International Security and Intelligence Cooperation
A collective case study of the OSCE and Europol

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Declaration

I, Hanne Mari Solhaug Djupdal, declare that this thesis is a result of my research investigations and findings. Sources of information other than my own have been acknowledged and a reference list has been appended. This work has not been previously submitted to any other university for award of any type of academic degree.

Signature........................................................................................................
Date................................................................................................................
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ABSTRACT

Non-traditional, transnational security threats have developed into some of the most pressing threats to contemporary states. One of these threats is international terrorism. It has become evident through the 21st century that terrorists plan, plot and execute attacks across borders, and several attacks on European soil have revealed the challenge of suspects moving undetected between different countries. Recent examples of this in the public domain are the 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris and the 2016 attacks in Brussels. These two attacks were the deadliest acts of terror since the second world war in both countries. Due to atrocities like these, and specifically after the 9/11 attacks in the US in 2001, it has become a general understanding in the international community that terrorism requires international cooperation to counter. An urgent part of national security has thus become the exchange of secret information, or intelligence, between states about the capabilities and intentions of non-state terror groups. In the aftermath of the Brussels attacks, it was revealed that the terrorist cell connected to the outrage was the same cell responsible for the attacks in Paris the year before. Members of the cell had been able to travel undetected between France and Belgium (Soufan, 2016). At the time, it seemed that terrorists crossed borders more easily than information and intelligence. The attacks have led to a number of ripple effects and caused politicians, academics and journalists to call for a closer and better cooperation between states.

This dissertation explores that subject: international security and intelligence cooperation, mainly for the purpose of counter terrorism, in the Transatlantic and Eurasian regions of the world, mainly focusing on Europe in particular. More specifically it investigates the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the European Police Office (Europol) as a juxtaposition about how two structures with similar focus areas and work have developed in different ways. The aim of the dissertation is to study the similarities and differences in characteristics between the OSCE and Europol to understand how they impact their ability to cooperate and exchange information and intelligence, whether or not the two structures impact the level of security in the Transatlantic and Eurasian region, specifically Europe, and in what ways. The findings are also used to draw some conclusions about the broader nature of international security and intelligence cooperation of the day.

At the outset, the OSCE and Europol look like similar organizations. On closer inspection, I discovered that the two are actually not, and that I was really comparing two fundamentally different groups. Despite similar expressed aims, one is a group and platform for discussion, the other has an actual operational remit and intelligence function. They were not initially developed for the same purpose or have the same methods of work. The research also indicates that the two organizations differ in their ability to successfully cooperate. Whereas the OSCE’s ability to reach agreements face major challenges, due to a broad membership of non-like-minded states and a lack of trust, Europol arguably cooperates more successfully as an integral EU agency. Despite these significant differences, I argue that both organizations pursue the same overarching goal: security for the citizens, institutions and values of their respective regions, and in the light of the main topic of this dissertation: protection from terrorism. In addition, I argue that the two complete each other in this work, as their different approaches to countering terrorism contribute to the international efforts of tackling the multifaceted threat.

It needs to be stressed that, due to a low number of interviews, what follows are tentative and preliminary conclusions based on a limited data set. However, it serves as the basis for expanded research in the future, with a larger data set, which I intend to publish in a peer-reviewed journal.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ........................................................................................................... v
ABSTRACT ............................................................................................................................. vi
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ...................................................................................................... ix

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................. 1
  1.2 The dissertation’s outline ................................................................................................. 3
  1.3 The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) ............................... 4
    1.3.1 Developments on counterterrorism ........................................................................ 7
    1.3.2 Working thesis ........................................................................................................ 8
  1.4 The European Police Office (EUROPOL) ..................................................................... 8
    1.4.1 Developments on counterterrorism ........................................................................ 10
    1.4.2 Working thesis ........................................................................................................ 12

CHAPTER 2: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY ............................................................................. 14
  2.1 Research strategy – a qualitative approach ..................................................................... 14
  2.2 Research design ............................................................................................................. 15
    2.2.1 Collective case study ............................................................................................. 15
    2.2.2 The cases of the OSCE and Europol ....................................................................... 16
  2.3 Data collection ............................................................................................................... 16
    2.3.1 Primary and secondary data .................................................................................. 16
    2.3.2 Triangulation ......................................................................................................... 18
    2.3.3 Sampling ............................................................................................................... 18
    2.3.4 Qualitative interviews ........................................................................................... 20
  2.4 The trustworthiness and quality of the study .................................................................. 22
  2.5 Limitations ..................................................................................................................... 24

CHAPTER 3: LITERATURE REVIEW AND THE THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF INTELLIGENCE ......................................................................................................................... 27
  3.1 Intelligence studies and theorization of intelligence in general ...................................... 27
  3.2 Theorization of international intelligence cooperation .................................................. 32
  3.3 The OSCE ...................................................................................................................... 34
  3.4 Europol .......................................................................................................................... 37

CHAPTER 4: FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION .......................................................................... 40
  4.1 The OSCE ....................................................................................................................... 40
  4.2 Europol .......................................................................................................................... 46
  4.3 Comparison between OSCE and Europol ...................................................................... 49
4.4 International security and intelligence cooperation in the current political climate .......................................................... 53

CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................................................. 55

5.1 Contributions of the study ........................................................................................................................................... 58

REFERENCE LIST ................................................................................................................................................................. 62

Books and book chapters ..................................................................................................................................................... 62

Journal articles ....................................................................................................................................................................... 63

Reports .................................................................................................................................................................................... 65

News articles and websites ..................................................................................................................................................... 66

Appendix – Interview Guides .................................................................................................................................................. 67

OSCE interview guide .............................................................................................................................................................. 67

Europol interview guide ........................................................................................................................................................ 68
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>API</td>
<td>Advance Passenger Information</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBMs</td>
<td>Confidence-Building Measures</td>
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<td>CSCE</td>
<td>Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
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<td>CTG</td>
<td>Counter Terrorism Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECTC</td>
<td>European Counter Terrorism Center</td>
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<td>EIS</td>
<td>Europol Information System</td>
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<td>EPE</td>
<td>Europol Platform for Experts</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>EUROPOL</td>
<td>European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation</td>
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<td>ILP</td>
<td>Intelligence-Led Policing</td>
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<td>INTERPOL</td>
<td>International Police Force</td>
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<td>IR</td>
<td>International Relations</td>
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<td>IS</td>
<td>Intelligence Studies</td>
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<td>IWG</td>
<td>Informal working Group</td>
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<td>JITs</td>
<td>Joint Investigation Teams</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>ODIHR</td>
<td>Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights</td>
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<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe</td>
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<td>PC</td>
<td>Permanent Council</td>
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<td>POLIS</td>
<td>OSCE’s Online Law Enforcement Information System</td>
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<td>SIENA</td>
<td>Secure Information Exchange Network Application</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPMU</td>
<td>Strategic Police Matters Unit</td>
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<td>TNTD</td>
<td>Transnational Threats Department</td>
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<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>US</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
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<td>VERLT</td>
<td>Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to Terrorism</td>
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<tr>
<td>WMDs</td>
<td>Weapons of mass destruction</td>
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

In an historical sense, a state’s main threat to national security was an attack from another state, i.e. downright military war between states (Lowenthal, 2017, p. 7). Despite modern tensions between certain states, such as the US and Russia, the main concern for western democratic societies is at this point arguably not the threat of war with neighboring states. It is a common understanding that the nature of threats has changed, with a shift most visible in the late twentieth century and early twenty-first century (Lowenthal, 2017, p. 7). Commonly referred to as transnational threats, issues such as climate change, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), conflicts in cyberspace and non-state actors composed of e.g. human traffickers or terrorists have become some of the most pressing threats to national security. These are not considered traditional threats (Lowenthal, 2017, chapter 5). This trend has been heightened by recent development of “hybrid” warfare, pioneered by Russia, in which warfare combines traditional hard-power and new technologies against “soft” targets. This dissertation focuses on the transnational threat of international terrorism, arguably one of the most pressing transnational threats at present.

It is a general understanding in international fora, and among world leaders, that many transnational threats – threats that cross borders and affect people regardless of state affiliations – requires international cooperation to counter. This includes the threat of international terrorism, which was increasingly acknowledged as a collective threat after the 9/11 attacks in the US in 2001. It has become evident through the 21st century that terrorists plan, plot and execute attacks across borders, and several attacks on European soil have revealed the challenge of suspects moving undetected between different countries. Recent examples of this in the public domain are the 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris and the 2016 attacks in Brussels, which highlighted the need for international cooperation. An urgent part of national security has thus become the exchange of secret information, or intelligence¹, between states about the capabilities and intentions of non-state terror groups.

¹ There is a lack of consensus in academia concerning how to define intelligence and what intelligence should be understood to be used for. Various national intelligence services also operate under somewhat different definitions. For the purpose of this dissertation, I understand intelligence to be (secret) information and knowledge sought to protect a nation, especially the well-being of its people, institutions and values, from external (or internal) threats, here specifically terrorism.
The attacks in Paris and Brussels specifically have led to a number of ripple effects and caused politicians, academics and journalists to call for a closer and better cooperation between states. These two attacks were the deadliest acts of terror since the second world war in both countries. The devastating attacks left 130 people dead and 352 injured in Paris (Camilli, 2015), and 35 people dead and 340 injured in Brussels (Birchall, 2017). In the aftermath of the Brussels attacks, it was revealed that the terrorist cell connected to the outrage was the same cell responsible for the attacks in Paris the year before. Members of the cell had been able to travel undetected between France and Belgium (Soufan, 2016). At the time, it seemed that terrorists crossed borders more easily than information and intelligence.

These events prompted me to think, and study, these subjects for this dissertation. It will explore international security and intelligence cooperation\(^2\), mainly for the purpose of counterterrorism, taking place in the Transatlantic and Eurasian regions\(^3\) of the world, mostly focused on the European states in particular. More specifically, it will investigate the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the European Police Office (Europol). The reason why they are chosen is because they offer a juxtaposition about how two structures with similar focus areas and work have developed in different ways. The aim of this dissertation is to study the similarities and differences in characteristics between the OSCE and Europol to understand how they impact their ability to cooperate and exchange information and intelligence, whether or not the two structures impact the level of security in the Transatlantic and Eurasian regions, specifically Europe, and in what way. The findings will be used to draw some conclusions about the broader nature of international security and intelligence cooperation. The following four research questions will thus be explored in this dissertation:

- *Do the member states of the OSCE and Europol engage in intelligence cooperation within their organizations, and to what degree?*

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\(^2\) See above for definition and understanding of intelligence. Further, intelligence cooperation is thus understood as the exchange of intelligence between states for the sake of national security, here specifically protection from the threat of terrorism.

\(^3\) As the OSCE is one of the specific cases under study in this dissertation, I have had to involve and consider states from all relevant areas in the research. The OSCE have participating states stretching from North America to Europe to Central Asia, thus using the term ‘European’ was not adequate. The descriptions ‘Transatlantic’ and ‘Eurasian’ are commonly understood terminologies used to define the areas of Europe and North America and Europe and Asia and are often expressed in the OSCE itself to describe the relevant regions of participating states.
• How do the differences in characteristics in the OSCE and Europol impact the member states ability to cooperate and exchange information and intelligence?

• Do the OSCE and Europol impact the level of security in the Transatlantic and Eurasian regions of the world, here specifically when it comes to counter terrorism efforts, and in what way?

• What can the findings of this study imply about the general nature of the international security and intelligence cooperation of the day?

At the outset, the OSCE and Europol look like similar organizations. On closer inspection, I discovered that the two are actually not, and that I was really comparing two fundamentally different groups. Despite similar expressed aims, one is a group and platform for discussion, the other has an actual operational remit and intelligence function. They were not initially developed for the same purpose or have the same methods of work. Despite these significant differences, I argue that both organizations pursue the same overarching goal: security for the citizens, institutions and values of their respective regions, and in the light of the main topic of this dissertation: protection from terrorism. However, the research indicates that the two organizations differ in their ability to successfully cooperate to reach this goal and that the OSCE suffers from more significant challenges to its cooperative abilities than Europol. Despite certain cooperative challenges, I argue that the two complete each other in their counter terrorism efforts, as their different approaches to countering terrorism contribute to the international efforts of tackling the multifaceted threat.

It needs to be stressed that, due to a low number of interviews, what follows are tentative and preliminary conclusions based on a limited data set. However, it serves as the basis for expanded research in the future, with a larger data set, which I intend to publish in a peer-reviewed journal.

1.2 The dissertation’s outline

Following at the end of chapter 1 is a presentation of a brief background information of the OSCE and Europol, as well as a description of the context and relevance of the two structures in this dissertation. Chapter 2 of the study elaborates on the methodology, with descriptions of all methodological approaches and choices made during the research process, thus explaining
the frames in which the research was conducted. Following, chapter 3 presents a literature review and with that also explores the theoretical foundations of intelligence and intelligence cooperation. Here, the most significant and relevant literature is presented and reviewed, in relation to intelligence and intelligence cooperation as well as the OSCE and Europol as organizations. The purpose is to explore the existing academic landscape, build a foundation to be able to place this research study in the existing literature and see where it advances it, i.e. provide context. Finally, in chapters 4 and 5, the dissertation will present and discuss the findings of the research and draw conclusions based on those findings, in an effort to answer the above research questions and objectives in the best possible way.

1.3 The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) is the largest regional security organization in the world and covers a vast geographical area, from “Vancouver to Vladivostok”. The organization currently have 57 participating states, 11 partner countries, 3 autonomous institutions, 16 field operations, numerous special representatives, a large secretariat and a parliamentary assembly. Employed staff consists of around 550 people in the various OSCE institutions and around 2330 people in the field operations (Osce.org, 2018). The number of representatives in each state’s delegation largely varies. The OSCE works for peace, stability and democracy through political dialogue and practical work (Osce.org, 2018), and for a while, the OSCE was the sole regional security organization that encompassed a so-called “comprehensive security approach” (Møller, 2012). Specifically, the OSCE consists of three dimensions, or baskets, of cooperation – politico-military, economic and environmental, and the human dimension (Stewart, 2008, p. 267). For long, this broad and comprehensive approach to security was one of the major characteristics that distinguished the OSCE from other somewhat similar organizations, like the EU and NATO.

The OSCE was started as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), when the Soviets proposed a conference for discussing and sanctifying various borders with Europe after World War 2 in the mid-1950s (Krupnick, 1998, p. 31). The western powers only agreed to such discussions after the tensions between the East and the West eased a little in the late-1960s and early-1970s, and only if the negotiation framework were wider than solely a discussion of borders (Krupnick, 1998, p. 31). In the late summer of 1975, 35 countries were gathered for a summit, which concluded the negotiations with the signing of
the CSCE Final Act in Helsinki, Finland (Krupnick, 1998, p. 31). Both in the years up until 1975 and following, complex and extended meetings took place. With the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, the involved states not only accepted Europe’s post World War 2 borders, but also agreed on a number of commitments meant to function as conflict-prevention measures. For instance, they agreed to abstain from “the actual or threatened use of force to settle disputes”, to develop economic relationships, promote and cooperate on solutions to concerns related to culture and the environment, and respect human rights and fundamental freedoms (Krupnick, 1998, p. 31-32).

It seems evident from the published literature that the OSCE, then CSCE, played a significant role during the Cold War: bringing the East and the West together for neutral discussions (Krupnick, 1998, p. 32). After the 1975 summit in Helsinki, the CSCE participating states gathered for review conferences and meetings regularly to advance and develop the Helsinki Final Act, despite tensions and difficult Cold War situations (Krupnick, 1998, p. 32). The CSCE contributed with various measures to help facilitate the cooperation between the sides, which eventually played a role in bringing the Cold War to an end (Mlyn, 1998, p. 228). These efforts were, inter alia, the establishment of confidence and security building measures (CSBMs), sponsorship of the CFE Treaty (the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe) and support for dissident movements in countries in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union (Mlyn, 1998, p. 228; Stewart, 2008, p. 267). In 1994, at the Budapest Summit, the participating states decided to turn the CSCE into a full-fledged organization to reflect the more institutional status. Made effective in January 1995, the CSCE became the OSCE (Krupnick, 1998, p. 31, 35).

Today, the OSCE is a broad, complex and comprehensive organization, with many areas of work and a uniquely broad membership. The organization still functions as a meeting place for opposing sides in conflicts within the tense international security crises today.

The organization’s multiple field operations are where most of the OSCE’s commitments are set into practice, through specific mandates agreed upon by the 57 participating states. Field operations at this time are taking place specifically in states in South-Eastern Europe, Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus and Central Asia. The operations’ tasks are to assist host countries with concrete projects, such as supporting law enforcement, assisting in legislative reforms, promote tolerance and non-discrimination and many other areas. The field operations
are where the larger parts of the OSCE’s staff and resources are put into use. The OSCE also has a number of institutions and structures of which they work with on a daily basis to implement the various agreed commitments, such as the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media and the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities (Osce.org, 2018). Through these institutions, the OSCE contributes with such matters as election monitoring, training programs for governments, observation of ethnic tension or conflict, advice, and ensuring the safety of journalists (Osce.org, 2018).

In December of every year the OSCE participating states gather for a so-called Ministerial Council meeting. Ultimately, it is the states’ foreign ministers who are the top representatives to the organization, though they are represented by diplomats on a daily basis. The location of the Ministerial Council rotates annually with the organization’s chairmanship. At each Ministerial Council meeting, the participating states seek to agree on new commitments, through decisions and declarations, which have been negotiated by the diplomats, experts and other state representatives in the upcoming weeks before the Ministerial. Every year, new commitments or reiteration of old ones are agreed by the ministers. Though, agreeing on any meaningful commitments has shown to be difficult, if not impossible, in recent years.

Two of the OSCE’s unique traits, and arguably curses, are its large and broad number of participating states and its requirement for consensus-based decision-making. On the one hand, the OSCE is uniquely inclusive, with 57 participating states, making it possible for both smaller countries and larger powers to be heard at equal terms and for a large number of issues to be discussed among a large number of states (Kroptacheva, 2012, p. 373; Krupnick, 1998, p. 42). On the other hand, self-interested states can block any decision they do not see as the most favorable to themselves. This often makes it hard to agree on anything significant, as participating states often have substantial conflicting interests (Kroptacheva, 2012, p. 373).

Although there are significant problems with participating states agreeing on any new significant commitments, there have been some agreements in recent years. But even when agreements have been reached, there are troubles with enforcements. To this day, the OSCE has no legal personality or authority, meaning the decisions made are not binding on participating states. Implementation of agreed OSCE commitments thus depends solely on political will of each participating state. This makes the OSCE significantly different from most other international organizations, like the UN, EU and NATO, which were established
by and are based on treaties. By contrast, the OSCE was started as a conference, without the signing of a legally binding treaty, and in time developed into an organization. There is a good argument that its lack of legal authority weakens the organization. The OSCE’s legal status is continuously being discussed within the organization among participating states, due to challenges posed by its lack of legal capacity. The problem is, though all states have agreed to evolve the organization’s legal personality, they have not been able to reach consensus on what process to adopt. For example, in 2007, a Draft Convention was agreed, but member states still disagree on its adoption, some conditioning it on the addition of a charter, while others oppose that suggestion. The process over the Draft Convention is still stagnated.

1.3.1 Developments on counterterrorism

Ever since the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, the OSCE has stressed its concerns over terrorism, the theme being a recurring subject in OSCE meetings and reports since then (Freire, 2005, p. 190). After 9/11, like most organizations concerned with international security, the OSCE has “systematically increased its portfolio of relevant activities” (Neumann, 2017, p. 29). New measures have been established, both at its headquarters in Vienna and in the field, to operationalize agreed commitments and to incorporate counterterrorism into their main tasks of conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation (Freire, 2005, p. 191). In 2001, an Action Plan for Combating Terrorism was agreed, as an “institutional framing of the OSCE fight against terror” (Freire, 2005, p. 191). This further led to the adoption of a “OSCE Charter on Preventing and Combating Terrorism” the next year, and in 2003, the “OSCE Strategy to Address Threats to Security and Stability in the Twenty-First Century” (Freire, 2005, p. 191). The efforts have been renewed and reiterated in later years. In 2012, the OSCE states agreed on the “OSCE Consolidated framework for the Fight against Terrorism” (Osce.org, 2018). These proposals have set the basis for the organization’s efforts and developments in addressing the transnational threat of terrorism since. Although embedded in all parts of the OSCE’s work, its coordinating efforts are contained within the organization’s Transnational Threats Department, and its Action against Terrorism Unit. The OSCE’s own principles rests on the view that the spread of democracy and rule of law is the basis for a more secure Europe (Freire, 2005, p. 190). Terrorism is obviously a source of instability and thus the OSCE regards it as an obstacle to these principles (Freire, 2005, p. 190).
1.3.2 Working thesis

At the beginning of the research process for this dissertation, my hypothesis was that the OSCE facilitated practical and operational cooperation among states. It is, in fact, the world’s largest regional security organization, with a Permanent Council, a Forum for Security Cooperation, numerous working groups and multiple field operations doing practical work, such as assisting with border management, police activities and countering terrorism and other organized criminal activities. To this end, it was my initial view, and working thesis, that the OSCE held some kind of operational intelligence function, or at least in one way or another shared information among participating states in order to promote its stated work for cooperating and tackling transnational threats. On its website, I read about systems for sharing passenger data information and projects for identifying and handling foreign terrorist fighters. I was able to investigate this thesis through personal work experience for four months at the OSCE at its headquarters in Vienna and through interviews. What follows is the first academic research of its kind, based on my experiences and unique interviews at OSCE.

1.4 The European Police Office (EUROPOL)

The European Police Office (Europol) is an international police organization established within the structures of the European Union, with an aim to promote cooperation among law enforcement agencies across the EU member states (Deflem, 2006). Europol, with a variety of specialized centers and services, staffs about 1200 employees, including liaison officers from member states and third parties.

The first high level discussions on whether EU member states have a common interest in the fight against serious crime came after a suggestion by the German government in 1991 (House of Lords, 2008, p. 11). The creation of Europol was then agreed in 1992 through the Maastricht Treaty, or the Treaty on the European Union (Deflem, 2006, p. 341; Europol.europa.eu, 2018). Article K1 stated that member states should regard police cooperation a common interest and with that organize a union-wide “system for exchanging information within a European Police Office (Europol)” (House of Lords, 2008, p. 11). The office’s task of facilitating police cooperation among the member states was described therein. Article K1 captured member states’ agreement about setting up a European Police Office, but did not serve as a legal basis for such an establishment. Article K3(2) of the same treaty required the Council to create a Convention for the member states to adopt. In 1995, a
Convention on the Establishment of a European Police Office, the Europol Convention, was signed. Ratifications by the then fifteen member states were slow, and the last ratification did not come until June 1998. The Convention entered into force in October that year (House of Lords, 2008, p. 11). Europol began operations in July 1999, also taking over functions of the European Drugs Unit which had been in operation since 1994 without formal constitutions. The European Drugs Unit is often seen as Europol’s modest beginning.

The objectives of Europol, as stated in the Europol Convention of 1995, are “to improve the effectiveness of and cooperation among the police authorities of the EU member states in order to prevent and combat serious international organized crime” (Deflem, 2006, p. 342). Since initial commitments to the European Drugs Unit and Europol’s establishment in 1998, other areas of criminality have gradually, yet progressively, been added to Europol’s mandate through the years (Bureš, 2016, p. 59). With this, Europol’s present goal is broadly stated as achieving a safer Europe for all EU citizens by supporting the 28 members in the fight against terrorism, cybercrime and all other forms of serious and organized crime (Europol.europa.eu, 2018). To be able to achieve this broad mandate, Europol also cooperates with states outside the EU and other international organizations, like the international police force (INTERPOL), through negotiated cooperation treaties (Wagner, 2006, p. 1232).

Europol’s main activities are collection, analysis and exchange of relevant data provided by member states. It does not have collection capabilities itself. For this purpose, and to keep its activities effective and secure, Europol has developed and maintains a technically advanced telecommunications infrastructure. Within this are several data systems which make up Europol’s operations network, connecting law enforcement agencies in all member states together (Europol.europa.eu, 2018; Wagner, 2006, p. 1231). Within Europol’s information systems, data provided by member states on suspects and sentenced individuals are collected and stored so that law enforcement in the member states can access it (Wagner, 2006, p. 1231). The communication among Europol, the EU member states, non-EU states and other third-party structures, like international organizations, is mainly conducted through three main channels, or systems. First, the Europol Information System (EIS), which is Europol’s central database for criminal information and intelligence, covering all of Europol’s mandated areas of crime, terrorism included. Second, the Secure Information Exchange Network Application (SIENA) ensures a secure exchange of the more sensitive and restricted operational and strategic crime-related information. Access to this has also continuously been extended to partner countries and entities outside the EU. Lastly, information is being shared through the
Europol Platform for Experts (EPE). This is not used for personal data or classified information, but as a secure, collaborative internet platform for experts and specialists in areas of law enforcement. It facilitates sharing of such as experiences, knowledge and best practices (Europol.europa.eu, 2018).

Within the EU, Europol is accountable to the Council of Ministers for Justice and Home Affairs. The Council is the EU body “responsible for the main control and guidance of Europol”, and appoints Europol’s Executive Director and Deputy Directors (Europol.europa.eu, 2018). In collaboration with the European Parliament, the Council approves the budget and adopts regulations related to Europol’s work (Europol.europa.eu, 2018). Europol is run by an Executive Director, responsible for its daily operations, including recruitment of personnel and planning and setting agenda for its work (Busuioc and Groenleer, 2013, p. 290). The director is accountable to a management board, made up of one representative from each member state. On paper the director is autonomous in executing the tasks he has been given. (At this time it is a man who holds this post: a British official, Robert Wainwright). In reality, he is expected to carry out decisions by the management board. This appears sometimes to lead to a slower and more hampered operational process (Busuioc and Groenleer, 2013, p. 290).

1.4.1 Developments on counterterrorism

After the terrorist attacks of 9/11 in 2001, Europol’s mandate got further expanded, as most other security institutions with a focus on counterterrorism. Several Council Decisions in the EU were made to this extent. In 2002, the Council of the EU instructed that all member states become dedicated to intelligence- and information sharing, and stipulated that the following minimal information must be communicated to Europol: ”data which identify the person, group or entity; acts under investigation and their specific circumstances; links with other relevant cases of terrorist offences; the use of communications technologies; and the threat posed by the possession of weapons of mass destruction” (cited in Bureš, 2016, p. 59). In a Council Decision from 2005, the importance of data exchange on terrorism was further emphasized and reiterated. This decision required all member states to establish a point of contact between national law enforcement and Europol, with responsibility for collecting the relevant investigative information and passing it on to Europol (Bureš, 2016, p. 59). In 2015, a European Counter Terrorism Center (ECTC) was established within Europol, meant to function as the principal information center in the EU for fighting terrorism (Bureš, 2016, p.
In May 2016, a new EU regulation was adopted, when the European Parliament agreed to update Europol’s power and enable it to “step up efforts to fight terrorism, cybercrime and other serious and organized forms of crime” (Europol.europa.eu, 2018). This newly adopted regulation introduces a number of changes to Europol’s structure and strengthens Europol’s capacity and role as a supporter and facilitator of cooperation between law enforcement authorities within the European Union (Europol.europa.eu, 2018). The changes will “make it easier for Europol to set up specialized units to respond immediately to emerging terrorist threats and other forms of serious and organized crime”, improve Europol’s abilities as the EU’s “information hub” and enhance the mandate to make Europol “fully equipped to counter the increase in cross-border crimes and terrorist threats” (Europol.europa.eu, 2018). Set into force on May 1st 2017, Europol officially became the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol.europa.eu, 2018). Despite the changes over the years, the essence of Europol’s main purpose remains the same, where Europol “shall support and strengthen action by the competent authorities of the Member States and their mutual cooperation in preventing and combating serious crime affecting two or more Member States, terrorism and forms of crime which affect a common interest covered by a Union policy” (Europol.europa.eu, 2018).

There has been disagreement through the years as to how much autonomy Europol should have. At the establishment of Europol, Germany proposed an institution that would evolve from simply information exchange to a structure with independent investigative powers. Other member states, like France, Denmark and the UK, strictly opposed, arguing it would be a considerable interference into their national sovereignty (Wagner, 2006, p. 1232). When established through the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, a compromise was reached with the “Union-wide system” for information-exchange (Wagner, 2006, p. 1232). Consequentially, Europol and its officers do not have executive powers. Europol is not an executive police force. This means, for instance, that it cannot organize actions like wiretapping, house searches or arrests of suspects themselves (Bureš, 2016, p. 59; Wagner, 2006, p 1232). Instead, Europol’s activities are confined to data-sharing and are designed and meant to support national police and help make their executive powers more efficient, primarily through the exchange of information (Bureš, 2016, p. 59; Wagner, 2006, p. 1232). EU member states have, though, granted Europol some operational powers, with the institution
being able to interact and share information with third parties, like Interpol, the FBI and police forces in other non-EU states. Europol has also gained the authority to ask member states of the EU to initiate investigations and to take part in multinational investigation teams (Bureš, 2016, p. 59; Wagner, 2006, p. 1232). Europol also supports and participates in so-called Joint Investigation Teams (JITs), a cooperation tool for tackling cross-border cases among two or more member states (Europol.europa.eu, 2018).

The impact and significance of Europol’s developments and strategies since its establishment, in counterterrorism as well as other areas, is difficult to estimate due to a lack of published records. Europol is not transparent about the few investigative activities described above it performs, as it tries to preserve the operational police and security collection autonomy of member states (Deflem, 2006, p. 346). However, Europol does publish annual reports, or reviews, about its activities, which can give a sense (but not specific details) about its participation in the European counter terrorism. In the 2016/2017 report, the numbers presented show an increase in the use of Europol as an EU information hub. According to the report, information sharing on counter terrorism among European countries and through and with Europol “reached an all-time high by the end of 2016” (Europol, 2017, p. 30). Cases in the SIENA system related to terrorism rose from 2245 in 2015, to 3934 in 2016. So-called SIENA messages nearly doubled, rising from 56 277 to 94 770 in the same period (Europol, 2017, p. 30). Evidently, it seems EU member states and third parties value and utilize Europol and its capabilities and doing so more than ever. Although the impact of this trend on security is hard to estimate, this dissertation makes an effort to do so.

1.4.2 Working thesis

It was my initial working thesis that Europol functions as a hub and platform for the EU member states to share and exchange information and intelligence with each other, to better be able to counter and prevent serious criminal activity, here specifically terrorism. In this regard, I initially thought that it shares data and information about suspects, suspected plots, leads and other relevant information. I had reason to believe that certain EU governments maintains lists of individuals of concern, known to have become radicalized or suspected to be of radical, extremist views, and individuals suspected to be part of terrorist cells (Camilli, 2015; Robertson, 2015). I wanted to find out whether EU members share this information with each other and if this information gets exchanged through Europol. Starting my research,
I also assumed that EU intelligence exchange through agencies such as Europol is likely to be flawed: successful terrorist attacks in the EU would seem to be evidence of failed Europol intelligence exchange. In other words, the initial reason as to why I wanted to further research this topic in the first place is because several instances of terrorist attacks on European territory in the 21st century suggested a lack of cooperation and flawed information-sharing between relevant states and actors.

Additionally, since the United Kingdom, for years considered to be a crucial actor in European security and intelligence cooperation and one of the major contributors of quality data and personnel, have decided to leave the EU, I also wanted to see if Brexit is likely to have any perceived consequences on the EU and Europol intelligence cooperation. Although a full dissertation could have been written on this topic, I still wanted to briefly relate it to my research, as Brexit is arguably the most significant development in the EU in the recent past and it is reasonable to assume that Europol’s role and competences might be, or already have been, affected by the UK’s EU-exit.
CHAPTER 2: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This chapter lays out and explains the approaches taken and decisions made during the research process of this dissertation, aimed at answering the objectives of the study. First, this chapter will focus on the overall research approach, or research strategy, that was applied in this study and why. Second, it will seek to explain the research design used to collect the data, following onto the data collection methods and sampling criteria. Further, it will seek to explore the criteria for a measurement of the study’s quality and trustworthiness, as well as looking into the limitations impacting this quality.

2.1 Research strategy – a qualitative approach

The main objectives of this study, as written out in chapter 1, has been to explore the practice of security and intelligence cooperation among states and actors in a Transatlantic and Eurasian context, by investigating the structures and processes of the OSCE and Europol. The aim was to look beyond the limited, existing literature, further understand this issue and its challenges, and help build into the knowledge on the matter. For these purposes, finding the most eligible research strategy was important.

The research strategy for a project can be described as being “the plan for how the study will be conducted” (Berg and Lune, 2012, p. 41), and thereof “provides a framework for the collection and analysis of data” (Bryman, 2016, p. 40). For the purpose of this study, a qualitative research strategy was considered most eligible. A qualitative research strategy is characterized by its interpretivist epistemological position, meaning that the focus is to understand the social world through examining the interpretations of the members of that world (Bryman, 2016, p. 375). In this case, the purpose was to investigate and understand the processes around and efforts to cooperation and sharing of intelligence between states and other actors, and to do this mainly by interpreting the experiences of actors in the field. Second, a qualitative approach typically has an inductive view on the relationship between research and theory, meaning that theory is generated out of the research instead of the more typically quantitative approach of testing theory with research (Bryman, 2016, p. 375). In this study, I had no specific theory to test. Instead, it was an investigative and exploratory approach, led by curiosity and questions, leading to a development of theory to answer the research questions.
2.2 Research design

2.2.1 Collective case study

The qualitative research study in question was conducted using a case study research design. The design was considered most suitable, as case study research concerns itself with the specific nature and the complexity of a particular case or phenomenon, emphasizing a detailed examination of that case (Bryman, 2016, p. 60). There are numerous definitions and understandings of the case study method, but simply put it can be defined as “in-depth, qualitative studies of one or a few illustrative cases” (Hagan, 2006, p. 240). When focusing on a specific case or cases, it gives the opportunity to uncover the relations between significant factors that characterizes those cases. It is most often conducted with a holistic approach, aiming to gather detailed, in-depth information on the phenomenon under study (Berg and Lune, 2012, p. 326-327). Case study methods are also associated most often with building of theory, rather than testing of theory (Berg and Lune, 2012, p. 328).

More specifically, as this particular study investigated two illustrative cases, the research conducted was a comparative case study, also known as a multiple-case study or a collective case study (Berg and Lune, 2012, p. 336; Bryman, 2016, p. 64). Such a collective or comparative case study “involve extensive study of several instrumental cases”, with the aim of allowing better insight into not only the cases in question, but also better understanding of a broader context (Berg and Lune, 2012, p. 336). Multiple cases may be selected to represent contrasting situations, as is the case of this case study, or to replicate insights found in individual cases (Yin, 2003, p. 46). In both instances, Yin (2003, p. 46) indicates that collective case studies are often “considered more compelling, and the overall study is therefore regarded as more robust”, in comparison to a single case study. In this dissertation, having more than one case allowed me to study the reality from more than one perspective. As the aim of this study has been to explore, understand and investigate the nature of cooperation and intelligence sharing between relevant actors, specifically narrowed down to and within two organizations, the OSCE and Europol, a collective case study approach deemed fit. Detailed and in-depth information was attempted gathered about the two cases, to better understand the processes within them and to be able to compare them, their characteristics and their level of “success” to each other. Further, the study aims to use findings within the two cases of the OSCE and Europol to better understand the nature of and challenges behind security cooperation and intelligence sharing in a broader context of
Transatlantic and Eurasian relations.

2.2.2 The cases of the OSCE and Europol

The two selected cases for this case study, the OSCE and Europol, were chosen by a combination of opportunity and availability as well as based on their appropriateness and relevance.

When narrowing down and choosing the focus of this dissertation, the opportunity of an internship in relation to the OSCE arose. Four months were spent at the Norwegian Delegation to the OSCE in Vienna from the end of August until the end of December 2017. This gave access to OSCE staff and experts, as well as national officials and diplomats from around the region, and a unique opportunity to experience the organization’s work first-hand. Before the internship I conducted some initial research on the OSCE, which led me to think that the OSCE had an operational, practical level of cooperation between its participating states and that they engaged in intelligence exchange, or at least shared some operational information with each other. This was my initial working thesis.

When looking at and investigating the nature of the sharing of information and intelligence on a regional basis, mainly focused at European and other relevant partnering states, Europol becomes another obvious case study. Europol is the EU’s collective police office, established with the aim of facilitating information-sharing for a safer Europe. This points to the relevance of Europol in a study about intelligence cooperation. Many of the OSCE’s participating states also cooperate through Europol, both EU members and other third countries who have agreements with the office.

2.3 Data collection

2.3.1 Primary and secondary data

There are mainly two types of data available for analysis in a research study: primary and secondary data. Primary data is original and raw data collected first-hand by the researcher, for the purpose of that researcher’s specific study at hand and to address the given research questions. On the other hand, secondary data comes from secondary sources, meaning it is data that has already been collected or produced by someone other than the researcher and for a different purpose. Secondary data is often more readily available, but is not adapted or customized to the relevant research questions. All methods used to gather information in
research falls within primary or secondary data. For this study, both primary and secondary data was collected and used to draw conclusions.

Within qualitative research, the most frequently employed method of data collection is the interview (Bryman, 2016, p. 466). As Berg and Lune (2012, p. 331) point out, “one of the most effective ways to learn about the circumstances of people’s lives is to ask them”. As this study looks into such a contemporary issue and demanded novel information, interviews were the most natural and desirable data collection method. Being a case study, more specifically a collective case study, its purpose was to gather extensive, in-depth information about the phenomenon at hand. As the aim was also to attain novel information from first-hand experiences and interpretations of relevant actors involved in the given phenomenon, interviews were thus considered to be the approach best able to fulfil these aims. Although the aim of a qualitative case study is for the interviews to be extensive, it became evident during the research process, due to difficult practicalities, that the interviews for this dissertation cannot be considered extensive. In the end, only three interviews were conducted. This challenge will be further addressed in chapter 2.5.

The interviews conducted through the research were initially thought to serve as the main source of data in the process of describing findings and establishing conclusions, accompanied by other secondary sources. Due to a limited amount of interviews, the study’s conclusions are made based on a comparison between the primary data from the interviews and the already published literature (secondary sources). For one of the cases explored, the OSCE, interviews were also complemented by observation. I spent four months working at the Norwegian Delegation to the OSCE, every day working on issues related to the OSCE and the region’s political challenges, attending meetings, writing reports and having conversations with personnel on various levels within and in relation to the organization. The first-hand experience through this observation in the field gave me an extraordinary ability to understand the research questions in this dissertation.

Further, in the case of both the OSCE and Europol, secondary sources were utilized. Extensive research was conducted concerning the background and history of both selected cases, as well as on the field of security- and intelligence cooperation in general. The context around the contemporary issues and challenges that were the basis for the research questions was examined, both looking at the specific cases as well as the broader context. For all purposes, sources used were scholarly, peer-reviewed articles, books, official reports and
other documents from both the OSCE and Europol, as well as media articles.

2.3.2 Triangulation

To be able to answer the research questions and reach the conclusions in this study, a mix of sources was used: interviews, observation and written sources. This is called triangulation. Triangulation means using more than one source of data or method of investigation, leading to a greater confidence in the study’s findings (Bryman, 2016, p. 386). All methods of investigation will reveal slightly different facets of the same topic, as will every source of data. By combining several views and angles, a researcher is better able to obtain a more comprehensive and realistic picture of the topic (Berg and Lune, 2012, p. 6). In many forms of study, researchers combine research strategies, creating a mixed research approach made up of both qualitative and quantitative research. Such a combined use of methods also falls under triangulation. For the purpose of this specific study, a qualitative research approach alone was conducted, though made up of a triangulation of data collection methods and sources, contributing to the quality and trustworthiness of the study by creating a more substantive image of the reality.

2.3.3 Sampling

What material or interviewees a researcher chooses for an analysis depends on a variation of factors, such as the defined research questions, access and how much knowledge the researcher has about what will be of most relevance and not (Phillips and Jørgensen 2002, p 78). The most frequently used method of sampling in qualitative research is called purposive sampling (Bryman, 2016, p. 407). As opposed to sampling approaches in quantitative research, purposive sampling is a non-probability form of sampling and it does not aim to sample material or interviewees on a random basis (Bryman, 2016, p. 408). The aim is rather to strategically choose samples that in the best possible way can inform the issue at hand and are the most relevant (Bryman, 2016, p. 408). Because the sample is of non-probability and not randomly selected, the researcher cannot use the sample to generalize to a larger population, as is the goal of quantitative research. This is not the aim in most qualitative research, neither in this specific study. In qualitative research in general, and in this study, the goal is most often a different one – to illuminate and understand a certain issue, and create more knowledge on that specific topic. Thus, the goal becomes to strategically pick the sample that can most likely help the researcher reach that goal. The researcher will handpick
cases based on their unique features and relevance to the topic being studied and the research questions formulated (Bryman, 2016, p. 408-410).

Accordingly, a purposive sampling approach has been employed for this study, and because it is a collective case study, sampling had to be done at different levels. First and foremost, the two main cases being studied and compared in this collective case study, the OSCE and Europol, was chosen for their relevance to the topic as well as possible access. The selection of the OSCE and Europol has been earlier elaborated in chapter 2.2.2. The OSCE was thus selected based on (i) access to the organization’s personnel, a sampling approach called convenience sampling, which refers to a sample that is available and accessible at a given time; and (ii) the organization’s relevance to the study, it being the world’s largest regional security organization focusing on cooperation for a better security (Bryman, 2016, p. 187). Europol was chosen on the basis of relevance, it being a collective police office for the entire European Union and a number of partnering countries, designed to share information.

As I pursued the investigation, it became clear that the cases selected deviated largely from each other. My research soon developed into understanding why they deviated from each other.

Further, interviewees within the two cases were also selected using a purposive sampling approach. More specifically, a stratified purposive sampling strategy, used when sampling “typical cases or individuals within subgroups of interest” (Bryman, 2016, p. 409). In the case of the OSCE, the interviewees were selected based on an evaluation of relevance, where individuals considered to have a large degree of knowledge, insight and overview on the topic and questions at hand were prioritized – typical individuals within that subgroup of interest. Due to time constraints, it was not possible to conduct extensive interviews of the OSCE, as would be desirable. In the end, only two interviews were conducted concerning the OSCE. However, while the number of interviews was small, the officials interviewed had significant positions in the OSCE, making their interview data also significant. The first interviewee selected is an individual highly incorporated in the OSCE’s Transnational Threats Department, with a general overview of the OSCE’s efforts on security cooperation and specifically counter terrorism-related work. This is arguably the most relevant official I could interview at the OSCE in relation to the cooperation for countering transnational threats. This interviewee also has a background from the EU. I met this person through my presence at the OSCE and was first introduced during a meeting at the OSCE Security Committee. The
second individual selected is a national diplomat with a very long and extensive history of work in global security politics, with experience from the UN, EU and OSCE, and an impressive knowledge of and insight into the politics of the OSCE and the broader global political climate of the day. The interviewee is acknowledged internationally for the extensive efforts in international security politics. I was lucky enough to work with this individual on a daily basis, and we eventually found the time to conduct a more official interview.

When selecting interviewees within and in relation to Europol, decisions were made in conjunction with the study supervisor and with the help of my own contact base. Of course, the interviewees were selected based on relevance, but also availability. Contacts at the Norwegian Delegation to the OSCE were kind enough and able to help reach out to relevant Norwegian personnel in The Hague, where Europol has its headquarters. In the end, however, only one interview was conducted. Nevertheless, like with the OSCE, the Europol official interviewed had a significant role and meets the criteria, discussed below, for qualitative research: the interviewee is a counter terrorism liaison officer to Europol and the Counter Terrorism Group (CTG, not established by Europol) in The Hague. The interviewee has extended experience in the fields of policing, security and intelligence, and great inside knowledge of the nature of cooperation at Europol and in The Hague in general. The interviewee is thus at the heart of the subject with which this dissertation is concerned. All three interviewees, both from the OSCE and Europol, are considered to be some of the most relevant respondents I could have selected, based on their ability to contribute in answering the study’s research questions.

Lastly, the study’s secondary sources were also selected and handpicked based on relevance to the topic and research questions. In the case of the secondary sources, one can say a sampling approach called snowball sampling also was conducted. Snowball sampling refers to a technique where the researcher initially selects a small group of cases relevant to the topic, and then these sampled cases leads the researcher to other relevant cases (Bryman, 2016, p. 415). In the process of this study, actively using the references applied in the written documents, initially selected sources again and again led to new ones.

2.3.4 Qualitative interviews

The interviews for this study were conducted using a qualitative, semi-structured interview technique. In qualitative research, initial ideas and research questions tend to be rather open-
ended and there is a focus on the selected interviewees’ own thoughts and perspectives. For the interviewees to go off topic and drift into sidetracks of their point of view is often encouraged, as this gives room for ideas and perspectives the interviewees see as important, and which the researcher may not have thought of. Qualitative interviews are also open for the researcher to ask spontaneous questions and follow up on the interviewees answers (Bryman, 2016, p. 466-467). All these factors make the qualitative interview technique very flexible, thus making the research open to new ideas and perspectives during the data collection process. Also, as the qualitative researcher is interested in rich and in-depth information from the interviewees, a less structured interview is necessary to generate such information (Bryman, 2016, p. 467).

A researcher could use a totally unstructured interview technique for the data collection, maybe simply asking a single question. The more relevant approach for this study was the semi-structured approach. When conducting a semi-structured interview, the researcher typically has a list of questions or narrowed down topics to cover during the interview, but gives the interviewee much flexibility to reply and to impact the direction of the interview (Bryman, 2016, p. 468).

When conducting a collective, or comparative, case study, it is preferred to use more or less identical methods for collection of data on both cases (Bryman, 2016, p. 64). When using qualitative, semi-structured interviews, there is little to no possibility for the interviews to be identical, but the researcher will want to emphasize the same type of questions and gather the answers and perspectives on the same topics in all interviews, to be able to get different perspectives on the same reality. In this study, the questions were minimally altered between the OSCE and Europol to fit the different organizations, but still emphasized the same questions and topics (see appendix).

The first two interviews, on the OSCE, took place in December 2017, while still present at the OSCE headquarter in Vienna. The first interview, with the OSCE official, was conducted at December 14th, at the margins of a meeting of the OSCE Permanent Council. The interview gave valuable and insightful information on the part of the interviewee, with clear answers regarding the specific work and efforts of the OSCE, what they do and what they do not. Still, the interview could have been of even better quality. Even though the time was scheduled by the interviewee, the interviewee was very busy and needed inside the meeting. I got all prepared topics and questions covered and answered, but more time would have allowed the
interviewee to elaborate even more and depart into further relevant viewpoints. The interview was also conducted in the café outside the hall of the meeting, making the surroundings rather noisy and distracting. The setting could thus have been better.

The second interview, conducted with the national diplomat, was held at December 19th, in the interviewee’s office. This time, the surroundings was much better fitted for an interview. It lasted longer and took many detours into relating topics, bringing elaborate information on a broader context. There were no outside disturbances, and the interview got to last for as long as wanted. Thus, the interview gave comprehensive information on the OSCE and its work and efforts on the relevant topics, the OSCE’s role in a broader context, as well as insights on the regional and global political climate of the day, which is also significantly impacting the work of the OSCE.

The interview on Europol, with the counter terrorism liaison official, took place in the spring of 2018, on March 28th. As the liaison was in The Hague at the time, the interview was conducted over the phone instead of in person, due to practical considerations. Even so, this did not seem to affect the interview in any way. The interviewee was in his office and had set aside plenty of time. Thus, the interview was conducted without specific time constraints or stressful distractions, it took interesting detours based on what the interviewee considered relevant for the topic, and I was able to ask any and all questions I had. The interview resulted in valuable, relevant and extended information on the general nature of the cooperation taking place at Europol, here specifically related to their counter terrorism efforts.

### 2.4 The trustworthiness and quality of the study

In quantitative research, the trustworthiness of a study and the following findings are estimated using measures called validity and reliability. These are important criteria in assessing the research quality. In qualitative research, on the other hand, consensus regarding quality criteria is further from agreed. Measurements per se is not as important or relevant in qualitative studies, as what you are looking to do is to understand and interpret meanings and events based on other people’s experiences and thoughts. This is obviously hard to measure with numbers. As a result, qualitative researchers disagree on how to assess their data’s trustworthiness, and whether the same criteria can be applied to qualitative as well as quantitative research. Put simply, one interview with a key subject may be worth more than a thousand interviews with irrelevant subjects. Some researchers choose to assimilate reliability
and validity into their qualitative research, with little change. Others, taking an alternative position, choose to evaluate their data according to different and adapted criteria. Researchers Lincoln and Guba (cited in Bryman 2016 p. 384) have proposed alternative criteria, arguably better equipped for assessing the quality of qualitative data, but still corresponding to the quantitative criteria of reliability and validity. They divide their measure of trustworthiness into four criteria, all with an equivalent criterion in the quantitative research: (i) credibility, (ii) transferability, (iii) dependability and (iv) confirmability (Bryman, 2016, p. 384).

First, credibility is equivalent to internal validity and, quite obvious, say something about whether the data and the conclusions drawn from it are considered credible or not. Are we actually ‘measuring’ what we want to be ‘measuring’? Important for establishing credibility is conducting the research according to principles of good practice, as well as presenting research findings to the individuals in the social context that was studied, for the researcher to be able to get confirmation that he or she has correctly understood the social context under study. This practice is often referred to as respondent validation (Bryman, 2016, p. 384-385). Another practice recommended for a credible study is triangulation (Bryman, 2016, p. 384). The concept of triangulation and the presence of it in this study was elaborated in chapter 2.3.2. Second, the concept of transferability parallels with external validity, and refers to the findings’ applicability beyond the sample (Bryman, 2016, p. 384). To this end, qualitative researchers are encouraged to provide so-called thick description, that is, plenty enough of information and details about the research for others to be able to make their judgements about the transferability of the findings to other contexts (Bryman, 2016, p. 384). Third, dependability is equivalent with the concept of reliability, meaning, are the findings presented reliable? To be able to establish dependability, researchers are encouraged to adopt an approach of auditing. Keeping an audit trail, e.g. a systematic log, of the entire research process, helps to keep track of all decisions made and makes sure that the data is correctly represented. The thought has been for peers to act as auditors and assess the procedures of the research based on the logs, but this has yet to become a popular practice among researchers (Bryman, 2016, 384-385). Finally, confirmability parallels with the concept of objectivity, and concerns the level of neutrality or unbiasedness of the data. In qualitative research, complete objectivity is arguably impossible, which needs to be recognized by the researcher. Although, the research should clearly show that the researcher has acted in good faith and not blatantly allowed personal values, attitudes or theoretical preferences impact the research process or the findings presented (Bryman, 2016, p. 386).
To strengthen the quality of this study, the research has been heavily based on triangulation, in terms of both methods of investigation and sources of data, which are closely tied together. The research is based on both primary and secondary data. The secondary sources includes, for both the OSCE and Europol, written documents, i.e. scholarly articles and books, media articles and official reports, like the regular reports publically available on the efforts and work of the OSCE and Europol. The primary data consists of interviews with selected relevant respondents, as well as, in the case of the OSCE, observation and direct experience in the field. In this case, the fieldwork and direct participation enabled a much better understanding of not only the work and processes of the OSCE, but the regional and global political environment. The methods of investigations thus included textual analysis, interviews, and, in the case of the OSCE, field observation. This form of triangulation strengthens the study’s credibility and overall quality.

In all levels of the presentation of the research, I have attempted to the best of my ability to provide details and thick description – when presenting the background information, the description of the choices made during the process and the presentation of the findings and conclusions drawn from the data. Detailed information is provided to establish a level of transparency and transferability of the findings. For the purpose of dependability, a systematic log was kept during the entire research process, of decisions made and why, transcription of interviews etc. All decisions were also taken in conformity with a research supervisor, arguably ‘auditing’ the research process both during and at the end of the process. Lastly, the study was in general meant to be investigative and objective, with the purpose of examining the processes of cooperation and intelligence sharing and not the intelligence information itself. Even though it is a matter of national security and the consequence of an alleged intelligence failure can be fatal, the study of the intelligence process itself and the nature of intelligence cooperation is arguably neutral. This has made it easier for me as a researcher to strive for neutrality and not be biased during the research process and allowed for a larger degree of objectivity in the study.

2.5 Limitations

As all research projects, regardless of methodological choices, this study suffered from several limitations.

During the data collection, I was able to experience first-hand the processes and efforts going
on within the OSCE, leading to another data collection method and source of data for the research conducted on this part of the case study. Four months was spent at the inside of the organization, arguably leading to a better understanding of the organization’s work than what would have been possible if I had not been there. However, in the case of Europol, I was unable to attain the same level of understanding and comprehension of the efforts and processes within that organization. The data collection lacked observation, leading to a lesser degree of triangulation and thus a lesser degree of credibility.

Further, while conducting fieldwork at the OSCE, several challenges became evident. The main purpose of the presence at the OSCE was not conducting research and performing interviews for the sake of this dissertation. Overall, time became short as the workload was very large and there was little time left for conducting interviews. In addition, the fall semester at the OSCE is busy for all the staff and professionals. With the Ministerial Council in December, the preparations take a lot of time and efforts, as well as other larger meetings and conferences. With this, it was a challenge to schedule interviews with possible respondents, as their availability was scarce. This led to a total of only two interviews conducted with OSCE interviewees. A larger number of interviewees would have arguably led to a higher quality of the data and findings. The two interviews conducted was also completed in totally different environments, due to availability. One was rushed and in a noisy space. The other was longer and more relaxed, conducted in a quiet and more fitting environment. The latter led to more comprehensive information. Despite these differences, the first interview still led to valuable data, and most likely would not have led to any different conclusions if conducted in a more suiting environment.

As mentioned, when conducting a collective or comparative case study, it is preferred to use methods as identical as possible. In this study, this aim was attempted reached in the best possible way, but there were still deviances in the approaches. First, the methods differed in the fact that observation and actual on-ground fieldwork was not possible in the case of Europol, only the OSCE. As mentioned, this arguably creates a different basis for the ability to draw conclusions. Second, as I eventually got to know that the OSCE lacks an intelligence function entirely, the questions asked during the interviews with officials related to the two different organizations had to be somewhat different and thus not completely identical. Still, I attempted to my best ability to gather information on the same issues and attain the kind of information needed to be able to see where the two structures differ from each other and how these characteristics make it easier or more challenging for them to cooperate.
When researching matters related to intelligence, I initially was aware that some information most likely would be less available or harder to attain. The field of intelligence contains, to a large scale, information that is supposed to be secret (Lowenthal, 2017, p. 1). In this case, the research conducted concerned the process of collecting, analyzing and specifically sharing intelligence and data rather than the actual intelligence, avoiding the challenge of collecting classified, secret information. Although some relevant information, like reports on the work of Europol and the type of cases they are involved in, still proved to be somewhat difficult to attain, this arguably did not affect the study in a larger degree or the conclusions made.

Lastly, the most obvious limitation of the study is the limited amount of interviews. In the end, I ended up conducting only three interviews in all, two in relation to the OSCE and only one in relation to Europol. As I was physically present at the OSCE, I might have been able to interview more people had there not been for the pressing time constraints and workload. However, the two interviewees were arguably the two most relevant actors available to me. Within Europol I had no personal contacts and was dependent on help from others to be able to get in touch with relevant interviewees. I fortunately received help from contacts at the Norwegian Delegation to the OSCE and was able to get in touch with arguably at least the most relevant Norwegian individual working in relation to Europol on counter terrorism. Together with the high relevance of my interviewees, allowing me to build arguments based on first-hand, inside information, the triangulation by complementing the interviews with written sources also strengthens the arguments and conclusions made. Even so, such a low number of interviews limits the quality of the study. A larger number of interviews would have given a more nuanced and reliable image of the reality under study. What follows, then, are tentative and preliminary conclusions based on a limited data set. However, it serves as the basis for expanded research in the future, with a larger data set, which I intend to publish in a peer-reviewed journal.
CHAPTER 3: LITERATURE REVIEW AND THE THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF INTELLIGENCE

The main subjects of this dissertation are intelligence cooperation and states’ ability to exchange intelligence with other states for the sake of national security, specifically within the OSCE and Europol, mainly for the purpose of counter terrorism. The aim of this chapter is to explore the relevant academic landscape. First, an exploration and review of the academic field of intelligence is presented, while at the same time reviewing the attempts of theorization of intelligence and the relationship between intelligence and academic theory. To be able to study and answer the dissertation’s research questions, i.e. to understand whether states engage in intelligence cooperation, to what degree and how successful this appears to be, I needed a more comprehensive understanding of the field of intelligence in general – what intelligence is, how it is defined and understood, what the purposes are and what its place is in international relations. To be able to add to the existing theorization of intelligence, more specifically intelligence cooperation, I needed to know and understand where others have placed intelligence and intelligence cooperation in the theoretical landscape before me. Hence, I will first review some of the most significant literary works within the study of intelligence and the attempts of theorizing intelligence and intelligence cooperation. I have worked under the assumption that a theory in this sense is “a kind of simplifying device that allows you to decide which facts matter and which do not” (Baylis, Smith and Owens, 2014, p. 3). This qualitative, exploratory study aims to accommodate the existing theorization of intelligence cooperation, and look at which factors matter for “success” in intelligence cooperation. To be able to distinguish the OSCE from Europol, and look at characteristics within the two separately, this chapter will also present the most prominent existing literature concerning the nature of the cooperation within the two organizations, specifically related to counter terrorism as this dissertation’s main concern.

3.1 Intelligence studies and theorization of intelligence in general

Studies of and research related to the field of intelligence do continue to develop and grow in number, and the amount of literature in the field has expanded considerably in recent years, probably as a result of the prominent place that intelligence occupies in contemporary news and international affairs. This is also true when talking about the theoretical and academic
aspects of intelligence, gathered under the umbrella of intelligence studies. But, as I will present, intelligence studies is a theoretical camp with blurry borders and much disagreement.

For a more comprehensive, general understanding of intelligence and intelligence cooperation, both in theory and in practice, several books by leading scholars in the intelligence field of study are worth distinguishing. Former US intelligence official Mark Lowenthal (2017); scholars Peter Gill and Mark Phythian (2012); as well as Christopher Andrew, Richard Aldrich and Wesley Wark (2009) are all prominent figures within intelligence studies and offer broad and extensive insight into the field of intelligence: how intelligence is understood, what the purposes are, the intelligence process and relation to relevant topics such as transnational issues and threats. All the above have contributed to the overall understanding of the field while writing this dissertation.

The literature in intelligence studies reveals differences in viewpoints and arguments, where some are directly linking intelligence to International Relations and its various theories while others are arguing for the development of Intelligence Studies as its own academic discipline. The former US intelligence practitioner and now academic, Stephen Marrin (2016, p. 266), argues that Intelligence Studies is “becoming more established as an academic discipline”, due to the growing literature and attention of academic programs and colleges to the study. National Intelligence services in several countries has eventually begun to support intelligence research. Many university departments have become more interested in study of intelligence, which are contributing to rapidly expanding bodies of literature, mostly in departments of government, international relations and political science. A few journals dedicated to the topic of intelligence have been established, also accompanied by some book publishers creating earmarked book series. All this contributes to an ever-growing base of literature on intelligence studies, and feeds into the argument of the development of an academic discipline (Marrin, 2016, p. 266). Despite this, Marrin (2016) highlights certain challenges researchers in the field of intelligence studies are facing. He argues that many current scholars tend to forget and overlook specific important authors and work from the past, and thus ignore insights from other already published work. This leads to a lesser degree of development in the field. Also, a characteristic in most academic disciplines are the establishment of competing schools of thoughts with individuals evaluating and critiquing each other. This has not yet developed within intelligence studies.
Peter Gill and Mark Phythian (2016, p. 8, 14), on the other hand, argues that intelligence studies is not an academic discipline, and maybe should not be, it is rather a “coherent subject area” and a “field of study”. They point to the benefits of interdisciplinary within intelligence, and argues that the research is more effective when it can draw on several disciplines (p. 8). Where Marrin (2016, p. 278) argues that “intelligence studies as a field of knowledge is subordinate to other more traditional academic disciplines”, like political science and history, Gill and Phythian (2016) suggests that he is missing the point. Rather than being subordinate, they argue that the aim of intelligence studies is, and should be, to draw on those other disciplines and the relevant ideas and research that can help build understanding of intelligence concepts as well (p. 12). They argue that this is a better tactic than harshly establishing and protecting a border of its own discipline, most likely leading to disputes with other disciplines (p. 12).

Regardless of whether or not intelligence studies can be considered its own academic discipline or part of another one, the topic and field of intelligence is a largely under-theorized one (Andrew, 2004; Phythian, 2009). In 2001, David Kahn, historian of intelligence, observed that scholars had been calling for a theory of intelligence for many years, yet none had been able to present advanced suggestions or propose concepts that could be tested (cited in Phythian, 2009, p. 54). Since then, and after the 9/11 attacks in the US, scholars have upped their efforts, with an aim of developing a solid theoretical basis for the study of intelligence (Phythian, 2009, p. 54). Mark Phythian (2009, p. 54) argues that this added attention to building of theory has come, in part, by a build-up anxiety within the academic community of intelligence studies that a form of theoretical basis and extended theoretical work needs to be developed for the legitimacy of intelligence studies as a subject area. Still, there is no consensus over how this ought to look and so there is no agreed intelligence theory.

Although general theory of intelligence, how intelligence operates successfully and not, is rare, more attention is given to how intelligence does not work, i.e. intelligence failure. Richard Betts (1978, p. 62) argues that it is more accurate to say that what lacks is a positive or normative theory of intelligence. He further points out that “negative or descriptive theory – the empirical understanding of how intelligence systems make mistakes – is well developed” (p. 62). Betts has contributed significantly to the theorizing of intelligence failure through the years, more recently with his book *Enemies of Intelligence: Knowledge and Power in American National Security* from 2007. Other scholars contributing to the theorizing
of intelligence failure are, inter alia, Robert Jervis (2010) and Amy Zegart (2005, 2006, 2007), authors of both a number of articles and books on the topic. All three has a significant focus on the intelligence communities of the US and has especially contributed greatly in the debate over what happened leading up to the tragic events of 9/11 as well as the Iraq war.

Several scholars link intelligence studies to International Relations (IR) and argue that certain IR theories already cover much of the concepts and areas in intelligence studies. Intelligence, and thus intelligence studies, are part of the international realm – it is a part of, impacts and is impacted by, international affairs, or international relations. Still, compared to other topics within international relations, the academic discipline of IR has shown very little concern for intelligence. Christopher Andrew (2004) argues that intelligence is one of the most “under-theorized” parts of IR and “all but absent in most contemporary international relations theory”. Andrew (2004) argues that with more intelligence related material entering the public domain, international relations scholars must also acknowledge the importance of studying the role of intelligence.

Under what category to place and study intelligence will depend on how one chooses to define “intelligence”. How intelligence as a concept is defined obviously is a condition for what research approaches to choose and other decisions to make when writing about the subject (Scott and Jackson, 2004, p. 141). The literature reveal significant disagreements over how to define intelligence. What intelligence should entail and what it should be understood to be used for is still under much debate (Phythian, 2009, p. 56; Scott and Jackson, 2004, p. 141). Without such a definition or clear idea of what intelligence is, it is also hard to develop an agreed theory to explain how it works (Warner, 2002, p. 15).

Phythian (2009) has comprised a variety of proposed definitions and explains some of their commonalities. He points out that many of these definitions have in common the idea of providing security, as well as intelligence’s and intelligence agencies’ aim to secure relative advantage (p. 57). Following this commonality, Phythian (2009, p. 57) links intelligence and intelligence studies to the theory of structural realism. Phythian (2009, p. 57) describes that the job of intelligence is to ensure security and securing relative advantage. Further, structural realism is the approach, or theory, in IR that is most centrally concerned with security, linking intelligence and structural realism together. He goes on to argue that “structural realism already provides a theoretical explanation for certain key questions in IS” (intelligence
studies) (p. 57). These are questions such as why intelligence is necessary. Phythian (2009, p. 57) further argues that, even though it is often suggested that intelligence receives little attention from IR scholars, intelligence does occupy an implicit, central place in structural realist thinking. He lists some of the core assumptions in structural realism, as outlined by prominent realist John Mearsheimer, arguing some of them explains the need for intelligence, e.g. the assumption that “states can never be certain about the intentions of other states” (p.58). What intelligence aims to do is to “reduce this uncertainty about other states’ current and future intentions” and thus provide states with warning in advance and create a sense of security by reducing fear (Phythian, 2009, p. 58).

Munton (2009) also link intelligence with realism. He states that realist ideas make up a lot of intelligence thinking and practice, and that, even it is most often implicit rather than explicit, lots of intelligence literature assumes realist principles (p. 126). As classical realism is based on the idea that the international system is anarchy – it has no central authority – states need to fend for themselves and protect their own national security. Sometimes also seek to dominate other states. The international system thus consists of a constant struggle for power. Realism also constitutes that states who are considered allies will “attempt to cooperate in the face of a common threat” (Munton, 2009, p. 126). Munton (2009, p. 126) argues that these ideas in classical realism is highly compatible with the practice of intelligence, where the purpose of intelligence is to protect a state’s security and serve a nations self-interest. In a more recent article, Munton (2013), in collaboration with Karima Fredj, presents and elaborates on many of the same ideas as in Munton’s 2009 text. Here, the authors explore the links between intelligence and realism, still maintaining the idea of an implicit position of realist theory in the world of intelligence. They argue that “while realist theorists themselves have often ignored intelligence as a phenomenon, intelligence thinking and practice are in fact infused with realist ideas” (Munton and Fredj, 2013, p. 668).

Having considered the literature and its proposed definitions of intelligence, for the purpose of this dissertation, I consider intelligence to be (secret) information and knowledge sought to protect a nation, especially the well-being of its people, institutions and values, from external (or internal) threats. In this dissertation, that threat is considered to be terrorism.
3.2 Theorization of international intelligence cooperation

Where intelligence receives little emphasis in studies of international relations theory, international intelligence cooperation has historically received limited attention within intelligence studies. Even though the literature within intelligence studies has grown, and still is, scholars have yet to explore more elaborately and explain the phenomenon of international intelligence cooperation (Munton, 2009, p. 121). The subject arguably remains highly “under-analyzed”, despite being a well-recognized phenomenon in international affairs (Munton and Fredj, 2013, p. 667). One explanation can be that, traditionally, intelligence cooperation between states has been very sensitive, and so governments are reluctant to declassify records. Theorization of intelligence cooperation has thus been difficult if not impossible since theorization relies on historical case studies. In later years, due to a rise in transnational threats such as international terrorism and other organized crime, as well as coalition operations among states, the presence and need of intelligence cooperation has become more prominent (Munton, 2009, p. 121).

Some scholars have recognized the importance of intelligence cooperation in the field of intelligence and attempted to analyze it. In 1996, Michael Herman (p. 217), in one of the landmark works in the study of intelligence, argued that “modern intelligence is a multinational activity”, and further that “national intelligence power is a function not only of national capabilities but also of the foreign cooperation and product they obtain”. In this book, *Intelligence Power in Peace and War*, Herman devoted an entire chapter to the elaboration of intelligence cooperation. Another scholar, H. Bradford Westerfield, was writing at the same time as Herman. Westerfield (1996, p. 523) once compared the importance of intelligence cooperation in reality with the attention it was devoted in intelligence studies, or lack thereof, especially in American intelligence studies. After this, he argued that intelligence cooperation was “one of the least sufficiently studied aspects of the entire field” (p. 523). In 2004, Len Scott and Peter Jackson published an essay exploring and reviewing many of the approaches taken and scholars studying the role of intelligence in international politics up until that time. They suggested that the “increased public awareness” and the changing nature of international intelligence cooperation following September 11 would boost the focus on such cooperation in the academic intelligence field (p. 162).
In recent years, the scarcity of literature on intelligence cooperation seems to have decreased on the more general basis, but limited work of theorizing and analyses of the phenomenon still appears evident. Inter alia, Munton and Fredj (2013, p. 667) argue that international intelligence sharing, or liaison, is unfairly omitted from the most common and familiar model in intelligence studies, the intelligence cycle, despite international intelligence cooperation being a “every-day phenomenon”. In their article, Munton and Fredj (2013) explore several international relations theories to help explain why intelligence agencies and decision-makers share intelligence. Munton focused on this question in his 2009 article as well, where he argues that traditional realist notions are not sufficient for understanding international intelligence cooperation. Rather, in addition, he looks to liberalism and constructivism as theories that can feed into the realist principles with their focus on the “role of international institutions, the social norms they foster, and the interests states construct on issues, including intelligence” (p. 138).

Munton and Fredj (2013) appear to build on Munton’s ideas from 2009, as many of the arguments appear similar. Although arguing that realist ideas make intelligence cooperation problematic, with the emphasis on competition and struggle for power and relative gains, the two try to implement a game theory model to analyze the occurrence of what they see as a “commonplace activity” (p. 669). Game theory is most often associated with realist theory. In terms of game theory, decision makers weigh the prospective benefits and risks of international intelligence cooperation. Munton and Fredj (2013) go on to list several aspects to consider on both sides of the scale. Despite their extensive game theoretic analyses, the two also argue that intelligence cooperation might best be explained by an alternative to realist thinking – the liberal institutionalism theory (p. 669). Like Munton did in 2009, Munton and Fredj (2013, p. 669) point to the liberal institutionalists’ and constructivists’ inclusion of cooperative aspects of the global system and the role of institutions.

Lastly, another prominent scholar who has provided me with useful reflections and information on the nature of international intelligence cooperation, in addition to intelligence in general, is Richard Aldrich. In his 2004 International Affairs article, he explores the nature of the transatlantic intelligence and security cooperation and what this entails in practice. Most noticeably, he identifies and describes a variety of issues and challenges that contribute to the limitations of intelligence sharing and cooperation among states, inter alia, the protection of sources and the balance between security and liberty. Aldrich also contributed
with a chapter in *International Intelligence Cooperation and Accountability*, edited by Hans Born, Ian Leigh and Aiden Wills, published in 2011. His chapter, “International Intelligence Cooperation in practice”, seeks to analyze and explain recent developments in international intelligence cooperation and the increase of such cooperation. The chapter specifically suggests and explores explanations for these developments, what he argues to be, inter alia, the phenomenon of globalization and the changing nature of security threats.

The above existing published works and discourse on intelligence in general, intelligence cooperation and the theorization of both subjects has helped me understand the subject matter, be able to analyze where my findings fits in and where they can possibly advance the literature. As part of the conclusion at the end of this dissertation, I will attempt to relate my own findings to the existing literature and theorization to suggest what theoretical foundations my findings indicate that intelligence cooperation should fall under and to explore the possible contributions of this study. As my findings are based on a provisional limited dataset and thus offer extremely tentative conclusions, it needs to be stressed that these arguments will have to be further explored in research in the future.

### 3.3 The OSCE

Despite the OSCE being the world’s largest regional security organization, reaching into vast areas of the world and being part of 57 states’ foreign policy, it can arguably also be said to be the world’s least known security organization. It continues to be largely overlooked and little understood outside diplomatic or political circles related to the organization (Krupnick, 1998, p. 30; Mosser, 2015, p. 579). In general, the discourse and scholarly literature concerning the European, or Transatlantic and Eurasian, security environment, and specifically cooperation, are large and comprehensive. Still, an omission is evident. Compared to other organizations dealing with similar work areas, the OSCE seems often to be forgotten and not included in the discussions or analyses. This lead to a gap in the literature on European, Transatlantic and Eurasian security, as the OSCE’s membership covers all of these areas. More research on the OSCE’s role and value in the security environment and multilateral efforts is needed.

For this dissertation, comprehensive research on the OSCE was conducted: on the organization in general, its role and value in global security, on its efforts related to counterterrorism and specifically level and nature of cooperation and information-sharing.
For a general background, history and context of the OSCE as a security organization, a mixture of sources were used: academic articles, books, the OSCE’s own website and my own knowledge from the four months present at the organization. The experience from first-hand presence at the Vienna headquarters gave a broader understanding of the organization’s present role as well as its history. While being an intern in relation to the OSCE, a stand-alone literature review was written on the OSCE’s role and value in the European security environment. Large parts of that background information fed into the research for this dissertation. The OSCE’s own website provided updated information on the organization’s present structures, partners, field operations and initiatives, here specifically on counter-terrorism and related work. Through the OSCE website, as well as the OSCE internal networks, published reports were also used for novel information. These were reports such as the Annual Report on OSCE Activities from 2016 (published in 2017), reporting on, among other work areas, the Conflict prevention Centre and Transnational Threats Departments activities. The Transnational Threats Department also provides their own reports on a regular basis, inter alia, the regular reports of the TNTD to the OSCE Security Committee on their recent activities. Lastly, academic scholars such as Charles Krupnick, Bjørn Møller and Eric Mlyn provided historical and contextual information on the OSCE’s general structures and work.

Concerning counterterrorism and related topics, the OSCE and its efforts are not well-known either. Neither in the academic or political circles, or in the media. Still, as elaborated in chapter 1, the OSCE has been no exemption among multilateral organizations regarding establishing a larger focus on the need to deal with and counter terrorism. Europol specifically and the EU in general, as well as NATO, are most often given the most attention in the literature concerning countering and preventing terrorism and this phenomenon’s perceived underlying causes, but a few scholars focus on the OSCE in particular while other compare the OSCE’s efforts to other organizations.

Alexandra Gheciu (2008) has thoroughly compared the efforts and initiatives of the OSCE, the EU and NATO. In her book, she argues that the OSCE is not only relevant in the work of countering international terrorism, but is also in some ways uniquely competent to deal with this task as a security institution. Gheciu (2008, p. 126) argues for what she thinks is the OSCE’s advantage in the security environment, compared to the other two organizations, that
is the cross-dimensional, preventive nature of the OSCE and the insistence that military force alone “cannot succeed in combating international terrorism”. Having a broad and multidimensional approach, backed up by a long history of defining security in a comprehensive way and experience with human rights, culture and economic and environmental challenges, Gheciu (2008, p. 126-128) argues gives the OSCE a unique role and advantage. She also points to the advantages of the OSCE’s many field missions, providing the OSCE with local presence. The cross-dimensional character is also perceived as a major advantage in the fight against the “multifaceted challenges of terrorism” by Marie Freire (2005, p. 206). She argues the organization “may formulate comprehensive responses, integrating these different dimensions and generating a complex and integrated approach required to address the threats associated with terrorism” when combining traditional “hard” security with economic, environmental and humanitarian aspects and concerns (p. 206).

Largely agreeing with both Checiu’s and Freire’s arguments is Peter Neumann (2017). Peter Neumann worked, on the appointment of the OSCE Austrian chairmanship, from January until September 2017 on analyzing the OSCE’s efforts in countering violent extremism and radicalization that lead to terrorism (VERLT). In his following report, Neumann (2017) points to how the OSCE is assisting with preventing extremism, radicalization and terrorism in many indirect ways, incorporated into its various work areas and comprehensive approach to security. According to his analysis, the OSCE’s added value in this field comprise three specific areas: i) “its role in preventing and resolving conflicts, promoting human rights, and safeguarding the rights of national minorities”; ii) “its strong local presence, particularly in Central Asia and the Western Balkans”; and iii) “its diverse membership and convening power, which can facilitate dialogue, cooperation, and the systematic exchange of good practices between Participating States” (p. 2). As the report was written on appointment from the organization’s chairmanship, the research allows for a detailed internal view of the OSCE’s current work in this field, both centrally and in various participating states.

Despite the agreement over the OSCE’s advantage in counterterrorism, Freire (2005) also points to some of the organization’s shortcomings and challenges in its ability to implement commitments and initiatives. A lack of consensus, resources and operational power is pinned out as some of the basis for this (p. 208).
3.4 Europol

In literature and discourse concerning multilateral cooperation to fight terrorism and other forms of serious crime, Europol, as a central office within the European Union, is an agency that is given much attention for their efforts and role as a platform for sharing of information. Europol has since its establishment enjoyed much support at the political level and is known to most with an interest in international security politics and cooperation. However, even though Europol is well-known and much written about in contemporary news reporting, finding reliable academic scholarship on it has not been easy. Europol is a developing organization, which has enjoyed rapid expansion since its establishment in the 1990s. As recently as 2017 a new and important regulation to Europol’s power within crime-fighting and counter terrorism was set into force (Europol.europa.eu, 2018). Little has been written in academia on Europol’s most recent developments and initiatives, and on how that might matter for Europe’s abilities to prevent and counter terrorism and other forms of serious, organized crime.

For the purpose of this dissertation, because of the limited novel information and literature on the newest changes and developments within Europol, I have used the organization’s website as well as their own published reports for information on the most recent developments, such as the new 2016/17 regulation. The Europol website contains press releases and general updated information on the organization’s structures and components as well as latest initiatives and developments. Here, they also publish reports such as Europol annual reviews, where specifically information from the Europol Review 2016-2017 was useful. The reports present information on the pressing issues, trends and developments of 2016 and 2017, and gives an idea of Europol’s efforts related to priority areas such as terrorism, cybercrime and drugs. Some statistics and general information is also presented on Europol’s intelligence function and information-sharing, e.g. giving some numbers on the usage of the systems for information exchange. Lastly, the review gives a sense of where Europol is headed and see their own role in the future. While using the report for general factual information on numbers and focus areas, I have remained aware that Europol may have a vested interest in minimizing failures while maximizing successes in their own published reports.

For historical and background information on the establishment and development of Europol, academic sources were used in addition to Europol’s own website. Another source that proved
valuable was the United Kingdom’s House of Lords’ (2008) European Union Committee’s report *Europol: coordinating the fight against serious and organized crime*. Here, information is given on the events of the establishment of Europol, as well as the office’s objectives, competences and work areas. Further, academic authors such as Mathieu Deflem (2006), Oldrich Bureš (2008, 2016), Wolgang Wagner (2006), Madalina Busuioc and Martijn Groenleer (2013), Monica Den Boer (2015) and John D. Occhipinti (2015) provided information for understanding the background, context and development of the European Police Office.

Further, several scholars have taken it upon themselves to look further into the role and ability of Europol to contribute in the work of counter terrorism. Through an analysis of Europol’s counter terrorism operations and efforts, Mathieu Deflem (2006) offers arguments as to why Europol is an important organization for cooperation and counter terrorism efforts. Other scholars have also examined Europol’s valuable efforts, such as Monica Den Boer (2015) who has analyzed the office’s efforts and developments in counter terrorism and intelligence sharing. Following, John D. Occhipinti (2015, p. 240) describes Europol’s developments in recent years, and shows, inter alia, that Europol’s participation in so-called Joint Investigation Teams (JITs) has increased. Although, he argues that Europol is a long way from developing into a “European FBI” (p. 239). A common denominator through much of the academic literature concerning Europol, is the scholars’ exploration of challenges and limitations to further cooperation and information-exchange within Europol. Both Deflem and Den Boer are amongst them.

Oldrich Bureš has written or been involved in several works on the EU’s counter terrorism efforts and structures. In several instances, he shows to be rather critical in his views of EU cooperation on the matter and specifically Europol. In 2008 he published an article exploring the then limited powers of Europol, according to Bureš, and the reasons for their limited added value in counter terrorism efforts. Visible in other, newer literature, much has happened since 2008. Although, in his 2016 article, he also critically assesses Europol as a platform for intelligence-sharing. He explains some of Europol’s challenges to better coordinate counter terrorism efforts and intelligence-sharing, such as the “top-down origins” of the coordination efforts from Brussels, whereas the various EU states’ police and intelligence agencies has often “viewed Europol with a great deal of suspicion” (Bureš, 2016, p. 61). Bureš (2016, p. 58) argues that Europol is a long way from becoming a “genuine intelligence agency”, despite
European politicians’ promise to “improve the fight against terrorism via better intelligence sharing”. Delfem (2006, p. 354) also shares the argument of Bureš in that the top-down creation of Europol by the EU can “hinder effective cooperation”, as officials in individual states may perceive such as “accountability requirements as intrusions on their activities”. Björn Fägersten (2010) also examines the challenges to a more comprehensive European counter terrorism intelligence cooperation. He has tried to analyze the differences between government ambitions for such cooperation and the actual practical outcomes. In his view, Europol has not been able to live up to the tasks it has been given, despite governmental support among the European states. He points to bureaucratic resistance as a prominent contributor to the challenges of cooperation (p. 519).

Where many other scholars see the value and importance of agencies such as Europol as a facilitating and convening contributor to cooperation and exchange to better be able to counter threats, Julia Jansson (2016) see risks in handing responsibility for counter terrorism over to institutions like Europol. Jansson (2016) study Europol’s role in counter terrorism in an article where she explores an argued trend of losing accountability due to normalizing counter terrorist procedures when trying to build resilience to terrorism. She is somewhat critical to the cooperation going on in Europol, on the basis of the argument that Europol lacks accountability and democratic oversight (p. 12-13).
CHAPTER 4: FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

4.1 The OSCE

During the research process and conduction of interviews it became clear that my initial working thesis and impression of the OSCE had to be corrected. My interviews and observation made it apparent that the OSCE has no form of intelligence-sharing whatsoever. The organization has no intelligence function, or even a mechanism for it to be possible. There even is no classification system, meaning that all information is open and available to all 57 participating states and their representatives, regardless of position. This for the purpose of transparency. Contrary to my initial assumptions, as I came to understand, the OSCE is not an operational police or intelligence organization – it is merely a political one. According to the interviewees, the meaning of the OSCE has always been to facilitate dialogue and cooperation through sharing of experiences not actual information or intelligence. The OSCE was established during the Cold War, with the purpose of decreasing tension between the opposing sides. The organization was never thought to have an operational role or to include something so tactical as intelligence in its portfolio of work. Its focus areas and niche from the beginning has been, and was meant to be, capacity building, preventive diplomacy and awareness raising.

According to my interviewees, the distinctive membership of the organization is one of the reasons for this lack of operational status and sharing of information. One interviewee said that there is no intelligence sharing in the OSCE because you cannot have intelligence sharing among non-like-minded states. To be able to have an operational capacity you need like-minded states, and the OSCE’s participating states are frankly not like-minded. They belong to different blocks of worldviews, they read and look at facts differently. The list of the OSCE’s participating states include, among others, the Russian Federation, The United States of America, Canada, the EU with all its members, the Holy See, Armenia, Azerbaijan and various Central-Asian states. Because of the crucial differences among these states, the participating states of the OSCE collect intelligence about each other, rather than share it amongst themselves. No states have even attempted to create or suggested the establishment of an intelligence function at any time. The interviewees underlined that, like in the entire global environment at this time, there is little to no trust between many of the participating states of the organization, and you will most likely not share your collected, confidential
intelligence with states you do not trust. The scholars in the existing literature are torn between the positive and the negative effects of the OSCE’s diverse and large membership. Scholars like Charles Krupnick (1998) and Victor-Yves Ghebali (2009) argue that this is what makes the OSCE the most inclusive security organization in the world, where both smaller and larger states are able to be heard, and that the broad membership gives the OSCE the advantage of reaching into areas of the world where other organizations does not. On the other hand, Elena Kropatcheva (2012) point to the reality of conflicting self-interests among the broad specter of participating states and how this often limit agreement. No literature is written in the perspective of information sharing and the possibility of the OSCE having an intelligence function. In this dissertation, the observations on the challenges of the diverse membership was shared in direct response to questions of the possibility of intelligence sharing in a more operational OSCE. In that sense, the findings are arguably unique, however still tentative.

The OSCE facilitates a couple of technical systems, which I primarily thought were for the purpose of information sharing: POLIS, a platform maintained by the OSCE’s Transnational Threats Department, and an Advance Passenger Information (API) system. As it turns out, neither has anything to do with sharing of actual information. According to one of my interviewees, POLIS is a knowledge management and learning platform for information, meant for a community of experts from law enforcement agencies. It contains data from field operations, courses for training, sharing of experiences and presentations related to transnational threats and security, provided by the OSCE as part of their capacity building efforts. Further, the interviewee informed that even though the Advance Passenger Information (API) system in itself allows sharing of information, the OSCE’s role is to help participating states install the system, be able to use it, and thus facilitate the use of it. As soon as the system is up and running the OSCE has no further role to play and no access to the actual information shared in the system. As of today, only two participating states have a fully interactive system – the UK and the US. Others who have implemented the system only has one-way communication. The OSCE is in no possession of databases, data on individuals or any leads of such.

The OSCE region is one of massive tensions and major disagreements in numerous areas. Still today the region is affected by both direct conflicts and other frozen conflicts. Just because the organization helped put the Cold War to an end, does not mean they have been
able to dismantle all conflicts within their region, which is a vast one. One of the major focuses in the organization at this time is the direct conflict in Eastern Ukraine. Since the Russian Federation annexed Ukrainian Crimea in 2014, the OSCE has been a platform for and a facilitator of the process to solve the conflict. Both the Russian Federation and Ukraine are participating states in the OSCE. So are Georgia, with whom the Russian Federation also has difficult relations, following the Georgian-Russian conflict of 2008. The states of Armenia and Azerbaijan are involved in a frozen conflict, over the region of Nagorno-Karabakh. So are Moldova and the Transdniestrian authorities, a break-away-region, in a conflict reaching all the way back to 1992. Other areas in the OSCE region are also seeing rising tensions and difficulties. Thus, thinking that these participating states, of whom many are in severe conflict with each other, are able to leave their differences behind for the purpose of cooperation in the OSCE seems naive.

One of the OSCE’s major focus areas at the time is what they refer to as VERLT – violent extremism and radicalization that leads to terrorism. This is an area where most participating states see challenges in their countries and have an interest of cooperating on this increasingly transnational threat. Like most other actors, the OSCE has increasingly systematized its efforts to counter terrorism (Neumann, 2017, p. 29).

Through 2017, Norway held the position as chair of the OSCE Security Committee, under the organization’s first dimension. Norway has thus planned and chaired the committee meetings through the year, as well as the negotiations of new commitments prior to the Ministerial Council together with the Austrian chairmanship of the organization. Before and during the 2017 Ministerial Council, three proposals were discussed in the Security Committee with the aim of agreeing on new commitments. One of them was a text on VERLT. Through the negotiations, most participating states showed an explicit will and were eager to complete and agree on a text for new commitments related to VERLT. This has shown to be an important topic and focus area in a large number of participating states in the organization, including the US, the Russian Federation, the EU and Norway. It has been expressed that it is a topic in need of broader cooperation across the region. Despite this, the participating states were not able to agree on and adopt the text on VERLT at the Ministerial Council last year. Countering VERLT has become one of the cornerstones of the OSCE’s work and reaches into practically all areas and activities in the OSCE region (Neumann, 2017, p. 33). Already being such a large part of the organization’s work and comprehensive security approach, large efforts were
taken to be able to agree at the Ministerial Council. Individual consultations and negotiations were held between the states with the strongest disagreements and meetings lasted until the late hours several days in a row before the final day of the Council. Though highly unusual, the discussions even, at one point, reached the minister level at a small breakfast meeting. Despite desperate efforts, the proposed text did not reach consensus and a new commitment related to violent extremism, radicalization and terrorism was not adopted.

The causes behind the lack of ability to cooperate and agree on how to counter VERLT coincides with general trends regarding the OSCE. Its participating states do not share the same world views, the same strategies or the same priorities. They are not like-minded. Although they all agree that terrorism is damaging to international security, and needs to be countered and prevented, they differ on how to reach that goal. According to my interviewees, some states, the Russian Federation in particular, believe in and carry out a “harder”, “heavier” approach to countering and preventing terrorism – a reactive approach. They believe in reactively cracking down radicals, extremists and terrorists. Other states, Norway included, believe in a more proactive, preventive approach, where preventing the spread of radical individuals and terrorist organizations in the first place needs to be the focus. These differences creates some clear limitations to the cooperation.

Despite the differences and disagreements among states, the OSCE does make important contributions when it comes to countering terrorism and especially preventing VERLT. This conclusion is seen in the literature as well as expressed by my interviewees. Prevention of VERLT is a large focus in the OSCE’s field operations, in a collaboration between OSCE officials and the host countries. One of my interviewees, in conjunction with scholars such as Peter Neumann (2017), stressed the value of the OSCE’s strong local presence, particularly in Central Asia and the Western Balkans. The OSCE’s main trait, highlighted in a majority of the literature and by one of my interviewees, is its cross-dimensional, comprehensive security character in the fight against the multifaceted challenge of terrorism. In the counter terrorism efforts of the OSCE there is a link between traditional “hard” security, economic and environmental aspects and humanitarian concerns, which allows them to create a comprehensive and integrated approach to address the complex threats of terrorism (Freire, 2005, p. 206). The OSCE also have explicit projects and activities aimed at preventing radicalization and extremism, like the online communication campaign #UnitedCVE aimed at raising awareness about the appeal of violent extremism and supporting participating states in
creating National Action Plans (Neumann, 2017, p. 35). Finally, my interviewee stressed the value of the OSCE as a platform for sharing of best practices related to prevention of VERLT among participating states. This coincides with the findings of Peter Neumann (2017).

Though not a major focus of this dissertation, as it is often seen to be somewhat disconnected from the traditional counter terrorism efforts, cyber security is attracting increasing attention in both the OSCE and Europol. In the OSCE, efforts have been made to operationalize cooperation related to cyber threats and -security. The process and preliminary results of these efforts also illustrate the general climate for cooperation in the organization.

In 2012, the OSCE participating states agreed upon and adopted a decision to develop “confidence-building measures to reduce the risk of conflict stemming from the use of information and communication technologies” in PC decision 1039 (OSCE, 2012). The decision also tasked the OSCE chairmanship at the time to establish an “open-ended, informal OSCE working group” (IWG), with the purpose of, among other things, creating “a set of draft confidence-building measures (CBMs) to enhance interstate co-operation, transparency, predictability, and stability, and to reduce the risks of misperception, escalation, and conflict that may stem from the use of ICTs” (OSCE, 2012). Two sets of confidence-building measures (CBMs) related to cyber security has been adopted since, in 2013 and 2016.

The stage of implementation and operationalization offers difficulties for the OSCE. Within the informal working group established by the PC decision 1039, attempts are being made to operationalize some of the CBMs adopted. These efforts include, inter alia, creating channels and routines for participating states to cooperate and share information regarding cyber threats. I attended meetings in the informal working group when operationalization of CBM number 3 was up for discussion, and it was a heated one as such. CBM 3 is about voluntary consultations between participating states, which proved hard to agree on, even though ‘voluntarily’ was underlined. The diverse membership and the major differences between the states’ worldviews again stood in the way of cooperation. As my interviewees pointed out, you do not want to share cyber-related information with a participating state that you do not trust and that you are afraid will attack you. The operationalization of the CBMs and the establishment of mechanisms for cooperation and sharing of information has thus failed so far. It is also worth stressing that cyber security is inherently a technical problem, which the OSCE arguably does not have the capabilities to pursue at this time. This issue is also part of the discussion of implementation.
Although not an operational police organization, one of the OSCE’s focus areas is cooperation in the field of policing. The organization works for and promotes professional, democratic and pro-active police services within their participating states, to be able to respond to modern transnational threats, like terrorism. The focal point for the OSCE’s police-related work is the Transnational Threats Department’s Strategic Police Matters Unit (SPMU). The SPMU work with police agencies across the OSCE region and supports the participating states in countering criminal activity through training, assistance and promoting cross-border cooperation. Most of this work happens in the various field operations, where the OSCE supports and facilitates sharing of information and exchange of best practices across borders (Osce.org, 2018). Though the OSCE supports, encourages and in some way facilitates through connecting the participating states together, there is no actual sharing of information – operational information – through the OSCE. There might be neighboring countries in the region, where the OSCE have field operations, that exchange information, leads or names, but nothing happens through the OSCE. This is difficult to know without looking at each state and their bilateral relations. As mentioned, the only two countries in the OSCE so far fully interactive through the OSCE API system are the US and the UK. Since relations are bilateral and no operational activities are conducted through the OSCE, it is difficult to measure or estimate the impact or success of the OSCE’s police-related work.

Efforts were also made to agree on a collective commitment concerning so-called intelligence-led policing (ILP) last year. The text simply suggested states consider introducing proactive, intelligence-led policing as a law enforcement tool to complement traditional reactive methods. Due to initial disagreements, the text never reached the official negotiations and thus was not agreed. The participating states highly vary in their strategies and legal frameworks for police-related work, as they have no legally binding common strategies, making it hard to develop a common strategy for police work.

Neither the existing published work or my interviewees are able to predict how the OSCE will develop going forward and what place the organization will enjoy in the participating states’ foreign policy in the future. A decrease in interest from many of the participating states seems to be the recent trend. This is visible by the rather limited amount of resources going into the work of the organization. The OSCE Unified Budget for 2018 totals EUR 137,801,200, funded by the 57 participating states. These observations and expressed challenges within the organization are also highlighted in Marie Freire’s (2005) published work. Freire (2005, p. 208) argues that, inter alia, a lack of resources and consensus limits the OSCE’s ability to
implement its commitments. Together with limited resources, the states’ lack of focus on recruitment of qualified personnel and the lack of will from some states to take on the chairmanship indicates the decreasing interest. Illustrative of this was that in the spring of 2017, Norway announced their intentions of applying for the chairmanship in 2020. Due to this expressed interest, no other states considered applying for the same year. However, not long before the Ministerial Council in December 2017, Norway withdrew their interest and decided not to apply. Other commitments held a higher priority. Still, in spite of the decreasing interest and attention, the 2017 Ministerial Council also showed some signs of the OSCE being on the international radar when the Minister of Foreign Affairs from both the US and Russia attended the Council.

According to one of my interviewees, one of the challenges limiting the attraction of attention and priority is the lack of visibility of the components of the OSCE that actually creates results. The majority of the OSCE’s staff and resources go into the field operations and its work in the host countries. This is where most efforts are set into practice and where results are more clear. The headquarter in Vienna and the formal discussions are most visible to the various state capitals, where little practical work is done and disagreement persist. This is making the organization look less attractive and relevant to the state capitals and leads to limited priority. The interviewees definitely think the OSCE should remain relevant in the future and it should be in the interest of many participating states for it to do so. Even though the organization is flawed, it is better to work on and focus on improving what we have than do nothing at all. With the amount of disagreements and conflicts in the OSCE region, the OSCE is a place for them to meet on a daily basis, discuss differences and cooperate on common interests. However, the interviewees do not see the OSCE becoming more operational any time soon. It is meant to be a platform and a forum for dialogue and they think it will remain this way.

4.2 Europol

Contrary to the OSCE, one of the main purposes of Europol since its establishment has been, and still is, the exchange of information and intelligence. Europol is practical and operational, assists states in investigations, provides intelligence analyses, and facilitates an ever-developing cooperation and information sharing. One can say that Europol’s enterprise primarily consists of two parts. On the one hand, there is the office’s own permanent staff with the main purpose of assisting national authorities with analysis of information related to
criminality. On the other hand, there are the various national desks at the organization – the gathering and co-location of national police from the different states – with the purpose of cooperation and exchange of information among each other. At this point, about 16 countries has permanent liaisons located at Europol’s headquarters in The Hague.

Europol, as we now know and as the name constitutes, is a European Police Office, primarily facilitating cooperation between member states’ police services and exchange of information and intelligence related to police matters and investigations. In most European countries, the national police services are separated from the state’s security, or intelligence, services. Europol does in many cases also cooperate with states’ security services, but at this time that has to happen through bilateral relations with the various national services. The Hague is a center for security cooperation and counterterrorism efforts, both within and on the outside of Europol. Other offices, sometimes maybe even competing ones, has been developed through other structures for the same purposes of cooperation and exchange of information. The so-called Counter Terrorism Group (CTG) is one of these structures. Whereas Europol is a police organization and deals with police services and information and intelligence related to police work, the CTG is made up of various states’ intelligence and security services and is purely concerned with wider intelligence information. At this time, European cooperation among security services and exchange of intelligence does not primarily take place through Europol. However, cooperation among police services and exchange of information and intelligence related to police work and ongoing practical criminal cases does. As I will further explain, efforts are being made to further incorporate the intelligence of security services into Europol and expand the cooperation between Europol as a police agency and the CTG as a congregation of states’ security services.

Which national agency has the responsibility for counter terrorism varies among states. In some EU member states it is the police agencies, while in others it is the intelligence services. In the existing literature, Mathieu Deflem (2006, p. 351) and Oldrich Bureš (2016, p. 61) view this as an obstacle to Europol’s cooperation on counter terrorism, as cooperation across police and intelligence agencies tend to be difficult due to the agencies interest in different types of information. Whereas policing is designed around the aim of making arrests, intelligence agencies are interested in a wider type of information (Deflem, 2006, 351). The Nordic countries, as well as Austria, in particular, differ from the other European states in that their national police is also responsible for the security services in the respective countries. This
way, the same people and the same structures from the state is concerned with both security and intelligence as well as police related work. This means that the same personnel can represent their country at both Europol and the CTG. Contrary to Deflem (2006) and Bureš (2016), my interviewee argued that these countries seem to have an advantage, because it becomes easier for their capitals to maintain an overview of all efforts related to counterterrorism, across both police work and security services, and they can arguably cooperate with other states’ services more easily and efficiently.

Still today, the security services in the EU are a national matter and not an EU matter, but, according to my interviewee, there does seem to be a political development in the EU pointing towards the wish for a collective European security service or intelligence service. The CTG links the various security services together, but this structure lies outside of the EU and is simply an agreed cooperation framework between states with no formal organization or central authority. Highly evident at this time is a significant political pressure from the EU for security services and police services to establish a better cooperation. For now, this means a better cooperation between Europol and the CTG. Such cooperation has met certain challenges, mostly due to the fact that the CTG has no organizational structure or central authority for Europol to establish a relationship with. A closer relationship with the CTG would arguably strengthen Europol’s ability to counter terrorism.

The pressure for closer European cooperation on counterterrorism is mostly stemming from EU politicians and the EU Parliament, as Europol is largely controlled by the level of funding from the EU. Centrally in the EU the commissioner for counter terrorism and the counter terrorism group are major drivers for an ever-stronger Europol. Deflem (2006) and Bureš (2016) both argue that the “top-down” origins of Europol and its counter terrorism efforts and the continued coordination from Brussels are obstacles to the cooperation in Europol. Further, both argue that this has led many member states’ police and intelligence services to view Europol with suspicion and perceive Europol requirements as intrusions in their activities and on their autonomy (Bureš, 2016, p. 61; Deflem, 2006, p. 354). My interview indicated a different conclusion. Even though the driving powers seems to be central and top-down at an EU level, according to the interviewee, there is an overall positive perception of this development among the EU and Europol member states: all members are positive towards the utilization of Europol in counter terrorism efforts and work for the development of further cooperation. Processes for closer connections are already in motion, as discussions and
negotiations are taking place between Europol and CTG representatives. In addition to the lack of organizational structure in the CTG, another barrier is challenging the cooperation, i.e. the level of classification of information and intelligence. The classification of the information within the security services are generally much higher and stricter, meaning that the information is more difficult to exchange within Europol as a police organization. But, as Europol is eager to improve their counter terrorism abilities and level of cooperation, developments within the organization are taking place to be able to handle information on a higher classification level and thus more easily be able to cooperate with security services and exchange classified intelligence.

Despite a development towards closer cooperation and more utilization of Europol, the interviewee does not see a future where Europol is given executive powers. They will not come to a point where Europol takes on and initiates their own cases. That barrier is hard to break. The process will continue in the fashion where member states requests Europol for assistance. Even so, Europol has, through the later years, grown significantly in the field of counter terrorism, and is still continuing to do so. Europol’s counter terrorism section, the European Counter Terrorism Center (ECTC), is striving to establish themselves as the leading actor of counter terrorism in Europe and wish to be a flagship of counter terrorism. According to the interviewee, this should also be quite possible, considering the amount of resources going in to the center from the EU budgets. In 2018, Europol’s budget, financed from the EU community budget, totals EUR 123,245,520.

4.3 Comparison between OSCE and Europol

When looking at the OSCE and its operations, talking to experienced inside-officials and researching published literature, challenges and limitations to an effective cooperation became clear, as presented above. Its broad membership and lack of trust and similar interests clearly poses challenges, as well as the original establishment of the organization. As mentioned, the OSCE was not established based on an agreed upon treaty like other international organizations, it has blurry frames and still no legal status. Compared to this, Europol seems to be a well-functioning organization, where practical and effective cooperation takes place, due to the members’ wish for it to do so, according to the interviewee. There are some clear differences between the two organizations. For one, Europol is an EU structure, made up of members that are more or less like-minded and have
to a larger degree the same values and interests. When entering the EU and becoming part of the judicial cooperation, a state agrees to a certain level of cooperation. Further, Europol is based on a clear mandate, which guides their work and developments. The mandate is regularly re-evaluated and improved, lastly done in May of 2017.

Further, Europol has been able to grow and develop due to the fairly large share of resources allocated by the EU. This indicates that it enjoys priority among the EU members. Although the OSCE’s total 2018 budget is larger than the budget of Europol (EUR 137,801,200 vs EUR 123,245,520), one has to view this in a larger perspective. Europol is part of the EU – an EU agency – with a narrower more specialized purpose than the OSCE. The OSCE is a stand-alone organization with a much wider specter of work areas. Also, Europol has fewer financially supportive member states and far less staff to wage than the OSCE. Thus, the OSCE budget has to be allocated over a much larger number of posts and recipients than the budget of Europol.

It seems, then, that Europol, more so than the OSCE, have the basics in place. In addition, other factors also simplify its cooperation. For example, all liaisons representing various states are gathered at the same place, literally in the same building, scattered only over about five floors. They have access to each other on a daily basis, and thus have the ability to interact, cooperate and exchange information. They develop close working relationships with each other. Finally, about 20 years of specialized work has led to a significant amount of experience on how to best accomplish and maintain this cooperation.

One of the major differences between the OSCE and Europol, is each focus on proactivity or reactivity. Whereas one of the major advantages and added values of the OSCE lies in its ability to be proactive and focus on preventive measures, Europol is to a larger degree a reactive agency. A major part of the cooperation through Europol is based on pending cases, where information is exchanged after an event, in the process of the investigation. Here, Europol contributes with collection and analyses of data and works as a platform for the exchange of relevant information. The proactive parts of such investigations are to a larger degree done by the national security services. When something concrete has actually happened there is a shift in responsibility and the police services are in charge. Even though not considered the main part of Europol’s efforts, they do also contribute significantly on a more proactive level of investigation. Inter alia, information is being exchanged on
individuals under surveillance in pending cases, information about previous cases are used to potentially uncover new information in other cases, or information is cross-checked to possibly uncover others who might be in the process of planning an event. Though it is taking place and cooperation on these kinds of information is evident, it might vary to what degree from case to case and state to state. Often, a state’s police authorities might get preoccupied in their own investigations and will not prioritize the sharing of information with others until the very end.

A major contributor and actor within Europol has for long been the United Kingdom. When it comes to police work and services, the UK is an innovative nation, somewhat ahead of several other states, and has contributed greatly to the police-related work of Europol. With the UK’s exit from the EU (Brexit), my interviewee finds it hard to see Europol come out of the process with greater strength. Of course, the outcome and impact on Europol’s abilities depends somewhat on the decisions and agreements that will be made concerning the UK’s access, according to the interviewee. This is still under negotiations. Although, the interviewee does not believe that, when it comes to counter terrorism, the EU will want to make an example of the UK rather than securing the best security cooperation on the continent. Exclusion of the UK will not happen at the expense of security. There is much disagreement within both the academic and political discourse on what the consequences of Brexit will be on European security and intelligence cooperation, for either side. Scholar Claudia Hillebrand (2017, p. 93) highlights that the UK has traditionally been both a strong supporter for and user of Europol. She argues that Europol will lose a significant driving-force with the UK leaving the EU. She stresses that the UK has often been the leading actor when pushing further information-sharing initiatives at the EU level and have had major impacts on the developments of European security policies (p. 94). Even if the UK rejoins Europol as a third country, this ability will be lost (p. 94). Europol Executive Director Robert Wainwright have also been very vocal on the subject. He have expressed the UK contribution to policy-making in EU internal security to be invaluable, and argues that the UK is one of the most influential member states in shaping European internal security legislation (Wainwright, 2012, p. 5). Wainwright has also warned about the consequences for Britain, arguing that Brexit will harm Britain’s crime-fighting abilities (Rankin, 2016; Wright, 2018). Richard Dearlove, former Chief of the British Secret Intelligence Service, on the other hand, argue the opposite. He does not think Brexit will harm UK security, as he argues Britain provides the EU with much more intelligence than it gets back and find it hard to imagine that any other
EU state would want to end their collaborative relationship with the UK simply because they are no longer a member of the EU (Dearlove, 2016).

In recent years, specifically in the aftermath of larger terrorist attacks like in Brussels and Paris, the European security cooperation and Europol has received a lot of criticism and calls for better cooperation and exchange of information. To some degree, this is justified, and as presented by the interviewee, is being constantly worked with and improved. Europol is obviously dependent on the security structures in the various member states. Some states have been less effectively organized than others and some still have challenges to overcome. But in the last years, most states have developed and improved certain barriers to better organization and cooperation. According to my interviewee, inter alia, national legal frameworks have been significantly improved to counter the threat of terrorism. For example, legal barriers in several countries created major limitations for information exchange. For the last three to four years, this has improved throughout. Second, laws related to participation in terrorist organizations has also changed. In Norway, for example, participating in a terrorist organization is now considered a criminal offense, making it easier to penalize foreign terrorist fighters, for instance. Such legal improvements have in turn developed the focus and priorities of the security services in various states.

Though some criticism may be justified and needed for Europol, or any security structure, to improve and develop further, the problem basically is that its is too large. There are too many individuals classified as dangerous or of concern, and Europol does not have the capacity to keep track of all of them. There simply are not enough resources, and there never will be enough to attain that ability. All in all, based on the inside-views and information of the interviewee, and secondary literature, the cooperation in Europol is well-functioning. Further, there are, at this time, larger processes for improving cooperation further and creating better connections among Europol’s member states for them to better connect databases and exchange information. According to the interviewee, all member states are onboard and positively leaned towards these developments and improvements. The basic reason might be that no state dares to obstruct the work for better cooperation, considering what the consequences might be. If events happen and officials within the security services know further work could have been done to avoid it beforehand, that would be hard to bare. They have then failed in the mission to keep the populations safe from threats, and it is in every states interest to succeed in this task.
4.4 International security and intelligence cooperation in the current political climate

The history of the world and its developments move back and forth through time, in the eyes of western democratic values, multilateralism, peace and stability. At this point in time, in the view of one of my interviewees, one can argue that “progress” of liberal democracies are taking steps backwards. This is visible by the trend of inward and nationalistic thinking across both Europe and North America. The interviewee, who has spent his entire working life in international politics, see that the interest for multilateral work is decreasing among states and politicians. Several countries are becoming more introvert and focused on domestic challenges, persuaded by the thought of turning their back on the collective international system for the advantage of perceived national interests. This has shown to be appealing in both Europe and the US, although my interviewee considers this to be short-sighted.

The US has elected a president based on the thought of “America first” and who retracts the US from international obligations and commitments. The UK is leaving the European Union, and the results of the exit on the multilateral cooperation remains to be seen. These observations coincides with trends explored by several distinguished scholars and professionals. For one, Richard Haass (2017, p. 2), president of the Council on Foreign Relations, emphasize that nationalism and populism are now on the rise and that a rejection of globalization and international involvement is evident. He argues that the world now needs a new operating system that reflects the modern realities (p. 2). None other than Francis Fukuyama (2016) also explores the trends of leaning away from international cooperation with the example of what he argues to be a dysfunctional America. Fukuyama (2016) argues that the election of nationalistic Trump as the American president could potentially lead to an “unravelling of the liberal world order”, which the US “has done much to build since the 1950s”. Max Boot (2017), senior fellow for national security studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, similarly argues that “the foremost threat we face today is that globalism may once again go into reverse as it did in 1914, because the United States – for so many decades its foremost champion – may now, under Trump, become a hindrance rather than a help to transnational trade and cooperation”.

My interviewee stressed that the level of trust between states is at a low, and that countries neither want to reveal their weaknesses nor capabilities to others. Suspicion supersedes the
willingness to cooperate, and a number of pressing, transnational challenges like terrorism and migration has, alongside some’s call for further cooperation, also increased the level of national populist rhetoric among both populations and politicians. These trends leave the future of multilateralism uncertain. Neither Haass (2017), Fukuyama (2016), Boot (2017) or my interviewee favor these trends or see them as a positive development in the eyes of what is best for the citizens of the world – and in this case for the ability to counter terrorism.

The OSCE proves to be a good example of the global political climate because of their list of participating states, which contains a number of countries who certainly do not trust each other, who have complicated relationships or even are in conflict with each other. The basic differences between states from different areas of the world and opposing theoretical camps become very clear in the discussions in the OSCE. It really depicts the differences between International Relations theories in real life.

Even though many now view the trends in multilateral cooperation with dread and frustration, the EU system might seem to be the one to persist in the best way, despite the circumstances, according to the interviewee. Although several EU states are also facing nationalistic, populist trends, the European system still prevails, maybe due to their supranational structures. As presented above, my research indicates that the European security cooperation through Europol is enjoying support from all member states and no one seems to be opposing the developments for further cooperation. Even despite the exit of the UK, the research for this dissertation indicates no lesser degree of willingness among other EU member states to continue improving Europol’s efforts.
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION

The aim of this dissertation has been to study the similarities and differences in characteristics in the OSCE and Europol to understand how this impacts their ability to cooperate and exchange information and intelligence, mainly for the purpose of counter terrorism, and whether or not the two structures impact the level of security in the Transatlantic and Eurasian region, specifically Europe, and in what way. Further, the findings were to be used to look at the nature of international security and intelligence cooperation as a whole in the political climate of the day.

Despite looking somewhat similar from the outset and although they do focus on many of the same work areas, the research has revealed some clear differences between the OSCE and Europol. Some of the main differences lie in the basic background of the organizations and the frames in which they operate. Despite statements that it seeks to promote security, the OSCE is not an operational organization, not a police- or an intelligence organization, and it thus has no operational powers. It is a political organization, where the purpose has been, from the establishment during the Cold War until today, capacity building, preventive diplomacy and awareness raising, through functioning as a platform for dialogue and cooperation. Experiences and best-practices are exchanged in it, rather than actual operational information. Contrary to the OSCE, one of the main purposes of Europol since its establishment has been, and still is, the exchange of information and intelligence. Europol is practical and operational, assists states in investigations, provides intelligence analyses, and facilitates an ever-developing cooperation and information sharing.

In addition to revealing clear differences of operations, the research also indicated that the ability to cooperate clearly varies between the two structures. Even though the OSCE is mainly based on voluntarily engagement and implementation of commitments, it still struggles with disagreements and limitations to its cooperation. One of the main challenges that became clear through the research is the OSCE’s diverse membership. The organization is made up of a group of states from different areas in the world, which possess different worldviews and interests: they are basically not like-minded states. In fact, many of the participating states are in either direct conflict with each other or part of frozen conflicts. Further, this leads to a lack of trust among the participating states. In addition, the OSCE
enjoys no legal status or legal personality. This means that the implementation of any agreed commitment depends solely on the states’ political will. Thus, specific implementation and operationalization of sometimes vague declarations often proves to be a challenge. The OSCE also suffers from fluctuating interest from the participating states. Thus, the amount of resources available and recruitment of qualified personnel present persistent challenges.

More so than the OSCE, Europol has a basic capability for a more successful cooperation. First of all, Europol is an EU structure, made up of members that are more or less like-minded and have to a larger degree the same values and interests. Second, Europol is based on a clear mandate, which has been there from the beginning, but that is also regularly reevaluated and improved. Third, Europol enjoys a valuable amount of resources allocated from the EU level, giving them the ability to grow and develop. This also shows that Europol is prioritized by the EU countries.

As clarified through the research for this dissertation, Europol is only made up of police services and primarily exchange information related to police work and investigations, rather than proactive intelligence. In The Hague, the CTG are the ones primarily concerned with wider intelligence and link national security services together. Even though the CTG is not an official, structured organization with a central authority, but rather a collective agreement between individual states, efforts are being made to create a closer and better cooperation between the CTG and Europol, and thus a better cooperation between police- and security services. This is considered to be crucial to be able to attain an even better ability to counter terrorism in Europe. This is now an ongoing process, where Europol is developing its structures to be able to handle information and intelligence on a higher level of classification, which will be necessary to be able to connect police- and intelligence services more than they are today.

This dissertation’s main focus has been the handling of counter terrorism, and thus the impact on security and a safer environment for civilians. Here, it has become visible that the two organizations have significantly different ways of working, despite a large focus on the matter in each agency, but that both structures contribute to security and counter terrorism in their own way.
The OSCE’s added value on the topic seems to be its large preventive and proactive focus, where preventing radicalization and violent extremism through all work areas in its organization is a large focus. Collective preventive efforts and sharing of experiences and best practices on how to prevent violent extremism and radicalization that leads to terrorism (VERLT) from each individual country’s knowledge contribute to preventing terrorism. Even though the OSCE participating states show large differences in their views and definitions of both terrorism and the best way to tackle it, and are having a hard time agreeing at the central level in Vienna on the rhetoric of new commitments, valuable initiatives are being played out in the field operations and various participating states. On the other hand, Europol is primarily a reactive agency, assisting in investigations after an actual event have occurred and exchanges information on ongoing investigations. I initially also wanted to find out if Europol does exchange information proactively, inter alia on suspected individuals or terror plots. My research of published works and my interview with a Europol officer at the center of counter-terrorism policies, indicates that some parts of Europol’s work do exactly that. They crosscheck information between cases and see if information from one case can be used to uncover other plots and they exchange information on individuals under surveillance. Although this form of proactive efforts varies and is not always given the highest priority among the various national police services, information exchange is being conducted and Europol is, as mentioned, in the process of improving and developing this proactive cooperation.

Based on the above findings, my research indicates that despite the fundamentally different operations between the OSCE and Europol, and their methods of work, the two organizations do in fact pursue the same overarching goal: to ensure the security for the citizens, institutions and democratic values of their respective regions. And in the light of the main topic of this dissertation: to protect them from the threat of terrorism. I also argue that the OSCE and Europol complement each other in this work and as structures for security cooperation. Terrorism is a multifaceted and complex threat, one that breaches borders and nationalities. Preventive as well as reactive efforts are necessary to minimize the possible damages it can create and help reach this ultimate goal of security.

The findings of both organizations can be used to get an overarching image of the global political climate of today. The OSCE is arguably a suitable example of the general trends within the current international system, where the level of trust is low and the ability and will
to cooperate is fluctuating. It can seem that the interest for multilateral cooperation is being overthrown by the wish to protect own interests, resources and security. Some states, such as the US, are questioning the value of multilateral work and taking practical steps to withdraw from certain international obligations. Different direct and frozen conflicts are pressuring the international judicial order. The future of multilateralism is uncertain. However, the research conducted indicates that the member states of Europol are able to cooperate to a much larger degree than those of the OSCE. It seems that, despite the decrease of some public faith in multilateralism and interest in multilateral cooperation, the EU system is persisting. Here, despite the UKs exit from the EU, the will to further improve cooperation and develop the abilities to collectively counter terrorism is evident in all member states, due to their common wish to succeed in the task of protecting their citizens.

5.1 Contributions of the study

This dissertation has attempted to contribute to the existing research, understanding and theorization of international security and intelligence cooperation, the nature of this cooperation at the OSCE and Europol, the states’ ability to cooperate and its value to the member states’ security, all mainly in relation to counter terrorism.

As mentioned, general positive theories of intelligence, how intelligence operates successfully and not, as well as theories of intelligence cooperation, are rare. This despite how the presence and need of intelligence cooperation has become more prominent in later years, due to a rise in transnational threats such as international terrorism and other organized crime, as well as coalition operations among states. As I point out in chapter 3, one of the reasons for this omission in academic theory could be that, traditionally, intelligence cooperation between states has been very sensitive, and so governments are reluctant to declassify records. Theorization of intelligence cooperation has thus been difficult if not impossible since theorization relies on historical case studies.

This dissertation has attempted to study what characteristics can either challenge or advance security and intelligence cooperation, and thus contribute into the attempts of creating theories of intelligence cooperation. The findings of this study, revealing traits within the OSCE and Europol that limits or supports the organizations’ ability to cooperate, and thus indicates certain characteristics which seems to be an advantage for a well-functioning
intelligence cooperation, extend the existing published literature on the subject and contributes into the generation of such a theory. However, because of the fact that the findings of this dissertation is based on a very small data set and are considered to be preliminary and tentative, it is difficult for this study to contribute in any meaningful or significant way to the building of theory in intelligence. Further research will have to be conducted, with a much larger data set and a combination of a more historical approach together with the novel information. Although, this dissertation serves as a basis for this further research.

Despite the still limited meaningful contribution of this study to the theorization of intelligence cooperation, I would preliminary, based on my findings, agree with the arguments of Phythian (2009) and Munton (2009) in that intelligence holds an implicit place in the international relations theory of realism: intelligence assumes several realist principles, specifically related to ensuring national security, protecting the state from the anarchic world system and serving the national self-interest. As Munton (2009, p. 126) points out, realism also constitutes that states who are considered allies will “attempt to cooperate in the face of a common threat”. This coincides with my research findings, where the allies who are members of Europol willingly engage in a comprehensive intelligence cooperation to counter their common threats, here specifically terrorism. However, Munton (2009) also argues that traditional realist notions are not sufficient for understanding international intelligence cooperation. He also looks to liberalism and constructivism as theories that can feed into the realist principles with their focus on the “role of international institutions, the social norms they foster, and the interests states construct on issues, including intelligence” (p. 138). As my research also indicates, the EU system serving as a supranational institution seems to play a significant role for the member states’ ability to continue and develop their cooperation. Accordingly, this indicates that international institutions, the norms they foster and the interest in issues and ideas matter.

Theoretical foundations meant to analyze intelligence and intelligence cooperation seems unfit to analyze the cooperation going on in the OSCE, as it became clear during the research process that the OSCE has no intelligence function and does not facilitate any form of intelligence cooperation or exchange of operational information. Because of their major differences, many of the participating states in the OSCE actually perceive each other as threats to their national security rather than allies, and thus collect intelligence about each other rather than share it amongst themselves. Of course, this does not apply to all OSCE
participating states, as several allying states are part of the organization, but the OSCE cooperation have not been extended into a more operational purpose mainly due to the diverse membership of conflicting states and their lack of trust in each other.

Even if researching the OSCE does not specifically advance or add to the existing literature on intelligence cooperation, it provides valuable insight into the states’ ability to cooperate for general security purposes and specifically counter terrorism. When it comes to the OSCE, generally very little literature exists regarding the organization’s value and especially their counter terrorism efforts. This dissertation now adds to the limited discourse, with novel information and observation. Albeit, the research done here seems to often agree with much of the already existing literature about the organization. My research indicates that the OSCE has much added value with its broad and comprehensive collaboration, although not operational cooperation, in the Transatlantic and Eurasian counter terrorism work. This is seen in its large preventive efforts to counter radicalization and violent extremism, solve and prevent violent conflicts and promote human rights. Still, as others in the literature have pointed to as well, it seems that the OSCE see major challenges in their cooperation and specifically implementation, due to such as disagreements and conflicting views, lack of trust and limited resources.

On the other hand, the research conducted here on the part of Europol does not match quite as well with the main arguments visible in the existing literature. The literature indicates that the cooperation in Europol is rather limited, suffering from major challenges and flaws. In this study, the interviewee gave the impression that all states’ police- and security services support and have an interest in the developments and improvements for closer cooperation and that none of the states are opposing this. In addition, the interview indicated that the counter terrorism cooperation at Europol is working quite well at this point, and that processes are taking place to further attempt to improve their efforts and abilities. Frankly, some mistakes have to be made, because they are not possible to avoid. But to a large extent, Europol appears to be well-functioning and handles their goals of countering terrorism well, contributing to a safer Europe.

No previous analyses or comparisons have been done between the OSCE and Europol, their member states’ ability to cooperate and what factors impact this ability. Obviously, it became clear during the research process that I might be comparing oranges and apples in this study.
Even so, the comparison of characteristics between the two can arguably give a valuable impression of what basic traits are needed in an organization to be able to obtain a well-functioning cooperation, both on intelligence specifically, on counter terrorism and on various other matters, and what traits seems to obstruct cooperation. However, again it needs to be stressed that the conclusions made in this study are extremely tentative and preliminary. Even though I triangulated my findings with existing, written sources, it is difficult to draw any broad conclusions from a small data sample, of just three interviews, but this is precisely what I intend to do with further research.
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Appendix – Interview Guides

OSCE interview guide

- Is there any form of intelligence sharing in the OSCE?
- Why is there no intelligence function?
- Is the OSCE, or the participating states, in any way sharing information and cooperating in a practical way to prevent and counter e.g. terrorist attacks?
- Do the OSCE aspire in any way to cooperate on sharing intelligence and information, in a more practical and operational way, to increase the security in the region? E.g. when it comes to border security etc.
- What is the functions of the POLIS network? Is there further potential for utilizing it and communicate on possible threats?
- What are the functioning of the advance passenger information (API) systems? What are the aims? Potential? Are these efforts complimentary to the EU or in some ways a duplication?
- There are efforts for operationalizing, e.g. attempts to further develop communication related to cyber-attacks. What is preventing or limiting the operationalization?
- In general, what are the challenges to more practical, operational work related to countering transnational threats and cooperate on border security and management, cyber security, policing etc.?
- What are the big frustrations you see in your areas of work?
- What would you change if you could? What would you wish to be different?
- What lies in the future? Where is the OSCE going, specifically in terms of further cooperation, countering of transnational threats. What role will the OSCE play in European security and intelligence cooperation in the future?
Europol interview guide

- To what degree do the member states of Europol share intelligence and cooperate?
- Do you think there is “enough” sharing?
  Do some states want to share less/more than others?
- What characteristics do Europol have, that makes them able to have this level of cooperation and to share intelligence?
- The information systems, SIENA etc: are they being used and fed with information and utilized by the states?
  Are they effectively being used?
  Is Europol directly involved and have access to the information? Develop analyses?
- How do the different Europol databases/information systems work?
  Do all states use them? Update them? Are they being considered “successful”? Are they being utilized to the full?
- (Do states want work related to cyber security in Europol? Is it a big focus there, or does it duplicate other venues? Are states able to cooperate on cyber security in Europol?)
- Do Europol focus mostly on reactive or proactive efforts?
- Do they share information about individuals of concern or suspected radicalized individuals? Who they are worried can preform terrorist attacks? Do they share info on individuals moving between states? Foreign terrorist fighters?
- What impact do you believe Europol have on European security?
- What role do you see Europol have in the future? Will Europol take on a more executive role? Become closer to a “European FBI/CIA”? Do states want this? Do you think it is something that Europol should want to do?
- Brexit – what do you think are the consequences for Europol intelligence cooperation?
- After terrorist attack, for example specifically the Paris attacks in 2015, there has been much criticism of European intelligence cooperation and sharing and calls for better cooperation. Do you think this criticism has been valid? Was it deserved? If so, has measures been taken in the last couple of years to enhance effort?
- What are the challenges to cooperation and exchange of information in Europol?
- What are the biggest frustrations you see? Are there anything you would wish to be different?