Europe not taken for granted:
The Ford Foundation’s exchange programs in Eastern Europe in the 1950s and '60s
Ingeborg Stensrud

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Thesis for the Degree of Philosophiae Doctor

Trondheim, May 2018

Norwegian University of Science and Technology
Faculty of Humanities
Department of Historical Studies

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Preface

What was The Cold War – and to whom? For myself, growing up in NATO Norway in the 1970s and ‘80s, it meant an absolute division between West and East, “Us” and “Them.” My parents, uncles and aunts, and all their friends, were liberal, non-socialist, with an obvious and unwavering faith in the righteousness of the Anglo-Atlantic world. Others, especially younger parents of some of my school friends, were different. They celebrated International Workers’ Day, demonstrated in the streets with banners and slogans, and were engaged in politics in the socialist and communist parties. In high school, communist paraphernalia became popular among some of the students, and they talked as if they would welcome a marxist revolution any day. To me, it was incomprehensible. Everything about “the communist world” seemed drab and gloomy and evil to me. I did not know much about it, we did not learn much about it at school, and I was not much interested in politics, but the images on TV from the countries behind the Iron Curtain were always drab. Everything was grey: the sky, the buildings, people’s clothes, people’s faces.

In my most impressionable years, the news often covered the struggle of the Solidarity movement in the Lenin Shipyard in Gdansk. Hardly a place then, for fun and games, nor a representative of the society as a whole, but those images stuck. I admired the Soviet and East European athletes whom I watched during the Olympic games and other international competitions, but they, too, looked pale and drab. Then there were stories of defectors: Rudolf Nurejev, Mikhail Baryshnikov, Martina Navratilova, Nadia Comaneci; and there was the Berlin Wall – a symbol of captivity if ever there was one.

In contrast there were the American movies, where California was bright and sunny, while New York appeared a thrilling mix of seediness and dark crime with creativity and glamour. They were many things, these movies, but they were rarely drab and grey. The Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation’s TV-channel (the only one until the 1980s), did occasionally air films made in Eastern Europe, in the “Eastern Bloc.” That was what it was to me, and I dare say for most Norwegians: a Bloc, where the individual nations, languages and cultural characteristics were almost indistinct from each other. These films were cartoons or animations, and if they featured people, they were of the Cinderella variety, based on old fairytales.

A concrete wall with barbed wire (the Iron Curtain, real and tangible), sinewy athletes, angry shipyard workers, and Cinderella – those were some of the few images of Eastern Europe made available to me as a child.
But the Cold War was much more than the mixture of political and cultural images I have just described. We knew that there was a danger of real war. Rarely, but regularly, the air raid siren would sound while we were at school, and we would practice getting to the shelters in the basement. We knew of the threat of nuclear war, and we knew that the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc were our enemies, and maybe even China, but that was so far away. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, was a neighbouring country with which we shared our northernmost border.

The Cold War was also much more than Eastern Europe vis-à-vis Western Europe. We knew of wars fought far away, in Vietnam, in Afghanistan, in Lebanon, and I had an uncle who had been a MASH-doctor in Korea during the war there, and a UN-doctor in the war in the Congo. As a child I was not, of course, conscious of any of these conflicts being part of the greater context of the Cold War. We heard our parents talk about “the Bay of Pigs” and “the Cuban crisis,” about how scared they had been, and about how close we had been to nuclear destruction. This, I knew, had something to do with Communism and the Soviet Union, but how it all tied in was hard to grasp.

It is still hard to grasp all the personas, events, attitudes and images of the Cold War. It is hard to understand how all the pieces fit together, to really understand all the facets of this more than forty year long period in our recent history. Even for historians, and even now, when many of the Cold War archives are open for scrutiny, there are a host of challenges to be met, some of which pertain to contemporary history in general.

Historians have never been objective, but the endeavour to be as balanced and nuanced as possible is in some ways complicated further, I think, by proximity in time and place. We, people of my generation and older, all over the world, in some way or another, are ourselves part of the Cold War. We were all, on some level, indoctrinated. Self-evident, you may say, and that may be. It may also be that many people do not reflect enough on this. In any case, a reminder will not hurt: We are all biased. We are all shaped by our environments and our times, and so were the objects of my research, the men and women who lived and worked on the front lines of the cultural Cold War.
Introduction

The term *Iron Curtain* was a useful metaphor for the systemic divide between East and West during the Cold War. However, although the “curtain” often appeared solid and almost impossible to permeate, it was not. It was permeable to such an extent and for such reasons that “nylon curtain,” with its multiple meanings (strength, translucency, modernity, symbol of Western technology), may be a more descriptive term. This study is about some of the people who permeated the curtain in the 1950s and 1960s: from the West, the representatives of the American Ford Foundation; from the East, exchangees in the Foundation’s East European exchange program.

The study started as part of the international research project “Imagining the West,” which was initiated in 2006 and formally ended in 2011. I joined the project from its start in 2006, but was then swept away by life, and by work in various archive institutions. When I again picked up my dissertation, in 2016, I found that two Polish scholars, Antoni Sulek and Igor Czernecki, had written about the Ford Foundation and its Polish program. Hardly surprised after several years, I will admit to feeling both dismayed and pleased by this; dismayed because that meant I was no longer the first to use the Ford Foundation archives about the Polish program (Czernecki even quoted many of the same passages I had quoted in my drafts), pleased because it meant my topic was obviously interesting to others. I was also pleased that these two scholars provided me with another perspective, one that I had not been able to access because I do not read Polish. Discovering their interesting articles made me more conscious of what my own contribution to the discourse would be. I found much of the answer in the name of the project I was a part of: “Imagining the West.”

The object of the project was “to visit and study some hitherto unexplored corners and dimensions of modern identity formation along the East/West divide in Europe.” One intention was to “devote a great deal of attention to the interaction in which both Westerners and Easterners “mentally map” the East/West divide with constant back and forth.”

I have focused on the reciprocal relationship between the Ford Foundation, at the time the largest of American philanthropic foundations, and scholars, experts, leaders and students who

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1 Often attributed to Winston Churchill at his Fulton, Missouri speech on 5 March 1946, the term had been in use long before. See Patrick Wright. *The Iron Curtain: From Stage to Cold War.* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).


3 For more information on this project go to “Imagining the West,” *Program on East European Cultures and Societies*, accessed 22 December 2017, https://www.ntnu.edu/peecs/concluded.
came from the communist countries Poland, Yugoslavia, and Hungary to the United States – on grants from the Foundation. I have explored the motives and intentions behind the Ford Foundation programs and how the reciprocal relationship between the granters and the grantees influenced the people involved.

The opposite to “imagining the West” is, logically, “imagining the East,” an imagining which has a well-documented history. At least since the Enlightenment, Westerners have studied and “mentally mapped” both “the Orient” – as in the Ottoman Empire, the Middle East and beyond – and the nearer “East” – as in Russia and Eastern Europe. Larry Wolff, in his book *Inventing Eastern Europe*, uses various sources such as travelogues, journals, letters, and autobiographies to argue the point of his title: that western Europeans of the Enlightenment who travelled to the eastern regions of Europe “invented” the people and places they met. They did so by creating them in their own image, based on their own experience of life in the West and by ranking them along a scale of the more or less barbaric. This scale was still at work in Westerners’ minds in the 20th century when Russia and, later, the countries of Eastern Europe, became communist states. My own experiences and current public discourse tells me that it is still very much alive today.

Accounts of how people in Eastern Europe have experienced their encounters with the West have not been sought out and researched to the same degree as their Western counterparts. In the 20th century, the way in which people in communist Eastern Europe viewed the West is one neglected aspect of the East/West discourse. Have the people from the communist East “invented” the West similarly to how western Europeans “invented” them? Very likely. Finding out something about what that invention was like, what images of the West were like, is one ambition of this dissertation. How the Americans (the people at the Ford Foundation, their associates, others of importance to the discourse) imagined the East Europeans (officials in government agencies, but most importantly the grantees) is also a component, as the relationship was reciprocal. How did ideology and politics, domestic and international, influence the programs? How did the two parties “imagine” each other, and how did their images of each other

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4 I have chosen to use the term communism throughout the text when I mean the ideology of the Soviet Union, even though the European countries under their dominance were considered socialist by the Soviets themselves: The “peoples’ democracies” were considered on their way to communism, like the Soviet Union, but on a lower level. The term communism was the dominant term used at the time, in the 1950s and ‘60s, when dealing with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Today many scholars call them state socialist.


6 Central and East Central Europe were often a part of this conception.

and interaction with each other shape Foundation programs and influence attitudes during the Cold War?

**The archive sources**

Most of the primary sources for this study are from the Ford Foundation archives in New York. I have consulted all the “Grant files” for the East European programs as well as the categories “Collections,” “Unpublished reports,” and “Dockets”, and the transcribed interviews from the Ford Foundation history project from 1972 and ’73. To supplement my findings in the Ford Foundation archives, I have also perused Shepard Stone’s papers in the Dartmouth College library.

Except for Igor Czernekci, there is little evidence that other authors have consulted the same material. The Ford Foundation archives have been used by many scholars, of course, and Volker Berghahn, Giuliana Gemelli, and Francis X. Sutton have all used the archives to write about the Foundation’s work in Europe. However, their work does not refer to the grant files or any other collections concerning Eastern Europe to any great extent. Thus, my archive research sheds new light on the Ford Foundation activities in Eastern Europe; it offers new perspectives on Cold War academic exchanges in general, and on individual encounters between East and West.

Sutton, a former Ford Foundation officer, in a book chapter about the Ford Foundation and Europe published in 2003, wrote:

> The ultimate effects of what was done can hardly be deduced from the history of policies and their expression as surveyed here. To know better what the Ford Foundation accomplished in and for Europe in the generation from 1950 to 1980 we shall need more than the comprehensive view attempted here, such as studies of particular fields and places must provide.  

My dissertation is such a study of “particular fields and places.” The field is scholarly exchanges, and the place is Eastern Europe.

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8 The archives were moved from the Ford Foundation headquarter in New York City in 2012. They are now at the at the Rockefeller Archive Center in Sleepy Hollow, New York.

Thesis statement

My particular study suggests that the exchange programs with Poland, Yugoslavia and Hungary – three different countries in the sphere of communist Europe – created a window of opportunity for interaction between scholars, experts and leaders from the East with scholars, experts and leaders in the West. This interaction, this power struggle and exchange of ideas and practices, challenged pre-conceived notions on both sides, and had a lasting effect on many of those who participated.

At a time when the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe were redefining their former version of Communism, the programs were a rare, valuable source of contact between East and West. The interaction resulted in cultural, academic and scientific cooperation that changed the perception of “the self” and “the other” for those who took part in it. These changes affected the academic elites in Poland, Yugoslavia and Hungary, and altered scholarship and teaching in some disciplines. To a lesser degree, they also influenced American academic counterparts. The networks established through the programs continued to influence those who participated and may eventually have contributed to a change in the politics and ideology of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

The structure of the dissertation

To understand the Ford Foundation’s exchange programs with Eastern Europe, enmeshed as they were in the Cold War, I set the stage in Chapter 1 with an account of the main features of the so-called cultural Cold War.

In chapter 2, I discuss the role of American foundations and present an overview of former research on the Ford Foundation and Europe.

In Chapter 3, I account for and analyze the activities of the Ford Foundation’s International Affairs Program with regards to (Eastern) Europe in the years leading up to the exchange programs. This provides the background to the rationale behind the programs.

In Chapters 4, 5 and 6, I focus on the development of three distinct exchange programs, respectively: Poland (1957-62), Yugoslavia (1959-69), and Hungary (1964-69). In a chronological narrative I describe what the exchange programs were (who were involved, from where, for how long, etc.) I discuss what the Ford Foundation’s motives and intentions for launching the programs were: How were they negotiated? How where they planned and
implemented? What obstacles did they encounter? In short: why and how, in the midst of the Cold War and all that it entailed, did these programs come about and work?

In Chapters 7 and 8 I shift my focus from what happened in the programs to an analysis of the experiences and perceptions of those who participated in them. I analyze the encounters between the Ford Foundation and the individual East European. One aim is to find images of “Self” and “the Other” along the East/West divide. I explore how the East European Ford fellows presented themselves in the encounter with the Ford Foundation, and how their presentations may reveal something of their “images of the West.” I also look at how “Westerners” reacted to the “Easterners”’ presentations of the self. Did their encounter strengthen or weaken their view of their “systemic other”? Did it seem to have changed their outlook and attitudes about each other?

My sources for this analysis have been texts written by, for, to, and/or about the individual East Europeans. I have made use of sociologist Erving Goffman’s studies on interaction and role play; what he called the “arts of impression management.” His insightful concepts and categories, which he used to explain how and why people behave in certain various ways when encountering others, have provided me with tools to analyze the texts.

As a result of my study of the programs and their participants, I am, in Chapter 9, able to make a reasonable assessment of the question: Did the Ford Foundation’s East European programs have any impact? (And if they did, was it the kind of impact that had been desired? In that case by whom?) The programs were small, less than a thousand fellows participated in the exchanges. This fact suggests that any impact on a political-systemic level was limited, and my discussion of impact is largely on an individual/professional level, but also on the level of a more general change in sentiment and attitudes among the fellows and among the Ford Foundation officers and their associates. Such phenomena are hard to prove, but qualified assumptions, based on a study of texts, can tell us something about what the exchange programs did or did not achieve. In this chapter I also present criticism against the Foundation and describe and analyze why and how the programs came to an end in the late 1960s.

In Chapter 10, the concluding chapter, I sum up my findings.
Chapter 1. The cultural Cold War: winning hearts and minds

Underneath the political, military, and diplomatic history of the Cold War, there was a range of cultural themes that have only been seriously explored and researched in the last 20 years or so. Scholars have explored this particular chapter of history from alternative angles to illuminate previously obscured corners of the Cold War world, thereby showing that the fronts in the Cold War were not only shaped by the arms-race and other political-military factors, but also by various forms of cultural warfare. The Ford Foundation exchange programs with East European countries was part of this warfare, part of what came to be called the cultural Cold War, a struggle for cultural hegemony between the USA and the Soviet Union, which played itself out where the ideological fight for or against Communism was on.

**From allies to enemies**

After the end of World War II it gradually became obvious that cooperation with the Stalinist Soviet Union would not be possible. The unlikely war-time ally, personified by Joseph Stalin, had made that clear with a gradual, and ever more crushing, domination in Eastern Europe.

Up until the death of Franklin D. Roosevelt, and finally, with the dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima, Stalin had hoped for some degree of cooperation and détente with his wartime allies. However, deep suspicion of the Western powers’ motives, coupled with his compulsion for totalitarian rule, made Stalin abandon any ideas of cooperation and turn “against this faction of capitalists.” To Westerners such as George Kennan, the American ambassador to the Soviet Union, Stalin seemed, by early 1946, so ambivalent that Kennan reported to Truman’s administration that a peaceful co-existence with the Soviet Union would be impossible.

The relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union changed radically in the first two years after the war. During the war (after the USA and the Soviets became allies), “Premier Joseph Stalin opened Soviet borders to Lend-Lease aid, as well as to music, films,

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10 Although the term was used at the time, in the 1950s and '60, Christopher Lasch has later been credited for introducing this term in the cold war discourse. Christopher Lasch “The Cultural Cold War: A Short History of the Congress of Cultural Freedom” in Barton J. Bernstein, ed. Towards a New Past: Dissenting Essays in American History. New York: Vintage Books, Random House, 1969.

11 It has been much debated who is to blame for starting the Cold War. For a brief and good analysis, see Günter Bischof, “The origins of the Cold War at home and abroad 1945-1950” in Antonio S. Thompson and Christos G. Fretzos, eds. The Routledge Handbook of American Military and Diplomatic History: 1865 to the present. New York and London: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2013.

printed materials, and American tourists.” One year after the war Andrei Zhdanov, the secretary of the Central committee, launched a new cultural doctrine: the *Zhdanovshchina* (Zhdanov Doctrine), a “gigantic ideological reconversion operation.” It was a purification effort to counteract the “contamination” caused by the interaction with Western allies during the war. According to the doctrine, the world was divided into two camps, the “imperialistic” world, lead by the USA, and the “Democratic” world, lead by the Soviet Union. Within the Soviet sphere, intellectuals and artists who did not comply with the doctrine risked prosecution. When the Soviet authorities, in June of 1947, were offered financial aid through the Marshall plan, they declined, calling it “political pressure with the help of dollars.” Soon after, the top delegates of the Soviet and East European Communist Parties met and established the Cominform, to “coordinate the activities of the Communist Parties.” One of their goals was to fight “imperialist expansion.”

The leaders of the United States were no less bellicose in their statements. On 12 March 1947 Truman declared an “anti-communist crusade,” that in one senator’s words was “a declaration of war against Russia.” This launched the political-cultural offensive to counteract communism in the USA and in the world. *McCarthyism*, the anti-communist campaign that took its name from Senator Joseph McCarthy, took “red-baiting” to another level, and the anti-communism offensive at home escalated. But McCarthyism was much more than senator McCarthy. The attack on American communists and fellow-travellers (“those Western intellectuals who did not openly join the Communist Party of their country but who nevertheless wished to support the Soviet Union in its anti-fascist struggle”) began in the immediate wake of the war. It tapered off in the late fifties, but did not really end until the mid-sixties.

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15 Péteri, “Nylon Curtain,” 118.
17 Iván T. Berend. *Central and Eastern Europe*, 34.
18 “*Fellow traveler*, Russian *poputchik*, originally, a writer in the Soviet Union who was not against the Russian Revolution of 1917 but did not actively support it as a propagandist. […] Outside the Soviet Union the term *fellow traveler* was widely used in the Cold War era of the 1950s, especially in the United States, as a political label to refer to any person who, while not thought to be an actual “card-carrying” member of the Communist Party, was in sympathy with its aims and supported its doctrines.” “*Fellow traveler*,” *Encyclopædia Britannica*, accessed 21 December 2017, https://global.britannica.com/art/fellow-traveler.
Despite the Truman doctrine, McCarthyism and the Korean War, there were influential Americans who did not think aggressive measures were necessarily the best, or at least not the only, methods for containing Communism or for creating change. In their opinion, co-optive, or “soft power” strategies were more useful than the prevailing coercive “hard power” methods. Instead of using military force, threats, or political and economic sanctions, they thought that their culture and society had characteristics that were superior and universally attractive, among them democracy and individual opportunities. Soft power is “the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion and payments. […] “Seduction is always more effective than coercion.”

These ideas of co-optive power were not new, nor were they exclusive to the Americans. The Soviet Union, by combining force and coercive power with co-optive methods, had succeeded in convincing millions of people of the righteousness and beauty of their communist ideology and society. The countries in Europe that had come under Soviet control after the war, the so called “peoples’ democracies,” varied in their loyalty to Soviet ideology. People in these countries also differed greatly in their loyalty to the regimes in their own countries, but officially the Soviets had helped them enter the right path on the way to true Communism.

Definitions and terms for the Cultural Cold War

The non-military, cultural, offensives between the USA and the Soviet Union during the Cold War were given many names. Cultural cold war was one, another was intellectual cold war, and terms like propaganda, cultural warfare, cultural infiltration, and public diplomacy were also used to describe the various actions and objectives of the cultural Cold War. Walter L. Hixson uses most of these terms in his book Parting the Curtain, and he explains them according to the development in the relationship between East and West.

Truman and Eisenhower. London: Secker and Warburg, 1978, for detailed accounts of McCarthyism. One from the perspective of an American scholar, the other from a British.

Joseph S. Nye, Jr. “Soft Power” in Foreign Policy no. 80, Twentieth Anniversary (Autumn 1990), 153-171. I use this term in the way Nye used it in 1990. As a descriptive, and not normative, term for co-optive power. Soft power, like coercive power, can thus be both good and bad.


According to Stephen Whitfield the “Peoples’ Democracies” was a phrase “invented to describe countries of ‘socialist orientation’ which could not yet claim to have built socialism itself. It was used first in reference to the ‘fraternal allies’ of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe after the Second World War and then those countries that adopted the Soviet model after decolonization.”

Also involving Europe and other areas where communism was seen as a threat.
During the first years after the war, the cultural struggle between the super powers was generally described as *psychological warfare*. After the *Zhdanovshchina* ended, following the death of Stalin in 1953, and after the most aggressive measures of McCarthyism petered out in the mid-to late 1950s, other words were used to describe what was going on. The rather blunt and too obvious methods of the direct propaganda of this warfare was not getting the desired results, and more sophisticated means were employed.

Hixson defines *propaganda* as “the attempt to influence behavior by shaping the attitudes of masses of people,” and propaganda played a big part in the psychological warfare in the early Cold War. But the early methods were not working:

By the mid-fifties, psychological warfare had stirred unrest behind the Iron Curtain, but had failed to deliver liberation of the “captive peoples” of Eastern Europe and the USSR. As a result, U.S. policy began to shift toward an evolutionary approach emphasizing straight news and information programs, cultural exhibitions, and East-West exchange programs. Officials began to realize that Voice of America jazz programs and the “polite propaganda” of *Amerika* magazine could foster a more appealing image of the United States than anti-Soviet diatribes. Initially slow to respond to the de-Stalinization and the cultural “thaw” in the USSR, Washington began to make inroads by the late Eisenhower years.

The offensive that made these “inroads” was now termed *cultural infiltration or public diplomacy*. The shift in terminology reflected both a change in methods and a wish to break with the negative connotations of psychological warfare, too often associated with totalitarian regimes.

While the term *cultural Cold War* seems to cover all the cultural bases: newspapers, journals, magazines, and other written material; radio, television, film, literature, exhibitions, art shows, music performances, festivals, and academic and scientific exchanges of ideas, the term *intellectual Cold War* seems a somewhat narrower term, but that depends on how one defines the term intellectual: does it pertain to highbrow culture, scholarship in various forms, or does it refer to anything concerning the intellect: thoughts, ideas, ideology, and convictions? Both the terms cultural Cold War and intellectual Cold War can be broadly interpreted, given that both “cultural” and “intellectual” are elusive and complex concepts, and both apply to the themes of this dissertation.

The Ford Foundation involvement in Eastern Europe was undoubtedly an expression of cultural warfare, but it represented part of the “evolutionary approach” described by Hixson. Already in its 1949 charter, the *Report of the Study for the Ford Foundation on Policy and

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26 Hixson. *Parting the Curtain*. 1
27 Ibid., xiv
Program (also known as the Gaither Report), the Foundation was clear on its commitment to the “strengthening of democracy.” As an American Foundation in the context of the Cold War and in the face of its credo “to advance human welfare,” (of which main points were “human dignity,” “personal freedom and rights,” “political freedom and rights,” “social responsibility and the duty of service”) it would have been hard pressed not to have become a part of the cultural warfare that was such a prominent feature of the Cold War. Add to that the fact that most of the leading officers and trustees of the Foundation were men in eminent positions with connections in both corporate America and government, and it becomes evident that the Ford Foundation was one of many American enterprises intimately involved in the cultural Cold War.

It is impossible to discuss the cultural Cold War without trying to grasp how the world looked for those who lived in it. To the Americans I’ve encountered in my research, there was no doubt in their minds that they were well qualified to further democracy, even though – as stated in the Gaither-report – the “attitudes and actions of Americans sometimes seem incomprehensible to our friends and allies abroad, who speak of their confusion at the disparity between the words and deeds of our democracy.” The solution would be “[t]o supply them with examples of democratic philosophy at work [that] may in the long run prove to be the most important part of our logistics in the ideological war.” This, however, could only be accomplished “if we ourselves understand the basic principles of freedom and democracy and interpret them through sustained, consistent demonstration.” Anti-communist hard-liners (even before McCarthy entered the scene) were not showing this understanding and, in their fear of communism, were starting to treat some of their own citizens in ways eerily reminiscent of authoritarian regimes. People at the Ford Foundation were not in that category.

Images of America

The United States had always been in an awkward relationship with Europe. The European elites had traditionally regarded Americans as uncouth and uncivilized, but they also observed (and partially acknowledged) the innovative and efficient dynamic of the people in the young state. For the conscious members of the middle and, especially, the working classes the United States held appeal as a society where they may escape the shackles of old, stale Europe. Still, for those who remained, America seemed too foreign in her people’s apparent lack of regard for the old order of knowing one’s place. Besides, for those who cared about Europe’s cultural heritage,

America seemed devoid of anything that could match it. Thus, Europeans both despised and admired Americans.29

This did not change with the Second World War, from which the United States emerged as the only Western power with any real power left. According to Olivier Zunz, its rise to prominence (which had begun already in the 1920s) “rested on an array of original achievements in science and industry and on concurrent and deliberate reorganization of society.”30 A partnership between big business, government, higher education and foundations “allowed producers, brokers, and users of knowledge to interact […] and develop together an array of cognitive strategies.” On this basis, strengthened by the Marshall Plan, the United States succeeded in gaining its hegemonic status. Despite or because of this, many of the perceptions and prejudices among (West) Europeans remained after the war. A country that had in many ways been regarded as the underdog was now on top (if still inferior in “high culture”), and this was a slap in the face for many West Europeans. On the other hand, they were acutely aware of the fact that, without the Americans, they may now all be subjects of Hitler’s Third Reich, or even (after 1944) the Soviet Union, as communist or socialist parties were strong in several West European countries.

The financial aid provided through the Marshall Plan, to rebuild devastated Europe, was also a double-edged sword. It is never easy being on the receiving end of charity, which was one way to interpret the Americans’ aid programs. One aspect of being on the receiving end is the humiliation of it, another is the obvious realization that there is no such thing as a free lunch. And it was obvious what the Americans expected in return: Loyalty and co-operation in rebuilding Europe and restoring a liberal economic world order, and in containing Communism.

In the Eastern parts of Europe it was not the Americans who had “saved” them, but the Soviets. For some people it meant replacing one tyranny with another, for others it meant the end to young and fragile democracies. For all, under the domination of the Soviet Empire, it meant a new way of life with a new ideology that they were mostly coerced or forced to submit to. Many were indifferent: One government seemed as good as another for those without the means or power to have a voice. Most were too exhausted from war or in other ways powerless to defend themselves against any power. Some, especially in Poland, fought fiercely for their democracy, but they, like all others who opposed the new masters, were eventually forced into submission by the superior military power and the terror tactics of the Soviet Union and their puppet-governments in the new people’s democracies.

Attempts at capturing sentiments among Europeans, East or West, are generalizations and interpretations made from what history tells us. But history can only tell us so much, to the extent in which it was recorded and in what choices historians have made. We can assume that ideas about America – where they existed – were as varied as the individuals who held them. We can also assume that there were some ideas that were more prevalent than others, keeping in mind that most people’s thoughts and ideas are never recorded.

In turn, Americans, with all their different life trajectories, must have viewed Europe through as many different lenses as there were people. However, there are also here some generalizations to be made. Like Europeans about America, Americans had mixed feelings about Europe. The elites and middle classes often admired the traditions and high culture of Europe, while at the same time questioning or disliking the adherence to the old social structure and lack of efficiency and flexibility. Europe was the Old World, with all that that entailed. For recent European immigrants, nostalgia for what they left behind blended with the promise of their new lives, however hard they may be. America allowed them to look forward, but we may assume that most felt attached to Europe in some way or another. Regardless of what individuals felt or not, in the struggle against the Soviet Union and communism, Europe was a necessary ally.

Because World War II and the Marshall Plan did not change the superior and hostile attitude of the European intellectual elites towards the United States, it has been argued that it was against them that the most important battles were fought by Americans in the cultural Cold War of the early 1950s. The vast majority of “influential Western European intellectuals”

scorned what they saw as the U.S.’s shallow, business-dominated culture and its “Coca-Colonization” of the rest of the world but who were also leery of Stalinist authoritarianism and militarism. To these Europeans, American culture was Mickey Mouse and cowboy movies at best and malevolent military-imperialist power at worst.31

This worried Americans in the governing and elite strata who were eager to rid themselves of this particular inferiority complex in relationship to Europe.32 To remedy this, programs were launched in support of foreign intellectuals, with the expressed wish to “instruct them in the unique qualities of American society and culture.” 33 This wish and the assumption that sympathy for the United States would follow from such efforts, is evident among Ford Foundation documents, and this tells us much about how the people at the Ford Foundation

32 Berghahn. America.
viewed their own ability to create change and to influence others, and also about their faith in their country’s position in the world, the “manifest destiny” of America.

Although many West Europeans believed in the superiority of their societies, and looked down on both American and Soviet culture, their countries were recovering from war and their voices were weak. Hence, although the war had ravaged the Soviet Union and many of the Eastern European countries worse than Western Europe, the revolutionary zeal of the Soviets (or their sheer numbers coupled with Stalin’s terror-tactics) made them a strong force vis-à-vis Western Europe. With Europe (East and West) hanging in the balance, the battle for the hearts and minds of Europeans was largely carried out by the Soviet Union, on the one side, and the United States on the other.

Many Americans realized that their own affluence – used, of course, as one of the strongest Soviet arguments against America and Capitalism – and popular culture held great appeal for the war-weary Europeans. In Walter Hixson’s words:

“The nation’s rise to world power was inextricably linked with the dissemination of images of affluence, consumerism, middle-class status, individual freedom, and technological progress. The appeal of American mass culture facilitated overseas expansion and identified the United States with progress.”

Among the American elite, many were not happy about this “mass culture,” that it was that the world was exposed to and considered American. But they had new confidence in their society and culture and thought that Europeans must learn about American culture, whether they were living under Communist regimes, were western intellectuals, or even fellow-travellers in France, Italy, Britain or elsewhere in Europe.

The Soviet sphere struggled with its own image and identity problems both at home and abroad. To create new narratives about past and present that would suit their postwar objectives and visions, the authorities of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe developed practices of “forced forgetting” and used various strategies to keep people from speaking about their history and memories with each other. With official history thus manipulated, individual testimonies and counter-narratives were crucial in offering alternatives of memory and forgetting in Eastern Europe during the Cold War. One alternative route was offered by the underground democratic opposition. Dissident writers and intellectuals constructed a “counter-memory” which often

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34 Hixson, Parting the Curtain, 8
“resided in finding blemishes in the official narrative of history or even in one’s own life.”

People did find these blemishes, and the West, especially represented by American cultural cold war warriors of all kinds, did their best to expose them.

As for the Soviet image of America, it was seen as efficient and technologically superior, but also as soulless, and as a source of contamination. Without the economic power of the USA, and without nuclear weapons, it was paramount for the Soviet authorities to establish and uphold their claim to cultural supremacy, to win the battle of hearts and minds, and hence spread the image of the USA as devoid of culture. During the Stalinist years, when the West was largely inaccessible to the East, the propaganda worked. The Director of the American Education and Cultural Relations department observed that among the Soviets “‘[o]ur culture is regarded as materialistic and frequently one will hear the comment, ‘We have the skill, the brains, and you have the money.’”

Compared to the Soviets, the Americans were "virgin[s] in the practice of international Kulturkampf,” writes Frances Stonor Saunders:

As early as 1945, one intelligence officer had predicted the unconventional tactics which were now being adopted by the Soviets: “The invention of the atomic bomb will cause a shift in the balance between ‘peaceful’ and ‘warlike’ methods of exerting international pressure,” he reported to the chief of the Office of Strategic Services, General Donovan. “And we must expect a very marked increase in the importance of ‘peaceful’ methods. Our enemies will be even freer than [ever] to propagandize, subvert, sabotage and exert…pressures upon us, and we ourselves shall be more willing to bear these affronts and ourselves to indulge in such methods – in our eagerness to avoid at all costs the tragedy of open war; ‘peaceful’ techniques will become more vital in times of pre-war softening up, actual overt war, and in times of post-war manipulation.38

Polish writer Czesław Miłosz described the effects of the propaganda also in Poland:

The official order is to evince the greatest horror of the West. Everything is evil there: trains are late, stores are empty, no one has money, people are poorly dressed, the highly praised technology is worthless. If you hear the name of a Western writer, painter, or composer, you must scoff sarcastically, for to fight against “cosmopolitanism” is one of the basic duties of a citizen.39

36 Svetlana Boym. The Future of Nostalgia. New York: Basic Books, 2001, 61. One of the most quoted examples of the institutionalized manipulation of memory is that of the retouched photograph from 1948 in which one fallen party leader was erased, while his fur hat still remained on the head of another communist leader, as a trace of history “that served as a perfect trigger for counter-memory, pointing at seams and erasures in the official history.”
38 Saunders, Who paid the piper, 17.
The Americans knew well the image fostered by the Communists, and they employed many of the methods they had learned from the Soviets to counteract it.

**The end of Stalinism**

When Stalin, “the fountainhead of all wisdom, knowledge and power,” who “symbolized permanence and changelessness himself” died on 6 March 1953, it threw the monolithic Communist world off kilter. Monolithism was, according to George Schöpflin, “the political reflection of the ideology of perfection and omniscience; it meant the denial of the possibility of error and political neutrality.” After the death of Stalin, there was fear among the Soviets of what would happen next. People understood that changes would have to take place, but instead of hope for reform and changes to the better, many feared unrest and conflict. The leading politicians, too, feared what would come to fill the vacuum after Stalin. The path they chose reflected this apprehension: Instead of an immediate program of reforms, the new leaders in the first couple of years chose to lay low and continue in the spirit of Stalin to prevent from “rocking the ship of state,” as Russian historian Elena Zubkova puts it.

That is, they would continue at least the outward appearance of his political course. In reality, this course meant that they would consciously proceed along the same hopelessly uncompromising paths. It was not accidental, then, that the leading positions came to be occupied by a group of people (Malenkov, Beria, Krushchev) committed in the long run to reforms, but in the short term to reassurance and inertia – to not rocking the ship of state.

It took three years for Nikita Krushchev to challenge both monolithism and inertia, when he denounced Stalin and his crimes at the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in February of 1956.

In the meantime several actions had been taken. The new Soviet leadership introduced the *New Course* which, in Schöpflin’s words, was “a mixture of tactical and strategic initiatives” that involved diminution of the Terror, the release of vast numbers of prisoners from Gulag, the hesitant ending of mass arbitrary action, though without any thought of abandoning arbitrariness as such.” The party leadership had to redefine itself, strengthen the power of the party in its “proper Leninist vanguard role of acting as the central powerhouse of the system.” The leaders had to find some measure of security, so they agreed that the top tier would be protected from terror. To ensure this they executed the foremost symbol of terror, chief of the secret police,

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Lavrentiy Beria. Krushchev also made an effort to reconcile with Tito, thereby implicitly acknowledging his form of national Communism which until then had been anathema. Another important step in the New Course was for the leadership to legitimize itself by gaining more popular support. This entailed a shift from the capital investments of heavy industry to more emphasis on agriculture and consumer goods. Opening up for something other than Stalin’s “relentless mobilization” signalled, albeit in a small way, that the system may open up for some level of debate. 41

By denouncing Stalin, because he “had offended his sense of justice and of the revolutionary promise,” Krushchev dealt “an irreparable blow to Soviet Cold War propaganda both in the world Communist movement and among the Soviet elites.”44 He also “made the most far-reaching attempt in Soviet history to dismantle the worst institutions of Stalinism and reform the conservative, entrenched bureaucracy.” 45 He was “genuinely interested in shifting investment from industry to agriculture, in decentralizing the economy and lessening social stratification”, and he also “tried to bridge the chasm between the leaders and the led in the Soviet population.” His reforms were, however, “largely superficial and never touched the fundamental social relations and power structure of the Soviet system.”46 But he tried, and reforms were certainly needed, because the illusion of the communist utopia was cracking up also in the population:

Everywhere it is said and written that we are prosperous and have everything, while in fact we have nothing. It is empty chatter....What has become of consumer goods? We have to stand in line all day. Are we under blockade? The truth is that abroad they have everything, and here at home we have only rubbish.47

Krushchev once described himself as “a child of two epochs. One man inside me understood something and the other shouted something completely different.”48 A wish to achieve a “peaceful coexistence” with the United States was one way in which his place in a new epoch eventually manifested itself. Another was to open up for some interpretation of communism, to allow for different (national) socialist paths. In both respects, Krushchev contributed to a weakening of the Soviet Communist system.

43 Ibid.
44 Zubok and Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin, 174
46 Suny. The Soviet Experiment, 419
47 Zubkova. Russia after the war, 162. “Comment written on a ballot in the 1955 ‘elections to the supreme soviets of the union republics and the localities’ (people used security provided by anonymity to voice their discontent).”
48 Zubok and Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin, 175
But the weakening, the “thaw,” had begun before Krushchev’s “secret speech,” even before Stalin’s death, as historians Zubok and Pleshakov argue:

When we speak of de-Stalinization, we usually have in mind the conspicuous changes in the political life of the society in the 1950s and 1960s. This idea is in part appropriate, but it diverts attention from the deeper political processes that formed the nature of the thaw. The thaw was not born suddenly and without antecedents. It developed quietly in its own, naturally although unexpectedly. The very term thaw expresses what people anticipated, their feelings rather than their rational prognoses. It was a very personal conception; and the public, accustomed to thinking exclusively in terms of social issues, suddenly began to discover a new value, the individual.49

Zubkova also emphasizes this point, that changes were in the making even before the death of Stalin:

A common interpretation of the USSR in the years between Stalin’s death and the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956 is that nothing much happened. Underneath the surface of relative stagnation, there was, however, an ongoing process of great change, particularly in the sense that people gradually dared to question official truths and to become more critical of them. In Ilya Ehrenburg’s words: “Critical thoughts just spilled out, stimulating the wish to find out about one thing, to examine another. The 1940s were gradually liberated from preconceived characterizations fastened on them from adolescence, and adolescents learned to judge cautiously.50

Despite the changes in attitude among some Soviets, the leaders in the Soviet Union were masters in ignoring individual freedom, integrity and dignity. Hence, Krushchev managed to keep his empire at home running as before. In the peoples’ democracies, however, the communist rulers struggled to uphold a system based on a personality-cult after Stalin. The charismatic leader had been the trump card of the Stalinist regimes, and any social or political movement during that time “was almost exclusively defined by loyalty to the leader, by the possession of political capital.”51 When Stalin was gone the national leaders were left with a bureaucratic, totalitarian structure and neo-Stalinist regimes that tried to hold on to power, even though some of their reasons no longer existed. This lack of legitimacy eventually resulted in uprisings in Poland and Hungary in 1956. 52

Meanwhile, in the United States, interest in Russian/Soviet Studies and, to a lesser degree, East European Studies skyrocketed in the immediate post-war years. According to

49 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
52 Kolosi and Szélényi. “Social research,” 145
Robert F. Byrnes, there was “relentless American interest in increasing knowledge and understanding of Russia and Eastern Europe” which originated in the pre- and interwar eras and resulted in strong, influential university departments for East European area studies that eventually made it possible to carry out academic exchanges with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union from the late 1950s on.53

American post-war interest in the study of the Soviet Union and the other state-socialist countries of Europe was not reciprocated by post-war Soviet Union or communist Europe. There had been a period of openness and “internationalism” in the 1920s and early 1930s. An acceptance of sharing international knowledge and expertise54 had offered opportunities for both technical professionals55 and Western academics to spend months working or studying in the Soviet Union.56 Lenin’s great admiration for Taylorism and Fordism led to the adoption and adaption of Western ideas on economics and rationalization, and this brought Americans with technical know-how to the Soviet Union in the 1920s. By the late 1930s and in the subsequent years, however, the Soviet Union entered a period we may call “isolationalism.” György Péteri argues that “a state socialist regime is characterized by isolationism when its dominant discourses, policies, and institutions are geared to minimize interaction with the outside world, especially with their systemic Other.” 57 This tendency culminated in the “offensive isolationism” of the Zhdanovshchina.

While keeping in mind that this thesis will be dealing with Eastern Europe rather than the Soviet Union, the political climate in the Soviet Union was crucial in how it affected the peoples’ democracies. In order to understand the mentality in the post-Stalinist period, the impact on Eastern Europe of Soviet “offensive isolationism” from 1947 to 1953 is worth considering. According to Péteri, this involved propagation of “Soviet patterns of institutionalizing and organizing cultural, social, and economic life, efforts based on and promoted by the assertion of the unquestionable superiority of Soviet Music, Soviet Literature, Soviet Architecture, Soviet Science, etc.”58 Many of the members of the intellectual elites of Eastern Europe who later became Ford Foundation fellows had thus been bombarded with assertions of Soviet superiority – coupled with “offensive isolationism” towards the West – for a significant part of their lives.

54 Péteri, “Nylon Curtain,” 118.
56 Byrnes. Exchanges, 15.
57 Péteri. “Nylon Curtain,” 119
58 Ibid., 120
With the death of Stalin and the end of the Zhdanovshchina, the isolationism was, according to Péteri, succeeded by “a partial revival of internationalism.” This “partial revival” contrasts the previous “isolationist” years, and may be called “integrationist,” meaning that the “dominant discourses, policies and institutions [of the state socialist regime] are geared to engaging in interaction with the outside world with a view to systemic expansion or/and to learning and catching up.” It was this integrationist stage that made exchanges with Eastern Europe possible.

59 Ibid., 118
60 Ibid., 120
Chapter 2. The role of the big Foundations

In the USA the cultural Cold War, in its many facets, was, according to one scholar, largely conceived and carried out within a “triangular relationship between the producers of ideas and ideologies, corporate America, and Washington policy makers.” One important link in this relationship was the large American philanthropic foundations. With their vast resources they played a role through their networks spanning from the academic world and the corporate world to the political world. One key actor among the foundations, alongside the Rockefeller foundation and the Carnegie Foundation, was the Ford Foundation.

Although most of the Ford Foundation’s funding was aimed at domestic projects and projects in developing countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin-America, the foundation established a European program in the mid-fifties. It was a comparatively small program, but it played an important role in the cultural Cold War, through its involvement with the Free University in Berlin and other institutions, Radio Free Europe, the America-Haüser, the Congress of Cultural Freedom (CCF), and periodicals that furthered the dissemination of American culture and the English language, such as and the magazine Perspectives USA. It also supported the nascent European Economic Community and East European and Soviet area studies at universities at home. When the Ford Foundation finally launched its own program of scholarly exchanges with Eastern Europe in 1957, it contributed to increased interaction between the intellectual elites of Eastern Europe and the West, and it exposed influential, or soon-to-be influential, scholars and leaders to Western (American, but also West European) culture.

61 Berghahn. America, xiv
62 The CCF was founded in June of 1950 by more than a hundred European and American writers and intellectuals “to resist the Kremlin's sustained assault on liberal democratic values. In the 1950s the Congress spread throughout the world, successfully creating magazines, organizing protests, establishing a network of affiliated national committees and fostering international contacts. The Congress continued into the 1960s, broadening its focus to lay the basis of an international community of liberal and democratic intellectuals. It was America's principal attempt to win over the world's intellectuals to the liberal democratic cause.” Peter Coleman. The liberal conspiracy: The Congress of Cultural Freedom and the struggle for the mind of postwar Europe. New York: The Free Press, and London: Collier Macmillan, 1989, xi.
64 Christopher Booker and Richard North. The great deception : a secret history of the European Union. London: Continuum, 2003, 43. The authors claim that the Ford Foundation, along with the Rockefeller Foundation and the CIA, contributed funds to the Action Committee on United Europe (ACUE) “…to promote the State Department's obsession with a united Europe…”
65 The Foundation also supported the Bilderberg conference in the late 1950s and early 1960s.
One of the original aims of the European Program of the Ford Foundation was gaining “assistance in exposing the nature of the Soviet system.” They thought that the best way to crack the surface of the official narrative about the “demonic” West was to expose people to the West, and ultimately to let them experience it first hand. The exchange programs did exactly that: in a time when the opportunity to travel abroad was close to non-existent in the peoples’ democracies, they tested the hypothesis that sympathy for the United States would follow if only the East Europeans were exposed to those “unique qualities” that many Americans believed their culture possessed.

The ruling elites of Eastern Europe felt they were lagging behind the West in many respects. The governments of Poland, Yugoslavia, and Hungary, who chose different paths to nationalizing their approach to communism, eventually welcomed exchange programs with America and West European countries. The opportunity to learn something about what the West was obviously doing right outweighed the risks of exposing their most influential and promising scholars and leaders to other, less desirable, Western ideas. Other governments, who remained more loyal to the Soviet doctrines, such as in East Germany and Czechoslovakia, were unwilling to compromise their position by risking such contamination.

With their exchange programs the Ford Foundation had the opportunity to immerse cream-of-the-crop Eastern Europeans in American culture. It was hoped and expressed that they would come as fellows, and then go back home to change things. Subtly, from the inside. The presumption was that former fellows, after having encountered America and Americans face-to-face, would be left with a favourable (or preferably awe-inspiring) impression of the USA which would shape the futures of their respective countries and contribute to a change in attitudes towards America and the West in general. According to Stephen R. Graubard, “support of foreign intellectuals expressed itself largely as a wish to instruct them in the unique qualities of American society and culture. It was taken for granted that sympathy for the United States would be created by such politics.” The ambition and expectation was that, ultimately, such a shift in


67 If people were not already influential, the Foundation and their associates hoped they would become influential, maybe “…by ricochet…” DCSS. FF-IA. Correspondence, 1957, D-P. Stone to W. Paul O’Neill, Jr. East-West Contacts Staff, Department of State, July 9, 1957. Quoting John Michael Montias, an economist and art historian, who worked as a consultant for the Foundation.

attitude and outlook may eventually contribute to the downfall of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{69}

The big American foundations have often been considered “neutral” and unpolitical, but they were in fact important political actors who moved in the same circles as the others in the “triangular relationship.” And the Ford Foundation was a key actor.

\textit{Former research on the Ford Foundation and (Eastern) Europe}

It was after the Second World War that the Ford Foundation emerged as the largest and most powerful of all American philanthropic organizations.\textsuperscript{70} It had started out in 1936 as a local actor closely affiliated with the Ford Motor Company in Michigan, but developed into an independent national and international force in the wake of the Second World War.\textsuperscript{71} Throughout the period of the Cold War, like today, domestic projects remained the main focus of the Ford Foundation, followed by projects in Asia, Latin-America and Africa. Compared to these, the projects in Eastern Europe represented only a very small part of the Foundation’s overall involvement. According to one estimate, the entire European program, East and West, represented about four percent of the Foundation’s total spending during this period, a total of $235 million.\textsuperscript{72} Of this, about $5 million dollars were spent on exchange programs with select East European countries.\textsuperscript{73}

American philanthropy had traditionally furthered the cause of mankind through medical research and action, educational reforms, and the prevention and treatment of poverty and disease. From the late 19th century it developed from, mainly Christian, charity organizations into a conglomerate of small and large philanthropies of all kinds. Out of this development grew the large, “general purpose”\textsuperscript{74} foundations, of which Ford was the largest.

In the postwar years, when the USA had embarked on what was seen by them as a mission of securing peace, containing communism and contributing to the development and education of lesser developed areas, the general purpose foundations were confronted with new challenges and difficult decisions to make. Although philanthropy never was as “neutral” or

\textsuperscript{69} This view permeates the archive records of the Ford Foundation.
\textsuperscript{70} In 1951 it became the wealthiest philanthropic foundation in the world. Lawrence J. Friedman and Mark D. McGarvie. \textit{Charity, philanthropy, and civility in American history}. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003., 319.
\textsuperscript{71} Berghahn, \textit{America}, 143.
\textsuperscript{72} Francis X. Sutton. “Ambitions and Ambivalences,” 57.
“unpolitical” as the general notion had it, the Cold War political climate undoubtedly influenced Ford Foundation policy.

Publications on the Ford Foundation reflect the fact that the European program had, “a rather modest, but not insignificant place in the totality of Ford’s expenditures in its 1950-1980 years.” Books and articles on the Foundation’s domestic programs, as well as on overseas programs in Asia, Africa, and Latin America are abundant, but little has been written about Ford’s involvement in Europe. Richard Magat’s *The Ford Foundation at Work: Philanthropic Choices, Methods, and Styles*, mentions the European program, but only in passing, while the only comprehensive history written about the Ford Foundation, Dwight Macdonald’s *The Ford Foundation: The Men and the Millions* was published before a European program was even established. Nevertheless, it does offer an interesting view of the years leading up to the establishment of the program. There is also a publication by the Ford Foundation called *The Ford Foundation in the 1960s*, but activities in Eastern Europe are almost left out completely.

According to Volker Berghahn,

Work on philanthropy, at least in the United States, is almost a genre in itself, with its own research centers and professional caucuses. Much of this work focuses on philanthropy inside the United States, whereas the European-American relationship continues to be studied at the level of public and official policy making. Only recently [he wrote in 2000] have some scholars connected U.S. foreign policy with the activities of the big private foundations and the millions of dollars they spent on international programs.

Berghahn’s book, *America and the Cultural Cold Wars in Europe: Shepard Stone between philanthropy, academy, and diplomacy*, is the single most important account on the context and background of the relationship between Europeans and the Ford Foundation. Shepard Stone was crucial in establishing and implementing the exchange programs with Eastern Europe, and he is also the central person in my dissertation. By addressing the period and the subject of Foundation involvement in the cultural Cold War through the life and work of Shepard Stone, Berghahn unites elements and issues that have usually been dealt with separately, and argues that

The life and career of Shepard Stone provide us with a sharply focused lens on a world of people, ideas, policies, and institutions that are central to an understanding of Western history during the Cold War. It is a world of Ivy League academics and East Coast

Berghahn uses, as he himself states, “Stone’s career as a window to the world in which he operated” and believes that Stone “embodied and mirrored the larger cultural, political, and socioeconomic trends, shifts, and generational conflicts in Europe and America.” His portrait of Stone gives us a good example of a type of person who was influential in the American world of diplomacy and philanthropy during the Cold War. Stone was a socialite and a networker of proportions, whose tentacles reached in many different directions of public and private enterprises, and whose ambitions for Europe, by way of disseminating American culture and ideas, led him to work incessantly to establish and maintain a European Program – both East and West. Only a small part of Berghahn’s book is devoted to the East European exchange programs. Still, his combination of biography with the history of the Ford Foundation and its role in the Cultural Cold War is very useful.

The role of the large American foundations as a transnational actor during the Cold War has been explored from different angles by scholars such as Waldemar Nielsen, Francis X. Sutton, Robert Arnowe, Peter D. Bell, Edward H. Berman, Peter Coleman, Yale Richmond, Frances Stonor Saunders, Oliver Schmidt, and, more recently by Olivier Zunz and Inderjeet Parmar. These authors provide us with various interpretations of the Ford Foundation’s role during the Cold War, but its role in (Eastern) Europe is often left out or only mentioned in passing.

79 Ibid., xiv.
80 Ibid., xii.
One scholar who has concentrated on the Ford Foundation’s involvement in Europe is Giuliana Gemelli.82 She argues that “The Ford Foundation did not operate through transplant but mainly as a translator.”83 Challenging a tendency to regard Foundation programs abroad as manifestations of “Americanization,” Gemelli argues for a more “interactionist” approach, one that “sees the policies of the Ford Foundation as a ‘prism.’” This prism reveals various levels of analysis, by which one is able to “question the limits of concentrating exclusively on the notion of Americanization when the forms of cultural transfer are considered.”84 Rather than wanting to “Americanize” the areas that they got involved in, or to strive for a mere imitation of American ways, Gemelli argues that the people at the Foundation aimed at strengthening certain American patterns and to internationalize scholarship and education. In the case of Ford Foundation involvement in Eastern Europe during the Cold War, such an approach is useful. It helps analyze and nuance a Foundation which is too often seen as the mere extension of the U.S. Government, Corporate America, or both. That said, the foundation was seen as a representative of American ideas and way of life by people both at home and abroad. In Peter D. Bell’s words:

Even when the Ford Foundation is viewed as an instrument genuinely advancing human welfare, its officers tend cautiously to hope that kindlier views of America result. Francis X. Sutton, deputy vice-president of the International Division, for example, “retains confidence that successful and competent people will have a trusting view of this country and be understanding and forthcoming partners in new ventures.”85

Even if the object, or result, of Foundation programs was not imitation, but adaptation, and even if “Americanization” is not sufficient to explain what happened, it is a fact that the Ford Foundation leaders, trustees, and officers were products of their own environment and their own times, and that a drive to “Americanize” was a strong motive in their activities. This should be kept in mind, but so should the fact that their East European counterparts were knowledgeable agents with their own will and agendas, tempered by their experiences, and not simply passive objects of ”Americanization.”

Until the Cold War the “neutrality” and good intentions of foundations generally went unchallenged. Waldemar A. Nielsen, former Ford officer, wrote his book The Big Foundations primarily in order to “produce some plain honest talk about foundations and their problems.”86

84 Ibid.
He wrote the book at a point in time when the big foundations had, in the preceding years, been under heavier attack than usual from several fronts in American society (revelations about involvement in the CIA funded Congress for Cultural Freedom, scrutinizing new tax policies, etc.87), and some of Nielsen’s difficulties in gathering sound, accurate information may be indicative of the pressed situation of the foundations at that particular time.

Francis X. Sutton’s article “The Ford Foundation and Europe: Ambitions and Ambivalences,” gives an empirical, chronological account of the Ford Foundation and its involvement with Europe from 1950 to 1980. Sutton, also a former Ford Foundation officer, provides a comprehensive account of the Ford Foundation’s European program during the Cold War. He also shows how the Cold War put foundations to the test as to what their domain ought or ought not to be.88

A useful book on Cold War exchanges in general is Robert F. Byrnes’ book, Soviet-American Academic Exchanges, 1958-1975. The book provides a valuable introduction to the theme of academic exchanges during the Cold War. It deals specifically with the government-run exchanges between the Soviet Union and the USA – which were partially funded by the Ford Foundation – and devotes a chapter to the differences between Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, and how these affected the various exchange programs. Byrnes describes how American exchangees experienced their stay in Eastern Europe, especially the Soviet Union, but does not mention the experiences of East Europeans who visited the USA.

Peter D. Bell, in his article “The Ford Foundation as a Transnational Actor” (written in 1971 between jobs at the Ford Foundation), challenges the once common notion of foundations (“private, nonprofit organizations that make grants for public purposes”89) as “nonpolitical, professional, and bland,”90 He contends that foundations – with the Ford Foundation as his example – are significant transnational actors “not only because of the direct outcome of their grants, but also because of their direct and indirect influence on other actors in world politics.”91 He challenges what he calls the “mythology of foundations,” meaning “that their motives should not be impugned nor their operations questioned,” and quotes a Foundation trustee, who “described foundations as encompassed by ‘such an aura of respectable honour that the layman does not know what goes on within the arcanum’.”92 Bell also challenges the Ford Foundation

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87 This will be dealt with in Chapter 9.
88 Sutton, “Ambitions and Ambivalences.”
89 Bell, “The Ford Foundation as a Transnational Actor,” 465.
90 Ibid.
91 Ibid., 466.
92 Ibid., 467.
claim of being “nonpolitical” by showing how the aims and priorities of the foundation indeed reflect certain political beliefs and considerations. He also touches upon the Foundation’s “Americanism,” that the rest of the world sees the foundation as a representative of American ideas and way of life. Bell concludes his article with the following claim:

Foundations inform and evaluate governmental policies, serve as resource bases for ideas and talent, and even legitimate or undermine governmental programs and actions by supporting them or failing to do so. Foundations also influence, if only by assisting, other transnational and national actors which, in turn affect domestic and world politics. In short, consideration of foundations as transnational actors does not impair our view of the importance of government. Instead, it gives us a richer picture of the complexity of world politics.  

Oliver Schmidt is another author who has studied the role of the large foundations as transnational actor, claiming that “American foundations contributed to a division of labour between public branches of government and private agencies, often taking on projects that may have been compromised by ‘official’ government support.” He emphasizes the role of foundations as “cooperators,” serving as a “bridge between guests and hosts at home, foreign publics and foreign leaders.” They were also “critical catalysts,” inviting members of the European elites in order to persuade them that “the United States had nothing to hide and much to offer, as well as offering hospitality to foreigners.” Schmidt contends that foundations played a “prominent role,” and that their activities and image abroad “strengthened the impression that the US was a civilian power after all.”

The scholars mentioned above have all dealt with various areas related to my research, but mostly with issues pertaining to Western Europe. Much of what their work reveals has been of importance to my work, both as a framework for understanding the Foundation’s activities in Europe, but also because their experience and knowledge in the field enable them to ask important questions and to identify interesting problems yet to be explored.

93 Ibid., 478.
Critical approaches to Foundations

The discourse about foundations is extensive and complex. As mentioned, foundations have generally been either idealized as being politically neutral and all benefaction, or as the mere tools of the elitist elements of government and hence an obstacle to socially progressive development. The various versions are all true on different levels.

It is tempting to believe in the sincerity and good intentions of an institution whose expressed aim it is “to advance human welfare,” but critics of the role of foundations have pointed out that their “cultural offensive” during the Cold War was “designed to supplement the policy of military containment,” and not an expression of philanthropy. Thus, although philanthropic institutions have generally been perceived as good, bland, and impartial, they have also been the object of critical scrutiny. Social scientists with a leftist bent have challenged the notion of philanthropic foundations as altruistic and “pure” in their motives, and claim that they do more to sustain the status quo which they and their numbers benefit from than they contribute to the betterment of society. Influenced by Antonio Gramsci’s ideas on hegemony, they claim that the Ford Foundation and the other large foundations consistently contribute to producing, reproducing and projecting the international hegemonic power of the USA. By supporting the interests of American policy makers in a joint effort to maintain a political, economic, social, and cultural status quo both at home and abroad, they claim that the foundations uphold and mirror the elitist conceptions of the American political, academic, and financial elite:

A central thesis is that foundations like Carnegie, Rockefeller, and Ford have a corrosive influence on a democratic society; they represent relatively unregulated and unaccountable concentrations of power and wealth which buy talent, promote causes, and, in effect, establish an agenda of what merits society’s attention…. They help maintain an economic and political order, international in scope, which benefits the ruling-class interests of philanthropists and philanthropoids.

Edward H. Berman’s book *The Influence of the Carnegie, Ford, and Rockefeller Foundations on American Foreign Policy: The Ideology of Philanthropy* from 1983, has been influential in shaping such opinions. He argues that the great foundations Carnegie, Rockefeller, and Ford were part of an

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almost symbiotic relationship linking the decision-makers in government agencies, corporate boardrooms, and foundation offices. Their similar backgrounds, common outlook, and shared perspectives on the United States’ role in the world helped to insure a broad consensus on the directions to be followed. The foundations’ major direct contribution to the evolving Cold War strategy was a sophisticated cultural offensive, designed to supplement the policy of military containment. 99

He further contends that the close ties between philanthropy, government and corporations originated in the early decades of the 20th century when the great foundations established their agenda to further the interests of mankind, and that the various programs of the American philanthropic foundations “were designed to further the foreign policy interests of the United States.”100

Berman claims that in ways that are not as easily detectable as political and economic programs often are, the foundations managed to maintain a reciprocal relationship with the U.S. State Department in which both had their needs met. The strength of the foundations was their involvement in the cultural life of America, especially in the sphere of education. By the time of the Cold War, many American universities – some founded by philanthropists – had already been sponsored by the large foundations for decades.101 Consequently, the world view of foundation leaders had been imprinted on the profiles and objectives of these universities, and they, in turn, educated the future leaders of the foundations as well as for corporations and government office. Berman sees the educational and cultural ambitions of the foundations abroad as complementary to the official foreign aid program of the USA and argues that

The foundations’ location in the capitalist state leads them to support educational institutions–particularly universities–at home and abroad to train individuals who not only share their perspectives, but who will use their influence to “sell” it to others who are less convinced of its merits…. Foundation programs were designed, in short, to train reform leaders.102

In Berman’s opinion the large foundations sustain the world capitalist system, but he admits that this is hard to document because this is not done overtly. He seems to doubt that foundations even have agendas of their own, in claiming that they for years “have perfected methods whereby their educational and cultural programs would complement the cruder and more overt forms of economic and military imperialism that are so easily identifiable.”103 He is

99 Berman, Influence, 7
100 Ibid., 3
101 Zunz. Philanthropy in America, 23. One aim of the foundations, especially Rockefeller and Carnegie, was “to keep religion and science distinct and separate.”
102 Berman, Influence, 13-14
103 Ibid., 3

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also critical of the apparent contradiction between the foundations’ “public adherence to
democratic principles and their support of a carefully selected and nurtured elite to implement
their programs at home and abroad,” and points out that “both the trustees and the foundation
staffs are recruited from backgrounds that can hardly be considered representative of the
population at large.” 104

Foundation representatives never claimed to be representatives of general society, they
were not politicians, after all, but Berman criticizes the members of this elite for thinking they
were well suited to disseminate their world view, and that, in their opinion, the majority of any
society would benefit from such a top-down approach. He also criticizes that the foundations
extended their support to certain educational institutions abroad based on their model of
educational programs at home. Allegedly, they did so with the same objectives on a global basis
as in the United States: to disseminate their ideas of progress and cultural growth via a loyal elite
at home and abroad. Berman argues that the “support for elites in the foundations’ overseas
programs can only be understood as part of an analysis of their support for domestic elites,
particularly since the overseas programs were merely adaptions of earlier efforts at home.”105

The various large foundations, in order to ensure that their efforts would be complementary
rather than competitive, coordinated their efforts so that each concentrated on those institutional
areas where they felt capable of making the greatest contribution. Hence, the Carnegie
Corporation concentrated on teacher education and the strengthening of libraries, the Rockefeller
Foundation on the social, natural, and biomedical sciences, and the Ford Foundation on the
social sciences and public administration. Berman contends that foundation officials hoped that
the university departments and programs that they supported would provide an evolving
indigenous leadership cadre with perspectives on development similar to their own.106

International foundation fellowship programs allowed a limited number of students and scholars
from other continents to spend time at those universities already supported by the foundations,
and hence the world view of the foundations (and the US state department) was hoped furthered
and fixed in those who participated.

Berman particularly cautions us about the deceptive nature of the foundations’
cooperation with many so-called independent institutions in the administration of the
programs.107 Cooperating with these “independent” institutions, Berman claims, boosts the

104 Ibid., 5-6
105 Ibid., 6
106 Ibid., 8
107 The East European programs of the Ford Foundation was administered by one of these: The Institute for
International Education (IIE).
credibility of foundations as independent organs, too, and by funding the initiators of ideas and policies, and shaping them in their own image, the foundations have been “in positions to foster certain lines of inquiry while neglecting or de-emphasizing others.”

**Berman’s “theory of elitism”**

Foundation support for the theory of democratic elitism, which ostensibly would enable all classes of citizens to rise to positions of influence and responsibility, played a central role in the foundations’ emerging hegemony. It appeared to epitomize the democratic ethos: talent and merit would be rewarded wherever they were identified. Achievers from nonprivileged backgrounds would be encouraged, nurtured and, and inducted into the decision-making stratum of the democratic state. The theory of democratic elitism gave the appearance of non-partisanship, of neutrality, indeed of concern only for identifying talent that might serve the interests of the republic, regardless of its origins. The theory appeared to be commonsensical.

This is an accurate description of what the Ford Foundation wanted with their exchange programs in Eastern Europe. Whether that was good or bad, however, depends on the perspective. For Berman this “commonsensical” theory of the liberal foundations meant that people were led astray, and that it prevented or delayed a change in the underlying class structure, or the incentive to question hegemonic power institutions. In other words: it only contributed to maintaining the elitist status quo.

He also rightly points out that the leading men of the foundations were the liberals of their time, men from similar backgrounds and with a similar outlook on life. The meaning of the term *liberal* at the height of the Cold War is worth discussing. According to Christopher Lasch “the Communist issue overrode conventional distinctions between Left and Right….In the early fifties, this uneasy alliance worked because the liberals generally took positions that conceded a good deal of ground to the Right, if they were not indistinguishable from those of the Right.” “Official liberalism,” according to Lasch, had “taken over essential features of the rightist world view” in the early fifties, and it “belatedly dissociated itself from the cruder and blatantly reactionary type of anticommunism, and pursued the same anticommmunist policies in the name of anti-imperialism and progressive change.”

Walter Hixson similarly argues that “While

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108 Berman, *Influence*, 13
109 Ibid., 27
various officials, Republican and Democratic, may have varied in the means they would employ, they agreed on the end in view.”

Olivier Zunz provides us with yet another definition:

Liberals spoke often in contradictory voices. Too dissimilar to be a cohesive “power elite” in the C. Wright Mills’s sense, they constituted rather an early incarnation of the best and the brightest and were among the first navigators of the institutional matrix. They were graduates of an expanding network of educational institutions and were drawn to the connection among science, management, and policy. They believed simultaneously in the experts’ ability to generate wealth, in the need for social engineering, and in the possibilities of individual improvement. [...] They worked in politics, government, business, science, the professions, higher education, philanthropy, journalism, social work, or moved among several of these fields. They possessed a self-assurance that today’s experts have largely lost, and they articulated the ideals and practices we associate with the “American century.”

In Berman’s conception, “the liberals of their time” believed in the independence of Third World nations, but thought that American-style democracy was the only way to go – especially if socialism was the alternative. They also sought to protect the American economy, and hence it was important to secure good relations with the young states of Africa, Asia, and Latin-America. (Berman here deals with foundation involvement in the developing world, but I think his arguments are also applicable to Eastern Europe.)

Although criticized for letting his “Marxist framework” shape the presentation of his data, many of Berman’s arguments are convincing. From what I know about the objectives for the programs in Eastern Europe, there is little doubt that the Ford Foundation indeed aimed at creating a scientific, cultural, and administrative elite that would be sympathetic to the world view of the foundations as well as of the United States and the West in general.

Given that much of the material to be found in the Ford Foundation archives belongs in the category “self congratulatory output of foundations themselves,” scholars like Berman, Christopher Lasch, Robert Arnove and, more recently, Interjeet Parmar and Olivier Zunz, who have argued that foundations “help maintain an economic and political order, international in scope, which benefits the ruling-class interests of philanthropists and philanthropoids,” provide valuable perspectives. Still, they all use “ex post facto historical analysis,” which Joseph Galaskiewicz defines as “presenting historical data and then overlaying a global interpretation onto events.” He cautions scholars “who impute class-based motives to foundation staff based on

111 Hixson, Parting the curtain, 14.
114 Nielsen, Big Foundations, 1
policy outcomes.” Like Galaskiewicz, I am sceptical of that type of analysis. Keeping it in mind, aware of my own biases and position of hindsight, I have tried to limit it in this dissertation. Rather, I have followed his suggestion for an alternative way of analyzing motives. By researching “goal statements and quotations from foundation trustees and staff members,” I feel more confident “that foundations were motivated by this or that motive.” 115

Chapter 3. The beginnings of the Ford Foundation’s involvement in Eastern Europe in the 1950s and 1960s

American philanthropic foundations played an important role in the cultural Cold War effort. In the interwar years some ventures, such as between the Rockefeller Foundation and Eastern Europe, had been very successful, especially in public health.116 In the early post-war era it was difficult to get involved in Eastern Europe because of the Zhdanovschina, but by the mid-fifties the networks established before the war were renewed and the work resumed by the Rockefeller Foundation and others who had previously been involved. The Ford Foundation was a new actor in international affairs, but it soon joined in the philanthropic effort “to recruit and train a new generation of leaders for the democratic rehabilitation of a devastated continent.”117

In the mid 1950s the Ford Foundation decided to carry out exchange programs with Eastern Europe. With varying degrees of success, the Foundation proceeded to run three such programs: one with Poland, one with Yugoslavia, and one with Hungary. How did it come about that an American Foundation, one that had started out as a local actor closely affiliated with the Ford Motor Company in Michigan – as great a symbol of Western Capitalism as there ever was – succeeded in carrying out exchanges with some of Europe’s Soviet satellites in a time when the tensions of the Cold War were still as strong as they were in the 1950s and ‘60s?

The Ford Foundation was able to launch exchange programs because, on the one hand, leading American politicians, educators, and administrators saw exchanges as one of the best ways to make a difference in the cultural Cold War. On the other hand, politicians, educators, and administrators in some of the peoples’ democracies saw exchange programs as an opportunity to learn something about how the United States stayed technologically and economically ahead of them. Taking the initiative, the authorities in Poland, Yugoslavia and Hungary asked the Ford Foundation to include them in their programs and let many of their best scholars and experts travel to the West because it was seen as an opportunity to promote their wish to catch up.

The origins of the exchanges can be traced back to the early postwar years, when the Foundation developed into an independent national and international force. By the end of 1950, the Ford Foundation’s assets were close to $500 million dollars, with liquid assets of about $70

million, and the Foundation was involved in large scale domestic programs as well as in international issues. It had thus come far from its modest beginnings in Detroit in 1936, when Henry Ford and his son, Edsel, founded the Ford Foundation with a $25,000 initial gift from Edsel. When the foundation was set up in Detroit as a philanthropy for local institutions, the founding charter stated that the funds of the Foundation be used “for scientific, educational and charitable purposes, all for the public welfare.”

After the death of both Edsel, in 1943, and Henry Ford in 1947, their bequests contributed to the Foundation’s growth, and assets continued to grow quickly because of a favourable stock market and tremendous growth in the automobile industry. The question of how the Foundation should spend its money became more pressing, and in 1948, Henry Ford II, Edsel Ford’s son, who was then President of the Ford Foundation, appointed a study committee to deal with the new situation.118 Rowan Gaither, a lawyer and former President of the Rand Corporation, was put in charge, and in 1949 the committee presented a report that would serve as a basis for the future development of the Foundation, and which has been called “a blueprint for Cold War philanthropy”.119 The Report of the Study for the Ford Foundation on Policy and Program, often called simply The Gaither Report, began by stating that “The aim of The Ford Foundation is to advance human welfare,” of which the basic elements were “human dignity,” “personal freedom and rights,” “political freedom and rights,” and “social responsibility and the duty of service.”120

What was new about the Gaither report, compared to earlier reports by philanthropic organizations, was the political implications, the assertion that a foundation could play a part in reaching democratic goals on a global scale. The democratic goals were based on liberal American cultural, economic, and political ideals, and after the devastation of Western Europe during the war, the United States was perceived as the only country who could uphold, strengthen and spread these ideals (and also “fundamental scientific knowledge”), in American society as well as globally.121 The Gaither report also recommended that the foundation operate under the “general guidance of the trustees,” and that the president and staff officers be given “a

118 Berghahn. *America*, 143
high degree of discretion and the flexibility to respond to unforeseen issues and new opportunities.” 122

To cover all the main areas of involvement deemed most purposeful for the Ford Foundation, the Gaither report outlined “Five program areas for the advancement of human welfare”:

I. The establishment of peace
II. The strengthening of democracy
III. The strengthening of the economy,
IV. Education in a democratic society
V. Individual behaviour and human relations

Of these, only Area I was related to international affairs, and the East European exchange programs were eventually created under its umbrella. The other areas were for domestic purposes, and indeed the Foundation continued to spend most of its budget on domestic projects. However, changes were in the making, and the fact that Henry Ford II appointed Paul G. Hoffman as President of the Foundation in 1950 went to prove that the Foundation was moving in a more international direction. 123

*Why Europe? And how?*

Paul Hoffman came to the Foundation during a time when the primary tasks were organization and planning. 124 As coordinator of the Marshall Plan in Europe, Hoffman was “a man of enormous prestige,” and “a world hero” at the time of the Marshall Plan era. 125 According to Waldemar Nielsen, a former Ford Foundation officer, the Hoffman period represented “a sort of glowing phase when...he brought in a new group and everything looked springtime and daisies,”126 but there were also problems. His “political concerns” often took precedence over the Foundation, and the Foundation leadership was a “total snarl internally” because of a

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123 Volker R. Berghahn. America, 144.
126 FFA. Interview with Nielsen, 20
“deplorable clash of egos.” George Kennan has claimed that Hoffman “had an idea that with this amount of money you ought to be able to buy world peace. He was persuaded that there was nothing, including world peace, which several hundred millions of dollars couldn’t buy if they were properly spent.” He would eventually scale his expectations down a little, but he did get the Foundation’s involvement in the international area started. At the end of 1951, he had come to the conclusion that the year’s experiences had confirmed that

there is a unique and increasingly important place for private philanthropy in advancing the welfare of mankind. The flexibility and independence of the private foundation often enable it to undertake tasks that cannot be performed as promptly, as well, or at all by a governmental agency.

The needs of the world are vast; the Ford Foundation cannot meet many of them. The problems of the world seem insoluble; certainly the Ford Foundation cannot solve many of them. But by patience, persistence, and humility the Foundation may in the course of time be of some use to humanity.

One area in which the Foundation could do something was in the cultural sphere, and this was recognized in the 1951 annual report:

\[\text{The [Ford Foundation] officers regard the exchange of ideas, and possibly also of artistic and literary productions, as one of the most promising methods of fostering the development of World understanding and a sense of the moral and cultural community among the peoples of the world.}\]

For Hoffman, the most important tasks for the Foundation in international matters was the strengthening of the United Nations, disarmament, international exchanges – anything that could reduce the chances of war and of tension resulting from poverty and frustration. This corresponded to the Foundation objective, stated in the Gaither report, of the establishment of peace. The Overseas Development program was established to deal primarily with the Middle East and Asia beyond, while Europe received funding to solve acute problems in a time of postwar trauma and reconstruction. A European program as such, however, would not become a reality until 1956; there was disagreement within the Foundation both concerning a basic

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127 Ibid., 4 and 7.
strategy for promoting international peace, and whether or not the Foundation really ought to have a European program at all because of the political implications.

There was an ongoing debate among trustees and the various levels of leadership as to where the line between the domain of foundations and government ought to be drawn, and this was particularly difficult to assess in issues aimed to promote international peace. To try and deal with the vagueness surrounding these issues Hoffman launched the project “Conditions of Peace” and in 1952 hired Shepard Stone and John J. McCloy, former High Commissioner of Germany, as consultants.131

Stone and McCloy were both men of action, with a passionate interest in international relations, who considered conditions in Europe of great importance to maintaining international peace and order. In the annual report of 1951 a plan is mentioned of setting up a project to “try to reduce tensions arising from ignorance and want and misunderstanding,” and “to increase maturity of judgement and stability of purpose in the United States and abroad.” In a paper outlining the project there are two areas of emphasis, of which the first was to build better relations between the USA and the Soviet Union: “That we can live in the same world with the Russians without going to war with them despite profound and continuing differences of philosophy and interest.” The other emphasis was of domestic concern: to create a “healthier atmosphere created only by way of awareness and understanding” to counteract “the climate of opinion that now prevails in the United States [which is] too tense and emotional, too close to that of a religious war.”132 The report concluded that the

real objective would be to help establish a kind and degree of public understanding which would serve as the basis for wise planning and skillful operation by the U.S. government in its continuing effort to move through the current problems toward the goal of peace with freedom and justice.133

The Ford Foundation thus planned to embark on projects that would contribute to a change in both domestic and foreign policy, as well as a general shift in attitudes – both among Americans and Europeans.

Where the European program was concerned, it seems that Stone and his colleagues did not treat Eastern and Western Europe as completely separate entities; Europe – both East and West – were in need of enlightenment, at least where European images of the USA and American culture were concerned.

131 Stone and McCloy will be properly introduced later in the chapter.
132 Berghahn, America, 145-146.
133 Ibid., 147
Despite certain problems during the Hoffman presidency, a few important measures were taken to make the Foundation better suited to deal with international issues, and Europe in particular. The Conditions of Peace Project was one such measure that led to increased interest in Europe, and the fact that it brought Stone and McCloy to the Foundation proved most useful in this respect.

Hoffman’s choice of consultants became a turning point in the development of a Foundation policy for Europe. John J. (Jack) McCloy (1895-1989) had, before he became High Commissioner for Germany, been a Wall Street lawyer, served as Assistant Secretary of War under Henry Stimson from 1941 to 1945, and been president of the World Bank. After returning from Germany (he was High Commissioner from September 1949 to August 1952) he became a trusted advisor for Dwight Eisenhower, and his “dazzling array of activities continued under successive presidents, in the international business world [...] and in the constellation of non-profit organizations that had him be called the Chairman of the American Establishment.” In a way McCloy embodied the American Dream. From a poor background in Philadelphia, he lost his father at five and his mother was a hairdresser. Later he said he grew up on the “wrong side of the tracks,” and described himself as an outsider in the high circles he moved in as an adult.

McCloy played an important role in the Ford Foundation’s involvement in Europe. As Chairman of the Ford Foundation Board of Trustees for many years (1958-1965), he had considerable power. Shepard Stone got to know McCloy when he worked for him during his time as High Commissioner of Germany, a job he got because of his German experience.

Shepard (Shep) Stone (1908-1990) had grown up in New England in a Jewish family of modest means. He attended the prestigious Dartmouth College, and after graduating in 1929, travelled to Germany for graduate school. He finished his thesis in 1932 and returned to the United States with his German wife in 1933 to pursue a journalistic career in the New York Times.


Stone, too, refers to how people misinterpreted his friend Rovere, and quotes him as having said: "I wrote that tongue in cheek," but that it was "partly serious." Oral history interview, 34. That being said, McCloy was powerful with powerful friends, such as Dean Acheson, Charles E. Bohlen, W. Averell Harriman, George F. Kennan, and Robert A. Lovett. See Walter Isaacson and Evan Thomas. The wise men: Six friends and the world they made. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1988.

Times. He admired what he had seen of German and European art and culture, and abhorred the political development he had witnessed during his time in Europe. During the war he joined the armed forces for intelligence work in Europe and North Africa, and before being employed by McCloy, he had taken part in post-war reconstructive information work in Germany. Both McCloy and Stone were energetic, self-confident and “eager for close acquaintance with political and other leaders,” and Stone was was looked upon as McCloy’s “ally and protege.” McCloy and Stone set out to change the course of affairs by being in continuous contact, directly or indirectly, with political leaders and other decision makers whom they thought could make a difference.

**The Conditions of Peace Project**

The Conditions of Peace Project involved interviewing influential people across the United States in order to map out their knowledge about the world and world tensions, and also to find out how these people regarded their own contribution in attaining and maintaining peace. Stone and McCloy spent the fall of 1952 travelling together for this purpose. In December 1952 McCloy expressed his conviction that the Ford Foundation could achieve great things, not only in America, but in improving the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. He wrote to Hoffman and associate director Milton Katz that the Ford Foundation could act as “chief stimulant” in rethinking the Soviet-American relationship.

In January of 1953, McCloy and Stone wrote a memo on their thoughts after having carried out their survey, and they concluded that they were

> [...] now fully convinced that the Ford Foundation can make an important contribution in the field of peace. Many men in leading positions in government, at the universities, in business and professional life, have told us of their deep interest and support for action we may take in the peace area. They have been encouraged by the idea that the Ford Foundation has shown the vision to undertake this work. It is now our conviction that we have passed the...

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136 See Volker R. Berghahn. America, for a full account of Shepard Stone’s biography.
138 See Berghahn for more details on this.
140 Berghahn, America, 151
point of investigating the need for a fund for peace. The need is apparent, something can and should be done about it, the fund should be established.¹⁴¹

McCloy and Stone wrote that they could not immediately act on their plans: they were waiting for the necessary organization to be set up at the Foundation, and also for the new Eisenhower administration to “outline its world policies, policies which will have important implications for all work in the peace area.” They had, however, “certain broad aspects of the peace problem” ready for the trustees of the Foundation to consider. One was that “a precondition of peace with the Soviet Union is unity among the free peoples.” Although they thought that the new Eisenhower administration was “likely to try to bring the free nations together,” they also thought that the task would be “enormous and parts of the task will be difficult for government to undertake,” and that this situation opened up “a large opportunity” for the Ford Foundation:

We are not thinking of political devices, but rather of actions that will bring peoples together in understanding and support for common goals. Unless important developments take place to reverse present trends there will be little room for developing conditions of peace. Rather capitulation of the free nations or war will be more likely. For these reasons it appears to us that the fund for peace will have to operate in a broad area. The area covers problems of coexistence with Russia, study and activities to support the political, military, economic, ideological and cultural combination of the non-communist nations, the identification of national interests and their submersion in the common interest, disarmaments etc.¹⁴²

McCloy and Stone proceeded to suggest the organization of the division, or fund, with 1) an advisory board, 2) staff, and 3) international consultants or board. McCloy was suggested as chairman of the advisory board, Stone as director of staff, and the consultants were suggested as: “Sir Oliver Franks,¹⁴³ Frenchman, German, East European or Russian Exile, Indian.”¹⁴⁴

One of the prospective projects up for discussion was “coexistence with Soviet Russia,” where the main aims were to “try to identify the major problems of coexistence with Russia,” and to “seek to determine what the general terms of a settlement would be to make coexistence possible without the likelihood of war.” In this, socialists in Western Europe played “an equivocal role.” The strength of the socialist parties in France, Britain and Germany was recognized, and the fear was that their “activities or lack of activity can have serious effect in

¹⁴² Ibid.
¹⁴³ Oliver Franks was an English civil servant and philosopher who has been described as ‘one of the founders of the post-war world’. Franks was involved in Britain's recovery after the Second World War. Knighted in 1946, he was the British Ambassador to the United States of America from 1948 to 1952, during which time he strengthened the relationship between the two countries. “Oliver Franks, Baron Franks,” Wikipedia, accessed 21 December 2017, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oliver_Franks,_Baron_Franks.
weakening the free peoples in trying to establish a situation of honourable coexistence with the Russians.” One way to prevent that would be to bring together “advanced Socialist thinkers from these countries, men who have prestige within their own parties, to study the problem of coexistence and to propose solutions.”

Preparing for a European Program

An important aspect of the Conditions of Peace project was to build networks of people in the political, corporate, and academic worlds. Stone and McCloy were very good at networking and many of the experts they established a relationship with at this point would later be used as consultants when the International Affairs Program finally got on its feet.

Although the Foundation had commissioned Stone to perform the survey for the Conditions of Peace, it took some time before he was properly employed by the Foundation. By the end of January 1953, however, it seems that the suggestions made by McCloy and Stone had been taken to heart by the trustees, at least on the point of McCloy’s and Stone’s roles, and Stone wrote in a letter that McCloy was to become “chairman of the Board of our so-called Project of Peace and I am the Director of it.”

Stone wrote, in September of 1953:

The Conditions of Peace project has undertaken to study and to try to come up with recommendations on the contribution that the Ford Foundation can make toward the solution of the central issues of peace. Those involved in the project have carried on discussions with the President of the United States and with leading public officials and private citizens. They have exchanged views with outstanding men in the academic area. Moreover, the Conditions of Peace US/USSR group, working under a Foundation grant, is engaged in making a detailed study of major problems confronting the free world with a view to formulating proposals looking to their solution.

This memo was written at a time when direct exchanges with communist countries were not considered possible. The only project proposed at the time of this memo, September 2, 1953, that had anything to do with Eastern Europe, was the “establishment of an Institute on Western-Slav relations,” an attempt at trying to reach people behind the Iron Curtain via East Europeans living (or travelling) in the West:

145 Ibid.
146 Berghahn, America, 152
Recent developments in the East Zone of Germany and elsewhere in the Soviet-controlled areas of Eastern Europe point to the necessity of anticipatory work in the field of Western-Slav relationships. For example: (1) There is strong need to find ways to bring the Eastern European countries, now under Soviet control, into closer relationship with the Western European community. (2) There are dangers in the German-Slav relationship. It is already apparent that the problem of German unification will lead to the emergence of many of the German-Slav problems which have shaken Europe in the last 150 years and disturbed world peace. It is important that work should be started among American, British, French, German experts and Polish, Czech and other Slavic leaders, now available in the West, in an attempt to anticipate problems of Eastern Europe. A German-Slav understanding in the Political, cultural, and economic areas is only second in importance to a Franco-German agreement.\(^{147}\)

Stone and his group requested $500,000 allocated for this program. Whether they got it or not is not clear, but the proposal itself tells us something about how Stone, McCloy and leading figures in the American public and private sectors regarded Europe, and the role of the Ford Foundation, in 1953.

A further assessment of the situation was presented by Stone in the fall of 1953, shortly after he returned from a trip to Europe:

> We are facing a long period of cold war. In the years ahead the USSR will use every political, economic and psychological weapon to damage the alliance of the free nations and to prevent the so-called neutral nations from coming closer to the free.
>
> At the same time the free nations of Europe, recovering from the immediate need for shelter and food, may be on the threshold of more vigorous and independent thought and action. Although they recognize the fact that the United States is their shield, they are likely to develop political, economic and intellectual ideas that are not always in accordance with our own.\(^{148}\)

Stone recommended that the Ford Foundation include in “its overall objectives” a contribution to the “wisdom and maturity” that the United States would need in order to meet the challenge posed by the cold war. He emphasized that he did not believe that the Foundation could change “the entire political climate,” but that there was “reason to believe that much could be accomplished, and that what was needed was “a few ‘bodies’ and a courageous program.”\(^{149}\) At this stage, Stone was trying to create consensus for a general European program, but Eastern Europe was still too hostile, under the shadow of the recently deceased Stalin, to get directly involved with. At a time when there was a perceived, dual threat of communist influence and anti-Americanism in Western Europe, a program for Eastern Europe was not first priority.

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\(^{147}\) DCSS. FF-IA. Correspondence, 1953. Stone to Osigley, 2 September 1953.

\(^{148}\) DCSS. FF-IA. Stone to Price, 22 November 1953.

\(^{149}\) DCSS. FF-IA. Stone to Price, 3 December 1953.
**McCarthyism**

Stone, McCloy and others in the Ford Foundation, government, academia, and the corporate world, represented quite a different approach to the problems of the cold war than did senator McCarthy and his like-minded Americans who were hounding American Liberals at the time. The anti-communist rhetoric of the McCarthy era put its mark on American society through channels of literature, art, film, television, radio and the printed press, as well as on government policy and attitudes. This led to general suspicion among Americans, directed both at members of their own communities and at the communist "others."150 “So indiscriminately was the term [fellow-traveller] bandied about during the post-war American witch-hunts,” writes historian David Caute, “that it came to signify anyone who received Pravda through the post, anyone who took the First or Fifth Amendments, anyone who defended the constitutional rights of those who did, anyone who had doubts about the guilt of Alger Hiss, or anyone who dared to contend that Russia had made a major contribution to winning the war.”151

The aggressiveness of McCarthyism affected the Ford Foundation whose leaders regarded the influence of McCarthyism on American politics and society as detrimental. The Foundation itself came under fire from anti-communist forces in 1952, when Congress commissioned the Cox Committee to investigate U.S. foundations. In 1953 the same task befell the Reece Committee. A general counsel for the Reece Committee, Rene Wormser, later wrote that “[a]n unparalleled amount of power is concentrated increasingly in the hands of an interlocking and self-perpetuating group. Unlike the power of corporate management, it is unchecked by stockholders; unlike the power of government, it is unchecked by the people; unlike the power of churches, it is unchecked by any firmly established canons of value.”152

In a speech in 1953, documented in the Congressional Record, and in support of a new investigating committee, Reece criticized foundations in the following way:

> Some of these institutions (foundations) support efforts to overthrow our government and to undermine our American way of life. These activities urgently require investigation. Here lies the story of how Communism and socialism are financed in the United States, where they get their money. It is the story of who pays the bill. There is evidence to show there is a diabolical conspiracy back of all this. Its aim is the furtherance of socialism in the United

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States. Communism is only a brand name for socialism and the Communist state represents itself to be the only true form of socialism.\textsuperscript{153}

Having thus come under attack from the hard-line anticommunists and conservative right, the Foundation established a “so-called Fund of the Republic, intended to strengthen the country’s ‘free institutions’.” According to Volker Berghahn, this was “a cover for a domestic program” to counteract the detrimental influence of McCarthyism. The Fund of the Republic was also launched as a “self-defense of leading Ford Foundation people.” Berghahn argues that “a connection can also be established between the foundation’s opposition to McCarthyism at home and the considerations behind its decision to develop a strong European program.”\textsuperscript{154} In turn, this affected the decisions made and directions taken within the Foundation in matters pertaining to Eastern Europe, too.

\textbf{Convincing the Ford Foundation trustees}

The attitudes reflected in the hard-line anticommunist campaigns at home added to the difficulty in determining whether or not a philanthropic institution such as the Ford Foundation should really get involved in political issues. In 1954 Stone presented an “Outline for Discussion of Activities with Respect to Europe.” The following comments generated among the officers by Stone’s proposal give us an idea of how the Ford Foundation regarded involvement in European affairs at that time:

\begin{itemize}
\item[a)] most actions discussed in the papers are more appropriate for government than for the Foundation;
\item[b)] activities in Europe should be organized under the divisions managing domestic programs;
\item[c)] it is troublesome to work abroad except in well-defined scientific and educational fields.\textsuperscript{155}
\end{itemize}

These views reflect a scepticism that had started with “Hoffman’s bold launching of Ford into dealings with governments and international matters that are normally the business of governments.” This had “exhilarated some but did not sit easily with others. One colleague thought Hoffman wanted to ‘run the world from the Ford Foundation’ and another thought the board of the Foundation even after Hoffman’s time was filled with \textit{hubris} and acting like a


\textsuperscript{154} Berghahn, \textit{America}, 154

private government.” This sort of approach was controversial for a foundation, given that one of the ways by which foundations legitimized their work was by staying “neutral” and not associating themselves with issues that were too “political.”

Convincing the trustees of the Ford Foundation about the importance of the threat a weak Europe presented, and of the Foundation’s role in trying to alleviate it, was not easy. They were reluctant to establish a program that would deal extensively with European-related issues. This was due to both to the political implications and the notion that Europe was not a region that needed “developing.” They thought it was hard to find proper justification for such involvement. Hence, in the time between the initiation of the Conditions of Peace project in 1952 and the initial program with Poland in 1957, Stone and McCloy (it seems indeed that they were the two who were really pushing the European ideas) faced many challenges, not least within the Foundation.

During Rowan Gaither’s time as President (1953-56) nothing much happened about the proposals that Stone and McCloy presented to the President and the Board of Trustees. President Gaither was, according to Francis Sutton, “unable to decree how his divided staff should resolve their differences,” and Waldemar Nielsen described his presidency as a sort of muggy period of however long it lasted […] with Gaither a not very effective head. [He] was a completely indecisive, practically cataleptic man, once he really got the responsibility of running the organization.”

Hence, despite the optimism and the good results of the Conditions of Peace program, Stone and McCloy had to wait to launch their European program. It was during Gaither’s time, however, that Henry Ford II became the Chairman of the Board and McCloy a trustee, and that proved useful.

Stone and McCloy had developed plans not only for Western Europe, but for an ambitious program with Eastern Europe. It was even more controversial than Western Europe, but they argued that the United States and the Foundation should take advantage of the shift in

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156 Ibid.
158 Traditionally, philanthropy had dealt with immediate problems such as poverty, disease, education, either at home or in Third World countries. Work in Europe did not fit into these categories now that Europe was back on its feet after the war.
159 Berghahn and Sutton treat this issue in detail
160 Sutton, “Ambitions and Ambivalences,” 30
161 FFA. Interview with Waldemar Nielsen, 6
162 Ibid.
the political climate behind the Iron Curtain. To further democracy, they proposed research, exchange and educational efforts with Eastern Europe, possibly also with the U.S.S.R. One of the objectives would be to offer members of the intellectual elites of these countries fellowships, and specific groups mentioned were “important technicians, journalists, and university students.” While the chief aim of these exchanges would be to expose these East Europeans to the West, another objective was to educate Americans about them and their respective countries.163

Finally, in the summer of 1954, Gaither made the decision to establish their proposed program, “after a good deal of pressure on the Ford Foundation leadership to focus its attention on Europe,” and the International Affairs Program was finally formalized. 164

**The International Affairs Program (IA)**

When the IA finally became a reality, its main aims were to “contribute to”:

- a. the strengthening of the democratic forces in Europe and their relations with the U.S. and other free nations.
- b. the increasing of the American public’s understanding of world affairs.
- c. the strengthening of the foreign policy of the U.S.
- d. the increasing in the competence and effectiveness of international organizations.165

This list of objectives, however superficial, leaves little doubt that Stone and his handful of colleagues would need to keep in close contact with the U.S. government to reach any of their goals.

When Dwight Eisenhower won the presidential election in November 1952, Stone felt optimistic and “an even stronger sense of mission” in his job at the Foundation. Although he thought that some people assumed that with a Republican president “the so-called ‘eggheads’” would be “removed from influence in American life,” he felt that it would not happen because the President would “need the backing of all Americans, including the liberals and intellectuals.” His rationale for this was that “eggheads” had “developed the atomic bomb,” and that they had made and would continue to make “major contributions to American life.”166

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163 Berghahn, _America_, 179
164 Ibid., 178
165 FFA. Trustees Docket, 3/1957.
166 Berghahn, _America_, 150
In February of 1955, Eisenhower made a promise in one of his speeches to support the case of the East European countries under Soviet domination; that Americans must “help intensify the will for freedom in the satellite countries,” and remind them “that the outside world has not forgotten them […] in this most critical of battles—the winning of men’s minds. Without this victory, we can have no other victories.” A strong statement, that tells us how important the cultural dimension was during this phase of the Cold War.

As for cooperation with United States government agencies, it was an absolute necessity with regards to programs in Europe. With all the political implications programs could not be carried out without the approval and cooperation of the U.S. government. People at the IA were aware of this, and knew that an appropriate balance must be found that would not undermine the purpose of the Foundation. In a draft to describe the workings of a possible European Program in 1956, they presented the following thoughts on the “Liaison with U. S. Government”:

> The essential virtue of a private foundation is that it is a private, independent source of action for the public welfare. In its domestic work, therefore, intimate involvement and operational coordination with the government would destroy the justification for private philanthropy in a free society. In operations abroad the question is slightly different, however. We must on the one hand avoid becoming a handmaiden to government and above all must not become a covert instrumentality of official agencies. On the other hand, in the world today an American foundation must, as a patriotic obligation, be most careful not to interfere with U. S. Government activities, and where possible and appropriate, contribute positively to the achievement of the broad purposes of the nation abroad.

They found a balance they could live with, but it meant cooperation with the government, especially the State Department.

**A separate European Program**

Despite the establishment of International Affairs and their thorough plans for a European Program, President Gaither did not make a decision to let them have it, and by the summer of 1955, Waldemar Nielsen warned Gaither that “we may be on the verge of moving from too little to too much talk.” Still, nothing happened in the way of establishing a well-defined program until Henry Heald became President of the Foundation on 1 October 1956. Nielsen’s words,

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167 “Message to the Nationwide Meetings in Support of the Campaign for Radio Free Europe,” 8 February 1955, Eisenhower Papers 1955. 250–251. Eisenhower also reminded his audience that “to toughen, strengthen, and fortify such dedication to the cause of freedom is the mission of Radio Free Europe.”


169 Berghahn, America, 181
describing the shift in the Foundation when Heald took over, tells us a lot about how things changed at the Foundation, and also explains how Stone may have developed some “freewheeling” tendencies under Gaither:

Then Heald came in and that was a major and decisive turning point. That was the point at which the Foundation got itself on a new tack and got itself organized under a strong managerial person. Whether one is entirely enthusiastic or not about the directions that Heald led it in, this was a man who took charge, and a lot of things that had been very obscure and uncertain under Gaither’s management were resolved. Heald quickly cleared up the months and months of old memos and the thing began to work. Now, internally for the staff, the advent of Heald meant not only the end of the idealistic interval when Hoffman first came in, it also meant the end of that period under Gaither in which as a senior officer you could, to a large extent, do what you damn pleased. Gaither didn’t really restrict you much and it was in effect a congregation of independent tribal potentates that made the Foundation’s program. Heald was more effective. You really had a sense of having a boss and of having to clear things through him and of him having an attitude on things. I must give Heald credit. He was not a positive leadership force with ideas and so on of his own, except, perhaps, in a couple of fields, but on the other hand he was not an absolutely unresponsive person either. If you had enough courage and persistence to keep going at him with something that you really believed in, he would often times say, “Well, all right damn it! I’m not really for it, but if you want to put it in your budget and present it to the Board, it’s up to you and it’s on your head.” He wasn’t, in other words, an absolutely arbitrary man. 

Although Heald could have made life difficult for Stone, the latter obviously had enough courage and persistence to make the most of that side of Heald which gave in to projects that people “really believed in.” Also, it was to Stone’s advantage that Heald knew little about Europe and international affairs in general. As it was, Heald now “moved quickly to resolve remaining uncertainties about the European program”, and it was “firmly put ‘under [the] IA Office, [with] Stone [as its] director’.” With his position finally confirmed, Stone had more freedom to move along with his European concerns.

Heald, at the time when he approved the European Program in the fall of 1956, had never been to Europe, and he was a man who was first and foremost interested in furthering education on the domestic scene and who, according to Shepard Stone

very openly said he had concentrated his life on the United States. He knew nothing, he said, about Europe or other parts of the world at the time. He tended to have if not an isolationist point of view an attitude that probably an American tended to be morally superior to a non-American. I believe that he was opposed to substantial amounts for this European or International Affairs Program.

170 FFA. Interview with Waldemar Nielsen, 21-22.
171 Berghahn, *America*, 182
172 At one point Heald went on a European tour with Stone to learn more about Europe, another indication that Stone was considered an authority on European affairs within the Foundation, and that he was given particularly free reigns under Heald’s presidency seems obvious. FFA. Ford Foundation oral history project. Interview with Shepard
Hence, although Heald gave Stone great freedom in carrying out his program, it seems that he “simply had to come to an armed truce with McCloy and Stone over the political rationales of the European and Atlantic programs they believed in.”173

As Francis Sutton has pointed out, it is quite ironic that it was under the most traditional president, the one who considered the advancement of education and research the only proper role of foundations, that the East European program was initiated and flourished. On the other hand, Heald’s ignorance of European affairs was perhaps exactly what made it easy to persuade him to approve European programs for the next nine years, and which permitted Stone his free reigns. Heald’s resistance to programs of “action” did, however, eventually cause so much frustration among trustees and officers, that he was “forced out of the presidency” at the end of 1965.174

Back in 1956, however, when Stone made another attempt, in September, at convincing the Board of the need for a “new approach to the organization of Foundation activities in Europe and related to Europe,” he succeeded. A European Program was approved, and one of its major objectives was to develop East West relations “on a democratic basis.”175 This was spurred on by the developments in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe: Krushchev’s attack on Stalin and his personality cult, and the subsequent upheavals in Poland and Hungary.

On 13 September 1956, seven months after Krushchev’s “secret speech” at the Soviet Communist Party’s 20th Congress, Stone proposed “a new approach to the organization of Foundation activities in Europe and related to Europe.”176 He emphasized that “developments during the last three years in Western Europe and in Eastern Europe and the U.S.S.R. have increased the need and opportunity for American action.” A few months later, following the October-November revolution in Hungary, he wrote in another memorandum that the priorities for a European program would “necessarily be influenced by the critical events” in Eastern Europe, suggesting immediate focus on the areas affected, as well as on “the development of East-West contacts on a democratic basis.”177 Stone was heard, and the first fellowship program in Eastern Europe, with Poland, was approved in April 1957.

174 Ibid., 48.
175 DCSS. FF-IA. Memo from Adie to Bunny, 20 March 1957
176 Berghahn, America, 182-83
177 Ibid., 187-188
To the question of whether Stone had tried to “educate” the trustees to any extent, in order to gain their support for the Polish program, “by bringing them to Europe, showing them the work you were doing, what the problems were, how the Foundation’s role was effective and so forth,” Stone replied:

Very much so, but as I recall, in those days a number of the trustees were men who had had very substantial experience with European affairs. After all, we were only ten years after the war, or even less. I don’t recall all the names but sitting around the room with most of the men, I don’t think one needed to try to educate them; they were in a position to educate you or me and had had a lot of experience. Some hadn’t. But of course it was in my mind and some of the reports I used to make were structured the way one would structure, as I had learned, an article in a newspaper or a magazine to make sure it would have maximum effect. But when I recall some of the members of the board, it really wasn’t necessary; they’d been there.178

Unlike Heald, then, many of the trustees had experience from Europe, and were probably more interested in European affairs than most Americans. In any case, they saw the value in carrying out programs there – a value enhanced by the many convincing memos they received from Stone.

Freewheeling? 179

The exchange programs with Eastern Europe under Stone’s IA Program were characterized by a great degree of personal influence on the hands of few people, and of relatively small-scale, rather elitist, projects where Stone played a central role in most decisions. It seems that few people elsewhere in the Foundation interfered with what the IA was doing, and there was a strong focus on the individual, both among the granters and grantees. Because of all these features, and perhaps also because Stone was not known for being a particularly systematic administrator180, his Program, especially the European Program, was considered rather “freewheeling.” 181 With its emphasis on major political issues and direct, informal contact with influential leaders, IA’ activities were marked by a flexibility to engage in “action,” and it seems that Stone succeeded in running a non-bureaucratic and flexible organization that could do things the federal government couldn’t do. The sense of suspicion that was felt for the Program by

178 FFA. Interview with Shepard Stone, 16-17.  
179 “freewheeling, adj. ... moving about freely, independently, or irresponsibly,... not governed or influenced by rules, responsibilities, or the like.” Webster’s encyclopedic unabridged dictionary of the English language. New York: Gramercy Books, 1996  
others within the Foundation, was partly the result of scepticism at such flexibility and freedom of action.

As mentioned, the approach of the IA seems to owe much the influence of McCloy, who was Chairman of the Foundation Board of Trustees from 1958 to 1965. McCloy was someone who “believed in Wise Men,” and Stone was, according to Francis Sutton, “like McCloy in his energy, self-confidence and eagerness for close acquaintance with political and other leaders.”

The two kept “seeking opportunities for influencing the course of affairs” by making and sustaining “direct and intimate contact” with powerful people, all the while considering how far they could go within the limits of what was “proper for a private philanthropy.” Also, they were both seen as sceptics of approaches that were too academic. Whether this characteristic is accurate or not, it is obvious that both McCloy and Stone were focused on “action” rather than research, and Stone expressed pride about his “freewheeling” IA. Stone’s perception of the role of his program resonated with many Foundation officers, and they “shared the idea that their autonomous status had certain advantages, enabling them, for example to act quickly, and with less fanfare than, say, the State Department.”

Back in the mid-1950s there was a spirit of optimism among the IA staff as to what it could achieve. The Ford Foundation had not had any involvement in Europe prior to WWII, but Shepard Stone’s networks, some from his time in Germany in the 1930s, and most from the time he spent in Europe after the war, played an important role in the development of the Foundation’s European programs. According to Francis Sutton, who points out that “Stone was not a diffident man,” he had “with his European experience and McCloy’s help [...] access to people at the highest – or nearly highest – levels in Europe and he used his contacts with them to advance his case with the officers and trustees of the Foundation.” He also used these contacts to build the exchange programs, to get the “right people” in position, both as consultants and as candidates for fellowships.

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182 For a comprehensive account of the activities of Stone and McCloy, see Berghahn, America.
184 Oliver Schmidt. “Networks of Patronage,” 145-46
The following excerpt from a self-evaluation in 1961 about the work and methods of the IA illustrates the methods of the IA. It also gives us some clues as to how the IA was initially run during the Heald years, and what Stone and the other people working on it expected from it:

The IA program…has tried first to study the major issues and then to select points of impact for Foundation activity…[Its projects] have been pointed toward action rather than research or education per se…There has been a vigorous use of conversation, meetings, telephone calls and cables with a view to action. There has been an attempt to maintain contact, and to work together with some of the most thoughtful people we could identify here and abroad.\textsuperscript{186}

This quote also describes another factor that influenced the perception of IA as freewheeling: that the issues the IA dealt with were generally of a character that often made it difficult to get a tangible “product of philanthropic action.” How tangible is “vigorous use of conversation, meetings, telephone calls and cables with a view to action?”\textsuperscript{187} In the continuation of that, Francis Sutton points out, that because the results of activities such as those carried out by the IA were less tangible than other forms of action, the IA was particularly vulnerable to any change in “leadership,” or the temper of the times,\textsuperscript{188} something which proved right when the IA was reorganized in 1966 and many of its programs terminated in 1969.\textsuperscript{189}

According to Verne Atwater, who was Director of the Latin American Program and Vice President of Administration in the 1960s, the European Program was “McCloy’s baby” and “Shep was implementing McCloy’s ideas.” Atwater remembers Stone and his staff as being “on their own track,” that there seemed to be a direct line between the IA Program and the Board, and that nobody else in the Foundation really knew what was going on.\textsuperscript{190} This largely corresponds to other accounts of the IA and to how Stone himself thought his Program was perceived by others: “as too freewheeling.” When considering that Stone and McCloy had started out at the Foundation when things were less organized than under Heald, it makes sense that they would have a different approach to their work than those who had joined the Foundation later. In Stone’s own words, the IA’s concept of the European Program was that it was important to help in the areas in which the Foundation could help; education, science, culture, and others. Let’s face it; so many of these things do have political implications; that the building of Europe was a tremendously important factor; that Europe’s tremendous

\textsuperscript{186} Ibid., 43
\textsuperscript{187} Ibid., 48
\textsuperscript{188} Ibid., 48
\textsuperscript{189} This will be dealt with in chapter 9.
\textsuperscript{190} My conversation with Verne Atwater at the Ford Foundation Archives in New York, January 24, 2008. I have, however found documents addressed to Atwater in which Stone informs him of IA activities, so he was not kept entirely in the dark as he implies. But we all know that memory is fickle.
talent—scholarly, educational, cultural, and political—had suffered during the war and it was very important at the time to create the conditions so that Europe could again help its own talent along the way. So we had, and I had a lot to do with this, the central idea to do anything we could that seemed constructive.  

In terms of accountability and reporting, Stone did not, however, agree to the label his program was given: “After all, everything we did had to go through either [vice-president] Don Price or Frosty Hill or Tom Carroll, the president, the Board of Trustees.” That being said, he regarded the term “freewheeling” as something rather positive and answered the criticism by asking “Is it creative? Is it doing something useful? Is it nonbureaucratic? And just what is your criticism other than—how do you define freewheeling?” In his opinion “freewheeling” was a “good word for foundations in general,” in the sense of keeping an office small and non-bureaucratic. Stone succeeded in keeping his organization small, only about a handful of people were on regular staff, and the rest of the work was done by hiring consultants wherever they were needed. Consultants there were plenty of, and they were usually university professors and administrators. Throughout his years in Europe and later with McCloy on the Conditions of Peace project, Stone had built himself an impressive network of influential people both in Europe and the United States. According to himself, when asked what Europeans he were “close to,” he answered:

Well, I think of the range from people at Oxford, Cambridge, London, the Isaiah Berlins, the Bill Deakins, the Noel Annans, the Willy Brandts, the Ernst Reuters. I could name twenty-five German professors and others, some of whom I’d known previously, but whose names wouldn’t mean very much now. In every country a tremendous network of people.

He was also in regular contact with Jean Monnet and he, at least once, corresponded with Hugh Gaitskell and had dinner with Willy Brandt – at least twice. There are not many traces in

191 FFA. Interview with Stone, 10.
194 Thomas Henry Carroll, Associate Director and vice-president of the Foundation (1953-61), President of the George Washington University (1961-64).
195 FFA. Interview with Stone, 21.
196 Stone, Waldemar Nielsen, Stanley Gordon, Joseph Slater.
197 FFA. Interview with Stone, 25.
198 Stone probably had contact with Jean Monnet also because of the Foundation’s alleged funding of the Action Committee on United Europe (ACUE). Christopher Booker and Richard North. The great deception : a secret history of the European Union. London: Continuum, 2003, 43.
199 In the files, I have found but one letter each from Stone to (indirectly)Willy Brandt (DCSS. FF-IA. Correspondence, 1954. Stone to Lasky, 5 October 1954) and Hugh Gaitskell, (DCSS. FF-IA. Correspondence, 1954.
the archives that can document Stone’s contact with all the people he claimed to have been close to, but that concurs with Francis Sutton’s contention that much of what the IA did never was documented. Although one can understand why some would find Stone to be a bit of a name-dropper, it seems that he did indeed make contact with many powerful Europeans, and that these connections were crucial in building the reputation of the IA as a well-informed, well-connected organization, whose projects attracted the “right” people.

**Europe, West and East**

The pivotal year for the Foundation’s involvement in Eastern Europe was 1956, but that does not mean that it was their first, nor only, involvement in the region. When the Ford Foundation expanded its activities in 1950, it didn’t take long before Eastern Europe was on the agenda, as part of the new objective to advance peace. The first action taken, in 1951, was to create the Eastern European fund to “aid exiles from the Soviet Union to be established” in the United States. Accompanying this program was the founding of the Chekov Publishing Company whose mission it was to “print classics of Russian and Western literature in the Russian language,” and a grant to the International Rescue Committee for “its campaign for exiled professionals.” In 1952 a large grant was given to help solve the refugee problem in Europe, and in 1953 the first fellowship program for Soviet and Eastern European studies “was inaugurated to enable American scholars to improve their knowledge of these areas.” Grants were also made to the Eastern European fund “for the support of its research program on the USSR.” Thus, the first activities in Eastern Europe were directed either at aid for refugees in various forms, or at the education of Americans in matters pertaining to Eastern Europe and, especially, the Soviet Union.

Western and Eastern Europe were both eventually placed within the same European program, but in 1954 attention was still chiefly on Western Europe. Thus, from the beginning the IA program concentrated on issues in West-Germany, Britain, and other West European countries, and especially on the strengthening of the Atlantic Community. Already in 1953, however, a consultant had suggested to President Gaither that Foundation officers should also get involved in finding out more about what was “going on beyond the Iron Curtain and to

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Stone to Gaitskell, 11 October 1954) very short and formal. Also, Stone had dinner with Willy Brandt at least twice (DCSS. FF-IA. Correspondence, 1959. Memo from Stone to Stone, Berlin, 6 October 1959.) But, Stone never did claim to be friends with these people, just that they were part of his networks. And, as pointed out by Sutton and others, much of Stone’s activity was never recorded in any files.
initiate contacts on which we may wish to rely when the formal barriers between East and West are let down or are drawn further Eastwards” and that “private Western organizations can and should develop the material and contacts which can be utilized and built upon by those in governmental authority.”\textsuperscript{200} The aim of International Affairs in 1954 was to convince the Board of the need to establish a program in Western Europe, but Yugoslavia was also dealt with, under the separate post: “Supporting Western trends in Yugoslavia”:

Yugoslavia is [in] a special situation of importance to the Western world. There are many indications that the Yugoslav leaders are trying to establish closer contacts with all levels of Western thought and experience. The Foundation can aid U.S. interests in Yugoslavia by supporting certain projects in that country.\textsuperscript{201}

While waiting for the barriers between East and West to come down, or, rather, to help ensure that they would eventually come down, work in Western Europe was, crucial, and Stone explained why in the memo “Program for Europe,” in September 1954, :

The importance of developments in Europe for the security and peace of the U.S., and the significance to us of political, economic and cultural relationships with Europe are generally recognized. At the present time these relationships are not as close as they should be. There is danger of a gradual crumbling of the Western alliance. American prestige and influence in Europe are at a post-war low. The Soviet is beginning to make an impression on Western Europeans with a display of improved manners and a new policy to open a few doors through the Iron Curtain. There are signs that in the years ahead Moscow will exert a consistent, subtle, dangerous pressure on American-European relations. Our assumption must now be that we can no longer take Europe for granted.\textsuperscript{202}

There was still fear that the West Europeans would let themselves be lured into the Soviet sphere and abandon relations with the United States, even with Stalin dead and the apparent changes in U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe (the revolt of workers in East Berlin in June 1953 was one early indication), and despite hope that the barriers may be “drawn further Eastwards.” The understanding was also that Western and Eastern Europe could not be treated in isolation from each other.

\textsuperscript{200} Berghahn, America, 162. Berghahn refers to a report about Europe which Gaither received in September 1953 from a trustee and U.S. District Court judge, Charles E. Wyzanski Jr.
\textsuperscript{201} DCSS. FF-IA. Program for Europe by Shepard Stone. Draft. 16 September 1954.
\textsuperscript{202} DCSS. FF-IA. Program for Europe by Shepard Stone. Draft. 16 September 1954.
**East European exchanges as cold war strategy**

When Shepard Stone and his IA staff increasingly turned their attention to Europe’s Eastern states, they focused on exchange programs and set as their main objective to strengthen the region’s “educational, scientific, and cultural relations with the United States and other free nations.”

One may ask why there was such agreement that exchange programs would be the best type of action in Eastern Europe? Already in the fall of 1953, President Gaither, who was sceptical of expanding the Foundation’s international involvement, had received assessments about the situation in Europe, and about ways in which the Foundation could contribute. One opinion was that exchanges would be the most effective way of “replacing resentment and misunderstanding with understanding and respect.”

Although this particular example pertained to Germany, it seems that the idea of exchanges as means of establishing contact, trust, and the opportunity to exert influence, steadily gained ground in the next couple of years and was readily applied to Eastern Europe when the time was ripe. Shepard Stone, too, in a 1953 memorandum on how to develop the so-called Area I in Europe, suggested that “After a careful survey by competent persons, support a ten-year program of exchange of persons – students, professors, leaders of opinion – selected to advance the objectives of the free peoples.”

In 1955, there were signs at the Foundation that the focus was starting to shift over from aid for refugees, which had been the Foundation’s primary concern with regard to Eastern Europe, to exchanges. Up until then there had not been any direct exchange activity, but with the signs of “internal strain and impending upheaval” starting to show in Eastern Europe, and even the Soviet Union indicating a willingness to allow foreign scholars to travel in the USSR, exchanges suddenly appeared feasible. When Krushchev delivered his anti-Stalin speech in the spring of 1956, it was obvious that something had changed.

In September 1956, advocating increased “need and opportunity for American action,” Stone wrote a new memo about a European program. He proposed a “new approach to the development of Foundation activities in Europe and related to Europe,” this time including Eastern Europe. After emphasizing that “the strengthening of Europe and of American-European relations is fundamental to the security and well-being of the United States and to the

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203 Trustees Docket, 3/1957. FFA
204 Berghahn, America, 161
205 DCSS. FF-IA. Correspondence 1953. “Notes on a Program for Area I” Stone to Price, 3 December 1953. Price had been on the staff of the Gaither’s Study Committee, was elected “Associated Director” in 1953, and was Vice-President from 1954 to 1958, when he accepted the position as Dean of the Graduate School of Public Administration of Harvard University. He left the Foundation in 1959. It seems that Stone for the most part reported to Price, and later to F. F. “Frosty” Hill, who was Vice President from 1959 to 1965. Hill later became program advisor for the new International division under President Bundy.
Foundation’s interest in peace, freedom and human progress,” he referred to the events of the “past three years in Western Europe and in Eastern Europe and the U. S. S. R.,” and that President Eisenhower had “emphasized, a proper, growing and vital role for private Philanthropy.” Stone acknowledged Europe’s weakened role, and stressed its importance to the United States “in a world made insecure by Communist imperialism.” He argued that to strengthen the historical bond, their common “heritage of cultural freedom,” the Americans and Europeans must combine their “manpower, brains and skills” to strengthen their advantage politically, scientifically and culturally. By doing that, Stone contended, they would “fortify the area of freedom in the world.” If they did not do that, the fear was that the resources of Western Europe may “fall under Soviet control.” In addition to strengthening ties with Western Europe, Stone stressed that “American policy must work toward a relaxation of the Communist dictatorship of Soviet Russia, the loosening of ties between the East European satellites and Russia and a gradual reorientation of Eastern Europe toward free Europe.” One important factor in this was to continue and step up the efforts to make Europeans, East and West, understand “the true nature of American life and objectives.”

Despite the changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, that had not yet manifested themselves in the uprisings in Poland and Hungary (they were just around the corner), the Soviet Union was considered a great threat. They had proved their military strength, but it seems that Stone and his like-minded feared their strength in cultural-economic terms more. Stone painted a bleak picture (at least from an American point of view; to many Europeans it would have been attractive) of how Europe would look if the non-military efforts of the Soviet Union were as “spectacular” as he feared:

The entire Soviet apparatus will be employed to achieve victory. Soviet trade and aid will be offered to Europe. Soviet cultural achievements will be paraded before Europe. Soviet universities will be opened to Europeans. Soviet leaders and delegations may be expected to try and dazzle the businessmen and workers of Europe with economic, agricultural and scientific achievements paralleling American developments of the past fifty years. They will appeal to the youth of Europe by pointing to opportunities for talented young people in the Soviet Union to get to the top. The Soviet Union will try to become the economic, ideological, and cultural magnet for 200,000,000 Europeans. 206

Cultural warfare indeed! Replace “Soviet” with “American” and vice versa, and the Soviets could use this text, unchanged, for their propaganda purposes. But the message was clear, and for

those who abhorred Soviet-style communism, with good reason, it was a scenario they did not want.

When the Poles revolted against their Stalinist regime and against Soviet domination in October of 1956, in the so-called Gomułka revolution, and the revolt was not crushed by the Soviets, it seemed that the Soviet Union had lost much of its power. When the Hungarians, inspired and strengthened by the Polish uprising, initiated a revolution in the end of October, the optimism was great. But Krushchev knew that he could not risk losing more face, and the Hungarian revolution was brutally crushed. The Americans did nothing. They had never intended to, despite propaganda to the contrary. Through channels such as Radio Free Europe, the Hungarians had been led to believe that help would be forthcoming if they dared take on their regime, and especially if the Soviets intervened. The Suez crisis in Egypt, where the French and the British supported the Israelis in an attack on Egypt was not sanctioned by the United States, but it kept them preoccupied and took away whatever momentum they could have brought to the Hungarian revolt.207

Despite the failed revolution in Hungary, the revolts had shown that many East Europeans did not want Soviet domination and that their regimes did not have sufficient support in the population. It seemed that the “blemishes” in the official communist narrative were large and conspicuous enough for the Ford Foundation, or rather the “freewheeling” IA, to finally act. (Shep Stone would probably have argued that it was able to do that exactly because it was such a small and flexible body) and made the most of the new situation.

The first, not so controversial, action to be taken in Eastern Europe after the 1956 revolutions was to provide relief for the Hungarian refugees who had fled after the Soviet army returned on 4 November to crush the revolutionary uprising. At a Member-Trustees meeting on 7 December 1956 Stone and Don Price contended that, although the Foundation could help provide acute relief through fund-raising campaigns, the area in which it could make the most of its efforts would be by assisting students and teachers through “cultural activities.”208

208 FFA. Trustees docket, 7 December 1956.
The East European exchange programs

By 1957 it was clear that the communist countries, despite their propaganda, were lagging behind the West in terms of technological development, productivity, wealth, and standard of living. Their predicament had become obvious to people in the Soviet and East European governments, and re-establishing contact with the West became a priority in some, but not all, of the state-socialist regimes. There was still the fear of contamination: that people who were exposed to the West would be contaminated by Western ideas. However, the desire and need for Western technology, and the willingness to make some sacrifices to obtain knowledge about what made the West prosper, made some authorities risk jeopardizing the hearts and minds of their people. At the same time, Americans, in the Ford and Rockefeller foundations and the U. S. Government, decided that the advantages of cooperation would outweigh the dangers of inviting communists to their country.

When the Polish program was launched only a few months after the initiation of the European Program, Stone wrote a memo that serves to explain some of the reasons why this program was launched exactly at that time, and it gives us an idea of what the IA’s future plans were in August of 1957:

High officials in the U. S. Government continue to encourage the Ford Foundation to develop its East European programs. Government officials and other experts are in agreement that the intellectual ferment in Eastern Europe may provide new opportunities for the Foundation. In the effort to be in a position to act if these opportunities develop, it is recommended that in the coming fiscal year the following steps should be taken:

1. **Poland** – Study and observation in Poland of our present program and, if the situation warrants, recommendations for an extension of our present program. In the United States, Western Europe and in Poland there appears to be agreement that our present Polish program is significant and that we should be prepared, under suitable circumstances, to extend it. Our present program and any extension will depend on a careful day to day assessment of the situation in Poland.

2. **Yugoslavia** – Foundation representatives have visited Yugoslavia during recent years and the Yugoslav Government has requested us to initiate programs in that country. The situation in that country is not clear. In the coming year we should assess the Yugoslav situation, both in Washington and in Yugoslavia, and if the findings are positive, be prepared to support a limited program.

3. **Soviet Russia** – Assessment of the situation, particularly talks are necessary with the highest officials in Washington. If the findings in this country are positive, the door should be kept open for visits to Russia to make a further investigation of the possibilities of a program in respect to that country.

4. **Czechoslovakia** – A Foundation representative visited Czechoslovakia in March 1957 and concluded that we should delay activities in that country until our Polish program had been launched. Action in Czechoslovakia should be given second priority.

5. **Finland** – A visit to that country to determine the effectiveness of our present grant and the desirability of expanding our activities.
Rumania and Bulgaria – Third priority, but discussions in Washington about the desirability of a visit to Rumania. 209

This short and schematic overview of the future plans of the IA in August 1957 provides a point of departure for exploring the Foundations East European program in the subsequent twelve years. Starting off with the ideas of what the Foundation officers imagined and planned and comparing it with what actually happened, is an important step towards assessing and understanding what the Foundation achieved.

My first observation is that much turned out the way the author of this memo had envisioned: The Polish program was extended, the Yugoslav program got started a couple of years later, involvement in Czechoslovakia was briefly tested on a very small scale, and projects in Romania and Bulgaria did not get off the ground until the re-structuring of the Foundation in the late sixties. Priority-wise, then, the author’s predictions were fairly accurate. Where the Soviet Union was concerned, the initial plan of close coordination with the government in Washington was carried out: the Foundation did not launch its own exchange program with the Soviets but helped fund the government-run academic exchange program between the Soviet Union and the United States which was initiated in 1958. 210 Two countries stand out, however: Finland, because of its being incorporated into an “East European program,” and Hungary for being omitted. In the case of Hungary the political situation following the Soviet intervention in October 1956, and the counter-revolutionary terror of the Kádár regime that continued into the beginning of the 1960s, would explain why the Foundation did not find it feasible, or desirable, to plan an exchange program there. However, as mentioned, the Foundation did contribute to a campaign to aid the refugees following the revolution. This support for “Hungarian refugee students, scholars, artists and others who played an important role in the gallant effort to achieve freedom in Hungary,” and which involved language training in the U.S. and two-year scholarships for studies in Western Europe, was the result of a “splendid cooperation” between the U.S. and eight European countries, 211 but it does not compare with the subsequent fellowship-

210 The “Agreement Between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Exchanges in the Cultural, Technical, and Educational Fields,” often called the “Lacy-Zarubin Agreement” after its chief negotiators, was signed on January 27, 1958. According to Yale Richmond, the scope of the agreement was much broader that indicated in its title, and included “exchanges in science and technology, agriculture, medicine and public health, radio and television, motion pictures, exhibitions, publications, government, youth, athletics, scholarly research, culture, and tourism. This program was, in the U.S., administered by the Inter-University Committee at the University of Indiana. Richmond, Yale. Cultural Exchange and the Cold War: Raising the Iron Curtain. University Park, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2003, p.15
211 Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Switzerland, Denmark, and Sweden. DCSS. FF-IA. “Draft insert for speech on Poland”. “Possibly by Waldemar Nielsen.” Several paragraphs from this draft are exactly the same as in Heald’s speech of April 26, 1957, and as in “News from the Ford Foundation” released on the same day.
programs that were exclusively funded by the Foundation. Such a program with Hungary was not implemented until 1964.

Other sources also tell us about how the people at the Ford Foundation perceived Eastern Europe. Where the Soviet Union is concerned, it was in its own category and usually mentioned as a separate entity; it was thus generally not included in “Eastern Europe.” What about Yugoslavia, the black sheep of the communist camp? In a memo from 1954, Shepard Stone deals with Yugoslavia in one point, and with “persons from behind the Iron Curtain” in the next. Both points, however, were marked: “(All such projects would require the approval of the United States Government).” It would seem then, that Yugoslavia was not considered as being behind the Iron Curtain, but, being a communist country, it still required special “approval.”

In another memo called “Contacts with Eastern Europe,” Yugoslavia was, however, grouped – atypically with the Soviet Union – as a country in “that region,” and an exchange program with Finland is listed among the 1956-57 “grants and appropriations in respect to Eastern Europe”. By 1959 Finland was firmly placed among the West European states. In other words, the concept of Eastern Europe was fluid and based both on the geographical and mental maps that prevailed during the Cold War – as it still is today.

Prior to the Ford Foundation’s first exchange program in 1957 the U.S. government had, for more than a decade, attempted to establish an academic exchange program with the Soviet Union and other countries of Eastern Europe, but without success; the Soviet institutions to which offers of reciprocal exchanges were made did not even acknowledge them. Only after the Lacy-Zarubin agreement of January 1958, were government exchanges between the USSR and the USA established.

The Foundation funded many different exchange programs under the direction of other institutions, one of them being the above mentioned exchanges between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. However, the first programs with Eastern Europe, while Stone was in charge, differed from the Foundation’s involvement in other exchanges. The most important difference was that they demanded more influence over the selection procedures in the countries they negotiated

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212 DCSS. FF-IA. “Europe” by Shepard Stone. September 28, 1954
213 See Ford Foundation Annual Reports, last accessed 21 December 2017: https://www.fordfoundation.org/search/?q=annual+report&p=0.
214 Byrnes, Soviet-American Academic Exchanges, 33
216 Ibid., 44.
with. In other words, funding for exchanges would only be granted if the Ford Foundation officers could choose their own candidates among a country’s intellectual elite.217

Because of these conditions only some of the state-socialist countries would agree to the terms and participate in the Foundation’s programs. The Soviet Union would never have accepted the Foundation’s terms, so there was no attempt to establish a program there. Poland, with its position as a relatively open society, functioned as “Russia’s ‘Window on the West’. “218

This was recognized by Shepard Stone and the Ford Foundation, and it became the first country with a Ford Foundation exchange program.

217 Berghahn, *America*, 190. This criterion caused a break with the Poles for a few years in the 1960s, when Polish government officials wanted greater influence over the selection of the candidates. 192.
Chapter 4. The Ford Foundation fellowship program in Poland 1957-1962

Well, Poland and all of—There is a footnote to history there. That was an idea that took shape right after [Władysław] Gomulka had come in, and it was thought that he was going to be the great liberal change in Poland.

[…] we wanted to show that there was some deeper concern, not just purely ideological worries involved. I think the East European Program and opening up and re-establishing scholarly and scientific connections between Eastern Europe and the West and the United States was probably, looking back at the years—Joe McCarthy had just been around the corner—the most adventurous and bold decision made by the trustees of the Ford Foundation.\footnote{FFA. Interview with Shepard Stone, 11.}

- Shepard Stone, 1972.

As the first and largest of the Ford Foundation fellowship programs with countries in Eastern Europe, the Polish program was of special importance. Announced in April 1957, with the first fellows arriving in the United States and Western Europe in September 1957, it was “considered to be the first major effort undertaken by an American institution to open channels into Eastern Europe.”\footnote{FFA GF 2517-57-32-2. Memo, Gordon to Kimbler, 16 July, 1971.} While any prior Foundation involvement in Eastern Europe was largely limited to grants for American institutions “to advance knowledge of American scholars of Soviet Russia and the countries of Eastern Europe,” the Polish program involved the first grants made by the Foundation directly for a program of exchange with an East European country.\footnote{DCSS. FF-IA. “Draft insert for speech on Poland”, “Possibly by Waldemar Nielsen.”} It paved the way for other programs in Eastern Europe and served as a model for later proposals and appropriations.

The impetus for a Polish program was a meeting between Shepard Stone and Madame Eugenia Krassowska at the UN headquarters in New York. The Polish government was seeking to obtain economic aid from the USA, as well as establish closer cultural connections. The visit of the Polish delegation to New York in January 1957 was a step in this direction, and the big foundations were considered important. The experience with the Rockefeller Foundation’s programs in the interwar years, especially in public health, was good. So were the experiences with the Rockefeller fellowship program that had enabled “some 209 Polish graduate students to do research and study abroad with foundation aid” from 1918 to 1939. These programs had established a relationship between Polish authorities and American philanthropy that resurfaced
in the wake of the Polish uprising. When negotiations with the Polish delegation were opened at the UN, the aim was to receive “aid from the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations.”

During their meeting, Mme. Krassowska who, in a Ford Foundation memo, was called “a charming lady who subsequently turned out to be one of the staunchest pro-Stalinists in the present Polish government,” made it clear that she would welcome any effort on the part of the Ford Foundation to initiate exchanges of scholars and experts between Poland and the United States, and she encouraged Stone to visit Poland on his already planned trip to Europe. Stone almost immediately took her up on her offer and started planning a trip to Poland to assess the situation. The Foundation’s trustees meeting in December 1956, where a European program had been approved, and of which one of the major objectives was the “development of East-West contacts on a democratic basis,” was an added incentive and justification for Stone’s trip to Poland. However, as mentioned, it was the tense and uncertain, but exciting, political situation in Poland that formed the backdrop for Stone’s visit.

The political climate had started to change in Poland for some time before the uprising in October, and some people were allowed to travel abroad in 1956. As an example, a group of Polish sociologists had been permitted by the authorities to participate in a conference, the Third World Congress of Sociology in Amsterdam, and later in the year a number of Polish social scientists traveled to Paris to take part in a colloquium on economic and social progress arranged by UNESCO. These meetings between scholars from all over the world, created an opportunity to make new connections that would later prove very useful. The renowned Austrian-American sociologist Paul Felix Lazarsfeld was in Paris, and his advanced research centers in New York would later be the hub for sociologists who came to the United States on Ford fellowships. Polish sociology had been greatly influenced by American sociology before the war. After the war the discipline was revived, but by 1950 the Stalinist condemnation of sociology as a “bourgeois” science prevented further research and teaching, as well as foreign travel. Sociology and the other social sciences were regarded as disciplines that could help shape a society, by seeking to understand and interpret it. Stalinism, leaning heavily on the Marxist-

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223 DCSS. FF-IA. Memo from Adie to Bunny, March 20, 1957.

224 A discussion of what Stone and his like-minded meant by “democratic basis” will be discussed later.


226 Ibid. Sułek specifically mentions the meeting between Lazarsfeld and Stefan Nowak, a Ford fellow in 1958-59, who would become an influential sociologist.
Leninist doctrine of “changing” society, saw sociology as a “bourgeois pseudo-science,”
describing society instead of stating how it should function. The “Marxist-sociology” of later
years is, as such, somewhat of a contradiction in terms. Still, in 1956 Polish social scientists
were mostly marxists – especially the younger generation who had not experienced the pre-war
era of exposure to other ideas. Marxism was, however, some times used as a “tool of liberation”
in 1956. The social psychologist, Andrzej Malewski (a Ford fellow in the United States in 1959-
60), told a Swedish sociologist “that he had joined the upsurge that became the so-called Poznan
revolt of 1956 by using Marx to explain to workers that their opposition to the regime far from
being an act of treason against communism was a true expression of the laws of historical
materialism.”

There was also a ferment among young intellectuals that the Foundation probably knew
about through their channels in Eastern Europe. At the initiative of the weekly newspaper Po
prostu, many “Young Intelligentsia Discussion Clubs” in Warsaw and other major cities had
been established in 1955 and 1956. According to Witold Jedlicki, the Po prostu editors were not
motivated primarily by political considerations when they urged young people to organize local
clubs: “The main intention was to activate young university graduates from the provinces.”

One of the best-known and most influential clubs, which also survived the longest, was the
Crooked Circle Club. It was formed in 1955 and took its name from the street in which the first
meeting was held, in a private apartment. There were meetings once a week, and the club
attracted people who

were glad of a chance to participate in public discussions on subjects which had hitherto
been taboo. The old maxim: Don’t speak in the presence of agents” was transformed in
practice into: “Speak – even in the presence of agents.” This transformation took place not
only in the speaking itself but even in the way things were said. The fact that simple human
speech was possible again, after years of petrified official speech, had an exhilarating effect
on everyone concerned.

To begin with the members were mostly young intellectuals, but soon “prominent writers and
artists, university professors, supreme court judges and even members of the government and of
the Council of State” started showing up regularly. The discussions reached new levels, and the

227 Tamás Kolosi and Iván Szélényi. «Social research on social structure in Hungary.» In Birgitta Nedelman, ed.
228 Antoni Sułek. “To America!” 345.
on Polish government and politics. New York: Twayne Publishers, 1972, 120-21. Jedlicki was a member of the club
and later emigrated to the USA.
230 Jedlicki, “The crooked Circle Club,” 120.
club gained authority as a discussion forum, thereby assuming “a place in the intellectual firmament of Warsaw.”

Although clubs such as the Crooked Circle Club started out as places for people to talk, discuss and be intellectually stimulated, they grew into breeding grounds for ideas that led to the uprising in October of 1956. Members of these clubs played an important role in this uprising, and they continued their political battle until their clubs were closed down by the authorities.

The people at International Affairs knew that things were brewing in Poland, but if there had not been the revolutionary events in the fall of 1956, the Ford Foundation trustees may not have seen Poland as a potential country for exchange.

**Stone’s first visit in Poland**

By mid February 1957 Stone was in Warsaw, on his first mission to negotiate possible programs in Eastern Europe. Stone had intended to keep this first visit in Warsaw low-key, but word got out, and Stone allegedly found his hotel lobby filled with people who wanted his advice on how to travel to the West to study, train and learn, and he was “overwhelmingly impressed with the pressure and outspoken nature of public opinion in Poland for contact and exchange with the West.”

The Poles, especially the intellectual elite among whom most had refused to be stalinized, had always been comparatively feisty, outspoken, and hard for the communists and other oppressive regimes to control. The time immediately following the uprising was, however, particularly optimistic and conducive to more freedom of expression. To approach Stone with questions and information at that particular time would thus have been easier than both before and after. At that time the enthusiasm may have led to a certain hubris, and a corresponding lack of fear that bringing up sensitive issues with an American could backfire on them if the political tide turned.

After spending nine busy days in Poland, Stone wrote enthusiastically to Ford Foundation vice-President Donald Price. In a long letter he described his first encounter, and what he wrote tells us a lot about how he perceived the mood in Poland at that particular time:

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232 Ibid., 121.
233 The Crooked Circle Club was closed “by the Party” in February 1962. FFA GF 2318-57322-4 From K. A. Jelenski, Congress for Cultural Freedom, to Stone, 9 April 1964.
234 In the course of this trip Stone also visited Czechoslovakia where “he was told of an interest in contact with the West but [where] fear to speak openly was only too evident.” DCSS, Memo from Adie to Bunny, March 20, 1957.
235 DCSS. FF-IA. Memo from Adie to Bunny, March 20, 1957
236 John Connelly, *Captive University*
Although I expected a friendly reception in Poland I was not prepared for a demonstration – that is the only word for it. I had made up my mind, before entering Poland, to be discreet, to avoid the press, to listen and to leave. Recognizing Poland’s delicate position, I decided that I would go about it as quietly as possible. Through the French and East German Communist papers I had known of the allegations against the Foundations as supporters of sinister projects etc.  

When he arrived in Warsaw on 11 February, he was shown headlines on the front pages of Warsaw newspapers, announcing that “the Ford Foundation had sent a representative to Poland to investigate help for the universities, academies, students etc.” He had dinner with government officials at his hotel, and noticed that many professors and students (“dozens”) were waiting in the hotel for interviews. In describing the hotel, he painted a rather sinister picture: “the Bristol Hotel is Grand Hotel in Warsaw – dirty red plush; dark, run down; strange characters from the East sitting around, listening, watching every move.” While in Warsaw he was approached by Polish journalists for interviews. He did not give any, but the press, both in Warsaw and Krakow wrote about his visit in Poland. From all this Stone got the impression that

the Polish Government had evidently made up its mind that, Russia notwithstanding, they wanted the Polish people to know that the American foundations were welcome in Poland; that the Polish authorities, as well as the universities and students, were glad to have the Foundation representative on hand.

Stone reported that he was welcomed wherever he went. At a lunch given by the Minister of Higher Education, he met university officials and the leaders of the academies, and he spent an hour talking to the Minister of Education, Władysław Bieńkowski, “Gomulka’s right hand man.” Bieńkowski, like many others he met, told him that Poland needed “help for its universities, professors, students; that through the Foundation the Polish experts could learn about business management and planning; that sociology, psychology and other subjects which had been banned until recently needed invigoration from the West.”

During his long week in Poland, Stone “spoke with dozens of Government officials, more than a hundred university professors and instructors; hundreds of students; many young authors, writers and artists, particularly with the young Polish intellectuals who had spearheaded the drive for change.” It was especially important to find out how the government officials viewed a possible Foundation program, and from talking to Bieńkowski “who was speaking for Gomulka,” the prime minister Józef Cyrankiewicz, and many other officials, he got the definite impression that

237 DCSS. FF-IA. Correspondence – 1957 – D-P. Stone to Don Price, February 23, 1957
the Foundation was welcomed by them. They asked the Foundation for help and gave Stone “specific ideas” as to what kind of assistance the Poles needed the most.

On 14 February 1957, while Stone was in Poland, the International Affairs presented the Ford Foundation Board of Trustees with a recommendation for action in Poland. They sought the approval of “an appropriation of $500,000 for a one-year pilot program to strengthen Poland’s educational, scientific, and cultural relations with the United States and other free nations.” It was considered “in line with U.S. policy,” and enhanced by “the State Department announcement in Washington that negotiations regarding possible American economic aid would soon be opened with a Polish economic delegation.”

In Poland, still waiting for the Board’s decision, Stone told the Polish officials that

if the Foundation trustees took positive action (and I repeated to the point of monotony that the might not) we would not make a grant to a government. I think we shall want to make grants to the universities, to one or two academies of science and very importantly to institutions in the United States and in Western Europe who can work out matters with the Poles.

The officials agreed that it was a good idea to organize the funding in that manner – if there was a program, and they proceeded to tell him what they needed. The requests were so similar wherever he went that Stone told Price that “it almost became monotonous to hear from all sides what the needs are in Poland. Again and again it was emphasized:

1) Scholarships and travel grants to make it possible for professors, instructors, university and school administrators, teachers to study in Europe and the United States. Poland’s lack of foreign exchange makes it impossible for the Poles to support a large program of their own.
2) Scholarships and travel grants for writers and other intellectuals.
3) Support to enable outstanding foreign experts to come to Poland
4) Support for a large program to provide books and periodicals published during the last ten years in the West. The libraries, institutes and individual scholars are hungry for this literature.
5) Support for buying a limited amount of laboratory equipment.”

After this “monotony” of requests, (which Stone took to heart and later convinced the Foundation to grant), Stone was very happy to land a prestigious appointment with Cardinal Stefan Wysziński. Because the Cardinal had shown support for Gomulka, the Church was no longer only for farmers, but had joined forces with the intelligentsia. Hence, because of the

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communist ban on religion and the Catholic Church, the Cardinal was extremely popular with a 
major cross-section of Polish people, and Stone referred to him as “the most important man in 
Poland.” Neither he or Gomułka, he was told, would receive any foreigners, not even diplomats. 
Stone, however, decided to write to the Cardinal’s secretary, 

stating that the Foundation had sent me to Poland, that I was looking at the educational and 
scientific situation and that his views would be of great help to us. Through his bishop 
assistant I was informed 24 hours later that the Cardinal would receive me. I saw him last 
Monday morning. This is not the place to give a full report on the conversation. The main 
point is this: the Cardinal believes that the type of help the Poles want is essential and urgent 
and that we should act immediately, that there is no time to lose. The fact that he received 
me is restricted information – in our office and elsewhere.

As “the most important man in Poland,” the Cardinal was crucial in the political landscape at the 
time, and he regarded Gomułka “the only political hope for a better future.” The Stalinists in 
Polish politics were already trying to bring Gomułka down, but he had the Cardinal with him, 
and consequently most of the Polish people, too. In Stone’s view, “Poland votes the way the 
Cardinal directs.” Getting the approval of the Cardinal was, hence, a boost to Stone and his faith 
in a Polish program.

That a Foundation could play a different role from government was confirmed for Stone 
while he was in Poland. He observed that the “Western Embassies, including the American, have 
had little or no contact with high Polish authorities, or for that matter with university leaders and 
important intellectuals.” At the American Embassy they were afraid that making contact with 
Polish officials may cause more harm than good, in their balancing act with the Soviets. And 
some officials were afraid to have contacts with foreign diplomats or press. A private Foundation 
must have seemed safer, and people both at the Embassy and Polish officials “urged” Stone to 
get a program started, “even though at any time Moscow might decide to try to stop the new 
trend in Poland.”

Stone’s days in Poland also gave him the opportunity to form a better opinion about the 
economic situation there, and of how the Poles saw themselves in relation to the West. From 
what he saw and heard, Stone drew the conclusion that the Communist economic plans had not 
worked and that the planned economy had “collapsed.” The difficult economic situation in turn 
“aroused the Poles to demand action.” As for himself, coming from affluent America, Stone was 
taken aback by the economic situation in Poland, which convinced him of “the failure of the 
Communist economy”: 

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Housing is totally insufficient despite many East Berlin Stalin-Allee type building projects. I visited the homes of professors and high government officials in which three or four people live in one small room, furnishings are few, facilities sometimes primitive. Transportation is backward – the street cars are cans of sardines and few people have an automobile. In the agricultural area farmers would not go along with the State collectives. Now there is a change because the collectives are disintegrating and private ownership and initiative among the farmers is recognized. On their own the farmers are establishing Scandinavian-type cooperatives and production of farm products is expected to increase. Consumers goods are shabby and prices are sky-high, particularly for clothes. Wages are very low. An unskilled worker earns 30-35 dollars a month and puts in a six-day week. An instructor at the University earns 50-60 a month and a full professor about 100 dollars a month. Yet a man’s suit of decent quality costs 200 dollars. Eggs and other foods are much higher priced than they are in New York. The only part of the budget that is cheap is rent, and, as I have said, housing is deplorable.

Stone got the impression that the Poles were aware of the “enormous advances made in the United States since the war,” but that they looked to Western Europe, especially West Germany, whose great economic growth had impressed them. According to Stone, people in Poland knew that it was “unreal to measure their situation with our [the American] yardstick.” What they saw across the border to the West, however, seemed more attainable.

By asking the United States for a loan, the leaders in Poland obviously realized that something had to be done to improve the situation. The loan would have to be granted fast, thought Stone, as the “anti-Gomulka pro-Stalinist” forces in Poland were getting stronger, as was the Soviet propaganda and pressure.

The Poles hoped that the Soviets would let them “develop their own Polish ‘socialism,’” even though Stone found them unable to define the term “socialism.” They wanted an economic system with some government control, but which also allowed for a private sector, more competition in industry, and the possibility of individual initiative. “Even in large industry,” Stone claimed, “they are groping for a system which will permit good men to emerge. They have had enough of the party characters who don’t know how to manage, plan or produce.”

Many of the people Stone met were or had been members of the Communist party, but he found “almost all […] bitterly opposed to Moscow, to Stalinism, to the Communist ideology and think of themselves as Social Democrats, western style.” He perceived a great desire and hope for “freedom” in the people he talked to, and that this affected their behaviour: “Even the cynics, and there are many in Poland, are beginning to enjoy a situation in which they speak some of the things they think instead of thinking what they speak.” He also noticed, however, that “every conversation ends in a low tone. Somehow the shadow of a Stalinist agent, of Soviet action falls over the Poles. […] Professors and government officials still look over their shoulders when they
talk with you; they prefer to hand over their memoranda in person and not leave them with the hotel porter. Many things are left unsaid.” “Everyone,” including Stone, knew that the threat of the Soviet Union meant that people in Poland must continue to appear respectful of the policy and position of the Soviets. Still, there was a new openness, and Stone described (slightly condescendingly) people he met as being “like children who for the first time are allowed to speak and be listened to in the parlour.” Especially among students and young intellectuals, some of which had incited the uprising of 1956, Stone experienced “a fresh joy about freedom of speech.”

One encounter with a large group of students in Krakow, which Stone thought showed “the depth of feeling for the USA and for the West,” illustrates the mood and hubris among the students:

The students put on a “Rock and Roll” ball. They invited me to come. When I arrived the dancing stopped, students and others made speeches about the hope that the Ford Foundation would help them to go to the West, to study and to find out what freedom really meant. By inference they told what they thought of the Communist system under which they had been living until the “October” revolution. (In Krakow the students had led the anti-Stalin movement last October.) They continued to make speeches, I had to reply and admit that it had been necessary for me to come to Krakow to see my first Rock and Roll, and then I was tossed into the air five times – and the Poles tell me that this is a mark of friendship though for me it was a rough affair. The students kept me on until two AM, there were more speeches and this time I was sent aloft ten times. Then I was accompanied back to the hotel. Obviously this was not a personal demonstration, but evidence of their feeling about the first American to come to Krakow, representing an institution which they hoped would open the door to the world. This type of demonstration by six hundred students in a city in which, at the same time, eight Russian generals were making a military inspection reveals the hope of the young people of Poland. 241

Stone described his stay in Poland as “an extraordinary experience.” What people had told him they needed from America strengthened his belief that the Foundation could make a valuable contribution, and he (somewhat dramatically) summed it up as a collective “plea”:

“There is no time to waste, help us quickly with economic aid and with intellectual contacts with the West. If we get aid and if our economy starts to produce the Stalinites will have lost half the battle. If you help us to go out into the world again, if your leading authorities come to us so that Polish science, administration, economics and university life can have the benefit of modern ideas and knowledge, our professors, students and intellectuals will be bound to freedom. They will be a bulwark against the Communist philosophy and practice which have ruined us.”

Stone concluded, in his letter to Don Price, that there was “a large opportunity before the Foundation and that we should not hesitate to support a program for Poland.” They should take “immediate action,” even though it was possible that the Soviet Union could intervene “overnight” […] and destroy the new movement toward freedom.” The chance was worth taking. Poland would, either way, be “a powderkeg for the Russians,” and Stone thought that developing Polish institutions in a western direction would serve both Poland and the West well.

**Winning over the Board of Trustees**

Stone came back from Poland impressed with the courage and outspokenness of the Poles, and with a conviction that Poland should receive both financial aid from the American government and help from the Ford Foundation to prevent any “backsliding” in the direction of Moscow.

There were obvious challenges to a program, however, and Stone realized that it would have “international and political implications.” There were Soviet divisions in Poland and on the border, and hostile communist governments in the neighbouring countries of Czechoslovakia and East Germany. The Polish feared the Germans and realized that the Soviets, after all, were their only bulwark on the Oder-Neisse border. Stone felt that many Poles accepted Soviet domination until their western border was more secure. The Poles also realized, after the failed Hungarian revolution, that the western powers would not support them if they pushed their reforms so hard that the Soviets decided to intervene.242 Stone recognized that the Poles were struggling to regain their footing in relationship to the West, while simultaneously keeping the Soviets at arm’s length by not provoking them too much. When the Polish leaders and intellectuals, despite all their fears, had approached the Foundation about a program, it was a strong statement. According to Stone, it was important, that “their yearning for contact with the West is matched by a readiness in the West to help.”243

Government support was necessary to launch a program with Poland, and to make sure he had a strong hand when meeting the Board of Trustees to get their approval for the Polish program, Stone travelled to Washington in March of 1957. He met with several officials, mostly from the State Department, but also other people in prominent positions:

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242 Ibid.
243 Ibid.
Robert Bowie, Assistant Secretary of State for Planning, “urged the Foundation to support promptly a program for Polish professors, leaders and students to study and visit in the United States and in Western Europe and for Western professors and leaders to go to Poland”. Bowie also emphasized the importance of sending books and periodicals to Polish institutions, and he hoped that the American government would be forthcoming with “substantial economic aid” for Poland.

Robert Murphy, Deputy Undersecretary of State, who also supported a possible program with Poland, was more pessimistic about the financial aid. He told Stone that “negotiations with the Poles were difficult” and that there was opposition in Congress. The State Department was in favour, but even if they succeeded (which they did) they did not think they could give the Poles as much as they had asked for.

William Lacy,244 special assistant to the Secretary on East-West Relations, Frederick Merrill, Director of the State Department’s East-West Staff, and Henry Leverich, East European Desk of the State Department, all “urged” the Foundation to launch a program with Poland. They were also optimistic about the prospects for financial aid, but thought only about ten percent of the Polish request would be granted. Merrill later phoned Stone to reinforce the view of the State Department, that it “considered exchanges with Eastern Europe a high priority and that it was strongly in favor of The Ford Foundation’s programs”. He also listed the priorities in terms of what countries to get involved with: “Poland, Yugoslavia, Soviet Union, Rumania, Czechoslovakia.”245 Lacy wrote a letter to Stone a couple of days later, stating the State Department’s policy toward Poland, and its support of a Polish exchange program. He thought it would help Stone convince the Foundation Board of Trustees.246

Christian Herter, acting Secretary of State, also supported both financial aid and an exchange program with Poland, as did Douglas Dillon, Deputy Undersecretary for Economic Affairs.

Stone also spoke with Thorsten Kalijarvi, Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs. He was part of the team who were negotiating with the Poles, and he thought that “a great chance in the cold war” might be lost if the Americans did not help Poland financially, when the country was now “at the crossroads.”

244 William S. B. Lacy was ambassador to Korea for a short term in 1955. In 1957 he was special assistant for East-West Exchanges to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. He also played a big role in negotiating the US-Soviet cultural agreement of 1958, called the “Lacy-Zarubin agreement.”
245 DCSS. FF-IA. Correspondence, 1957. Stone to Central Files, August 14, 1957
246 DCSS. FF-IA. Correspondence, 1957. Lacy to Stone, 15 March 1957.
The Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Charles Bohlen, cautioned Stone about the difficult political situation, reminding him that

the USSR looked upon Poland as a key stone in its European security position. The Kremlin was aware of the anti-USSR attitudes in Poland and was watching carefully all Polish attempts to make contact with and obtain support from the West. No one could anticipate what Russia would do, but the Ambassador thought that caution was necessary so that the Kremlin would not move on Poland as it had on Hungary. He was somewhat surprised at the extent of the Polish requests to the Ford Foundation and Rockefeller Foundation. He urged that whatever decisions the Foundation made we keep in close touch with the East European Desk of the State Department.

John F. Kennedy, who was then Senator for Massachusetts, “strongly urged Foundation support for a program with Poland in the educational-cultural area” when he met with Stone. Kennedy had also written a letter to the State Department “urging United States economic aid for Poland.” Finally, Stone spoke with Allen Dulles, the director of the CIA, who also “urged the Foundation to support a program for Poland.”

Back in New York, Stone met with Ambassador Michalowski, Chief of the Polish Mission to the U.N. He, too, cautioned Stone that “Poland was in an extremely difficult position; that if United States aid were not forthcoming, Poland’s attempt to strengthen contacts with the West would be severely damaged.” At the same time, he hoped that the Foundation “would not tie up our decision with political matters,” but “take action soon.” The Poles obviously wanted to develop contacts with the West, but knew that they were “in a dangerous position” and that they “must not publicly antagonize the Kremlin.”

Thinking back on the East European program fifteen years after he initiated it, Stone said he didn’t think “the Federal government at that time would have dared” to carry out a program with Eastern Europe, but that he thought “they were very pleased indeed that it was done.” He also said that he

made a point during all of those years of talking, whenever we were developing ideas of programs, with some of the best minds I knew in the Federal government or in governments overseas as well as talking to people in universities and with newspapermen whom I thought knew a great deal. And so I used to keep in touch; I didn’t go to Washington every week or month but I probably made three or four trips a year to Washington to talk to people. Many of them came here. And because it just so happened that the High Commission for Germany was a big establishment, I never could move in the streets of Washington or New York or any capital without somebody coming up and saying, “I used to work with you or for you.”

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So I had a tremendous network of people to talk to. And I do think that we did many things that the U.S. Government couldn’t have done. 249

After his trip to Washington in March and his meeting with Ambassador Michalowski, thus having compiled all his support and arguments from both the American and the Polish government for the Polish program, Stone was ready to meet the Board of Trustees. The program he wanted them to approve was designed to:

1) Enable outstanding Polish professors in the social sciences, economics, engineering, architecture, etc. to establish or renew contacts with Western colleagues and gain knowledge of Western developments primarily by study in the U.S. and in Western Europe;
2) Make available outstanding American and West European professors for teaching and lecturing in Poland;
3) Provide a two-way exchange of experts in various fields who would help Poland to develop its economic life and to work with Poland’s educational and scientific institutions;
4) Provide a two-way exchange of students, primarily from Poland to the United States and to Western European countries, with a limited number of American students going to Poland;
5) Enable leading Polish intellectuals, writers, engineers, architects, workers’ council representatives, economic planners to visit the U.S. and other free countries, and to send American, British, Scandinavian, French, and other experts to Poland;
6) Provide books and periodicals published during the last ten years in the U.S. and Europe to leading Polish libraries, universities, institutes and academies and, in [some] cases, to individual Poles,
7) Provide a limited amount of equipment and testing materials to the Poles;
8) Support a few research projects in Poland 250

While stressing that the program should “remain elastic” in order to “achieve maximum effectiveness,” the proposed program would bring 65 Poles to the U.S. (20 experts and leaders, 20 professors, and 25 students), 60 Poles to Western Europe (25 experts and leaders, 15 professors, and 20 students), and 35 Americans to Poland (15 experts and leaders, 10 professors, and 10 students). The duration of the stays was to be two months for the experts/leaders, nine months for the professors and one year for the students. In addition there were to be some money granted to provide Polish institutions with books, periodicals, and equipment.

249 FFA. Interview with Shepard Stone, 21.
250 FFA. Trustees Docket 3/1957, “Program for Poland.”
There was, not surprisingly, both resistance and support among the Board members. Following the presentation of the program proposal, points “against” and “for” the program were discussed:

The arguments against the program echoed the general fear that the Soviets might at any time intervene and reverse the apparent process of democratization in Poland and that the Poles would continue to meet Soviet demands to an extent unacceptable to the Foundation. The opposition among certain “powerful political forces” in the United States was also stated as a reason why a Polish program may not be such a good idea, but here Stone may have calmed the waters with all his accounts of “urging” from Washington.

The main arguments in favour of the program were that things would likely go wrong if it was not launched. If the Foundation did not reach out at this moment, when the Poles had made the first move with the uprising and then reaching out the United States and the Foundation, Polish hopes would be crushed and the spirit of people all across Eastern Europe would be weakened. It was argued that the people of Poland were strongly anti-Soviet and that they were “pinning their future” on closer contact with the West and eventual freedom from Soviet domination. There would, however, be something to gain for the West, too, and it was claimed that “[e]ven if Moscow tried to reimpose controls over Poland any investment made by the Foundation in the educational, scientific, and cultural life in Poland would have long-range, positive results for the free nations.”

In the same docket as the above, there is also an outline of the “procedure” in the case that the Foundation approved the Polish program, and the main points here provide a good starting point to describing how the fellowship programs were carried out:

1) Grants would not be made to the Polish government. Grants would be made to Polish universities, academies, and institutions, to a small number of institutions in Western Europe, and to American institutions such as I.I.E. and a few individual universities.

2) With respect to awards made to Poles for travel and study abroad, the institutions mentioned above would assume responsibility for the administration of the program, but steps would be taken in the selection process, with the aid of a few non-Polish experts in East European affairs, to make certain that political factors would be fully considered.

3) Grants could be terminated if events forced a reversal in Poland.

251 Ibid.
4) The State Department would assume responsibility for clearance of all Poles, including Party-members, coming to this country.

5) The Polish government has promised to cooperate fully to support an objective selection of individuals.

As we shall see in the course of the present chapter, these procedures were carried out almost to a tee, and when the premises set by them proved hard to fulfill, there was trouble.

**Announcing the Polish program**

The Trustees were convinced by Stone and approved the Polish program with “an appropriation of $500,000 for a one-year pilot program to strengthen Poland’s educational, scientific, and cultural relations with the United States and other free nations.”

Henry Heald, the President of the Foundation, announced the program in a speech to the Executives Club in Chicago on 26 April 1957.

He stated firmly that a foundation could not in any way take the place of the American government in issues of foreign policy and security, and that “activity of an educational and scientific character is not a substitute for the essential security efforts of our Government.” He did, however, express his conviction that foundations could have a “proper and vital role” in the development of international understanding. He legitimized the program further by emphasizing that “the strengthening of Europe and of European-American relations is fundamental to the security and well-being of the United States and to the Foundation’s interest in peace and freedom.” He also stressed how recent developments had shown that the Polish people wanted, and were free to, “establish relationships with the West,” and that the Ford Foundation should try an assist the development because “the renewal of Polish educational, scientific, and cultural relationships with the West can be of benefit to the United States, to Poland, and to the rest of Europe.” Although Heald acknowledged the “many uncertainties in and around Poland” and the possibility of “reverses” back into a tight Soviet grip, he concluded that the Ford Foundation was “convinced that the Western countries have nothing to fear from intellectual and scholarly contacts with individuals from the Communist-dominated sphere,” and

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252 Ibid.
281 DCSS, FF-IA. Attachment A to "Background and guidelines for 1961 selection team," February 9, 1961. The Polish program was followed by a program with Yugoslavia in 1959, and with Hungary in 1964. In addition, two exchangees visited the U.S. from Czechoslovakia in 1967, and eleven exchangees were selected from Bulgaria in 1968-69.
that they were confident that “philosophically and practically the exponents of democracy and of a free society carry the future with them.” 254

Most points in Heald’s speech are identical to those made in a docket item prepared by the IA staff in November 1956, 255 and the rest of it echoes the opinions and judgements formed by Shepard Stone on his visits to Poland and Washington. This corresponds with the view that Henry Heald trusted Stone as the expert on the matter, and therefore endowed him with much power and responsibility where the European program was concerned. 256

The day after Heald’s announcement, The New York Times wrote a long article on the new Polish program, stressing that it “required courage on the part of the Polish Government and of the Ford Foundation to make this program possible,” and that there were “groups and individuals” in the United States who thought of Poland “only in terms of past stereotypes, forgetting the Polish people and their aspirations.” Those who had “visited Poland during the past year,” however, or “followed the Polish press,” knew the “vast hunger for contact with the west in that country.” Obviously trying to educate its readers, The Times reminded them that Poland’s historic, cultural and religious ties with the West have been forged over the centuries. The forced break in those ties during the decade of Stalinist oppression could not and did not end the link, and in the atmosphere of the post-Stalin period the people who gave the world Chopin and Mme. Curie have been eager to resume old contacts. 257

Stone remembered the articles in the New York Times well (there were several about the Polish program), and seemed quite proud when he recalled the attention the program was given:

In The New York Times, on page one, the story appeared and as I recall the headline—this is overdramatizing it—it said something to the effect that $500,000 was being given to Red Poland by the Ford Foundation, which, of course, was very helpful. (Ironic tone) But the story was precise, factual, and I think, mainly correct, and it was a story that started on page one—these details are interesting—and jumped to about page fifty-one or so, and, on the jump, there was a statement that I, Shepard Stone, had negotiated the grant, and had been in Poland and worked it all out. 258

255 DCSS. FF-IA. Docket Item: Program for Europe, prepared by IA staff. Revised Nov. 8, 1956
258 FFA. Interview with Stone, 11.
Although the Ford Foundation launched programs for the exchange of individuals, Foundation policy required grants to be made out to certain organizations which in turn administered programs for, and distributed funds to, the individual exchangees. The Institute for International Education (IIE) agreed to be the grantee for the exchange program with Poland (they received six grants for this, totalling $1,225,000), and they administered the Polish program until 1969.259

The IIE had been involved with American foundations from the day it was established, in the aftermath of the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. Generally, exchange activities funded by American foundations and European organizations with similar objectives, such as the Universities Bureau of the British Empire, the German Exchange Service and the British Council, focused on certain fields in education that they administered themselves. The IIE was different. It was created to “act as the node in the world of educational exchanges.”260 During the interwar years and until the 1950s, the IIE mostly ran small-scale programs with Europeans and people in America – north and south. As the role of the United States in the world changed, so did the IIE. The American government had begun to see education as one of the most important aspects of furthering America’s new global role, and already in 1946 implemented the Fulbright Program.261 The IIE followed course, and wrote to their granters in the American foundations that they, at the Institute, regarded it “a moral responsibility” for America to “assist in preparing the future leaders [in “dependent and backward territories”] for service.” In 1950, the new president of the IIE, Kenneth Holland, stated in his presidential address to his organization that “if the free world is to avoid succumbing to communist totalitarianism, leaders in every country must be developed with international experience.”262

For the Ford Foundation and the East European fellows, the IIE was essential in running the exchange programs: It was their “responsible agency to carry out its exchange programs, and not […] a body to support with one-off grants or cyclical appropriations.”263 Their people were responsible for working out the logistics of the exchanges, they took care of all practical matters.

259 At that time the Foundation went through major changes and new International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX) took over. The FF did not rely on IREX as they did the IIE. I will discuss this when I get to the late 1960s and the restructuring of FF.
263 Ibid., 42.
from day to day, and they were the primary contact for the exchangees – although most of them also met directly with Stone or other officers of the IA, who were obviously very involved with the program. The Foundation was in charge of selections and, according to the amount of correspondence and reporting that went past Stone and the others at the IA, they seem to have been closely involved with most other aspects of the program, too. In their own words: “The International Affairs program has taken care to talk with the scholars and leaders coming to the United States and after their visits and otherwise has attempted evaluation of the results of the program.” 264 This arrangement, with strong Foundation involvement, was adhered to also in the subsequent programs with Yugoslavia and Hungary. 265

**The Sputnik scare**

Just after the first Polish fellows had arrived in America, there was a rather dramatic intermezzo. The Sputnik launch by the Soviet Union on 4 October 1957, and the shock effect this had on Americans – in retrospect quite out of proportion – did nothing but inspire those who, like Stone and his like-minded, believed in the importance of fighting communism with soft power measures. Even if it meant that the Soviets were technologically stronger than presumed, and even though the Sputnik shock had given the Soviet Union a propaganda advantage, there was still the conviction that American culture was superior and that, if only it could be dispersed appropriately, it was only a matter of time before the war was won with other means than the military high technology of the time. Howard Cullman, Commissioner General to the U. S. at the 1958 Expo in Brussels, believed that “[w]ith appropriate funds, […] we can do a Sputnik culturally, intellectually, and spiritually.” 266

**Negotiating with Polish officials: Krassowska, Leszczynski and Schaff**

In foreign work a private foundation enjoys a special privilege extended by its government and by the government of the country in which it operates. It bears a special responsibility for carrying on its work with respect for local attitudes, sensibilities and values and for maintaining appropriate contacts with governmental agencies. Otherwise it can generate


266 Walter L. Hixson. *Parting the Curtain*, 142.
harmful repercussions which will extend well beyond the technical fields in which it happens to be engaged.267

The main channel through which the Polish government sought to re-establish a connection with the West, was the Ministry of Higher Education. The Polish program in the beginning largely rested on the success of the cooperation between the Ford Foundation officers and the officials at the Ministry. Although Stone met with the Minister of Higher Education, Stefan Żółkiewski, on several occasions,268 it was the Ministry’s Vice-Minister, Eugenia Krassowska, who became the Ford Foundation’s “official liaison” and who most often was in charge of the negotiating the program as it progressed. Krassowska was, according to John Connelly, a “Belorussian fellow traveler,” who had “completed studies in Wilno in the 1930s, taught in underground education during the war, and afterward held leading positions in the Democratic Party […], which unwaveringly supported the Polish Workers’ Party/ Polish United Workers’ Party. She succeeded Władysław Bieńkowski in education administration in 1946, and “remained an undersecretary of state responsible for higher education until 1964.”269

Another person who figured often in Stone’s correspondence and reports, in the beginning of the Polish program, was Ludwik Leszczynski, the Director of Universities at the Ministry of Education. He was a strong supporter of the Polish program, and although Stone once called him “a cynical man who has been of great use to us,”270 and was later warned by Jerzy Giedroyc of the journal Kultura to “take all the precautions possible when dealing with Leszczynski. He is an opportunist and a false,”271 the correspondence between them gives the impression of two men on friendly terms. Leszczynski, especially, was very personal in his letters to Stone.272 Leszczynski, had, in Igor Czernecki’s words

On numerous occasions […] backed politically tainted figures who would otherwise have faced significant bureaucratic difficulties. He was a reliable counterweight to the more

268 For example, Stone wrote that, after arriving in Warsaw in September 1958, “During the next two or three days I had long meetings […] with Minister of Higher Education, Zolkiewski”. DCSS. FF-IA. Correspondence, 1958. Stone to Price, Nielsen, Gordon. Paris, September 6, 1958.
270 Berghahn, America, 192. Stone wrote this to Adlai Stevenson on June 17, 1958.
271 Ford Foundation Archives. Grant Files (Henceforth FFA GF). 2520-57-322-5(7).Grant attachments. Giedroyc to Stone, July 28, 1958. Kultura was one of the journals financed by the Ford Foundation. I was considered an important factor in the Foundation’s deployment of soft power in Europe.
dogmatic representatives of the Polish side of negotiations. But liberal inclinations were falling out of favour in the CC [Central Committee].

Thus, when he left his job at the Ministry of Education shortly after a visit to the United States in 1958, and much of the responsibility for the Foundation program passed to the not-so-friendly Krassowska, it complicated matters for Stone and the Foundation. Although Leszczynski claimed that he was changing jobs because of his health (this was also the official explanation), “it was no secret that he was not a dyed-in-the-wool communist.”

With Leszczynski’s exit, another and more prominent person in Polish academic and political life increasingly got involved with the Ford Foundation program: Adam Schaff, who later called himself the “‘gray eminence’ of Polish Communist ideology and science.” He was considered “Poland’s master ideologue,” especially from 1948 to 1956, and was a member of the Central Committee. From 1957 to 1968 he was also professor of philosophy at the Polish Academy of Sciences, Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, and it was in this capacity that he became involved with the Ford Foundation program.

Schaff has an interesting biography: he was awarded a kandidat degree in philosophy from Moscow State University in 1944, and “claimed equal fluency in Polish and Soviet scholarship.” The Polish Communists were too weak to bring about radical change in the universities after 1948. Hence, leading academic functionaries in the Polish United Workers’ Party, like Schaff, had to use “loyal” and “cooperative” non-Party members in the universities as their intermediaries. This led Schaff and his colleagues into “unending rounds of bargaining” in order not to lose contacts with the universities. This “gradually wore away at their self-understanding as Party functionaries” and they came to see themselves, especially after Stalin’s death, “as intermediaries, as the ‘protectors’ of the academic community, proud of their ability to limit the damage of a system that they themselves grew to call Stalinist.”

John Connelly credits Schaff with being the most important person “in attempts to convert Polish social sciences and humanities to Marxism,” and claims that he had anticipated from the start that it

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273 Igor Czernecki. “An intellectual offensive,” 303
274 DCSS. FF-IA. Correspondence 1958. Leszczynski to Stone, Warsaw, December 17th 1958. “P.S. I have not been too well for the past fortnight and following an urgent advice of my doctor I tended my resignation of my post. It has been accepted and beginning with 1 January 1959 I shall leave the Ministry and work elsewhere with responsibilities more adapted to my present state of health. I hope to meet you when in Poland in January.”
275 Berghahn, America, 192
277 Connelly, Captive university, 38
278 Ibid., 47.
279 Ibid., 151.
Schaff played a central role in the Marxist-Leninist education of a whole generation. According to Connelly, the formal competency of lecturers in the subject were wanting. In the mid-fifties “[o]nly two of eleven lecturers [in Warsaw] possessed full academic credentials. The others had learned their Marxism-Leninism in nine-month courses at Adam Schaff’s Institute of Social Sciences[...].”281 Although he was a Stalinist, Schaff had a “very un-Stalinist way of propagating Stalinism, and he must be given credit for helping to keep a spirit of intellectual inquiry alive in Poland during the dark years of the early 1950s.”282 For some reason Schaff, unlike many others, had survived professionally and politically also after 1956, despite his reputation as a “self-important” man with a bad temper. 283

In other words, it was a powerful, many-faceted man whom Stone and his colleagues were presented with. He was a staunch Marxist, but also an intellectual who was obviously not opposed to encounters with the West. When Stone once asked him “why he favoured the [Polish] program,” Schaff answered: “The fact that I am a Marxist doesn’t mean that I agree with everything taking place in the East. I think it is vital for the future development of Poland to have full and friendly relations with the West, particularly the United States.”284

Schaff has generally been regarded as someone who became a revisionist with a humanistic approach to Marxism after the Gomułka Revolution. When Schaff lost his position in the Central Committee he did, naturally, deny the charges against him: “My whole past, my whole internal conviction has been a testament of deep attachment to the movement of the Party, which has been, and is, the profoundest substance of my life.” Peter Raina argues that he never was a revisionist, but that he “preached and practiced Party dogma all his life.” 285 Schaff nevertheless remained an important figure vis-à-vis the Foundation and the Polish program

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280 Ibid., 156.
281 Ibid., 210.
283 Connelly, Captive university, 157.
284 DCSS. FF-IA. Memo from Stone to FF, “Visit to Poland—Part I” October 23 – November 1, 1957, 8.


through its most tumultuous years, and the relationship lasted a least until the Polish program resumed in 1967.  

For Schaff, whose whole life must have been a virtual rollercoaster-ride, the tensions with the Ford Foundation were probably a minor challenge compared to all the other battles he was compelled to fight. He managed to stay afloat and maintain his position in Polish academic and political life until 1968 – in itself a testimony to his talents for handling many roles and changes – when he lost his position in the Central Committee on charges of revisionism.

**The social or natural sciences?**

It soon became obvious that the Polish program was prestigious, both for the Foundation and for the Polish fellows. The Polish authorities, too, often expressed how valuable the program was for Poland. Nevertheless, despite – or because of – its prestige, there was an ongoing dispute between the Foundation and the representatives of the Polish government on the issue of selections. There was an agreement from the beginning that the Polish authorities (Ministry of Higher Education) could nominate a certain number of candidates, but that the decision in the end rested with the Foundation selection committee. While the Foundation was most interested in sociologists, economists, writers, and others in the humanities, arts, and social sciences, the Polish authorities often wanted to send people in the natural sciences whom the Foundation considered to be “technicians.”

The insistence on selecting their own candidates for the fellowship programs was central to the concept of exchanges developed by the IA and unusual in the Cold War world of exchanges. The fact that the Foundation selected many more people in the humanities and the social sciences, and that they picked people who were not necessarily on good terms with the governments of their respective countries, became a source of conflict and frustration, and over the years the Foundation demands were modified, in order to keep programs running, but they were never abandoned while the IA was in charge.

Already in December 1953, in connection with a proposal to further “international cooperation” of scientists, Stone had asked Price important questions about what this would entail; what focus the Foundation should have: “Is a primary objective to achieve a better

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286 FFA. GF. 2318-57322-4. Stone to Schaff, 16 June 1967. “By this time you will know all about the group arriving in Warsaw on June 26. This is simply a note to tell you that we look forward to the visit. During our stay in Warsaw you and I can have a good talk about a number of matters we have previously discussed.”

287 I won’t go so far as to say unique; the Rockefeller Foundation carried out exchange programs much by the same method, but chiefly in the natural sciences and health related disciplines.
exchange of technical information? Is it to help scientists to develop better bombs, insecticide or television sets? [...] Or are basically ethical considerations in mind – to develop some common philosophical thought among the scientists of the world? To marshal, in favor of projects of peace, the wisdom and technical capacity of the scientist?”288 These were questions that would be important also when determining the considerations of the future exchange program with Eastern Europe, and selections for the IA programs were based on “basically ethical considerations” more than on “exchange of technical information.” The preference for fellowship candidates in areas such as economics, sociology, and journalism goes to prove this, as well as explicit instructions not to select mere “technicians” in the natural and technical sciences. That the Eastern European governments to a large extent took the opposite position and wanted to send natural scientists and technicians to learn about western technology and methods, was one of the reasons for tension between the Ford Foundation and the East European institutions involved in the exchange program.

Why were the social sciences so important? According to Olivier Zunz, there was a “wide spread […] belief in the link between expertise and progress” in the United States. American reformers and social scientists had, since the late eighteen hundreds, been strengthened in their faith of improving society by way of “social investigation” and that boosted the social sciences.” This was infused with “Christian concerns,” and “social scientists nearly always kept sight of large political and moral goals. […] In the end, the missionary impulse behind the American century was channeled into a belief that [social] problems could be solved.” 289 In this the social sciences played the major role: Economics, political science and sociology were all important, and statistical methods were applied. Statistics had first been developed in Europe, but in America European ideas “were to flourish in ways unfathomable in Europe.”290 Social scientists “suggested that more information and a better understanding of social complexity would eventually produce a more harmonious society.”291 With a belief in social engineering social scientists also applied psychology to understand and shape mass-society.

It is difficult to find accounts in the files that are explicit on why the social sciences were important to the Ford Foundation, so we can assume the reasons were so obvious that they

288 DCSS, FF-IA. Stone to Price, 18 December 1953.
289 Zunz, Why the American Century. Zunz’s book is about how the Americans “With their new organizational techniques and principles of social order […] believed they had salvaged their own mass society from potential chaos” by the end of World War II. They also believed that in their new hegemonic position their “ideas and programs, which derived their specific qualities from the American experience” could be imposed on the rest of the post-war world.
290 Zunz, Why the American Century, 49.
291 Ibid., 43.
needed not be stated. However, in a background memo "Social Sciences in Europe" from 1966 I found the following explanation:

One premise for the Foundation's interest in the advancement of the social sciences in Europe is this: A high professional level of social science discourse contributes significantly to the ability of a country to understand itself in objective terms, to confront successfully its national problems, and to deal more constructively with its international relations. At least by American standards, European social scientists are short in number and trained both narrowly and poorly. Their research tends to be descriptive rather than analytical. Among the major social sciences, economics receives most attention, sociology modest, and political science least. Important here is the substantial absence of graduate training and the lack of curriculum attention to the contemporary social world.292

American approaches to sociology, as an example, dominated Europe and the World in the 1950s and 1960s, and are still influential today. However, Europeans adjusted their approaches as the sociological theories were seen as a reflection of “American thought and reality.” American sociologists saw the social world as “as being made up of the voluntary acts of negotiating and cooperating individuals which occur at every moment in life.” Marxist sociologists often left their theories of dialectics and developmental logic for the more empirical approach of American sociologists, hence adapting, if not adopting, the methods of the Americans. There was a move from constructing theory for its own sake to using theory to guide empirical investigations that were carried out “according to approved quantitative and qualitative methods.”293

In the case of sociology in the time before the war, the discipline was weak in Hungary and Yugoslavia, stronger in Poland and Czechoslovakia (the country in the region considered the most “Western” and complex society at the time). Although Poland and Hungary were in similar stages of development, sociology flourished in Poland in the years between the wars. Hungarian sociologists Tamás Kolosi and Iván Szélényi (a former Ford fellow), attribute the strong position of Polish sociology at that time to “exceptional personalities and to the dynamics of institution building.” One of the strong personalities, Florian Znaniecki, was one of the most important in establishing a strong sociology-field in Poland. He was educated in Poland, Switzerland, France, and the United States and later lectured both in Poland and the USA, and was influenced by both European and American approaches to sociology. Because of the strong position of institutions

292 FFA Collections. Slater. Background memo for meeting from Gordon (STG), 7 November 1966.
for sociological research before the second world war, Polish sociology survived the Stalinist years.294

**American philanthropy meets state-socialist bureaucracy: Problems with selections**

Implementing an exchange program between a communist country and a capitalist country (and not any capitalist country, but The Capitalist Foe, the United States) during the Cold War, does not immediately strike one as the recipe for success. That a private “freewheeling” American philanthropy like the Ford Foundation was able to plan and run a program in cooperation with the Polish Ministry of Higher Education (a state-socialist government agency, as bureaucratic and politicized as they come) was no mean feat.

The networks established by Stone and others at the Foundation were crucial to the program. Connections at American universities, at European universities, at the Congress for Cultural Freedom, Radio Free Europe, among government officials in the U.S. and in Europe: all provided Stone and the others at IA with a starting point for selecting good candidates. Members of the Polish diaspora in Western Europe and the U.S. were also important as consultants in this respect. As the ball started rolling, and the selection committees from the Foundation had interviewed a few hundred Polish scholars, specialists, and leaders, and as the first year of exchanges had established relationships between the Ford Foundation and former, often devoted, fellows, the web of connections grew steadily, always providing the IA with new potential candidates. If a candidate came highly recommended by someone that Stone had reason to trust, he usually took their recommendations at face value and nominated the people they proposed. Likewise, if he was warned against a candidate for personal or professional reasons by someone he had confidence in, this often sealed the fate of the candidate in question. If a candidate’s reputation preceded his or her personal encounter with the Ford Foundation selection team, the recommendations or warnings were added to the interview report, and regardless of how the candidate had performed during the interview, these comments seem to have carried much weight in the final selections.

So, the selection process, at the Ford Foundation end, started with suggestions and recommendations from some expert, leader, professor, generally in Stone’s extended network. The next step was to decide, either based only on the one recommendation, or after consulting others as to the credentials of the candidate in question, whether or not to put him or her on the

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list of nominees. It is unclear whether this list was then presented to the Polish Ministry of Higher Education, or whether the IA kept it to themselves until the final phase of the process.

On the Polish side, nominees for their allotted list were selected by the Ministry of Higher Education. The Ford Foundation had expressed that they wanted a call for applications widely and publicly distributed, to universities and institutions in all regions and cities, and in all fields. However, the Ministry favoured some universities, cities and fields, and did not spread the word generally about the opportunity that the Ford Foundation had to offer. Allegedly, to limit unwanted applicants, the various ministries informed people who inquired about the possibility of applying for Ford grants that they couldn’t apply unless their names were on the government list. In addition, there was no mention of the arrival of the selection committee in the Polish press. Consequently, many candidates were deterred from applying, while others heard about the application deadlines and interview rounds too late to be a part of either the Ministry’s or the Foundation’s list. The Foundation was aware that they may miss out on brilliant candidates because of this, and this was one of the reasons why they wanted a relaxed and open atmosphere surrounding their selection team while they were in Poland. It was thought that such an atmosphere would encourage persistent, strong, and courageous candidates, who had perhaps been excluded by the Polish authorities, to approach them directly while they were in Poland to make their selections. The Ministry of Higher Education, on the other hand, wanted to participate in interviews, or at least be present at them. Without success, they tried convincing the Foundation to choose more “official” spaces for their interviews. The Foundation representatives, however, preferred the suite at the Hotel Bristol in Warsaw as their base while in Warsaw.

The Ford Foundation was not completely free to do exactly as it wished with regards to Poland. As mentioned, it was necessary for the Ford Foundation to cooperate with the State Department, most often in order to obtain visas for its fellows, but also on other issues. Nevertheless, the Foundation and its grantee organization IIE were private enterprises with relatively free reigns vis-à-vis the U.S. government.

The Polish Ministry of Higher Education, on the contrary, was a government agency in a slow-moving bureaucracy, and the people working there were inextricably and directly linked to the Polish communist party and its political agenda at all times. All real power lay with the Central Committee of the party, and that took some time for the Foundation to realize, as they

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thought they could appeal to officials in the Ministry of Higher Education or members of Parliament when negotiations were difficult. In the beginning, however, when Ludwik Leszczynski was in charge of the program at the Ministry of Higher Education, they could negotiate directly. He had agreed to Stone’s demands that the Ford Foundation was to have the last word in the selections, and he stuck to the agreement.

With Schaff it was different. He, too, insisted on his support for the program to the Ford Foundation, but at home he was adamant about “correct control of our scientific and cultural exchanges.” This was as early as 1958 and, through the Congress of Cultural Freedom, his comments were made known to the Foundation. What Schaff recommended to the Central Committee was an “effective institution, which could take upon itself the organization and control of cultural and scientific exchange in the interest of the state.” This meant that he wanted an end to the practice of allowing the Foundation to pick their own candidates.

The Foundation had known about a change in attitude and Schaff’s opinions before his speech to the Central Committee. Already in the fall of 1957 there was some concern as to whether the Polish authorities would honour the agreement, but negotiations were still successful. The New York Times announced on November 2, 1957 that “Polish officials have reassured the Ford Foundation that there will be no political interference with its program there.” What called for such reassurance was the “tightening cultural controls recently decreed by Poland’s ruling Communists [which] had caused concern that the foundation’s program was heading into trouble.” Following a speech by Gomułka, where he “dealt harshly with the Left or liberal wing of the party” and “accused the liberals of having tried to revise socialism out of existence in Poland and threatened them with expulsion,” both the Ford Foundation and their affiliates in Poland became worried that this would affect the fellowship program. Also, “[p]articular anxiety had been caused by an article written by Prof. Adam Schaff for Trybuna Ludu, the main Communist newspaper, saying that the party had to reassert control over scholarships and exchange programs with foreign countries.” Schaff had “asserted that the people who had interpreted his article as an effort to rechain culture were mistaken,” and when Stone travelled to Poland to negotiate the issues concerning selections, both Schaff and Leszczynski told him that “the Polish Government was delighted with the program and hoped not only that it would be continued but that it would be expanded.”

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The issue of selections is what dominated the correspondence on the Polish program throughout its existence, and disagreement over this issue was the reason that the program broke down in 1962. As far as Stone and the Foundation was concerned, there had never been any real question as to who would be in charge of the program and have the last word. For the Poles, it was a different matter. In 1957, the Polish authorities had asked for and welcomed the Ford Foundation exchange programs, as they had the negotiations for trade and loan agreements with the United States. Consequently, they were positive in their attitude, although they realized that the Ford programs were an extension of State Department policy. It was deemed acceptable because it was regarded as support for the 1956 uprising. At the time when Stone first met Madame Krassowska in New York in January of 1957, the main goal of the Polish authorities was to improve Poland’s “faltering economy,” and they hoped to do so by obtaining assistance from the United States, which they got. Already by October of that year, however, the liberal atmosphere that had lead to the uprising in Poland was changing. At a Central Committee meeting, “an important intellectual stated that ‘academic freedom … is not equivalent with the Party letting its grip on culture abate’.”

By 1960, the Polish authorities fully recognized the value of the Ford Foundation program and therefore wanted to gain control of the selections, so they could pick people with the “appropriate moral and political outlook.” The object was that such candidates would further the progress of “Peoples’ Poland” in the image of the – now regressive – Central Committee. The Ministry of Higher Education thought the Foundation only selected party members (10%) to cover up their real agenda of choosing candidates who were revisionist and would work against the interests of the Polish state. The Polish government grew gradually more displeased with the program for political reasons, as the political climate was changing in Poland and in the world. The Central Committee put increasingly more pressure on the Ministry of Higher Education to negotiate the program in a direction more in tune with the government’s idea of how to catch up with the West in terms of technology and know-how.

The press, both in Poland and the USA, on several occasions wrote about the Foundation’s exchange programs, and in November 1960 the Polish weekly Polityka echoed the discontent of Polish authorities. In an article titled “Come, Child, I Shall pay for You…”, it


301 Igor Czernecki. “America,” 66

contended that “the Foundation was motivated by certain political considerations” in their choice of candidates, and that “too many people have gone abroad to study humanities … which was not the most rational way of using money offered to [Poland] by foreign foundations.” A few days later the New York Times announced that “The Polish Government has imposed new controls on private United States fellowship programmes.”303 In the last week of 1960 the New York Times, in a notice praising the efforts of the Foundation at home and abroad, wrote that the Foundation had announced “continuance of its program with Eastern European countries,” including Poland, thereby continuing to enable “foreign scholars and experts […] to travel and study […] at centers of learning in the Western world, where they have found welcome exposure to the fresh air of freedom.”304

Hence, in 1960, the Foundation and the Polish authorities had succeeded in their negotiations. Discussions between the IA and Polish authorities were, however, rife with “misunderstandings” and the Foundation liaison at the Ministry of Higher Education, Madame Krassowska, the once “charming lady” became instead: “Take my word for it that the lady is confused.”305 What prompted Stone to call Madame Krassowska “confused” in this manner, was apparently a letter in which she claimed that there had been an agreement between the Ford Foundation and the Ministry of Higher Education that the list of candidates for fellowship would “be definite only when both sides […] accept it.”306 Krassowska’s complaint was that the Ford Foundation had notified candidates of their fellowships before the Ministry of Higher Education had approved them all, and despite the reservations the Ministry had expressed concerning some of them. This indeed seems like a bit of a provocation from the Ford Foundation, but was probably more a result of impatience as well as a reflection of the differences between the “freewheeling” IA and the “bureaucratic” Ministry in terms of efficiency and planning and expectations of how the program was to be carried out. The fact that more and more of the candidates selected by the Foundation had trouble getting passports reflected badly on the Polish authorities in light of their initial assurance that there would be “no political interference,” an assurance that in essence was a contradiction in terms: the Ministry of Higher Education, a government agency in an authoritarian regime, was, if anything, political.  

303 Czernocki. “An intellectual offensive,” 303  
305 FFA 2518-57322-4. Letter marked “Confidential” from Stone to Anita McGrath (IIE), 30 June 1960.  
Modifications of selection criteria

Both parties wanted the exchange program, and although the Ford Foundation insisted on their freedom to choose their own candidates, they were willing to modify their selection criteria as the program progressed. Not surprisingly, however, they seem to have been more willing to implement changes suggested to them by other American institutions and advisers than from the Polish authorities. In preparation of the 1961 selections, suggestions were made by the IIE and “American educators” to consider new fields and specializations for the program. “Managerial personnel” was one of the categories recommended, on the basis that

> All the signs in Eastern Europe point toward national leadership gradually passing from the traditional political generalists into the hands of the managers and technologists. If the present trend continues, persons now filling positions of management responsibility in industrial and service organizations are likely to be most prominent among the men who will influence Poland’s future development.\(^{307}\)

At the time, it turned out that it was difficult to “identify Polish managers and to bring them into the exchange program,”\(^{308}\) but the field of management training remained one that the Ford Foundation would pursue in the decades to come.

> “Technologists” were the other group at the top of the list of recommendations, as they were also “bound to exert greater and greater influence in the life of Poland as its economy expands and decision making at every level becomes increasingly concerned with technological questions.” There were a few things about this group, however, that needed cautioning, according to the recommendations of IIE and their advisers. Firstly, if the Foundation chose to include persons from this group in the program, they would have to be “engineers (all specialists), metallurgists and others working in applied scientific works.” Secondly, the training of “technologists” in Poland was “highly vocational and anti-theoretical in approach,” and Polish technologists and engineers were “often working on a very specific problem within a narrow field and some of these esoteric specialists are not represented in universities or industrial training programs in the United States.” Thirdly, there was the question of whether or not American authorities and research institutes would allow Polish scientists to enter their industrial laboratories. These were, in many cases, “classified either by governmental ruling or to protect commercial processes.”\(^{309}\)

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The third group considered to be of great importance was “Local Party Officials”, on the grounds that no other persons were “more influential in the lives of ordinary Polish citizens than the local Communist Party Officials,” whose “attitudes, predilections, loyalties, etc.” were thought to be “key elements in the unfolding of Poland’s future.” The question of whether or not the Ford Foundation ought to invite more self-professed “Communists” into the program was recurring. It was thought that such a move, in addition to proving the FF’s “objectivity,” may include those people who really were in positions to make a difference. Also, if anybody needed a “conversion” it was the Party-members and communists. The others had already “seen the light.”

One of the problems of funding avowed Communists was that they may not be admitted into the USA by the State Department, whose responsibility it was to clear “all Poles, including Party-members.” Also, non-communists may be good candidates because they would likely be more receptive to Western ways and ideas. Another reason for choosing non-Party members and dissenters was the hope that it would put pressure on the Polish government to grant passports to intellectuals and academicians who would normally not be allowed to travel. For Stone it was important to “not play into the hands of the Party bureaucracy.” Still, it was considered to bring local or regional party officials to the USA to “observe local government administration and pursue studies in their own special fields,” something which would “surely be a bold stroke.” This was done, but only on a small scale.

It was thought by the Foundation that these groups: managerial personnel, technologists, and local party officials, “distinct, but essentially one” would be very influential in forming Poland’s future, and that it was “vital” that these particular groups were to “possess an accurate portrait of America.” Where senior leaders were concerned, there was some times trouble when they felt that going through all the same procedures as the junior candidates was undignified, and Ford Foundation officer Joseph E. Slater brought this up in a proposal for the “new” IA in 1960. For staff officers, too, it would be much better, Slater thought, that “travel and study awards to senior leaders should be made at the discretion of the program director” as it was

310 DCS. FF-IA. Correspondence, Stone to Bell, 16 January 1967.
312 Joseph Slater is another example of a man who worked both in philanthropy and government: “In ’57 I joined the International Affairs Division, then was on leave of absence to the White House on the Draper Committee of which McCloy was also a member. In ’59 I went back to the government as Deputy Managing Director of the Development Loan Fund of the AID Program and then at the beginnings of the [President John F.] Kennedy Administration setting up task groups in the field of educational and cultural affairs as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Educational and Cultural Affairs.” [He came back to the Ford Foundation in 1962 and to IA in 1963, until 1967] Ford Foundation Oral History Project. Interview with Joseph E. Slater [transcribed from cassette recording] New York, New York. February 2, 1973. Interviewer: Charles T. Morrissey, 2-3.
“far more gracious and dignified to invite someone on the spot than to go through a period of
several weeks of vague statements awaiting approval.”313 There were some examples of leaders
who did not go through the general selection process, but this seems to have applied only to the
most powerful. In several cases, the Foundation was asked to be discreet when handling a leader
or senior professor who was reluctant to apply and go through the regular procedure for fear of
humiliation if he was rejected.

Other groups recommended for increased emphasis were: chemists and physicists, and
persons in the fields of psychology, American literature, English linguistics, and history. The
social sciences, which had been well-represented (some thought over-represented, especially the
Polish authorities) in the first years of the program, would continue to play an important role in
the continuation of the program, but both the IIE and others thought that sociology, which had
received the most attention by far, should be limited in the future.314 In fact, the Foundation
thought the whole program should be, in a sense “limited.” Before the selections in 1961, the IA
recommended to reduce the number of scholarships in Poland from 100 in 1959 to “50 or 60 in
1961,” because of “some feeling on the Foundation’s part that the cream may have been
skimmed.”315 This says a lot about both what level of achievement expected from their
candidates, but not least about the self-confidence and somewhat condescending attitude of the
Ford Foundation officers and consultants: that a handful of men could feel certain, after only
four years of selection, that they had “skimmed the cream” in a country as large and manifold as
Poland, tells us that these men must have had remarkable faith in their own ability to recognize
and judge what in fact the “cream” was.

Passport and visa problems: Life on hold

Already by the second selection for fellowships, in 1958, the passport trouble began. In a letter
from Jerzy Giedroyc of the journal Kultura, one candidate, Zdzisław Najder, was refused a
passport by the Polish authorities. According to Giedroyc, it was Leszczynski himself who had
made the decision, and that his “motive for this refusal [was] that Najder’s candidature was not
agreed with him.”316 On July 9, Jane Addams of the IIE had urged Leszczynski, in a telegram, to
issue a passport to Najder, and that he was scheduled to begin language training in the U.S. in the

313 DCSS, FF-IA. Correspondence, 1960. “Preliminary Thoughts on IA Future Plans and Organization from Slater to
Stone, 23 September 1960.
1960.
315 FFA GF, 2520-57-322-5(7).Grant attachments. Giedroyc to Stone, July 28, 1958. If it is true that Leszczynski
could single-handedly make such a decision, it seems that the Polish system may not have been as “bureaucratic” as
it gave the impression to be.
middle of July.317 There is no reply to be found in the files, so it seems that Leszczynski may have ignored the request. It was apparently difficult to get straight replies from the Polish officials in passport cases, and this was a source of much frustration among the staff at IA and IIE. Najder, who described himself as “rather a philosopher than a historian of literature”318 was an example of a candidate in literature/philosophy who was refused a passport. These were fields that the Polish authorities were not happy about, especially in those cases where the candidates in question had written critical texts about the regime, as was the case with Najder. In his application letter to the Ford Foundation in 1957, he described his work, and a few of his articles, such as “‘Philosophy in a Swamp’ about the situation in the Polish philosophy of today” and “‘Debt and Treasure’, about misinterpretations of facts in Polish modern history, which were committed during the ‘Stalinist period’,”319 tell us that Najder was not a man the Polish authorities would have wanted to run loose in the West. The fact that he had studied under professors Władysław Tatarkiewicz and Tadeusz Kotarbiński was probably not an asset in the eyes of the authorities, either. They were both among those philosophers who lost most of teaching and research privileges between 1948 and 1956.320 As far as I can see from the files, and despite the fact that Stone reported that the “passport situation [had] cleared up considerably” while he was in Warsaw in September of 1958,321 Najder never did get to make use of his grant.

Another case where a passport was denied was that of Waclaw Niepokolczycki, a translator of English and American literature, but in his case the problems were resolved and a passport was issued two years after the initial application. Niepokolczycki himself, according to a report from the IIE, explained the delay as a consequence of “a number of pro-western activities in which his late father had engaged.”322 It was Eugenia Krassowka herself who notified Stone and the Foundation that Niepokolczycki had been granted a passport, in the following manner.

In connection with the correspondence we have carried on in the matter of the candidates for the Ford Foundation scholarships, I wish kindly to inform you that Mr. Waclaw Niepokolczycki, who could not in the former years take advantage of the scholarship that was granted to him, now can take advantage of that scholarship, provided that the Ford Foundation expresses its approval and provided that the Ford Foundation grants him that scholarship.323
It must have been a frustrating two years for Niepokolczycki: his passport was first withheld in 1959, but a year later he notified the IIE that he would be coming in July of 1960.\textsuperscript{324} Obviously, he had to wait yet another year.

Several of the notified candidates received their passports after months or years of waiting, and some, like Najder, never received one at all. This became a great source of disappointment and discontent among the candidates. On the other hand, the Ford Foundation was very flexible about when the selected candidates could make use of their grants and some times left a grant open for years, until the candidate was able to make use of it. Flexible/rigid are suitable words to describe the IA vs the Ministry of Higher Education, although it seems as if the Ministry really (over)stretched itself in the case of the Ford program. One example that they stretched their limits to accommodate the Foundation was that they greatly sped up the passport procedure for those fellows they approved. Usually, obtaining permission to travel abroad and being issued a passport was an ordeal that could take months. With approved Ford fellows the Ministry of Higher Education went far to accommodate the Foundations dates and plans for the candidate, and passports could be issued within mere weeks.\textsuperscript{325}

As mentioned, the State Department sometimes interfered with the East European programs by not issuing entry-visas to selected candidates. Visa refusals were a problem for the IA, and the officers urged the State Department to reconsider. One example is mentioned in a letter from Stanley Gordon to a member of East-West Contacts Staff at the Department of State:

> From your conversations with Mr. Stone I am sure you appreciate the importance in his negotiations of not leaving the impression that we are unable to invite certain individuals tentatively selected in Poland. It would be helpful indeed if it were possible to pass favorable word about both Mr. Morawiecki and Mr. Wiatr to Mr. Stone during his stay in Poland. Please do not hesitate to phone me if any questions arise.\textsuperscript{326}

> Usually, the candidates in question were among those selected from the Polish government list, and in that sense the American authorities mirrored the Polish authorities in their refusal to issue passports to certain candidates not on the government list.

\textsuperscript{325} FFA GF, 2520-57-322-5(7).Grant attachments. Mikulski to Gordon, Warsaw, 27 September 1961. Describes the difference between applying for a passport as a Ford Fellow and without that status.
\textsuperscript{326} DCSS. FF-IA. Correspondence 1958. Gordon to O'Neill of East-West Contacts Staff, Department of State in Washington, 25 March 1958.
The program breaks down

Gomułka had become a disappointment to the many who wanted change in Poland. He, and many others in the Polish communist party, “grew increasingly hostile to intellectual fervour” both within the Party and in the society as a whole. The academic and literary intellectual ferment that was still strong in certain circles (such as the Crooked Circle Club) was called “tubercular revisionism,” by Gomułka and he blamed foreign agents:

At a party meeting devoted to ‘ideological struggle’ in July 1963, the Party Secretary stated that the authorities had uncovered ‘efforts aiming at ideological penetration’, using scholarships ‘for stimulating bourgeois and revisionist trends in the arts and sciences’. The leader assured his audience that ‘these activities had been put to an end’.327

The Ford Foundation program was one of very few opportunities for Poles to travel and study in the West, and the Ministry of Higher Education was the only institution in Poland to make nominations. Hence, the officers at the Ministry were in possession of much power: if you were not on their list of nominees, your chances of foreign travel and study were close to nil.

Following the selection mission to Poland in February and March of 1961, one of the Ford Foundation selection committee members, Edward L. McGowan, wrote a summary report to Stanley Gordon on the impressions he gathered in Poland. He had observed that, although it was the Polish government that laid the law for who would and would not be allowed to travel abroad, it was the Ministry of Higher Education that controlled the fellowship program through its power to nominate candidates.

In the opinion of McGowan, the fact that final approval for travel abroad rested with the Ministry of Higher Education was a “real consideration [for] almost every Pole who wishes to go abroad, irrespective of his professional connections.” He contended that there was a “very definite association in his or her mind between professional travel abroad and being included on the official list submitted to the Foundation’s Mission by the Ministry.” He also observed that the situation concerning selections was both “political” and “bureaucratic.” While many persons who were ideologically suspect, and hence not approved by the State, were – as expected – not on the Ministry’s list, other “worth-while people,” who had no ideological problems, were not included on the list either. Why? Because they were not “functionally … subordinated to the Ministry of Higher Education in the government structure.” McGowan concluded that

The above situation creates a wide area of ambiguity as regards the Foundation’s operation in Poland, since the scope of the program’s interests does not lie exclusively with candidates from institutions directly responsible to the Ministry of Higher Education. The solution to this problem would seem to be further negotiation of the question, with a view to finding some other, more appropriate government agency (perhaps the Academy of Science or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) to coordinate the whole operation.\footnote{FFA 2518-57-322-4. “Summary Report” from McGowan to Gordon, 31 March 1961.}

**The last selection**

The last selection in 1961 gives us a better picture of why the Ford Foundation decided not to continue their program with Poland. The Foundation had prepared for a moderate shift in focus from the social sciences to fields within science and technology, but they were not willing to go as far as the Polish authorities wanted. The Foundation made a great effort to negotiate and prepare the selections well, and when they were finally being made, the IA and the Ministry of Education were not the only ones who followed them with interest. The American embassy in Warsaw was an important link between the Ford Foundation and the Polish and American authorities, and in a report to the Department of State on March 3, 1961, an analysis of the “Polish Government Nominations for Ford Foundation Grants” was presented:

A preliminary examination of the list of candidates proposed by the Polish Government for 1961 Ford Foundation grants indicates that the list reflects the needs of the Government’s development in industry, technology, economic planning, and science. The major emphasis is on candidates in various kinds of engineering and industrial sciences, economics and related sciences, and chemistry. The list appears not to reflect the reported understanding between Mr. Shepard STONE of the Ford Foundation and Ambassador Henryk BIRECKI of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, that the 1961 Ford program in Poland would continue to emphasize the foundation’s primary interest in the humanities and related academic disciplines.\footnote{FFA 2518-57322-4. Foreign Service despatch from the American embassy in Warsaw to the Department of State, Washington. 3 March 1961.}

Correspondence between the Ford Foundation and the selection committee confirms that neither the Foundation nor their selection team were happy with the developments, and, according to the Embassy, members of the team had told Embassy officers that they were “disappointed by the poor quality of the candidates proposed by the Ministry who [had] been interviewed so far, and their poor command of the English language.”\footnote{Ibid.} In addition to proposing candidates in fields that the Foundation had not expressed particular interest in, the Ministry had picked candidates “whose studies [would] be in the interest of the Polish Government,” even in the fields that the
Foundation had wanted candidates from. It was these candidates that the committee was especially disappointed by.

Following the selections, a report on the selection procedure was filed about how the Foundation carried out their selections and about the disagreement between the Ford Foundation and the Ministry of Higher Education, represented by Madame Krassowska.

The selection team interviewed 192 applicants. 116 of these came from the recommendations of the Ministry, while 76 candidates had been recommended by the Foundation. In total, the Foundation selection team rejected 128 applicants; 84 from the Ministry’s list and 44 from the Foundation list. According to the report this equated 66% of all candidates: 66% of the Ministry’s recommendations and 58% of the Foundation’s. Of the Ministry’s 128 candidates 30 were recommended for awards by the selection team, 12 did not show up for the interview, 1 withdrew his application, 1 was given a Rockefeller Foundation award and 84 were rejected. The “main categories of reasons why candidates were rejected were “language deficiency” (in over 40 of the applicants), “Vague program, no contacts (Lab.), etc.” (25 applicants), “No PhD.” (16 applicants), “deferred (postponed)” (in the case of 4 applicants). The author of the report points out that “Very often a candidate was turned down because two or three of these reasons combined against him.”

Of the 60 person total that the Foundation selection team presented to Madame Krassowska for approval, she rejected 7 of the 18 candidates in the humanities and arts and 9 of the 17 candidates in the social sciences. The author of the report made the following comments to this:

N.B. All objections made by Madame Krassowska were against recommended awards outside the Polish ministry list, and against candidates in the two areas only: humanities and social sciences. No objections have been raised by Madame Krassowska against candidates in exact and technological sciences.

While the Foundation’s recommended awards were in the more traditional ratio of 35 awards in humanities and social sciences, Madame Krassowska’s discriminatory action against applicants from humanities and social sciences reverses this ratio entirely in favor of the technological sciences (25 for exact & technological sciences as compared with only 19 awards in the humanities and social sciences).

[…] Madame Krassowska’s objections against applicants outside the Ministry list makes it almost impossible for any such candidates to hope to have any success in their application without the Ministry’s prior approval.

The author of the report added the observation that Krassowska had added nine candidates that were not on the Ministry’s list, and who were “not regular award recipients.” Krassowska herself
approved six of these candidates, but the author was scathing and ironic in his observations on the “high caliber” of these candidates: one did not show; three were rejected for “poor” to “hopeless” English language ability; one was rejected because of language deficiency and medical problems: “has an artificial leg and had a nervous breakdown; came to the interview directly from the sanitarium”; one was considered “weak, not ready to study abroad”; another one was “weak in theory; doesn’t even know with whom he wants to study in the USA; English only fair”; yet another one “seems to be outside the Polish program: wants to become acquainted with scholars in the USA, UK, and France, who are specialists on the MIDDLE EAST POLITICS AND ARAB NATIONALISM”; and the last one was “reliable rather than brilliant. His program rather simple one.” In other words, the author of the report did not hold Madame Krassowska in high regard where her ability, or perhaps rather, willingness, to present excellent candidates in the humanities and social sciences was concerned. Accounts such as this would have made the Foundation more confident than ever that their own candidates were the best and that the program could only continue if it was based on their right to make their own selection.

The Polish program in abeyance, 1962-1967

In 1962, after five years of carrying out exchanges to “establish educational, scientific, and cultural relations between Poland and the United States,” the cooperation between the Ford Foundation and the Polish institutions broke down. They did not find a satisfactory solution to the selection problem, and the selection in 1961 became the last: the program did not resume until 1967, and then it was short-lived because all the exchange programs were terminated in 1969. Between 1962 and 1967 there were negotiations to try and re-open the program, but none of the parties gave in to the other’s demands. However much Polish officials at the Ministry of Education may have wanted the program to continue, it was really out of their hands. The Polish government was in a difficult position, trying to balance their post-1956 destabilized country, while preventing the Soviets from intervening. As the leaders in Moscow “became increasingly dissatisfied with Americans ‘running around’ in Poland ‘as if in their own back yard’, ” the Poles had to be careful. As a consequence, they lost their Ford Foundation program for five years.

331 FFA. Trustees docket, 12/1966.
332 Czernecki, “An intellectual offensive,” 305.
Throughout those five years, the Polish authorities tried to get the program restarted, and already in August of 1962, Schaff urged Stone to “proceed with [his] “gentleman’s agreement” and get a selection team into the country soon […] he thinks it urgent that the momentum be maintained by the visible early presence of a selection process.\(^333\)

Stone was also interested in a solution, and he wanted to “take up the Polish program” for discussion in September of 1962.\(^334\) However, following a letter from Ambassador Henryk Birecki, Stone had second thoughts: “Some of the changes you propose in the understanding I thought we had reached in Warsaw are not in accordance with Foundation methods of procedure in this country or elsewhere in the world. Consequently, we shall be unable to proceed without an adjustment.”\(^335\)

The correspondence between Stone and Polish officials continued, and on 5 December 1962 he wrote to Minister Josef Winiewicz at the Polish Mission to the United States with more changes to the points in the agreement signed in March. In addition to the points about relative freedom of selections, the inclusion of both humanists and natural sciences, Stone also addressed the problem of 13 grantees from 1961 who had not yet received passport, despite Polish officials indications that “many” of the grantees would eventually be given passports.\(^336\)

There was especially one condition, however, that he and the Foundation could not accept: that Polish representatives would have to participate or be present at the interviews in Poland between the Ford Foundation selection team and the candidates. As I have said in previous conversations, and repeated on November 27, this suggestion is so much at variance with our principles and procedures both at home and abroad that it would prevent us from sending a selection group to Poland.\(^337\)

Stone expressed surprise that the Polish authorities were “making this suggestion after five years of experience with our program” and wrote that we believe the candidates should have the opportunity to be alone with those who are interviewing them, and that any outside participation would serve to dissipate the informal atmosphere of the interview. I am sure you are aware of the fact that all Poles who come to this country under our program are free of any supervision whatsoever on our part. For the sake of the continuation of the fellowship program and other efforts in which we have been

\(^{333}\) FFA. GF. 2318-57322-4. Richard E. Neustadt [American political scientist specializing in the United States presidency. He also served as adviser to several presidents.] to Stone, 1 August 1962. [Report from visit to Poland.]


\(^{335}\) FFA. GF. 2318-57322-4. Stone to Birecki, 16 October 1962, in reply to Birecki’s letter of 28 September.


Despite these disagreements, Stone had planned a visit to Poland in May of 1963, but when the Polish position did not change in the way he had hoped, he decided not to go after all.  

In September, Winiewicz and Schaff requested a meeting with Stone, and he agreed to meet them. Presumably based on this meeting, they agreed to proceed with interviews the following spring, based on the “Yugoslav system.” This does not seem to have happened, and in the spring of 1964 something occurred that hampered further negotiations. Thirty-four Polish writers and scholars signed a note of protest against censorship that they delivered to the Polish government on March 19. K. A. Jelenski at the Congress for Cultural Freedom called it “the first major action of intellectual opposition since 1956 and the list of signatories is most impressive.”

To Mr. Prime Minister Jozef Cyrankiewicz, Warsaw:

The limitation of the supply of paper for the publication of books and magazines and the tightening of censorship create a situation which endangers the development of national culture. The undersigned, believing that the existence of public opinion, of the right of criticism, of free discussion and of objective information is an indispensable condition of progress, moved by their sense of citizens’ duty, demand the change of the Polish cultural policy in the spirit of rights guaranteed by the constitution of the Polish State, rights which are in accordance with the welfare of the nation.

Eight of the thirty-four signatories were former Ford fellows, and three of them, Jan Kott, Tadeusz Kotabinski and Jan Szczepanski, were among the six “probably considered to be the organisers of the action,” who “were called to the Ministry of Culture in Warsaw” for questioning.

The letter of protest had direct consequences for the Polish program, although the official reasons for postponing selections were different:

Adam Schaff, in a conversation on May 7, stated what may be the official Polish position on the cancellation of the Ford Foundation 1964-65 Program. He blamed the Ford Foundation for this action, saying that the general agreement which had been reached with the Ford Foundation was for the acceptance of 10-20 names to be suggested by the Ford Foundation.
to be included in the official Polish list of candidates who would be interviewed by the Ford selection team. He maintained that the later submission of 54 names was disturbing to the Polish authorities and violated, both in spirit and explicitly, the oral agreement of January. Schaff went on to say that the Polish acceptance of 17 names submitted by the Ford Foundation represented a fulfillment of the agreement and that any further compromise was impossible. He also said that the Ford Foundation actions were calculated, as well as being politically motivated in an election year. He stated his optimism for a resumption of the program next year, and hoped that the recent developments would not affect other exchanges between the United States and Poland.344

Although Schaff was the one to deliver the message, he said in a conversation with Frederick Burkhardt “that Madame Krassowska was responsible for negotiating with me and that she had complete power,” and that she had been “instructed that no writers or journalists could be included in the list.” Her explanation was that “at this time […] the Polish government felt it was not opportune to include writers and journalists in the exchange program.” The problem of not including writers and journalists, which was difficult for the Foundation to accept, meant that there were Foundation candidates that could not be included. Schaff said that “for the time being it would be impossible for writers to be issued passports,” but he “urged” Burkhardt “to give in: “He said it was too important to have things break down on the basis of twelve names. We must not allow ourselves, he said, to be driven to ridiculous lengths because of silly bureaucratic obstacles.”345

There were obviously a division between those Polish officials who wanted the program and those who did not. Ludwik Leszcynski addressed this when he said to Burkhardt that the Americans always talked as though there were one single monolithic authority in these matters. The “they” that had set up the appointments for the candidates was probably entirely different from the “they” who were against the agreement in the first place and who continued to work against it. He said that Americans could scarcely conceive the suspicion with which some of the political Poles would regard a list of names submitted by the Foundation. They operate on the assumption that obviously Ford wants to submit names for intelligence purposes or to encourage defection. It would simply not occur to them that the list was an honest one.346

346 Ibid.
In September of 1964, in another conversation with Burkhardt, Schaff admitted that “the scandal involving the writers” made the time “very bad for negotiating an agreement [...] they simply could not admit this category to the agreement.”

There were other issues, too, that made the Polish authorities sceptical of the Ford Foundation program. Again, it was Schaff who brought these to the attention of the Ford Foundation, this time in a conversation with Robert Byrnes:

Another complaint which he made was that the program has emphasized social scientists and humanists to an extremely high degree. He said there are probably no sociologists in Poland now of any ability who have not been abroad, in part because of the emphasis of this program. He remarked too, that a number of scholars had been abroad several times and that this raises the questions about their contribution to Polish development.

Schaff noted, also, that the Polish government did not wish to be put in the situation of colliding always with its scholars, who had been interviewed by foreigners, offered fellowships for travel by foreigners, and then denied visas by their own government, which might simply want them to stay in Poland that particular year to contribute to the national recovery. He said that this put the Polish government in a humiliating position, one in which they were also open to attack from their fellow socialist states. He cited the East German critique in particular, but also indicated that the Soviets were quite critical of the Poles. [...] to have a representative of the Ministry of Education...would insure not only that the proper people were interviewed and selected, but would also eliminate humiliating pandering by Polish scholars before foreigners whose countries they wish to visit. 348

It is obvious that the Polish authorities were afraid of the “contamination” of their best minds, as well as of “back stage” comments by candidates and fellows, “disloyal” comments that could taint and humiliate the Polish authorities.

It did not help matters that Schaff, who was going through “a personal struggle for retention of position and power in the ideological-academic hierarchy on the eve of the 4th Part Congress last spring,”350 was saying that he would “see to it that the Ford Foundation would have no program whatever in Eastern Europe.” 351 This may have been what made Stone decide against taking any more initiative in getting the Polish program back on its feet at that time. 352

When the Polish authorities again made a motion in favour of the program, Josef Winiewicz “stated that it was very important for Poland to have the Ford Foundation active in

349 This concept will be discussed in chapter 7.
350 FFA. GF. 2318-57322-4. Frank Siscoe, Department of State to Stone, 27 October 27 1964.[Comments of Adam Schaff to Jack Scanlan, U. S. Embassy in Warsaw, September 16, 1964.]
the country […] there was a great symbolic value for Poland in our presence. Stone, in turn, told Winiewicz that he

thought there was a feeling in Poland that the Ford Foundation had devious motives and that certain high-placed Poles probably thought we were trying to overthrow the Government. This created such a lack of confidence – at least as we saw it – that we saw no point in trying to work in such an atmosphere. I made it clear that we had never tried to hide one fact, and that is that Poles and any other people who come to the United States to study under our programs would undoubtedly return to their countries with more enlightened views about the United States and tend to cast off some of the propaganda instilled in them at home. We never made a secret about that.353

One view voiced to Stanley Gordon in January of 1965 was that the Polish authorities “desperately need the program and that they will eventually accede to nearly all demands.”354 Stone, too, wanted the program to start up again, and he wrote to Ludwik Leszczynski in December of 1965 that

A promising and useful program is now dormant. I regret these developments and, frankly, I must hesitate to think that Viet Nam is the cause. If one stopped intellectual and academic contacts everytime difficult governmental situations arose, there would be a complete breakdown of the dialogue between rational human beings. Many of us are not in sympathy with all actions taken by governments in your part of the world, but we have believed that our contacts should be maintained.355

Schaff, by this time, had also calmed down, “behaving with great courage” he had “not caved in under the heavy attacks to which he has been subjected by the Party since the publication of his latest book.” […] Curious, how a person who used to be so weak and shifty can suddenly show himself in an entirely different light. Maybe his visits to the West have something to do with it.356

Writing to the new President of the Ford Foundation, McGeorge Bundy, in September of 1966, Stone described how he perceived the Polish program in relation to developments in Poland:

On the Polish side the program has always been sensitive to the climate of U. S.-U. S. R. relations. For our part, we have always maintained the role of the private U. S. foundation. It is our hope to start again, but we should not be willing to sign a blank check. The program, while active, was a significant, positive effort. During frequent visits to Warsaw I had discussions with Premier Cyrankiewicz, other Cabinet Ministers, and Winiewicz. Some

friendly personal relationships were established and our Polish friends knew that we were quite amiable about bugged rooms and the other paraphernalia of diplomatic negotiation.\textsuperscript{357}

By that time, Stone had resumed negotiations, and he wrote to Birecki in October 1966:

We have re-read the “Pro Memorium Note” drawn up in Warsaw, dated January 27, 1964, signed by the then Vice Minister of Higher Education in Poland, Madame Eugenia Krassowska, and myself. I am glad to report that on our part we find this document an appropriate basis upon which to proceed.\textsuperscript{358}

The shift in attitude happened in September 1966, “while attending the Pugwash conference in Sopot, Poland,” where Stone met “with Polish officials and representatives of the Polish Academy and universities.”

The Poles initiated a request to renew the Foundation program. Mr. Stone returned to Poland for specific discussions, and it was agreed that about 60 Polish candidates would be selected late in June. It is understood that these 60 candidates would for the most part come to the U.S., a small number this autumn and the remainder in 1968.\textsuperscript{359}

The Polish program finally resumed with these proposed selections in the summer of 1967. Before Stone left the Foundation to take up his new position as Director of the International Association for Cultural Freedom (the successor to the Congress for Cultural Freedom),\textsuperscript{360} he summed up his impressions of the situation with Poland:

Poland in 1967 is a confused country. Economically, people appear to feel that there is neither movement nor hope. Politically, there are reservations about Gomulka’s leadership – somewhat like his Paris counterpart, he seems to be increasingly difficult and remote. Vietnam and the Middle East crisis have stimulated Gomulka to take a romantic anti-American, anti-Semitic and anti-intellectual stand.

In this situation, the resumption of the Ford Foundation program is considered by a few thoughtful Poles to be a light in the Polish tunnel. Apparently, the need for managerial and other competence is recognized by the highest party officials and there has been enough discreet talk by the Winiewicz-Michalowski foreign office group, by managers and by former Ford Foundation grantees, who now play a role in Poland, to convince the people around Gomulka that our program is useful. In other words, it is accepted with reluctance that there should be a narrow, intellectual bridge to the West.

\textsuperscript{357} FFA. GF. 2318-57322-4. Stone to McGeorge Bundy, 29 September 1966.
\textsuperscript{359} FFA. GF. 2318-57322-4. Stone to Bundy and Bell, 9 August 1967.
\textsuperscript{360} After taking up his new position, Stone was denied entry into Poland. FFA. GF. 2318-57322-4. Stone to Pendleton Herring, 21 November 1967. This was “ironic and amusing,” as Stone himself wrote, given the following observation from a visit to Poland: “The combination of a Kennedy connection and a Stone connection opened all doors. […] On balance I think the Stone connection was the more useful.” FFA. GF. 2318-57322-4. Richard E. Neustadt to Gordon, 6. August 1962.
The program takes on more significance when it is remembered that the Ford Foundation is the only organization, private or governmental, which is permitted to send a team of experts into Poland for study abroad. Some highly placed Poles think this provides a small area of freedom in an otherwise closed society.\footnote{361 FFA. GF. 2318-57322-4. Stone to Bundy and Bell, 9 August 1967.}
Chapter 5. the Yugoslav program 1958-1969

The Yugoslavs had, like the Soviets, succeeded in their own communist revolution. In that way they were different from the peoples’ democracies, who had been beaten and coerced into submission. It was because of Yugoslavia’s “initial revolutionary impulse”362 that Tito continued to lead his country according to communist principles after the split with Stalin in 1948. A communist revolution was, in its nature, “irreversible.”363 Although the Ford Foundation exchange program with Yugoslavia did not get properly started until 1959, it had been the first of the communist countries to be considered for cooperation.

Why not a program sooner?

Yugoslavia’s non-alignment and strong stance against Stalin was coupled with a wish to draw the country closer to the American orbit. Because of this it was suggested in 1954 that the Foundation could “aid U.S. interests in Yugoslavia by supporting certain projects in that country.”364 Already in 1951, Melvin J. Fox at the Foundation had written to the president of the IIE to say that “we definitely will be interested in exchange projects with Yugoslavia, provided that projects can be worked out that meet with both government and sound exchange requirements.”365 These requirements were obviously not met at that time, and only in 1956 was the importance of developing closer relations with Yugoslavia seriously dealt with by Stone in one of his many memos on the European Program. He suggested that the Foundation engage in projects “to develop closer relations between Yugoslavia and the West,” and claimed that “Yugoslav officials are requesting support to bring Yugoslav leaders and institutions into closer contact with Western Europeans and Americans.”

The fact that involvement with Yugoslavia was suspended – despite the alleged interest in the program both among Foundation people and the Yugoslav authorities – and surpassed by involvement in Poland, can be explained in part by a temporary shift in the relationship between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. Between 1955 and 1957 the Yugoslav government moved “steadily […] toward the Soviet position”:

Since the East German affair last fall, however, the Soviets have made it clear that they are still talking about a Communist bloc, led and directed by the Soviet Union. As a result, Tito lately seems to have begun to swing back toward the Western side.

362 Schöpflin, Politics, 160
363 Ibid., 161
365 FFA, GF, reel no. 2474-5995-4, Fox to Holland, 11 October 1951.
Krushchev’s visit to Yugoslavia in 1955 to approach Tito as an ally, and not a treacherous criminal to Soviet Communism, was obviously a turning point in the shift in Yugoslav/American relations that resulted in the American government becoming “progressively cooler” and general relations becoming “more strained.” Officials at the State Department told Waldemar Nielsen that apparently “the explanation for this drift was that Tito felt that Kruschev was a man that he could work with, particularly after the ouster of Molotov, and he modified the Yugoslav government’s position considerably on the basis of that gamble.” In other words, at the time when the IA finally got the go-ahead to initiate exchanges in early 1957, Yugoslavia had still not swung back to its relatively pro-Western position and probably seemed too sensitive and uncertain a country for the Foundation to get involved in.

When it started to become clear that communist Europe would still be led by the Soviet Union and Tito consequently “began to swing back toward the Western side,” exchanges with Yugoslavia was put on the agenda again, but people at the Ford Foundation were still sceptical. At International Affairs, it was Waldemar Nielsen who had been put in charge of a possible Yugoslav program, and in May of 1957, he met with Averell Harriman, who was Governor of New York and former Ambassador to the Soviet Union. Nielsen claimed that Harriman “made the best case [...] so far in favor of doing something in Yugoslavia.” Harriman was “disturbed about American-European relations generally,” and felt that Yugoslavia could “still slide east or west.” He thought it “very important to bring the important second and third level people in government to a more intelligent understanding of Western political philosophy,” and that the Ford Foundation could make a “very important contribution through activities in Eastern Europe.” According to Nielsen, Harriman

feels the matter has gone beyond mere hurt feelings in Europe [...] a deepseated fear – and therefore resentment – has developed in Europe that the United States has turned its back on them. He feels that it is most important to counter any feeling in Europe that they can no longer count on us in great emergencies.368

Harriman’s thoughts on fear and resentment were probably caused by the failure of the U.S. and its allies to come to the rescue of the Hungarians during the revolution of 1956. It was a source

366 FFA. GF. 2474-5995-4, "Conversation with Mr. Robert Hill, Mr. McKisson and Mr. Monty Speer of the East European Division of the State Department." Memo from Nielsen to Central Files, 15 January 1958.  
367 FFA. GF. 2474-5995-4, "Conversation with Mr. Robert Hill, Mr. McKisson and Mr. Monty Speer of the East European Division of the State Department." Memo from Nielsen to Central Files, 15 January 1958.  
of much disappointment among many people in the people’s democracies. The Poles, who regarded themselves a courageous people, were also disappointed in their own, as well as their neighbours’, failure to help the Hungarians, and there was allegedly a saying in Poland after the bloody revolution: “In the Hungarian revolution the Hungarians behaved like Poles; the Poles behaved like Czechs; the Czechs and Russians behaved like swine.”

As for the Yugoslav government, it occasionally expressed its interest for an exchange program with the United States. When the Ford Foundation announced its Polish program the Yugoslavs expressed new interest, but the U.S. State Department didn’t do much to meet them. Waldemar Nielsen thought this was unfortunate, and added that if there was anything foundations could do with Yugoslavia the time was “certainly ripe for such a move.”

By 1957, Ford Foundation officers had visited Yugoslavia, and Yugoslav authorities had shown interest in an exchange program for years. The question of why the Foundation had not followed up on its previous plans became somewhat of a sensitive issue. When Joža Vilfan, “Tito’s right-hand man,” visited the United States in June of 1957, the question came up. He was impressed with the Polish program, but why had the Ford Foundation not developed a program for Yugoslavia? Stone told him that he had the impression that the Yugoslav Government had not been particularly eager for the Ford Foundation to support programs in Yugoslavia. Stone said that his reception in Yugoslavia had “been courteous”, but that he could not escape “the impression that it had been cool.”

Recounting this comment later in a memo to the Foundation, Stone admitted that this answer did “not quite correspond to the facts,” but that it “appeared to be a good technique in talking to Dr. Vilfan.” Thus, instead of confronting Yugoslav officials with whatever complexity of reasons for the delay in initiating a program, Stone fibbed his way out of an uncomfortable confrontation by blaming the Yugoslavs. His technique worked. Although Vilfan was surprised to hear that the alleged coolness of his compatriots was what had deterred the Foundation earlier, he was glad that the misunderstanding had been cleared up. Still very interested in a Ford Foundation program in Yugoslavia, he invited Stone to visit Yugoslavia the following fall, with the expressed hope that the Foundation would proceed to “take action.”

370 FFA. GF. 2474-5995-4 Letter from Kline to Sims, 27 June 1957.
371 Vilfan was Chief Secretary for the President of the Federation of Yugoslav People’s Republics, 1953-58.
373 FFA. GF. 2474-5995-4 Memo, From Stone to Central Files, 28 June 1957.
**Considering a program**

In August 1957 Stone didn’t think the situation in Yugoslavia was “clear,” but requests from the Yugoslav Government to initiate programs made him think that the Foundation should look into it. He suggested that the Foundation “assess the Yugoslav situation, both in Washington and in Yugoslavia, and if the findings are positive, be prepared to support a limited program.”

Ford Foundation vice-president Don Price consulted with people at the State Department and with Allen Dulles, who was then leader of the CIA. He then reported to Ford Foundation President Heald that those he had spoken to were “urging the Foundation to continue and expand the program in Poland and also in Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Roumania, and possibly the Soviet Union.” The State Department was also looking to run their own exchange programs with Eastern Europe, and had “committed itself to ask Congress for money.” Price informed Heald that in addition to continuing the Polish program, the Foundation should “explore the possibilities of a smaller exchange with Yugoslavia, but defer consideration of exchanges with other East European countries until we are better able to judge current developments.”

In January 1958 it seemed clear that an exchange program with Yugoslavia would be useful. The State Department contended that although “[t]he attitude of the American government is that Tito fundamentally identifies himself with the Communist world and believes that the Western world is fundamentally opposed to him,” it was important “to maintain relations,” as long as Tito continued to “maintain his heresy from the point of view of Communist doctrine.” The conclusion was that “now might be a very good time for the Ford Foundation to undertake some activity in Yugoslavia.” And the IA followed the recommendation.

**Planning a program**

Waldemar Nielsen went to Washington in January of 1958 to gather information. He saw representatives of the State Department for a general estimate of the political situation. In keeping with Stone’s intentions and to prepare for a first trip to Yugoslavia, Nielsen had already planned his visit to Yugoslavia when he met with the State Department representatives. This corresponded with the principle outlined in the guidelines for a program with Poland: “From time to time there should be consultation in advance on proposed Foundation activity – but such
consultation must stop short of request for official clearance or endorsement of projects and should also avoid close operational coordination.”

The impression among the State Department people was that, although the authorities in Yugoslavia had recently made the import of American books and films more difficult, they were “definitely interested in expanding educational and cultural exchanges” with the USA. This was an indication of the ambivalent relationship the Yugoslav authorities had with the West, despite it’s relative “openness.”

Nielsen left the State Department with a list of names of people he should look up on his Yugoslav visit. He also visited the Yugoslav Embassy while in Washington, and when asking representatives there for advice on whom to meet with in Yugoslavia, they gave him almost the same list of names that he had been given at the State Department. Besides asking advice about what people to consult in Yugoslavia, Nielsen wrote that “I explained as clearly and forcefully as I could without becoming offensive” how an exchange program with the Ford Foundation would work. Other exchange programs, often government funded and administered, were carried out on different premises, and a recurring theme in Ford Foundation documents is the importance of communicating the distinct character of the Ford Foundation programs to those they planned to carry out programs with. Like in Poland, the question of selections would become the crux of the negotiations.

Nielsen was given a tentative go-ahead for the Yugoslav program in July of 1958. Stone had gone to Yugoslavia to assess the situation there, and he wrote to Nielsen: “I don’t feel that things will go as well as they have in Poland and any minute we may not be able to go through with the program.” Without explaining further why things would be more difficult in Yugoslavia, he added: “But again I repeat, let’s start and the way to do it is for Mr. Nielsen to come here late in September or, as most people tell me, in early October.”

On October 16, 1958, the Ford Foundation announced that a three-member team was departing for Yugoslavia, and that “Beginning October 22 in Belgrade, the group will visit Yugoslav universities and research institutes to study recent educational and scientific developments in that country.”

Negotiating with the Yugoslavs

Meeting the Yugoslav representatives was a mixed experience, judging from the account of Waldemar Nielsen. He arrived in Belgrade on October 16 to prepare for the negotiations. On the
evening of his arrival, he wrote a memo where he recounted his first meeting with Borislav Blagojević, Rector of Belgrade University and head of the Yugoslav Education committee, and Milovan Matic, head of the Yugoslav National Commission for UNESCO. Nielsen was not impressed with Blagojević, whom he considered “little more than a windbag,” despite being “extremely friendly.” Nielsen was not impressed with the nominating committee the Rector presented him with, either: “Actually, I think the committee that has been set up under him is of no particular importance. All of the men have big titles, but they in fact are not very impressive, with the exception of my friend, Stanovnik.” The conversation had been “mainly in generalities,” about how the Ford Foundation saw this first exchange venture in Yugoslavia as an experiment were they would pick only eight candidates. If that was successful they could discuss possibilities of extending the program, either in the direction of additional individual exchange or to some assistance in the purchase of books, to bringing a small number of American professors to Yugoslavia to work an teach, and perhaps even the strengthening of an institute of American studies at Zagreb or Belgrade […] We made no mention of the ugly question of who is going to make the final choices. I am going to proceed as if that is the prerogative of the Foundation and I do not think that Blagojevic will interpose any objection.

Negotiating with the Yugoslavs was not easy. They managed to agree on points that had been discussed earlier, such as dividing the fellowships between the six Republics (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia) and to concentrate on the fields of economics, public administration and business management, but Nielsen ended up discussing the matter of selections for days with Blagojević. In short, the Yugoslavs wanted to choose their own candidates, and they wanted the Foundation to choose the people whom the local authorities “thought were the best suited but also those who could be allowed leaves of absence with pay and without administrative inconvenience.” Blagojević insisted that if others were to be proposed it would cause difficulties. Before Nielsen continued the negotiations he “conferred with a Yugoslav in whom he had great confidence”:

That man pointed out to him a Ford grant was a terrific honor. A recipient would put the award in his cursus honorum in every academic Who’s who. And monetarily, the proposed per diem allowance in U.S. was so generous that a recipient could save in 6 months more than he could save in Yugoslavia in 15 years (where the salary might be $120 per month). This man said that had he been in BLAGOJEVIC’S shoes he would have been glad to abdicate to The Ford Foundation the invidious task of selecting for, and excluding from, a list of successful candidates. But he could understand that now the matter had gone to such a point that it might be best to select all the 16 in the second category from the 50 already nominated [by the Yugoslavs]. […] If there are on the Ford lists really important people whom the Yugoslav authorities have omitted we ought to be able to take 2 or 3 names from

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those lists for supplemental grants, and then we have established the principle of our free choice.”

It seems that Nielsen largely agreed to the Yugoslav demands, and the Ford Foundation later wrote that this had been necessary because of Yugoslav law, that “all Yugoslav candidates for study abroad must be screened by an education commission, and these were the candidates interviewed by the Ford Foundation.” Maybe the decision was made easier by an agreement to select candidates mostly in the fields of humanities and the social sciences. Unlike the Poles, the Yugoslavs did not seem to push for more candidates in the natural sciences.

The settlement agreed to in Yugoslavia was different from that in Poland. This became a problem later in negotiations with the Poles. Apparently, the selection procedure agreed upon with Yugoslavia had been “a mistake.” When Polish officials complained, that was what they were told, true or not. One difference, which the Foundation was emphatic about in later discussions with the Poles, was that the Yugoslav program was aimed at specific fields chosen by the Foundation. When the Polish officials were asked if they wanted that arrangement instead of the more individual approach in the program with Poland, they said no.

**Implementing the program – trouble with selections, again**

The Foundation invited a small group of Yugoslavs in 1958 and decided to try a full one year program in 1959. For the second selection, in 1959, the selection team had problems in Yugoslavia. An indecisive committee member in Belgrade wrote to New York to seek advice:

> We have stated to Blagojevic our understanding that an agreed-upon principle is involved. The Yugoslav Commission has the right to select nominees; the Foundation has the right to select award recipients among the nominees. The closed list abrogates the right of selection and we cannot act on this basis. Should we adhere to principle or not? Shall we interview or not?

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384 FFA GF, 2518-57322-4. Robert F. Byrnes to Stone, 24 July 1964
386 FFA Collections, Slater, 47-523. “Abstract from memo read over phone by Mr. Shoup from Belgrade...” 6 April, (no date written, but most likely 1959).
They did interview, and 24 fellows came to the United States in 1959. International Affairs reported that the fellows “represented the five major universities in Yugoslavia (Belgrade, Zagreb, Sarajevo, Ljubljana, and Skoplje).”

Equal representation from the six republics was, however, a challenge. After the first two years of Yugoslav exchanges, Joseph Slater of the IA particularly worried that the Foundation was “not yet getting a broad enough cross-section of Yugoslav society.” The hierarchy among the Yugoslav republics was complicated, and at the time the complexity may not have been completely clear to the Ford Foundation. However, in Slater’s opinion Blagojević and the Yugoslav Committee were “playing favorites,” and he thought they had neither tried to cooperate fully nor get suggestions from the regional universities. There were other “soft spots” too, such as inadequate publicity about the “competition,” and that “its terms were not understood sufficiently around the country.” He also thought the competition was “too short and there was not enough advance notice.” Slater was not happy with the candidates that the Yugoslav Commission had suggested, either. Their quality varied too much and some of them were “complete duds.” Slater concluded that the Foundation must be informed better about the quality of the candidates. He added that the Yugoslavs insisted that they were seeking quality, too, and “stressed that their Commission did not want to look like a bunch of farmers.”

The issue of selections was a sensitive one. Blagović and the other Yugoslav committee members were particularly sensitive about the selection of candidates from the so-called group “A” – leaders. The screening process was somewhat complicated by the insistence on the part of the Yugoslavs that “the Foundation should NOT talk to “A” Group leaders and then tell them they did not qualify,” because that would be humiliating to them. They reached a compromise where the Yugoslavs selected the candidates, without telling them that they were being screened, but then Waldemar Nielsen and the Foundation would have the last word. Slater was adamant about insisting on the last word, and wrote that the Foundation had been “more than fair in meeting them half-way and a retreat would represent a serious erosion of our rights in Yugoslavia. (The U. S. Embassy does not even consult with the Yugoslavs before offering invitations to leaders. Of course, they deal one at a time and not on a program basis as in the case of the Foundation program).”

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388 Slater would succeed Stone as leader of the IA in 1966.

Where the Group “B” – Scholars – was concerned, one of the main problems was that the Yugoslav Committee may not be “truly representative.” Also, according to Slater, there was a “strong tendency” to regard the “B” Group as being only for young people, “Asst. Professors and Docents”, and that full professors were not encouraged to apply.

The “B” Group applicants should submit their academic records and grades in order to help the Foundation Committee spot “hacks” and “favorites” who have risen for political or personal reasons and not on the basis of merit.

The “B” Group list to be interviewed was light in the humanities and heavy on the social sciences which reflects the nation’s desire to develop specialists in economics, sociology, psychology, etc.

The Group “C” – specialists – was, according to Slater,

designed to help broaden the program by the inclusion of such specialists types as cultural (artists, authors, composers, etc.) leaders, journalist and others who do not fall under the jurisdiction of governmental agencies, universities or institutes as in the case of Groups “A” and “B”.

**The American government**

The Foundation, as usual, was in close contact with American government officials. Slater reported that he “on several occasions” met members of the staff at the American Embassy in Belgrade, and that they asked to be informed about the possible candidates. He told them that the Foundation would send them their “evaluations on a personal and confidential basis as well as inform them about basic project requests made by the Yugoslavs. I stressed, however, that we must keep our private identity and they agreed.” He added: “All of our selectees will require State Department waivers according to the Embassy. I will take 4 to 5 weeks but they expect 100% action and told us to proceed with the invitations at once.”

**A success, after all**

Despite his worries, Slater was also optimistic for the program with Yugoslavia, and did not question its overall value: “The returning grantees (and those writing back from the U. S.) have praised the program highly,” he reported. “The program is gaining in status and top people are attracted to it. The level of the second year is reported to be even better than the first and next year should see improvement over the current year.”

Many years later, Slater spoke about some of the challenges of running exchanges, in an interview at the Ford Foundation: “[B]uilding stronger cultural ties, not just in a sort of passive sense of exchanging artists and companies, but in the deeper sense of cultural community. That’s hard to do; you deal with a lot of prima donnas, a wide range of political belief, and people sounding off in terms of extreme positions. That was very tricky business.”\footnote{Ford Foundation Oral History Project. Interview with Joseph E. Slater [transcribed from cassette recording] New York, New York. February 2, 1973. Interviewer: Charles T. Morrissey, 74-75.}

Slater managed to maneuver through the most difficult issues, and the Yugoslav program was the most successful of the East European program in terms of causing the least trouble. There is no mention of passports or visas being refused, nor of fellows being denied access to certain research facilities. The discussions about selections seem to have quieted down, probably because a different approach to exchange programs was chosen. They focused on specific fields, and the emphasis was on “joint projects and bi-national efforts for strengthening or encouraging the establishment of centers […] for planning, policy study, training, and research in significant problem areas such as sociology, psychology, educational planning, urban planning, management, international relations, and linguistics.”\footnote{FFA Collections, Slater, 44-446 “East European program, Soviet Union”, memo, 1 December 1966, author unidentified.} The early predictions, already in the early fifties, that Yugoslavia would be fertile ground for exchanges, proved right, and the program ran relatively smoothly until 1969.

On May 21, 1970, Stanley T. Gordon at the Ford Foundation presented an ”Evaluation of Yugoslav Exchange Grant No. 59-95” (“mainly during the academic year 1965/66.”) in a memo to Howard Swearer, a new man at the Ford Foundation:

In line with the purpose of the Program, broadly speaking, the Yugoslav scholarly community and professional scholars were enabled to do advanced work in their fields beyond the level available in Yugoslavia, so that upon their return they could contribute significantly toward the development of their professional fields and toward rational modernization generally in Yugoslavia. It was the judgement of the Foundation staff that, taken as a whole, the fellows were of high quality and worked diligently in the United States. As a by-product, these intellectual leaders became acquainted in a very personal way with their American professional colleagues and they were enabled to observe first-hand American institutions and cultural values, thus providing the basis for accurate understanding and lasting convictions about the American scene generally. […]\footnote{FFA GF. 2474-5995-1. Stanley to Swearer, 21 May 1970.}
Chapter 6. The Hungarian program 1964-1969

If the Yugoslav program had seemed difficult to Stone in 1958, an exchange program with Hungary was completely out of the question until the end of the counter-revolutionary terror of the Kádár regime that continued for years after the 1956 revolution. As with the Poles and the Yugoslavs it was a question/problem/answer of reaching out to try and establish a mutually acceptable understanding. As with the Poles and the Yugoslavs, the contact and negotiations were initiated by the Hungarians.

Hungary’s history in the 20th century was different from both Poland’s and Yugoslavia’s. Starting the century as one of the ruling nations in the dual monarchy of Austria-Hungary, the country lost two thirds of its territory as a result of the Paris peace agreements in 1920. The small, now ethnic nation-state had right-wing authoritarian regimes in the interwar years, and it was relatively backward in socio-economic terms. During the Second World War, Hungary was an ally of Nazi Germany, and after the war, the ruling aristocracy in Hungary lost its power.

A populist sociologist, Ferenc Erdei, presented a sociological theory as to why Hungary had not developed into a modern bourgeois society by the time they decided to join the Nazis:

Capitalism penetrated these societies from outside and above… At the same time, the structure of society has not been transformed… As a result, the feudal forms of social structure survived… Thus… capitalists and workers --- had not been transformed into bourgeois social classes. [In the East European societies which have taken the road to capitalism … the social structure … [remained] … partly feudal … 394

Erdei argued the “embourgeoisement” in Hungary had been had been retarded by the persistence of the feudal hierarchical social order in Hungarian society, and Hungarian sociologists Tamás Kolosi and Iván Szelényi (the latter was a Ford fellow in 1964-65) considers Erdei’s sociological explanation as valid also for the other countries in the region. 395

In the early 1960s Hungary embarked on its “second reform period.” The authorities were struggling to legitimize their “post-Stalinist social order,” and socio-economic reforms were under way. A neo-Stalinist regime was instated after the revolution in 1956, but it only lasted a few years before the ruling elite realized that they had to find a compromise with other forces in society. 396

395 Ibid.
396 Kolosi and Szelényi. “Social research on social structure in Hungary,”144-148.
Already in 1961 there were indications that certain forces in Hungary were interested in a program with the Ford Foundation. Professor József Bognár, Chairman of the Institute of Cultural Relations revealed that he was “particularly keen that the program of the Ford Foundation should encompass Hungary.” He also would “undertake to obtain as liberal conditions as possible for the work of the Foundation in Hungary.” It was also reported that there was “considerable interest in the Polish program of the Ford Foundation” and that “many economists” had asked whether there was “any chance the program would be extended to their country.” A consultant to the Ford Foundation, J. Michael Montias, who wrote to Stone from Hungary in November 1961, also reported that

Many liberal elements in Hungary regret that our relations with Kadar’s government are so poor, claiming that this stems mainly from our reluctance to deal with a government that helped to squash the revolution and imprisoned many of its participants. Actually, they say, the government has released almost all its political prisoners—the only major exception seems to be Istvan Bibo—and the writers imprisoned in 1956-57 (including Tibor Dery). Kadar’s regime is far more liberal than Novotny’s in Czechoslovakia and only somewhat harsher than Gomulka’s (the two are converging toward a single point, one from the right and the other from the left). As one professor said: “The U.S. missed the boat in October 1956; you are not going to catch up with it by shouting from the shore, as much as it may appease your feelings.” Their idea is that, in the mean time, Western influence can be reinforced and some good people can be helped to develop their knowledge and get acquainted with Western achievements by extending the Ford program to Hungary.

While some were optimistic about the Foundation’s hopes of extending the exchange programs in Eastern Europe, others were pessimistic. Robert Byrnes, Chairman of the Inter-University Committee on Travel grants, sent some information to Stone about their own exchange program, and he ended with this: “I should be surprised if you are successful in your exchange mission, but I am sure you will be warmly received and I wish you every success.” Stone replied, agreeing “that the success of the mission is highly unlikely.”

The sociologist Alexander (Sándor) Szalai, who was appointed chair of sociology at the University of Budapest after the war, is an example of an East European consultant to the Ford

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398 FFA GF, 2346-64-432, section 4, Montias to Stone, 18 November 1961. Montias was teaching economics at Yale at this time.


Foundation. He was sacked from his position as chair and imprisoned for “a few years,” then briefly reinstated as chair in 1956, before being fired again after the Soviets crushed the revolution.\textsuperscript{401} He gave advice to the Foundation in establishing and implementing the Hungarian exchange program.\textsuperscript{401}

A Canadian professor, Denis Szabo, wrote to Gordon, stressing Szalai’s importance and usefulness:

As you know, he is one of the few persons able to advise you on the very complex problems of the relationship between the Western Countries and the Socialist States. He has paid a very high price for the knowledge (many years in concentration camps).\textsuperscript{402}

Gordon met with Szalai, who was then Professor of Sociology at Veszprém University, in September 1963. He had been recommended to him not only by Szabo, but also by Paul Lazarsfeld when Szalai was in America to attend an international conference at Yale. Szalai provided Gordon with some advice, how he could best promote the idea of an exchange program in Hungary:

Mainly, Professor Szalai volunteered suggestions for Foundation exchange activities in Eastern Europe. His first suggestion was that we might better initiate exchanges in small batches with a mixture of scholars selected in part by us and in part by officials abroad. […] The point here, of course, is to give the officials an opportunity to join in the selection.

Szalai also stressed that the success or failure of exchange programs would depend upon “optics” – whether the name of the American sponsoring organization looked something like a recognized academic or scientific organization in the particular East European country. These countries do not have the acceptable equivalent of “capitalist foundations”.

The East European countries, excluding the Soviet Union and of course Yugoslavia, know very little about the Ford Foundation – only the small amount which has filtered through from Poland. The Poles have not talked very much, preferring to keep somewhat of a monopoly on the Foundation as a source of scholarly advantage. The other East European countries still think Rockefeller Foundation is the one big foundation.\textsuperscript{403}

Alexander Szalai wrote to Gordon again upon his return home in September, after having talked to some leading officers at the Academy of Sciences in Budapest, and with Professor Joseph Bognár, Chairman of the Office of Cultural Connections. From what they told him, Szalai felt certain that Stone would be well received, even if he came to Hungary “in a completely private


\textsuperscript{402} FFA GF, 2346-64-432, section 4. Letter from Denis Szabo to Stanley Gordon, 17 October 1963.

capacity,” and that scientists and officers from various “institutions concerned with cultural exchanges,” including Professor Bognár, would “seek the opportunity to see him.”

Bognár told Szalai that a professor from Yale “Montias or whatever was his name,” had visited Budapest the year before, and that Bognár had “expressed his view that some kind of direct contact could be established between the Office of Cultural Connections [Institute of Cultural Relations] / a government institution founded for such and similar purposes / and the Ford Foundation.” According to Bognár, Montias had promised to relay this information to the Ford Foundation, but Bognár had not heard much about it since.404

**Initiating a program**

The first official move by the Foundation towards Hungary happened in October 1963, when Stone wrote to the Hungarian Charge d’Affaires of the Hungarian legation in Washington. He wrote that he was planning a trip to Hungary in November, and that he hoped to be able to meet, “informally” to exchange views with “government officials, university leaders, scholars and students, and intellectuals and artists. […] During my visit I would hope it would be possible to determine if there is any interest in Hungary in the types of program the Ford Foundation assists in other parts of Europe and elsewhere in the world.”405

At a Board of Trustees Meeting in December 1963, it was concluded, after having evaluated the Polish and Yugoslav programs with the help of “experts inside and outside the State Department,” that this non-governmental channel of cultural and leader exchange with Eastern Europe, including the Soviet Union, is kept open. They [the experts] have urged that these exchanges be extended to Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania, and possibly Czechoslovakia, so that Western thought may have access to these areas which have been sealed off, more than Poland, from intellectual contact with the West. On balance, there is agreement by knowledgeable persons that East European, including Soviet, exchange at the present time should be stimulated. It is generally felt that this activity has value both for international relations and for scientific and scholarly advancement.406

One of the American academic consultants to the Foundation, the famous Harvard economist Wassily Leontief, telephoned Stanley Gordon on February 7, 1964, after spending time in Hungary on the invitation of the Hungarian government. He said that he had “strong

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feelings about the importance of encouraging the East European trend toward ‘intellectual independence’.” Hungary was important, partly because Leontief thought that the country “may be progressing at the moment at a faster pace than Poland.” Gordon asked him “what types of exchanges he thought would be most fruitful,” and he answered that he believed

the best group probably is the intellectual workers in their early thirties and that they should come for at least six months, preferably ten, and in some cases, a year and a half. Since these people can be effective upon their return only with sympathetic interest from professional persons in the coats of power, it is probably wise to invite a number of older and better established persons like Dr. Peter [György Péter, President of the Hungarian Central Statistical Office, one of the leading reform-communists and reform-economists in the 1950s and 1960s] for shorter periods. These are the ones who could obstruct or promote the influence of the young people, and they might have problems of jealousy if they were not invited first. Also, the older people should be the source of good recommendations of names.

On March 12, 1964 Stone cabled József Bognár, the Chairman of the Institute for Cultural Relations in Budapest, notifying him, “if agreeable,” of the arrival of the Foundation selection team on May 10, and that Stanley Gordon would arrive a few days earlier to set things up. Stone also promised Bognár a letter in which he would outline the details of the selection process and suggest some candidates.

In early April, Stone got publicity in the Hungarian press. An American friend in Budapest wrote about his surprise when he “leafed through the April 4 issue of Népszabadság”:

You couldn’t possibly have made a better issue since the April 4th number was the great festive one, celebrating the 19th anniversary of the liberation of Hungary from the Nazis. This issue, therefore, had a greater circulation than the usual Sunday issues and was read, presumably, with greater care than the weekday numbers. At any rate, I rejoice to have found your words and your visage printed – at long last! – in the popular democratic press. Please accept my congratulations!

In response to Stone’s letter of March 18, Bognár wrote on April 10: “I was very pleased to receive your letter […] I am glad to inform you, that in line with the foundation’s policies, we managed to select in sufficient member, mature scholars and specialists as well as younger research workers from different fields of natural and social sciences and humanities. We agree with you in the procedures for selection of candidates. This list includes, in accordance with the

409 DCSS. FF-IA. Correspondence, 1964 R-Z. Cable from Stone to Bognár, 12 March 1964.
Foundation’s objectives, nominees from Hungarian universities, the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and other important areas of Hungarian life.” 411

In addition to nominating candidates for longer stays in the United States, the Foundation had also invited “several outstanding Hungarians” for a one month stay. Bognár was among these outstanding people, along with Rector of Budapest University, István Sőtér, the composer Zoltán Kodály, and ethnographer and politician Gyula Ortutay. 412 In his letter to Stone, Bognár expressed his “sincere thanks” for this invitation, and the hope that the Hungarians may also invite some “outstanding Americans to Hungary.” 413

First selections

The Foundation selection team made their first selections in Hungary in May 1964. When Gordon was in place at the Royal Hotel in Budapest on May 11, Stone sent a telegram asking him to “convey our regards to professor Bognar and his associates and our sincere wishes for constructive mutual relations.” 414

Thirty eight leaders, scholars and specialists had been chosen for fellowships. Thirty six candidates had been selected to go to the United States and two to go to Western Europe. There were also three Americans who had been chosen to go to Hungary for six week stays. The selection team “included Frederick Burkhardt, President of the American Council of Learned Societies; Samuel Eilenberg, Professor of Mathematics at Columbia University; Earl Heady, Professor of Economics at Iowa State University of Science and Technology; Pendleton Herring, President of the Social Science Research Council; and John Lotz, Professor of Linguistics at Columbia University.” 415 In addition, Tom Mark, an American working in Budapest, had assisted the selection team. On the Hungarian side, Gábor Vigh worked with the selection team as secretary. 416

On 3 June 1964 Stone wrote to Turner B. Shelton at the American Delegation in Budapest, reporting that Burkhardt and Gordon had given him “glowing reports of their visit to Budapest”: “So far as we are concerned, everything is in order and there should be final action

413 FFA GF, 2346-64-432, section 4. Letter from Bognár to Stone, 10 April 1964.
414 DCSS, FF-IA. Correspondence, 1964 R-Z. Cable from Stone to Gordon, 11 May 1964.
within the next few weeks so that our Hungarian friends can begin their work in this country this autumn.”

Back in March 1964, when Stone wrote to Bognár to outline the Foundation’s procedures and objects, he described the kind of candidates they were looking for: “Generally speaking, the Foundation favors candidates of outstanding competence, men and women who are likely to contribute leadership in their professional field to the development of Hungary over the next twenty or thirty years. Also the Foundation tends to favor professional fields in the social sciences and humanities which may be in special need of development. Each candidate will be expected to have received the maximum training available in his specialty in Hungary, and to have demonstrated large competence as an instructor, researcher, or professional practitioner.”

The foregoing description of the Foundation’s Hungarian Program may give the impression of rigid policies and procedures. Despite this, I would like to assure you that it is our intent to work on a friendly and relaxed basis. The procedures I have outlined are similar to those we employ in Poland.

There were also language requirements, and they had become stricter due to some bad experiences with Polish and Yugoslav fellows who could not make proper use of their fellowships because they did not know enough English:

Each candidate should have a working knowledge of English, both oral and reading, in order to benefit fully from his exchange experience. In those cases in which the candidate may be selected owing to outstanding qualities and despite poor oral command in English, he would be expected to engage in systematic study of English before he took up his fellowship. In such cases we would be prepared to finance two or three preliminary months in the United States in advance of the academic year for special language training.

Although they obviously still supported programs with Eastern Europe, the issue was regularly discussed at the Foundation. At a Board of Trustees meeting in June, the discussion had focused on the value and quality of the East European Program. They concluded that “Experts inside and outside the State Department believe the process of change in Europe is quickening and that the time is auspicious for an extension of the Foundation’s program in Eastern Europe.

417 DCSS, FF-IA. Correspondence, 1964, R-Z, Letter from Stone to Turner B. Shelton, American Delegation, Budapest, June 3, 1964
On June 1, Stone cabled Bognár to tell him that he and his colleagues at the Foundation were pleased that an “excellent program start [had] been made and basic understanding established for future improvements,” and that Bognár would be notified by Gordon about the outcome of the final selections as soon as these were completed.422

Running the program

The Hungarian program was run along the same lines as the Polish program, with focus on economists and other social scientists. In fact, one of the reasons consultant Michael Montias had for suggesting a program with Hungary was that he thought that the Foundation’s work in Poland had “so thinned out the [economics] field in Poland that there is at present more talent to be found in Czechoslovakia and Hungary than in our traditional hunting ground.”423

As in Poland, however, there were soon problems with respect to selections, passports, and visas. Already in September of 1964 there were problems concerning a delay in the U. S. State Department’s procedure to issue entry visas.424 In a letter to the IA, it was referred to “three or four visa delay cases which have been real cliff hangers. Unfortunately the first one concerned a party member. The party immediately said: ‘You see, the first trouble starts when a party member is involved’.” Despite this hurdle, the author stressed that

The program has been very well received in Hungary. In fact, several persons said it was the most important single step pointing the way to more flexible arrangements in other fields as well. They seemed satisfied with the selections and liked the Ford selection team. The visa problem merely happened to be in a bad state during our visit. It was the only black spot in the picture since the negotiations began.425

It would not be the only “black spot,” but the program was generally working well. The IIE wrote regular reports to the Ford Foundation, and this was the primary source of feedback about how the fellows were doing. During the first year of the exchange program with Hungary, they reported the following:

While you are probably aware that the comments coming our way from American professors about the first Ford Hungarian scholars has been highly favorable, you may get a better idea by the warmth of the reception from some of the letters received by the IIE, copies which are

422 DCSS. FF-IA. Correspondence, 1964 R-Z. Cable from Stone to Bognár, 1 June 1964.
423 FFA GF, 2346-64-432, section 4, Montias to Stone, 18 November 1961. Montias was teaching economics at Yale at this time.
424 According to Yale Richmond at the State Department, in this case it was merely a delay in the treatment of the application, and not one of the cases where there was reluctance to issue visas. FFA. GF. 2346-64-432, section 4. Memo to Stone, presumably from Gordon, 16 September 1964.
425 FFA Collections, Slater, 46-495. Letter, author unidentified, 19 September 1964
attached. […] IIE staff, both in New York and the regional offices, speak of the Hungarians and their spouses (with minor exceptions) as cooperative, responsive to program suggestions and to opportunities offered by their stay in the United States, serious about their scholarly interests and generally well informed.

We are looking forward enthusiastically to the new program and are pleased the Foundation has asked us to administer it again. […] Be assured of our continued interest and desire to do our best for the Foundation’s East European programs.”

The Hungarian authorities, too, provided their view of the exchanges, and József Bognár wrote to Stone after the first selections in Hungary:

I am glad to let you know/ as my cable already did/ that we were very pleased with the work of the selection team of the Foundation in Budapest last March and are satisfied with the list of recipients you have chosen from our candidates.

I am convinced that on this basis of mutual understanding of each other’s point of view and interests we shall be able to fruitfully cooperate in the future, too.

In the hope of meeting you/ in Budapest or in New York/ soon.

The use of consultants

With a small “freewheeling” staff, the IA heavily depended on input from outside, as we have seen in the case of Szalai and others. Professors in the United States and Europe contributed to the exchange programs by recommending candidates in their fields, by serving on the selection teams, and by receiving fellows at their institutions.

John Lotz at Columbia University was in regular contact with Stanley Gordon about the Hungarian program, especially to recommend candidates. Lotz was himself a Hungarian émigré, and in March of 1964, he sent a recommendation of ten linguists and scholars in the Humanities to Gordon and wrote that he would “regard them all as first-rate men.” When the program was well under way he also wrote about how he perceived the program, that he assumed the aim of it was “to make an impact in Hungary by aiding Hungarian scholars and institutions in establishing contacts with the west, mainly with the United States of America, and to help to build up their resources.” He added that he thought the aim also was to get American scholars to visit Hungary “with this in mind.” He addressed the problem that it was hard to get American scholars who were interested in spending a long time in Hungary. This was a problem because there was “a definite demand on the Hungarian side to try and get American scholars to Hungary.” He also thought one of the aims of the program was to “stir up Hungarian circles intellectually, to make

them formulate results of Hungarian scholarship for a western audience.” He thought that that was too ambitious at the time, as the scholarly production of Hungary was “taken care of as a routine by the publishing house for the Hungarian Academy of Sciences.” He hoped for a way to engage “leading competent people in Hungary, to try to present a broad field of Hungarian studies, for instance, musicology, history (possibly from the Marxist point of view), literary history, and language, etc. Such a commission should be made from institutions in America.” 429

One consultant was Earl O. Heady, Professor at Iowa State University and member of the Ford Foundation selection team for several years. After selecting candidates in Hungary in 1965, he wrote to Stone about his experience:

I greatly enjoyed serving on the team again and I believe that the program is an extremely important and influential one. In the long run, these programs are likely to be more significant in East-West relationships and Eastern changes than any others under way. The difference between 1964 and 1965 in Hungary is an illustration. In 1964 the applicants could hardly believe that they could obtain grants to come to the U.S. Although it was true and they were making application, they could scarcely believe that it would actually go through. Few considered bringing their wives. Yet, after actual realization of the grants by the group now in the U.S. and the letters home, the 1965 group had an entirely different outlook. Not only were they in real competition for the grants, but also they had all been brushing up on English and the majority planned to bring their wives. 430

Heady thought the program was going well, and he praised Stanley Gordon for accomplishing “an excellent task in building up the right relationship and in getting the confidence of the appropriate influential people. I doubt that any one in the State Department has done better.” Heady recommended that the Foundation in future should “get as many good applicants as possible from economists,” with the following explanation as to why he thought so:

While all fields are important in these exchanges, the social sciences and humanities particularly so, economics has special importance. Eastern European countries are giving “some heavy thought” to the direction their economic systems should go and are interested in getting more highly trained scientific economists. They generally have too few well-trained persons at the present. However, there must certainly be some long-run interaction between economic system and well-trained economists over the long run. It is worth “betting on” and the opportunity does exist. However, more of these economists should be capable young people who will come to spend a concentrated period of study (i.e., most of their time) at a good university, learning the concepts, principles, and models well enough to understand them and use them. Certainly, these possibilities should cause more emphasis to be placed on the market mechanism and the individual choices of people, as well as potential turn to other organizations of economic enterprises and sectors. Beyond this, the potential of change might be even greater.

I emphasize the need for an ample number of well-trained economists simply because the potential of change in economic systems and planning which considers the preference of

430 FFA GF, 2346-64-432, section 4, Letter from Earl O. Heady to Shepard Stone, 12 April 1965.
individuals (hoping that consideration of individual preference in markets and prices eventually can lead to similar attention to individual preferences in political selection, etc.).

Hubert Heffner, Associate Provost or Research at Stanford University, was part of the selection team in Hungary in 1965. On the request of Stanley Gordon, he wrote to Stone to tell him about his impressions of science and education in Hungary.

First, let me say how interesting I found it to participate in the interviewing. Although I am quite familiar with science and scientific education in England and western Europe, having spent a year visiting various institutions there as Scientific Liaison Office for our government, I was totally unfamiliar with the situation in eastern Europe. This was the first time I have visited Hungary.

Heffner had observed that the Hungarians were lagging behind in the “physical sciences,” but that the level was high in “cultural activity in the arts.” Much of the reason for the low level of research in the natural sciences was caused by a lack of equipment, he thought. The Hungarians simply could not afford the latest and best, and that made their research suffer. It was also a problem that Hungarian scientists rarely participated at international conferences. Despite this, Heffner found that Hungarian scientists and engineers had access to western scientific literature, and that they seemed to “keep up” on some level. Maybe the Hungarians had benefitted from the information that trickled through from Poland. In any case, Heffner was surprised that there seemed to be “a greater knowledge of American work than of Russian.”

Heffner also described how the Hungarian scientific community was organized, that there were three arenas for research: the universities, “individual factory laboratories, and “research institutes organized either by an industry (electrical, chemical, etc.) or by the Academy of Sciences.” He observed that it was in the research institutes that the best work was done, because of having “the most competent people and the greatest financial support.” Scientists there were usually also on university faculties, and Heffner had the impression that “Everybody in Hungary seems to have more than one job.” As for the universities, which were “organized in the typical European tradition with a single professor in each field,” the quality was generally low, Heffner thought:

I heard several times the critical comment – and criticism is frequent and open in Hungary – that the senior faculty members in the universities were often the old-time political appointees who had obtained their positions through influence during the period of the “personality cult”, the universal Hungarian euphemism for the Stalinist period. Whatever the

431 FFA GF, 2346-64-432, section 4, Letter from Earl O. Heady to Shepard Stone, 12 April 1965.
432 FFA GF, 2346-64-432, section 4, Letter from Hubert Heffner to Shepard Stone, 8 March 1965.
cause, the quality of university research is markedly inferior to that of the research institutes.433

As we shall see in Chapter 8, what often impressed the East European fellows most about the United States, was the dynamic and flexible organization of American universities, as well as first-rate equipment.

The Ford Foundation as catalyst and cooperator

Some times, East European scholars were invited by American colleagues to come to the United States. Before the Foundation got operative in Hungary, people would contact the State Department asking for possible solutions. Once, in April 1964, professor Wassily Leontief at Harvard University, wrote to the State Department: “I understand that the State Department has not yet organized a program of cultural and scientific exchange with Hungary. However, it occurs to me that some other way might be found to invite Dr. [George] Peter to spend a month in the United States.”434 Leontief got the following reply:

Dear Wassily: I have looked into the problem of getting Dr. George Peter to the United States. There is a general feeling hereabouts that it would be fine if Dr. Peter got here. Unfortunately, a direct U.S. Government grant is not possible. As an alternative, it is suggested that Dr. Peter (and perhaps yourself) get in touch directly with Mr. Stanley Gordon of the Ford Foundation in New York. They seem the most likely source of help.435

This is an example of the type of letters the Ford Foundation often received from American professors who wanted to cooperate with their colleagues in Eastern Europe:

Gentlemen,

It has come to my attention that the Ford Foundation plans to support the visit for one or two years of a group of scientists, physical and social, from Eastern Europe, in particular from Hungary and Poland. The Economics Department at Rochester is interested in a visit by Dr. J. [János] Kornai of the Computing Center of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences for the Spring semester of 1965. He has tentatively accepted an offer to come here then. I am wondering whether you are interested in joining with us to sponsor this visit, perhaps sharing the cost, or enabling us to extend the term of the visit beyond one semester.436

433 FFA GF, 2346-64-432, section 4, Letter from Hubert Heffner to Shepard Stone, 8 March 1965.
Problems with the American authorities

It was in the program with Hungary that the Foundation met the most problems with the State Department. From time to time the fellows were subjected to official surveillance. This usually affected natural scientists, and only fellows from Hungary. Neither the fellows nor the IIE were pleased by this, of course, but the IIE concluded that in most cases it did not “present any major obstacles to the mobility of scholars or completion of high priority objectives.” With time, the State Department also “showed more flexibility” than before. This may have been the result of an intervention by one of the members of the Ford Foundation selection team, Dr. Corson. Both “directly and through his intermediaries in Washington” he argued the case for the fellows when he thought the “Government was not properly interpreting the content of grantee proposal.” He offered to help the IIE in such cases, and they took him up on the offer on “several occasions.” 437

In a memorandum to Stone in October of 1965, Gordon addressed what he termed “Governmental Impediments to East European Exchange.” To him the “general picture” was that people at the State Department and other departments found the East European exchanges “bothersome.” Because of that, he thought, matters were handled in a “slow, routine way without benefit of selective, helpful judgements.” The matters were often cases involving scientists from specific areas that the State Department considered sensitive. Frank Siscoe, Director of the Eastern European Exchanges Staff of the State Department had written to the Ford Foundation, explaining that: “In those sciences which are related to design, production and utilization in industrial processes, there are frequently obstacles.” Hence, in fields like “microwave communications”, “electronic computers”, “data processing”, “semiconductors”, “advanced scientific apparatus”, “space associated activities”, “cryogenics”, “high temperature refractory, metals and alloys”, “synthetic polymers for light temperature uses” and “petroleum refinery and petrochemical catalysts” the Ford Foundation could not expect the State Department to issue visa waivers. The question Gordon posed to Stone was whether or not they should notify the authorities in Hungary that they would not nominate people in those fields? He foresaw some problems to such an approach, not least that it would give grist to the mill to those who meant there was a “lack of freedom” in the United States. He also, however, felt that something must be done to prevent the disappointment and frustration for those who were nominated but then refused visas or denied access to important institutions in their field. “The above problems involving delays and restrictions,” he concluded, “have served to irritate grantees, advisers and

prospective hosts and have undermined the efforts of IIE and the Foundation to sustain the confidence of the grantee in making program plans.”

In April of 1966, Yale Richmond at the State Department called Stanley Gordon to tell him that four of the recommended candidates for fellowship would most likely be refused visas to come to the United States. Two of the candidates were physicists, two were in the field of automation. “In my conversation with Yale Richmond,” Gordon wrote to Stone, “we agreed to work out some arrangement whereby the State Department, perhaps through its Legation in Budapest, would notify Bognár about the difficulties in connection with visas for the above-mentioned Hungarian scientists. The objective is to do this quickly so that these four persons will not discover such difficulties long after they have begun their serious preparations to go abroad.”

The physicist Dale Corson was “incensed,” called up Yale Richmond and told him he would write a letter of protest.

It seems that the Foundation was able to negotiate somewhat with the State Department, but by summer there were still two candidates that the State Department would not admit. József Bognár sent an “aggressive cable,” and Gordon tried to mediate:

Dear Professor Bognár:

I am responding to your cable of June 23. The Foundation shares your concern that the State Department was unable to issue visas to Drs. Pocza and Varga. I wish to assure you that we made a very strong appeal to the department of State and were extremely disappointed to learn that the Department would not reconsider its judgement.

You know that the State Department refused visas to two Ford invitees last year and that Frank Siscoe, then Director of the Soviet and East European Exchanges Staff, offered to clarify the official position during his visit to Budapest last spring. We assume that he met with you at that time and explained the State Departments position with regard to certain “sensitive” fields. You and I have also talked informally about the presence of governmental restrictions pertaining to technical information and visits to certain technical-scientific institutions. I would like to reiterate the Foundation’s desire to minimize the likelihood of such restrictions being applied to our Hungarian grantees by keeping the emphasis on its program on university visits and non-technical research.

But the Foundation didn’t give up:

There has come to my attention a copy of your letter of July 1 addressed to Dr. Franklin Long at Cornell University regarding the two Hungarian scholars, Dr. Jenő Pocza and Dr. László Varga for whom visas were sought under the exchange program of the Ford Foundation. As we see the record in these two cases, it differs from the statements made in your letter.

It was after many efforts on our part to obtain the approval of the State Department for visas for Drs. Pocza and Varga that we received the enclosed letter dated May 26, 1966, from Boris H. Klossen, Director of the Soviet and East European Exchanges Staff. I think you will agree that the enclosed letter represents clearly the State Department’s determination not to grant the visas. In addition, Mr. Falkiewicz, an associate of Mr. Klossen, agreed on the telephone with my associate, Stanley Gordon, to ask Mr. Klossen to discuss the State Department’s refusal with Professor Bognar in Budapest during Mr. Klossen’s forthcoming trip to Hungary.

If the State Department is prepared to do so, we recommend that it take immediate action to provide the two visas. We could be prepared to inform Professor Bognar that the Ford Foundation now finds it practicable to reinstate the invitations to Messrs. Pocza and Varga. We think the Ford Foundation program would be strengthened by this action.

The IIE, too, were frustrated by the visa troubles. In June 1966 they wrote some comments to a proposed letter from the National Academy of Sciences to the Secretary of defense: “The inconsistent application of restrictions by the State Department is the greatest source of our problems[…]” The IIE was not generally informed by the preliminary discussions between the Ford Foundation and the State Department, they just had to take the brunt of the work when visa requests did not go through. Hence they urged the Foundation to clarify the program restrictions to the Hungarians.

“On the negative side,” Tom Mark wrote to Stanley Gordon, “the first complaint concerns the rather strict supervision of study programs on the part of the U.S. (What exactly this means, I can’t say; I merely pass it on to you for whatever it may be worth.)”

There was concern that the Hungarians were pushing natural scientists at the expense of people in the humanities and social sciences. On July 2, 1965, Gordon wrote to Stone on the “Science emphasis among Hungarian exchangees”:

You raised the question about the seeming over-emphasis on scientists among the Hungarian exchangees actually coming to the United States. The attached roster of 38 Hungarians invited in 1964 includes 21 persons who are not physical scientists. […] The first year when the Poles caused trouble in Hungary we achieved a roughly 50-50 split of science and non-science only by including the leader group made up almost entirely of non-scientists. A number of the leader group, such as Bognar, have postponed their trip, hence causing the seeming preponderance of scientists.

The trend picture, however, is in the right direction. For 1965-66 only one half of the competitive selectees (non-leaders) are scientists and the science definition is broad. In
addition, as I mentioned to you, I have laid the groundwork with the Hungarian Institute and Academy for a gradual decrease in the number of physical scientists below 50 percent of the competitive group.446

**Defectors**

From time to time the issue of defectors came up. “It is certainly true”, wrote Stanley Gordon to Thomas A. Sebeok in July of 1965, “we must take all reasonable steps to avoid selecting potential defectors. We shall welcome the advice of persons like yourself, Austerlitz and Lotz. Lotz agrees about Antal but feels a travel award of two or three months for him alone would be beneficial and safe.

Austerlitz’s second point relates to candidates for Fellowships who are likely to defect. We both feel that such types are relatively easy to identify and must be shunned. Should any defections occur, the adverse effects on the Program as a whole are bound to be quite damaging. A specific case in point is the Hungarian linguist Antal; Robert and I independently arrived at the conclusion that were he to get out he would never come back. There are others like Antal, and an inquiry to Professor Lotz or to Austerlitz or to myself may identify such cases before a commitment is made.447

Amid all the politics and ideology-issues, there were also more mundane concerns. A recurring theme was living costs. Even though the Ford fellows had more money to spend than those on similar programs, the Foundation regularly received feedback on this and other issues. One complaint was about “financial realities”:

Briefly, the exchange scholars haven’t the vaguest notion of living costs. To be sure, they know that life in western Europe is more expensive than it is in Hungary, and they go on to assume that the purchasing power of the dollar is the same in the U.S. as it is in, say, West Germany! Such an assumption, I need hardly say, can be catastrophic. […] “[A] Hungarian is lost out in the west. Would it be possible for the Foundation to give each candidate a list of typical expenses here in the U.S.? Such information could be most useful. And, finally, some of the candidates did not receive their monthly grants on time, with the result that not infrequently they were embarrassed. In spite of all this, they all seem to think that the Ford scholarships are the greatest thing that happened to Hungary since 1956.448

Selection categories

There were some differences in how the fellows were selected and treated, and in how much money they received. The fellows were selected in four categories: “Class ‘A’” was for those candidates who were of the “highest caliber and influence having broad responsibility for the development of public affairs, education, sciences or the arts in Hungary.” These fellows had been invited especially by the Foundation and did not have to compete for their awards. Their programs lasted from one to six months, and they were treated as VIPs: first class travel, higher maintenance fees, and more money for books and other supplies. They were also provided with interpreters and could receive “other unusual treatment” if necessary.449 Their programs consisted of “Travel, observation and consultation with American leaders in their respective fields of professional and personal interest.”

“Class ‘B’” candidates were “professors and their non-academic equivalent not holding additional important positions to qualify them within ‘A’ group”. They were invited by the Foundation “either on competitive or non-competitive basis” for “short visits, travel, observation and consultation” and could carry out programs of up to nine months. For those who spent a whole academic year in the United States, the Foundation as a rule asked them to remain in residence at one institution for a full term or more “before making comparative visits.”

The “Class ‘C’” category was usually for “those who hold Kandidatus degree, title of Docent, or equivalent status”, and “Class ‘D’” for those who did “not yet hold Kandidatus degree or equivalent status”. The fellows in these two categories were classified as visiting scholars who were expected to work at one university in the United States for at least one semester, followed by “shorter comparative visits to other university centers,” and their whole program should last for up to a year. The only difference between the class “C” and “D” seems to be that class “C” fellows were granted $40 more a month for “maintenance and incidentals.”450 The travel grant, for which the fellows could travel around the United States, was the same amount for all three “lower” categories, up to $400.

Candidates in the B, C, and D categories were allowed to bring their spouses with them. The Foundation had been advised that it may be a good idea, that fellows may be more content and productive if they had their spouses with them. Children, however, were not permitted to

450 There were some differences in how the fellows were selected, treated, and how much money they received: Class “A” fellows got from $25-$40 a day, class “B” $450 a month, class “C” $400, and class “D” $360 a month. In addition, fellows in all categories got a “books and supplies”-grant of $200, but in some cases the Foundation granted “special allowances of up to 400 additional for artists, geographers or other specialists requiring more costly materials, theatre tickets, film, etc.”
come with their parents to the United States, and this was a point of frustration both for the fellows and the Ford Foundation at times. The opportunity to bring spouses was offered from 1966 onward. In that first year, among the thirty-nine married candidates in Hungary and Yugoslavia, thirty-four brought their spouses. One requirement was that the spouses agreed to “remain in the United States with grantee for at least five months”, and in which case the Foundation would cover international travel, add $250 to the fellows’ travel grant and 25% to their maintenance. Another requirement was that the spouses had a good knowledge of English, and they had to show proof of that before coming to the United States. They were, however, also offered language courses at Columbia.

**Extensions**

An ongoing challenge for the IIE and the Foundation was that many grantees requested extensions of their grants.

Despite our administration to scholars and advisers that extensions of award are not generally encouraged and that plans should be tailored to fit existing awards, extension requests continue to come in each year at this time. [...] If it were possible to go into each situation in real depth, we might find that a few proposals were engineered to accommodate a primary motive to avoid Hungarian duties on cars coming into the country. It seems to be common knowledge that almost every Ford grantee last year brought home to Hungary a car purchased with funds saved from the maintenance stipend. This year we know that at least four grantees have made similar plans. Since persons away from Hungary for twelve or more months pay either no duty at all or a very low one, it is obvious that many grantees attempting to remain abroad for that period need continued financial support. There is also some indication that, this year, Hungarian regulations stipulate the entire time abroad must have been spent for officially approved (i.e. award) activities.

You will surely agree that IIE cannot possibly attempt to ascertain to what extent a car is the primary motive behind each extension request enclosed and that we must limit ourselves to judging each on its professional merits in accordance with established criteria. The IIE recommendations, therefore, reflect our best judgment within the limitations to which we have referred. Please let us have your decisions as soon as possible.

As you know, I hope the extensions to Europe will be kept to a minimum – that is, restricted to experiences of truly special significance, and then arranged (as to time and people) so that maximum benefits are assured. We must avoid the situation where most candidates are trying to make cases for sojourns in Europe.

The fact that many fellows wanted to stay longer in the West, is not strange. As mentioned, their opportunities for travel and study abroad were very limited, and they tried to hold on to the opportunity given them by the Ford Foundation for as long as possible. This in itself proved the value of the program, as a way for East Europeans to get out and experience the West and make scholarly and professional contacts. For the Hungarian authorities, the value outweighed the risks, and despite cases of defection, withheld passports, visa restrictions and some surveillance on the part of American, they agreed enough to the Foundations terms to carry on the exchanges until they ended in 1969.
Chapter 7. Impressions in the encounter between East and West.

This story about the Ford Foundation exchange programs with Poland, Yugoslavia, and Hungary involves a detailed account of how the programs were planned and implemented, and the rationale behind them. It also involves an analysis of the encounter between the Ford Foundation and Eastern Europe on two levels.

On one level the encounter was between two different cultures, two different systems, personified by the officers and consultants of the Foundation, on one side, and by East European government officials, academic leaders and scholars, on the other. How was the Ford Foundation, this American, capitalist, private philanthropic foundation, imagined and experienced by the East Europeans? And how, in turn, did the Ford Foundation view them and their societies?

On another level the encounter was between the Foundation representatives and the individual East European fellows who came to the United States. In application forms, reports, and correspondence between the Ford fellows and the Ford Foundation, we get an impression of how the fellows presented themselves — their “Eastern Selves,” vis-à-vis the Ford Foundation — their “Western Others,” and of how they experienced the United States. How the Ford Foundation and their associates experienced East Europeans, and how they reacted to their presentations, is also an important aspect of the encounter. These encounters will be dealt with separately, in chapter 8.

In this chapter I will try to grasp how “Easterners” and “Westerners” in the context of the Ford Foundation programs regarded each other generally: What notions did they have of each other, and how is this reflected in the sources? Did the different intellectual, academic cultures of Europe and North America affect the relationship? If so, how? Were there prevalent stereotypes? Did the East Europeans know what the Ford Foundation was, what an American foundation was? The sources (documents from the Ford Foundation describing what type of people they wanted as fellows, interviewers' reports, annual reports from the IIE, correspondence between the Ford Foundation and their consultants) provide insight into how people from East and West regarded each other. I will use some concepts from the work of Canadian-American sociologist Erving Goffman in my analysis, in order to articulate my findings.
Erving Goffman’s “interaction order”

Erving Goffman’s book *The Presentation of the Self in Everyday Life* was published in 1959. Goffman studied the structure of face-to-face interaction, and is considered “among those who have blurred genre distinction in the human sciences.”454 His influence has been described as “extraordinarily diffuse,” but Goffman has also been credited with “altering the chemistry of the worlds of social science and social theory (and beyond), and many of us fall back on his work without even knowing it.”455 Another scholar credited Goffman with showing us that “roleplaying is not fraudulent but universal”.456

Goffman intended his book “to serve as a sort of handbook detailing one sociological perspective from which social life can be studied,” and promised the reader that a “set of features will be described which together form a framework that can be applied to any concrete social establishment, be it domestic, industrial, or commercial.”457 Together, this “set of features” form what Goffman called “the arts of impression management.” I will apply some of his terms and concepts to my study of the encounter between Eastern European exchangees and the Ford Foundation.

While Goffman recognized that a staged performance and a real-life encounter were not the same, he saw enough significant similarities that it would be useful to compare the two and to apply terms and concepts from the stage to analyze social encounters in real life. Similarly, I recognize the challenge in applying principles from face-to-face encounters to a study of texts, but also consider the similarities significant enough to make such a shift in application useful.

The basis for Goffman’s study is the assumption that everyday encounters can, for the purpose of analysis, be compared to staged performances. Using vocabulary from such disciplines as drama and the theater, and psychology, he pulls the reader into a world of roleplay that most people probably recognize, but are at a lack of words to describe, because many of the mechanisms that surround human encounters are so ingrained in us or so obscured by convention, or other cultural blindfolds, that we often cannot identify them.

Goffman wrote the following on the conceptions of behaviour in Anglo-American culture:


456 Sheila Fitzpatrick. *Tear off the Masks*.

There seem to be two commonsense models to which we formulate our conceptions of behaviour: the real, sincere, or honest performance; and the false one that thorough fabricators assemble for us, whether meant to be taken un seri ously, as in the work of stage actors, or seriously, as in the work of confidence men. We tend to see real performances as something not purposely put together at all, being an unintentional product of the individual’s unselfconscious response to the facts in his situation.458

Aiming to shed light on life’s “real performances” by focusing on the dramaturgical elements of the “interaction order,” 459 Goffman’s observations and analyses challenged many of the assumptions Americans and other Westerners had about themselves and their society in the 1950s and 1960s. His theories are considered to have had a general impact on how we (in the “West”) regard the dynamics and codes of the social interactions we enter into every day. By addressing the types of issues that he did, Goffman was ahead of his time in analyzing and questioning the established notions of behaviour, which in turn contained significant signs of the prevailing ideals in Western society and culture in general.

While Goffman was one of the first to challenge Western assumptions of what was real and sincere as opposed to false in face-to-face interaction, the idea that one must perform in real life was not new to the Eastern European; that is, if we trust the Polish writer Czesław Miłosz in his claim that East Europeans dealt with life’s contradictions by becoming actors:

It is hard to define the type of relationship that prevails between people in the East otherwise than as acting, with the exception that one does not perform on a theater stage but in the street, office, factory, meeting hall, or even the room one lives in. Such acting is a highly developed craft that places a premium upon mental alertness. Before it leaves the lips, every word must be evaluated as to its consequences. A smile that appears at the wrong moment, a glance that is not all it should be can occasion dangerous suspicion and accusations. Even one’s gestures, tone of voice, or preference for certain kinds of neckties are interpreted as signs of one’s political tendencies.460

One should think, then, that the East Europeans had much practice in playing different roles, and that they would be prepared for any situation, even in the encounter with the West, but according to Miłosz it was not that simple:

A visitor from the Imperium is shocked on coming to the West. In his contacts with others, beginning with porters or taxi drivers, he encounters no resistance. They lack that internal concentration which betrays itself in a lowered head or restlessly moving eyes. They say

459 This was Goffman’s term for “the structure of face-to-face interaction.” In A. Javier Treviño. ed. Goffman’s legacy. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003, 1.
460 Miłosz, Czesław. The captive mind, 54.
It seems that one difference between the interaction order in East and West was that in the East people were constantly aware of playing roles, while in the West it happened more or less subconsciously. In the East, the performances in everyday life were marked by the real fear many people felt, as citizens of authoritarian or totalitarian regimes, of having their masks torn off:\footnote{Inspired by Sheila Fitzpatrick’s book *Tear off the Masks. Identity and imposture in Twentieth-Century Russia.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005.} so much was at stake that one must always be on guard, lest one is found out.

Despite obvious differences, the descriptions of how Milosz and Goffman perceived everyday performances are similar. They were contemporaries, and maybe there was something in the *Zeitgeist* that opened their eyes to the dynamics of social interaction?

### Notions of West and East

“Are Americans really stupid?” Miłosz was once asked in Warsaw, and

[i]n the voice of the man who posed the question, there was despair, as well as the hope that I would contradict him. This question reveals the attitude of the average person in the people’s democracies toward the West: it is despair mixed with a residue of hope.\footnote{Czesław Miłosz, although never a Ford fellow, was indirectly in contact with the Foundation about a summer seminar at Harvard he organized with Henry Kissinger. FFA. GF. 2520-57322-5(7), Grant attachment, Szczepanski, 1958. Jerzy Giedroyc to Stone, 5 March 1958.}  

The outburst of this man in Warsaw is a good example of the janusfaced notion of the USA that prevailed in (Eastern) Europe in the postwar era. Americans, too, as we know, viewed East Europeans with suspicion and had mixed images. The Ford Foundation and the IIE also seems to have had an ambiguous view of intellectuals, that may not always have been conducive to understanding East European intellectuals. Shepard Stone, for example, was known for his pragmatic approach, and has even been criticized for his “profound lack of understanding of intellectuals.”\footnote{Saunders, 412. McCloy, too, was described as having “limited patience with academic studies.” Sutton, 26.} For a man who had earned his PhD in a German university, and who, according to himself had done a lot to promote “Europe’s tremendous talent—scholarly, educational, cultural, and political,”\footnote{Interview with Shepard Stone [transcribed from cassette recording]. For the Ford Foundation Oral History Project, New York, December 12, 1972. Interviewers: Charles T. Morrissey & Ronald J. Grele, 10.} this seems a harsh characteristic, but one which may, in fact, reflect the differences in the perception of what “intellectuals” and “intelligentsia” signified. Indeed, if
Miłosz was right about how “The man of the East” and “Americans” regard each other, perhaps the Ford Foundation people did not ponder this aspect at all:

The man of the East cannot take Americans seriously because they have never undergone the experiences that teach men how relative their judgements and thinking habits are. Their resulting lack of imagination is appalling. Because they were born and raised in a given social order and in a given system of values, they believe that any other order must be “unnatural” and that it cannot last because it is incompatible with human nature.466

Miłosz’s analysis is somewhat in keeping with ideas expressed in Ford Foundation documents. Although people such as Stone often expressed admiration for aspects of European culture, and disapproved of superiority-thinking on the part of Americans, it is obvious that he considered Americans to be in a position where they could teach Europeans something about how to live, and that their societies would certainly benefit from it.467 Stone was not without prejudice (“We have been reading your notes from Paris, Rhodes and other civilized parts in Europe”468), but he expressed that in some cases Europeans could teach Americans something, too, even East Europeans, albeit rarely. The fact that he emphasized this point is a strong indication that it was a view that was not necessarily common among his American peers.

Intelligentsia vs intellectuals

The East Europeans in this story were part of the intelligentsia in their respective countries. They were all well-educated academics, and in that sense comparable to well-educated people in the West, some of whom we would call intellectuals.

In books and articles about intellectuals in Eastern Europe, East European scholars insist that the intelligentsia of the East was different from intellectuals in the West.469 In Aleksander Gella’s words: “Of all the social groups in eastern Europe, the intelligentsia is the most interesting stratum, and for western sociologists the least understood. All the other classes and strata that have existed in eastern Europe have had their counterparts in the West. […] Only the intelligentsia as a social phenomenon was without a counterpart in either western Europe or America.”470

466 Czesław Miłosz. The Captive Mind, 29.
469 Scholars such as Alexander Gella, George Shöpflin, Jan Szczepanski, Hugh Seton-Watson and Zygmunt Bauman all contend that the intelligentsia of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union were fundamentally different from the Western concept of intellectuals.
The origins of the intelligentsia, in the East European and Russian sense, go back to the 18th century, but I will not go there, apart from stating what several writers have claimed, that the intelligentsia had a critical role in their respective societies and would often be found to be in opposition to the ruling regime, at any time, and that in Poland especially, the intelligentsia was a guardian of national consciousness and identity, in the period of partition when the country and the Polish people were divided between Germany, the Habsburg Empire, and Russia. In the time after the Russian revolution the intelligentsia in the Soviet Union developed in the new political setting as something different from before, and still different from its Western counterpart. In the new, communist society the intelligentsia continued to include the thinkers and critics, but also encompassed all people who were not manual labourers: functionaries, trained technicians, people who worked in education; in short what we have usually called white collar workers in the West. One tier of the intelligentsia, the “creative” intelligentsia, was probably made up of people most like what we in the West call intellectuals. This conception of the intelligentsia dominated also in the new peoples’ democracies of the 1940s and ‘50s. The Ford Foundation fellows would have been a product both of the old and the new conception. In any case, they came from a different tradition than intellectuals in the West.

It is not easy to fully grasp the unique qualities of the East European intelligentsia, and what separates it from intellectuals in the West. Western intellectuals, too, have often been political, often with a strong element of elitism. They have also discussed who they are and what they represent: “Are intellectuals a very large or an extremely small and highly selective group of people?” asked Edward Said. There have been different answers, from Antonio Gramsci’s view that “all men are intellectuals, […] but not all men have in society the function of intellectuals,” to Julien Benda’s “celebrated definition of intellectuals as a tiny band of super-gifted and morally endowed philosopher-kings who constitute the conscience of mankind.” For the East European intelligentsia, Gella gives us one definition: “as a social stratum the intelligentsia appears when and where some section of the educated people began to feel that their nation faces a set of serious problems that will never be resolved by the existing ruling


classes and the establishment intellectuals.” From the descriptions of the intelligentsia as white collar workers, I assume that Gella was referring to only parts of the stratum in this definition.

The changes in the traditional-historical intelligentsia after the war under communist rule in the peoples’ democracies called for new conceptions and definitions. A project description for a sociological research project in Warsaw in 1958 tells us that the intelligentsia was not easy to understand even for its own members, and that they grappled with its new role and function. The project description was written by Polish sociologist and soon-to-be Ford fellow Jan Szczepanski and sent in translation to the Ford Foundation in April of 1958. It provides us with a definition of the Polish intelligentsia as perceived by Szczepanski and his colleagues at that time:

Intelligentsia consists of various categories of workers performing intellectual work in three sociological categories: creators, experts and performers. Intelligentsia is not an independent social class, but a combination of various categories of paid (employed) workers. Not an independent social-political force, because it has no economic basis of its own and depends on the ruling class. Taking over of the ruling power of the working class and the process of building the socialism has serious consequences in the structure and functions of intelligentsia.  

The project aimed to "describe and explain the changes taking place in that structure and functions of intelligentsia in our country, especially to answer the following general questions:

In a country building socialism and showing an increase in population, is intelligentsia becoming a more important social layer? Is it beginning to show tendencies to change into an independent class?

Or on the contrary, because of an increase in population is it losing its “elite” character and becoming more dependent, lost in the mass?

Do the individual categories of intelligentsia close their rank and form institutions, or – on the contrary, separate from each other, with some of the categories showing tendencies to dominate the others?

What are the results of the power being taken over by a class, which cannot control intellectual activity?

What is the sociological character and functions of people’s intelligentsia in comparison with analogical professional (trade) categories in a capitalist society?  

473 Gella, Development, 163
474 "Szczepanski is a courageous man” wrote Stone to Dr. Fritz Stern, New York, 20 October 1958. He is one of the leading sociologists in Poland. Paul Lazarsfeld can tell you a great deal about him and so can I.” FFA, GF, 2520-57322-5(?) Grant attachment, Szczepanski, 1958.
475 FFA, GF, 2520-57322-5(?) Grant attachment, Szczepanski, 1958. “General picture of sociological research on intelligentsia conducted by the Institute of Sociological Research of the Polish Academy of Sciences.”
476 Ibid.
The Polish sociologists presented four different hypotheses to how the intelligentsia might develop: It could obtain a more important place in Polish socialist society because of its role of performing “key planning functions in [the] construction of a new system. As a result it may become “more and more independent,” to the extent of forming a “new class,” with its “own institutions and own ideology.” Another possible path was that the former intelligentsia, with its “elite” character, would fall apart. In that case, its social importance may decrease, and “its various professional categories become isolated from each other,” thereby becoming “a combination of various types of mental workers, who only carry out orders and are subordinated to a political control of the governing class.” A third path may also result in a new class, a ruling class, made up of some of the categories of the intelligentsia “(for instance, government technicians, administration executives and leaders in industry).” If this happened, they may “impose their rule over the working class and the rest of the intelligentsia.” Finally, the Polish sociologists envisioned the intelligentsia as becoming “a layer of employed or otherwise dependent mental workers.” This type of intelligentsia, they thought, may begin “to look alike the working class, which achieves ever higher intellectual level, flows into it and together with it begins to form a new social element.”

Obviously, then, the intelligentsia of the East was not easy to describe or understand, even for the East Europeans themselves, but it is obvious from the sources that they perceived their role as different from that of Western intellectuals, and often as superior. Thus, according to Miłosz, what was referred to as

the “stupidity” of the American masses, who are satisfied by the purely material advantages of this new civilization, is exceptionally irritating to the Eastern intellectual. Raised in a country where there was a definite distinction between the “intelligentsia” and the “people,” he looks, above all, for ideas created by the “intelligentsia,” the traditional fermenting element in revolutionary changes. When he meets with a society in which the “intelligentsia,” as it was known in Central or Eastern Europe, does not exist, he has great difficulty in translating his observations into conceptual terms.

More than the West imagines, the intellectuals of the East look to the West for something. Nor do they seek it in Western propaganda. The something they look for is a great new writer, a new social philosophy, and artistic movement, a scientific discovery, new principles of painting or music. They rarely find this something.

Also, if we believe Miłosz, the “Eastern intellectual is a severe critic of everything that penetrates to him from the West. He has been deceived so often that he does not want cheap

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477 Ibid.
478 Czesław Miłosz. The Captive Mind, 33-34
479 Ibid., 37
consolation which will eventually prove all the more depressing. The War left him suspicious and highly skilled in unmasking sham and pretense.”

There was also fear among East European intellectuals, argues Miłosz, “of the indifference with which the economic system of the West treats its artists and scholars,” and a view of Westerners as “good-natured idiots.” They thought it better to deal with an intelligent devil than with a good-natured idiot. An intelligent devil understands their mutual interests and lets them live by a pen, a chisel, or a brush, caring for his clients and making his demands. A good-hearted idiot does not understand these interests, gives nothing and asks nothing—which in practice amounts to polite cruelty.

Whether or not the individual East European fellow of the 1950s and 1960s identified with what Miłosz wrote, I can only speculate, but it is reasonable to assume that his analyses applied to many of those who came from backgrounds similar to his. That being said, he published his book in 1953, during a period in which the prospects of peaceful interaction between East and West were bleak, and much had happened in this respect by the time the first Ford Foundation exchange program was launched. Also, much changed during the years that the programs were carried out. In any case, it seems that the fellows had a hard time finding an intelligentsia in East Central European terms in the United States, except perhaps among the East European diaspora. Judging from what they wrote, however, the fellows presented their role as members of the East Central European intelligentsia as an asset rather than an impediment.

The Americans knew that the East Europeans they chose as Ford fellows were different from American academics. They were from the old world of Europe, and they came from communist countries. Of course something was different. What the difference was, however, may have been difficult for them to pin-point. Given that the members of the East European intelligentsia themselves were in a process of re-defining their identity and role in society, it is likely that their self-identity, how they felt in relationship to their counterparts in the United States, was unclear to the Americans. They may also have been quite unaware of how contemptible, as described by Miłosz, some Eastern intellectuals found Westerners.
What kind of people did the Foundation want?

Whatever their conception of East European intellectuals, the guidelines presented by the IA to the Foundation selection teams tell us what kind of people the Ford Foundation wanted. They wanted people who were academically excellent and full of promise; objective and flexible with the willingness to learn and the desire to exchange ideas, and who possessed “evident potential leadership qualities.” The candidates must not, however, “bury themselves in research” at the expense of their exposure to institutions and individuals, nor use the time in the United States to obtain an academic degree. 482 Compared to the role of the intelligentsia in Eastern Europe as “the traditional fermenting element in revolutionary changes”, and the self-image of the East European intellectual as a “learned person from the Continent,” the Foundation’s expectations may not have matched the candidates perception of themselves. In any case, it is likely that successful impression management, in the Goffman sense, was necessary for a candidate to succeed in convincing the Foundation of his or her suitability.

As we have seen, selections were at the core of the exchange programs, and the Ford Foundation repeated time and again that their programs were democratic. “Democratic” was a word that Stone and his like-minded used often, but without clearly defining or explaining what meaning they actually attributed to the term. The East European programs promised to be carried out on a “democratic basis,” 483 and a definition that suits the way in which Stone and his colleagues used the word is that “talent and merit would be rewarded wherever they were identified”, and that “achievers from nonprivileged backgrounds would be encouraged, nurtured and, and inducted into the decision-making stratum of the democratic state.” 484 In other words, the conception of democracy among Stone and his like-minded was very much as Edward Berman saw it, as a “democratic elitism.” 485

The IA officers and the others on the selection team, usually prominent American professors and leaders, prided themselves in the fact that a candidate could practically walk in from the street, sign up for an interview, and then get an award. 486 To be sure, the candidate would have to be “outstanding” by way of merit, but any outstanding person would have as good

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482 FFA GF. 2518-57322-5 “Background and guidelines for 1961 selection team,” 9 February 1961. Considering that the IA never had more than half a dozen regular employees, and that Stone was the director, it is likely that he wrote this document. It is also written in a style that resembles other documents he wrote.
483 DCSS. FF-IA. Memo from Adie to Bunny, 20 March 1957
484 Berman. *Ideology of Philanthropy*, 27
485 I introduced Berman and discussed this in more detail in my introductory chapter.
486 One example of this was a fellow named Mikulski. FFA GF, 2520-57-322-5(?).Grant attachments.Mikulski to Doherty, Warsaw, 27 September 1961.
a chance as any other outstanding person of getting an award. Of course, it wasn’t quite that simple: most fellows had a network, a professor, somebody that vouched for them, so that talent alone would not be enough to secure an award. Nevertheless, such a “democratic” approach to selections was the ideal.

There was also the “ideal” candidate. In the IA document “Background and guidelines for 1961 selection team,” the ideal type of person for a Ford fellowship are described, and the instructions were to search for:

recognized and influential scholars or professional specialists, or those who are obviously talented aspirants to either of these roles. The successful candidates should evince readiness to carry out a study or observation program with a reasonable degree of objectivity, willingness to learn, and desire to exchange ideas. Beyond the basic requirements of intellectual quality, flexibility and promise, the important requisite is evident potential leadership in the future development of Poland, both academically and culturally.487

The selection team was further instructed to inspect the candidates’ academic grades early in the process “so that the less than excellent scholars may be culled out quickly” and urged to avoid selecting scholars “who would be expected to ‘bury himself’ in a narrow research project thus restricting himself from broad exposure to institutions and individuals.” The team was also emphatically made aware that “[t]he purpose of individual exchanges is not to provide opportunities to obtain academic degrees.”

These instructions tell us that what Stone, the IA, and the Ford Foundation wanted, were people who were basically mirror-images of themselves or, rather, of their ideal selves: bright, well-educated, suave, sociable, with open minds and intellects of a broad horizon. In other words, they wanted people fit to carry and combine both the cultural heritage of Europe, which Stone admired so much, and the progressive, socially mobile, flexible, action-oriented qualities of the United States that Stone and his like-minded continually promoted.

Apart from choosing candidates that were compatible with Ivy league ideals, the most important aspect of the selections was to retain control over them, partially so they could pick the cream of the crop, the very best of Polish, Yugoslav and Hungarian minds, regardless of whether they were Communists or not, and partially to ensure that the candidates were not in the category of “bootlickers, hacks and sycophants.”488

487 FFA GF. 2518-57322-5 “Background and guidelines for 1961 selection team,” 9 February 1961. Considering that the IA never had more than half a dozen regular employees, and that Stone was the director, it is likely that he wrote this document. It is also written in a style that resembles other documents he wrote.

488 FFA GF, 2346-64-432, section 4, Montias to Stone, 18 November 1961.
Selection criteria

The programs were generally divided into three distinct categories of candidates: Leaders, experts, and research scholars/graduate students. As mentioned, the criteria for selection were different for each category, and so were the duration of the visits and the amount of money the candidates were given.

The largest group of grantees, the research scholars and advanced graduate students, generally spent from nine months to a year in the US, and they were generally selected on their academic merits alone, but also – as always – on the basis of their personality. Narrow-minded, introverted scholars were generally not favoured, as one of the main objectives of the program was to encourage dynamic interaction between the grantees and their colleagues at American institutions.

An important factor for selection, in addition to scholarly excellence and merit, was that a candidate’s application was backed by particularly enthusiastic recommendations from people whom the Foundation valued. “Unless testimonials of overwhelming weight should be found, this does not seem a likely recommendation.”

Another winning asset for the candidates was to present a particularly well-conceived and planned program, which showed that they had established contacts in the US on their own, or that they – at least – knew exactly who they wanted to study with, and that they had good reasons why.

Language ability was also an important criteria. Although it was not an absolute, knowledge of English was a definite plus for selection. The candidates were offered language training in the US upon their arrival, and some were asked to come early, to be intensively trained in English before the start of their studies.

In some cases, scholars were invited directly by an American university or institute and offered tuition and maintenance. Some of these scholars applied for Ford grants, too, and some, who would not have filled the Foundation criteria for full fellowships were accepted on a partial basis where the Foundation paid their travel expenses. “His rating would normally be C+, but if Pittsburgh wants him and can give him some solid training, I can see no harm in it” wrote one interviewer about a candidate in 1961. Ultimately, he was rejected even for a travel grant, but others did obtain travel funds from the Foundation when an American institution covered the rest of their stay in the US. The example shows, not surprisingly, that the Ford Foundation was not

490 FFA GF. 2518-57322-5."Rejected applicants.” J. Handwritten note from 1961 selections, probably by Montias.
quite as adamant about excellence in those candidates they supported as part of non-Foundation program as they were in the case of their own “full” fellows.

The interviews

As the selection teams did not allow representatives from the East European authorities to be present at the interviews,\textsuperscript{491} the interview situation was an encounter between one candidate and one or two members of the selection team.\textsuperscript{492} For each interview the interviewer filled out an “Interviewer’s evaluation form.” This contained all personal data of the candidate; field; desired country of destination; length of time recommended; a tentative rating based on the American grading system, As and Bs and so on; what type of award was recommended “Leader; Visiting Professor; Specialist; Senior Research Scholar; Jr. Research Scholar”; an “Evaluation of applicant,” where his or her “Personality,” “Background (academic and experience),” and “Language ability” was judged. In addition, there was an “Evaluation of the proposed program” and a space to put “Additional comments and evaluation.”

Prior to the interview, the team had been presented with a standardized application form for each candidate, in which the candidate presented his / her curriculum vitae (personal data, present position, education, previous experience, knowledge of foreign languages, previous travel experience) and a statement on the “purpose of your trip abroad and plans for research.” Many candidates opted to write long proposals in a separate document, rather than write a short statement at the bottom of the application form. In the first few years the form did not call for a photograph of the candidate, but by 1961 an attached photograph was encouraged.

During the selection procedure, especially during the interview, the candidate, being aware that the Ford representative would come to the interview with certain expectations may, in Goffman’s words,

wish them to think highly of him, or to think that he thinks highly of them, or to perceive how in fact he feels about them, or to obtain no clear-cut impression; he may wish to ensure sufficient harmony so that the interaction can be sustained, or to defraud, get rid of, confuse, mislead, antagonize, or insult them. Regardless of the particular objective which the individual has in mind and of his motive for having this objective, it will be in his interests to control the conduct of the others, especially their responsive treatment of him.\textsuperscript{493}

\textsuperscript{491} This was one of the demands of the Polish authorities, that they wanted one of their representatives present at the interviews, and it was a demand the Foundation could not accept. This was one of the reasons the program broke down in 1962, and why they couldn’t agree to resume it until 1967.

\textsuperscript{492} I draw this conclusion from reading the interviewer’s reports. I don’t know if there were one or two Ford – or more - representatives present, but the reports were signed by one team member only.

\textsuperscript{493} Goffman, Presentation, 15.
In this particular situation, where much was at stake for the candidate, special care must be taken to meet the expectations of the interviewer. In the context of the Cold War, and probably conscious of the fact that the West had invented an image of him quite different from his own perception of self, the presumption, on the one hand, is that the candidate may try to appear as “Western” as possible. The question then arises: do interviewer and candidate have the same conception of what it means to behave in a “Western manner”? On the other hand, the candidate may, if an ardent defender of a different view than the one he expects in the interviewer, assert his opinions to this effect. How did this manifest itself in his/her behaviour, and how did it affect the Ford representative? Was the interaction maintained or did it break down?

The fellows were often confronted with someone else’s categorization of them, one that often did not match their own ideas of what they were or were not, and this may have made them more conscious of their own identity and of what “categories” they belonged to. Trying to foster a favourable impression on “others” whose definition of them differed from their own, the fellows may have experienced a change in their self-perception, as well as a change in their perception of “the other”, the American, the Westerner. In being confronted with a new conception of self, the Fellows had to perform in a way that would protect their own image of themselves while simultaneously securing continued interaction.

Rejected applicants

A look at the files of rejected candidates provide some clues about which strategies worked and which didn’t. The number of people who were interviewed was much larger than the number of awards available, so most of the candidates were rejected. In the 1961 selection process in Poland for instance, the selection committee interviewed 450 candidates for 100 awards. Several candidates applied for Foundation fellowships two, or even three, years in a row, and some finally succeeded. Comments like “he has not yet proven his scientific worth. He might be a top-rank candidate in the next two years,” suggests that some candidates may have been encouraged to apply again.

In general, the candidates were well-qualified, so the explanation sent out to the rejected candidates by the IA at the end of each selection process was, in most cases, sincere: that the main reason for having to reject a candidate was the fact that the number of candidates “was much larger than the number of awards,” but that the “Foundation staff gave careful

494 FFA GF. 2518-57322-5.”Rejected applicants, J.” Handwritten note from 1961 selections, probably by Montias.
consideration to all candidates.” Because of this, the Foundation regretted it was “necessary to exclude many outstanding candidates by reason of such factors as low priority of their professional field, lack of language proficiency and other opportunities for travel or study abroad.” It was also emphasized that the failure of securing an award was not an indication that a candidate had “been judged unqualified.”

Although this polite letter of rejection was, of course, sent out to all candidates in question, and although most candidates were deemed appropriate, if perhaps not quite outstanding enough to deserve a fellowship, a few candidates were indeed judged to be totally “unqualified”. One example was the case of a man who had been “prevented from attending” a meeting in the US in 1959 because of “US actions” and who seemed, according to the interviewer, “to demand a grant as recompense for his thwarted trip of 1959.” He was described as “unpleasant, aloof, superior & cynical,” and was “not to be considered.”

Another candidate, interviewed by another selection committee member was described as simply a “primitive type,” whose English was “too poor,” and whose “knowledge of sociology seem[ed] extremely limited.”

Another category among the rejected candidates was that of those who were deemed “self-important” or “arrogant,” obviously not desirable qualities in the eyes of the Foundation. One candidate was described as an “alert, quickly-spoken individual who speaks English fluently and precisely.” Although the interviewer found him to be a “rather sophisticated” man, he was also described as a “slightly self-important individual.” Further, the interviewer found the candidate to be “[h]ighly confident in himself and probably inclined to dogmatism, even doctrinaire judgements. Manifest drive and ambition, perhaps also aggressive and arrogant.”

There was a fine line, then, between confidence, drive and ambition, qualities highly prized by the Foundation, and arrogance, which they disfavoured. Was the perceived “self-importance” and “arrogance” expressions of bad impression management, in the way that the candidate tried to impress the Foundation with a confident attitude, but missed the mark? Was it perhaps an expression of the “learned person” from the Continent, in combination with the East European political intellectual, and as such strange and foreign to the American interviewer, and apt to be read as arrogance? Or, was the candidate simply an arrogant man by any standards? We can only speculate, but it is interesting to note that this candidate had applied for a Ford fellowship.

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“several years before”, and that he stressed the fact, during the interview, that he exposed himself to a second application only at the request of [his] institute.”

Being rejected was disappointing at best and often humiliating; hence we can assume that elements of defiance and sceptical apprehension also shaped this candidate’s performance. The candidate above, forty-one years old at the time of the interview, described himself as a “scientific research student” at the Polish Institute of International Affairs and had previously worked at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a press attaché in Israel, political adviser in Vietnam, and commissioner in Laos. He applied for a grant in the field of International Affairs with the Middle East as his specialty, and he wanted to go to the United States, Great Britain and France. Thus, he was a well-travelled, experienced man who would not, we may assume, be inclined to diffidence in his meeting with the Foundation interviewer. Although the Foundation representatives expressed a preference for confidence and disliked a servile attitude, a certain degree of modesty was expected and appreciated, and this candidate did not meet their expectations. Chances are that he was rejected also because his project about “problems of the Arab East” may not have been a field particularly well-suited to instil in him a more favourable view of the United States.

Generally, the Foundation had set as a prerequisite that applicants to the research scholar category had already earned their doctoral degrees, but this prerequisite could, in some instances, be waived if a candidate was considered particularly brilliant, and/or in a field judged to be particularly important. For those who were not so brilliant, they had to wait until their theses were approved in order to get a grant. One such candidate, who had applied for the first time in 1958 and had still not finished his thesis by the time he applied again in 1961, was nevertheless, his interviewer wrote, a possible fellow for the 1962 selection, if he was given a “high rating” by the appropriate people. This candidate, whose supervisor was in the US on a Ford grant at the time, was not described in the glowing terms of those who were immediately recommended by their interviewers, and the description of him is interesting because of its rather condescending tone:

A fairly pleasant fellow who is apparently “scratching” to make ends meet as a researcher while he finishes his doctorate thesis. Somewhat “sloppy” in personal appearance but he would adjust satisfactory[ily] I think to social circumstances of U. S. Reasonable and responsive.”

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499 FFA GF. 2518-57322-5.”Rejected applicants, R.” Interviewer’s evaluation form, assessed by John Dickey on the selection committee, March 1, 1961.
After the account of the not-so-impressed interviewer in March 1961, the enthusiastic letter to Stanley Gordon from another American provides an interesting contrast:

I understand that the Ford Foundation is nearing completion of its selection of Ford Fellows from Poland for the coming academic year. And I understand that Mr. A[...] R[...], a sociologist, is one of the candidates.

I met Mr. R[...] during my visit to Warsaw last summer and was exceedingly impressed by him. Many of the younger Polish sociologists, as you may know, are of extraordinary high calibre. I would rate Mr. R[...] among the top group. He has been a student of Professor Ossowski and was one of the initiators of the Public Opinion Research Center. He is independent of mind and widely read.

I hope that the Ford Foundation will be able to act favorable on his candidacy.500

Both interviewer’s comments and letters of recommendation are usually included in a candidate’s file, and together they paint an interesting picture of how different a person can be perceived, and of how important the first impression at the interview was. Obviously, the Foundation had also reflected on this and usually considered a combination of interview and recommendation the best way to screen a candidate. The face-to-face encounter was important to assess the way a candidate carried him- or herself when put on the spot and forced to foster and impression that would convince the interviewer of his or her suitability and excellence, but the Foundation realized that a wrong, incomplete impression could also be the result and thus placed great emphasis on the recommendations of people who had met the candidates under different circumstances. With flippant and unprofessional “personality” comments such as “Very nice (and rather nice looking, too),”501 a back-up of recommendations was probably to the advantage of most candidates, especially it would seem, if you were a woman.

Women candidates

The Ford Foundation fellowship programs, being carried out on “a democratic basis”, was open to women candidates, and women made up about ten percent of the total number of Polish candidates who received fellowships.502 It is interesting to note that, with the exception of Michelle Kimbler, Stone’s secretary, the Foundation end of the program was an all male enterprise. Not a single woman was sent as part of the selection committees, women seemed to

502 As there is no comprehensive record of rejected applicants, I don’t know the man-woman ratio among those who applied but were not accepted.
be absent also as consultants and contacts at various American universities and institutes. The only capacity filled by women, it seems, was that of administrators of the program at the IIE, and in this they played the major role.

Judging from the general absence of the issue of women fellows in the files, it was not reflected upon or discussed to any significant degree, neither within the Ford Foundation nor in their dialogue with Polish authorities. In one of the few cases where gender was made the subject of a discussion, it was in the same, flippant and unprofessional manner as in the quote above. Shepard Stone wrote the following to Nielsen and Gordon upon receiving the IIE report about the fellows from the first year of the program:

> Obviously I was delighted to read the IIE report on the Polish scholars; with the exception of Maria Zagorska, I think we can be fairly happy. By the way, Maria Zagorska again. I have just read her letter to Miss Addams and my only comment is that I hope Mr. Nielsen doesn’t pick any women in Yugoslavia to come to this country, unless they are more than 55, have lost all their teeth and have a few other disabilities.503

Although Stone was exaggerating, perhaps trying to be funny, and may have been writing this tongue in cheek, he was obviously irritated about the fact that Zagorska had married an American while in the United States as a Ford fellow. This would have reflected badly on the Foundation program, which was based on the presumption that all fellows would return to Poland after their sojourn in the United States. Much of the trust between the Foundation and the Polish authorities rested on this, and that a defection occurred in the first year of the program was unfortunate for both parties. After all, as Stone wrote, “it was not the purpose of [the] Polish program to develop an efficient marriage bureau for Polish women in the United States.” I cannot gather from the documents whether or not Zagorska finished her studies in the United States, but her accomplishments there would in any case be wasted in the sense that she would not be bringing her knowledge and experiences back to Poland. Stone, although wishing her a “happy married life,” mockingly suggested that it “might be a good idea to tell her that she ought to put aside some money over the next two years to make it possible for a Pole to come to this country who will then go back to Poland.” It is obvious that he considered her grant a waste of money, and that she had robbed another, more deserving, Polish candidate of the opportunity to be a fellow.

Stone’s comments about Zagorska belong in the back-stage realm; it was neither meant for the eyes of the Polish authorities nor for Zagorska herself, but for Stone’s closest colleagues.

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503 FFA GF. 2518-57-322-4. Stone to Nielsen and Gordon, Alpbach, Austria, 26 August 1958. Unfortunately Zagorska’s letter to Addams is not among the files.
Nevertheless, it was an official letter, written in a professional capacity and filed in the Polish grant file, and a copy was sent to Sims, the vice-president of IIE. As such, there was a risk that the comments about Zagorska could be taken at face value by someone who was not a part of Stone’s inner circle. Stone’s concluding remark, if interpreted literally, suggests that if it were up to Stone, women could risk being excluded from participating in the program, or at least from being part of a “democratic” selection procedure: “Frankly, in Poland, if we carry on the program, I should consider ruling out all women, unless we know they are going to be Nobel Prize people.” Quite an unsuitable comment for the Director of a “democratic” program. Stone never seems to have expressed such disapproval of subsequent fellows who decided to remain in the United States – and there were a few others, mostly men – as he did in the case of Zagorska. The sense of having been betrayed is strong in Stone’s letter, and the image he painted of Zagorska as a treacherous female who exploited the generosity of the Foundation in order to find an American husband, tells us as much about his view of women as it does his opinion of those fellows who did not keep their side of the bargain.

A week after his fiery letter about Zagorska, Stone again mentioned the case in a long letter to Nielsen. This time he was more level-headed and professional in his treatment of it. He stated that “Maria Zagorska’s case is going to cause us some difficulty,” and informed Nielsen that “Leszczynski had no idea about it.” He explained that the only reason why he mentioned the case again was because he hoped that “along with the congratulations IIE and we may be sending to the lady, that she gets no simple picture of the situation. I’m sorry that I keep talking about this case but I still don’t like it.” There are no more traces of the Zagorska case in the files, and the foundation continued to select women on the same basis as before, it seems. A few other cases of defection came up from time to time, too, but without causing serious problems for the program.

The issue of women came up frequently under the category of “wives” (this was later changed to “spouse”), as the fellows were eventually allowed to bring their spouses with them to the United States. Dealing with the “wives” seems to have taught the Americans something about the difference between the “bourgeois” West and the communist East. The East Europeans often informed them, or reminded them, that women members of the intelligentsia stratum in the East were often scholars like their husbands. The Foundation and the IIE took this to heart and accommodated the spouses as best they could by organizing scholarly activities for them, such as following lectures, getting them in touch with professors they wanted to meet, or facilitating

their research while in America. One example, although not typical, was Mrs. Peter, or Dr. Emmy Pickler, as her professional name was, who had her own program while in the USA as “a physician and leading figure in infant education and child psychology.” Her husband, Dr. György Peter, President of the Central Statistical Office in Budapest was the main grantee, so although she had a program of her own and held a couple of lectures in the US, she was an auxiliary to her husband, like so many other wives who accompanied their husbands. Special arrangements were made for her, however, as her husband’s visit had to be cut short to six weeks, and a wife could normally only accompany her husband if the stay was a minimum of three months. The Foundation made an exception because of her own standing as a professional and her own plans for a visit to the US.

Stereotypes and language problems

If an individual or a group of people are unfamiliar with a person, they will combine whatever clues they may glean from the person with previous encounters and experiences with “similar” persons to try and construct an identity for the “unknown.” Chances are that the person is thus likened to stereotypes rather than to his or her own qualities.

Although the selections were based on individual merit and the fellows were seen and described individually, some stereotyping was inevitable. It comes through in reports and evaluations from the IIE and in correspondence. In the evaluative report to the Ford Foundation after two years of exchange with Poland, the IIE tried to sum up their impressions of how the Polish fellows had behaved, to what extent they had adapted to life in the United States, and whether or not they had seemed to benefit from their stay. The first indication of a need to generalize and stereotype is that the report describes “the Polish scholar” or “the Pole” as if all the fellows were one:

Superlatives and precise praise have been used to describe the Polish scholar or specialist and his progress and achievements in the U.S. There are few exceptions to this statement. Bright, original, mature, disciplined, industrious have been frequent plaudits. Most commonly praised has been the Pole’s keen professional sense and high motivation or dedication to scientific work. He has been called aggressive in the best sense of the word. He has shown a welcome eagerness to learn.
The stereotyping continued with “the ‘amazing detachment’ of the Pole”. What exactly that meant is not clear, but the IIE thought that the characterization “may be partial explanation of his capacity for survival and for his inherited scholarly ability which by its nature demands an attitude of objectivity or personal detachment in scientific and philosophical work.” It seems that idea of “the Pole” was that of a survival-type with “inherited scholarly ability” which was somehow a natural part of being Polish.

Politics was naturally a consideration, and the IIE observed that there was “no evidence that the Marxist philosophy and indoctrination that has been incorporated in the education of most of the grantees has had its affects on his receptivity to new methods and ideas.” The overall impression of “the Pole” as fellow was that he “conducted his professional and scholarly work with political discretion and objectivity.” The few who had displayed political bias that affected their academic work were anti-Communist or anti-Socialist and active Catholics. From the experience of such antipathies, the IIE cautioned the Ford Foundation that future selection teams must be alert to “any extremist point of view that will limit a man’s capacity and willingness to learn,” and that they must be careful to select candidates with “intellectual integrity and objectivity.”

There were also some areas where the Polish fellows did not impress the IIE, such as showing frequent “initial resistance to authority or direction,” and a tendency to be late for appointments. They also had trouble “proposing a realistic program of travel and study” in the United States, partly because of “an uncontrollable drive to accomplish the impossible within the prescribed time and budget limits.” The IIE thought that this was because they had not been prepared for the “endless resources available in U.S. institutions,” and that they couldn’t believe “the number and size of universities and the vastness of the country itself.” After some time in the United States, however, the fellows learned to appreciate “the practicality of careful programing.” There is some condescension in these comments, and they indicate differences in academic culture. However, the people at the IIE were, by all accounts, highly competent, well meaning and popular among the fellows.

For the IIE it was important to fulfill the Ford Foundation’s ambition that the fellows used their time to the fullest, and that they were exposed to those institutions and people with the best expertise in their particular fields. It was also important that their stay proved valuable to the individual fellow’s “aims in his home country.” The IIE saw the need to work closely with each fellow to make sure that these goals were met. This was not always an easy task, and they had three different categories of fellows to work with: The specialists, who usually visited for three
to four months; The visiting and senior professors, who stayed for a few weeks; and the research scholars and students who generally spent from nine to ten months in the United States. The first group, the specialists, traveled around a lot, and the IIE felt that for their program of “consultation and observation,” it was crucial that they had good English, and that they were “perceptive and intelligent” with a “strong professional sense.” Most of the specialists in these first two years had met these requirements. The visiting and senior professors, however, suffered from a lack of adequate English, which was especially critical because they often gave lectures that people could not understand. “A detriment to their prestige and to the Program,” the IIE concluded, and felt that these fellows had not prepared well enough for their trip to the United States. The research scholars and students, too, struggled with their English, and this was the greatest worry of the IIE:

[I]t cannot be stressed enough that to misjudge a man’s language ability or grade him upwards in an interview or test is doing him a great disservice and compounding the problems of adaptability to a new environment that presents barriers and unforeseen difficulties to even the most fluent in the language. And there is greater danger in the man’s misinterpreting what he hears and sees, thus minimizing, even nullifying, the impressions and conclusions he will take back to Poland.

The Ford Foundation took to heart the feedback they got from the IIE, and there was greater emphasis on language proficiency in the following years. Those candidates who did not have adequate English-skills at the interview were obligated to study at home prior to coming to the United States early to spend weeks or months in English classes before taking up their scholarships.

National/ethnic generalizations, as mentioned in the Polish case, were also applied to the Yugoslavs. Federal judge Charles Wyzanski described his impressions of Yugoslavs to Ford Foundation President Heald:

I began with a visit to the Workers’ University. There I was received by the Director, a handsome Slav. (This may be a good place to note how handsome the best looking Serbs are. Individually some of them have a striking combination of intellectuality and strength in their faces. Collectively at a gala affair like the Opera they have so much firmer and leaner facial structure and such strong bones that they give an air of dignity rare in a fashionable U.S. audience.)

It is obvious that this comment was made as a compliment, but it reminds us of how racial/ethnic discourse has changed since the 1950s. Wyzanski expressed admiration for the Yugoslavs, or

rather, for the Serbs, and perhaps reverence for the old world of pomp and circumstance, when he accounted for his meeting with Yugoslav jurists: “As a group they were more obviously intelligent and forceful in appearance than a conference of U.S. judges. We sat informally in armchairs. Quite aware of their significance…” When Wyzanski spoke to one of the Yugoslav jurists, who was “reputed to be the leading lawyer of Yugoslavia,” and also with a Yugoslav neuro-surgeon, his first favorable impression was confirmed, and he was impressed with “the frankness of comments and lack of any sort of subservience to an American or a Russian viewpoint” – implying that subservience was something he had expected.

It seems that this was Wyzanski’s first visit to Yugoslavia and perhaps to a communist country, and it is obvious that his preconceived notions were challenged and that he was pleasantly surprised by what he saw and heard. On his scale of what made a civilized society – of which America was his touch stone – he found aspects of Yugoslav society that could in fact compare somewhat to American ways. He seemed surprised to find that the female workers of a radio factory did not seem “harassed or overworked. In fact they were gay, wore clothes of which an American girl would not be ashamed, usually had wrist watches, and often seemed recently to have visited a hairdresser.” He also noticed the traditional elements of Yugoslav peasant culture at the factory and noted that “there were peasant types who still wore native costume, - the kind that one constantly saw with big bundles on the streets of Belgrade.” He was told that an average monthly wage in a profitable year was $40: much, much less than American workers at the time were making, but he did not comment on that. The Yugoslavs showed him how they had introduced “measures for technical efficiency […] at the suggestion of the U.S. technical service […] and experts from the International Labor Office,” and they showed him American pamphlets which were allegedly “in current use.” Wyzanski was obviously pleased by this. He left Yugoslavia with an “impressionistic picture of the Yugoslav scene,” after spending two and a half days in the country, seemingly only in Belgrade. Despite his short stay he was certain that he had been “in a society as free, as vital, as likely to prove viable as most places in the world […] outside of the U.S., the British Commonwealth, the six Western European countries, and Scandinavia.”


thus very obvious in Wyzanski’s comments, and we may assume that he was not alone in his judgements.

**East European images of the Ford Foundation**

The Ford Foundation was often equated with the American Government, the Ford Motor Company – prime symbol of Western capitalism, or both.512 From a European point of view, especially an East European point of view, the belief that the Foundation was a government agency was not surprising. There was not a tradition for philanthropy, in the American sense of the term, in the people’s democracies, and after the communist takeovers all institutions were governed by the state. Consequently, the whole concept of a private foundation was something unfamiliar.

   Capitalist corporations, however, and especially the Ford Motor Company, was something East Europeans did know about, as the ultimate “other” and source of all evil – at least this is what communist propaganda wanted people to believe. Thus, making a clear distinction between the Ford Motor Company and the Ford Foundation was especially important when dealing with communist regimes. However, even the Board of the Foundation some times had trouble with “taking a clear position on the question of […] relations between the Foundation and the Motor Company,” and according to Waldemar Nielsen, the Motor Company could be “very intrusive.”513 During the McCarthy period, especially, the Motor Company was very critical of the Foundation, its liberal counterpart, and “several of the Company officers […] were just absolutely livid about this idiot Foundation and what it was doing to “our sales and our competitive race with Chevrolet.”514 No wonder, then, that many Europeans did not know the difference between the two.

   As for the perception of the Ford Foundation as a government agency, it was hard to get rid of that, too. As late as 1965, Stanley Gordon reported to Stone that, according to the qualified opinion of a Polish scholar who had spent enough time in the United States “to absorb American values,” “[m]any, many Poles still think the Foundation is a branch especially of the CIA.”515

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512 The Ford Foundation was also called ”The Ford Motor Company Fund,” and in the information booklet ”Ford International Fellowship Program: Policies and Standards” prepared by the Institute of International Education (IIE) the Foundation was described as ”an independent charitable organization wholly supported by Ford Motor Company contributions.” No wonder the East Europeans were suspicious! We have to keep in mind that the American tradition of philanthropy did not have an equivalent in Europe.

513 Interview with Nielsen, 8.

514 Ibid., 13.

515 FFA GF, 2518-57-322-4 Stanley Gordon to Stone, 13 January 1965. “Reports from meeting with Bloch on Jan. 11.”
Even after the Foundation had run programs with Poland and Yugoslavia for years, it seems that they still lacked the insight into the East European mentality, especially in relation to America and the West – not to mention the concept of “philanthropy” in the sense of the American “general purpose foundation.” President Henry Heald recounted his experience with the issue in an interview in 1974, saying that

It was awful hard anyway to make the people in some of these countries believe that the Ford Foundation really wasn’t a government agency. I tried to explain that once in a meeting in the Kremlin with [Anastas I.] Mikoyan and some other Russian officials – and I’m sure they didn’t believe me. They were convinced we wouldn’t be operating as well as we were if we weren’t a government agency, and you wouldn’t in Russia, of course. And to a lesser degree, this was true with some of the other countries. 516

Stanley Gordon, (who surprisingly thought that the Soviet Union was well acquainted with the Ford Foundation) was of the opinion that the East European countries – except for Yugoslavia – only knew the “small amount” that had “filtered through from Poland,” where they preferred to “keep somewhat of a monopoly on the Foundation as a source of scholarly advantage.” In the other East European countries, according to Gordon, people still thought that Rockefeller Foundation was “the one big foundation.”517

Heald and Gordon were not the only ones who were concerned about the alleged ignorance of the East Europeans, but they did not quite grasp the complexity of the problem. This lack of insight on the part of the Americans worried the Hungarian sociologist and consultant to the Foundation, Alexander Szalai, who was at Harvard when he wrote a long report to the Foundation on the problem in 1964: “Some thoughts on the difficulties and complexities encountered by the Ford Foundation in its dealings with East European Socialist countries.” The report gives us a better idea of how Ford fellows and other East Europeans regarded the Ford exchanges, and where and how the communication failed. As an accomplished sociologist who had both been imprisoned by the Hungarian regime and who had spent time at universities in the United States, he was in a good position to write such a report, and he provides us with glimpses, “back stage” as it were, of how his countrymen perceived the Foundation and its programs. He did not, he wrote, aim “to give a general picture of those difficult and complex conditions under which pioneers of Western culture have to do their planning and their daily fight for progress in the European ‘Wild East’,” but he acknowledged what he saw as the accomplishments of the Ford Foundation in Eastern Europe in the face of difficult times in a difficult cultural and political area:

The development of the relations between the Ford Foundation and the socialist countries of Eastern Europe, the success or failure of all those benevolent initiatives and programs by which the Foundation has tried and is continuously trying to extend its philanthropic activities to these countries depends on many factors, most of them well beyond the control of the Foundation, or for that matter of any single human institution. Vagaries of international politics, ups and downs in the temperature of US-Soviet relations, caprices of domestic policy, economic difficulties or even personnel changes in any of the countries involved may have a quite unpredictable – beneficial or deleterious – effect on any or all of the projects. This is simply part of the risk the Foundation, and more specifically its International Affairs Program, has taken when it decided to do some pioneering work for the reestablishment of cultural contacts between the West and all those countries which had been cut deep from Western culture during the “deep freeze of Stalin’s rule. Deep frozen soil, just beginning to thaw up offers naturally only some very slippery paths to go. And if it comes to climbing some steeper slopes, it may very well happen to the pioneer that one less fortunately placed step forward leads to a slipback of two steps. Nevertheless all those experiences which have been made up to now, seem to prove that progress is possible even under such unfavorable circumstances, chances of success are growing, temporary failures can be localized and put under control. Probably now a stage has been reached where it would take a major disaster of world politics to ruin all the positions established by the courageous work of the Foundation.518

Szalai’s assessment is one of few we have from a “man of the East,” even though he may have been “contaminated” by the West. In any case, he functioned as a sort of translator who wanted to help the communication between the Ford Foundation and the people they were dealing with in Eastern Europe. He was shocked at “how horrendously the spiritual and semantic gap between ‘Western’ and ‘Eastern’ thought, feeling and expression has become during those ten to fifteen years which were spent in ‘deep freeze’ by the people of Eastern Europe!” That information from one side to the other, especially information from or about the Ford Foundation (its purpose, motives and methods) could not be spread without misunderstandings, misconceptions, and suspicion bothered him. Hence, he wrote his report to provide suggestions to how the communication could be improved.

Information about the Ford Foundation was not easy to come by in Eastern Europe, but even if it had, Szalai thought that all the annual reports, essays, leaflets, speeches, “the literary output” of the Ford Foundation was virtually useless as information for the East European countries. It was not a question of translating the material from English – it was because what was “self-explanatory to anybody accustomed to Western standards have to be explained in all detail” to the East European reader, or “simply left unmentioned”. He stated that terms like “philanthropy,” “policy,” “welfare” and many-many others/ have to be avoided/ or used with special safeguards/ as they have quite different connotations for readers who have got their

education under the rule of Marxist ideology.” Even people who had not accepted Marxist ideology in itself were influenced by these connotations.

To Szalai it seemed obvious that the Ford Foundation had not been aware of this semantic gap, how information perfectly well understood by any American or Westerner could not be understood in Eastern Europe: “Many questions repeated obstinately by people behind the Iron Curtain, wouldn’t come to anybody’s mind on this side of it.” One of the questions, or rather misconceptions, was the relationship between the Ford Foundation and the Ford Motor Company. Szalai had met a friend, “a high functionary” in the Ministry of Foreign Trade, who told him he was “so happy” and said: “My son is going to America with a Ford grant this autumn! I have heard you were somewhat involved in the negotiations. Well, the next time you meet those Americans tell them, Mercedes and Volkswagen will not have anymore a near monopoly of Western car exports to Hungary. I am secretary of the ministerial commission which decides what cars get imported to our country. And we will see to it that Ford’s ‘Taunus’ has in future its share on our car imports…”

Although Szalai was taken aback by the “naively misdirected and uninformed expression of the gratitude of a happy father to the Ford Foundation,” he was more worried about the statement of another high functionary, this time in the Ministry of Education: “It is well known that old Henry Ford has been a staunch antisemite and had some sympathies for nazism. Maybe we better ask our legation in Washington to gather some information about how his sons and grandsons think now. After all a couple of our best young scholars will be exposed now for a year to the influence of the Ford Foundation!”

That Szalai was worried about “this type of misinformedness” is understandable. He believed in the value of the Ford programs and he was afraid that such misconceptions could become a “real source of troubles in the implementation of the Foundation programs.” In response to Szalai’s observations and suggestions, the Foundation composed a 34-page document, “About the Ford Foundation,” “for use in Eastern and Central Europe,” with sections on “The purpose of philanthropy,” “Origin of the Ford Foundation,” “The Organization of the Foundation,” “The Foundation’s Domestic Programs,” “The Foundation’s International Programs.” There is no account as to the effect of the document.519

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519 FFA. Reports. No. 102667. “1 of 2”, Walter E. Ashley, 8 March 1965.
Chapter 8. Presenting the “East European ‘Self’”

[…] I have to emphasize that it was not only the American culture that I found so interesting. It was also the life, the customs, the ways of organizing every day commodities […]. Of course, I had also critical remarks. But the positive experience I appreciate much higher as being a citizen of another hemisphere. I had so many clichés about America. This is a European burden which can be thrown off only by living in your country.¹²⁰

A Ford fellowship was considered an honour and a privilege. The opportunities to travel to the United States were extremely limited for all East Europeans in the 1950s and 1960s, and a Ford fellowship was one of the few channels for attaining the “dream” expressed by many, of experiencing the United States. Our access today to the experiences of the Ford fellows so long ago is limited. Even at the time, however, the fellows’ experiences were quite inaccessible unless they were willing to share them. Some shared their opinions and impressions, others not. In this chapter, I will analyze some of the texts produced by the fellows in their dialogue with the Ford Foundation/IIE to form an image of how the fellows imagined and experienced the United States (“the West”) and of how their sense of identity found expression in what they wrote.

In a performance, one party performs while the other observes. Who is what changes according to the setting and the context, and tends to shift back and forth (“…the individual will have to act so that he intentionally expresses himself, and the others will in turn have to be impressed in some way by him”).¹²¹ The encounters between the people of the Ford Foundation (representatives of an American foundation, of the USA, and of the West) and each of the individuals from Eastern Europe who was granted money by them, represents such interactive performances. The responses to the fellows’ self-presentation, the responses of the “audience,” is crucial in order to fully understand the performance; hence, any observations made by the Foundation representatives are important to the analysis of the interaction.

In Goffman’s conception of social interaction as performance, there is emphasis on the active role played by both performer and audience: “…the individual will have to act so that he intentionally expresses himself, and the others will in turn have to be impressed in some way by him.” Goffman also distinguishes between the expression “given” and the expression “given off,” where the latter is presumed to be more or less unintentional. The use of the term “performance” does not mean that Goffman considers all social interaction deceitful or false, but he recognizes that elements of both can be found in social encounters. In the case of the Ford

¹²¹ Goffman, Presentation, 14.
Foundation and their East European Fellows during the Cold War, we are likely to face a certain degree of “feigning”, more or less intentional, and in some cases outright “deceit.” However, the study of written documents renders unavailable many of the signs that Goffman refers to in his studies. The “personal front” is limited to the fellows’ descriptions of self and the other, and the descriptions provided by the Ford Foundation officers upon encountering them. Hence, the “expression given off” is harder to capture than the “expression given” through the words in the texts.

Interaction and credibility are largely based on trust, and whether or not a person appears trustworthy is of great importance. If an individual has dishonest motives it is thus crucial to perform well in the sense that the expressions given and the expressions given off correspond to each other. If there is disharmony between the two, the audience may grow suspicious. In the case of the encounter between the Ford Foundation and the East European Ford fellows-to-be at the height of the Cold War, both parties were likely to have held preconceived notions of the other, and the historical context suggests a mutual element of suspicion.

**Personal front: Appearance and manner**

Those fellows who were accepted into the Foundation program must have presented a successful “personal front” at the interview, in the sense that they presented a front that was in tune with what the Foundation was looking for. As part of “personal front” Goffman includes: “insignia of office or rank; clothing; sex; age; and racial characteristics; size and looks; posture; speech patterns; facial expressions, bodily gestures, and the like.”

The fellows’ descriptions of themselves, serve to illustrate how personal front can be divided into two components, one called “appearance” and the other “manner.” While appearance is described by Goffman as referring to “those stimuli which function at the time to tell us of the performer’s social statuses,” the definition of manner is a little more complex:

‘Manner’ may be taken to refer to those stimuli which function at the time to warn us of the interaction role the performer will expect to play in the oncoming situation. Thus a haughty, aggressive manner may give the impression that the performer expects to be the one who will initiate the verbal interaction and direct its course. A meek, apologetic manner may give the impression that the performer expects to follow the lead of others, or at least that he can be led to do so.

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522 Ibid., 34.
523 Ibid.
A shorter explanation of appearance and manner is that the first relates to “decorum” and the other to “politeness,” or the manner in which a person chooses to behave in relationship to others.525

In the case of the Ford fellows’ case, their appearance, which they implicitly refer to throughout the text, is that of the well-bred and well-read European. It was important to successfully create a coherent image of themselves where appearance, and their status as European intellectuals, corresponded to their manner of behavior. If the fellows mastered the art of “getting off on the right foot” and made a favourable “first impression,” the crucial step was taken, and the stage was set for the “initial definition of a situation.”526

Most often, the candidate’s chance of making a good first impression, in a face-to-face encounter, was the interview itself. The interviewer’s evaluation forms, especially the comments added by the Foundation selection team-member under the heading “Personality,” tell us a little about how successful a candidate had been in presenting his or her personal front. In most cases where the candidate ended up being accepted for an award, the comments were positive, brief, and very general. Some typical examples are: “very fine,” “pleasant,” “excellent.”

Dramatic realization

Not all occupations make visible the effort and work that lies behind the front that is shown to an audience. Nor is it always obvious what a person knows or otherwise merits in his or her work. For example, a surgeon or a musician have a greater chance of displaying skills and talents than, let’s say, a computer programmer or a scholar. The case for most of the fellows was that much of their work was not directly accessible to the Ford Foundation because of its not being available in English, and also, of course, because their encounters with to the Ford Foundation were brief. Hence, some fellows used their final reports as a sort of grand finale to their stay in America, as a way to show off. In Goffman terms, this is known as dramatic realization, and he explains the phenomenon as follows:

While in the presence of others, the individual typically infuses his activity with signs which dramatically highlight and portray confirmatory facts that might otherwise remain unapparent or obscure. For if the individual’s activity is to become significant to others, he must mobilize his activity so that it will express during the interaction what he wishes to convey.527

525 Ibid, 111
526 Ibid., 22-23
527 Ibid, 40
In keeping with Goffman’s observation, some fellows emphasized their importance, and the importance of their work, by infusing their final reports with long accounts of their accomplishments.

Mixed in with descriptions of how accomplished they were, the fellows often added elements of protective practices, more commonly known as tact. Goffman introduces us to the concepts "defensive practices" and "protective practices" in Presentation, and the tactics involved in both these practices are evident in the final reports. The defensive practices – which involve both “preventive” and “corrective” practices – are employed in order to, respectively, avoid and remedy discrediting occurrences on the part of one’s own projections. The protective practices, also called “tact” are used to save an unfortunate situation that has been created by another’s projections. Being immersed in a culture and a reality in which they were marginalized, the fellows employed both defensive and protective practices to avoid possible embarrassments, surprises, and disappointments. In being confronted with new images of both themselves and of the West, the fellows had to perform in a way that would protect their original conceptions, while simultaneously securing continued interaction.

Some fellows tactfully pointed out the qualities of the West, rather than leaving the subject untouched or unfavorably describing their experience. Others did the opposite. Some played out the identity “learned person” from the Continent, as described by Hungarian writer George Mikes:

On the Continent learned persons love to quote Aristotle, Horace, Montaigne and show off their knowledge; in England only uneducated people show off their knowledge, nobody quotes Latin and Greek authors in the course of a conversation, unless he has never read them.528

Although Mikes’s experience of the West was England, not the USA, and despite his ironic tone, there is a sense of kinship in the way some fellows used quotations to make a point of their erudition and education.

Regions: Front and back

George Mikes’s statement about the difference between the Continent and England offers an opportunity to illustrate what the Goffman’s concepts “front” and “back” regions can entail. In a situation such as the one where the fellows were trying to impress the Foundation

528 George Mikes, How to be an Alien, 16.
representatives, they would not likely have included any irony or sarcasm in their applications and reports to the Ford Foundation. George Mikes, on the other hand, wrote his text – the quote above is taken from a short book – when he was frustrated with England and the English, and he wrote the book to irritate and offend them, as well as to ridicule, irritate, and offend the immigrants from Eastern Europe. How the East European immigrants reacted is not known, but the English loved the book, and Mikes had to give them credit for their sense of humour and ability to laugh at themselves.529 Usually, however, unless one is a comedian, a satirist, or a little impertinent, comments of Mikes’s kind are often uttered in the back region of an encounter. This is explained by Goffman in the following manner:

> when one’s activity occurs in the presence of other persons, some aspects of the activity are expressively accentuated and other aspects, which might discredit the fostered impression, are suppressed. It is clear that the accentuated facts make their appearance in what I have called a front region; it should be just as clear that there may be another region – a ‘back region ’ or ‘backstage’ – where the suppressed facts make an appearance.

Since the vital secrets of a show are visible backstage and since performers behave out of character while there, it is natural to expect that the passage from the front region to the back region will be kept closed to the members of the audience or that the entire back region will be kept hidden from them.530 What is “front” and what is “back” changes according to the role played in any given situation. In the case of our East European Fellows, one “back stage” arena may be his interaction with students or colleagues in his own home environment, and which is not accessible to us in this context. Another aspect of the distinction between “front” and “back” in the context of an East-West discourse is that acceptable “front” behaviour in the East, may only be acceptable as “backstage” behaviour in the West, and vice versa; something which may have been a source of frustration and misunderstandings for the East European fellows in their encounter with the West.

Comments that the Ford Foundation communicated between themselves about the fellows, but not to the fellows themselves, often consisted of elements that would be considered belonging to the back region of the interaction, such as in the above-mentioned case of Zagorska, for example. In the case of the Ford fellows, regardless of how the individual fellow chose to present him- or herself, their presentations (at interviews, in letters, in reports) were, by definition, “front stage” performances. This does not mean that they are not genuine, or that what

529 Mikes. How to be an Alien, in the preface to the book.
530 Goffman, Presentation of the self, 114 and 116
is presented does not give an accurate representation of what the fellow describes, but only that it was carefully designed to assure that the interaction was successful.

“Back stage” comments: a few observations by Polish fellows

As I have focused on the material in the Ford Foundation archives and do not read or speak any East European language, I have not had access to comments made by Ford fellows to their compatriots. However, thanks to an article by Polish scholar Antoni Sulek, there are a few comments by Polish fellows to other Poles available to us.

Włodzimierz Wesolowski, a sociologist who had benefitted from the books provided by the Ford Foundation to Poland after 1956, and therefore was well read in American sociology, remembers his interview with the Ford Foundation in 1958. Although short, the questions he remembered being asked gives us a glimpse of the interview situation:

“Are you a member of the [Communist] Party?”
“Yes.”
“Is Bronisław Wesolowski a relative of yours?”
“No.”
“What are you dealing with?”
“Social structure.”
And why do you want to go to America?”
“Because I have already started studying American sociology. I would like to continue that, and then to study the class-and-strata structure in Poland.”

Wesolowski later said: “That and the titles of the books read probably convinced them.”

Although many of the Ford fellows had read much about America, they were not prepared for the society they came to. When in America, Wesolowski recalled, people were curious about him, one of the first people to come to them from behind the Iron Curtain. “They were approachable” and “pleasantly surprised” to find that he was well-read in American literature, and they were interested to hear about the political changes in Poland: “Someone ‘from the other side’ was asked ever and ever again about communism, the way in which that

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531 Presumably the Polish communist leader of the Polish-Soviet war 1919-20.
532 Antoni Sulek, “To America!, 341.
system functioned, and the divisions in the party. They also asked about the ‘thaw’ and most importantly ‘whether it had a chance to last’.”

Wesołowski was “surprised that trade unions (in Poland solely a ‘transmission belt’ of the Communist Party) were well organized and developed institutionalized conflict-solving methods, that so many renowned sociologists were immigrants from Germany and Austria, and that the psychoanalytical session looked the way it did.”

A fellow Ford grantee, Jan Strzelecki, in an inscription on a book he had written about America, wrote to Wesolowski: “Let us again visit such a strange country together.” When he first came to America, Strzelecki had been “angry and wanted to return quickly,” wrote his friend Jan Lutyński. Strzelecki later wrote a book he titled American Anxieties, where he articulated his “conflicting emotions and opinions” coupled with “fascination and worry with the changes that were happening in this huge country.”

Lutyński, who wrote home about his experiences, was himself “astonished” by New York: “everything is in a hurry, and one day it is going to collapse.” He was equally astonished by “the dynamic characters of the lectures, and by the way of life of the students.” They did not always impress him. Far from it. Rather, he found them usually to be without social aspiration. Sociology is ‘a job’ for them – a type of work, a profession – and not, as it frequently is the case in our country, a vocation connected with the need for intellectual understanding of the processes operating in their own society and the world in which they live. For that reason, they have perfect technical knowledge, but their so called horizons are narrow. In this respect we are at a higher level.

This is a good example of the often illusive difference between members of the East European intelligentsia and American intellectuals.

One “committed Polish Communist”, who thought he knew much about America before coming there – he had “even written a book about America” – was greatly surprised that he felt much more at home, more at ease in social situations, in the South than in the other parts of the United States. This reaction naturally puzzled him, since he was bitterly hostile to the pattern of race relations in southern life and thought he disliked everything the South stood for. On thinking the matter through, he realized his reason for his contradictory feelings was that interpersonal relations in the South – race relations apart – were more like those of Europe, including Communist Poland, than those of northern states.

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533 Ibid.
534 Antoni Sulek, “To America!”, 345.
535 Ibid.
536 Ibid.
537 Ibid.
538 Antoni Sulek, “To America!”, 346.
The way in which the South resembled Europe, he reasoned, was that “elitism”, “ascription”, particularism”, and “diffuseness” were part of social interaction, while in the North it was more about “equality and achievement.” 538

Sources in which the Ford fellows presented themselves

In the given situation of an application procedure, the Ford Foundation representatives would have come to the situation with some clues as to what to expect. The would have been quite certain that the applicants to their fellowship programs were well-educated, and in that sense belonging to the intellectual elite of their respective countries. They would also have presumed that the applicants were products of the environment (socially, politically, and culturally) in which they had been raised and educated. The officers’ interpretation of the information provided in the application documents would hence have been coloured by their preconceptions. Also, in a situation where one side provided the money and the opportunities, the other was at its mercy, so to speak.

There were various types of documents where the fellows wrote about themselves to the Ford Foundation: applications, letters of intent, letters to the Foundation on various other matters. In addition there is the material in which the IIE and Foundation officers wrote their reactions and responses to the fellows (front stage), or about the fellows (back stage). These give us an oblique view of the fellows in that it tells us how successful they were at their impression management: did they succeed in fostering their desired impression of themselves? The sources are, however, often incomplete, in the sense that the whole range of documentation is rarely in place for one and the same fellow. In one case the correspondence between a fellow and the Foundation is extensive and provides some clues, but the final report is missing. In other cases there are lots of documents with comments on a certain fellow, but nothing written by the fellow him- or herself. The difficulty of assembling a complete “file” on any fellow makes it impossible to present single fellows complete with trajectories, self-presentation at various stages, and responses from the “other.” I will present a few examples of fellows whose histories are well documented, to get a sense of the individual experiences, but for the most part, by exploring the common denominators in what the fellows wrote, I treat the individual accounts as pieces in a collective puzzle of experience and perceptions.

538 Ibid.
The most informative and interesting group of documents in the search for the “identity” and perceptions of the fellows are the final reports all fellows were required to write at the end of their stay in the United States. The reports of many fellows, but not all, are filed in the Ford Foundation grant file. Some of the fellows, through their descriptions of their experiences in, and impressions of, the United States, tell us a great deal about how they wanted to be perceived vis-à-vis their “other” in their encounter with the United States and Americans, others tell us very little.

The reports were important as a the conclusion of one phase, and the beginning of another. For most fellows, the final report seems to have been a rather tedious obligation in which they simply “filled in the blanks” and got on with it; for others, it was used as a last opportunity to voice their frustrations and to speak their mind about things they did not like. For some, who either hoped for an opportunity to return to the United States for study or work, or at least to maintain a relationship with the people they had forged connections with, the final report was a chance to sustain and strengthen the impressions of the West and the image of themselves that the fellows had balanced since the time of their first interview with a Ford Foundation representative.

In focusing on these reports in my analysis I have attempted to create a general impression of the fellows as a group by looking at those elements which are the most typical and that occurred the most often.

The Foundation/IIE presented the fellows with a set of questions to be answered as the basis for the final report. Some fellows built their reports carefully around these questions; some wrote very short reports and largely ignored the questions posed by the Foundation; others were very detailed in their description of how they had spent their scholarship period and embellished their answers with how they had experienced everything that happened to them along the way.

The IIE questionnaires for the final report changed slightly over the years, but most of the themes remained the same from 1958 to 1969. In the early period of the Polish program, the questions were long and elaborate, mostly asking for details about the fellows’ professional experience, and reflecting the IIE and the Foundation’s need for feedback in order to evaluate or modify the program. In time, however, they became less detailed and focused more on the

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539 In the “attachments” section of the grant files, where the reports are supposed to be filed, many reports are missing. Whether this means that the final reports of the fellows in question were never written, or that the Foundation has, at some point moved them to other files, or disposed of them, I don’t know. Given that the archives are generally very well organized and that the Foundation seems to have saved everything else about those fellows, it seems most likely that they actually never submitted their reports.
fellows’ social experiences. Had the fellows taken courses, engaged in formal research, lectured, partaken in field trips or travelled to different places? Had they published articles, theses, papers during their fellowship period, and had they received a certificate or degree while in the United States? The Foundation asked for a detailed description of where, when, and with whom the fellows had carried out all these activities. The fellows were also asked if they had experienced language problems, whether or not they planned to continue their studies and research when they returned home, and would they receive credit for the work they had done while abroad?

In the last part of the report form, the questions turned more to how the fellows felt about their own experiences: did they “feel” that they had accomplished their objectives, did they “feel” that their fellowship experience would contribute to their professional future at home? They were also asked to “comment on any similarities or differences” in their field of speciality, and to provide the Foundation with “recommendations and suggestions” the fellows thought would improve the exchange program. The question that generated the responses most interesting to me in my pursuit of self-presentation, and of how the fellows positioned themselves along the systemic divide, was the last one:

Comment on any particular problems you encountered during your stay in the U.S., on any outstanding features of your program, on incidents of special value, on any general impressions of the U.S., or any points that you feel are pertinent to a summation of your experience in the U.S.  

For the fellows who had much on their mind, and a desire to share their thoughts with the Foundation, these questions provided them with an opportunity to show were they stood. Recurring positive responses, to some extent represented in almost all reports in which the fellows answered the Foundation questions, were: the friendliness and hospitality of the Americans they encountered; impressive facilities and equipment in the institutions they visited; the beauty of American cities and scenery; the great variety of nature, culture, and society; the high standard of living. Recurring negative response, often juxtaposed with the positive, were: superficiality in the way the Americans treated them; that the standard of teaching and research in the universities did not always reflect the material wealth of the institutions, and - often stressed - that despite the wealth and beauty of the United States, there was poverty and ugliness and inequality.

Adhering to the norms of gratitude

Most of the fellows generally stayed within the bounds of appropriate front stage behaviour. Often, as could be expected from people who hoped to remain on good terms with the Foundation, there was much praise of the program, of the IIE and of the institutions where they had worked. Most fellows also praised the USA, but many added a few words on what they had experienced as the downsides of American society.

Having been welcomed in the West, and being “learned people from the continent,” the fellows adhered to the norms of gratitude that the situation required of them. They had been given generous grants, many had been wined and dined by the Ford Foundation, the IIE, the representatives of their visiting institutions, and people had invited them into their homes. In short, it seems that they were well received, and that most people they encountered did their utmost to make the fellows feel welcome and comfortable. One may be cynical and attribute all this attention and hospitality to the soft power strategy that lay at the core of the fellowship programs, but the impression is that the Americans who encountered the fellows were genuinely interested in them as people and professionals, that they got on well with them, were often impressed by them, and that they were sincere in their generosity towards them. Thus, the fellows were obliged to return the hospitality and generosity with gratitude, and most of them seemed sincere in their praise. Others, perhaps as a result of being in shock at how different the world they encountered was compared with the diabolical image of the West they had been indoctrinated with at home, wrote nothing, or were very defensive in their comments. Some were also limited in their knowledge of English, and probably kept their reports short and schematic for that reason. Others were reserved, or so absorbed with showing what professional results they had achieved, that they did not comment on their social experience, or about how their sojourn in the West had affected them.

In light of their life in communist countries, some fellows were likely not eager to share anything personal or political, or anything else that could reflect badly on them and possibly come back to haunt them. The evidence that words once written and filed cannot be erased, is right here, in the fact that we presently have access to every word these fellows wrote more than fifty years ago. Showing gratitude towards individuals, however, was one of the safer ways of paying respect without jeopardizing the culture to which they belonged, and to which their own lives, careers, and identities depended.

In the final reports, the favoured – and “safe” – objects of praise were the various members of the IIE staff. This may have reflected their experience from back home, where keeping up
appearances vis-à-vis government offices was an important survival strategy. Although the IIE was not a government office, it was a large, nation-wide institute that had been the leading administrator of international exchanges since 1919. The difference between the function of the IIE as compared to the offices in charge of exchanges in Poland may not have been as clear to the fellows as we might assume, at least not before the fellows encountered the people there.

Stefan Morawski, a Polish professor of aesthetics, was but one of many fellows who wrote in their final reports that they appreciated the efforts of the women administrators at IIE, and Morawski’s wording is typical:

First of all, the staff of the IIE, Mrs. Gellert and Mrs. Doherty are simply unforgettable persons. Their efficiency and deep kindness made my life and professional activities really fruitful.\(^{541}\)

We could speculate that this “efficiency” and “deep kindness” came as a surprise to Morawski and most other fellows, as the administrative offices in the peoples democracies often seemed in want of both.\(^{542}\)

Gratitude towards the Foundation was, of course, almost mandatory. Many fellows, in addition to praising the Foundation in their reports, also wrote letters of gratitude to the Foundation officers directly, especially to Stone and Stanley Gordon, both after being notified about their awards and after they had completed their stay in the United States. Stone seems to have had almost a godfather-like status, and people wrote to him about personal problems, too.

**Degrees of placing oneself in relationship to the systemic divide**

When the fellows were asked to describe their impressions of the United States, many of the responses show how the fellows used all their impression management skills to construct “a mental map in which they could acknowledge US performance (or, even leadership) without having to compromise basic norms of the systemic relativism of Marxism-Leninism. (Systemic relativism, this master discourse of the state socialist social order, can best and shortest be exemplified by György Lukács’s infamous saying: ‘Even the worst socialism is better than capitalism’).”\(^{543}\)

In a response by the Polish fellow Jan Mujzel, the conflicting emotions upon encountering American society are obvious. He admits to having been “impressed by the most beautiful

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542 There are several comments by Foundation and IIE people of the inefficiency of East European bureaucracy.

543 György Péteri, “Reporting from ‘Over there’: Eastern Europe’s Ford Fellows on Their Experience in the USA during the 1960s”. Unpublished manuscript.
residential areas, apartment and office buildings, highway networks, university campuses”, but he immediately qualified this by pointing out that he, at the same time, “met the city quarters and dwellings so dirty, poor and ugly that it was almost incredible.” This contrast was not limited to the general impression of what he could see on the streets; on a higher level, in the areas of expertise that the Americans were expected to excel and be in control, Mujzel observed that the United States had its short-comings:

At schools of business I met the extremely brilliant professors, specialists, booming research activity, and the teaching standards may be the highest in the world. On the other side I had the opportunity to get in touch with very complicated and painful economic and social problems. I saw in the campuses the facts of frustration, disorder and violence. 544

Mujzel was in the United States in 1968-69, at the time when the youth-, student-, peace-, and civil rights movements took to the streets. Nevertheless, impressions similar to what he describes as the “complicated and painful” problems of the United States echoed through fellows’ accounts in the entire period of the exchanges. The United States did have problems, there were great contrasts, so these observations were not figments of the fellows’ imagination. Wanting to balance the dark sides of American society with the affluence and abundance in other parts, is a natural reaction that have befallen many visitors to the United States. Still, in the case of the East European Ford fellows, it also seems to have been one of the means by which they adhered to, and justified, their own position as socialists and Europeans. They seem to have been in need of a dialectic approach to what they were experiencing.

A Hungarian fellow, Pal Steingaszner, who stated that one of his main objectives was “to learn as much as possible about American people and the United States,” presented a very similar description as Mujzel of his encounter with America. He, too, expressed admiration for many aspects of American society, and wrote that he was “greatly impressed – based on the small fraction of the U.S. that [he] saw – by the industrial and agricultural potential and the generally high living standard, by the natural beauties abundant in the Western States, and by man-made achievements, such as the super highway system, spectacular progress in space research etc.” Like Mujzel and many others, he immediately contrasts this by stressing that he soon realized that there were “big problems still not solved such as the coloured-people problem, organized crime, poverty in certain parts of the U.S. to mention only the biggest.” To balance his two contrasting impressions, and to adhere to the norms of gratitude and politeness, Steingaszner rounded off his impressions of the United States by emphasizing that he “sincerely appreciate[d]...
the intentions and the steps already taken to overcome these” and that he was fascinated by the “concept of America being a mixing pot for all irrespective of color, creed and language.”

Another Hungarian, M. Kozak, presented a similar account, where he starts off by praising “the wonderful cities…and mountains of the US”, and that the United States would “always remain in my memory like a lovely remember.” Like many others, he felt that he now knew “more about the real US.” However, unlike those who expressed the ingrained European notions that the United States was a country of populist, low-brow culture, exemplified by the entertainment industry, Kozak praised the places that had become symbols of American superficiality and soullessness as “valuable and unforgettable things”. He had a hard time choosing which ones to rate as the best: “the wonderful world of Disneyland? Or may be Las Vegas (without gambling)? the wonderful Rocky Mountains i Colorado? the tremendous number of films? the famous actors and actresses? may be Hollywood?” He also listed the more cultured museums and “the unforgettable exciting traveling on the Queen Elisabeth,” and deemed them all to be “unforgettable and unmeasurable of value,” and that these were the reasons, “that this year was a very valuable part of my life.” Unlike many others, Kozak was reluctant to criticize the United States, but obviously had reflected on the negative aspects and that an assessment of these may be expected of him. “One m[a]y ask,” he wrote, “could I tell you some negative, what I learned in the US? Well, my time was short and therefore my opinions should not be perfect.” He did find some negative aspects to point out: “In my opinion, the level in the middle schools are very low. It was very surprising me, what I heard about it. These tremendous criminal cases are very tragic. […]The terrible hippies! I better not mention them.”

While most fellows balanced their good impressions of America with the bad, some were impressed and admitted to it without qualms: “This country of yours is very beautiful and when I think that it is the freest country in the world I am sure that everybody who calls this country his can be justifiably proud,” wrote Polish fellow Bozesca Retman to Stone in 1960. She was one of the few who had prospects of remaining in the United States for another year, independent of the Foundation. Retman also was one of the fellows who indicated that Stone had played an important part in their American experience, and she ends her letter by telling Stone that she could not leave the country without seeing him and saying goodbye.

545 FFA. GF. 2347-64432-5. Final Report, Steingaszner. He was Head of the Research Department or Chemistry, High Pressure Research Institute, Budapest, and spent a year in the United States in 1964-65.
547 DCSS. FF-IA. Correspondence, 1960. Letter from Retman to Stone.
Reactions to American “imperialism”

The international political situation and American involvement in this was something that affected the fellows to various degrees throughout the period of the exchanges, and these were, naturally, fuelled by the major events of the Cold War: the Bay of Pigs, the Cuban missile crisis and the Vietnam War, as well as of changes in their own societies and relationship with the USA.

Zoltán Majdik, a Hungarian schoolmaster to whom people in the United States had responded “exceptionally enthusiastically since he was sophisticated, witty, friendly and extremely knowledgeable about the American scene,”548 was one of those who commented on the international political situation.549 He wrote, to sum up his impressions of the United States, that when he left Hungary the international situation “seemed to be favourable for an unbiased portrayal of the USA,” but that since then, things had “changed for the worse.” Majdik wrote that he had been “more and more disturbed then shocked by US foreign policy in the Congo, in Santo Domingo and particularly in Vietnam.” Accounts such as this were not uncommon, and the role of the United States as the new Imperialist, was one that surfaced in the reports from time to time, even though the fellows generally were careful not to be too explicit or crass in their judgements. As always, the interaction must be maintained, and too much hostility did not, generally, go over well. Nor was it conducive to the success of the exchange programs. The fellows knew this, of course, both that their own reputations and that of the program could be jeopardized by hostile attitudes and too many negative reports. Many solved this dilemma (We can imagine it going something like this: “I have to keep my integrity as a socialist European who opposes imperialism, but I must not alienate myself from the Americans I have made new connections with”) by ending their negative observations on a positive note - for the future. Mujzel did so by summing up that his impressions of the United States were “as varied as is the whole country itself. Let us hope that in the years to come the positive features will prevail and there will be no need to be worried about the negative ones.”550

A theme that often came up when the fellows tried to describe their impressions of the United States was that they had not yet had the time to “‘digest’ and evaluate everything before coming to a conclusion.”551 One fellow thought that many of his “feelings and impressions” were “superficial,” and that he would “have to think them over and put [them] in order.” 552 Another fellow similarly wrote that it “would be very hard to describe my impressions of the U.S. in a

548 FFA. GF. 2347-64432-5. IIE Confidential Report.
550 Ibid.
552 Ibid.
mere one paragraph. I have seen and learned so much that it will take quite a time to systematize all of it. The U.S. is large and manysided. In one year’s time one gets only superficial impressions sometimes." 553

**Feeling alienated**

Jerzy Sawicki, Vice Director of the Polish Institute of International Affairs in Warsaw and a research scholar of international law, was in the United States from 1 February to 31 October 1962. Described by Ann Doherty as “a polished and attractive person with a firm manner,” who struggled with English and was “disturbed about the conversational level to which he was reduced by lack of fluency,” had trouble connecting properly with people he met in the United States. The IIE thought that this may be because Sawicki, “who worked intensely at his research,” was openly critical of the United States and was doctrinaire in his approach to most international problems. These characteristics, combined with a rather stern manner, probably alienated him from any person without the interest or the persistence to penetrate his formidable façade. Once he felt at ease, Dr. Sawicki displayed a keen sense of humor and conversation with him was pleasant as well as stimulating. […] Dr. Sawicki made little effort to overcome his biases about the United States; this disturbed persons at the Harvard Law School, who asked us whether Dr. Sawicki had been given sufficient opportunity to observe American government in action and to see how some of our financial institutions and businesses operate.

He had had ample opportunity, wrote Doherty, but had preferred to do his research. She concluded that he “seemed unable or unwilling, for his own reasons, to seek a better understanding of this country. He preferred instead, to confirm views previously held.” 554

It was not easy to know who would be receptive to American ideas and who would not. The interviewer, John Dickey 555 who spoke with Sawicki in Warsaw in March 1961 described him as having an “Attractive appearance with a strong but pleasing manner. Evidence of a sharp, critical intellect, probably more promising as a critical than as a creative scholar. He ought to find ready acceptance both personally and intellectually in an American University.” Dickey gave him a tentative rating of A-. He was the only promising Polish candidate in international affairs that year, and he came highly recommended. 556

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555 John Sloan Dickey, President of Dartmouth College.
Despite his “formidable” personality, Sawicki expressed gratitude and humility in his letter to Ann Doherty after his return to Warsaw:

[...] what I want to emphasize most it is that personal, warm hearty attitude of both of you – I mean Mrs. [Cordelia] Reimers and you – towards a foreigner from a very distant country. It helped me to get over a very unpleasant feeling of solitude in a different and in many respects strange environment and to offset impressions gained of contacts with a certain kind of people. 557

In very few words he gives us a glimpse of how difficult it could be for an accomplished scholar, well-versed in international affairs and well-travelled (he had been to Southeast Asia on several occasions, as well as to the Hague), to feel lonely and alienated by language and a culture he found strange.

Four, more complete, examples
Some Ford fellows left a greater imprint than others in the files. Choosing a few of these gives us a better impression of how the sojourn in the West affected them. My criteria for choosing the four following cases are that they are interesting. They may not be representative or typical, but they give us an insight that the shorter quotes I have chosen so far do not give. As mentioned, it has been difficult to find fellows with complete trajectories in the files, but these four are among the most complete in terms of continuity and content. Also, they represent different views of what it meant to them to be Ford fellows, and I have categorized them according to the features that seem most prominent in what they wrote.

1) Stanislaw Leszczycki: The Strategic Professor
Stanislaw Leszczycki, a professor of geography from Warsaw, spent three months in the United States from March to May, 1962. Born in 1907, he was a man of high credentials and much experience, who had held a professorship at Warsaw University after 1948, and had been Director of the Institute of Geography at the Polish Academy of Sciences since 1953. Since 1952 he had also been a “Member of the Presidium of the Polish Academy of Sciences”. He was well travelled, and listed “Germany, Austria, Yugoslavia, Turkey, Finland, Sweden, etc.” as countries he had visited before World War II, and “Uruguay, India, China, USSR, Germany, Austria, France, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, etc.” after the war. 558 Leszczycki first

came to the attention of the Ford Foundation when he was nominated for a Ford fellowship by Professor Chauncy D. Harris at Chicago University in October 1960. The latter described Leszczycki as “the key person in the post-war development of Polish geography and more than any other single individual accounts for the lively state of this field in this country in contrast with its relatively moribund state in some of the more dogmatic peoples democracies”. The two professors had met on several occasions at conferences in Sweden, Poland and the Soviet Union, and Harris considered it “of the utmost importance” that Leszczycki “be brought to the United States soon in order that he become personally acquainted with American trends in scholarship and also tell us something of Polish work”. According to Harris, Leszczycki had a strong position with the government in Poland, “(based in part on personal relations developed in a Nazi concentration camp near Munich in which the entire faculty of Kraków University were interned),” as well as with the Polish Academy of Sciences. As a consequence of this he had been able to “sponsor and protect young scholars doing original and objective research of high quality,” and had been “amazingly effective in keeping open the window to the West in his Institute.” Harris was obviously aware of the concern of the Ford Foundation that a fellowship could in some way jeopardize potential fellows’ positions in their home countries, and hence assured them that Leszczycki’s “good deal of stability” in Poland would protect him from trouble in that respect. Three other professors, John P. Miller at Harvard, Herold J. Wiens at Yale, and Edward B. Espenshade, Jr. of Northwestern University, promptly joined Harris in his recommendation, and wrote similar letters to Stone in which they strengthened the impression of a man of excellent quality and worth. Wiens wrote that Leszczycki struck him “as being a very able scholar as well as a person of great prestige in Poland.” At a Polish-American Seminar in the summer of 1960, Wiens and the other American geographers there had been impressed by the “remarkable freedom of expression and friendliness toward Americans among the members of the Institute of Geography under his direction.” Miller, like Harris, pointed out that Leszczycki had “maintained remarkably close ties with the West, especially in England and the United states,” but added that despite his extensive travels, “his knowledge of the West is very meagre.” Espenshade thought it likely that Leszczycki was “strongly oriented towards the Socialist state,” and that, because of this, a fellowship would be “an important matter of strategy.” In addition, he thought that “an exchange would be beneficial for the individual who is not pro-American” and expressed “faith in Leszczycki’s objectivity as a scientist.” All four professors invited Leszczycki to visit their departments.
Interestingly, the “Interviewer’s Evaluation Form,” from March 1961, gives us an entirely different picture of Leszczycyki. J. Michael Montias, who interviewed him, described his personality as “Ok but not very attractive. Nervous,” and considered him a “second-rate man,” despite having been “recommended by the members of the U.S. Embassy.” Although he had “received good prewar training,” Montias thought that this had been “apparently long unused” and that Leszczycyki’s “interest in ‘Marxist geography’, politics, organization and administrative work [had] diverted him from earlier scientific interests.” He also thought that his “fair to poor English” would prevent him from getting much out of his proposed “comprehensive ‘grand tour’ of geography centers.”

The example of Leszczycyki’s selection process shows us that the Foundation’s procedure of balancing the opinions of people who recommended a candidate with the assessment of the selection committee who interviewed the candidates, was a good way of forming as complete a picture as possible of the candidates. It also tells us that the face-to-face encounter of the interview-situation demanded a lot of the candidates’ impression management skills. Obviously, Leszczycyki had failed at fostering an impression of himself that was strong enough to impress Professor Montias, an economist, but in this case the opinions of all the others who vouched for him, plus the argument that a fellowship would be strategically wise, convinced the Foundation that he should be accepted into the program as a “visiting professor,” a decision they had no reason to regret, it seems.

According to the IIE’s evaluation, “all reports” confirmed that “Leszczycyki’s visit to the United States was a great success” and that his program had been “an unusually heavy one.” That was not an exaggeration. In his final report, Leszczycyki described how he and his wife (she had, contrary to normal procedure, been allowed to accompany him to act as his interpreter and translator) had travelled extensively, in order to achieve his “first aim” of getting acquainted “with the country and the society as well as with American economy from the geographical point of view”:

Our travel covered over 17 000 miles/6 790 miles by car, 6 764 miles by plane, 2 004 by train, 1 0402 miles by bus and 106 miles by boat/. The Institute of International Education covered the travel expenses for 8 935 miles that is 53% of our travel, the remaining 47% of our travel was organized by American geographers or paid by us out of our grant. We visited 35 larger cities: New York/9 days/, Philadelphia/ 3 days/, Washington/ 7 days/ San Fransisco – Berkeley – Stanford / 8 days/ Carmel – Monterey / 2 days/, Los Angeles / 3.5 days/, Las Vegas / 1 day/, Flagstaff / 1.5 days/. Albuquerque/ 1 day/ New Orleans/ 3 days/, Miami Beach/ 4.5 days/, Syracuse / 4 days/ Ithaca / 2 days/, Worcester / 3.5 days/, Boston – Cambridge / 4 days/, Chicago / 15 days/, Indianapolis – Bloomington / 3 days/ Evanston / 2 days/, Ann Arbor – Jackson – Detroit – Toledo/ 2 days/, Madison / 2 days/, Wilmette / 1
No less! In addition, Leszczycki wrote that they had been on “sightseeing tours in 28 cities and their neighbourhood / 686 miles/ and 21 excursions among others one by a small sport plane/ altogether 2 298 miles,” and these were organized by “American geographers.” The couple also visited “three national parks/ Yosemite, Grand Canyon Colorado, Everglade/ many natural reserves, about 20 museums and over 15 industrial establishments.” The detailed record of his trip, complete with exact measurements of distance and duration, is fascinating in its nerdiness, and one wonders if Leszczycki had read Montias’ evaluation and wanted to shame him in his assumption that he would not get “much out of his proposed ‘comprehensive ‘grand tour’. In any case, we now have a clear idea of how a visiting professor could spend his fellowship. Although Leszczycki’s visit was “unusually heavy,” many other fellows in the “specialist,” “leader,” and “visiting professor” categories travelled extensively in their 2-6 month fellowship periods, unlike the research scholars who generally visited 3-6 institutions in the course of their stay.

Despite his over-the-top travel description, Leszczycki is an example of a fellow who presented his impressions of the U.S.A. in a sober, matter-of-fact manner. He represents those fellows who acknowledged good qualities in American society, but without being carried away, and he presents himself as a man and a professional whose person and field of study was valued by the Americans he encountered, thus leaving him feeling secure in his own identity as an accomplished Polish intellectual.

In his report he is modest in his expression of admiration, and is not openly critical of American society. He mentioned having stayed “over 20 days with the Americans in their homes,” and that this has enabled him and his wife “to learn the style of everyday American life.” He also wrote that he had become acquainted with many of “the main centers of social and economic life of the States,” and that his joint experiences in the U.S. enabled him “to form an opinion about the style of American life and development trends of national economy both from territorial and economic point of view.” He was:

particularly impressed by the strong trend towards the concentration of population in towns and towards deserting of farms, by important changes in agriculture, by growing employment in services, by enormous trade and credit turnover and also by the American way of life, by the amount of individual family houses, by the common use of cars etc.
The final reports were often used by the fellows, first and foremost, to sum up all the professional experiences and achievements during their time in the U.S. Leszczycki is a good example in this respect, too, as this was what he devoted the most space to in his report. Although he commented on his general impressions of American society, culture and standard of living, the main aim of his visit, he stressed, was of a professional nature,

   to get acquainted with American geography, with the most important geographical research and teaching centers, with new methods applied in American geography and, last but not least, with American geographers themselves. I achieved this to an important degree. I visited 18 geographical departments [...]. I saw there the excellent technical equipment of the geographical departments, their teaching and research work.559

Leszczycki, like nearly all fellows, emphasized the importance of experiencing the way American institutions worked, the methods, the equipment, the colleagues from the other side of the systemic divide, the whole experience of being a part of a transnational professional milieu, with all its otherness, but also with the familiarity of being in the same field, of studying similar issues, and of trying to solve similar problems. He displayed his networking abilities and cooperative skills by mentioning, in passing, that “No doubt, the fact that I met nearly 400 geographers and economists and have contracted closer acquaintance with over 100 of them will also contribute to further American-Polish cooperation in the field of geography.”

Some fellows expressed that they felt marginalized, and that Americans were ignorant about their countries and Europe in general. Some, however, encountered people and milieus who knew more about them, their fields, and their countries than they had expected, and Leszczycki was one of them. Adding to his general enthusiasm of becoming part of a transsystemic network of geographers, Leszczycki was also “very pleasantly surprised by the fact that so many American geographers [were] interested not only in USSR but also in other East European countries and among them in Poland.” He pointed out that the geography departments at many universities, were “particularly interested in Poland” and that they employed “Poles or geographers of Polish origin in their staff.” He “had the impression that Poland is rather known and even liked there,” and that “Polish geography is relatively well known by American geographers.”

His enthusiasm at discovering that there was this knowledge about, and respect for, his country and the geography field in Poland at American universities is obvious. The following quote sums up how important it was for Leszczycki (and his observations are representative of most other fellows) to become and remain part of a professional and scholarly world that would

transcend the systemic divide, and that the fellowship program had brought the two worlds closer together:

This rather broad interest in Poland underlies the American-Polish cooperation in the field of geography because many American geographers would be glad to come to Poland to visit the country, to get acquainted with our people, our economy etc. It also stimulates exchange of publications. On the other hand, it seems to me that the good opinion of American geographers about Polish geography will allow from time to time to invite Polish geographers for lecturing. Thus we can draw a conclusion that there exists a good basis for the permanent American-Polish cooperation in the field of geography.

Leszczyckii did not present himself as inferior to the Americans, rather the opposite. And although he wrote that he had “learned something new” in “all the institutions visited,” he considered it equally important that American geographers visit Poland to learn, and for Polish geographers to lecture Americans at home. He was impressed, however, by “the excellent technical equipment of the geographical departments,” and thought that the application of “new quantitative methods” were interesting. He pointed out that these “new trends” were “already rather well-developed in American geography but relatively little known in Europe,” but also observed that other, more “traditional” methods that were “well known in Europe” prevailed. Leszczycki contended that “the American system of training geographers,” which he thought was too different from the Polish to “be broadly adopted in Poland,” was also not quite as good as the Polish, and his conclusion was that “in a way the Polish system is even better.”

Finding that many of his American colleagues were indeed interested in him as a person and a geographer, and that they knew more than he had expected about geography in Poland, Leszczycki was presented with a positive “mirror” in which to re-confirm the value of his identity. Like many of the other fellows, he had not expected to find such recognition in the lion’s den, so to speak. To observe that, in some respects, the Polish system had something to offer that was better than the American, would have been an added bonus to his sense of self and a reassuring discovery for him as an individual, a geographer, and a European. In short, being a “learned person from the continent,” was not a drawback, even when faced with the efficiency, affluence, and the many “freedoms” of the United States.

The last trace of Stanisław Leszczycki in the Ford Foundation archives is a letter which he wrote to Stone after returning to Poland:

I wish to say that this trip to the United States has been a most wonderful experience in my life and I will remember for long the most pleasant time spent in your country.  

2) Ludwik Leszczynski: The friend and convert

Ludwik Leszczynski, the first liaison to the Ford Foundation in Poland, whom I have presented earlier, expressed great admiration for the United States. According to Berghahn,

Stone caught a glimpse of his innermost feelings when he drove Leszczynski to Idlewild Airport on his way back to Poland. During the ride Leszczynski became “rather emotional as he looked at the lights of New York from Triborough Bridge.” Evidently thinking of Krushchev’s recent propaganda offensive, he did not understand, he remarked spontaneously, why the Americans were so fearful of Russia. If only they were more confident of their own strength and vitality, “within a few years,” it would be the Soviet leader who would “be answering you people and not always the other way around.” 561

Leszczynski was also very familiar in his correspondence with Stone, more so than any other fellow I have encountered in the files. Like Stone, he was a leader, an authority, and perhaps this made him feel like a peer to a greater extent than many other fellows. They were, in many ways, equals in position and age, and they had both experienced the pre-war world. Stone was impressed by Leszczynski when he first met him in 1957: “Some day […] a writer with the insights of Koestler and the late Anne O’Hare McCormick should do a biography of this extraordinary man.” 562

Early on in the Polish program, but after Leszczynski had been replaced by Krassowska, he wrote to Stone from London:

Dear Mr. Stone,

I am alive and sorry for the fuss I made. It was simply a result of too much smoking and drinking.

I miss the U.S. and things here seem to me dreary, stale, flat, and unprofitable.

Too soon I had to leave the newly discovered, immense, exciting, wonderful country. To part from most interesting, noble, and good people, who extended to me so moving, kind, and warm hospitality.

For the wonderful time I had in you country, for all co[u]rtesies – wrong – I feel I must say – friendship, I am deeply indebted to you.

I hope to see you soon in Poland.

Please, give my kindest regards to Mrs. Stone, my love to Maggie.

With sincere best wishes,

Yours,

Ludwik Leszczynski 563

561 Berghahn, America, 193.
Like so many other fellows, Leszczynski, showed gratitude about having been given the opportunity to visit the United States, but he goes further, calling his relationship with Stone a friendship, and expressing a feeling of indebtedness. He also admitted that Europe seemed drab after his American experience.

Leszczynski, as we know, was in a difficult situation after being ousted from the Ministry of Education. Maybe this had hurt his pride and affected his loyalty to his Polish peers. In any case, he was full of praise and gratitude in the letter he wrote to Stone from Warsaw in December of 1958:

Dear Shepard,

A month has passed since I left you and I have not written you as I have felt the urgent need all this time. Nevertheless, I venture to ask you not to think me a cad on whom your hospitality, consideration, amiability, generosity, warmth of heart has been wasted. No, indeed, I have been greatly moved by them and they have stirred in me a sincerely friendly response.

My debt to you had been already great, the visit in your great, magnificent country has increased it overwhelmingly.

My stay there has been made a most illuminating, memorable and happy time. I have been honoured and pleased to meet distinguished, knowledgeable, conscientious in the highest degree, competent and yet modest men – that “dynamic minority” by whose vigor and quality, according to Toynbee, the health of a society is to be judged. I value above all the opportunities to get their views and I deeply appreciate the kindness, readiness and lucidity with which explanations were given by them.

What I have gained is out of all proportion to the length of my stay, -- the insight into the general picture of higher education in the United States, its current problems, their history, the perspective and many others.

The knowledge gained, the contacts made or renewed cannot but contribute to an end dear to my heart; friendship and mutual understanding between our two countries, the expansion of links which is so vital for the future. The extension of imagination and understanding to the life of your universities should give us a better basis for judgment and choice and noble action. 564

As for losing his job at the Ministry, he explains it by way of a protective practice, claiming that he resigned from his post because of bad health an on the “urgent advice” of his doctor.

The willingness to admit to his own weaknesses is one of the curious aspects of Leszczynski’s letters to Stone, but also an indication of friendship and trust. He apologizes for making “a fuss,” he describes himself as a man of “many faults,” incapable of doing things “at the right time, by a damned dilatory disposition.” He comes off as almost too humble some

times, writing that he was “terrified” that Stone should be “annoyed” with him, or regret that he recommended him to a certain Mr. Cole, whom it seems was going to offer Leszcynski a job that would make it possible “if my Government agrees,” to join the “Secretariat.” Of what, is not clear. “To many favours you have done me, you have added one,” he wrote as a response to this job offer in 1960, and continued: “I wish I could tell you how much I appreciate, and how grateful I am.”

His connections with America were maintained though other channels, too, and he expressed pleasant surprise at having been invited to a conference in 1960 by Frederick H. Burkhardt, the President of the American Council of Learned Societies and consultant to the Ford Foundation: “I have been most pleased and excited about the opportunity of another trip to your country and I only hope that the bureaucrats in Warsaw will not be nasty depriving me of the possibility to accept the invitation. I have been waiting now for more than a month for their green light and have not been able to answer Mr. Burkhardt’s letter.” As a learned person from the continent and a man of the old world, he was obviously not too happy with his country’s bureaucrats, nor was he happy with politicians, and he expressed worries about “the world and the ways of politicians,” which made him feel “either disgusted or bewildered.” In this Christmas letter to Stone in 1960, along with his heartfelt wishes to Stone and his family, he expressed hope of “good will in human relations in the coming year.” He also congratulated Stone on “the election of Mr. Kennedy.”

Leszcynski’s letters are, on some level, a testament to Stone’s ability with people. For him to write so freely, Stone must have made him feel secure enough to do so. As to his encounter with America and Americans, his enthusiastic reactions and commens were more favorably to the West than probably even Stone had anticipated. However, being old and ousted, he may not have been able to spread his message about the West in a manner that would have had the effects on Polish society that the Ford Foundation hoped for. Nevertheless, his “conversion” was proof that the programs worked on some level. They did bring people together, they did create hope of mutual understanding and cooperation across the systemic divide, and Leszcynski was a man who expressed this with conviction and pathos.

565 DCSS. FF-IA. Correspondence, 1960. Leszcynski to Stone.
3) István Sőtér: The tourist and expert on “small nations”

One of the Hungarians who visited the USA on a leader grant, István Sőtér, the Rector of Budapest University, (and a professor of the history of literature) was described by the IIE as

Commanding, impressive but flexible. […] As Rector of the University [Budapest University] and as a personality he has distinguished influence. Also perhaps significantly—he is president of PEN. 566

Sőtér had shared some of his impressions with Tom Mark, who “confessed” at feeling good about hearing Sőtér and his wife

praise so many things about this country. They had the highest praise for the courteous treatment they received from the Ford Foundation and from others connected with one or another university. They were amazed at the strong cultural life to be found in this country. Like so many other Europeans who know us either through Hemingway, Lewis, Faulkner and other literary classics, they too had a distorted conception of the United States. They discovered what we knew all along—that the America of the “cultural hinterland” is rapidly disappearing.567

This, as we know, was at the heart of the matter for the fellowship programs: to change the fellows’ perceptions of American culture. For Stone and his colleagues it must have been a boost to the confidence in their exchange programs, as well as a confirmation of their own fears about the American image abroad, when a man like Sőtér told Mark that he thought the Americans were their “own worst propagandists, inasmuch as we scatter abroad a public image that is worlds away from the reality that is to be found.” Such a statement strengthened the thesis that it was imperative for Europeans to spend time in the USA to correct what was considered their misapprehensions about its culture and society.

Mark, in response to Sőtér’s observation, explained to Stanley Gordon:

[F]irst, that Europe knows us from movies that were meant for internal consumption and in which, therefore, we exaggerate our faults in order better to satirize and parody them; second, that American literature, particularly that of the present, analyzes situations that cannot be considered either normal or average.568

This tells us that Mark was conscious of the “back region” elements of many American cultural products, and that they were not accessible to foreigners on the same level as they were to

566 FFA. GF. 2347-64432-5. Interviewer’s [Stanley Gordon’s] evaluation form.
568 Ibid.
Americans. Mark decided, however, to keep Sőtér in the dark about the “back region” issue of how the state-socialist countries appeared to an American such as himself, when he “didn’t add what hardly needs to be stated, namely, that there is no organized, concerted effort to cultivate a pleasantly colored myth about this country, designed exclusively for foreign consumption; in other words, there is no such thing as “capitalist realism.” Ironically, his claims about neither American movies nor literature being representative of “normal” or “average” situations, suggests that there were in fact certain images of the USA that he and his like-minded considered less suitable than others in representing American culture. Some degree of “pleasantly colored myths” was thus also a part of how many Americans wished to present themselves.

Sőtér was one of many fellows who expressed their intention of giving a “true picture” of America upon their return home after their stay in the United States. This in itself must have been seen as evidence that the program indeed had some impact, that the main objective of changing the fellows impression of the USA, of presenting them with a “true” and better picture of the country’s culture and society, was in fact being fulfilled.

Sőtér, who spent almost three months in the U.S., from September 21 to December 15, 1965, wrote about his experiences in the United States, first in an article published in the Magyar Nemzet (the daily newspaper of the Hungarian Patriotic People’s Front) and then in a book, Dinner in Carmel: An American Travelogue. The article was published already on 25 February 1966. He called it “The New Content of National Sentiment,” and it may not have been quite what the Ford Foundation people had hoped him to write, as he used the United States as an example, not of a federation (as Americans thought they had and also wanted in Europe), but as a continent made up of small nation-states. One part of his article was devoted to his “impressions while in the United States”, and he comes across as quite the specialist on American society.

What he had learned from his impressions he used to argue his case for his conception of nationalism:

Some US ideologists represent the principle of national indifference. In their opinion, the existence of small nations is irrational, both from the economic and historical points of view. They claim that small units have to be fused into big units. This standpoint, which has developed on the basis of economic and technical empiricism, is erroneous and grotesque, because it denies the principle of individualism, i.e., the same principle which, in the economic field, is defended by these ideologists. Persons familiar with the land and life of the US know that this country consists of clearly demarcated national units. These units not only make people aware of the differences of region and language, but, more so, they also confront the differences of national traditions and ways of life.

569 Ibid.
These confrontations and differences fill the body of federation with the tension and power of life. These national differences exist, for example, between the East and the West of the US, between New England and Arizona, between Michigan and California, yet, at the same time, they also constitute the chief resources of the strength of the federation. If the technical civilization reduces or eliminates these differences, which could be called national differences, the whole ensemble becomes poorer and shallower. If there is something that we might conceive as reassuring, human and truly educated in the everyday life of the US, it is the existence, even today, of these differences, which could be called national differences and which are frail, are threatened with, and perhaps even doomed to, extinction. Every effort at trying to eliminate these differences will cause unpredictable damage to the US. This example and this possibility ought to be a warning for us as well. 571

The points Sőtér tried to make in his article was that there must be made a distinction between the “bourgeois conception of the nation [which] became harmful and led to wars of oppression because isolation and turning against the ruling economic, social or cultural tendencies of history formed part of its existence” and the “new and socialist forms of national awareness” that he sought to define and advocate. The example of the United States, of which “land and life” he clearly thought he was “familiar with,” for him served to illustrate the value of variety, of “national differences” that caused confrontations, and that they “fill the body of the federation with the tension and power of life,” and constitute the chief resources of the strength of the federation.” He was obviously afraid that the Communist future would be devoid of diversity, individuality, and hence, that Europe would risk becoming “poorer and shallower” just like the “technical civilization” threatened the cultural/national diversity of the US. He revealed a certain fear of the dehumanizing, universalizing effects of technology when he argued that “we” (the Hungarians, presumably), “have to seek the new and socialist forms of national awareness because, in them, we can find useful and favorable counterbalances for the equalizing tendencies of technical civilization.” He also resorted to a traditional “nationalist” measure when he wrote: “We should receive assistance in this task from our national sciences, above all, from the science of history.”572

The most interesting thing about this article in the present context is the air of familiarity with the United States that Sőtér immodestly flags.

In the mandatory Final Report from the IIE, Sőtér is described in the following manner:

Project:
Professor Soter was eager to see as much of the United States as possible in preparation for a book to be published in Hungary on his experiences in this country. In addition, he wanted to meet scholars in his field of comparative literature.

572 Ibid.
Program:
The program was arranged in New York City with Professor and Mrs. Soter and was
designed to accommodate what was stated to be a very keen interest in the following three
areas: seeing diverse sections of the American continent; meeting scholars of comparative
literature; conferring with administrators of American universities and private organizations.

[...] In each of the areas visited, Professor Soter was offered an opportunity to meet scholars in
his field; home hospitality and sightseeing arrangements were also available to him and Mrs.
Soter.

Comments:
The Soters were both pleasant and courteous; nevertheless, it was difficult to feel any
confidence that they would hold to arrangements made for them with their own agreement.
They made frequent changes, cancelling whole sections of the program previously desired.
[...] It may be that both Mr. and Mrs. Soter tired quite easily and that, in general, the
Professor did not want as strong a professional program as he felt it necessary to describe to
the IIE. He and Mrs. Soter seemed content mainly to sightsee in each area they visited, a fact
which does have some value, but which they did not adequately communicate to us, judging
from remarks passed along to us in advance, to Mr. Gordon when the invitation was
originally discussed.

From conversations with the Soters at the end of their journey and a subsequent letter to IIE,
we concluded that they felt they had had a good experience in the United States. In the
opinion of IIE New York and its regional offices, however, there is a serious doubt that the
Soters had a wide enough exposure, considering their failure to explore to any significant
extent the scholarly contacts offered them which could have resulted in a rich, as well as a
pleasant, program.573

It’s interesting to see how a man who writes authoritatively on the state of “nationalism” in the
US in fact saw so little and talked to so few during his stay. After his return to Budapest, Sőtér
wrote to Stanley Gordon, thanking him for his experience:

[...] Obviously our stay in the United States proved to be extremely useful and interesting
for us, being very agreeable in the same time. My visits of the Universities of your country –
I hope – will initiate new contacts between scholars, and we hope to have more visits of
professors, in our fields.574

Apart from his praise of his experience in America and his hope for further cooperation, the
letter largely concerns itself with Gordon’s upcoming trip to Budapest, the cold winter, and how
Gordon should, accordingly, dress warm. The letter is written in a familiar and congenial tone,
indicating that Sőtér, like Leszcynski for Stone, felt secure and comfortable in his place as
Gordon’s equal.

4) Anna Katona: The successful defector

America is limitless as the poet has it and it is a country with a thousand faces that eludes you and defeats you when you try to pin it down. It is entirely strange to the visitor from Europe.

— Anna Katona

Anna Katona, a Hungarian scholar of English and American literature, who spent the academic year of 1967-1968 in the United States, produced one of the longest and most elaborate reports I have found in the Ford Foundation archives.\(^{575}\) In length and scope, then, it is not a typical report, but both the way Katona described herself and her merits, and the way she wrote about her impressions of the USA have many parallels to other reports. Her report contains elements that recur in many reports, but she elaborated more on each question than most other fellows, and as such it gives us more insight into how one fellow handled her impression management.

Born in Debrecen on 1920, Katona was one of only two fellows selected from that city in 1967. She was also one of only two Hungarian fellows in the field of literature that year.\(^{576}\) As a docent in the Department of English at Kossuth Lajos University, she had earned her first degree in English, French, and German literature in 1944, and her PhD in English literature in 1959, both at the same university. She also wrote in her résumé to the Institute of International Education that she earned a “Candidate’s degree”\(^{577}\) at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences in 1964, and that she, on two occasions, in 1960 and 1963, had visited Great Britain on a one month British Council scholarship to do research on British literature.\(^{578}\) As a “First Assistant Professor”, she was given a nine month grant, and was most likely in the “B” category of the Foundation selection committee, alongside most other professors and their “non-academic equivalents.”\(^{579}\)

To start off her report, Katona gave a short, direct assessment of herself where she expressed her opinion of herself:

Since I am a fairly good lecturer I already have several invitations to lecture on my stay in the U.S. in the next academic year.

\(^{576}\) Of the 30 fellows selected in Hungary that year, 25 was from Budapest, 2 from Debrecen and Szeged, and 1 was from Fertod. FFA GF. 2348 64-432-5. Memo on 1967-68 Hungarian Exchange program.
\(^{577}\) Equivalent of a post-doc.
This short description tells us something about how Anna Katona regarded herself and how she wanted to be regarded by the Ford Foundation. In the expressions she gives off, through her choice of the little word “fairly” in front of her description of herself as a “good lecturer,” she tells the reader (The Ford Foundation) that, despite her obvious talents, she is modest and not conceited or self-important. By writing in the next sentence that she has “already” had “several invitations to lecture” on her “stay in the U.S. in the next academic year,” she is able to communicate her talents and her worth, thereby establishing her excellence and importance without retorting to superlatives about herself. In other words, she has successfully both given and given off the impression of an excellent scholar who, despite her evident excellence and the extraordinary privilege of being invited to the U.S. for a second period, is not haughty about it.

Already in the next paragraph of her report, Katona finds another opportunity to cast a favorable light on her own qualities. Upon answering the question of whether or not she experienced language difficulties, she manages to accentuate herself in relationship to the other foreign exchangees in a rather sophisticated way:

My admiration goes to those of my fellow grantees who ventured on this undertaking with rather poor English. They might not have been handicapped in their research, the language of science being somewhat particular, but how they managed their everyday life without adequate fluency in speech and facility in understanding the spoken language, how they managed their telephone calls and etc, is an enigma to me and a matter for admiration. I had no language problem whatsoever, but I would by no means pretend that I always understood easily the Negro taxidriver in Chicago or even the Caucasian librarian or the chairman of the English department at the University of Mississippi with their charming Southern drawl.

Writing in an immaculate, nuanced and highly sophisticated english, Katona succeeds, in one fell swoop, to demonstrate her great skill and ability in understanding, speaking, assessing, and appreciating the English language, while showing, although in a rather condescending manner, that she is an empathetic person who cares for and admires her peers. So far, she has thus presented a favourable “personal front.”

Early on in her report, Katona employs some of the techniques of “dramatic realization” when she emphasizes her importance as an expert by stating that for her, more than for most others, travelling in the U.S. was not just advisable and advantageous, but “quite a special necessity”:

For me, however, it was quite a special necessity. I do not think Americans realize how different their country is from Europe and that for anybody who wishes to say a meaningful word about this huge continent wide traveling is an absolute prerequisite.

It is interesting to see how she first points out her special need, and then argues that travelling is "an absolute prerequisite" for "anybody who wishes to say a meaningful word" about America.
Obviously, she considers herself someone with a special need for travelling because she wants to communicate that she is in a position, by being qualified and competent as a person and a professional, to lend a “meaningful” voice to her experiences in the United States. By stressing the importance of travelling, she also shows her own perceptiveness in recognizing that to grasp even the first thing about America and Americans, one must experience the country’s vastness and variety first-hand. Being a scholar of letters, Katona often resorted to linguistic or literary examples for her dramatic realization, as in the following quote where she gives her assessment of the English language in its American form:

I did find, however, American English very attractive, not so much the accent rather the idioms which to my mind are surprisingly expressive. I tried them out, some of them, on British friends on my way home. They worked wonders, the British did not understand them. This confirms my feeling that they are genuinely American, some of them extremely picturesque. American speech, as you can enjoy it in some of the finest contemporary novels, is very illustrative, expressive, much more so than British English.

Mixed in with her description of how she had cleverly practiced using the American idioms, she adds elements of protective practices, or tact. In response to being exposed to Americanized English, which is often ridiculed and belittled by speakers of “proper English,” Katona tactfully points out the qualities of the language, rather than leaving the subject untouched or unfavorably describing her experience of the language. With a humorous touch, she even manages to cast a shred of ridicule on to the British, because, in fact, they did not understand. On the other hand, this particular point could be read as signifying the complete opposite: that the Americans had so ruined the English language that it was rendered incomprehensible to the genuine English speakers. However, within the present context, the last interpretation does not seem plausible.

Perhaps the most distinctive among Katona’s dramatic expressions of her role as knowledgeable scholar, are her several references to, and quotes by, American writers and other important personalities in the grand narrative of American national identity and history:

I must quote Whitman. “Our lands, embracing so much, (embracing indeed the whole, rejecting none) hold in their breast that flame also, capable of consuming themselves, consuming us all.”

I must quote Wright Morris in this respect: “In the eyes of the world we are the future, but in our own eyes we are the past.”

These States are the amplest poem, Here is not merely a nation but a teeming Nation of nations. (Whitman)

As Steinbeck puts it, you can travel from New York to San Francisco “without seeing a thing.”
Ever since the days of the Pilgrim Fathers it has been a challenge to be an American. Ever since the days of Tocqueville it has been a challenge for Europe to understand and assess America. In this challenge we meet, let us hope for the best of mankind.

Although she quotes famous people apparently to give weight to her arguments concerning various issues in American society, it seems evident that she is eager to show off her knowledge, her ability to see the connections between society and art, past and present. Anna Katona is thus a good example of a learned person from the Continent, as we have seen it described by her fellow Hungarian, George Mikes.

The way Katona presents herself serves to illustrate the division of personal front into the two components of “appearance” and “manner.” In her case, her appearance, which she implicitly refers to throughout the text, is that of the well-bred and well-read European with a great deal of knowledge about the United States. Her manner is shown mostly in the way she positions herself in relation to the people and situations she encounters: confident yet humble in her meeting with America and Americans; gracious, empathetic and respectful towards her fellow grantees; thoughtful and concerned in her approach to issues and problems. Thus, she successfully creates a coherent image of herself where her appearance, her status as European intellectual, corresponds to her manner of behavior.

Anna Katona’s final report, like all the final reports, is by definition a front stage performance. We will never know whether or not Katona put on an act in order to deceive the Ford Foundation, whether she “feigned” her performance in order to seem more capable or attractive than she really was, or whether she was just being as sincere as she could. However, it is not the purpose of this analysis to find out what “reality really is.” Instead, to determine whether or not Katona’s report seems credible as a text and as an expression, I have joined Goffman in his fundamentally different inquiry: “What are the ways in which a given impression can be discredited?” In light of the previously mentioned Anglo-American conception of truth and truthful performances that Goffman refers to: “the two commonsense models to which we formulate our conceptions of behaviour: the real, sincere, or honest performance; and the false one that thorough fabricators assemble for us,” it is obvious that in order to have credibility – and credibility is the end-all in a successful interaction – it is crucial to appear real, sincere, and honest. Anna Katona was successful in this respect. By maintaining her expressive control, by successfully managing the impressions she made, she performed convincingly, so that whoever reads her text, whether people at the Ford Foundation in 1968, or myself now in 2017, are compelled to believe her.
Her personal front was indeed convincing and impressive enough to secure Katona a future at an American university, and she ended up teaching at the College of Charleston for 24 years, after receiving a fellowship from the American Council of Learned Societies at Yale University in 1975. When she died in 2005, she was described in her obituary as “Distinguished Professor Emerita,” “a respected and beloved colleague” who “presented papers and served as a convener at numerous international conferences including the Modern Language Association of America,” and who also served as an editor and member of various boards.580

The Ford Foundation had obviously chosen a very suitable candidate back in 1967: Katona proved to be “academically excellent,” and her ability to make a place for herself in the American academic and literary world proved that she indeed possessed the qualities that the Foundation had sought after throughout the period of their exchanges with Eastern Europe. Her legacy as a college professor “survived by generations of devoted students and a host of loyal friends and colleagues in Hungary, the United States, and throughout the world,” is a testament to her “objective and flexible” personality, her “willingness to learn” and “the desire to exchange ideas.”581 She was obviously not the dreaded example, in the Foundation’s eyes, of someone who buried themselves in research “at the expense of their exposure to institutions and individuals.” Katona even ended up as a philanthropist herself, by providing funds to a grant at the College of Charleston, for “the graduating English major with the highest average in American Literature.” The only problem with Anna Katona, in terms of being a successful Ford fellow, was that she did not return permanently to Hungary after the end of her Ford fellowship. Hence, it was the United States, not Hungary, which directly benefitted from her expertise. However, through her active involvement in the furthering of Hungarian studies, as well as of English and American literature and language, chances are she contributed considerably to the Foundation’s chief aim (albeit from the opposite side of what was intended) of developing mutual understanding across the systemic divide.

580 Compass: A Publication of the School of Humanities and Social Sciences – College of Charleston. Volume 1, Issue 2, March 2005. Katona was a member of the Board of Trustees for the Dickens Society, Hungarian editor for The Annual Bibliography of English Language for over thirty years, as well as being on the advisory board of The Canadian-American Review in Hungarian Studies.

In 1966, the Ford Foundation appointed a new President: McGeorge Bundy. He came to the Foundation directly from his job as National Security Advisor to presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson, and he brought a new era to the Foundation, with reduced expenditures and a restructuring of programs. Bundy was, according to Francis Sutton, who worked at the Foundation under his leadership, sceptical of “the style and substance of much that had been done by the Foundation for European and Atlantic Unity under the leadership of McCloy and Stone.”

The change of leadership and the restructuring of the Foundation coincided with a period when foundations were being scrutinized by Congressman Wright Patman in an investigation that lasted from 1961 to 1972, and which resulted in eight reports. The investigation was criticized for

- inaccuracy and exaggeration in its reports;
- failure to afford foundations an opportunity to be heard;
- for attempting, by the presentation of only certain selected material, to prove preconceived ideas;
- and, in short, for a consequent failure to present a fair and balanced picture of foundations.

Henry Heald remembered that Patman “sent all kinds of questionnaires to the foundations and gathered a lot of financial data. He never concerned himself with anything other than financial data about foundations.” In this, the Patman investigation was unlike the three earlier investigations, the Walsh Commission in 1915, the Cox Committee in 1952, and the Reece Commission in 1953 and 1954, which were all concerned with ideological questions and the content and conduct of foundations.

Heald, too, was critical about the reports that resulted from the questionnaires they had filled out:

We sometimes didn’t recognize the answers after they got into his publications (laughter). And, by and large, as long as I was there we didn’t do much to counteract some of the statements that he made in his reports. They weren’t really damaging to the Foundation, although he had a fellow working for him who had a faculty of twisting data – drawing his own interpretations which would prove whatever pre-conceived position that he or Wright Patman had. There isn’t any doubt that Patman did the foundations a certain amount of harm. A lot of people were willing to believe what Patman said about foundations. A lot of people are still willing to believe what he says about foundations, about the horrible things they do in terms of taking money out of the Treasury, and the way they’ve been used and mishandled for the benefit of some individuals and so on. And in some small foundations there have been a few cases where this is unfortunately true. I think that Patman, of course, kind of laid

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583 Kiger, Philanthropic Foundations in the Twentieth Century, 33.
584 Ibid., 31.
the basis for the 1969 legislation and contributed to that to some degree, although Patman is not the most influential member of Congress, at least as far as I know. And this was pretty much a one-man crusade on the part of Patman. He was supposed to be chairman of a committee but he never consulted his Committee. He was a very difficult fellow to work with. He’s convinced that anything that represents money and is large, whether it be a bank or a foundation or a corporation or anything else, is inevitably evil. And I guess he believes it.

The Patman investigations, although criticized, did succeed in exposing that some foundations had abused their position. Brought to the attention of the Treasury Department, the Internal Revenue Service, and the tax writing committees of Congress, this led to new investigations and eventually to the Tax Reform Act of 1969. The Act, which involved a new tax and new supervisory laws for foundations, dealt a serious blow to philanthropy. In addition to a 4% tax on net investment income, there were “restrictions on grants to individuals; a requirement that disbursements of a foundation must at least equal investment income in a year […], tightened restrictions on self-dealing between donor and foundation; and broadened and amplified reporting requirements.” 585

The Tax Reform Act was preceded by another damaging event for the Foundation: the revelation that the Ford Foundation had funded the Congress of Cultural Freedom alongside the covert funding from the CIA for years.586 Thus, the change in leadership, the scandal of the CCF funding, and the Tax Reform Act and were all factors that affected the Foundation and contributed to a change in their programs. Other reasons for the shift in focus and attitude where Europe was concerned, was that McCloy left as Chairman of the Board in 1965 and that Shepard Stone left the Foundation in 1967, to become President of the International Association for Cultural Freedom, the successor to CCF, by then fully financed by the Ford Foundation. Joseph Slater succeeded him as leader of the IA – which had also been restructured. In 1969 it was decided to close the East European exchange program down, and to organize exchanges in a different way. From then on the Foundation no longer had much influence in selecting candidates, and projects became group- and discipline-based. The regular scholarly exchanges, now reciprocal, with part of the cost being provided by the East European countries, continued on a smaller scale and were managed entirely by the newly formed International Research & Exchanges Board (IREX).587

585 Ibid., 35.
586 See Saunders, Who paid the piper? Saunders argues in her book that Shepard Stone was a CIA-man. Verne Atwater, who worked at the Foundation with Stone, said, when I met him in New York in January 2008, that Stone was not employed by the CIA, but that he “certainly fished in those waters”.
587 IREX was, in its first years, funded almost entirely with Ford Foundation funds.
Changes in the relationship between the USA and the Soviet sphere were also an important reason for a change in Foundation’s practices vis-à-vis Europe. By the end of the 1960s the new policies of the Soviet Union, the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, and the ongoing war in Vietnam all contributed to the gradual deterioration of the relationship. Also, there was a general change in the way people in America viewed the world. While the likes of McCloy and Stone never seem to have doubted that their view of the world was the right one, and that their methods were superior, the 1960s had brought a different, more soul-searching and less confident mood.

**International affairs and the CIA**

The IA Program was the most controversial of the Foundation’s departments, and its officers have been accused of being a little too cooperative with the CIA. When it was publicly known in the spring of 1967 that the Foundation for years had funded the CCF as a cover for the CIA, the Foundation suffered a severe blow to its credibility as a free-standing organization. As former President Henry Heald expressed it, in an interview in 1974,

> The cover was blown on the whole business with considerable repercussions around the world and in the United States. Maybe it’s all died down now and it doesn’t make a difference anymore, but this is what I always was concerned about, that there would be a big blow up and some of these things would come out and all the foundations would be tarred with the same stick. 588

Originally intended to coordinate military and diplomatic intelligence, the Central Intelligence Agency was created in July of 1947, 589 and Frances Stonor Saunders paints a vivid picture of the early days:

> In the beginning, its officers were animated by a sense of mission – ‘to save western freedom from Communist darkness’ – which one officer compared to ‘the atmosphere of an order of Knights Templars’. The dominant early influence was the ‘aristocracy’ of the eastern seaboard and the Ivy League, a Bruderbund of Anglophile sophisticates who found powerful justification for their actions in the traditions of the Enlightenment and the principles enshrined in the Declaration of Independence. 590

Being part of this “Bruderbund,” Stone and the other officers at International Affairs were undoubtedly closely connected with the intelligence community, and there was contact between them. Frances Stonor Saunders, in her book about the Congress for Cultural Freedom and covert

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590 Saunders, *Who paid the piper?* 33-34
support of it, points out that Stone’s “entire career, from the High Commission in Germany to the Ford Foundation, and now the Congress, was littered with intelligence connections,” and she claims that Shepard Stone was a “CIA man.” She also emphasizes the interdependency between the different sectors of American public and private enterprise, and she rejects what she calls “the myth of altruism,” that the CIA (and those they worked with and funded) “was merely interested in extending the possibilities for free and democratic cultural expression.” She adds the charge that the Ford Foundation cooperated with the CIA to a greater extent than what has previously been assumed, that it some times “seemed as if the Ford Foundation was simply an extension of government in the area of international cultural propaganda,” and that it had “a record of close involvement in covert actions in Europe, working closely with Marshall Plan and CIA officials on specific projects.” One of the reasons why the Foundation got involved with covert action, she claims, was that people at the Ford Foundation thought that the State Department was “subjected to so much domestic political interference that it can no longer present a rounded picture of American culture.” She also addresses the moral dilemma probably faced by Foundation officers and others who played a part in the cultural cold war. Did they really believe in what they were doing, justifying the means to their end, or where they consciously trying to deceive the world for more or less selfish gains?

When I asked Francis X. Sutton (who had himself worked with Stone in international affairs at the Foundation), about CIA connections, he answered by asking me to consider that the CIA was not perceived as an “evil” in the postwar era to the same extent as it is today. Many of those who became important actors in the Ford Foundation, as well as in government, had experienced World War II and the effects of Fascist rule first hand. Some of them, like Hoffman, McCloy, and Stone had worked in Europe after the War and observed the way the Soviet Communists had treated both their former enemies and their future allies. They had also experienced that many Europeans, partly as a consequence of their traumatic encounter with fascism, were welcoming Communist ideology at the expense of American ideals and interests.

Again, I want to quote Saunders, who describes the milieu of the time better than any other accounts that I have read:

591 Ibid., 412, refers to the memoirs of “East German spymaster Marcus Wolf [who] alleged that Stone was a CIA case officer.” This can, however, hardly be seen as proof, as many people were called spies without proper reason. My impression is that Stone was included by association, because he was friends with people like Michael Josselson, Head of the CCF Secretariat, who was a CIA-agent.
592 Saunders, Who paid the piper? 4.
593 That the Congress for Cultural Freedom had received covert funding from the CIA while being funded by the Ford Foundation was revealed in 1967, but Saunders claims the connection between the Ford Foundation and CIA was a constant throughout the 1950s and ‘60s. Saunders, 139.
The Dumbarton Avenue sceptics [sceptical of the general claim that Stalinism had changed to the better] were joined by David Bruce, Averell Harriman, John J. McCloy, Joseph and Stewart Alsop, Richard Bissell, Walter Lippmann, and the Bundy brothers [McGeorge Bundy, the future President of the Ford Foundation was one of them]. In long exchanges, heated by intellectual passion and alcohol, their vision of a new world order began to take shape. Internationalist, abrasive, competitive, these men had an unshakable belief in their value system, and in their duty to offer it to others. They were the patricians of the modern age, the paladins of democracy, and saw no contradiction in that. This was the elite which ran American foreign policy and shaped legislation at home. Through think-tanks to foundations, directorates to membership of gentlemen’s clubs, these mandarins were interlocked by their institutional affiliations and by shared belief in their own superiority. Their job was to establish and then justify the post-war *pax Americana*. And they were staunch supporters of the CIA, which was fast being staffed by their friends from school, business or the ‘old show’ of OSS.595

To attain their goals of improving the image of America abroad and of strengthening European institutions and their “best people,” so they would not be lost to Communism forever, the means by which they reached them were negotiable. This is not to say that philanthropic organizations considered it a good idea to participate in covert activities, as their entire enterprise depended on the trust of the society in which they operated. However, although there is evidence among the papers of the IA that the Foundation should officially neither cater to governments nor jeopardize their credibility by engaging in covert activities of any kind, there was a certain freedom of both interpretation and action in how problems could best be solved. The sources often refer to “meetings” or “talks” of which there are no further traces of in the archives, implying that there was activity going on which was not for the record.596

The following excerpt, from a dialogue between Charles Morrisey and Stone for the Foundation’s oral history project in 1972, says something about how Stone wanted to present himself, but probably also something about the attitude that prevailed in the IA, the Foundation, and in the social stratum and generation that Stone represented:

**Morrisey:** When you talk about relating the Ford Foundation to what the Federal agencies were doing in Washington, that raises the question of the relationships between Ford and the Intelligence Community in Washington. I was wondering whether you’d want to get into that?

**Stone:** Yes. Before I went to Eastern Europe, I myself had never been in CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] or any other intelligence agency. [...] But when I was going into Eastern Europe in a very tricky area, I asked and tried to get as much information as I could. I knew Allen Dulles before through the Council of Foreign Relations here in New York. I guess I was never cleared for anything. As far as I know, I never had any clearance so that I was never told anything really secret. But some people gave me general reports and that was

595 Saunders, 37-38. OSS *Office of Strategic Services* was the war-time predecessor to the CIA.

596 Stone, for one, often writes in his letters about issues that are too delicate to be discussed in writing.
simply part of the information that I gathered. I think I have received more useful information for myself from The New York Times correspondents in some of those capitals than I did from anybody in the U.S. Government. But, I did try to get information everywhere, as I did from West Europeans who knew a great deal, [...] 

**Morrisey:** Did anyone from the CIA ever approach you during those years and suggest or intimate that, perhaps the Ford Foundation in one way or another could become a conduit for intelligence purposes?

**Stone:** No, never in my experience. It sounds courageous for me to say had anybody done it I would have thrown him out but, no, I must say no one ever did to me and I don’t even have to say to the best of my knowledge. No one ever did.

**Morrisey:** We ask these questions now because of what happened in the last few years to other foundations.

**Stone:** Sure. No, I am just telling you honestly. I am speaking very openly as you can see. No one ever did. 

The Foundation had indeed been approached by the CIA, before Stone joined the Foundation, in 1951, and asked if they would “act as a channel for the expenditure of CIA funds in certain instances.” There was a discussion in the Foundation with Allen Dulles, and at first, because “nothing concrete in the way of a C. I. A. request” had been proposed, one Ford officer, Bernard L. Gladieux, wrote to Gaither that “[s]hould C. I. A. request us to handle such a project for them and it should do so, we will clear it with Tex Moore and refer it to Pasadena for decision.”

Another Ford Foundation officer, John B. Howard, discussed the matter with Allen Dulles, who was at that time Deputy Director of Central intelligence for plans, in a “follow-up meeting”:

Dulles said that he raised the question with caution, that he had just come from private foundation activity, and that he wanted to safeguard the interest of the Ford Foundation. So far as I know, CIA has only one case in mind at the moment, and I think they may be able to find another convenient channel for their funds.

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599 Maurice T. Moore was a lawyer and one of Eisenhower’s “closest New York friends” according to Kai Bird. The Chairman: John J. McCloy and the making of the American Establishment.

600 DCSS. FF-IA. “The O.P. Papers of Rowan Gaither. Area I. The Establishment of Peace – CIA” Bernard L. Gladieux to Rowan Gaither, 23 April 1951. Pasadena was where the Ford Foundation had its headquarters at the time.

Maybe it was already then that the needs of the Congress for Cultural Freedom became a case to consider for the Foundation? At a conference on April 3, 1951, “with Beadle Smith, Allen Dulles and others,” there was a comment by Frank Wisner, Head of CIA/State Department’s Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) 602, on the “Congress of Cultural & Intellectual Freedom.” Wisner was quoted as saying that the “Congress of Cultural & Intellectual Freedom,” presumably an early name for the CCF, had “great possibilities – must have private support; government funds are “kiss of death” – Could Ford receive government funds for disbursements.” CIA did eventually channel money through the Ford Foundation to the CCF, and when this was discovered, there was a scandal in which the Ford Foundation suffered a lack of credibility as an independent organ.603

Back in 1951 this was exactly one of the problems Ford Foundation officer John Howard and Allen Dulles feared. Howard wrote to Rowan Gaither:

> I made the observation [to Dulles] that clearly there were risks involved in the Foundation acting as a channel for CIA funds. If the arrangement were discovered, many of the Foundation’s activities might become suspect and the particular usefulness of the Foundation as a thoroughly private instrumentality might be jeopardized. Accordingly, I proposed that we not try and reach a decision in principle as to whether or not the Foundation would be willing to act as a channel for CIA funds, but rather that we wait until a specific case arises in which all other channels have been exhausted and it is in the national interest that the Foundation act as a channel. 604

Two days after Howard wrote to President Gaither, Gaither was clear on the Foundation’s position concerning channeling CIA funds. He wrote to Bernard L. Gladieux, stating that “the staff is opposed as a matter of policy. Hence, a legal opinion is not necessary.”605.

I have not found any other proposals from the CIA, but Henry Heald related his view of, and experiences with, the agency in an interview in 1974:

> This action of the C.I.A. in setting up and maintaining so-called foundations troubled me a great deal, particularly in connection with our activities in foreign countries. […] Well, after


603 See Francis Stonor Saunders and Peter Coleman.


605 Ibid.

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a time, I took the position that we wouldn’t support any organization that got support from the C.I.A. And of course, I also took the position that C.I.A ought not to do this thing. I recall very well a meeting I had – I think, Jack [John J.] McCloy, Chairman of the Ford Trustees and I with [John A.] McCone when he was Director of the C.I.A. And we tied to make the point to him that what he was doing was exposing the private foundations to possibilities of unfavorable reactions in various countries around the world, and that this just really wasn’t the way to do it. McCone never understood it. He thought our point of view was nonsense and, in effect, felt that maybe we really weren’t as good citizens as we ought to be, or we wouldn’t be concerned about that at that time. (laughter)

Well, of course, later on the thing happened that all of us had been afraid would happen.606

To the question of whether any trustees in the Foundation “felt that Ford and the C.I.A. should go along together,” Heald answered: “Not really, although some of the trustees were not as much concerned with this problem as I was. Some of them were inclined to hope it would go away and not take the position that we wouldn’t support anything that was a C.I.A. agency.” 607

As for Stone, it is difficult to assess whether or not he was telling the truth about his and IA’ relationship with the CIA, and I have not made it my task to credit or discredit him. If we take Stone’s answers at face value, the comment of one CIA agent, that “Shep was not a CIA man, though he may have fished in those waters”608 supports Stone’s own claims. Whether he was a “CIA man” or not, the image he has left behind is that of a man who believed in the power of individual agency and who treated the people he encountered with respect and dignity, but who, according to one colleague, Verne Atwater, was also “an actor” who was sincere “when he wanted to be.”609 However, Atwater also remembers Stone as a warm person whom he considered his friend and who encouraged personal contact and wrote thoughtful, sincere letters – even if they went beyond his duty as a colleague.610 Francis Sutton describes him as a confident man whose maybe greatest asset was his networking abilities, and he was “not bashful about name-dropping.” 611

Joseph Slater had a somewhat different impression of Stone, whom he described as having “a very particular style,” and “very great honesty and integrity, and [he] had instincts, particularly in things like the media and others where he was very good, but he allowed and encouraged his staff and the people working with him to do their thing. He was a very easy

607 Ibid.
608 Saunders, Who paid the piper?143. Verne Atwater, who worked at the Foundation with Stone, said, when I met him in New York in January 2008, that Stone was not employed by the CIA, but – and using the same wording as the CIA-agent in Saunders’ book – that he “certainly fished in those waters”.
610 Ibid.
person with whom to work and [he] encouraged things.”612 Slater acknowledged Stone’s important role in International Affairs and gave him “great credit” for the “highly successful” Eastern European program. He particularly credited his ability to get “top scholars as a permanent partnership in making the selections” in Eastern Europe, and described them as “a cadre of people [who] made a very strong team; they had very good judgment, they were balanced, they weren’t taken in by governmental positions but they were aware of them, always acted responsibly.” There was an “idea of community and the reinforcing of ideas” in the East European program, and Slater thought it was a good program, despite the controversy around CIA funding:

[Incidents like the Congress for Cultural Freedom and the whole involvement of the CIA, where the Foundation was making grants to the institutions that had money, or to help the institution to get out from under support. Those were highly debated in the Foundation, and always resolved on what makes sense. Was good work going on? Was it being done by good people? Was it independent? And I think a very sophisticated and intelligent policy was followed, including helping shift Congressional support from the CIA to private sources. 613]

He echoed Stone’s opinions here, about the CIA and CCF, but he was more willing to admit his involvement in it than Stone. When Slater was asked by interviewer Charles T. Morrisey whether he was aware of the CIA support, he answered:

Yes; yes, certainly. The Foundation knew that there was that money in it but asked of the scholars, “Is there any interference, is there any lack of integrity in the work you’re trying to do?” The answer everywhere around the world was “No.” And, by the way, so did the grantees know, and so did most of the people participating in the program! But what they said was that the United States didn’t have a mature system the way the British Council or other governments were supporting the same things. This was not intelligence, it was merely a form of support which we couldn’t get through our processes in the way that other governments had done, and there was a feeling of “you people should develop other ways of doing your business!” But meanwhile we’re doing things that are important and we go on. We never worked with the Agency as such, at least not to my knowledge.

Morrisey:
Yet you always knew its presence was there?

Slater:
We knew that some of the funds were coming from the non-covert side of the agency.

Morrisey:

613 Ibid., 67-68.
Did the CIA make any effort to use your grantees for intelligence services?

Slater:
That’s where there was a degree of sophistication. People like Mike [Michael] Josselson who ran the Congress had an extraordinary ability; he would have quit instantly had there been any activity of that kind. That’s what gave the thing its integrity. [...] CIA money was in all kinds of institutions and I’m not saying that was a healthy thing, because it wasn’t. But many of the programs under it were absolutely first class. [...] The degree of sophistication and lack of interference was really quite interesting to watch. I’m not arguing that was the best way to proceed, but I’m arguing those were the facts at the time.

Morrissey:
It must have been something of a worrisome situation, particularly when the lid came off. A lot of people were horrified to think that this was CIA money.

Slater:
The question is one of balance. When it came up was all the work undone? Or was it on balance to the good? Most people who’ve really studied it feel that on balance it was good. It was just a terribly unfortunate national way of going about business. By the way, most of those institutions have continued. They survived because they were doing some good work that was important.614

Slater and Stone were not the only ones to defend their position vis-à-vis the CIA. George Kennan, one time Ambassador to the Soviet Union, was adamant in his defense: “The flap about CIA money was quite unwarranted, and caused far more anguish that it should have been permitted to cause. I never felt the slightest pangs of conscience about it. This country had no Ministry of Culture, and CIA was obliged to do what it could to try to fill the gap. It should be praised for having done so, and not criticized.”615

That both Stone and Slater ( “We never worked with the Agency as such”), denied being “Agency men” but justified their connection with the CIA, says much about them as definite products of their personal histories, their times, and their environment. This included a liberal, and obviously pragmatic, view of the CIA and a rather elitist view of the world, for which both Stone and his generation of New England Ivy Leaguers have been duly criticized.

In the case of the International Affairs: Stone, Slater, the selection teams, the administrators at IIE, it is clear that they had motives that fit the mould of cultural warfare, but their belief that what they were doing was right and good, is hard to doubt. They obviously

614 FFA. Interview with Slater, 67-69.
615 Saunders, Who paid the piper? 408.
believed that they could accomplish important, good things in the name of America, philanthropy, and ambitions for a better world.

The “real game of philanthropy,” in Slater’s mind, was “the community building, the network building,” that had its own value because it allows a lot to be done. It gives continuity and it creates a mechanism in the world for stockpiling ideas, for having more diverse and collective judgments for a more democratic approach to problems, and a building of something that is helpful to governments ultimately in formulating and carrying out a foreign policy. So those are some of the broader philosophical trends. 616

If anything, it seems clear that both the CIA and IA saw the potential in cooperating as part of America’s cultural cold war strategy. Stone’s connections, both among the leaders of the corporate/political/philanthropic triad in the USA and among the intellectual and political elites in Europe, proved useful during his time as Director of International Affairs, and for the East European programs. Whether the end justified the means will be for someone else to judge. Now let’s look at the end.

**Impact of the program**

One of the most important questions about the Ford Foundation fellowship programs with Eastern Europe is what impact the programs had. Did they contribute to any changes in the East European societies they operated in? Did they change attitudes in Eastern Europe, in the United States and between East and West? Did they have any impact at all?

Yale Richmond, who worked at the State Department at the time, is one person who has given much credit to exchanges in general, and to the Ford Foundation programs in particular. While his main focus in his book *Cultural Exchange and the Cold War: Raising the Iron Curtain* is on the government-run U.S./U.S.S.R. exchanges launched in 1958, he argues that exchanges with Eastern Europe, especially through Poland, “Russia’s ‘window on the West’,” were influential, and that the Ford Foundation was an important actor. One of Richmond’s claims is that “much of what the East Europeans learned through exchanges, especially those funded by the Ford Foundation, eventually found its way into the Soviet Union.”617 Richmond, through the testimonies of, mostly, Soviet and American participants in and administrators of East-West exchanges, argues that the exchanges ultimately contributed to the changes that led to the downfall of Communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

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616 FFA. Interview with Slater, 50
617 Richmond, *Cultural Exchange*, 200.
One of the first Soviet students to come to the USA under the Lacy-Zarubin exchange agreement was Oleg Kalugin, and he told Richmond in 1997 that exchanges were a Trojan Horse in the Soviet Union. They played a tremendous role in the erosion of the Soviet system. They opened up a closed society. They greatly influenced younger people who saw the world with more open eyes, and they kept infecting more and more people over the years.618

Richmond also quotes the former executive director of the International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX), Allen H. Kassof, who wrote in 1995 about the extraordinary impact of East-West scholarly exchanges on the societies of Eastern Europe and the USSR. Even during the years when the rapid spread of Soviet influence to Europe, Asia, Africa and Latin America made Moscow look all but invincible, seeds of change that would later blossom into the democratic revolutions of 1989-90. Among the thousands of Soviet and East European academics and intellectuals who were exchange participants in the United States and Western Europe...many became members of what, in retrospect, turned out to be underground establishments. They were well-placed individuals, members of the political and academic elites, who began as loyalists but whose outside experiences sensitized them to the need for basic change. Together with the more radical political and cultural dissidents, towards whom they were ambivalent or hostile, they turned out to be agents of change who played a key part, sometimes unintentional, in the demise of European Communism. 619

I will not endeavour to prove whether or not the Foundation programs had any direct impact on the regimes in Eastern Europe. However, that there was impact in the form of individual fellows coming back from their stay in the United States with a different view of the world is quite clear. A discussion of impact here will hence concern itself with how the question of impact manifested itself within the discourse produced in the context of the Foundation programs.

Were the programs a success? How? And for whom?
The East European programs, being as controversial as they were, called for evidence to justify their existence. The amount of clippings, quotes and letters that testify to the success of the programs are abundant in the files, both at the Ford Foundation, and in Stone’s papers. Reports and comments from individuals who wrote to the IA was one channel for such evidence, newspaper articles, both American and East European, was another.

One of the early signs of success were the enthusiastic remarks of Ludwik Leszczynski, the first liaison of the Ford Foundation in its program with Poland, who expressed his “most

618 Ibid., 32.
619 Ibid., 21.
heartfelt admiration and warmest thanks for the excellent work which the Ford Foundation representatives have done […]. This is going to be of immeasurable value to us in our efforts to acquaint ourselves with the progress of the Social Sciences and with Western culture and thought.” Leszczynski emphasized that it was “not just idle talk when I said I was amazed by and felt the greatest respect for the work of you and your colleagues […] meeting, interviewing and having discussions with so many people on such complicated matters, as well as having interviews with the various government agencies.”

Even the Pope knew about the program in Poland and responded favourably to it, reported one man to Don Price in December 1957:

> During the course of our conversation His Holiness[Pius XII], unsolicited by me, made specific reference to the work which the Foundation was carrying on in Poland. His remarks were most laudatory of our efforts. He said that although he realized that the element of risk was high that nevertheless the cause was good and the assumption of that risk justified.

The fact that so many people wrote to the IA to tell them about favourable responses to the programs is in itself an indication that the programs were of some value. That people outside the Foundation were interested in documenting their importance, is a testament both to the interest inspired by the programs and to the networking capabilities of the IA officers.

As one of the chief objectives of the programs had been to shape and change East Europeans perceptions of the West, and of the United States in particular, what people reported to this effect was important for the Foundation in its running evaluation about whether or not the programs had any impact. And people, both Americans and East Europeans, were eager to report any signs of such impact.

Stone and his colleagues were made aware of the following statement at a conference about the Polish program in May 1959: “MODERN POLAND RESTS ON THREE PILLARS: THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, GOMULKA AND THE FORD FOUNDATION.”

Allegedly, this was at that time “a typical commentary on the importance of the Foundation’s program of awards for the Poles to travel to the USA and Western Europe.” Other, less tabloid statements to boost the confidence of the Ford officers was that the Polish Program was “becoming a very important factor in Polish academic life,” which was “beginning to have a

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620 DCSS. FF-IA. Correspondence 1957 R-S. Leszczynski to Stone, 3 June 1957.
622 FFA 2518-57-322-4  “Minutes of the conference in Mr. Stone’s office on Wednesday, 27 May 1959”. Also quoted in Igor Czernecki. “America and human capital…”
tremendous impact. For the younger scholars a FF award means a step toward advancement and career, for the senior professors it is a problem of prestige.”623

A former fellow, Jan Kott, one of the signatories of the protest to the Polish government in 1964, wrote to Stone on 23 August 1963, when the Foundation was negotiating the Polish program:

I wish to tell you how invaluable the whole Polish program of your Foundation was for the future of our liberal Intelligentsia. I think that the post-war years have proved beyond a doubt that the courageous opposition of the best part of Polish intellectuals under Stalinism and their role in preparing the October 1956 events was very largely due to their close ties with Western thought and culture. By granting such a considerable amount of stipends after 1956, the Ford Foundation has reinforced these ties, and formed a very valuable group of young writers and scholars.624

Another former fellow, Jerzy Lukaszewski, also wrote to Stone, a year later:

I am taking the liberty of sending you and offprint of my article “L’Europe de l’Est entre l’Est et l’Ouest” which was published a few weeks ago in the Belgian political science quarterly. In this article I devote a couple of pages to the rôle of the Ford Foundation exchange program in the peaceful evolution of East Europe towards a more humane and liberal form of society. I am convinced that the possibility to reintegrate Poland’s spiritual life into the free world context which was offered to Polish scholars and artists after a long period of forced isolation and sterility was the decisive turning point in the post-war history of that country. Any prospect of an organic inclusion of Poland into the orbit of aggressive totalitarianism was annihilated. I believe that the recent retrogression in that country cannot be but transitional: after the invigorating experience of the few years which followed 1956 there is no real chance for neo-Stalinism. I was sorry to learn from the NYT that the Ford Foundation Polish program had to be suspended but I am sure that what has already been done in this field is sufficient to fructify Poland’s intellectual life in the decades to come and to frustrate any new attempts at its degradation and submission to Communism.625

At about the same time, W. A. Douglas Jackson, a Professor of Geography at the University of Washington, Seattle, wrote to Stanley Gordon to tell him about his impressions of the impact of the program: “I know from my limited experience in Poland in the spring of 1963 how successful the program has been in bringing to the United States Polish scholars; certainly, a great deal of good will was generated for the United States in some circles in Poland.”626

The American Ambassador to Poland, John A. Gronouski, also voiced his opinion about the impact of the Polish program: […] the U. S. government’s English language program and the

623 Ibid.
625 FFA. GF. 2318-57322-4. Lukaszewski to Stone, 8 October 1964.
private enterprise of the Ford Foundation scholarship program in Poland combine to make a substantial contribution to the basic notion of bridge-building between the U. S. and Poland.”

That the Ford fellowship programs were popular among the fellows and the institutions with which they were affiliated, became clear early in the program’s existence. One of the first indications of this, came from Geneva in February 1958:

One can see how intelligent the Ford Foundation’s procedure is. No useless paperwork. As manager of the grant, our University has complete freedom of action within the framework of simple directives. To the four Poles temporarily settled in Geneva, to their compatriot studying at Uppsala, the University has been able to allocate a monthly sum covering not only room and board but also school fees, the purchase of books, petty expenses. Neither stingy scholarships, nor sumptuous subsidies. It is an excellent formula. It is far from the meager grants which, in our countries, allow the student barely enough to pay for his room and eat one crescent roll a day.

The generous grants (although, as we have seen, not enough for some), compared favourably to other types of fellowships and scholarships awarded for foreign travel, and were an added bonus to a program that was also considered generous in terms of the duration of the scholarship period. The well-known and somewhat controversial fact that several fellows spent large parts of their allowance on buying cars to bring home with them was frowned upon by the IA, as it meant that the fellows had to sacrifice a lot while in the United States, and that their programs of travel and study generally suffered from this. Besides, the import of American cars to Eastern Europe was hardly the impact the Foundation had in mind.

Most importantly, however, the Ford Foundation fellowships were more prestigious than most other exchange programs: only the best were selected, and they were selected, in the last instance, by the Ford Foundation itself. To have been chosen was a testament to a person’s excellence, something to distinguish her or him from others who may have earned their positions by other means than by their own merit.

**Lasting contacts**

For many fellows their time in the United States resulted in “ongoing scholarly contacts.” The IIE had discovered this through their informal correspondence with them after their return to

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629 In 1961, the issue of “Number of grantees who return from U.S. with automobiles” was given its own post on the “Notes for discussion of Polish program”. FFA 2518-57-322-4, March 31, 1961.
their respective countries. Some had invited Americans to their institutions in Hungary and Yugoslavia, and some had taken part in international conferences. One way the Ford Foundation helped former fellows keep in touch with their scientific fields in America, was to offer them a two year subscription to an American journal of their choice after they returned home. 630

One representative for the IIE, a Mrs. Gellert, traveled to Eastern Europe in May of 1966, and she reported that she was “touched by the warmth of her reception in Hungary and Poland (as well as elsewhere) where she saw former grantees Orszagh, Tamas, Szepé, Hajmasy and Morawski. She was impressed with the importance of the Ford program in the lives of these former grantees.”631

In Hungary, like in Poland, the feedback among Hungarian grantees was “indeed most favorable.” According to his “own personal CIA in Budapest,” Tom Mark wrote, it was reported that, on “one occasion, for instance, László Kéry was overheard defending American culture and living habits in a group composed partly of Englishmen who, as is their custom, indulged in knocking the U.S. (If the dogs weren’t so witty and charming about this pastime of theirs, I would resent it. As it is, I cannot but laugh with them – and return tit for tat.)” This reflects what I have discussed earlier, that the British and other West Europeans were critical of the United States. Mark continued: “Many of the people on the exchange found daily life in the U.S. so fascinating, so delightfully different from what they had expected that they got precious little of their own work done. Many of them, I am told, had as their only regret the inability to do more traveling. They all speak with respect about the quality of our educational institutions.”632

Mark also mentioned an occasion in Budapest, reminiscent of the episode Stone described when he first came to Warsaw in 1957. While at the Gellért Hotel in 1963, a group of American university students came in. They were visiting from Vienna. They had hoped to meet some Hungarian university students, but had missed out on their chance, they thought. “At any rate,” wrote Mark to Gordon,

a few Hungarian students did, finally, turn up at the Gellért, and I acted as interpreter-intermediary. Well, it was delightful to see how, within a couple of hours, the kids began to speak the same language, ideological differences notwithstanding. To both groups the exchange came as a revelation, I am sure.633

633 Ibid.
Antoni Sułek gives us an example of how the Ford Foundation exchange program impacted the field of sociology, as an example, in Poland: When Lazarsfeld came to Poland as part of the first selection team, he said in a speech to the members of the Polish Sociological Association that both Poland and the United States would benefit from the exchanges: “You will get to learn our methods and we shall have the opportunity to see what results may be obtained when our methods are applied to large-scale problems.” Lazarsfeld told a friend that he was especially enthusiastic about the possibility of “concerted cooperation between social research and socialism.” According to Sułek, “Lazarsfeld’s visit, opinions, and enthusiastic reports, which he willingly shared following his return to America, opened the door to the West for Polish sociologists.” For many contemporary sociologists, he claims, “the key to ‘modern’ sociology was the method, and they believed that it was to be found in New York.”

For one Ford fellow, Stefan Nowak, who came to the United States in 1958, his sojourn at Columbia University, studying with Lazarsfeld, was his “great personal success.” Although criticized upon his return to Poland “by a high Communist Party official for taking raw research data without anybody’s consent and subjecting them to ‘machine treatment’,” his methods were much appreciated by his students, and eventually returned to the United States:

Nowak became associated with Columbia University for good, and he had many colleagues from other universities because sociologists who received their PhDs from Columbia were offered teaching positions throughout America. Nowak went back to Columbia, Stanford, and Chicago. [He] was greatly appreciated in America, and in 1983 he was nominated as a Foreign Honorary Member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.

Andrzej Malewski, who spent thirteen months in the United States in 1959-60 as a Ford fellow, was already accomplished before his visit to the United States (as most Ford candidates were). Most notably, he had “conducted one of the first studies of attitudes toward social inequality in Poland” in 1958. What he brought home from America, however, was new knowledge and enthusiasm for the field of social psychology, which was largely unknown in Poland at that time. In his short life (he died at thirty-four), his research and publications were such that they “had a significant impact on the development of social psychology in Poland.” They were also well recognized in the United States. His work was included and cited in books by prominent American sociologists such as Reinhard Bendix and Seymour M. Lipset, as well as

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634 Sułek, “To America!” 330.
635 Ibid. The friend was Herbert Menzel.
636 Sułek, “To America!” 333.
637 Ibid., 334. Jan Szczepanski had been granted the same honour in 1972, as the only other Pole before Nowak.
638 Ibid., 337.
by Lazarsfeld. Lazarsfeld’s associate, Robert K. Merton, was also impressed by Malewski, and said of him: “If he had lived we might have learned something.”

Adam Podgórecki came to the United States in 1959, and spent a year and a half at Columbia with Merton as his mentor. His achievements and international networks from the 1960s onwards show how he (an obviously brilliant man from the start – with or without a Ford Foundation grant) was inspired by the ideas and the people he encountered in the United States. He was first a lawyer, but had studied sociology in Warsaw since 1956. He was greatly inspired by a Polish-Russian theoretician of law, Leon Petrażycki, and in the United States his interests both as a sociologist and a lawyer synergized into an idea of developing an empirical sociology of law. “It did mean transferring empirical sociology of law into the Polish context, because such sociology was not in existence then,” wrote a relative later. That meant that he had to create “a new discipline from scratch on the world scale.”

According to Sulek, Podgórecki got the tools for his new discipline from the “model and practice of empirical sociology” at Columbia and developed his ideas in discussions with Merton. Together with William Evan, a sociologist at the University of Pennsylvania who, incidentally, was born in Poland, and with the support of Italian jurist-sociologist Renato Treves in Milan, Podgórecki proceeded to establish the international Research Committee on Sociology of Law in 1962. Since 2004, the Committee awards an annual scholarships to “outstanding achievements in socio-legal research”: The Adam Podgórecki Prize. Podgórecki’s handbook on sociology of law, published in Warsaw in 1962, was later published not only in Eastern Europe (Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union), but also in England. Sulek claims that Podgórecki’s “own research on the prestige of law became a model in Polish sociology, and his research on legal phenomena and public opinion was soon repeated in several European countries.” Among his many achievements was also introducing the term “sociotechnics” to the field of practical applications in the social sciences, a field that owed much to American sociologists. The intention of the Ford Foundation: that their fellows return to their countries to further development there, was partially fulfilled in the case of Podgórecki. He stayed in Poland,

639 Ibid., 338. Merton was citing Isaac Newton, whose protégé had also died at 34.
640 Ibid., 339.
641 Ibid., 339.
643 Sulek, “To America!” 339.
where he taught and produced ground-breaking research until 1977. Then “the communists expelled him from his professorship for ‘anti-communist academic activities’.”

**What happened to the fellows when they returned home?**

As an example, in Poland, as the situation changed from an atmosphere in which foreign travel, as well as contact with Poles living in the West, was eased, and in which Poland received financial aid and was even granted “most favoured nation status in trade” by the USA in 1960, things were not progressing as hoped. While the barriers between East and West had been lowered since 1956, there was concern both for the future of the Polish program and for the consequences participation in the program may have for former Polish fellows.

In May 1960, Stone received a letter from a former fellow who informed Stone that it had come to his knowledge that there was “a certain anxiety felt in the U.S.A. concerning the well being of fellows who were granted Ford Foundation fellowships and studied in the U.S.A.,” and that that had come as a surprise to him. He had also heard that the Foundation may not carry out selections in Poland that year because of this concern that former fellows had experienced difficulties upon their return to Poland. He himself had not experienced anything negative since returning from his visit to the United States, but had rather experienced that people in Polish universities had been very interested in, and had shown their approval of, his lectures on his studies in the United States, as well as on his “impressions of America and American university life.” He thought that people outside of the university, including Party members, also shared this attitude towards the Ford Foundation fellows and scholars, and that the “great majority of university people would only be too glad to be granted fellowships and study in the U.S.A.”

Despite such reassuring letters, the question of whether or not the fellows were treated well upon returning to Poland continued to be posed. A professor of Philosophy at the University of Warsaw, while in the United States on his fellowship, wanted the selection team for 1961 to ask “appropriate people,” (of whom he suggested five himself), the following questions while in Poland:

1. Has the situation in Poland worsened as regards personal safety and political persecutions.

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646 FFA GF. Poland. 2520 57-322-5-7. Letter from Bronisław Oyrzanowski to Stone, Crakow, 30 April 1960.
2. Is there evidence of discrimination and persecution in relation to returned Polish exchanges who may have expressed abroad unfavourable opinions about the present Polish regime.\textsuperscript{647}

In summary, from what I have found in the sources about the Polish fellows, most continued in their prior positions or advanced in their professions and fields upon returning to Poland. Many of the former fellows remained in contact with the Ford Foundation, often as advisers to subsequent selections. Quite a few of the fellows, especially in the first three-four years of the program, were influential, prominent scholars who were unhappy with their regime in one way or another. When the strictures on censorship increased from 1963 on, several of the people who were persecuted or discriminated against in one way or another, had been Ford fellows. There seems to be no direct correlation between their fellowships and their later trouble with the government, however, but it may have added to the government’s alleged grievances against them.

\textit{Evaluating the exchange programs}

As mentioned, the Ford Foundation exchange programs changed their character after 1969 and were administered differently from before. The new programs were project-based, mostly channeled into the Management Training Program, and administered by IREX. According to Francis Sutton, the Management Training Program was initiated in 1970 with Poland, Hungary, and Romania, and it was apparently viewed by some as a “logical extension of the highly successful management education program in Great Britain and Western Europe conducted in the second half of the 1960s by the Office of Higher Education and Research.”\textsuperscript{648} The establishment of such a program was probably due to the agenda of the recently appointed trustee, Robert McNamara, who declared in February of 1967 that the “‘technological gap’ between the United States and Europe was really a ‘managerial gap’ rooted in deficiencies of European education.”\textsuperscript{649}

By that time the methods of the IA program, which were untraditional and person-based, had been abandoned. The IA had than been long frowned upon by colleagues in other Foundation programs who apparently had

\textsuperscript{647} FFA GF. Poland.2518-57322-4. Confidential letter from Gordon to Michael Montias [Member of selection team], 23 February 1961.
\textsuperscript{648} Sutton, “Ambitions and Ambivalences,” 54.
\textsuperscript{649} Ibid.
difficulties in accepting the style and the freedom of a program that ranged from the sciences, the social sciences and the humanities to, the study and conduct of international affairs, and considerably more, all under the rationale of serving peace, stability and progress from its indispensable Atlantic core. The use of contacts in the highest levels of European and American government and society, and the promotion of “meetings of thoughtful, influential men, normally without publicity”, no doubt provoked envy; but it brought forth sceptical and ironic questioning too, even in an era before late Sixties populism brought down ridicule on such elitist strategies.650

We have seen that the IA was elitist, and that it was based largely on the networks established through the personal connections of Stone, McCloy and the rest of the handful of people on regular staff. It was as they said, non-bureaucratic, and it seemed that they had been able to run their East European program without much interference from the Ford Foundation leadership and trustees.

In the first year of running the new Management Training Program, the original exchange programs were discussed and evaluated at a “Conference on Foundation Programs in Europe” in February of 1971. In a report on the conference, the original ambitions for the Based on these ambitions and the subsequent outcome of the programs, it was argued that “the hopes expressed” at the beginning of the programs “never materialized.” It was thought that there was sufficient evidence to show that despite the presence of several hundreds of Ford Foundation alumni in Poland and the preferential treatment of that country by the U.S. Government since 1956 (e.g. trade and economic aid), the early promises of continued liberal policies were not fulfilled and Poland kept sliding back toward increasingly conservative policies.651

In contrast to Poland, for which the assumption had been that contact with the West would further a more liberal and democratic society, the report stated that countries such as Czechoslovakia which had practically no contacts with either the Foundation or the U.S. Government, managed nevertheless to overcome the obstacles posed by the persistence of the conservative political system reaching the apex of liberalization in the spring of 1968.

Based on that rather unexpected turn of events, the conference participants’ “broad preliminary observation” was that “the impact of the exchanges on the possible liberalization of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe cannot be easily calculated, at least in the short run, and that the ultimate payoff is likely to take a long time to develop.”

Shepard Stone and his like-minded who had campaigned for the East European programs and run them for over a decade had always known that change would be slow, that any impact

would be a long time in coming. Also, as we know now, what trickled through from the
countries with which exchanges were run, especially Poland, affected the neighbouring societies,
also Czechoslovakia, but this may not have been obvious at the time of the conference in 1971.
Hindsight is always an advantage. At the time, the conference participants thought that the
reasons why the benefits of the programs had been “different from those originally anticipated,”
could be found “in the nature of the program itself.” By this they meant the selection procedures,
that the IA had mostly chosen people who were “‘liberal’ or ‘Western-oriented’ and hence did
not need to be persuaded about the advantages of the democratic systems of the West.” This
approach had been largely abandoned by 1971, and the author of the report argued that

The Western students of Communist politics are by now generally agreed that liberalization
of these systems must come above all from within, spearheaded by members of the
Communist elite itself. The liberal, non-party members, including the alumni of the
exchange programs, may perform a useful and necessary function of transmitting democratic
values from the West, but in the final analysis they are powerless to effect significant
systemic changes.
If the above reasoning is correct then one implication for future exchange programs might
be that the early emphasis on selecting or accepting only or mainly the “good” people should
be amended in the direction of providing greater opportunity for the members of the ruling
elites to spend some time in the United States. To be sure, there is always present the
“moral” issue of rewarding those who for one reason or another refused to become part of
the Communist establishment and who often suffered on that account. Nevertheless, in the
long run, the inclusion of the members of the ruling elites appears absolutely necessary.

With the re-structuring of the Foundation’s departments in 1966-67 there was “a marked change
in the Foundation’s objectives and evaluations of the program, both of which began to be
couched in more cautious terms,” the 1971 report contended. From having had the ambitions of
changing the East European societies from within, through influencing their most promising
scholars, experts and leaders with Western ideas, the Foundation had become more measured in
their articulation of objectives – even of past objectives. From words such as “liberating” and
“changing,” they now wrote of how the aims of the programs with Eastern Europe and the Soviet
Union had been

to increase knowledge and expertise on the Communist nations in the U.S. and Western
Europe; and, conversely, to enable scholars and professionals from Eastern Europe and the
USSR to obtain a more realistic and personal understanding of Western societies.652

As to the assumed effects of the exchange programs, the expectations had also been “scaled
down,” and they were thought to have had “some effect in modifications in Eastern European

regimes in the direction of greater pragmatism and pluralism.”653 Although the people at the conference in 1971 were reconsidering the impact of exchanges, they were “convinced that as in the past one of the ways in which the Foundation can make a contribution to the strengthening of peace is through facilitating interpersonal contacts between East and West.” To understand the “motives behind the action” in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, they thought it necessary to get to know “the other side’s history, traditions, culture, and social, political and economic systems.” They did not, however, think that exchanges were “the only way of acquiring that knowledge, perhaps not even the ‘best’ or the most efficient method.” They still saw exchange as “absolutely indispensable if both sides are ever going to understand each other,” but made “no claim regarding the impact of the exchanges on potential changes in Communist politics in the direction of greater pragmatism and/or pluralism,” evidence of which they thought was “either non-existent or highly inconclusive.” But they had not completely abandoned the idea of exchanges “having a liberating effect on the ruling Communist establishment.” They saw it as a possibility, but at the same time, if the Communist regimes were willing to take the risk, as they were, there must have been something in it for them that indicated a different impact than the one first hoped for by the Ford Foundation.

One of the arguments against the idea of impact, in the sense of a creating a change to more liberal regimes, was that exchanges were useful to the Communist regimes. It was thought that contact with the West could serve them, by

- improving the working of their systems through acquiring knowledge and expertise from the West, and on the other, by reducing potential opposition among intellectuals who are given the opportunity to spend some time in the West. In the latter case the exchanges might be viewed as a kind of safety valve for intellectual discontent. In both instances the existing regimes may well be strengthened and stabilized a by-product of the exchanges.

Whether the conference participants realized it or not, an indication that the exchange programs had indeed had the desired impact, by ricochet, was that East Germany, “probably the most conservative and anti-Western East European regime,” had shown interest in an exchange program by 1971. They noted it as an “interesting footnote.”

Ending on a note about the Management Training Program and other cooperative projects funded by the Ford Foundation after 1970, the report contended that these programs had been “based on roughly the same assumptions that underlie academic exchanges: The promotion of international understanding by reducing and removing the existing barriers between East and West, and by giving Eastern scholars an opportunity to get to know the United States.”

653 Citation from “The Foundation’s Activities in Europe, March 1968,” p. 26 in the report.
In 1971, there was still awareness about the work that Stone and the IA had done in the 1950s and '60s. Even though the earlier objectives and hopes of impact were scrutinized, discussed, and partly discredited, the importance of the exchange programs was recognized. This seems to have changed very quickly. I found it surprising that there was little mention of the achievements of the IA in subsequent years. Either there was a conscious effort to minimize or forget what the IA had done, or the new generation was not aware of the IA’s accomplishments. In any case, the IA’s East European program was not given much retrospective credit within the Foundation, and it is barely mentioned in Richard Magat’s book about the Foundation.654 A 1976 evaluation of the Management Training Program stated that

the [Management Training] Program represented the first major direct Foundation venture into Eastern Europe, reflecting its growth of interest in that region. Although the Foundation had supported academic exchange programs in Eastern Europe since the late 1950s, the Management Training Program was in fact the first, large-scale, and functionally oriented Foundation program in the Eastern Socialist Countries. 655

This is an astonishing statement, given the hundreds of East Europeans who had spent time in the West under the IA, the thousands of pages that remain to prove it, and the meager size of the Management Training program in comparison. Whatever reasons and motives lay behind the selective memory of the new generation, it seems clear that by the mid-1970s the Ford Foundation had made a definite break with its pioneering projects in Eastern Europe during the 1950s and '60s.

Other exchanges

As an appendix, I must mention that the Ford Foundation also ventured into other communist countries in Europe, but on a much smaller scale than in Poland, Yugoslavia and Hungary.

The IA involvement with the Soviet Union was largely limited to "three major elements: (1) non-governmental conferences, (2) two-way exchange of teams of professional specialists, and (3) two-way exchange of cultural and scholarly leaders through the auspices of the American Council of Learned Societies and the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences."656 The non-governmental conferences, four carried out from 1960 to 1964, took place in New England and Leningrad. The number of participants varied, but from ten to fifteen people from each country was the norm.

656 FFA Collections, Slater. Background memo for meeting from Gordon, "Foundation activities pertaining to East Europe including Soviet Union: Background and projection." 8 November 1966.
From the American side, three people were present at each of the conferences: Shepard Stone, Norman Cousins, the editor of the Saturday Review, and Arthur Larson, Director of World Rule of Law Center at Duke University. Participants that took part once or twice were George Kennan, John Kenneth Galbraith, David Rockefeller, and other leaders from American academic, corporate and political life. On the Soviet side there were also some participants who attended two or more of the conferences, notably the historian Oleg Bykov, the economist Modest Rubinstein, and writer and Deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR. Boris Polevoi. In addition to academic and political leaders, invitees also included film makers, composers, biologists and jurists.

The Foundation was regularly approached by “the representatives of the Bulgarian, Roumanian, and Czechoslovakian governments,” who indicated “their interest in establishing an exchange program under Foundation sponsorship,” wrote the IA in 1960. At the time, they did not think the conditions for involvement in these countries “favorable” despite the access to funds for the purpose, but they were planning to send a representative on a visit to those three countries to assess the possibilities of “moving into new areas.” They emphasized that they “would continue to deal primarily with educational and cultural institutions, selecting individual exchangees on the basis of scholarly and scientific competence.” They also made a point of reaffirming the role of the American authorities in the exchanges: “The Department of State would continue to assume responsibility for clearance of all foreign nationals, including Communist Party members coming to this country.”

In the case of Czechoslovakia, there were long-standing discussions. In April 1960, Joseph Slater reported to Stone and Nielsen that he had met with the “Second Secretary of the Permanent Mission of Czechoslovakia to the United Nations,” Evzen Zapotocky, in New York, and that Zapotocky had been very interested in hearing about the Foundation programs in Poland and Yugoslavia. Although Slater told Zapotocky repeatedly that candidates for the program were selected by the Foundation on the basis of merit only, and had not given him any hopes about the Foundation having any immediate plans for involvement with Czechoslovakia, Zapotocky let Slater know that Czechoslovak authorities may be interested in an exchange program, too, on the

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657 The Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, the largest of the Soviet republics, today Russia.
658 DCSS. FF-IA. Correspondence, 1964, A-P, Memo from F. F. Hill to Stone and Slater, 7 July 1964./ Lists of participants, July 10, 1964. Hill wrote that Heald and his staff had approved of a new conference, but that they questioned the tendency of the IA to select the same people for participation from year to year, given that the objective of the conferences was the exchange of views and to expose new people to other points of view.
same conditions as that of Poland and Yugoslavia. Slater’s letter reveals that there had been uncertainty about Czechoslovakia, and that Stone had once considered a program there but had decided against it. Slater implied that Stone planned to take another look at Czechoslovakia.

I purposely remained vague and did not encourage any detailed discussion, since I know you would want to take another look at Czechoslovakia. One thing is certain: he [Zapotocky] knows the basis of the Foundation’s exchange programs in the most ideal terms from our point of view. We parted without making any dates or arrangements for the future.660

In September of 1961, Michael Montias visited Budapest, Prague and Bratislava, and was told that the Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs in Prague, Jiri Nosek, was interested in the Foundation program, but he “did not think fit to follow this up.” He thought the case of Czechoslovakia to be more delicate than that of Hungary. He had found that there were some really good candidates there for fellowships, but he had doubts as to whether or not their government would let them go.

Novotny’s regime is cordially hated by the great majority of the population; and one may apprehend that some of the recipients would be unwilling to return (although I presume that, as usual, the police would make sure that every recipient had some close family tie to coax him back). From what I know the personal debasement that accompanies any sort of preferment in this country (and preferment includes travel to the West), we may be fairly sure that any government list would comprise a high percentage of bootlickers, hacks and sycophants. Still, if a solid agreement could be negotiated, it would be worth trying.661

In September of 1965 the issue of exchange with Czechoslovakia was still not resolved, when Vladimír Kadlec at the School of Economics in Prague wrote to Earl Heady, consultant to the Ford Foundation:

Our Ministry of Education will be glad when, during your stay in Europe in the charge of Ford Foundation, you would pay a visit to our Secretary of Education to discuss with him the Ford Foundation’s scholarships for Czechoslovakia.662

At about the same time, Stone wrote to François Bondy, editor of the *Preuves-Revue mensuelle* in Paris, thanking him for some material Bondy had sent him on Czechoslovak intellectuals, and expressing the hope “that we shall be able to develop a program with Czechoslovakia. At the present time we do not have one and therefore we cannot make any moves.”663

661 FFA GF, 2346-64-432, section 4, Montias to Stone, 18 November 1961.
662 DCSS. FF-IA. Correspondence, 1965, A-R, Letter from Vladimír Kadlec, School of Economics, Prague, to Earl Heady, Executive Director of the Center for Agricultural and Economic Development, Iowa State University, September 27, 1965.
The only concrete result of the years of back and forth about Czechoslovakia was that in 1966, Svatopluk Cerny, an Associate Professor of Political Economics at the University of Prague, and Josef Polak, “Questor of Charles University,” spent four months in the United States to assess whether or not an exchange program would be of value to Czechoslovakia. The IIE, who paid much attention to their visit, reported that the Czech visitors were “enthusiastic about the net results of the visit and its implications for an expanded visit program for scholars.”

That never happened, and I have not found any explanation as to why, except for this: “In Czechoslovakia the situation has recently been complicated by the Kazab-Komarek case (the American of Czech descent who was high jacked from a Soviet plane at the Prague airport). Our State Department is now holding up visas for Czechs until this matter is settled.”

Romania regularly appeared on the IA agenda, as in October 1960, when Stone reported that he had met with Chairman Gheorghiu-Dej who had assured him that if the Ford Foundation would develop a program with Romania they would be free to talk with whomever they pleased and go wherever they wanted. At this time, the Foundation was considering sending a team to Romania to assess the possibilities for a program, but nothing had yet been decided. Now that Gheorghiu-Dej had explicitly encouraged Foundation activity in Romania, the “next move” would be up to the Foundation, and, if he did decide to visit Romania, Stone predicted that “the red carpet” would be rolled out in front of him, but also that he may find “something unpleasant” behind him. “After all,” he wrote, “there have been a number of examples of double-crossing in Roumanian history,” thereby confirming the deep-seated notion among westerners (and among Poles and Hungarians for that matter) of Romania as a country far out on the “barbaric” scale.

No mention of the communist regime, as had been the focus and worry when getting involved with both Poland and Yugoslavia, but a reference to “double-crossing in Roumanian history.”

Maybe it was this old conception of Romania as a backward, barbaric country, more than its totalitarian, communist political leadership, that made Stone and the others at the Foundation decide against a fellowship program with Romania. The IA officers and experts were, after all, elitists, whose general interests in Europe were largely aimed at those who had shared in the European tradition many of them admired, and Romania may not have fit that mold. On the other

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hand, Yugoslavia, or at least parts of it, was also regarded as being less civilized than Poland and Hungary, but nevertheless had a Foundation program. Yugoslavia was, however, in a category of its own, where concerns other than the degree of “civilization” were of greater importance in the Cold War struggle.

Bulgaria was also on the agenda, but in the time of IA and Stone a substantial program was never launched. However, there was some involvement, and Stone wrote to John D. Clayton, at the American Embassy in Sofia on 12 April 1967:

I shall write to the Bulgarian authorities, telling them that upon investigation I found that our interviewers talk alone with those whom they are interviewing and that we would only come into Bulgaria under similar conditions. It is now up to the Bulgarians to make their decision.667

Stone reported in June of 1966 to the Ford Foundation files that “Mr. Vassilev called me today on the telephone to ask for the Foundation answer, and I told him that we would be prepared to make a start on a small program in Bulgaria this autumn.” Stone continued:

I said that a member of the staff plus one or two experts, such as an agricultural economist and a physical science-engineering expert, would accompany the Foundation staff member to start the process of interviewing. I said that we would contemplate 5-10 people the first year (1967). Mr. Vassilev was delighted with the response and said that he would be in immediate touch with his government and would call us as soon as he had final word from Sophia.668

In August Stone reported to Bundy that

Bulgaria has decided to join our East European club. The Bulgarian government, following up my March visit, has now sent a letter asking when our experts will be able to come to Sofia to interview candidates. As I have previously reported, we agreed on a small program – ten people – if Bulgaria accepted our conditions.

It is planned to have members of our next selection team in Poland – next November – visit Bulgaria.669

There is little further mention about this program, but eleven Bulgarian fellows came to the United States in 1968-69.

In total, 714 East Europeans came to the United States as Ford fellows from 1957 to 1969.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Costs</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>1957-62, 1967-69</td>
<td>$1,999,007</td>
<td>368</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>1958-69</td>
<td>$1,705,883</td>
<td>188</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>1964-69</td>
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<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>1967</td>
<td>$19,205</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>1968-69</td>
<td>$121,200</td>
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</table>

Chapter 10. Conclusion

The Ford Foundation exchange programs with Eastern Europe under the direct control of the International Affairs Program were unique in the history of Ford Foundation exchange programs and unusual in the general landscape of exchanges. Unlike subsequent Foundation programs, they were designed and implemented by only a handful of people, and personal agency was paramount to the success of the programs. One of the crucial people, Shepard Stone, before leaving the Foundation in 1966, wrote an article on his thoughts about the role of American foundations. He thought they could “provide the vital margin of support for research, and for pioneering and pilot ventures,” that they could “provide the cutting edge for social, scientific, and educational advances,” and that they could “call attention to significant problems by supporting experiments, testing new concepts, giving a chance to men and women with ideas.” He summed up his opinions in the following manner:

A foundation can be discriminating. It can select a problem that may seem remote but which has the seed of significance. It can identify relatively unknown, promising individuals and institutions for support. It can test ideas by establishing new institutions. It can be hospitable to ideas and can entertain conflicting ideas without partisanship.

A foundation can pioneer ahead of public opinion. It can act quickly, where and when necessary, and not be hampered by governmental bureaucracy. It can attempt to do things when and where they need to be done and not be hindered by popular prejudice. It can enter into controversial fields.

A foundation can show by example and thus stimulate ideas and fields of inquiry. It can help to establish new institutions and organizations. It can call attention to urgent problems and needs, and by so doing, encourage interest and efforts of others.

A foundation can be objective. Although it makes grants for specific purposes, a wise foundation does not interfere with the freedom or mobility of the grantee. Consequently foundations can help to develop and maintain a free intellectual climate in which independent minds are limited only by their own imagination.671

In many ways, Stone here summarized the intentions, as well as effects, of the East European exchange programs. To establish such programs in the midst of the Cold War, the Ford Foundation had to be discriminating, in the sense that they selected which countries, which promising individuals and institutions, and which ideas, were worthy of their support. Being quite controversial at the time, the exchange programs came about because the Ford Foundation was able to act quickly, without having to wait for official, political decisions. The Ford Foundation, through the exchange programs, stimulated ideas, called attention to urgent problems and needs, and encouraged interest and effort. The Foundation did also, to a greater

extent than other exchange programs, allow exchangees much freedom and mobility, thereby stimulating a free intellectual climate.

The East European exchange programs were innovative and controversial, and the Ford Foundation was the first American institution to venture into communist Eastern Europe with a program of scholarly exchange. Being the youngest and largest of the American philanthropic foundations, it launched its new postwar agenda with confidence.

The rapid growth of the Ford Foundation coincided with the rise of the United States to the position of hegemonic power in the Western world. After a brief postwar period when the relationship between the Soviet Union and the Western powers was unresolved, the fronts hardened in 1947 when the Soviets formed the Cominform and Truman declared his commitment to rolling back communism. In the same year, the Ford Foundation went through great changes following the deaths of Henry Ford and his son Edsel. The Foundation’s assets skyrocketed, and the *Gaither report*, published in 1949, laid the basis for Foundation activity in the next two decades.

When Paul G. Hoffman became president of the Foundation in 1950, the new program was put into action. Hoffman’s idealistic zeal influenced the Foundation strongly in the early 1950s. He wanted to save the world, and he did not think that blatant anti-communism was the way to go. Employing like-minded men who could further his vision of a better world became the driving force behind the decision to establish a European program, and eventually an East European program.

Two of these men, who would become essential in this development, were John J. McCloy and Shepard Stone. Like Hoffman they had worked in Europe during the early postwar reconstruction period, and they felt passionate about Europe: that it must be strengthened, and that it must be drawn into the Atlantic orbit rather than fall prey to the Soviets or to ideas of communism, ideas which were strong in many European countries at the time. In other words, they did not take Europe for granted. Fear of communism was, however, not the only incentive for involvement in Europe. Hoffman, McCloy, Stone and their like-minded also admired Europe and Europeans, for their culture, their traditions, and for their many excellent minds. Their culture and traditions – what was left after the devastations of war – must be salvaged, and the excellent minds must be cultivated and brought to cooperation with similarly excellent American minds, many of whom had come to the United States as immigrants or as a consequence of war and persecution in Europe.
For an American philanthropic organization to get involved with Europe did, however, pose problems. Many people in the United States, within or outside the Foundation, did not think it appropriate or desirable for the Foundation to get involved in an area that was not in need of developing in the traditional sense, often associated with the so-called Third World. Also, it was too politically sensitive.

The Foundation was subjected to severe criticism from conservative political forces in the United States, spurred on by the anti-communist campaigns that culminated in the witch-hunts of Senator Joseph McCarthy. In the 1950s the Ford Foundation, and many other foundations, were regarded as socialist and as supporters of communist forces at home, and they were investigated twice for such subversive activity. This only served to convince the people at the Foundation who wanted to counteract the anti-communists at home that they had to keep working for mutual understanding in the world. In this, Europe was essential, as was a greater understanding of the Soviets and their new people’s democracies.

In 1952 Stone and McCloy embarked on a journey through the United States, to meet with influential people to assess their knowledge, understanding, and attitudes about Europe and the world and how these affected the Conditions of Peace (as the Ford Foundation survey project was called). The results of the survey provided Stone and McCloy with a platform to proceed with their plans for cooperation with Europe and with new people to ally themselves with: people to work with in their quest for international peace and understanding through cooperation. In order to establish a program of cooperation they also needed people who cooperated at home.

Under the new International Affairs Program, launched in 1954, of which Stone became Director, McCloy and Stone succeeded in convincing the Ford Foundation trustees of the need for a European program. For Stone and the others in International Affairs Eastern Europe was always on the agenda, however secondary. The people at the Foundation, as most informed Americans, had realized soon after the war that the people’s democracies were, at least temporarily, lost to the Soviet sphere politically and militarily, but that something could be done culturally. One way to make a difference, they thought, was by way of scholarly exchanges. By furthering scholarly cooperation across borders they thought they could facilitate the development of a more open, democratic world.

Before the death of Stalin and the exposure of his crimes, such exchanges with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union were not possible. When dissatisfaction with the regime in Poland resulted in an uprising in September of 1956, and when the temporarily more liberal regime showed interest in cooperating with the Americans, new opportunities arose, and the Ford
Foundation acted quickly. After negotiating with the representatives of the Polish authorities and academies through the spring of 1957, Stone and International Affairs succeeded in establishing the first Cold War exchange program with an East European country, and the first Polish scholars arrived in the United States in the fall.

Exchanges soon became a part also of the American government’s program, and in 1958 the Americans and Soviets signed the Lacy-Zarubin exchange agreement. The resulting student-exchanges, although involving many more people, were very different from the Ford Foundation exchange program. The Soviet-American exchanges were reciprocal: as many Americans travelled to the Soviet Union as Soviets travelled to the United States, and they came in delegations, were shown around, and only stayed for short periods. The Americans chose their exchangees, the Soviets theirs.

The Ford Foundation exchanges were much smaller in scale and were based on entirely different principles. The candidates were largely chosen by the Foundation and their associates, they were elitist and based on merit (and to a lesser degree on personality) and the Foundation always had the last word in the final selections. The Foundation largely wanted people from the humanities, and especially, the social sciences. These were the areas, they thought, where they would find people who could do the most to change perceptions and, ultimately, their societies. They also looked for people with leadership qualities and with open minds.

Selections became the single most frustrating issue in the exchange program with Poland. The Polish authorities wanted to use the exchanges to get ahead, to gain new knowledge of, especially, new technology and methods and discoveries in the natural sciences. They hence wanted more influence in the choice of candidates and in the final selections. The Foundation would not concede to these demands, and the disagreement over selections resulted in the Polish program breaking down in 1961-62.

Concurrently with the Polish program, the Foundation also ran a program with Yugoslavia. It was initiated in 1958 and ran through to 1969, when all the exchange programs of International Affairs were terminated and re-channeled into the programs of the newly formed IREX.

The Yugoslavs had been interesting as an exchange partner to the Foundation since the early 1950s, but because of Tito’s apparent temporary wavering between East and West from 1955 to 1957, a program with Yugoslavia was postponed. When the program finally got started it was run along slightly different lines than the Polish program. The Yugoslavs were allowed more freedom in the selection of candidates, but the Foundation had decided the disciplines from
which to choose them. This was a good template for the Yugoslavs, but the Poles would not agree to a similar arrangement. The Yugoslav program was a success, without the passport and visa problems that plagued the Polish program, and it ran smoothly throughout its existence.

In 1964 the Ford Foundation ventured into Hungary. While the counter-revolutionary terror of the Kadar-regime – following the crushed revolution of 1956 – was still prevalent in Hungary, a program had seemed impossible, but by 1964 things had calmed down, the Hungarians were planning a new economic reform, and the Hungarians expressed interest in an exchange program along the lines of what the Foundation had carried out in Poland. Knowledge of the useful Polish program had reached the Hungarians, and now they wanted their own program. It worked, and the Hungarian program ran until 1969. It did not, however, run as smoothly as the Yugoslav program, as there were several cases where the American authorities did not grant visas to the grantees. Nevertheless, the program was a success in many ways.

One of my aims in writing this dissertation was to show how the reciprocal relationship between the granters and the grantees influenced them, and how they perceived each other.

A part of that was the ambition expressed in the project description of Imagining the West, of which this study is a part: how did “people from the East” (the project included the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and Turkey) perceive the West? With that in mind, I have looked at how people from Eastern Europe, in the context of the Ford Foundation exchange programs, expressed their images of the West. I have explored these themes from different angles in chapters 7 and 8.

In chapter 7, I looked at how “Easterners” and “Westerners” regarded each other. How was the Ford Foundation perceived by the East Europeans, and how did the Ford Foundation view them and their societies? I discovered that, apart from the expected prejudices between people from two adverse systems, there were notions of East and West of a more diffuse order, and the expectations did not always match the experience of the encounter. Polish writer Czesław Miłosz, in his book The captive mind, gave me some clues as to what created the gap. In a Polish person’s mind, Miłosz observed, Americans were devoid of imagination and rather stupid in their belief of their own system of values. They did not have the life experience of the Polish, the experience from war and life under a regime that taught them how relative judgements and thinking habits were. Assuming that this actually applied to many Poles, and presumably also to other East Europeans, the judgement passed on Americans may have been rather harsh among
the Ford fellows, too. And there was a sense of superiority, of knowing better. The Americans felt superior, too, but for different reasons. They had their democracy, their affluence, their hegemonic position, their American Dream. Why should they doubt themselves and their system of values? Holding personal freedom as their torch, they could not possibly understand what possessed people with communist ideals. They could not believe that people could ever choose that path, so they thought, rightly or wrongly, that they needed saving, exposure to the true, good life of the West, of America. The encounter between such self-righteous people in two, opposite camps, made for frustrating, bewildering, and eye-opening experiences.

Just as the people at the time found it difficult to find words to describe what they were experiencing, I also found it hard to find a language to describe and analyze the encounter as a whole. I turned to a sociologist, Erving Goffman. His study of human interaction and self-presentation in North America in the 1950s helped me understand ways in which social interaction may work. His categories within what he called “the arts of impression management,” described in both chapters 7 and 8, made me able to put words to what I was reading, what I was thinking and feeling as a person today, and what people may have felt at the time. The Ford Foundation and the IIE tried to take care of, and make sense of, their fellows as best they could, and the Polish, Yugoslav and Hungarian exchangees tried to show gratitude and respect to their benefactors while struggling with their personal, professional, and national/systemic identities in a strange environment.

An important aspect of this encounter between East and West was the concept of the intellectual. In the literature about intellectuals, the Russian and East European intellectuals, the intelligentsia, is described as being different from their counterparts in the West. I found that this distinction, which I discussed in chapter 7, played an important part in the relationship between the Ford Foundation and the fellows, partly because the difference was not clear. The East Europeans had built their identities around being part of the intelligentsia, and they did not quite know what to do with that when they came to the United States, where an intellectual was more of a professional academic. Being part of the intelligentsia was a mindset, being an American intellectual was a job; at least that’s how many of the fellows seem to have perceived it. For “learned people from the continent,” this was bewildering, but more so than not, it seems to have strengthened their sense of pride in their identity. For the Ford Foundation and the grantee organization IIE, the Eastern intellectuals were some times hard to understand. They were often recognized as erudite and learned, but could also be seen as arrogant, resisting management, plans and time tables.
To try and understand the fellows, make sense of this particular factor which was hard to grasp, the Ford Foundation and the IIE, as well as the consultants and members of selection teams, often resorted to generalizations, trying to find common denominators with which to describe these Europeans. They looked like most white Americans, but there was something about them that was different, and I have argued that their place in the intelligentsia had much to do with that, but that the Americans were not sufficiently aware of that to articulate it. Nor, in fact, where the East Europeans, as the role of the intelligentsia was changing.

The selection procedures and criteria of the Ford Foundation set the programs apart from other exchange programs at the time. The IA officers and the selection teams were looking for ideal candidates to further their cause: excellent, open-minded people who could absorb American ideas and methods, and who showed potential for leadership. By looking at guidelines for the selection teams, correspondence, and interviewers’ reports for both accepted and rejected candidates, I found that the Foundation was elitist and democratic at the same time. They encouraged a broad selection-base in terms of age, experience, gender, and geography. I also found that they had many excellent candidates to choose from, and that they were able to pick what they themselves called “the cream of the crop.” They chose well, according to their expressed hope that the fellows would return to their respective countries and infuse their research, publications and teaching with what they had learned in the United States. Many former Ford fellows became influential scientists, educators, public intellectuals, and leaders. The files on rejected candidates, although many candidates were rejected simply because there were not enough fellowship to go round, tell us something about what the Foundation did not want. Narrow-minded, timid, arrogant, nervous, or single-minded (however excellent) scholars were not desired. Another criteria that many did not meet, was a sufficient knowledge of English.

Language proficiency became more important as the problems when it was lacking became obvious. Firstly, the benefit of a fellow’s stay would not be as great without sufficient knowledge of English; secondly, a lack of language capability frustrated the fellows themselves. For highly educated, proud intellectuals it was hard not to be able to express themselves as they were used to in their own language. Any learner of a foreign language knows this frustration, how it feels not to have or find the words one needs to communicate, to give a true expression of your thoughts and opinions. Generally one just feels like an idiot. Many of the fellows were masters of language in their own countries; they were lecturers, writers, public intellectuals. The
language barrier, with Americans, often greater than expected, was hard to accept for many of them.

The East European understanding, or lack of understanding, of what the Ford Foundation was, in a sense brought notions of East and West, communism and capitalism, intellectuals and intelligentsia together. Many East Europeans, not surprisingly, had a muddled idea of what the Foundation was, as there was no counterpart in their own countries. They knew their exchange programs provided money and opportunities, but what was the Foundation? A government agency? A motor company? I have shown how, by the help of Hungarian sociologist Alexander Szalai, the Ford Foundation was made aware of this confusion, and how they made an effort to remedy it, by writing a document about the principles and intentions of the Foundation. Whether it changed East Europeans’ view of the Foundation is doubtful, but the problem was identified and the effort was made.

In my own experience, when I first travelled to the United States as a young person, I too had my preconceived notions, mostly positive. Still, I sometimes had trouble understanding the people and the culture of that many-faceted country. Unlike the Ford Foundation fellows, however, I did not come from a society with an ideology antagonistic to American culture and society, and I did not have anything to prove. They did, and they struggled with it. They struggled with matching their (often) strong convictions of the values of socialist society with the capitalist society they met in America.

I found the different types of documents describing experiences and impressions, especially the final reports of the fellows, very interesting. It was a challenge, however, how to interpret them and present them. What to do with them? They were testimonials, in a sense, but how could I use them in an historical dissertation?
Again Goffman helped me voice a common experience, the experience most of us have in meeting each other, in trying to impress, sustain, keep, being a part of something, trying to be the best we can, even if we have to feign it or fake it; all to sustain and further communication; all to be accepted, make others accept us, be believed, be true, on some level.

Similar, yet different, phenomena are reflected in the *Captive Mind* by Miłosz. I have used it as a source to understand “Easterners” better. The documented impressions of the East European fellows who went to the United States suggest that, like the “Easterners” in Miłosz’s book, they did not know what to expect. Some were scared. Some were shocked. Most were impressed. Some felt lonely. Some felt ostracized. Some were happy: They could travel. They could learn. They could save money. They could buy a car. They felt, and expressed, many emotions we may all feel when confronted with a new culture, but, in the context of the Cold War, they were different, too.

The Ford Foundation exposed people to bright lights and new ideas, to great institutions of learning, to excellent people in their field of study, to wonderful facilities: great laboratories and equipment for everything. You name it! The fellows were usually impressed. Some expressed this, some not. Even if they were impressed, they were often reserved in their praise, or wrote that all the impressions were too much to digest, that they needed time to make sense of it all and articulate their feelings and opinions. Their societies were (supposed to be) better. Besides, they were European intellectuals, and as we have seen, that was different from being an American academic. Trying to compare and contrast the qualities and shortcomings of the two worlds, trying to make sense of it all, was not easy.

I have presented a selection of “impressions” and “self-presentations” in this chapter, from the more general, typical comments of gratitude, excitement, disbelief and frustration, to more specific examples of how individual fellows expressed their experience. Together, they paint a picture of what it meant to be a Ford fellow from the East during the Cold War.

In chapter 9, I have shown how the pioneering times of Stone and the International Affairs Program came to an end in the late 1960s, when the new president of the Foundation, McGeorge Bundy, brought a new era, and when attitudes in the United States and the world were changing: A more “soul-searching mood” had replaced the optimism of the 1950s and early 1960s.

I have also shown how the Patman investigations, scrutinizing American foundations for financial and tax reasons and resulting in the Tax-reform Act of 1969, made the Ford Foundation rethink their priorities. Another factor that affected the Foundation was the exposure of the
Foundation for supporting the Congress for Cultural Freedom along with covert funding from the CIA for years. This event made me search for proof of whether or not Stone and the others at the Foundation was aware of such funding, and whether or not they condoned it or opposed it. I found that they were aware, that they associated with CIA people and were in dialogue with the Agency – a dialogue they found inevitable – but that they did not think direct cooperation was a good idea. They were aware that such cooperation would weaken the credibility of the Foundation, and that is what happened.

Following the events of the late 1960s, within the Foundation and in the world outside, the IA model for exchanges was abandoned. The Foundation made a break with the pioneering, “freewheeling” years of Hoffman, McCloy and Stone, when a handful of men could spend millions of dollars and make decisions based on conversations, “cables,” and telephone calls with “wise men.”

An important question about the exchange programs is what impact they had, if any. I found that, on an individual level, there was great impact. The fellows were changed in various ways by their stay in the USA. For some, it changed their professional and personal lives forever, as it opened up opportunities to take up positions in the USA or elsewhere in the West. For those who remained at home, it also changed them. The ideas and methods they had acquired while Ford fellows shaped their focus for research, their results, and their way of thinking and teaching. It also opened up a new world of cooperation with scholars across borders and across the systemic divide. Many Ford fellows were already in influential positions when they received their fellowships, many others became influential later. Stone and his colleagues, with their elitist conception of who they wanted as fellows, knew how to pick the best, and this bore the desired results: the “good people” they chose did influence their academic environments, their peers, their students, and ultimately, their societies.

On a different level of impact, I found that the programs affected, “by ricochet,” also those who did not participate directly. The insight gained by former Ford fellows spread in their societies, “trickled through,” via their publications and teaching, and also affected the neighbouring countries that did not have an exchange program. The first exchange program, with Poland, had the most effect in this sense, perhaps because it was the first, but also because Poland was “a window on the West” to a greater degree than Hungary and Yugoslavia. Publications by Polish scholars were translated into Russian and other East European languages, and their new ideas were spread. The fact that the Foundation provided books and periodicals to
East European universities and libraries, as well as to the former fellows, also gave East Europeans the possibility of new insight into what was going on elsewhere in the world.

It has been claimed that exchanges, not only those of the Ford Foundation, but exchanges in general, undermined the communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. I have shown examples of that claim in this chapter. There were many factors that caused the changes in the 1980s, hence the claim is hard to prove. There is, however, no doubt that exposure to the West made it harder for the communists to sustain the image of the “diabolic West,” which in many ways had fed the communist project. It was not without reason, then, that the regimes feared the “contamination” that contact with the West entailed. When the Iron Curtain finally fell in 1989-91, it was partly because of this contamination, this exposure to Western ideas and affluence. Former Ford fellows helped spread the virus, so to speak.

**Concluding remarks**

It is easy to forget the struggles of the past. And it is hard to really understand the people of the past. I am, as historians are, curious of the past; that is what drives us. Whether or not I have been critical enough of the people who went before us, I don’t know. I have looked at these people through the documents they produced, but inevitably my choices and interpretations are coloured by my own mind, shaped through my own time. I have tried not to judge the people I have encountered in my research, but I have scrutinized them to the best of my ability.

When I embarked on this project, one of my aims was to explore the motives and intentions behind the Ford Foundation programs. What I found, on the part of the Ford Foundation, were intelligent people with good connections, a lot of money to spend, and a wish to do good. They were also people with experience, first hand or other, of what totalitarian regimes were capable of. The world had seen Fascism and Nazism. Communism still worked under the guise of equality and justice for all, but the reality for Soviets and East Europeans proved very different. Shepard Stone and people who thought like him, were greatly worried about what they saw happening in Eastern Europe. People couldn’t travel, scholars couldn’t take part in the international scholarly discourse. What was happening to the old Europe of ideas and learning? And how would that development affect the United States and the world? At the time, there was no guarantee that Europe – not even Western Europe – would join and remain in the Western camp. Hence, they did what they could to counteract the effect of totalitarian regimes on European culture, and they hoped that their efforts, in time, would lead to a change in those regimes.
The Ford Foundation had its “soft power” agenda, of course, and they were elitist. As we have seen in chapter 3, some scholars have criticized this. Criticism has also been directed at American foundations for their “Americanization.” In the case of the Ford Foundation exchange programs with Eastern Europe this was certainly a component, but based on the fact that it was the East European authorities themselves who initiated the contact, as well as the obvious popularity of the programs among scholars, I would argue that “Americanization” is a simplification. Both the intentions of the Ford Foundation, the experiences of the fellows, and the results of the co-operation suggests that these exchange programs synergized into something more. Although the Ford Foundation aimed at strengthening certain American patterns, they also strove to internationalize scholarship and education. They functioned as “translator” rather than “transplanter,”672 and it seems beyond doubt that for those who participated in the exchange programs they were seen as a good rather than an evil.

The Foundation supported many, many projects in the Unites States and around the world, and as we have seen, the East European programs were a very small part of their total involvement. How they fared in other programs and in other parts of the world is not for me to say. In the case of the East European programs in the 1950s and ‘60s, however, the Ford Foundation was definitely both cooperators, bridge-builders, and a catalyst in creating cooperation between scholars, experts, leaders and students from Eastern Europe and the West. The hospitality they offered through the exchange programs was also such that it often impressed the East European visitors. For those who came to the United States as Ford fellows, the idea of America was obviously challenged by what they saw and experienced, and they would have realized that the United States was “a civilian power after all.”673 Whether or not their regimes back home saw it like that is more uncertain; as we have seen there were many degrees of both suspicion and confidence in the way East European authorities viewed the Ford Foundation programs.

The East European fellows, some of them loyal to the ideas of their regimes, others not, were grateful for the opportunity to travel and to learn. All of them were changed by the experience, on some level, and for some it shaped their future life and work in very concrete ways. In some way the exposure to Western ideas and culture had the effect that the Ford Foundation had hoped for: influential East European intellectuals eventually contributed to the

672 This refers to Giuliana Gemelli’s analysis which I dealt with in Chapter 3.
demise of their communist regimes and helped build their new societies after. Some of them were former Ford fellows.674

In my introduction I set out to prove that the Ford Foundation exchange programs in Eastern Europe created a window of opportunity for interaction between scholars, experts and leaders from the East with scholars, experts and leaders in the West. I also wanted to prove that they challenged pre-conceived notions on both sides; that they had a lasting effect on many of those who participated, and that this, in turn, resulted in cultural, academic and scientific cooperation that changed the perception of “the self” and “the other.” I expected to find that these changes affected the academic elites in Poland, Yugoslavia and Hungary and altered scholarship and teaching in some disciplines.

My empirical evidence and analysis show that all these theses were right. I have also shown that the networks established through the programs continued to influence those who participated. My last supposition was that the effect of the programs eventually contributed to a change in the politics and ideology of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. My findings here are uncertain, but they suggest that the Ford Foundation programs, along with other exchange programs, did change the perceptions of Soviets and Eastern Europeans who participated, and that, with time, this did have some impact on the developments that brought the communist regimes down in 1989-91.

American foundations continue to be important actors, at home and abroad. The Ford Foundation is still huge, with programs throughout the world. The Melinda and Bill Gates Foundation, now the largest in the world, is devoted to the global challenges of improving health care, reducing extreme poverty, providing education, and giving access to information technology.675 Noble causes by any standard, one should think, as was the Ford Foundation’s goal to “advance human welfare” back in the 1950s. Foundations, however, are powerful, and they should be recognized as such. Power arouses suspicion, as it should. Americans, too, tend to arouse suspicion, and their motives are often questioned, because of their still hegemonic power in the world, not least culturally.

The Economist announced the following in February 2017:

674 Some notable former Ford Foundation fellows are: Smilja Avramov, Savka Dabcevic-Kucar, Branko Horvat, Vladimir Ibler, Pavle Ivic, Alfred Jahn, Kalman Kulcsar, Stefan Kurowski, Mihailo Markovic, Zdzislaw Najder, Josef Pajestka, Tibor Palankai, Longin Pastusiak, Janusz Reykowski, Marek Rostworoski, Svetozar Stojanovic, and Jerzy Wiatr.

NEW DELHI: The Centre has shut the gate on the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation on a critical national health mission, and possible conflict of interest issues arising from the foundation’s “ties” with pharmaceutical companies is one of the reasons.

All financial ties of the country’s apex immunisation advisory body, National Technical Advisory Group on Immunization (NTAGI), with the Gates Foundation have been cut off.\textsuperscript{676}

This decision was made based on a study by “Global Policy Forum, an independent policy watchdog that seeks to promote accountability in international organisations.” The title of the study, “Philanthropic Power and Development -Who shapes the agenda?” is reminiscent of the criticisms against the Ford Foundation, as I have outlined in chapter 3. The study cautioned against “the growing influence of the large global philanthropic foundations, especially the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, on political discourse and agenda-setting in targeted fields,” and recommended that “the risks and side effects — intended and unintended — of these activities on sustainable development,” should be investigated.

A challenge for every philanthropist and foundation is to balance the wish to do good with the inevitable question of power and agenda. A scholar on American foundations, Olivier Zunz, does not doubt that “American giving on a large scale reflects altruism.” He does, however, recognize the power of foundations: that “Americans of different wealth and culture have turned a universal desire to do good into a distinct brand of philanthropy. They have learned to turn market profits and market methods into a philanthropic engine powerful enough to influence the course of history.”\textsuperscript{677}

On some level, the Ford Foundation did influence the course of history in Eastern Europe in the 1950s and 1960s. They were pioneers in spending huge amounts of private funds to “advance human welfare,” and they were pioneers in Cold War involvement in Eastern Europe. The dilemmas and controversies surrounding their decisions and activities have been dealt with in this dissertation, and they blend with those of our own time in the words written in 1912 by economist Wesley Mitchell: “To spend money is easy, to spend it well is hard.”\textsuperscript{678}

\textsuperscript{677} Zunz, Philanthropy, 294.
\textsuperscript{678} Ibid., 1.
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