2003 and 2005. However, the victory of the opposition coalition in the 2005 elections led to his being replaced by Mayor Berhanu Nega from the Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD). Claiming that the elections had been rigged in other parts of the country, the CUD called for a nationwide strike against the ruling Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). The strikes in June and October were violent and led to the detention of opposition figures, including the newly elected mayor. Following this turmoil, the EPRDF-led government appointed a caretaker administration under the leadership of Mayor Birhanu Deressa in May 2006.
Waste management after 2005

In 2006 local government intervened only in cases of territorial conflicts among waste collectors or in the case of complaints made by clients. Either they had learnt from their failures or the issue of refuse collection was no longer politically important in the post-election period. All of the enterprises were registered, paid taxes and had a licence from the sub-city authorities. Another important development was the coordination between door-to-door waste collectors and municipal truck drivers, who transport waste from transfer stations to the dumping site. If the truck drivers did not appear at their allocated time, the collectors reported the matter to the sub-city, and the driver would be held responsible for refuse not collected at the appointed time. This coordination was an improvement, but limited to the central areas and main avenues of the city.

In 2009 the implementation of business process re-engineering signalled a further administrative reorganisation, with new practices aimed at improved, centralised service delivery. The city administration blamed the MSSEs for inefficiency, illegal disposal of waste and charging excessive fees. The city administration proposed reorganising the MSSEs into cooperatives and centralising the payment of the monthly waste-collection fees, which were previously paid directly to the waste collectors. The MSSE associations reacted strongly, disputing the municipality’s interpretation of the causes of illegal dumping, and instead blaming the municipality for the improper use of its collection trucks. They also rejected the proposed new fee-collection system as being imposed without any discussion. Additionally, they were being required to employ more people, who were to be selected by the kebeles. Salaries for waste collectors fell and people left in search of other work. The collectors claimed they were becoming ‘employees’ of the kebele, and losing their independence and power of initiative.  

Various World Bank–supported policies to reform the civil service and improve administrative efficiency and service delivery have been launched. These reforms have been used to gain more control on the ground.

Solid-waste management from below: Plastics recycling in Addis Ababa

At all times, parts of the informal waste-recovery system have been kept totally out of
the control of the municipality. The municipality is not involved, for example, in any systematic waste recycling of plastics or other materials. Consequently, the informal sector has recognised that there is a niche market for such activities, especially for plastic materials. This has resulted in the development of a highly organised system for source separation, collection, trade and transformation of plastic waste materials, yet one that is almost totally informal.

The organisation of the recovery system is complex. Within the system, several collectors work at different levels, such as scavengers operating at the landfill, foragers collecting materials in the street and *qorales,* who buy materials directly from households and to a limited extent from the foragers and the MSSEs. The *qorales* are different from the foragers and scavengers, in that they buy the materials before they enter the waste cycle, and, therefore, the quality of the materials they collect is much higher. Moreover, the *qorales* are a strong upward link to small traders, who are often called wholesalers. The wholesalers based in Mercato, the market area, form the central link between all the actors within the plastics-recovery system and are therefore essential to the function of the system. They make contact with the plastics factories operating at the top of the recycling hierarchy.

The relationships between these different types of collectors seem to be based on trade, with each seeking as much profit as possible. Within the urban plastics-recovery system, the clients are a business secret. It proved almost impossible to find out to which factories the wholesalers sold their plastics. Moreover, factory owners deny using waste in their production out of fear that the government would find out about this ‘illegal’ activity, which in most cases would result in increased taxes. In short, the social relationship between the actors within the plastics-recovery system can be characterised as a patron–client relationship based on dependence and mutual trust.

The recovery of plastic materials is mainly driven by the need to satisfy a huge domestic market. The growing demand for plastic waste stems from the poverty facing the majority of people in Addis Ababa. Products made from plastic waste have a market in terms of both quality and price. The high demand for plastic products ensures that almost all plastic is collected and brought back into the recovery system. In Addis Ababa, roughly 23 tonnes of plastic is collected each day in the city (Bjerkli 2005). The income generated from it differs markedly among the various actors operating within the
system. Foragers collect and trade materials at the subsistence level, whereas the *gorales* are able to generate higher incomes. And the income earned by the *gorales* is lower than that made by the wholesalers, which may be as high as $85 a day. This shows that the wholesalers operate in a monopolistic market, and are in a position to exploit the collectors. The current plastics-recovery system in Addis Ababa may not be a perfect example of how to manage the recovery of such materials, but the informal system functions efficiently at all levels. The wholesalers are the winners in terms of profit, and play a key role in its functioning.

The main problem with the system is the relationship between its actors and the government authorities. The government is aware of the activities of the informal plastics-recovery sector, but its decisions are made without consultation with the people concerned or affected. The government planned to relocate Menalish Terra, where the wholesalers operate from, and develop a new system for source separation and recovery through MSSEs. Consequently, actors within the plastics recovery system do not trust the local government and are wary of its intentions.

Despite the earlier improvements, the collection and disposal of solid waste are once again deteriorating in Addis Ababa. The number of trucks is still limited, and they only cover certain areas. Refuse is still left on the streets because of a lack of regular removal from the transfer stations to the landfill site. Waste is returning to the streets of Addis Ababa, with overfilled waste containers waiting to be taken to the dumping site, and waste piling up on the city’s river banks and bridges. Relationships between the actors are changing. The municipality ignores, and even works against, the existing informal system and MSSEs, reducing any partnership between them to a mere formality. The municipality has consistently applied its own political agenda to the urban waste-management strategy, using any opportunity to increase its control over the population, particularly in pre-election periods.

Barriers or resistance to the institutionalisation of the informal sector arise from both the institutional sector and the informal sector itself. In Ethiopia, the relationships between the state, the municipality and the informal sector in solid-waste management are such that the informal sector largely tries to avoid contact with the municipality. The latter is perceived as only interested in trying to impose new or increased taxes. In the collection of household waste and in its efforts to create employment and increase its control over
people, the municipality supported competing structures, thereby threatening the livelihood of the scavengers. It is therefore logical and understandable that the situation has deteriorated and that conflicts have increased. In this context, the informal sector in Addis Ababa has seen very little benefit from collaborating with a municipal authority that is unable to provide social services in return for taxes, or recognition or security.

The partially successful attempts at improving waste management under Mayor Arkebe between 2003 and 2005 nevertheless represented a new trend, as for the first time support and collaboration were organised by the municipality to the benefit of different categories of the informal sector – the street vendors, hawkers and scavengers – who had hitherto experienced only harassment from the authorities. An important issue concerns the general waste-management policy towards scavenging, recycling and reuse. This has not yet been addressed, and potential civil-society actors/partners, such as local communities and local NGOs, are not included or supported. Partnerships with enterprises exist only for the collection of solid waste, and they are not working properly.

Solid-waste management in Maputo

Internal structures and capacities: The politics of waste from above

After Mozambique gained independence in 1975, municipal organisation and infrastructure were not the new state’s priorities, and street cleaning and solid-waste removal were thoroughly neglected. When the local administrative system, still FRELIMO-dominated, was reformed in 1998, it was not capable of assuming full responsibility for municipal services, as it lacked financial and administrative capacity. In Maputo piles of uncollected rubbish remained the most visible sign of the failure of municipal services. The private sector was called in, but it too failed to deliver adequate services. In 2001 the collapse of the waste-collection system necessitated the intervention of central government, which de-legitimised the first ‘reformed’ local administration.

In 2004 a new FRELIMO-led urban administration under Mayor Eneas Comiche began its four-year mandate. It demonstrated for the first time real seriousness of purpose and the political will to deal with a range of urban-management problems. The major
constraints on effective delivery of urban services were the same financial and organisational factors that had always existed, but a different approach emerged. Comiche managed to build a team of younger, more motivated and professional urban managers, and tighter system controls were introduced to counter misappropriation of resources and irregularities in the municipal tendering process.

The key factor enabling improved municipal capacity was a technical cooperation agreement between the City of Maputo and GTZ/AGRESU. Comiche recognised the essential importance of a series of baseline studies, ignored by the previous administration, and provided the political and institutional support for the technical cooperation project to develop into a driving force for improved solid-waste management.

Comiche was widely recognised as an effective mayor who had inherited a city with innumerable management problems and took positive steps to address them. However, many urban problems – poverty, unemployment, poor housing, defective urban infrastructure and crime – were national issues beyond the capacity of the local government to manage effectively. Popular disaffection, spearheaded by the alienated and unemployed youth, has twice erupted into violent urban protests against increases in the cost of living (in February 2008 and in September 2010). Urban middle-class frustration with FRELIMO policies has not translated into the development of any effective opposition voice, and FRELIMO’s political hegemony remains unchallenged, as demonstrated by the 2009 national election results. Comiche was not selected by FRELIMO to stand as mayoral candidate in the local elections of 2008. He was ousted for having been too independent from the party, and ‘disciplined’ because he was seen to put the interests of the city above those of the party. It remains to be seen how the new team of Daviz Simango will build on the foundations laid by Comiche’s administration.

**PROMAPUTO (2006) and the Plano Director (2008)**

PROMAPUTO, the Maputo Municipal Development Plan of 2006 (Município de Maputo 2006), was a major initiative taken by the Comiche administration to address urban-management problems in general. It was drawn up on the basis of research and
stakeholder consultation, and Comiche’s team successfully negotiated financing from the World Bank and other donors, for a 10-year municipal development programme, which was approved by the Municipal Assembly in 2006. The project was largely driven by the municipality, and not simply by a project-management team of the World Bank (Stretz interview, 6 August 2009). The solid-waste component of PROMAPUTO was developed in detail by the Municipal Directorate of Health and Cleansing, with the technical support of AGRESU. In 2008 a 10-year master plan for urban solid-waste management was published. This aims to gradually extend cleaning services for the whole city ‘in an appropriate and economically viable manner’. A key component is financial sustainability. Financing comes from revenue generated by the sector, with phased-in tariff increases as the service is rolled out, and with affordability taken into account. The private sector is actively involved: two large companies provide secondary domestic collection, while another monitors their performance. It is envisaged that substantial civic education will be necessary to inform the public about the plan, its structure, costs and the changed behaviour necessary to implement it successfully. The plan makes provision for more community-based contracts for small-scale service providers. These are discussed in the following sections.

The politics of waste from below: Formalising the informal  

In 2000 generalised flooding affected Maputo profoundly, badly damaging the degraded urban infrastructure and exposing residents to environmental hazards, such as massive erosion and landslips, and disease, including a major outbreak of cholera. The municipality’s failure to maintain infrastructure and provide services was painfully evident, and gave impetus to the development of informal solutions to some of these problems. Two experiences in particular became pilot projects for the extension of primary solid-waste removal to previously unserviced areas.

ADASBU (Associação de Desenvolvimento da Agua e Saneamento do Bairro de Urbanização)

The low-lying district of Urbanização was one of the areas worst affected in the city during the cholera outbreak. Médecins Sans Frontières intervened to bring in a fresh
water supply and storm-water drainage. Emerging from the relief work, a community association was created, its primary aim being the improvement of sanitation and solid-waste removal. AGRESU designed handcarts, known as *tchovas*, with a steel mesh bottom to filter out sand, substantially reducing the total volumes of waste collected and deposited into the municipal containers. Work teams were established, and a levy introduced to pay them. This was not sufficient for cost recovery, so the donors involved agreed to meet the shortfall for an interim period.

In 2002 the municipality introduced the *taxa de limpeza*, a cleansing tax of Mt.20 (about $60) per month, bundled in with the electricity account, as prepaid meters were being introduced by the national electricity supplier. This threatened to destroy the solid-waste collection work of ADASBU without substantially improving municipal collection in the *bairros*. ADASBU and AGRESU negotiated with the municipality, which eventually ceded a service contract for primary solid-waste delivery to ADASBU. The municipal by-law had to be changed to allow non-municipal entities to provide the service. This was a significant legal step and opened the way to the development of the pilot scheme.

Primary household collection by ADASBU was constrained by the inability of the municipality to regularly empty the containers on the main road into which the waste was deposited. The containers overflowed and created new mountains of waste in public spaces. When this occurred, the ADASBU teams abandoned their work in the *bairros*, letting the waste accumulate there rather than on the main road.

**UGSM (Uaene Gama de Serviços Municipais)**

A private entrepreneur, Paulino Uaene, set up a waste-removal project in Maxaquene in 1999, operating through the political and administrative structures of the local *bairro*. By the end of 2000, he had a team and basic equipment, but relied largely on head-loading to carry the waste. As his business expanded, he bought *tchovas*, developed a shift system and moved into nearby areas, as well as a local market. When the cleansing tax was introduced, his business nearly collapsed, as clients refused to pay both his charges and the municipal tax. He survived the crisis and in 2004 signed a service contract with the municipality as a micro-enterprise. His business has grown and he has
successfully moved into secondary collection from private companies in the ‘cement city’ using small trucks.

**Extending the system: Small-scale service providers**

In 2008 the system of primary collection was extended. Tenders were put out and contracts signed with 14 successful bidders in 19 *bairro*s. Bidders had to comply with stringent financial and technical requirements, and to undergo capacity building. The tender document was specifically designed as a training workbook listing all the financial and technical requirements to be met. AGRESU’s conceptual support was significant, and various private companies and NGOs did the necessary training.

Contractors are not required to be residents of the areas they operate in, but team supervisors and workers have to live in the *bairro* they service. Cleaning routes and schedules are provided in the contract. Teams circulate with *tchovas*, blowing whistles to signal to residents to bring their waste out, which is taken to the nearest container and deposited to await secondary collection and transport to the landfill. The shortage of containers in the *bairros* is an endemic problem, and the secondary collection service very unreliable. The primary collection teams are monitored by a supervisor and municipal inspectors. Within each *bairro*, the *secretário*, an elected and paid municipal official, remains a key point of contact between the primary removal teams, municipal inspectors, residents, the contractor and the district administration. The *secretário* monitors compliance with the collection targets specified in the contract and has to sign off on the monthly service report before it is forwarded to the district, and from there to the central administration, which makes the payments. The *secretário*, who has a wide range of other local administrative functions, is assisted in this task by the *chefes de quarteirão* – responsible for units of around 50 dwellings – who report on neighbourhood issues on a regular basis.

**Formalising the informal: Limits and possibilities**

It is estimated that currently about 400 000 residents receive primary waste collection, or about 65 per cent of the population living in those *bairros*. If this estimate is accurate, it represents a marked improvement on the former situation, where primary collection was restricted to three *bairros* in the entire city. About 65 per cent of total
estimated waste is actually collected from those serviced, but there is still a significant proportion of residents within these bairros with no primary collection. This is the outcome of choices made about the best use of limited resources: how to extend the service using the financial and technical capacity available. The introduction of the cleansing tax in 2002 provided a potential means to extend the service. It was ring-fenced in 2005 as a revenue source dedicated to solid-waste collection only, but not exclusively to primary collection. But the levels of the tax, and thus revenues, cannot legitimately be increased without first providing an improved service.

The primary collection process is now being ‘formalised’ and regulated. However, residents of the newly serviced bairros still encounter deficiencies in the service. Their rubbish is still collected irregularly, or at times not at all. And the workers decide, on an arbitrary basis, what sort of rubbish they are prepared to collect. Residents have resorted, in some cases, to contracting ‘informal’ collectors in their bairro as a second service. These are individuals who have no municipal contracts, but collect from residents using hired handcarts. They work irregularly, and charge on the basis of individual loads. Therefore there is still a parallel informal system of primary collection in areas where the municipality has seemingly formalised the system. Residents also maintain pits in their yards to store or bury uncollected rubbish. The informal treatment of waste through illegal dumping, burning and burying therefore remains a major challenge for the municipality.

The monitoring of the primary collection in each bairro is carried out by the secretário. A formal system has been conceptualised and put in place: inspections need to be made, and records of collection verified and passed up the chain of command to the district and municipality. If the secretário is not satisfied in the first instance, the small-scale collector does not get paid. They both have an interest in the system working. Both sets of actors are well-established members of their communities. In many cases, they both have strong party links, and may also be well known to each other. In practice, this means sufficient compliance with the formal norms to meet the requirements of the contract, and service levels that do not discredit either party in the eyes of the municipal authorities.

Residents’ views do not as yet seem to carry much influence. In cases where residents were not happy with the level of service, they seemed to be resigned to it and saw little
point in complaining to the secretário. There is a general and fairly deep disconnect between residents and the municipality, born of decades of municipal indifference, incompetence and neglect. Rubbish has often been at the heart of the issue, and it is only very recently that more serious attempts have emerged to deal creatively with a perennial problem.

**Recicla: Informal plastic recycling meets the formal economy**

The Recicla project provides an interesting example of the synergies created by cooperation between the municipality, NGOs and the private sector in the search for creative solutions to solid-waste-management problems. It also highlights the possible benefits to all of engaging directly with informal waste pickers. In 2004 a project was started that involved the municipality (which made available a site adjacent to the main city landfill, at Hulene, and facilitated the administrative processes), CARITAS Mozambique (a charitable organisation) and AGRESU (as principal funders), waste pickers and interested businesses. The project was designed to address poverty reduction and meet environmental-protection goals at the same time. Employment opportunities and income generation would combine with waste management and environmental action.

The plastic waste collected by the waste pickers is weighed, purchased, sorted, washed, dried, cut up by hand, machine-milled, packed and sold to buyers as raw material for the manufacture of new plastic items. In 2005, 17 project workers were recruited from among the waste pickers. They self-selected on the basis of continued voluntary and unpaid participation over an extended period of time, in weekly sessions involving training in literacy, group participation and health matters.

Construction of the facility was completed in March 2006, and Recicla opened for business. All the workers receive the same basic salary, regardless of their role in the production process, but weekend work is for their own accounts and earns a bonus. Recicla buys about 16 tonnes of plastic per month, divided into three categories: polyethylene jars, bottles, basins and boxes; polypropylene chairs, tables, buckets and domestic utensils; and plastic bags and film.

The Recicla project became self-sufficient within three years. In August 2009, it became
a cooperative and was officially handed over to the workers, who are now members and responsible for its operation. With their agreement, the former project manager has been hired as administrator to ensure continuity. Recicla’s aim to integrate the informal economy into the local economy has been partly achieved. One of the challenges is to maintain competitiveness in the market: informal private buyers of plastic waste attempt to intercept the sellers in the vicinity of the project and undercut Recicla by offering better prices.\(^{18}\)

Recicla can be judged successful on a number of counts. It has provided a new life and regular income for 17 formerly marginal *catadores*, who between them have over 60 dependants. The project has been able to balance its books and is economically viable without subsidies or donations. It has stimulated the market for plastic waste, encouraging waste pickers to use the facility, and at the same time has encouraged plastic recycling. It has also been a pilot for future recycling projects involving the municipality, the private sector and informal waste collectors in a symbiotic relationship. An irony that emerges from the case study is that Recicla needs municipal protection of its premises to defend its market share against competition from informal buyers, who enjoy a competitive advantage because they are unencumbered by the costs of formality.

**Ouagadougou and Accra**

**The solid-waste-management system: Reforms from above**

In Burkina Faso and Ghana, waste-management reforms are strongly connected to the political system, as an expression of a political ideology.

In Ouagadougou, before 1986, waste collection was handled by the municipal services. Thomas Sankara, the military officer who led Burkina Faso’s revolutionary process until 1987, created the Dinasene (Direction Nationale des Services d’Entretien, de Nettoyage et d’Embellissement) in 1986.\(^{19}\) Dinasene’s monopoly on the collection of both solid and human waste gave Sankara an opportunity to show his voluntarism by creating new services and to use the administration to handle the population’s basic needs. Characteristically, this new service did not run very well, particularly because it lacked funds (Bouju & Ouattara 2002: 69).
Waste management holds less importance than public sweeping and cleaning. In both Burkina Faso and Ghana, being clean has a moral dimension. During revolutions, participation was encouraged through popular actions such as cleansing exercises. This specific form of popular participation was possible because of a strong political project that motivated the people. The revolutionary powers tended thereby to give a formal frame to popular actions.

In Ghana, Jerry Rawlings’s ambition was to create an ‘African type’ of democracy based on new kinds of bonds between state and society. With this in mind, he tried to organise local administrations in the form of the People’s Defence Committees and the Workers’ Defence Committees, which mobilised vigorously in terms of the environment and sanitation. This power at a local level hid the fact that Rawlings organised administrative decentralisation to have better control of the territory (Crawford 2004: 7).

Ghana experienced a major economic crisis in the 1970s. The crisis brought into question the ‘Ghanaian model’, mainly based on the export of cacao, and brought about a period of political instability. Waste management became extremely disorganised, at a time when many rural migrants were arriving in Accra. The city’s waste collection worsened until 1985, when a Waste Management Department (WMD) was created, almost at the same time as the Onasene in Burkina Faso. The WMD still exists, but faces difficulties because its funding depends on the Accra Metropolitan Assembly (AMA), and because it has to deal with a lot of parallel private companies working in the waste-management sector (Boadi & Kuitunen 2003: 212).

While Ouagadougou focused on primary collection, in Accra the AMA tried to reorganise (secondary) collection itself by placing refuse containers in the city. Accra residents can ask an informal primary collector to collect for them or they can make use of the containers themselves. Municipal tax collection, consequently, became more difficult: when residents hire an informal pre-collector, they feel they are paying twice – to the informal primary collectors and to the AMA. People are also not prepared to pay for waste collection, which appears as a ‘non-service’, compared to water connection, for instance. This prompted the AMA to adopt a new kind of waste management and assign all the waste collection to a single company, City and Country Waste Limited (CCWL), a Canadian company.
From the mid-1990s, the rectification process led by the new Burkinabé president, Blaise Compaoré, in the 1990s allowed Burkina Faso to return to the international scene and to become eligible for donor funding programmes. A new constitution in 1991 and a structural adjustment plan modernised the law and began the process of decentralisation. In 1995 Ouagadougou elected its mayor, Simon Compaoré, a significant milestone for the capital.

In 1994 the CFA franc was devalued by 50 per cent. The devaluation, which may be compared to Ghana’s economic crisis of the 1970s, radically changed access to the labour market and encouraged the development of informality. The establishment of many informal networks, especially women’s associations, was an answer to the financial crisis and a way for people to make money through small-scale activities such as soap production and waste collection. In this sense, informality protected the urban social structure.

International donors funded the sub-metropolitan assemblies rather than central government. That was made easier by the fact that, at the time, the number of sub-metropolitan assemblies had increased from five to thirteen. But this aid was mainly focused on equipment. All these projects were implemented by technicians, which led to a kind of ‘depoliticisation’ of waste management. Furthermore, civil society was not integrated within the analysis, and this led to a strong dualism between what was technical and official, and what was specifically from civil society and informal.

Ghana followed the same pattern as Burkina Faso. Its decentralisation programme of the late 1980s was the first to adopt the neoliberal orthodoxy of the World Bank and IMF. In both countries, the civil-society aspects were managed by UNICEF through various programmes of participation to make the poor responsible for their own development. This participation was in some people’s view ‘the ideologically acceptable face of an economic theory of efficiency towards the poor’ (Jaglin 2005: 273–274).

Informality was a very useful means of managing what the municipal authorities could not. It became an issue when the cities faced severe shortages and criticism of their management. They then tried to eradicate informality. Accra chose a kind of repression, trying to formalise the entire process, whereas Ouagadougou aimed at integration. Both
methods were hazardous, and had unexpected effects on urban life.

**Formalising the informal: Reforms during the early 2000s**

**The CCWL experiment in Ghana: A hazardous U-turn**

In an effort to rationalise the waste-collection system, the municipal authorities in Accra delegated waste collection to a single private company. Until mid-1999, waste collection had been shared between the public and private sectors. The private contractors were efficient (Obirih-Opareh 2004: 29), but labour conditions were very hard compared with the public sector. The city used to choose the contractors, and in some cases paid them directly. This way, the municipal authorities could control the private contractors, but also depended on them to keep the city clean.

The municipal authorities needed to show they were trying to find solutions to improve their waste collection. The central government, however, made the decision in 1999 to award the management to a single contractor, CCWL. This allowed the government to claim that they were concerned about the situation and were seen to have proposed an innovative solution. At the same time, the municipal authorities were relieved since they only had to deal with one contractor. Besides, the choice fitted with World Bank recommendations by increasing privatisation in the city.

CCWL worked with both Canadian and local subcontractors. Since the company controlled the entire waste-management operation, it became more influential than the WMD itself. All the local private contractors were opposed to the decision to award the contact. Furthermore, the municipal authorities decided to pay 211 000 Ghana cedis per tonne, as opposed to the former sum of only 10 000 cedis. With so much revenue, CCWL’s results were effective: the firm doubled waste collection within eight months (Hofny-Collins 2006: 118–119). However, problems developed.

Firstly, this management of the city waste did not integrate a recycling system: the contractors were paid per tonne and had no interest in waste reduction. Secondly, the AMA struggled to pay CCWL. Thirdly, the system undermined the small local contractors, making it hard for them to survive. And with the AMA’s focus solely on CCWL, no attention was paid to the informal sector.
For these reasons, the partnership was terminated after the 2000 presidential elections and the change of government. The municipal authorities went back to the local small-scale contractors and retained CCWL’s equipment. The current system divides the collection between the AMA and local contractors. The public services focus on the inner city centre, especially the markets and drains, but they cannot achieve their waste-management objectives without the informal sector. Informality therefore appears to be a political answer to a technical issue. No specific policy has been formulated to integrate or repress the informal actors. This lack of will could be understood as a wish to protect a sector that appears to be very useful in achieving the municipal authorities’ formal goals.

The Schéma Directeur de Gestion des Déchets reform in Burkina

Burkina Faso also tried to rationalise waste collection, but in a very different way. At the end of 2000, Ouagadougou chose to implement the Schéma Directeur de Gestion des Déchets (SDGD), or waste management master plan, to reorganise waste collection, transportation and storage.

The municipality invited tenders for 12 contractors – private, associative and/or informal – for each area of the city (Meunier-Nikiema 2007: 12). Each area would fall under the exclusive charge of a single contractor responsible for primary waste collection and cleanliness, for four years.

The selected contractors had to become a Groupement d'Intérêt Economique (GIE), or economic interest grouping. This was relatively easy for the private contractors, but much more difficult for the associations that had previously not been taxed. The GIE has to collect fees from the residents to pay the workers, but also, in theory, to finance storage areas and transportation to the main landfill site. These responsibilities are very onerous but seem logical because this plan has been implemented alongside a World Bank project for the landfill site. The World Bank can fund infrastructure but not the operating costs of a project. This reform seems to have been very successful, but the contractors now face difficulties, especially because they have to deal with informal collectors, who were not integrated into the plan.
Unexpected uses of informality

Ouagadougou: A new type of actor

By choosing local associations, the municipal authorities wanted to maintain the strong bonds existing between associations, residents and local territories. The aim of the local associations is to socialise the poorest women and to improve their lives and health by providing jobs and support. On the periphery of Ouagadougou, where the settlements are very new, associational life structures society and creates new relationships among the residents, as well as new kinds of links. In some respects, associations tend to be an alternative to traditional bonds, creating a new local identity, based on urbanity.

In any sub-metro one will find several well-organised associations, traditional chiefs – lacking in formal power but nevertheless respected – and the decentralised administration. Residents have a wide range of opportunities, and they can contact a specific ‘type’ of actor, depending on their problem. This institutional opportunism creates a flexibility of relationships at the local level and is a major factor creating a ‘local political field’, based on specific rules.

To fight informality, the municipal authorities chose to reorganise both the private and the associational sectors. The system works better now, but these two parties are a potential threat for the municipality because they are powerful and can stop waste collection if they dispute one of its decisions.

This rationalisation tended to unify the private and the associational sectors. It created new city actors, whom one could describe as entrepreneurs. Informality is therefore no longer the result of opposition between the formal and informal sectors but within the private or the associational sectors.

Through rationalisation, the municipal authorities aimed to formalise part of the informal sector. But those who have not been integrated into the plan are marginalised and complain to the entrepreneurs:

Right now, we have no way to make the informals leave the areas. We know where they live and, anyway, you can’t hide to collect the waste…Something very paradoxical happens: the ones who haven’t been integrated into the project, they summon us to the City Council to tell us that we bring the mess (sorry for that) into their area. You see that! The informals summon us to the City Council! (Nikiema interview, 7 April 2005)
At the same time, the municipal authorities consider that the private contractors are responsible for their area and want to ‘decentralise’ more responsibilities to them:

When some people don’t pay, there are some things that we – the contractors – can’t do, because we live in the areas. [If we summon someone to the City Council,] we will be accused. People will say, ‘It’s you who said I did this thing, it’s you who summoned me.’ It brings problems. I’d asked the municipal authorities to give us…a paper, something to protect us in case of problem. We are a relay of municipal authorities in the area. But, once, they called me. They wanted me to summon the people who throw their waste in the streets! I said it’s not my job. I said I am a resident in the area. (Siliga interview 5 April 2005)

In some areas, the entrepreneurs have no choice but to use the informal-sector operators as subcontractors because they do not have enough employees or equipment, or because the municipal authorities themselves asked them to give the informal organisations some work, to keep peace in the city. Ouagadougou’s reform gave more credibility to the new private sector, and also more powers to negotiate with the municipal authorities. But, at the same time, the reorganisation marginalised the poorest informal organisations. The reform was designed to ensure that responsibilities were borne by the entrepreneurs, and not the municipal authorities. Informality has thus been thwarted from above. From below, it becomes a local problem for the entrepreneurs and remains an opportunity when there is too much work. This situation does not allow any specific policy to be found to fight informality or improve the living conditions of the informal actors.

Accra: Informality as a social link

The AMA makes use of the informal sector to clean the city’s ‘hot spots’, such as the markets. The La sub-metro, a middle-class area close to Accra’s city centre, uses many informal operators to keep the district clean. This choice is logical, since it is a newly created district with little finance and even less personnel.

A group of about 20 young ‘truck-pushers’ work for the city and for private clients (residents or market traders) on tasks such as collecting the garbage in the markets or
emptying the drains. Their organisation is strictly informal; they have no documents proving that they are an association. These men offered to do this work because they are poor and uneducated. When the municipal authorities appoint them, they provide the equipment but do not pay them. The workers say that they are paid if the work is done well. An interviewee stated:

We are supposed to work in an association and possibly get a permit or an authorisation certificate which would enable us to work, and even pay tax. But this may involve a lot of difficulties and bureaucratic problems. So we decided to help the AMA so that if we have any administrative problems…then the AMA will protect and defend us. (Interview with truck-pushers, 9 December 2004)

The municipal authorities and these waste-collection workers are therefore mutually dependent. This kind of relationship reinforces the informal sector, especially because, in this specific case, the workers have no need to formalise their status. On the other hand, although this type of relationship may be effective at achieving specific goals at specific times, it is only in the short term. The immediate problems may be solved, but waste management is not improved; the truck-pushers have to move the garbage, but nothing is said about where to deposit it: ‘Our biggest problem lies with the collection of the waste as we gather it by the gutter side. When such problems occur, we have to convey the waste to the beach side.’, in the words of one of the truck-pushers.

In this case, the municipal authorities prefer to focus on cleanliness, which is easier to achieve than genuine sanitation.

The examples of Ouagadougou and Accra allow us to reformulate informality as a kind of relationship between two parties at a specific moment, rather than a category of actors or actions. In both cities, informality is present, even though the municipal authorities try to focus on what is formal on their territory. However, informality should not be seen as a weakness or a failure, but rather as a way to resolve new urban issues. It is an efficient alternative when funds or personnel are missing. Furthermore, it creates new kinds of relationships at the local level and contributes to building a local political field, with its own rules and a specific identity.
Conclusion: Solid-waste governance and informality

Cleaning the city by removing waste from the streets and the environment has become an important issue in the capitals analysed in this chapter. Far from being limited to technical solutions, such as the kind of technology employed, solid-waste management is first and foremost a question of politics and, increasingly, of the public image a city wishes to portray. One can also observe that, and question why, waste recycling is less visible and is given less priority than waste removal. The fundamental fact is that the analysis of solid-waste management in these capitals over the last 10 to 15 years has shown it to be closely related to political agendas at the local, national and international levels. It is notable that structural adjustment policies, and the decentralisation that follows them, have influenced waste management systems in all the case studies. After the decentralisation policies came the question of collaboration between the various actors involved in solid-waste management. The focus falls here on the type of partnerships to be developed between private and institutional actors, and particularly the place given to the informal sector.

A key issue: The inclusion of new actors

In Addis Ababa, Mayor Arkebe promoted the integration of some agents in waste management through the formation of small private enterprises, but his tentative measure to exert control and build up a political clientele cast a shadow over the whole initiative. In the case of waste management, only a few actors were considered as partners, and neither scavengers nor recyclers were included or even considered. A similar situation prevails currently with the implementation of business process re-engineering and the decision by the city administration to dismantle the existing partnerships with small-scale enterprises and replace them with so-called cooperatives directly administered by the kebeles. This removes autonomy from the previous partners, the small-scale enterprises born from the informal sector.

In Maputo, the municipality has engaged with the informal sector in a process of formalisation to extend and improve the primary collection system, and facilitate informal recycling in a creative manner. Despite being an effective and successful mayor who began to
turn the city around, Eneas Comiche was axed by FRELIMO from its list of mayoral candidates for the 2008 municipal elections for being too independent, and was denied a second term of office.

In Accra, the Ghanaian state has been reluctant to decentralise politically. Instead it decentralised its administration: ministries are well grounded locally, but decisions still come from the state. In addition, government still nominates a third of the local assemblies. In this context, informality has been opposed – an example being the CCWL experience discussed in this chapter. Compared with other cities in the region, Accra is quite clean. Nevertheless, the political cost of its waste-management reforms has been very high. The appointed mayors had to pay for this failure. But even if implementation was difficult, formally it led to a reorganisation of the local political game. Informal actors in Accra emerge as a resource for local political actors, who use them to improve their effectiveness and at the same time strengthen their leadership at the very local level. The paradox is that informal actors become key figures in the waste-management rationalisation process.

In Ouagadougou, reforms have created space for new relationships in which informality has a role. For instance, the formalisation of primary collection created new relationships (of competition, defiance and forced collaboration) between the ‘official’ primary collectors and the informal sector. We have seen that a part of the informal sector was integrated into the city’s waste-management reforms. By so doing, the municipal authorities created a more privatised and rationalised system. Part of the informal sector was marginalised, but still exists. Even if the formal actors have a monopoly over their areas, they still have to negotiate with the informal actors. The municipality requests them to do so, to avoid too much marginalisation, which might lead to violence. Besides, the formal parties in the relationship need the informal parties in order to achieve their goals. The municipality, for its part, achieved its objectives, showing to the government, and the world, that it is in control and that the city, if not sanitised, is at least clean.

In Addis Ababa, the Ethiopian state, given its strength and historical position, has shown continuity in its reluctance to trust a sector it cannot control. This, in turn, has generated a steady defiance from the informal sector. The authorities even sacrifice efficiency in their obsession to maintain control and demonstrate ‘modernity’ as a capital and a centre of power.
attractive to investment. In response, the informal sector is trying to escape from partnerships it considers detrimental to its activities.

In Maputo, the city management has always been dominated by party political considerations, and it remains to be seen whether the new team put in place by the ruling party will maintain the previous momentum. Decentralisation has left the ruling party firmly in charge, and opposition parties have been unable to challenge its hegemony over the city, so there is no great pressure for accountability from below. FRELIMO has effectively learnt the ‘rules of the game’ dictated by the World Bank and the international community, and has moved skilfully to maximise its resources at the local level, as these help it to consolidate its power within the city too.

**The informal sector today and the attitudes of the administration**

The informal sector is still considered as non-modern, traditional and backward, and accordingly is at best ignored. The evidence from local governance in our case studies is that democracy, transparency and accountability are not well developed in the handling of the informal waste sector. Maputo seems to be the only city genuinely engaging with the informal sector, at least in the recycling industry.

In Addis Ababa, neither the articulation of a good governance discourse nor the implementation of many administrative reforms has shifted the traditional way of exerting power. Mayor Arkebe’s period in office represented the first serious, partly genuine, attempt to improve the state of urban governance in the city. He reorganised the municipal structure, and dismissed allegedly corrupt and/or inefficient administrators. Nevertheless, these measures were aimed not only at efficiency, but also at increased political control through the dismissal of employees who were not supportive of the government.

As in Addis Ababa, informality has been considered as a threat by Ouagadougou’s municipal authorities. They tried to rationalise the informal system to achieve greater efficiency, but also to demonstrate their power over the capital city. Accra’s authorities claimed to formalise the waste-collection system, but it appears that the informal actors and municipal authorities have a ‘shadow’ partnership. Informal actors help the municipality to clean the city and, in turn, enjoy protection, despite their status.
In Maputo the poor performance of the solid-waste management system was seriously addressed in 2004 for the first time, and a potentially sustainable system created to gradually extend services to the suburban and peri-urban areas. The Comiche administration displayed political will in dealing with the many failures of urban management, including solid waste, and created the opportunity for a creative engagement with GTZ, which has provided the technical support necessary to develop capacity.

As well as the local differences observed in these cities in the attitudes of the administration towards the informal sector, one can also see certain similarities when using Medina’s (1997) categories of attitudes: direct repression and criminal collusion were not practised. Most attitudes fall between control and neglect. Control is quite common. Neglect is widely visible, especially in the field of recycling, the exception being Maputo, where the Comiche administration supported informal recyclers as opposed to businesses in the control of the recycling trade. This example may help explain why the neglect towards recycling observed in the other cities could stem from the difficulties weak administrations might face when confronted with the powerful private business world of recycling. Medina uses ‘stimulation’, a category ranging from tolerance to active integration, as a possible attitude shown by the administration side. Tolerance is widely practised in all cases. Therefore, in the case of Addis Ababa the attempts to incorporate the informal sector are more a form of control than integration.

The informal sector still needs to be taken seriously, and one needs to establish under what conditions its actors will engage in public–private partnerships or be available to formalise. Informality is often depicted as an issue that hampers local development – through the avoidance of paying taxes, for instance. But at the same time, it is an answer to a very complex local situation, comprising patronage, allegiance, corruption and loyalty to the top. Formalising the informal requires a consideration of the entire local political system, and its links to the powers that be and the outputs of decentralisation.

Compliance with formal criteria for good governance, a requirement of most international donors, may hide realities on the ground. All the cities analysed here have a long-standing tradition of upward accountability to the government rather than to the people; loyalty and trust shown to the dominant political party are important. All the cities have a legacy of authoritarian regimes. The case studies have shown that changes in political organisation
make little difference to the way things actually work. Informal institutions or patron-clientelism seem to be a culture impervious to change, even where there is a reorganisation of the system from a top–down to an officially proclaimed bottom–up approach. Despite the strong focus on good governance, and the various administrative reforms municipalities have implemented during the last 15 to 20 years, the ‘traditional’ way of doing things persists and seems to be resistant to change.

Solid-waste governance gives us a good picture of the political relationship between society and government. There are clear social inequalities in the delivery of the waste service, and the exclusion, in most cities, of efficient existing or potential partners, such as primary collectors or informal recyclers, demonstrates the social prejudice of the authorities and their tendency to sacrifice efficiency when their power is not secured. The real test of commitment by urban administrations to the social dimensions of poverty-reduction strategies, as championed by UN-Habitat, lies in the freedom they provide to informal actors, who are, by and large, the poor.

Even so, in some cases reforms have created the opportunity for new relationships where informality has a role to play. One element of hope for change is represented by an urban population showing increased awareness and expecting better services from their municipalities. In the cities we have studied, the dominant political cultures and the attitudes to informality have not changed fundamentally. Despite significant administrative reforms, and substantial donor funding, informality, in all its dimensions, has not been properly recognised. All the cities studied depend upon the informal sector to a great extent to provide services and sustain their populations. More recognition from the state, and better support and local arrangements with the informal sector, would stimulate it. The desired technical reforms for better service delivery cannot be implemented without considering the underlying political issues. This key link is missing, but needs to be created in order to allow all the informal actors better opportunities for employment and security within their cities.

Notes

1 Locally made glue that becomes sticky when mixed with gypsum, and is usually used for painting walls.
The provisional government replaced the regime led by the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), which defeated the Derg regime headed by Mengistu Haile Mariam in 1991. The TPLF later became the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), which has been in power in Ethiopia since 1991. The government has reshaped the Ethiopian state into a federal republic, and carried out many administrative and decentralisation reforms, which in Addis Ababa created the sub-cities and kebeles. The tight grip maintained by the EPRDF and their allied ethnic-based parties has gradually become stronger. It was only interrupted by the short-lived victory of the opposition, regrouped under the banner of the Coalition for Unity and Democracy in Addis Ababa, in the 2005 elections.

The kebele is the lowest-level administrative unit in Ethiopia.

5 Qorale: the short form of the Amharic expression, Korkoro yaleh? (do you have any scrap metal?), shouted by boys collecting waste.
6 See note 5 above.
7 For a discussion of the latter point, see De Brito (2010).
9 This section is based on interviews conducted between 25 February 2005 and 14 July 2006.
10 These handcarts are designed to pass through narrow alleyways, and are fitted with mesh beds to filter out sand from domestic waste.
11 The bairro is the local suburban administrative unit. Maputo is divided into seven urban districts, with 64 bairros.
12 This section is based on interviews conducted on 12 July 2006, 15 July 2008, 29 July 2009.
13 Secretários are the local point of articulation for many offices of state, including education and justice, and are the local link with the national service providers of water and electricity in their roll-out activities.
14 In the days of single-party rule, when party and state were indistinguishable, the secretário was a key appointed FRELIMO party official. Most are long-established residents of their bairros, with a substantial history of party involvement and/or state employment, and many also have private businesses of their own.
15 If the total urban population is estimated at 1.3 million, then the proportion of all residents receiving primary collection is just over 30%.
16 Notícias, 25 January 2009, reported that the municipality considered necessary some form of association of catadores, both to defend their interests, and to manage the pernicious effects of spillage around containers created by their activities.
17 GTZ/AGRESU contributed €50 000, and CARITAS & LVIA €89 000 (see Schwalbach 2005).
18 The Recicla manager argued that the informal operators do not carry the same social overheads as the cooperative, and do not pay tax, which gives them an unfair advantage (Chauque interview, 18 September 2009).
19 This service became the Onasene (Office National des Services d’Entretien, de Nettoyage et d’Embelleissement) in 1988, after Sankara’s death.

References


LVIA (Associazione internazionale volontari laici) & Caritas (2009) RECICLA e FERTILIZA: dois exemplos de como transformar o lixo em recurso. Maputo


http://dare.uva.nl/record/147405


Interviews

T Chauque, 18 September 2009
D Nikiema, CGMED, entrepreneur, Ouagadougou, 7 April 2005
M Siliga, president of CAVAD (coordination of associations), Ouagadougou, 5 April 2005
J Stretz, AGRESU, 6 August 2009
Truck-pushers, La sub-metro, Accra, 9 December 2004
APPENDIX

APPENDIX 1: Overview of the reduction of procedures to obtain a business license before and after introduction of BPR.

APPENDIX 2: The criteria for the evaluation of employees in line with BPR.

APPENDIX 3: Article in *Ethiopian Herald* on job creation within solid waste management.

APPENDIX 4: Article in *Addis Fortune* on new containers bought by AACA.


APPENDIX 6: Interview guides.

APPENDIX 7: Overview of the interviews conducted.

APPENDIX 8: Overview of the newspaper reviews conducted.

APPENDIX 9: List of materials prepared by various agencies in Addis Ababa.
APPENDIX 1: Overview of the reduction of procedures to obtain a business license before and after introduction of BPR (source: Getachew & Common, 2006).

Procedures to obtain a business license before BPR:
- Client
  - Information officer
    - Archive
      - Information officer
        - Cashier
          - Information officer
            - Expert
              - Cashier
                - Expert
                  - Registration clerk
                    - Mini secretary
                      - Expert
                        - Team leader
                          - Department head
                            - Archive
                              - Client

Procedures to obtain a business license after BPR:
- Client
  - Expert
    - Cashier
      - Clerk
        - Secretary
          - Team leader
            - Archive
              - Client
APPENDIX 2: The criteria for the evaluation of employees in line with BPR (source: Human Rights Watch, 2010).

1. Educational background (25%):
   - Qualifications (15%)
   - Relevant work experience (5%)
   - Qualities in personal file (5%)

2. Motivation for change and democratization (35%):
   - Efforts to know and accept government policies and strategies (10%)
   - Cooperativeness and willingness to participate in team work (8%)
   - Acceptance of the civil service reform and implementation in practice (10%)
   - Avoidance of traditional and non-progressive thoughts (7%)

3. Conduct/Good manner (15%):
   - Effective utilization and care of institution’s property (3%)
   - Performance in work and role model to others (5%)
   - Free from drugs and alcohol (3%)
   - Free from gossip and ‘clique-ism’ (4%)

4. Service performance (25%):
   - Efficiency and interest in providing appropriate service according to new standardized procedures (10%)
   - Problem solving and accomplishing tasks within a given time frame (5%)
   - Hostility and politeness (5%)

Accomplish work speedily and respect work time (5%)
APPENDIX 3: Article in *Ethiopian Herald* on job creation within solid waste management (Source: Ethiopian Herald, 9 August 2006, pp 6).

*Article Text*

ADDIS ABABA (ENA) - The Metropolitan Sanitation, Beautification and Park Development Agency said it has created 13,000 jobs through waste disposal service.

Agency Manager Musa Hassen told ENA that the Agency managed to get the stated number of people employed in waste disposal activities by organizing them into associations.

Musa said over 26.3 million of the 50 million birr budget allocated for 10 sub-cities in 1998 Ethiopian plan fiscal year was allotted to waste disposal sector.

He said the 20 million birr was also earmarked for the Agency to purchase 30 dump trucks in a bid to improve its services.

Six additional public lavatories the agency constructed during the last budget year have begin rendering services, he said.

Musa said currently the agency is undertaking activities to re-use two cemeteries with a view to reducing shortage of graveyards in the city.

The agency also established waste recycling centres in four sub-cities during the last budget year and has plans to establish similar centres in every sub-city in the new budget year, he said.

Musa urged the society to contribute their part in the efforts to clean and beautify the city.

The agency administers waste disposal services, park development, cemetery services and construction of public lavatories.
APPENDIX 4: Article in *Addis Fortune* on new containers bought by AACA. (Source: Addis Fortune, 12 December 2011, Vol. 11(554), pp 10).

*Trash Cans at 110m Br*

*By Eden Sahle*

*FORTUNE STAFF WRITER*

The Cleansing Management Agency and Recycling and Disposal Project Office of Addis Ababa is to receive 110 million Br by the end of December 2010 from the city administration to install 1,700 waste disposal containers around the city.

This came after the agency had submitted its proposal for the waste containers to the city's finance and economy office, which is mandated to allocate capital to agencies, according to Ermias Shyne, deputy manager and core process owner of the agency.

The proposal submitted includes an environmental impact assessment (EIA) done with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in the areas where the containers are planned to be placed, as well as a study on the socio-economic impact of the project.

"The study was conducted in 116 woredas and 817 sub woredas for the installation of a new kind of container which cost 56,000 Br each," Mekonnen Taffese, communication head of the agency, told *Fortune*.

The new containers have three different compartments for items that can be recycled, for plastics, and for waste that easily decompose. The city has planned to install these containers in 1,000 selected areas in the 10 districts based on the study it has done.

A planned total of 1,700 new kinds of containers will be installed in these areas, according to the deputy manager:

"Every wereda will receive two containers for the disposal of solid wastes," he told *Fortune*.

However, some houses may have to be demolished in order to install these containers.

The agency will start the installation on the already cleared selected areas, according to the deputy manager. In accordance with the city's urban plan, concrete placing with fences will be constructed to protect the solid waste.

These new containers will be erected all around the capital once the finance and economy office verifies the locations proposed, according to Mulatu Gebrets, manager of the agency.

1. Promote practical applications of environmentally sound techniques such as waste sorting, reduction, recycling, reuse, and waste-to-energy and composting activities.
2. Set up voluntary arrangements to promote recycling, particularly of packaging and scrapped vehicles and their parts.
3. Promote recycling programme for recyclable materials such as glass, paper, plastics, tyres, metals, cans, wood, and other materials.
4. Segregate different types of solid waste for compostable, recyclable, non-recyclable/non-compostable, and special/hazardous waste.
5. Introduce appropriate and low-cost technologies for SWM and liquid waste, with the best possible combination of types and sizes of trucks, including hand- and motor-driven carts for poorly accessible areas.
6. Encourage and enhance the design of waste pipes (chutes) in new high-rise buildings and apartments.
7. Enhance increased public awareness and change of attitudes/behaviours.
8. Develop mechanisms for programme support of kebeles, CBOs, and NGOs for environmental control, waste sorting, recycling, composting, and environmental cleaning.
10. Strengthen solid waste fleet management, routing, two-shift system, as well as introduction of an appointed collection time, including working at night.
11. Utilize computerized accounts of management of waste collection trucks.
12. Enhance and promote the participation of the private sector.
13. Provide a conducive environment for the private sector and NGOs.
14. Provide technical assistance for private investors and service providers to build their capacity.
15. Strengthen awareness-raising, specially targeting communities, by utilizing community leaders, religious and cultural leaders, professional associations, schools, and other social organizations.
16. Hold workshops, seminars, etc., to address issues related to target groups regarding the design and implementation of sanitation and beautification.

17. Media and other appropriate forums to be used appropriately for advocacy and awareness raising.

18. Promote community participation through establishing sanitation and beautification councils at all levels, as well as kebele and village sanitation and beautification committees.

19. Establish school clubs and involve students in keeping their schools, home, neighbourhood, and the general environment clean.

20. Promote intersectional collaboration and create strong partnerships with various governmental bodies, associations, NGOs, and CBOs, and strengthen them through networking.

21. Actively promote international and regional cooperation in waste management.

Targets for solid waste management in Addis Ababa in 2010;

1. 100% of the city’s major streets will be cleaned daily.
2. 80% of the city’s open spaces to be clean of solid waste at any given time.
3. 70% of the city’s drainage systems and rivers to be clean of solid waste at any given time.
4. 30% of the households to segregate waste into various receptacles at source.
5. Solid waste collection to increase from 65% to 90%.
6. Of the total recyclable and compostable portion of waste, 50% to be recycled and composted.
7. 80% of hazardous and special waste to be separately stored, collected, and managed from municipal solid waste.
8. 40% of the waste generated to be collected by the private sector, of which 10% is to be collected by pre-collectors (micro- and small enterprises).
9. 70% of the population to have proper awareness of urban sanitation and beautification.
10. The public is to participate in environmental cleaning, beautification, environmental and illegal dumping control, environmental awareness campaigns, waste sorting, recycling, and composting at community level.

11. People to actively contribute to:

- Illegal dumping decrease to less than 5%.
- 30% of households to segregate waste at source.
- 30% of households to compost their waste.
APPENDIX 6: Interview guides

INTERVIEW GUIDE: SCAVENGERS

- Gender
- Age
- Where do you come from?
- How long have you been working as a scavenger?
- Why and how did you enter this job?
- What is required to be allowed to work at Repi?
- Do you have another job?
- Can you describe a normal working day?
  - What do you like and dislike?
- Number of relatives who are scavengers?
- How are your relationships with?
  - The other scavengers
    - Competition
    - Support
    - Present or past problems
  - The manager at the landfill
  - The truck drivers
  - Middlemen
  - Methane project
  - Municipality
    - Has the municipality contacted you or given you some kind of support?
    - What do you expect from the municipality?
- What are the main problems you face today?
  - What can be done to improve your working situation?
- Do you have plans for the future?
  - How will you achieve them?
- What kinds of materials do you collect?
  - How much?
  - Income?
• How does the situation today compare to e.g. five years ago?
  – Amount of materials
  – Price of materials
  – Income
• Have someone informed you about future plans for Repi?

INTERVIEW GUIDE QORQORO ALLEH

• Gender
• Age
• Where do you come from?
• How long have you been involved in this activity?
• How and why did you enter this activity?
• How can you describe your work? What do you like and what do you not like?
• How is the situation within your business today compared to some years ago or when you started your work?
  – Due to income, amount of and access to materials?
• Do you have another job or income?
• Are you operating or performing this job in cooperation with other qorqoro alleh?
• How is the relationship between the qorqoro alleh?
  – Is there competition over places to operate?
  – Do you support each other?
  – Past and present problems with other qorqoro alleh?
  – Number of relatives that are qorqoro alleh?
• How is your relationship towards the MSSEs operating in the city?
  – Are you concerned about competition from the MSSEs?
• Have you considered improving your activity? If so, in what way?
  – What kind of support do you need in order to improve your activity?
• Have you thought about organizing yourselves collectively?
  – What is the main reason for you to organize yourselves?
  – Have you thought about how to organize yourselves?
  – What kind of support could you expect if you were to organize yourselves?
• How is your relationship with the wholesalers?
  – Based on contract? If so, what kind of contract and how many wholesalers do you have contract with?
  – Ethnic background/family?
  – Do the middlemen support you in any way?
• How is your relationship with the municipality?
  – Do you have any relationship with the municipality? If so, what kind of relationship?
  – How do you regard the municipality?
  – What do you expect from the municipality in order to be able to improve your activity?
• What do you expect from the wholesalers in order to be able to improve your activity?
  – If you where a wholesaler, what would you do in order to support the qorgoro allevh?
• What is your plan for the future?
  – How are you going to achieve this?
• Do you have a saving system such as idir/ekub?
  – What is the reason for saving money in idir/ekub?

INTERVIEW GUIDE: WHOLESALERS

• Gender
• Age
• Where do you come from?
• How long have you worked as a wholesaler?
  – What was your occupation before you started as a wholesaler?
  – Why did you become a wholesaler?
  – Are you working alone or together with others?
• Can you describe your business?
  – What are the positive and negative aspects of your work?
• Have you thought about improving your business?
  – If yes, in what way?
- Do you need any support to improve your business? If yes, what kind of support?

- How is your relationship with the *qorgoro alleh*?
  - Do you support them in any way?

- Do you buy materials from other people?

- Do you have any contact with the municipality?
  - How would you describe your relationship towards the municipality?
  - Are you willing to cooperate with the municipality?
  - What do you expect from the municipality and what are you willing to offer to enter cooperation with the municipality?

- To whom do you sell your materials?

- How is your work today compared to some years ago?
  - Due to amount of materials, quality, demand, price, and people engaged in the activity?

- What kind of factors influences the recycling market?

- Did you organize yourselves collectively?
  - Why did you organize yourselves?
  - How has the organization process been? Positive aspects and difficulties during the process? What have you achieved?

- How will the renewal of *täraMänn alleh/allesh tära* affect your work?

- If the *qorgoro alleh* were to stop working, in what way would it affect your work?

- If you had to relocate your work, how would this affect your work and supply of materials?
  - Have you thought about a possible place to relocate?

**INTERVIEW GUIDE: MSSEs**

- Gender
- Age
- Why did you enter this kind of activity?
- How long have you been involved in this activity?
- How would you describe your working situation?
  - What are the positive and negative aspects of your work?
• Would you like to improve your work? If so, in what way?
  – What kind of support do you need in order to improve your work?
  – What do you expect from the municipality in order to be able to improve your work?
• How would you describe your relationship towards the municipality?
  – How would you characterize your relationship towards the municipality during the period 2001–2005
  – How would you characterize your relationship towards the municipality during the period 2005–2009?
• Compared to five years ago, how is the working situation today? Has it improved or not? If yes, how? If no, why not?
• What do you think should be done in order for you to have better working conditions?
• What have you done in order to improve your working situation?

INTERVIEW GUIDE: COOPERATIVES
• Gender
• Age
• How long have you been working as a pre-collector?
• Can you describe your work?
  – What do you like and dislike?
• How the situation today is compared to e.g. five years ago?
  – Income?
  – Working situation?
  – Number of clients?
• How is your relationships with the
  – Cooperatives
  – Other members of the cooperatives
  – The kebele, Sub-City, or City Administration?
  – The households or your clients?
• What are the main problems you face today?
  – How can the problems be solved?
INTERVIEW GUIDE: CITY AUTHORITIES

- How is the agency organized?
- What are the main tasks and responsibilities of the agency?
- What kind of solid waste services are provided within Addis Ababa today?
- What are the main obstacles to the services currently provided?
- What should be done in order to improve solid waste management in the city?
- What was the main reason for implementing the new regulation with the pre-collectors in 2009?
  - Can you explain the new solid waste regulation?
  - How does the payment of waste fees work?
  - How many cooperatives have been established?
- How does waste collection from the transfer points work?
  - How do you control how much the cooperatives have collected?
- What is your experience of the new regulation and the implementation up to now?
- Do you have any strategy for how to improve solid waste services in Addis Ababa?
  - Collection
  - Transport
  - Landfill
  - Recycling
- Is it possible to obtain copies of the annual report, plans, and strategies, research conducted, annual budget, etc. of solid waste in Addis Ababa?

INTERVIEW GUIDE: HOUSEHOLDS

- Gender
- Age
- What is the respondent’s status within the household?
- Head of household’s education level?
- Household head’s profession?
- Average income of the household per month?
- How do you manage the waste generated by the household?
  - Dispose of it in the containers
  - Burn it
- Dispose of in open spaces
- Dispose of it in the river
- Use the private sector?
- Use the newly established cooperatives
- Qorgoro alleh
- Other

- Does your household have a solid waste collection service?
  - If no, why not?
  - If yes, who collects the waste from your household? (Private, cooperative, or others?)

- How long has your household used the solid waste collection service?

- How often do you receive the service? (Has it increased, decreased, or stayed the same for the last 6 months?)

- How much do you pay for the service each month? (Has the amount increased or decreased recently? If so, when and by how much?)

- Are you satisfied with the solid waste collection service you are getting today? (What are you satisfied with and what are you not satisfied with?)

- How has the new solid waste system affected your household?

- How is the solid waste service today compared to 6 months ago? (Better or worse?)

- What do you think should be done to improve the solid waste collection service?

- What do you think is the reason for the municipality to change the solid waste collection system?

INTERVIEW GUIDE: PRIVATE COMPANIES AND FACTORIES

- How long have you been involved in recycling solid waste?

- Where do you buy your materials?

- How is your relationship with the
  - Municipality
  - Wholesalers

- What are the main problems facing you today?

- What can be done in order to improve your capacity?
INTERVIEW GUIDE: LOCAL NGOs AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

- What kind of activities are you involved in?
  - Why are you involved in these activities?
- How long have you been involved?
- Who are your partners?
  - How are your relationships with your partners?
- What has the work with the projects been like?
  - What could have been improved?
  - What are the main problems with the projects?
- In what way will your project benefit solid waste in Addis Ababa?
  - What has been achieved within the project so far?
  - What is needed in order to improve the outcomes of the projects?
## Overview of the Interviews Conducted

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Informants</th>
<th>Planned number of interviews</th>
<th>Actual number</th>
<th>Follow-up interviews</th>
<th>What kind of information aimed at collecting</th>
<th>Different strategies to reach the informants</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Managers of MSSEs</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Why did they start to work as pre-collectors? How was their relationship with the municipality? What was their main problem when they were working as cleaners? How do they see the current situation and what do they think should be done?</td>
<td>Contacted them through the phone.</td>
<td>They were all kind, helpful, and wanted to share their experiences. They were also willing to talk for a longer time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managers of MSSEs</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Their view of SWM in Addis Ababa, current practice, future plans and their relationship with other actors within SWM.</td>
<td>All of them were kind and willing to share their experiences.</td>
<td>They were all kind, helpful, and wanted to share their experiences. They were also willing to talk for a longer time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wholesalers</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>The participants view of solid waste management in Addis Ababa and their strategies for the future.</td>
<td>Contacted the same participants that I interviewed in my master thesis, because I had contact with him frequently since 2004. He used to be a manager of the MSSEs and the Addis Ababa City Administration.</td>
<td>He was the manager within solid waste while I took my master degree and I have had contact with him frequently since 2004.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private sector</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Why did they get involved in the activity? What kind of activities are they involved in? How is their relationship with the municipality? What are their main problems and what kind of strategies are they adapting in order to cope with the current situation?</td>
<td>Wanted to meet the director of the company. In all of them, the relationship was good and they were willing to share their experiences.</td>
<td>They were all kind, helpful, and wanted to share their experiences. They were also willing to talk for a longer time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kebele managers SWM</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Their view of SWM in Addis Ababa, current practice, future plans and their relationship with other actors within SWM.</td>
<td>Wanted to meet the chief at his office and talk to him.</td>
<td>They were all kind, helpful, and wanted to share their experiences. They were also willing to talk for a longer time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous managers SWM</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>The participants view of SWM in Addis Ababa. Background information about their work, how was their relationship with the municipality? What was the reasons for the previous resignation? Working conditions within AACA. What was the reasons for the privoious resignation?</td>
<td>Wanted to meet the chief at his office and talk to him.</td>
<td>They were all kind, helpful, and wanted to share their experiences. They were also willing to talk for a longer time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Addis Ababa Environmental Protection Authority</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Their view of SWM in Addis Ababa, current practice, future plans and their relationship with other actors within SWM.</td>
<td>Wanted to meet the Manager they always guided me to officials at a lower level. Seems like they have limited knowledge about solid waste.</td>
<td>They were all kind, helpful, and wanted to share their experiences. They were also willing to talk for a longer time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private sector</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Why did they get involved in the activity? What kind of activities are they involved in? How is their relationship with the municipality? What are their main problems and what kind of strategies are they adapting in order to cope with the current situation?</td>
<td>Wanted to meet the director of the company. In all of them, the relationship was good and they were willing to share their experiences.</td>
<td>They were all kind, helpful, and wanted to share their experiences. They were also willing to talk for a longer time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Official working SBPDA</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Their view of SWM in Addis Ababa, current practice, future plans and their relationship with other actors within SWM.</td>
<td>Wanted to meet the Manager they always guided me to officials at a lower level. Seems like they have limited knowledge about solid waste.</td>
<td>They were all kind, helpful, and wanted to share their experiences. They were also willing to talk for a longer time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household SWM</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Households view of the solid waste service today compared to five years ago.</td>
<td>Contacted them through the phone.</td>
<td>They were all kind, helpful, and wanted to share their experiences. They were also willing to talk for a longer time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managers of MSSEs</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Their view of SWM in Addis Ababa. Current practice, future plans and their relationship with other actors within SWM.</td>
<td>Managment in Addis Ababa for the future.</td>
<td>They were all kind, helpful, and wanted to share their experiences. They were also willing to talk for a longer time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kebele managers SWM</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Their view of SWM in Addis Ababa, current practice, future plans and their relationship with other actors within SWM.</td>
<td>Managment in Addis Ababa for the future.</td>
<td>They were all kind, helpful, and wanted to share their experiences. They were also willing to talk for a longer time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous managers SWM</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>The participants view of SWM in Addis Ababa. Background information about their work, how was their relationship with the municipality? What was the reasons for the privoious resignation? Working conditions within AACA. What was the reasons for the privoious resignation?</td>
<td>Managment in Addis Ababa for the future.</td>
<td>They were all kind, helpful, and wanted to share their experiences. They were also willing to talk for a longer time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Addis Ababa Environmental Protection Authority</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Their view of SWM in Addis Ababa, current practice, future plans and their relationship with other actors within SWM.</td>
<td>Managment in Addis Ababa for the future.</td>
<td>They were all kind, helpful, and wanted to share their experiences. They were also willing to talk for a longer time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private sector</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Why did they get involved in the activity? What kind of activities are they involved in? How is their relationship with the municipality? What are their main problems and what kind of strategies are they adapting in order to cope with the current situation?</td>
<td>Managment in Addis Ababa for the future.</td>
<td>They were all kind, helpful, and wanted to share their experiences. They were also willing to talk for a longer time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Official working SBPDA</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Their view of SWM in Addis Ababa, current practice, future plans and their relationship with other actors within SWM.</td>
<td>Managment in Addis Ababa for the future.</td>
<td>They were all kind, helpful, and wanted to share their experiences. They were also willing to talk for a longer time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household SWM</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Households view of the solid waste service today compared to five years ago.</td>
<td>Managment in Addis Ababa for the future.</td>
<td>They were all kind, helpful, and wanted to share their experiences. They were also willing to talk for a longer time.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Interviews with wholesalers lead me to Wub consult. To confirm information about the current situation in Addis Ababa, I contacted the participant directly. However, I was unable to get a meeting with the participant. It seemed like they were not willing to talk to me. In three of the meetings the participant did not show up and did not return the phone. I then contacted them through email and social media to ask for their view on the situation and the process of the area.

Enda Ethiopia was contacted through ENDA - Ethiopia. They have been involved in various projects they are involved in, and their activities? What is their view and interest in Solid Waste? How is their relationship with other actors within the sector? What role do they have in the various projects they are involved in, aim, activities and outcomes? They have mainly small-scale projects, but the person in charge has been a master student at AAU for the last 3 years. Seems like they are giving all the tasks to master students at AAU.

Plastic Union was contacted through the phone book. They have many plastic factories in Addis Ababa and how many members do they have? How is their relationship with the city administration? They have been involved in the research by the wholesalers. They have a copy of the study and the informal recycling system and the reasons for this. However, I was not able to get a meeting with them. It seemed like they were not willing to talk to me. When I arrived there they did not have the research and I was told to go to Addis Ketema Sub-City. When I came there they did not know anything about the research and that they did not have any copies of it. I was told to go to the city administration. They have a copy of the study and the informal recycling system and the reasons for this.

GTZ was contacted through the phone book. They have been involved in the research by the wholesalers. They have a copy of the study and the informal recycling system and the reasons for this. However, I was not able to get a meeting with them. It seemed like they were not willing to talk to me. When I arrived there they did not have the research and I was told to go to urban planning agency at municipality. When I arrived there they did not have the research and I was told to go to Addis Ketema Sub-City. When I came there they did not know anything about the research and that they did not have any copies of it. I was told to go to Addis Ababa city administration.
APPENDIX 8: OVERVIEW OF THE NEWSPAPER REVIEWS CONDUCTED.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Heading</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>07.03.2004</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>City administration endorses regulation governing waste disposal administration</td>
<td>New regulation on solid waste disposal, health aspect.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26.03.2004</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>14,000 people get job opportunities in Addis Ababa</td>
<td>Some in waste management, some in sanitation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04.04.2004</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Agency improving dumping ground, creating new sanitary landfills</td>
<td>Closing existing landfills, looking for a new location.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04.08.2004</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Agency to involve private sector in waste management, beautifying efforts</td>
<td>Involvement of private sector in waste collection, selection of four new landfill sites.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31.08.2004</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Ethiopia endorses international agreement to ban hazardous waste imports</td>
<td>Implementing Basel agreement in Ethiopia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.11.2004</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Gash Abera Molla project wins international award</td>
<td>National and regional awards for environmental protection.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.11.2004</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Agency plans to create over 10,000 new jobs</td>
<td>Job creation for waste processing and composting.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21.12.2004</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Beautify and clean city growing concern, cleanliness, awareness, recycling</td>
<td>Need support from government, network association.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02.01.2005</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>President lauds Addis Ababa greening, beautifying efforts</td>
<td>Clean and green city.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.01.2005</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Clean and green Addis Ababa society: report plan</td>
<td>Clean and green society.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07.07.2005</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>City manager calls upon NGOs, residents to back Addis Ababa cleaning and greening efforts</td>
<td>Waste management - planting trees.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19.03.2006</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Agency commends reuse of wastes</td>
<td>Composting should be more beneficial than disposing, job creation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05.04.2006</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Green award program introduced in Ethiopia</td>
<td>National and regional awards for environmental protection.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27.04.2006</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Authority urges public to avoid use of plastic bags</td>
<td>Awareness of recycling by the private sector.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21.05.2006</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Authority undertaking activities to implement pollution protection law</td>
<td>Awareness, clean and green.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06.06.2006</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Nation contests green awards on environmental activities</td>
<td>Awards for environmental activities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27.06.2006</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Activities to create awareness on clean up measures underway</td>
<td>Study on waste disposal, teaching how to dispose waste properly.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09.08.2006</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Agency creates 13,000 jobs</td>
<td>Job creation, Sub-City, waste recycling centers in Sub-Cities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.12.2006</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Town administration urged to properly manage solid waste</td>
<td>Support recycling, job opportunities and public participation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03.02.2007</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Environmental protection crucial to development</td>
<td>Environmental rights, health and sustainable development.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.05.2007</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Authority says controlling environmental pollution</td>
<td>Mapping type of waste, chemicals and situation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.05.2007</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Agency says committed to improve Addis Ababa sanitation</td>
<td>Increased collection, transportation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23.05.2007</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Greener and cleaner Ethiopia in the new millennium</td>
<td>General about the main environmental problems in Ethiopia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.07.2007</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Millenium clean up campaign in Addis Ababa</td>
<td>Clean up campaign, awareness and public participation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04.08.2007</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Council determined to clean up Addis Ababa</td>
<td>Clean city.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31.10.2007</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Association lays stress on festival pollution awareness rising</td>
<td>SOS Addis, collection of festal waste.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.11.2007</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Incalculating values to make hygiene tradition</td>
<td>Clean campaign, awareness creation, solid waste situation in Addis Ababa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22.11.2007</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Waste burning: is it cleaning or polluting?</td>
<td>Cleaning day, not good - polluting, awareness.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02.12.2007</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Government attaches due attention to assist organisations engaged in dry waste disposal</td>
<td>Public and private involvement important.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06.01.2009</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Solid waste management</td>
<td>Technical, list of points, problems and definitions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.01.2009</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Organization assists in strengthening solid waste management system in Addis Ababa</td>
<td>SWM training for 250 residents.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24.01.2009</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Thinking outside the box: BPR</td>
<td>Awareness and attitude change - BPR will not accept throwing waste outside the container or piecing in the street.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01.03.2009</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Waste management methods</td>
<td>Technical.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Page</td>
<td>Heading</td>
<td>Comments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.08.2009</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Promoting product recycling - killing two birds with one stone</td>
<td>Cleanliness, job creation/recycling as a way of income generation and waste management, everybody is responsible, legal associations for waste collection need to be established and the whole community need to be participating, support recycling, create employment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21.11.2009</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Global economic expansion leading to environmental destruction in less developed countries</td>
<td>General about environment and development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22.11.2009</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Tragedy of the commons - river pollution of cities</td>
<td>Let's keep the rivers clean, cleaness, healthy urban environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08.03.2010</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Waste not the city: the imperative need for effective solid waste management</td>
<td>Waste situation is not good, household waste 70%, City responsible, 75 MMES problem with containers, clean, oil waste, operation and focus on recycling - management, low collection coverage, service delay, lack of human resources, technical knowledge, lack of plans, lack attention from national government, weak institutional capacity, lack of coordination among actors, converging systems obstacles for solid waste management, PPP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31.03.2010</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Sanitation, healthy life - underline costal facts</td>
<td>Interview with workers for the cooperatives, A good approach to the new system, job creation, cleanliness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09.05.2010</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Focus on hygiene</td>
<td>Mostly on hygiene, solid waste mentioned, general</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.08.2010</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Agency set for creating a healthy environment</td>
<td>City has improved STEDESS, new trucks, 704 all together, 24 hours, day, 2300 dust bins, 100 containers, focus on capacity building for officials, implement better and modern mechanism, awareness and PPP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24.08.2010</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Keeping Addis clean, safe - possible yet untouch assignment</td>
<td>City has improved STEDESS, new trucks, 704 all together, 24 hours, day, 2300 dust bins, 100 containers, focus on capacity building for officials, implement better and modern mechanism, awareness and PPP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.03.2011</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Environmental sanitation (well-processed benefits)</td>
<td>Clean environment, house waste mentioned, general</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.03.2011</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Starting waste heat treatment</td>
<td>Technical agreement - not about Addis Ababa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28.03.2011</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Recycling for sustainable growth</td>
<td>Recycling and its benefits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05.11.2010</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Keeping environment clean and healthy urban activity</td>
<td>A clean, sustainable, healthy urban environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05.11.2010</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Maintaining electricity from municipal only wind</td>
<td>Some basic facts about WM in Addis Ababa, waste to energy, recycling etc, very technical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.03.2011</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Waste reducing: way forward for sustainability and development</td>
<td>General development adopting a western approach, for how to manage waste in a sustainable manner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22.03.2011</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Cleanliness, Addis</td>
<td>Promotion, multipli importance of clean and healthy city</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Page</td>
<td>Volume</td>
<td>Number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07.09.2008</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>436</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21.12.2008</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>451</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22.03.2009</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>464</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.12.2009</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>502</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07.03.2010</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>514</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07.03.2010</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>514</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21.03.2010</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>516</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25.04.2010</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>521</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09.05.2010</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>823</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24.10.2010</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>547</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21.11.2010</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>551</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.12.2010</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>554</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09.01.2011</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>558</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06.02.2011</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>562</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### LIST OF MATERIALS PREPARED BY EPA AND AACA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Title of material</th>
<th>Type of material</th>
<th>Date of publication</th>
<th>Language</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Development and protection of riversides in our city</td>
<td>Brochure</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Amharic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Solid waste collection and disposal methods</td>
<td>Brochure</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Amharic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Compost, its benefits and preparation</td>
<td>Brochure</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Amharic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Why only in the month of Hidar</td>
<td>Brochure</td>
<td>Undated</td>
<td>Amharic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Let us join forces to create pollution free, clean and green Addis Ababa the natural resources of which are protected</td>
<td>Brochure</td>
<td>Undated</td>
<td>Amharic</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### LIST OF MATERIALS PREPARED BY SBPDA AND AACA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Title of material</th>
<th>Type of material</th>
<th>Date of publication</th>
<th>Language</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Let us introduce you SBPDA</td>
<td>Brochure</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Amharic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>The role of the community in the creation of clean and beautiful Addis Ababa</td>
<td>Brochure</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Amharic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Waste is resource; let us reuse it</td>
<td>Brochure</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Amharic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Sanitation is both individual and joint responsibility</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Undated</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>If Everyone cleans its neighborhood, our city will be clean</td>
<td>Brochure</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Amharic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Preparation of Compost</td>
<td>Brochure</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Amharic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>General awareness about solid waste and environmental hygiene for school sanitation and beautification clubs</td>
<td>Guideline</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Amharic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Let sanitation be our culture in the new millennium</td>
<td>Brochure</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### LIST OF MATERIALS PREPARED BY FEDERAL EPA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Title of material</th>
<th>Type of material</th>
<th>Date of publication</th>
<th>Language</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Festal</td>
<td>Brochure</td>
<td>Undated</td>
<td>Amharic</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### LIST OF SOME OF THE ACTIVITIES DONE BY AACA, SBPDA AND EPA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Language</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Radio program ’qorqoro alleh’</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Amharic</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>