United in the Fight Against A-krim

A Case Study of an Interorganizational Collaboration between Norwegian Public Entities

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Master’s Thesis, MSc in Economics and Business Administration, INB & BUS

NORWEGIAN SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS

This thesis was written as a part of the Master of Science in Economics and Business Administration at NHH. Please note that neither the institution nor the examiners are responsible – through the approval of this thesis – for the theories and methods used, or results and conclusions drawn in this work.
Preface

This master’s thesis is our final work as students at NHH and is written in cooperation with the FOCUS programme which we are proud to be a part of.

We, the researchers, have known each other for 21 years and have been best friends from the day we met. Little did we know that we would be writing our master’s thesis together. In the fall of 2017 the thesis journey begun, and we could not have chosen a more interesting topic although the work has been exhaustive. As we are very socially engaged and hold justice by heart, the a-krim collaboration was right on point. We have learned a lot and are well equipped to move forward to other chapters in our lives.

We want to thank our supervisor Torstein Nesheim for constructive feedback and for assisting us in times of need. Secondly, we want to thank our respondents for participating and for being honest and open, and very welcoming. Keep up the good work, we admire you all! We also want to thank our boyfriends and family for motivating and supporting us along the way, for years. Finally, we might as well thank ourselves for laughter, discussions and commitment. There have been many long nights, and we could not have made it without one another. We truly feel blessed for all the memories this journey gave.

Bergen, 20.06.2018

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Maureen Kvistad

Rakel Olava Mørch
Summary

In this master’s thesis we study the interorganizational collaboration (IoC) between Norwegian public entities in the fight against labor crime, or arbeidslivskriminalitet in Norwegian, further referred to as a-krim. The collaboration was established in 2015 as a result of The Government Strategy Against A-krim, and the strategy was revised and further strengthened in 2017, as the collaboration turned out to be value-adding and successful. The IoC mainly consist of Politiet, Skatteetaten, NAV and Arbeidstilsynet, whom all are affected by a-krim in some way, and these are the entities we study.

Our general proposition was that characteristics of the individual entities were entrenched in the IoC, meaning the entities also used the collaboration as a tool to realize own priorities. We have made a model specifically designed for our study, which consists of six defined characteristics. The characteristics are; Mandate & Authority, Goals & Performance, Structure, Information Sharing, Resources, and A-krim Strategy & Practices. We have examined these characteristics in our analysis, in order to answer both how and why they affect the interorganizational collaboration. The model and characteristics are inspired and built on interorganizational theory, as well as earlier research on the a-krim collaboration. As we explore and describe a phenomenon, the a-krim collaboration, we have a qualitative study. Our research strategy is a single case study with multiple analysis units, whereas we have conducted 12 semi-structured interviews.

We verified our general proposition; the entities’ characteristics affect the collaboration. Further, we find strategic anchorization of a-krim to be essential for the IoC’s efforts. Based on our empirical analysis we have seven overarching findings. We find: 1) Equivocal governance flow to be apparent, 2) Compounded complexity in the IoC, 3) Politiet holds a superior role while in a predicament, 4) Effects and efficiency of the IoC questionable, 5) Skatteetaten and Arbeidstilsynet as dominators and influencers, 6) The IoC’s time aspects as misaligned to fight a-krim, and 7) A collaboration that lacks (common) communication.
## Translations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Norwegian Term</th>
<th>English Equivalent</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A-krim</td>
<td>Arbeidslivskriminalitet (Work-related crime)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allmennpreventiv</td>
<td>Public prevention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arbeidstilsynet</td>
<td>The Norwegian Labor Inspection Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arbeids og Velferdsdirektoratet</td>
<td>The Labor and Welfare Directorate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control</td>
<td>Tilsyn eller kontroll</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Departementene</td>
<td>The Ministries of Norway</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disponeringsskriv</td>
<td>Allocation Letter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Felles Handlingsplan</td>
<td>The Joint Action Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forvaltningslov</td>
<td>Administration Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMS</td>
<td>HSE (Health, Safety &amp; Environment)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individualprevensjon</td>
<td>Individual prevention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kemner</td>
<td>Municipal Treasurer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAV</td>
<td>The Norwegian Labor and Welfare Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NTKG</td>
<td>National Interdepartmental Coordination Group (Norway)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NTAES</td>
<td>National Interdepartmental Analysis and Intelligence Center (Norway)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politiet</td>
<td>The Norwegian Police Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politidirektoratet</td>
<td>The Police Directorate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pålegg</td>
<td>Injunction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Økokrim</td>
<td>Norwegian Central Unit for Investigation and Prosecution of Financial Crime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skatteetaten</td>
<td>The Norwegian Tax Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strafferettspleie</td>
<td>Criminal justice care</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Styringsbrev</td>
<td>Management Letter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Svart arbeid</td>
<td>Undeclared work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tolletaten</td>
<td>The Norwegian Customs Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tildelingsbrev</td>
<td>Letter of Award</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tvetydig</td>
<td>Equivocal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<td>--------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>AT</td>
<td>Arbeidstilsynet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cf.</td>
<td>jf.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSSF</td>
<td>Det Sentrale Samarbeidsforum (The Central Collaboration Forum)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FTE</td>
<td>Full-time equivalent (Årsverk)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GnP</td>
<td>Goals and performance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IoC</td>
<td>Interorganizational Collaboration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LKG</td>
<td>Lokal Koordineringsgruppe (Local Coordination Group)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSD</td>
<td>The Norwegian Center for Research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTG</td>
<td>Overtredelsesgebyr (Penalty fee)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POD</td>
<td>Politidirektoratet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p.t.</td>
<td>Pro Tempore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RQ</td>
<td>Research question</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSG</td>
<td>Regional Styringsgruppe (Regional Steering Group)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skatt</td>
<td>Skatteetaten</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SG</td>
<td>Styringsgruppen (Steering Group)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The IoC</td>
<td>The a-krim collaboration</td>
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1. Introduction

Have you ever paid under the table? If yes, you are not alone, even public purchases may be sinners. In 2006 every 4th Norwegian bought undeclared work\(^1\), and we can only imagine what the numbers are today with increased population and immigration. But what does this have to do with me and you? This affects us as normal citizens, as criminals are basically stealing from our back-pocket. Undeclared work means less income to the welfare state, and thus public services that we enjoy are reduced. But to measure the extent of how much is lost is difficult, and Skatteetaten calculated that tax and fee evasion can cost society 40 billion NOK annually. This is more than Norway use on higher education in total, or double of what it cost to operate Politiet (Holte, 2017). However, this is just the tip of the iceberg. Undeclared work, together with financial crime, social security fraud and more make up something which we call working crime, and which will be the topic of this thesis.

Working crime is a highly complex and serious type of crime that is apparent in all work-related situations and is becoming an increasing challenge for society as a whole. In Norway working crime, hereinafter referred to as arbeidslivskriminalitet (a-krim), is defined by Departementene (2017) as; “Actions that violate Norwegian laws regarding salary- and work conditions, social security, and taxes & fees, usually carried out organized, which exploits employees or distorts competition while undermining the structures of society”.

To address a-krim in Norway, a national strategy was implemented in 2015. This recent government initiative was put into effect for establishing a collaboration between the main public entities dealing with the issue (Departementene, 2017). The main public players are Politiet, Skatteetaten, NAV, and Arbeidstilsynet. In 2017, the initiative was further revised and the efforts against a-krim were strengthened. Politiet prevents criminal acts and enforces criminal law (Politiloven, 1995, §1), thereby playing a superior role in tackling a-krim through investigation, sanctions and prosecution tools (NTAES, 2017). Skatteetaten ensures the financing of the welfare society in Norway (Skatteetaten, n.d.), and is subject to a-krim in terms of ID-fraud, tax- and fee evasion. NAV is the labor- and welfare administration and

\(^1\) Reference: Mykkeltvedt (2006); NSD; European Social Survey
contributes to a well-functioning society (Berg, 2015), making them exposed to social security frauds. Arbeidstilsynet ensures occupational safety and health thereby protection of employees in the labor market through supervision based on several laws, and breach any of these may qualify as a-krim (Arbeidstilsynet, n.d).

The entities have different challenges when working against a-krim, which is why a collaboration is needed. Collaboration between actors can lead to achieving goals one could not have reached alone (Haugland, 2004). However, the collaboration is highly complex as the individual public entities differentiate on many levels, as well as a-krim is complex itself. Per today there are seven local a-krim centres located in cities in Norway, which started out as three in 2015. Furthermore, the a-krim collaboration has become more formalized during the years, and thus the fight against a-krim has become more targeted, organized and interdepartmental since 2015. The next chapter will give a better insight to the context and case at hand.

1.1 The Purpose of The Thesis

The topic of the thesis is a-krim, while the theme we study is interorganizational collaboration between the main public entities fighting against a-krim in Norway. To study the interorganizational a-krim collaboration, there are two important levels to understand; A) the characteristics of the different public entities, and B) the collaboration itself. A and B are ratios that relates to each other. In so, the purpose of the thesis is to answer our research question;

“To analyze how and why characteristics of the different public entities affect the interorganizational collaboration on a-krim?”

1.2 Limitaions

Due to our time horizon and the constraints on size of a master’s thesis, it is not possible to study all aspects of the a-krim collaboration. We therefore saw it as necessary to draw large limitations. Seeing from our research question, we only have the means to study the collaboration between the most relevant players. Whereas there are other relevant players who touches a-krim in which we do not consider in our study. These parties include entities such as Tolletaten, Mattilsynet and Statens Vegvesen, market players, non-
governmental agencies like LO and municipalities. Further, tripartite collaborations will not be looked upon.

Emphasis will be on the collaboration on an overall level, not going into specific tasks or operational work of the collaboration, nor do we compare the local collaboration units against each other. By an overall level, we study the formalized collaboration through multiple views; national, regional and local level, which we then combine to get a general understanding of the collaboration and the main entities within, for the purpose of answering the research question. There are also unformalized a-krim collaborations throughout the country, these are not considered in our study.

We also address the fact that we will not be able to discuss all topics and themes acquired from the data collection. We therefore limit ourselves to the most important topics within each defined characteristic that is most central for the a-krim collaboration, and in which we believe are our main findings.

1.3 The Structure of The Thesis

This thesis will deviate a bit in structure compared to a traditional master’s thesis. The reason for this is because we believe it is important to explain the empirical context and specific case at hand, the a-krim collaboration, before theory and model is presented. In so, the reader will get a better understanding of the theory and our model. The structure will therefore be as follows; context & case, theory & previous research, synthesis & model, methods, findings & empirical analysis, discussion, and finally conclusion.

The next chapter will thereby give a presentation of a-krim and its scope, The Government Strategy Against A-krim, the a-krim collaboration in Norway, and lastly an introduction of the main public entities we focus on. Other than that, we wish you an interesting reading.
2. Case & Empirical Context

A-krim involves numerous types of crime, and an element that stands out is that there is often a feature of multi-crime. It is therefore characterized by systematic violations of one or more regulations (NTAES, 2017). In so, a-krim is a serious type of crime that could be apparent in all work-related situations and is becoming an increasing challenge for those involved; employees, organizations and the society. To have a prosperous and serious work-life in Norway, the rules of the game need to be adhered and the fight against a-krim must be hindered and fought (Departementene, 2017).

The Situasjonsbeskrivelsen 2017 written by NTAES, is a report to the Norwegian Government about the a-krim situation in Norway and has some main findings about the severity and main challenges of a-krim. The most common form of a-krim is undeclared work and turnover in connection with social dumping. Criminal businesses tend to professionalize and adapt to the control agencies efforts, where they can appear to be legitimate but is in fact not, this may be viewed as window dressing. A-krim is dynamic in the way that networks and traffickers can operate in several industries simultaneously or shift industry over time. For instance, criminals that earlier operated in the construction industry is now seen in publicly funded health-care services. Further, there are new methods to evade employer’s responsibility, and criminals may register fictional employees thereby giving them rights to obtain NAV-benefits (Politidirektoratet, 2017). Simultaneously, the authorities face challenges with foreign businesses due to uncertainty of where the business is liable in terms of tax and sanctions, as well as the complexity of abroad payments and lack of information (NTAES, 2017). Because of the wide variety in ways to commit a-krim, it is complex by nature. This is why it is difficult to fight, and hence pose a great threat to society.

Another factor that concerns a-krim is the relationship towards social dumping and internationally organized crime. The international aspect is necessary to consider, especially in respect to a-krim and its roots in migration and labor mobility. The term social dumping describes relations where foreign employees is affected by poor work conditions that may be illegal. For example, if they are offered unacceptable poor terms of pay compared to
Norwegian employees. However, a-krim involves criminal offences that are sanctionable and unlawful, whereas social dumping necessarily does not (NTAES, 2017).

The efforts against a-krim have been ongoing for some time between the entities; Politiet, Skatteetaten, NAV and Arbeidstilsynet, even though the term a-krim is fairly new. Earlier efforts and joint actions done across the entities was initiated under other terms, for example in terms of social dumping or organized crime. The efforts have now become more formalized and interdepartmental the last years due to the development and increased complexity of the problem (NTAES, 2017).

According to NTAES (2017), the entities possess different strengths in the efforts against a-krim. The gain of the a-krim collaboration is that the entities have access to more means than each entity alone. Means can be work methods to detect crime, sanctions and authorization. Each entity’s means are tailored to their social mission, for instance some entities can sanction immediately while others may hold better detection methods which in turn is more time consuming. So, the wishful situation is to combine the entities’ strengths and competence so that they are more powerful together. NTAES (2017) explains that the gains of co-location of a-krim centers are linked to awareness between the entities. For instance, more knowledge of the various entities’ detection and sanction possibilities further contributes to choosing the most cost-effective sanctioning tools.

2.1 The Government’s Strategy Against A-krim

In January 2015, the Norwegian Government presented a strategy against a-krim. The strategy was made in dialogue with the main organizations in the labor market. It entails two central directions for efforts; a cooperation between all actors in the organized work life, and improved coordination between the public entities so that their joint efforts will be as powerful as possible. Two years later in 2017, The Strategy Against A-krim was revised and reinforced because a-krim had become more extensive and complex, as well as the collaboration seemed to be effective (Departementene, 2017). The strategy involves seven main areas for action for the fight against a-krim (all with different measures). Since we only study the four main entities in collaboration, some of these main areas surpasses our thesis. We therefore focus on the Control and Monitoring direction of the strategy.
In the Government Strategy (2017) it is stated that each entity shall highly prioritize its efforts against a-krim. Better sharing of information is necessary to ensure effective follow-up from public authorities. In so, increased coordination and enhanced information flow between public entities will contribute to a more integrated and coordinated fight against a-krim. The different directorate's governing Politiet, Skatteetaten, NAV and Arbeidstilsynet develop The Joint Action Plan for the collaboration and its objectives. Further the entities should have resources available to the collaboration, so the entities can fight a-krim most efficiently. A collaborative goal is to use the most effective means and sanctions that the entities dispose, to hinder criminal businesses to continue or reduce their capacity to drive their business over time. Further, the collaborative goals and control parameters should be incorporated in each entity's performance measures. Each year the Ministries will prepare joint Letters of Award to the entities’ directorates, which gives homonymous management signals of the follow-up on the efforts against a-krim, including common goals. (Departementene, 2017).

We have also included a table of some of the means in the Control & Monitoring area, which gives an overview of which ministries that are responsible for what in the a-krim collaboration (Departementene, 2017), see table 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ministry of Justice and Public Security</th>
<th>Ministry of Finance</th>
<th>Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strengthen information sharing between the control entities and between the control entities and Politiet</td>
<td>Better registry quality in public records</td>
<td>Further develop a committed and coordinated collaboration between the entities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NTAES</td>
<td></td>
<td>Better registration and follow-up on exposed employers and service providers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More effective sanctioning of offenses within financial crime</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Delegated Responsibilities of The Ministries (Departementene 2017)

2.2 The A-krim Collaboration

The interorganizational collaboration on a-krim is per today’s date organized in a more formalized way then it was before. Due to its abrupt establishment in 2014, the entities involved were forced to put together a collaboration without any pre-planning or strategic implementation. In 2017, NTKG consisting of representatives from Arbeidstilsynet, NAV,
Politiet & Skatteetaten, created the document called “Felles styringsmodell for a-krimssamarbeidet” hereinafter referred to as Styringsmodellen, which formalizes and defines the many roles, responsibilities and groups within the a-krim network. Styringsmodellen was decided to be in place and implemented from 01.01.2018.

Since we are currently writing our master’s thesis during the spring of 2018, we were subject to the ongoing implementations. We therefore had to develop our own understanding of the complex a-krim network during our data collection. To explain the a-krim collaboration, we made an overview of the whole a-krim hierarchy and structure, which is illustrated in our empirical figure 1 below. To explain the abbreviations in the figure better, we will start by explaining the a-krim hierarchy from top. The four main public entities make up all the other groups in the collaboration, i.e. they are affiliated with and/or belong under the entities.

![The A-krim Hierarchy](image)

**National Level**

DSSF (Det Sentrale Samarbeidsfourn) was established already in 2005 to lead the fight against economic crime, and consists of the National Attorney General, the Økokrim Chief, and the directors of the main entities and Tolletaten. The purpose of DSSF is to strengthen the collaboration between the main entities to prevent and fight economic crime, hereunder a-krim. Together they provide the necessary guidance and hold the fundamental power and authority to take the most important decisions when it comes to their respective entities,
including decisions concerning interorganizational work and collaboration. According to Styringsmodellen (2017), the forum shall exchange information on issues of common interest and discuss ideas and opportunities to further develop the collaboration between the entities, in compliance with the entities’ social mission.

The Steering Group of NTKG and NTAES became the one and same in 2018. The Steering Group (SG) ensures the goals and frameworks for the a-krim collaboration on behalf of DSSF, this includes following up common directions given in the entities’ Letters of Award and Joint Action Plan for enhanced efforts against a-krim. SG consists of four department directors from each entity at directorate level that is connected to a-krim, whereas representatives from NTKG and NTAES may participate in their meetings which are held 2-4 times a year. Members of SG hold the authority to coordinate and decide on matters that cannot be solved on a lower level in the a-krim collaboration (NTKG, 2017).

NTKG stands for National Interdepartmental Coordination Group and is like its name a coordination unit on a national plan regarding specifically the a-krim collaboration. NTKG consists of four representatives, one from each main public entity directorate. The group has the responsibility for preparing The Joint Action Plan of the collaboration, be the case preparatory body for the a-krim SG, follow up decisions on implementations made in SG and DSSF, and lastly be a coordinating joint between the directorates and regional steering groups (RSG), the a-krim centers and other formalized a-krim collaborations. The members of NTKG have equal responsibility for carrying out tasks, but none of them have formal decision-making authority for their own entity. However, they can decide on smaller and ongoing issues, and the group receives authorizations from SG through approval of the annual plan. NTKG meet approximately once a month or when needed (NTKG, 2017).

On the other side we have NTAES, which is also subordinate to SG and DSSF. NTAES stands for National Interdepartmental Analysis and Intelligence Center and is located in Oslo. The purpose of the center is to facilitate the use of overall analysis and intelligence information that Politiet and the other control entities possess. The center shall develop a knowledge-based basis for the entities own and common priorities, such as national threat and risk assessments and deliverance of intelligence products that will help develop and implement a more targeted, effective and accurate fight against economic crime, hereunder a-krim (Økokrim, 2018). NTAES consists of 11 members from Politiet, Skatteetaten, NAV,
Arbeidstilsynet and Tolletaten, where all are assigned to work permanent in the center. However, they do not hold any authority over the “operative” a-krim collaboration, as they are an intelligence and strategic unit established to strengthen the efforts against a-krim as one of the measures in the Government’s Strategy Against A-krim. NTAES formally opened in 2016, whereas DSSF is who gives the center guidance and decides its missions.

**Regional Level**
The Regional Steering Group (RSG) is next in the a-krim hierarchy. RSGs has the overall responsibility to follow-up on the entities’ control signals and Joint Action Plan, as well as prioritizing measures in accordance to the threats in their own region. The groups are purposely divided into Police districts. RSGs consist of one Police Chief and regional directors or equivalent of the four collaborative entities, as well as Tolletaten when applicable. In so, the members hold corresponding mandate and authority connected to their title. RSG meets 2-4 times a year, where the local coordinator from the respective a-krim center in the region participate (NTKG, 2017).

**Local Level**
The local level consists of seven a-krim centers located in seven different cities. Within each a-krim center there is one local coordination group (LKG) with one local coordinator, referred to as Coordinator, who represents the a-krim center in question at regional level. Further the centers are internally divided into two operative teams; 1) Prevention & Control, and 2) Knowledge Building. Each center and LKG consist of employees from the four main public entities, as well as the local Treasurer. Other entities like Tolletaten participate when applicable.

LKG shall coordinate and lead the work at the local a-krim center, so that the efforts in the centers support the achievement of objectives according to The Joint Action Plan. Further, LKG shall coordinate the collaboration between the a-krim center and the entity line in each entity so that work in the a-krim centers becomes an integrated part of the entities’ further work against a-krim. LKG is made up by members with adequate decision-making authority and leadership responsibility in their respective entity, with the Coordinator in front in addition to one coordinator from the two operative teams respectively. The operative coordinators are present to ensure a good connection between the operative work, priorities and clarifications that LKG decides on. In so, the members of the group are able to manage
their own entities’ resources in the a-krim center, as well as hold the authority to follow-up and commit to tasks sent from the centers to the entity line. LKG is recommended to meet at least once per 14 days (NTKG, 2017).

The Prevention & Control team’s focus is to put criminals out of play by making them unable to continue their practice in the labor market, or at least reduce their capacity. In so, reduce the scope of action of the criminals, influence the non-serious players to comply with laws and regulations, and lastly obtain information and build knowledge. The minimum requirement consists of 11 full-time equivalents, 3 from Politiet, Skatteetaten, Arbeidstilsynet and 2 from NAV. The team is demanded to co-locate in the a-krim center for a minimum of three days a week, where the employees can prioritize tasks within the framework provided by LKG (NTKG, 2017).

The Knowledge Building team has its focus primarily on knowledge building and have three main tasks; 1) to contribute to knowledge building by obtaining, processing and disseminating information, 2) develop the basis for deciding efforts in the a-krim centers, including which actors, environments and phenomena to be prioritized and how the efforts should be aligned thereof, and lastly 3) contribute with intelligence products and a decision-making base to the entity line, in conjunction with information obtained from The Prevention & Control team. The work on knowledge building has come short in several of the entities, which implies that it will take time to build a competent group with focus on knowledge building. It is therefore suggested that this should be a priority for building competence in the a-krim collaboration in the coming years. The team’s mandate and requirements of co-location are corresponding with the Prevention & Control team (NTKG, 2017).

To sum up, figure 2 below shows the decision-making flow in the a-krim collaboration, whereas NTKG and NTAES are absent since they do not hold any decision-making power.
Activities & Results

The collaboration has an actor based perspective: facilitators, employers, contractors, employees (Arbeidstilsynet, NAV, Politiet & Skatteetaten, 2018). Table 2 gives an overview of some activities in the collaboration from 2015-2017. These figures are retrieved in the annual a-krim report from 2017. The figures for ‘15, ‘16 and ‘17 represent respectively three, five and seven a-krim centers, as they were created along the way.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity/Year</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>2017</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Businesses controlled</td>
<td>Ca 1500</td>
<td>Ca 1900</td>
<td>Ca 2100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work sites/constructions controlled</td>
<td>Ca 1200</td>
<td>Ca 1200</td>
<td>Ca 1300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persons controlled</td>
<td>Ca 5700</td>
<td>Ca 4300</td>
<td>Ca 4 600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expulsion cf. Police Act</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expulsion cf. Immigration Act</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changes in benefits</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decision of stop</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>352</td>
<td>518</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amounts secured</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Ca 23 mill. NOK</td>
<td>Ca 38 mill. NOK</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: A-krim Figures (Arbeidstilsynet et al., 2018)

It is specified that there is uncertainty related to the figures, as the figures are mainly based on manual counting. In addition, the different centers may have a different conception of what to report, especially when what to report should have a direct and known connection to the a-krim center. This means that many of the activities may have been performed in the entity line because of discoveries by the a-krim centers and/or in collaboration with the a-krim centers (Arbeidstilsynet et al., 2018).
In relation to this, a-krim cases will often demand resources in the entity line for further follow-up and case processing. Politiet’s resources for investigation are central when potential criminal offences are revealed. The a-krim centers have different support in the entity line, whereas some have good support and experience prioritization in the line, while some centers experience limited support in entity line due to lack of resources (Arbeidstilsynet et al., 2018). NTAES (2017) also pointed out that the entities lack resources to follow-up on the most time consuming and serious cases adequately. Further they explained that this was also due to entity goals, which lead to prioritization of less demanding and time consuming cases. Those who especially have a good connection with the prosecution competence in Politiet have a far better opportunity to achieve better results in the collaboration (NTAES, 2017).

2.3 The Main Public Entities

Here we give a brief introduction of the main public entities; Politiet, Skatteetaten, NAV, and Arbeidstilsynet, and how they relate to a-krim.

**Politiet - The Norwegian Police Service**

Politiet is subordinate to the Ministry of Justice and consist of twelve districts together with nine specialized units. Each district is headed by a Police Chief, which is in charge of services, budget and results. Each police district has its own administration and operation center (Politiet, 2018). Their mandate and authority, or social mission, is to protect people and property, and to prevent crime and ensure civil order. A-krim cases are a part of the case portfolio of the country’s police districts. Økokrim plays an important role on the topic of a-krim, and it is the central unit for investigation and prosecution of financial and environmental crime (Riksrevisjonen, 2016).

Politiet has the authorization needed to enter all property and premises where work is conducted. They also possess employees that know how to handle people and unexpected situations, as they are trained for this during their education. Hence, they hold competence in how to tackle challenging situations in real-time and have the authority to use sanctions immediately. For example, use of removal and expulsion, and practicing identity controls and visitations. Their strongest suit in combating crime is thereby their opportunity to follow up on criminal tracks with investigation and prosecution as tools (NTAES, 2017).
Skatteetaten - The Norwegian Tax Administration

The social mission to Skatteetaten (Skatt) is to ensure a financial basis for public activities in Norway (Regjeringen, 2017a). This entails to facilitate revenue to the public through a rightful and efficient collection of taxes and fees, determined by the Government. The entity also have responsibility for the municipal Treasurers (Skatteetaten, 2017). Skatteetaten is governed by the Ministry of Finance and is divided into five regions. The regions have their own department which are divided into six functional areas in their respective region. In addition there are three units with nationwide task responsibilities. The entity’s main goals are to; ensure that taxpayers and taxpayer’s given information comply with tax legislation and regulations, ensures user access to register data and information of high quality, and finally, ensure trust from the society (Regjeringen, 2017a).

Skatteetaten is currently in the process of a reorganization, since their current organization is partly complicated. The new organization will have need for less coordination. The new organizational model is planned to be implemented by early 2019, which involves nationwide divisions with responsibility within their respective disciplines. The divisions Information Management, User Dialogue, Efforts and Collection are responsible for Skatt’s social mission. The Efforts division will have the responsibility to reduce missing efforts on prioritized risk areas and to develop efficient methods to manage and prevent deviations. Such as interdepartmental collaboration as in the a-krim collaboration (Regjeringen, 2017a). The reorganization of Skatteetaten should therefore make it easier to coordinate and prioritize the a-krim collaboration and it efforts.

Skatteetaten can be exposed to a-krim in terms of ID-fraud, tax- and fee evasion. Skatteetaten possesses sanction opportunities, among these are sur-taxes and sur-fees, in addition to reporting incidents to Politiet. Regarding the a-krim collaboration, Skatteetaten and the Treasurers have access to registers that have information about businesses, persons and money trails. They also have the means to follow the money, which may contribute to knowledge-sharing on criminals’ methods, possible organizers (people behind the scheme), and criminal networks. In so, Skatteetaten works in past-time crunching and controlling numbers, but are preventive in terms of detecting future crime by having broad knowledge within industries and of potential “persons-of-interest” that may hinder or uncover extensive economic crime or a-krim in the future, and further impose sanctions later (NTAES, 2017).
**NAV - The Norwegian Labor and Welfare Administration**

NAV is governed by the Labor and Welfare Directorate and is divided into 19 regions (NAV, 2016a). NAV has the social mission to broadly contribute to society and participation in the labor market, and to give financial safety for individuals. NAV is the administrator of the Norwegian welfare system and manages over ⅓ of the Norwegian state budget, through services like unemployment benefits, pension, sickness benefits and so on (Berg, 2015). NAV’s main goals are to get people into work, create a well functioning society, give suitable services and benefits, as well as to be an effective working- and welfare institution.

NAV is divided into three lines, the Labor and Service Line, the Benefit Line, and the Economic Line, with underlying units (NAV, 2017). The units in the Benefit Line are organized in performance areas which have units with national responsibility. The unit NAV Kontroll has the primary purpose of discovering, reporting and preventing benefit abuse from NAV, as well as it has major tasks associated with registry management (NAV, 2016b). NAV Kontroll is NAV’s representative in the a-krim collaboration. Moreover, NAV Kontroll is divided in three regions, and has an underlying administration unit that handles the most serious cases of fraud.

In 2017 NAV reported 187 million NOK in social security fraud (Aspeli, 2018). Fictional employment relationship is another problem concerning social security fraud (NTAES, 2017). In May 2017, NAV made the statement saying that the main issue of the first quarter of 2017 was a-krim, and that employers and employees in many cases have cooperated in fraud to reduce labor costs which gives businesses a competitive advantage. According to NTAES (2017), the challenge lies in the enforcement, and it is difficult to uncover what really is social security frauds or not. NAV has the means to stop or cancel ongoing social benefits and can demand repayment, whereas the most serious cases are reported to Politiet.

**Arbeidsstilsynet - The Norwegian Labor Inspection Authority**

Arbeidsstilsynet (AT) is also subordinate to the Ministry of Labor & Welfare and its foundation is based on laws and regulations. Their aim and social mission is to have a serious, safe and including work-life. Their main task is to supervise and ensure that companies comply with the requirements of the Working Environment Act in terms of occupational safety and health, hereunder the Annual Holidays Act, National Holidays Act,
and certain sections of The Smoking Act (Arbeidstilsynet, 2018a). Breach of any of these are qualified as a-krim. AT consist of seven regions with underlying supervision offices across the country (Arbeidstilsynet, 2018b).

In relation to a-krim, Arbeidstilsynet can issue orders with short deadlines and make decisions that further stops current work until requirements are fulfilled in accordance to the law. AT also has the authorization to enter all property and premises in which work is conducted. They have the mandate to perform fast-efficient sanctions through requiring documentation retrieval, such as timetables, payrolls and employment contracts in real-time (NTAES, 2017).

**Overview of the public entities**

To sum up, we have presented an overview below, see table 3. The entities have different social missions and a-krim touches them all. Further they are under different regulations. In terms of number of employees NAV in general and Politiet are the biggest entities, while Arbeidstilsynet and NAV Kontroll are the smallest. All except AT have headquarters in Oslo. Number of regions between them varies, where NAV Kontroll have the least with three regions. NAV and AT are under the same Ministry, whereas Skatt and Politiet are under other. All entities are however subject to different directorates.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Politiet</th>
<th>Skatteetaten</th>
<th>NAV</th>
<th>Arbeidstilsynet</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social Mission</strong></td>
<td>Civil protection, crime prevention and sanction of criminals</td>
<td>Ensure financing of the welfare society</td>
<td>Contribute to participation in labor market, and to give financial safety</td>
<td>Ensure occupational safety &amp; health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Employees</strong></td>
<td>15 015</td>
<td>6 100</td>
<td>19 628 Nav Kontroll: 276</td>
<td>592</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>HQ</strong></td>
<td>Oslo</td>
<td>Oslo</td>
<td>Oslo</td>
<td>Trondheim</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2 In 2014 (Forvaltningsdatabasen, n.d.)
In terms of resources, Politiet was given the largest sum of allocation from the Government Budget of 2018 between the entities, see table 4.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expenditures</th>
<th>Politiet</th>
<th>Skatteetaten</th>
<th>NAV</th>
<th>Arbeidstilsynet</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20 176 496 000</td>
<td>6 739 605 000</td>
<td>11 852 847 000</td>
<td>636 186 000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revenues</td>
<td>1 729 733 000</td>
<td>2 271 201 000</td>
<td>71 520 000</td>
<td>44 079 000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When it comes to full-time equivalents (FTEs) in the a-krim centers in 2017, Arbeidstilsynet engaged with a total of 35,9 FTEs, the largest contribution of employees in all a-krim centers between the four entities with the exception of Oslo. Skatt has second most FTEs in the collaboration with 32 FTEs. Politiet is third in rank of the four entities with a total of 22,5 FTEs. NAV has 8,5 FTEs in the collaboration and thereby represent the entity with least resources in the a-krim centers. There is also variation between the centers, see table 5.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FTEs a-krim centers total</th>
<th>Politiet</th>
<th>Skatteetaten</th>
<th>NAV</th>
<th>Arbeidstilsynet</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FTEs Oslo</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FTEs Bergen</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FTEs Stvg</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4 - Overview of State Grants in 2018

Table 5: FTEs A-krim Centers (NTKG, 2017)

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3 Extracted from the Government Budget 2018 (Stortinget, 2018)
3. Theory & Previous Research

This chapter entails the theory framework for the analysis part and is based on public sector theory and interorganizational collaboration (IoC) theory. Since our thesis concerns an interorganizational collaboration between Norwegian public entities, it is important to take into account the background of public sector and public sector governance. We also address the dilemma of efficiency in the justice system.

The IoC theory will be the larger part of the chapter, and is partly based on international IoC theory from both the private and public sector. The other part of IoC theory is based on previous research on the a-krim collaboration. We focused our theory towards IoC literature that have identified characteristics that influence such collaboration. This is the basis for our model presented in chapter 4. The paragraph below gives a preamble of how both public sector and IoC theory can be connected on the basis of wicked problems, such as a-krim.

Wicked problems may be defined as a problem whose social complexity is so extent that it has no determinable stopping point (Tonkiwise, 2015). According to Marlin, Ritchie & Geiger (2009), interorganizational collaboration in the public sector has been increasing the last two decades as a result of the growing complexity of social problems. It is further suggested by Leung (2013) that such approach, collaboration, makes it easier and more effective to meet social needs than through individual actions. Wicked problems are complex, enduring, cannot be solved “once and for all”, and typically spans across organizational boundaries, management areas and hierarchical levels (Gressgård, Hansen & Nesheim, 2017). We therefore look at a-krim as a wicked and/or social problem of great complexity, which is difficult to solve “alone”.

3.1 Public Sector Governance

Norway’s political system, or governance, is in collective terms how the Norwegian state is organized and how the state interacts with the rest of society (Berg, 2016). In Norway the political authority lies nationally, whereas municipalities and counties only have authority to the extent in which they are delegated such power by Stortinget, the Parliament of Norway. Stortinget is the national legislative and granting authority. Norway’s political system is thus
parliamentary, democratic and consist of a constitutionally unitary monarchy state (Berg & Sterri, 2017).

Public entities hold their own domain, authority and mandate. This means there are clear boundaries for what type of actions they may carry out, as well as regulations they need to uphold. Public authority means a governmental or municipal unit which has some kind of legal power mandate to execute decisions within its domain (Knudsen, 2014). However, there are some grey zones that appear in the mandate and authority given out by the government. One of these grey zones is a-krim, which touches several public entities’ domain. This brings us to the Government’s Strategy Against A-krim (2017), which clearly states that a-krim is complex and must be combated through joint efforts by Politiet, Skatteetaten, Arbeidstilsynet and NAV, as well as other public entities.

Public sector management has been circulating in the literature since as long as there has been an existence of public sector and until today's date, and have especially accelerated with the theories of traditional Public Administration (PA), New Public Management (NPM) and New Public Governance (NPG). Traditional PA is characterized by formal control and strict hierarchical bureaucracy governed by politicians in the meer interest of the public (Hughes, 1998), whereas NPM have been focusing on the management of individual organizations and efficiency thereof, taking into account market-like arrangements (Wiesel & Modell, 2014). On the other side, NPG has been steering towards management of more multiplex systems, such as networks and interorganizational governance as a main focus (Osborne, 2006).

As the traditional model of PA remains the most successful and long standing theory of management in the public sector, it became recognized as inefficient and incompatible in the 1970s due to the ever-so changing environment of society who demanded flexibility and speediness over bureaucratic red-tape measures (Hughes, 1998). Moreover, we can tie all the three public sector management theories to the working government of Norway as it is today. The Norwegian Government holds clues to characteristics of all the theories, hierarchical bureaucracy, performance measurements in terms of results and efficiency, and lastly the use of interorganizational governance by having several tripartite cooperation’s and interorganizational relationships, such as the a-krim collaboration.
To address the governance in Norway, we have created a simple figure that illustrates the governance flow of The Government Strategy Against A-krim, see figure 3. Starting with the Government who develops the strategy against a-krim which is then sent to the Ministries who further develops Letters of Award. In the Letter of Award, the entity goal, expenditure- and revenue frames, budget authorizations and reporting requirements, are stipulated. It is therefore an important part of the Ministries total management (Regjeringen, 2017b). These letters are sent to the Directorates who prepares management and allocation letters to the entities, as well as The Joint Action Plan for the a-krim collaboration. This is finally communicated to the whole collaboration and each entity. At this level the strategic and operative work is conducted, which should be in line with The Government Strategy.

According to Gressgård et al. (2017) state governance based on ministerial responsibility and principles for goals and performance measurement between ministry and directorate are best suited in cases where there is not too big dependence between political sectors. In cases where there is such dependency, good coordination is required in so that each of the ministries prepares homogenous goals and other control signals to their respective directorates. In connection to this, control signals in the form of Letters of Award are key instruments.

3.1.1 Efficiency & The Criminal Justice System

We have included this section in respect to the difficulty “rightful” governance in the Criminal Justice System, and to give an understanding of what one often face in the a-krim centers as the IoC has a strategy on preventive and effective sanctioning. In the Norwegian
criminal justice care, public prevention and individual prevention measures are central (Elden, 2017). Public prevention is supposed to keep the public from committing crime on the background of the threat of penalties imposed. However, sanctioning also involves using resources in for example investigation and prosecution. In the a-krim IoC, low degree of public prevention can be due to the entities’ missing or limited sanctioning options, or resource limitation. This may lead to a sanction which is not sufficient enough to deter criminals from committing crime (NTAES, 2017).

![Diagram of trade-offs in an Efficient Criminal Justice System](image)

*Figure 4 - Trade-offs in an Efficient Criminal Justice System (Søreide, 2016)*

According to Søreide (2016), efficiency in the criminal justice system is associated with crime deterrence, a fair process, and value for money, *see figure 4 above*. These functions entail trade-offs, e.g. detection of crime should be evaluated under a fair process, while also giving value for money and ensure sufficient crime deterrence. The problem here is that one cannot know the cost or outcome of either of these functions. To have a fair process one may not always deter crime sufficiently or be cost-efficient in respect to alternative cost. To have good crime deterrence, a fair process may be undercut. Whether the ambition relates to crime prevention, detection, rehabilitation, court procedures, or imprisonment, “efficiency” involves *doing the right thing without wasting resources*. However, this is difficult in practice, and there is need for a lot of knowledge (Søreide, 2016). There are many examples in a-krim that reflect these difficult trade-offs, and the dilemma lies in how to do what is best for society.
3.2 Interorganizational Collaboration (IoC)

We are going to aim our theoretical point of view towards collaboration in the public sector. The following sub-chapters will build on what interorganizational collaboration entails. Interorganizational collaboration is defined as the process of collaboration between different organizations, both in public and private sector, by IGI Global (2018). Gray (1989) further describes organizational collaboration as dynamic relationships involving coordinated activity based on mutual goals. Moreover, IoC in the public sector is defined as “any joint activity by two or more agencies working together that is intended to increase public value by their working together rather than separately” by Eugene Bardach in 1998. Because of widely dissimilar usage of the term, we have landed on an adapted definition by O’Leary & Vij (2012) based on Agranoff & McGuire (2004) which goes as follows;

“Collaborative public management is a concept that describes the process of facilitating and operating in multi-organizational arrangements to solve problems that cannot be solved or easily solved by single organizations. Collaborative means to co-labor, to achieve common goals, often working across boundaries and in multi-sector and multi-actor relationships. Collaboration is based on the value of reciprocity and can include the public.”

We believe this definition of IoC is the most appropriate and accurate for the a-krim collaboration in Norway, since it reflects on “wicked problems” as something that cannot be easily solved by single organizations and working across boundaries to achieve common goals. Working not only for self-purposes, but creating value for society as a whole is the foundation of the a-krim initiative since it is in the best interest of the public. We therefore use the term collaboration as a way of exceeding sole entity goals when addressing wicked problems like a-krim. In short, we can say IoC entails benefits for all parties involved in how they pursue a common goal (Kozuch & Sienkiewiz-Maltajurek, 2016).

An important insight from organizational discipline goes back to the understanding of structural design and that tools are to be adapted towards the tasks to be solved. For instance, when there is high degree of uncertainty associated with customers, the market, and task solving, one typically chose to use less bureaucratic organizational forms. An inter-agency collaboration, or IoC, has its rationale in that a problem or set of tasks touches several entities and administrative levels (Gressgård, et al., 2017), such as the a-krim collaboration.
However, how the affected entities should collaborate with regards to the organization at various levels and specific mechanisms for coordination will vary with the traits by which the tasks to be solved are made up of. An analysis of an IoC should therefore be built on the understanding of the tasks that are present. A-krim can reflect on the importance of task type. There is emphasize on cross-sectoral strategies and policies at political level and at the strategic level of directorates. It is characterized by a relative stable set of participating entities, all of whom are affected and connected to the problem areas (Gressgård et al., 2017).

To illustrate this better, see figure 5 by Jansen (2013), who explains that the more complex a task is and the more equivocal it is, the more collaborative action is needed. The model takes into account solutions to the degree of tasks’ environment, thus stating that simple tasks that are of unequivocal or specific nature can be solved through hierarchical structure. Jansen (2013) refers his figure to Mintzberg’s Structure in Fives from 1993. The a-krim collaboration is prone to both complex and equivocal tasks.

![Figure 5 - Task Ambiguityness & Task Complexity (adapted from Jansen, 2013)](image)

3.3 Previous Research on IoC & A-krim

We have narrowed our focus on interorganizational research from Håkansson (1982), Hocevar, Jansen & Thomas (2006), the IRIS Report (2017), the Rokkan Report (2016), and Riksrevisjonen’s Assessment (2016). The first three have all identified characteristics or factors that affects interorganizational collaboration. The two latter are research specifically conducted for the a-krim collaboration in Norway, see table 6 for an overview.
In the following sections we go deeper into the different characteristics the previous literature has identified as affecting an IoC.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Literature</th>
<th>A - Characteristics that influences collaboration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Research on IoC</strong>&lt;br&gt;Håkansson (1982): Interactions between organizations</td>
<td>Technology&lt;br&gt;Organizational strategy&lt;br&gt;Structure &amp; size&lt;br&gt;Organizational experience&lt;br&gt;Individuals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Research on IoC</strong>&lt;br&gt;Hocevar, Jansen &amp; Thomas (2006): Inter-organizational collaborative capacity</td>
<td>Purpose &amp; Strategy&lt;br&gt;Structure&lt;br&gt;Lateral Mechanisms&lt;br&gt;Incentives&lt;br&gt;People</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Research on the a-krim IoC</strong>&lt;br&gt;Neby, Nesheim, Ryssevik, Rucksen Dahle &amp; Nordhagen (2016): “The Rokkan Report”</td>
<td>Goals &amp; Prioritization (social mission)&lt;br&gt;Size &amp; Structure&lt;br&gt;Organizational culture&lt;br&gt;Jurisdiction &amp; Sanction&lt;br&gt;Entity’s own a-krim strategy&lt;br&gt;Rules for information sharing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Assessment of the a-krim IoC</strong>&lt;br&gt;Riksrevisjonen (2016): Evolution of the authorities’ efforts against a-krim</td>
<td>Arbeidstilsynet use of sanctions&lt;br&gt;Politiet’s role&lt;br&gt;Challenges on resource contribution and info sharing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 6 - Overview of Previous Research on IoC & A-krim*

### 3.3.1 Interactions between Organizations

Håkansson’s model (1982) is based on a marketing context, but is examining the interactive process between two parties, mainly buyer-seller, which is divided into four basic elements of analysis. These are; the interacting process, the participants, the environment in which the interaction takes place, and the atmosphere affecting and affected by the interaction. We will be using his second element in our study, the characteristics of the interacting parties, or participants. Håkansson (1982, p. 18) says: “The process of interaction and the relationship
between organizations will depend not only on the elements of the interaction but also on the characteristics of the parties”. The main characteristics that influences a collaboration according to Håkansson (1982) is; technology, the organizational strategy, structure and size, organizational experience, and individuals within the organization.

Participating organizations in a collaboration will have their own technological system, thereby creating a foundation for interaction and communication. Differences or level of similarity in the technological systems will influence the interaction, for instance in terms of adaptation and contact patterns. Strategies according to Håkansson is connected with organizational size and structure, and is expressed to be an important influencing variable on the relationships between players. Organizational structure is often based on three dimensions; formalization, decision-making authority, and organizational forms (Soleng, 2007). Organizational size gives the members of a collaboration a basic position to interact. Size and resources are often connected, and an organization with large resources, or size, will have a dominating position in the collaboration thereby assumedly influence the interaction among the players according to Håkansson (1982).

Following Håkansson (1982) believes organizational experience from previous collaborations, or experience from the topic in question will help aid the IoC and is therefore important to consider. In an IoC there will be individuals exchanging information and developing relationships. Further, individuals will have different personalities, roles, functions, motivation and competence, which in return will affect the overall relationship among the parties in a collaboration (Håkansson, 1982).

3.3.2 Inter-Organizational Collaborative Capacity

Hocevar, Thomas & Jansen (2006) have developed a model that describes factors which drives and restrains collaborative capacity, i.e. collaboration. They define collaborative capacity as “the ability of organizations to enter into, develop, and sustain inter-organizational systems in pursuit of collective outcomes”. Their previous research lays within the area of emergency response field or crisis management, such as Hurricane Katrina and 9/11. They therefore address how IoC is carried out in complex situations where multiple parties are involved, and where there may be aligned and/or competing interests among the collaborators. Thus, their model represents a way of determining the “how” of
collaboration, by having factors that either enables or inhibits effective inter-agency collaboration, while looking at these factors at a specific scenario (Hocevar et al., 2011).

The factors are categorized into five domains, these are; purpose & strategy, structure, lateral mechanisms, incentives and people. Within each domain, there are either restraining or driving factors (Hocevar et al., 2011). Within purpose & strategy, there should for example be a common goal and a willingness to contribute to others interests. In so, the felt need and incentive to collaborate is necessary. Diverging goals and competing incentives will therefore be restraining forces. The remaining domains hold akin factors that either drives or restrains collaboration. Their model is illustrated below, see figure 6.

![The ICC Model (Hocevar et al., 2011)](image)

The **Purpose & Strategy** domain holds three factors; felt need, strategic actions, and resource investment. Felt need ultimately concerns the organization’s recognition of interdependence with others and the acknowledgment of needed collaboration to effectively accomplish mission and goals. Strategic actions are demonstrated through senior leadership and their commitment to the specific problem, which include goals for collaboration. In so, strategic actions cover the willingness to consider other organization’s interests. The felt need to collaborate is typically an initiation factor, but without adequate leadership and resources there is lacking strategic emphasis for building collaborative capacity. Resource investments assesses the extent in which the organizations contribute with resources to the collaboration, meaning among budget, personnel, or systems (Hocevar et al., 2006).

The **Structure** of the collaboration should be formalized, both in the coordination of roles and the coordination of processes according to Hocevar et al. (2006). The structure domain
in the ICC model consists of four factors; collaboration structure, structural flexibility, metrics, and support for individual efforts. Collaboration structure means clear roles for each involved organization, and internal processes that further enables or supports IoC. Structural flexibility involves adaptation towards collaborative partners and their requirements, as well as the willingness to adjust procedures to simplify coordination. Metrics includes performance- and management parameters for evaluating interorganizational efforts as well as assessing outcomes. Support for individual efforts can be divided into two, whereas the first angle is about how clear individual collaborative work is structured in terms of goals, constraints, and authority. The second angle is about to which extent organizations lay up the link between boundary-spanning roles, seen from a collaboration perspective and own entity perspective (Hocevar et al., 2006). It is obvious that the better the link between collaboration- and entity roles are, the more efficient an interorganizational collaboration is.

*Lateral Mechanisms* can restrain or drive collaboration depending on how social capital and the interactive process within the collaboration works (Hocevar, 2010). This domain entails four factors that represent both the “hard” and “soft” sides of lateral coordination, these are; social capital, collaborative tools & technologies, information sharing, and collaborative learning. Social capital represents the relationships, both social and professional, that collaborative members have with each other. Collaborative tools and technologies provide inter-operable systems and technical mechanisms that the collaboration can make use of. Information sharing constitutes the organization’s values and norms for information sharing, and includes the sufficiency of access to other organizations information that is applicable for own success in the collaboration. Collaborative learning is about learning about the other organization’s interests, capabilities, and limitations. In so, lateral mechanisms play a vital role as one look at hard mechanisms that are prerequisites to collaborate, as well as the soft side where social capital is a basis for trust-building (Hocevar et al., 2006).

According to Hocevar et al. (2006), *Incentives* and reward systems should also be considered as they may have an impact on the members of an organization in how the members deal with collaboration. External organizational factors, like financial awards or mandated requirements, will also motivate commitment and engagement in a collaboration. These factors derive from the broader environment or organizational context, instead of the individual organization’s internal reward system (Hocevar et al., 2011).
The domain of People has only one factor; individual collaborative capabilities. The organization's capability to collaborate is affected by the individuals within the organization, because people possess different knowledge, skills, attitudes and behaviours (Hocevar et al., 2011). In so, the members of an IoC should have respect and commitment for each other, and if there is lack of competency and arrogance it will restrain the collaboration. People practices and relations are therefore important (Hocevar et al., 2006).

To sum up, the participants should be dedicated to the cause and hold sufficient authority or mandate so that decision-making on behalf of the goal is possible and effective collaboration is possible. On the other hand, inadequate resources or lack of formalization will have a restraining effect on the collaboration. Incentives can further drive “collaboration as a prerequisite for funding or resources”, on the other side incentives will be restraining for the collaboration if there is competition of resources, territoriality, organizational distrust, or/and lack of mutual respect (Hocevar et al., 2006).

3.3.3 The IRIS Report

Gressgård, Hansen & Nesheim (2017) have defined four distances which describes different types of factors existing in the interfaces between organizations. These distances derive from earlier interorganizational literature. The individual organizational characteristics may create such distances between the collaborating parties, which may lead to coordination challenges in an IoC (Gressgård, et al., 2017). The distances are; organizational, structural, cognitive and geographical, see figure 7.
Organizational distance is based on organizational structure, size, decision-making procedures and more (Gressgård et al., 2017). Public organizations are often characterized by hierarchy, bureaucracy and organizational silos. Traditional roles and the lack of coordination often represent significant challenges in the public sector (Carstensen & Bason, 2012). Differences in structure and process, for example roles, rules, hierarchical levels or decision-making, can contribute to challenges in coordination of tasks that need to be solved together. If it is similarity in the organizational dimensions, it is easier to establish common understandings and relations. Additionally, it will lead to better results when parties’ organizational contexts have equal characteristics (Gressgård et al., 2017).

Structural distance may arise when there is asymmetry and power-difference between collaborating parties. This may create dependency and limitations in regard to the scope of actions and decision-making in situations where it exists different interests and goals. Public entities usually operate in political contexts, which again is recognized by resource limitations, negotiations and disparate interests. Entities involved in coordination processes often hold different purposes and demands which means that coordination challenges arise due to the entities’ different purposes, mandates, responsibility area, goal requirements and incentives. Not to forget that the ongoing competition of scarce resources (Gressgård et al., 2017). Because of the asymmetry in resources, the access to it and control of it, the power also becomes unevenly distributed in a collaboration (Singh & Prakash, 2010). In this context, we understand power as the ability to get things completed in a way one wishes (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003).

For public organizations there are often weak incentives for sharing of knowledge and tasks (Carstensen and Bason, 2012). To get effective coordination instead of competition, the organizations have to understand that it exists complementary needs, have common understanding of problems and have compatible goals, in addition to having enough resources (Gressgård et al., 2017).

Cognitive distance entails differences in knowledge bases and perspectives (Parajenen, Harmaanen & Franti, 2010). Knowledge and understanding is dependent on the context (Nootenboom, 2008), as well as if there are differences in how people interpret and evaluate situations (Wuyts, Colombo, Dutta & Nooteboom, 2005). This can arise as a consequence of both difference in organizational and professional affiliation. If there is difference in
professions, there will assumedly be divergent interests, perspectives and use of concepts and languages (Parajenen et al., 2010). For this reason, the ability to understand each other and to coordinate activities reduces with increasing cognitive distance (Gressgård et al., 2017).

The dimension of geographical distance, having various locations between collaborating parties, limits the coordination and communication processes of the collaboration itself. Different geographical locations of the parties involved in a collaboration may lead to poor communication, misunderstandings and further problems related to information sharing and development of a common identity (Gressgård et al., 2017).

3.3.4 The Rokkan Report

Neby, Nesheim, Ryssevik, Rucksen Dahle & Nordhagen (2016) presented in the Rokkan Report a model which intends to establish conditions that create frames for and may affect how the IoC of a-krim unfolds at the local and regional level. And later how these collaborations can lead to outcomes and effects in the fight against a-krim. They have defined six elements, where the three first form the premises for the a-krim IoC, meaning the national management efforts and the entities’ structure and characteristics. Following the three last elements can be seen as a chain of effects, see figure 8. Thus, The Rokkan report (2016) mapped and evaluated the a-krim collaboration in an early stage.

![Figure 8 - Simplified Framework: Basic Assumptions on Relations (Neby et al., 2016)](image)

According to Neby et al. (2016), The Government Strategy Against A-krim gives central political premises for the efforts done by Skatteetaten, Politiet, NAV, and Arbeidstilsynet in this area. With this comes the individual entities’ priorities, and The Joint Action Plan for the collaboration. Other important management signals are especially the coordination of the
Letters of Award with corresponding prioritization of resources. The instructions in the Letters of Award are given clear space in The Joint Action Plan, so there should not be any doubt that the interdepartmental collaboration is rooted in both the political and entity management (Neby et al. 2016).

The Main Structure element describes the division of labor and the involved entities. Each entity has their own jurisdictions, field of work, and domain. They are managed under different laws and regulations, imposes different knowledge and work practices. Additionally, they all are separate hierarchical organizations as part of The State and as an organizational system. It is within this context The Government Strategy and The Joint Action Plan shall be realized (Neby et al., 2016). To clarify, this relates to each entity and their respective directorates and regional divisions. The Rokkan Report (2016) defined six characteristics to the entities, which all are related to structural differences and which may bring challenges into the collaboration. They are; goals & prioritization, size & structure, organizational culture, jurisdiction & sanction, the entities own a-krim strategy, and finally rules for information sharing. We will address the six characteristics The Rokkan Report identified, and team them up to the report’s main findings on the a-krim IoC in Norway.

In respect to Goals & Prioritization, Neby et al. (2016) explain that the main public entities social missions and priorities differ, which entails that the entities have divergent goals and objectives between them. To accomplish these goals each entity has to make priorities, partly based on political priorities and partly on the input factors like resources or access to competence. None of the entities have reduction of a-krim as their overarching goal, however all have central objectives and sub-goals on the a-krim area. These objectives and sub-goals are operationalized differently, because different parts concerning the a-krim problem hits the entities (Neby et al., 2016). They further state this has to do with what legislation the individual entity administer.

Neby et al. (2016) found that there are greater organizational and administrative challenges when efforts are organized across entities, than efforts being organized internally in one entity. And that an important aspect for this is established traits by organization and management of the Norwegian State. This goes for especially for a) the principle of ministerial responsibility, which means that the minister is responsible for the work conducted within a ministry’s domain (including directorates and external entities), and b)
the principle for goal- and performance management in The State. They believe this type of system is well suited to capture results and outcomes to the ministers’ domain, but to a lesser extent suited to capture outcomes that goes across sectors and ministries. These two traits make interdepartmental collaboration especially challenging according to Neby et al. (2016).

Further, they found that there will be great complexity related to goals, objectives and results. The entities contribute to the “home entities” goals through activities and resources that are put in the IoC, while at the same time the IoC contributes to other entities’ goals, where they again contribute to achievement of own goals. Further, Neby et al. ties this to development of new work methods and common goals in the collaboration, where goals may be deviating from own entity “goal-structure”. It may also arise situations where new work methods contribute negatively to achievement of goal for one entity, while at the same time it contributes to good outcomes in the fight against a-krim (Neby et al., 2016).

Another main finding in the report reflected the fact that there are major challenges related to 1) measurement of goal achievements, and 2) connecting these results to its origin. By that, it is meant that it is hard to tell how and where goal achievements derive from, and that it is difficult to measure a-krim. Further they found that objectives primarily catch activities, but not effects in the market, and that goals in the collaboration may not be incorporated in the entity “goal structure”. Hence, Neby et al. (2016) found this to be challenges for the IoC.

The main public entities vary in size and structure. Neby et al. (2016) highlight that on a structural aspect all the entities have different regional divisions and geographical responsibility areas. Moreover, that the section of the entity who handles a-krim have unequal affiliation in their entity as whole. The report exemplifies Politiet has a functional oriented structure connected to a regional division, and that their regional divisions do not correspond with any of the other entities’ regional divisions. The different factors related to size and organization gives the entities different opportunities to make organizational dispositions to themselves, even though the overarching management signals of a-krim are well-coordinated across the entity (Neby et al., 2016).

Another main finding from the report is that it recognizes the IoC to be horizontal in structure, and not hierarchical. This implies that none of the entities are given a role as leading entity, that all resources, participants and activities are subject to. Therefore, the
three centers they studied (Oslo, Bergen & Stavanger) need to be understood as secondary structures which comes “in addition” and complements the entities own hierarchies. How this secondary structure works will thus be affected by traits that are specific for the participating entities and different regional local conditions. The local needs or conditions further leads to a discussion of to what degree standardization is reasonable to have in the local collaboration centers. Neby et al. (2016) thereby conclude that standardization and similarity in the centers simplifies coordination, while flexibility is needed to encounter a-krim alongside the local conditions. Further Neby et al. (2016) says that the balance of standardization vs flexibility needs so be confronted as the collaboration develops and expands.

Neby et al. (2016) recognized structure and work methods that are incorporated in the entities are important premises for the IoC, as they are adapted to the entities’ tasks. The greater differences between the entities, the greater adjustments one will need. To exemplify they found that Skatteetaten is a bigger, more complex and rule-governed entity than Arbeidstilsynet, where the individual inspector may have greater freedom of action. Further, Neby et al. (2016) found that different work practices can cause challenges in the collaboration. They also state that the more formalized and intensive the collaboration is, the greater the challenges may be.

Neby et al. (2016) states that the organizational culture of each public entity varies. And further that this also affects the work practice in each individual entity. For example, the collaboration consists of members obtaining different professional traditions and values related to exercise of authority. This is factors that have something to say for both concrete action and understanding of the environment (Neby et al. 2016). One example the Rokkan Report address is Politiet’s clear emphasis on building criminal cases, where ways to approach the environment is not just a result of processes and evidence requirements, but also a result of the entity’s own understanding of roles in society.

The Rokkan Report (2016) further found that during the development of the collaborative centers, relationships and common understandings have been established, as well as through common activities where new work methods have developed at each center separately as the crime picture for a-krim differ between the cities.
The entities obtain *jurisdictions and sanctions* opportunities which hit different parts of a-krim (Neby et al., 2016). The report explains that when it comes to sanctions one often differ between two general types, where the first is of administrative nature and may be imposed by the entity themselves, while the other type concerns the preparation of criminal proceedings and use of the judicial system. Neby et al. (2016) further explain that these two types of sanctions pose different requirements for processing and proofing. Sanctioning can often lead to a trade-off between the involved entities about which track to pursue (Neby et al. 2016).

Further, Neby et al. (2016) found that a-krim hits different parts of the entities jurisdiction. This means that The State’s primary organization in separate entities and units are not adapted to the development of the crime picture, thus the organization structures are not adapted the problem structure. It is a mutual dependence between the involved entities, and in this dependency there is potential for gain of interdepartmental collaboration. However, it is hard to enable sanctioning coordination across entities, as no entity holds jurisdiction over another. Moreover, they address that since a-krim is cross-border entity boundaries, means and sanctions should be revised to be designed in a way that is more suited to deal with the current problem (Neby et al. 2016).

The entities have their own strategy against a-krim. This means that goal achievement and the prioritization of actions against a-krim are not only something that will take place in the collaboration, but also within entity specific priorities. According to Neby et al. (2016) both will have a meaning for how the work is carried out and what results are achieved. Thus, in each entity there are at least two tracks against a-krim; one internal for the individual entity, and one reflecting the collaboration. This entails that resources are held off to the fight against a-krim. This is related to strategic priorities, social mission and the management of different regulations, which is also connected with work practices and time horizons that characterize the tasks in the different entities (Neby et al. 2016).

Further Neby et al. (2016) express that an important condition for successful initiatives in organizations are strategic anchorization and top management support. This indicates clear goals on political level and clear management signals down to the relevant entities. In an interdepartmental context this gets more complicated, because the hierarchical management chain breaks. Neby et al. (2016) emphasized that this demands a common strategy between
the involved ministries, homonymous management signals to underlying entities and within entity, as well as good coordination between them. Further, that this is difficult to achieve. The conditions for strategic anchorization is however believed to be present through the Government's Strategy and Joint Action Plan. Letters of Award and management signals are perceived as homogeneous, and are pulling in the same direction. Neby et al. therefore concludes that the conditions for a good interdepartmental collaboration were largely present.

**Rules for information sharing** varies between the different public entities, and according to Neby et al. (2016) the entities administer various types of information, thereby resulting in different outcomes in the collaboration. When personal information is necessary, it is stricter demands in regard to privacy requirements. Thus, parts of Skatteetaten’s information administration is subject to confidentiality, while other entities can more widely share information on a free basis (Neby et al., 2016). Further the report expresses that information sharing is an important prerequisite for an inter-agency collaboration to be effective.

In respect to information sharing, the report found challenges linked to regulations, practice of regulation, and to organizational culture. That there are issues related to both who that can share information with whom, in which situations, and how information can be stored. Confidential information poses further restraints between the entities, and depend on cases. They also found that practical matters like the use of systems, are not always compatible across entity borders. When it comes to the a-krim centers, they evaluated that there are most challenges in Stavanger, especially in regard to information shared by Skatteetaten (Neby et al., 2016).

Neby et al. (2016), found several benefits with the formalized IoC, among; more information about potential actors, more knowledge on other entities’ areas of means and sanctions, better foundation to make priorities regarding resources and use of means, as well as increased coordination of sanctions and other efforts.

### 3.3.5 Riksrevisjonen’s Assessment

In June 2016 Riksrevisjonen (RR), Office of the Auditor General in Norway, published a report with the purpose of assessing to what extent Arbeidstilsynet’s and Politiet’s efforts
were in line with the Government’s Strategy Against A-krim, hence an assessment of the a-krim IoC. According to RR (2016), Politiet and Arbeidstilsynet hold sanctions that play vital roles to ensure that businesses uphold The Working Environment Act and The General Application Act. The report has some main findings, where we go through a few that are mainly related to issues tied to Arbeidstilsynet and Politiet, the importance of Politiet’s role in the IoC due to dependency from the other entities, and lastly information sharing.

RR (2016) found that Arbeidstilsynet’s had limited use of reactions in regard to deterrence. Notification about injunction and issuance of injunctions were the most used ones. The stricter reactions like stop, OTG and police reporting were used to a smaller extent. RR explains the reason for the limited reporting to Politiet is not because Arbeidstilsynet does not think it is necessary, but because of resources scarcity in Politiet. Police reporting is resource demanding and Politiet often dismiss cases. Hence, Politiet’s prioritization of reports affects Arbeidstilsynet’s inclination to report criminal offences.

RR (2016) manifest that Politiet’s processing time of cases is long and there is undue delay in police investigation of a-krim. Long case processing time can be explained by competence in the investigation of a-krim, investigation capacity, Politiet’s district organization and the case complexity. The majority of the police districts who believe their competence is sufficient have put the investigation in an own unit or have own investigators for this type of cases. Poor investigation, long processing time and weak progress in investigation makes it difficult to fulfil the Government’s Strategy. Following RR says interdepartmental collaboration is strengthened, but it is demanding to get an operative collaboration between independent entities.

According to Riksrevisjonen (2016), Politiet’s efforts in the co-localized centers and in the entity line are key factors for gaining effects from the IoC. Politiet’s participation in controls makes it possible to uncover more cases. Furthermore, the effect of the collaboration is dependent on Politiet to investigate reported cases from the collaboration and that they should limit the dismissing of cases due to capacity. RR (2016) further elaborated on the unfortunateness of Politiet’s varied efforts in the IoC and that it in several places are limited.

Regarding resources, Politiet contributes with unequal amounts into the co-localized operative units. RR says Politiet has strengthened its resources into the collaboration during
initial establishment, and that this has contributed to increased effect of the collaboration. However, RR also state that Politiet has put in limited resources in the operative unit in Oslo. RR found that Politiet in Oslo has not taken into account that the amount of reports from the control entities would increase as a result of the establishment of the IoC. Hence RR assessed it as serious that Oslo Police District dismisses a-krim cases due to capacity. Oslo Police District, the Police Directorate and The Public Prosecutor acknowledged the capacity issue and stated that it may be challenging to handle an increased number of reports (RR, 2016).

Regarding information sharing, RR (2016) found that provisions on confidentiality limits information sharing and creates some obstacles in the collaboration. RR further recognize that information not shared is partly due to restrictive interpretation and lack of knowledge about the general provisions. The report further found that Skatteetaten in some regions have traditionally interpreted their duty of confidentiality very narrow. Additionally, RR (2016) meant it was necessary to assess whether the regulations on confidentiality are appropriate in regard to effective interdepartmental fight of crime.

To sum up the chapter, we see that interorganizational collaboration has many factors to consider, and that it further gives rise to several challenges that needs to be addressed. IoC is practiced widely, and it is no secret that is its extremely difficult. Kozuch & Sienkiewiz-Maltajurek (2016) summarizes it brilliantly through the following quote: "Legal requirements or collaboration agreements fail to constitute sufficient conditions to ensure effective inter-organizational collaboration. After all, its process is governed by numerous factors having attributes concerned with both internal as well as external determinants".
4. Synthesis & Model

In this chapter we present our research model which is adapted to our research question. The model and variables are based on above mentioned literature, and will therefore be a synthesis of earlier research on IoC and the a-krim collaboration in Norway. Further the model is developed for a concrete purpose, and we have done a selection of the most important factors for our research. Our initial model implied additional factors, such as people and culture that may affect the collaboration according to previous research. However, it is difficult to say if these factors are connected to entity affiliation, personality and skills, or is location-based, and so it does not fully match our research question.

We have thus identified six main characteristics; Mandate & Authority, Goals & Performance, Structure, Information Sharing, Resources, and lastly A-krim Strategy & Practices. Level A and B are made up of the same variables which we will refer to as characteristics. Level A holds the independent variables of each public entity, while Level B holds the dependent variables of the a-krim collaboration. Hence, A and B are different analysis levels. We have a general proposition from our RQ; that the entities’ independent variables affect the collaboration, thereby A affects B, see figure 9.

Figure 9 - Model
4.1 Characteristics of The Model

In this subchapter we present and explain each characteristic and link them to theory. We will discuss level A and B about another, and propose our assumptions regarding dispersions that may occur. A simplification of the model can be summed up in the below *figure 10*, which will also be found in the analysis chapter.

![Simplified Model](image)

**Figure 10 - Simplified Model**

1) Mandate & Authority

In this characteristic we want to look at what kind of mandate and authority each entity has in terms of fighting a-krim, and whether this is sufficient enough to execute their a-krim mission given by the government (3.1.1). This includes looking at their social mission, mandate, regulations, and sanctions, and further to see how this affects the collaboration.

The mandate and authority given to the entity by the government is tailored towards their respective social mission and purpose (3.1). The social mission of the entity may however be in conflict or incoherent with the a-krim mission through The Government Strategy, and we will look at how this is balanced (3.3.4), together with whether the entities’ mandate is sufficient to fight a-krim. Mandate is given by Letters of Award to the entities, while the collaboration is under The Joint Action Plan (3.1.1). The entities may also be bound by their own entity in terms of directions, instructions or management signals, where we assess mandate linked to strategic actions (3.3.1 - 3.3.4).

In the regulation part we look at the different entities regulation and legislation, and how they interact together. We also assess the understanding and interpretation of regulations, both of one owns regulation and of others’. In an IoC the different entities and people within may interpret rules and regulations differently, this may lead to an additional challenge.
Sanctions differ in the entities, as it lays under different regulations. We look at how the different entities sanctions complement or diverge from one another (3.1.1 & 3.3.4). In so, dependency of collective sanctioning will be looked upon.

This characteristic is posed to several challenges in terms of differences among the entities involved, but also posed to opportunities in regard to synergy effects that may be created by such collaboration. Collective sanctioning that hits a-krim on several dimensions is one these synergy effects, while deviating social mission in relation to a-krim can be a challenge (3.3.4).

2) Goals & Performance
In this characteristic we want to look at the entities own goals and performance measures, reporting of performance, and difficulties associated with measuring the performance.

IoC theory state that when there is a collaboration in place there are usually collaborative goals, as well as individual goals connected to the members of the collaboration (3.3.2), and further that these entity goals may be inconsistent with the collaboration goals, i.e. contradictory goals (3.3.4). We therefore want to explore the balance between the entity's goals with the collaborative goals, whether the entity’s goals strengthen or weaken the collaborative goals, and vice-versa. This includes looking at performance objectives for the individuals working in the collaboration, and thereby seeing how it may impact the collaboration.

Reporting of performance is also something that IoC theory refers to, specifically Metrics which evaluates interorganizational efforts in addition to assessing outcomes, together with Collaborative Tools & Technologies which enables performance measures to be reported (3.3.2). The latter reflects systems used in the collaboration (3.3.1) and will be addressed under the characteristic Information Sharing. Metrics on the other hand will be of main focus in this characteristic, and it is further linked to how the public sector is measured, i.e. is result-oriented (3.3.4). We therefore look at how metrics and reporting is done in the collaboration, and how one differentiates between entity performance and collaboration performance as the collaboration is made up by several entities.
This characteristic is closely related to the previous characteristic in terms of sanctions, as these are the activities or tools one use to achieve goals and performance objectives in the collaboration. Hence, we can say entity goals may shape collaborative activities if these activities are of benefit to the entity. We thereby assess the outcomes of how performance measures are evaluated. Since the entities are very different and hold responsibility for different domains, we assume that their goals and performance measures hold different focuses, which we assume will affect the collaboration.

However, a bigger challenge within this characteristic concerns how to measure performance and what activities to measure (3.3.4). Difficulties with measuring performance derive from the problem at hand and its nature, a-krim. What is a good measure on the a-krim problem if one do not know what kind of effects the collaboration activities or efforts give in terms of effect on crime and society. In other words, user-effects and socio-economic effects ex-post sanction/activity is perhaps impossible to assess. In short, it is difficult to measure the results as well as the effects.

3) Structure
The characteristic will include both the sole entity’s structure and the collaboration structure. Structure as mentioned earlier can be viewed as formalization, decision-making authority and organizational forms (3.3.1).

Sole entity structure is adapted to the entity’s tasks (3.3.4). At the entity level, we look at structure in terms of national management, regional division, organizational size & complexity. The latter includes entity line and how a-krim is organized. National management means management of a-krim from directorate level to entity level, how the entity’s collaborative efforts is run from top. Top management support is an important factor for successful initiatives according to Neby et al. Further, since the entities have different organizational structures and their regional borders differentiate. This brings us to the challenge of overlapping borders. Organizational size according to Håkansson (1982), gives organizations a basic position to interact, the bigger organization the more dominating in the collaboration, also because size often is associated with resources. Thus, bigger size gives more resources and a more dominating position in the collaboration.
Organizational complexity means the relation between tasks and sections in the entities (3.2). Some entities in the collaboration use the entity line to further process a case, thus cases from the collaboration are often sent to the entity line. However, this is dependent on whether the entity line has capacity to take the case and/or if the case should be prioritized over other cases. Thus, structure assumedly affects prioritization in the collaboration. This was a challenge defined by RR (2016), that the a-krim centers experience different support in the entity line. We will also look at Structural Flexibility (3.3.2), in terms of where the organization of a-krim tasks lays in entity line.

At the collaboration level we look at how the collaboration is structured, namely through Styringsmodellen - which is presented in empirical context, and try to relate how the entity structure influences the collaboration structure. As Neby et al. (2016) mentions, the collaboration units can be looked as secondary structures to the entities and the fact that no entity has the leading role. We will look at formalization of roles and decision making authority. Hocevar et al., (2006) suggests both formalization of roles and processes. However, formalization may bring challenges the more differences there are initially. Since local needs vary there is need for flexibility, but there may be need for more standardization at central level (3.3.4). As the literature suggests, high degree of uncertainty often leads to less bureaucratic forms (3.2). The question of standardization versus flexibility arise. As more standardization may lead to more efficient work routines, but may also hinder flexibility which is needed to solve the complexity of a-krim cases. Decision making authority is thus important, but since the entities do not hold decision-making authority over other entities, it may make coordination challenging in the IoC. In addition, we will see if there are some challenges and/or changes over time.

4) Information Sharing
Information sharing is an important activity in any interactive process (3.3.1). In regard to information sharing we consider the entities’ regulations for information sharing, practise of these regulations, as well as systems used, while also examining how this affects the collaboration.

Each entity has their own rules for information sharing that they are obliged to follow. This entails that some information is confidential while other type of information can be
shared, thus it most likely limits collaboration (3.3.4). It can further be unfortunate if specific information cannot be shared to all members of an IoC due to entity affiliation.

How the regulations are practised by collaborative members may vary due to different culture, norms, and personalities (3.3.1 & 3.3.2). This is challenging to assess. Systems or Collaborative Tools are needed to share information, and since we deal with four different entities they will have their own system alongside the collaboration. We therefore look at the compatibility of entities’ systems and systems in the collaboration (3.3.1 & 3.3.2), and further assess their impact on the IoC.

5) Resources
The entities in the a-krim collaboration gets resources from the government through letters of award from the respective ministries to execute the Government’s Strategy. These resources may not be enough, which is why some entities will most likely also use their own resources to contribute to the case. Therefore, resources in the fight against a-krim = granted a-krim funds + entity resources (3.3.4). This can be viewed as resource investment (3.3.2), the extent in which the entities contribute with resources into the collaboration. We also look at how the “a-krim resources” are allocated and distributed across the entities.

Following, the contribution of resources may differentiate and be asymmetric between entity to entity. Those who contribute with most resources will assumedly also influence the collaboration the most or have a dominating position in the collaboration, this is linked to organizational size (3.3.1). We also look at if the entities have enough resources to 1) follow up on instructions in Styringsmodellen and 2) follow up a-krim cases in the entity line. When following up a-krim cases in the entity line, priorities are assumedly needed to made, partly based on resources available (2.2).

Resources are needed to execute activities and they are scare (3.3.3 & 3.3.4). This leads to the challenge of how to delegate resources in a most efficient manner, and whether the resources are spent in the right way. Since the entities have lager social missions than a-krim, they are recipient to other tasks and goals, which perhaps may be more important. This leads to opportunity cost when resources are allocated to a-krim. Neby et al. (2016) emphasis that to accomplish goals there has to made priorities based on political priorities and resources.
There may also be resource dependency between the collaborative members. Resource
dependence meaning dependent on another entity to further case process in the entity line
and the dependency on police efforts for investigation and prosecution (2.2 & 3.3.5).

6) A-krim Strategy & Practices
A-krim strategy means the entity’s strategy towards a-krim, and we will look at the degree of
strategic anchorization of a-krim in the entities, together with the entities own strategies for
a-krim, e.g. industry focus and small versus big cases. Strategic anchorization will
assumedly influence the priority of a-krim compared to other areas within the entity.
Priorities is based on goals, political priorities and resources (3.3.4). Strategy in IoC
according to Hocevar et al. (2006) was stated above, and reflects the willingness of
commitment which is further demonstrated through goals. Further, we look at the
collaboration strategy, hence The Government Strategy. Neby et al. (2016) emphasized that
the common strategy will require coordination between the entities and directorates, this is
something we will look at.

A-krim practices will revolve around which work methods each entity has towards a-krim,
and we will focus on the different time aspects. Neby et. al (2016) states that the entities’
work methods are important premises for the IoC, and the greater differences, the greater
adjustments are needed and challenges may arise. To detect a-krim there are different ways
of detection depending on the crime, one usually works both “inside” punching and
controlling numbers, as well as “outside” to discover and follow up suspects and suspicion.
Here the entities have different approaches and routines, who are used to what, and we want
to look at how the collaboration is affected by this.

The Crime Picture
The last factor in the model, which is something that we do not call a characteristic because
it is not influenced by the entity but impacts only the collaboration. Therefore, we call it an
underlying factor. It entails the surroundings of the specific collaborative units, depending on
location. Due to different geographical locations of the regional collaborations, there is also
different needs in those specific areas. For instance, there is different magnitudes of crime in
the different cities, whereas more complex and serious crime might take place in the capital
Oslo versus a-krim happening in Trondheim.
5. Methods

In this section we describe the methods used to conduct our study, and explain how they support our research question. This involves our research approach, design, strategy, data collection and data analysis. Finally, reliability and validity will be addressed in the end of the chapter, while research ethics will be incorporated in the subsections concerning data collection and data analysis.

5.1 Research Approach & Research Design

Our approach is a combination of deductive and inductive reasoning. The deductive approach is used to generalize existing literature to our specific case in order to make a preliminary model. However, the inductive approach dominates since we have collected data to explore a specific phenomenon, the interorganizational a-krim collaboration, which also further builds on richer theoretical perspectives (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill, 2012). The theory chapter has thereby been changed and adapted throughout the thesis and became finalized after the completion of data collection.

The research design is the design of the study from start to end, and gives a general plan on how to answer the research question (Johannessen, Christoffersen & Tufte, 2011). To answer our research question, we needed to understand the different levels of analysis, A - the individual entity and B - the collaboration itself. We started to examine the a-krim collaboration in Fall 2017 through official reports and other available sources online. This was necessary to get a basic perception of the topic and theme.

In our thesis we have defined six characteristics of (A) the involved entities, as well as (B) the collaboration itself. Based on these characteristics, we have looked at how they affect the a-krim IoC. A qualitative method approach was used to better understand different underlying factors concerning our research question. This was carried out by conducting interviews, giving us non-numerical data to analyze, thus making qualitative method appropriate to use. Qualitative research is used when one needs to understand underlying factors, which in our case represent the characteristics we examine in both level A and B. It
helps provide insights and could contribute to potential hypotheses for further quantitative and qualitative research (DeFranzo, 2011).

Our thesis is a combination of exploratory and descriptive nature, as we both want to explore and gain insight to the collaboration at hand, while also get an accurate description of why and how the different characteristics may affect the collaboration. Descriptive studies usually have a coherent route towards the collection of data, while exploratory studies are flexible and can adapt to new insights during data collection (Saunders et al., 2012). This relates to us since we had a preliminary plan on how to conduct the research, however we were also aware of the possibility that new and essential knowledge could arise during the data collection period. We have for example continuously changed up our model and characteristics along the way because supplementary information was necessary to consider. This implies our exploratory design, which dominates the thesis. The first version of the model was solely based on existing literature, descriptive design, which was necessary to start of with for the purpose of guidance and understanding of both the topic and theme.

5.2 Research Strategy

The research strategy is linked to the research question and its objectives. It should be in coherence with the chosen research approach and design together with practical concerns such as timeframe, resources available and sources of information (Saunders et al., 2012). Since we are studying a specific phenomenon, a-krim in Norway, and want to say something about the characteristics influencing this IoC, it was suitable with case study strategy.

Case study is characterized by the researcher gathering as much information as possible from units of analysis through a detailed and comprehensive data collection regarding a specific phenomenon (Johannessen et al., 2011). According to Yin (2009), a single case study often represents a unique or critical case, and conversely gives the opportunity to observe and analyze a phenomenon few have researched before. Given this, the collaboration on a-krim is fairly new on a regional level and it is a unique phenomenon. Thus, a single case study with multiple analysis units will be appropriate, also called a single embedded case design. The fight against a-krim will be the case whereas the units of analysis derives from level A and B of the research question and model. The units of analysis consist of; Politiet, Skatteetaten, NAV and Arbeidstilsynet as they are the entities fighting a-krim in Norway in
an interorganizational collaboration. The interviewees or respondents in which we have attained data from, have involvement in both level A and B, thereby representing both levels of analysis at the same time. This is because they have an own entity affiliation while also being affiliated with the collaboration concurrently.

The data collection was conducted during a time frame of approximately three months, from late January until early April, and can therefore be regarded as a cross-sectional study. In so, our interviewees are a representative sample for that current time in the a-krim IoC. The collection of data necessitated some traveling, and we were granted a scholarship within the FOCUS program at school that covered our expenses. Because of our connection to the FOCUS group we were also appointed with a supervisor who specializes on the topic of new organizational structures and a-krim, which again resulted in a gateway into the network we have studied.

5.3 Data Collection

We have been using and collecting both primary- and secondary data for our thesis. The primary data will have emphasis for the analysis part of the thesis. Primary data is data that is specifically collected for the research project in question (Saunders et.al., 2012). In so, advantages of using primary data enabled us to continuously tailor our interview guides to the research question, hence we ended up with three interview guides. In our case, primary data involved the use of personal interviews that were of semi-structured character. While secondary data, data originally collected for some other purpose, is emphasized in the theory chapter, and inspired the preliminary and current model. Next, primary data will be explained through how we handled the sampling technique and how we conducted the interviews.

5.3.1 Sample

Our respondents were sampled through non-probability sampling. In other words, we selected our own units of analysis and aimed for key persons which held one or several positions in the collaboration, and also represented their own entity on different hierarchy levels. This reduced the number of interviews needed as the chosen respondents had broad knowledge from several perspectives; different local a-krim units as well as knowledge from
their own entity line. For instance, one respondent could have three independent positions in the collaboration representing their own entity through only one position.

For the purpose of this thesis, the most appropriate sampling techniques were both of purposive- and snowball sampling method. Purposive sampling is when the researchers relies on their own judgement when selecting the analysis units. Snowball sampling is when subsequent respondents are obtained from information provided by initial respondents (Saunders, et. al 2012).

We started purposive sampling through our supervisor who lead us to a key person in the collaboration. This person became one of our interview objects and later gave us contact information to other key persons. We contacted National units of the collaboration in December 2017 to inform them about our study and asked for interviews in advance. The snowball sampling method was deemed appropriate as it was likely that the overseeing units had broad knowledge regarding whom to further collect data from, as well as gaining an initial insight to the IoC.

However, during further mapping of respondents we attained considerable amounts of contact information from several key persons. This lead to use of own judgement through purposive sampling again, because we had to limit the number of respondents. We had to make sure our sample were representative for our research question which entails including respondents from all entities in a fairly equal number to balance out the analysis and to avoid sampling bias.

Our initial plan of the interview time slot was to be late January and February 2018. However, as more information and potential respondents increased during the data collection period, the interview time slot lasted until April. The approximate number of planned interviews were 13-16, but was later reduced to 12. The interviews were reduced due to information overlap and consistency, and perhaps due to good sampling technique. Due to anonymity, we will only be able to tell which entity and which hierarchical level in the collaboration the respective respondents have. This information will however not be in combination with one another, see table 7 & 8.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Politiet</th>
<th>Skatt</th>
<th>NAV</th>
<th>AT</th>
<th>SUM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of respondents</strong></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 7 - Respondents and Entity Affiliation*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Local Level</th>
<th>Regional Level</th>
<th>National Level</th>
<th>SUM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of respondents</strong></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 8 - Respondents and Collaboration Background*

Our sample includes respondent from all the main entities, and are balanced out according to their involvement and size. This justifies that we have more respondents from Skatt than NAV, see table 7. The respondents have different backgrounds in their respective entity ranging from regional directors, senior advisors, inspectors, operatives and so on. All have long entity experience, while they might have different roles in the collaboration. We have tried to distinguish the respondents’ hierarchical positions in the collaboration, see table 8 & Figure 1 in the context chapter. On a national level, we cannot say where the respondents arise from, but that they have central positions among leaders and coordinators etc. Lastly, we want to address that our local and regional respondents derive from the a-krim centers in Oslo, Bergen and Stavanger. We have chosen these locations because they are the oldest and largest initiatives in the collaboration. We refrain from stating the number of respondents at these specific locations due to anonymity concerns.

Our sample is thus a combination of homogeneous and heterogeneous respondents. They are homogeneous in the way that they all have central roles in the collaboration. However, our sample is also heterogeneous since their roles vary and since they come from four different entities. Moreover, the majority of the respondents have different responsibilities and tasks both for the a-krim collaboration and in their entity line.

5.3.2 Interviews

In semi-structured interviews, the interviewer commences with a set of themes, but is prepared to vary the order in which questions are being asked and to ask new questions in context to the research situation (Saunders et.al., 2012). Such structure enabled us as interviewers to understand and evolve the knowledge of the topic from interview to
interview with great flexibility. In such, we reduced the possibility of hidden information that may have arisen since structured questions may overlook important aspects.

Prior to conducting the interviews, approximately one week before, we informed the interviewees about the themes we were interested in. This provided the interviewees with the opportunity to prepare for the interview and some gathered additional information from their entity. This should promote the ethics and quality of the data collected. We chose not to attach the complete interview guide prior to the interview, so that we would attain a more honest and non-altered response to our questions. The interviews were audio-taped and only recorded for our own use, further they were transcribed with full consent, and sent out to the interviewees who wanted to dot a read-through in case of possible misunderstandings. This strengthens our research credibility. Confidentiality contracts were handed out prior to the interview and recording, assumedly making the interviewees comfortable to respond honestly yet again, see appendix 1. All interviews were conducted by both researchers, thereby avoiding possible misinterpretations and bias between ourselves during data analysis.

The interview guides consisted both of thin and thick questions, lasting approximately 1-2 hours. We started with thin question to warm up the interviewee, asking easy fact questions like who, what and where. Then we continued with thick questions which were more analytical, and where we expected longer answers. We ended up with three separate interview guides, originally in Norwegian. All of them started with easy background questions and ended with very open closing questions. The interview guides varied depending on context, whom was interviewed, what their position was both in their respective entity and in the IoC, as well as their assumed knowledge. Additionally, our own knowledge and understanding of the collaboration grew during the data collection period, which made us able to tailor the following interview guides towards our specific research question.

The first and second interview guide was made for the national level in the IoC, to get an overall understanding of the collaboration and to map its extent. The total number of respondents for these interview guides were 5. The first interview guide was structured in accordance with A and B of the research question, see appendix 2. Here we chose to divide the guide into four themes; 1) my entity, 2) my entity’s contribution to the collaboration, 3)
the collaboration between the entities at national level, and finally 4) the collaboration between the entities on operative level. The total amount of questions on the first interview guide were 37 excluding sub-, follow up, and closing questions. Specifically, for the second interview guide, we chose to divide it into two themes whereas we separated the questions between; 1) being an external observer to the IoC, and 2) being a participant in the collaboration. The total amount of questions in this interview guide were 28, excluding sub-, follow up, and closing questions, see appendix 3.

The third and last interview guide was specifically aimed at the local and regional level, i.e. the local a-krim centers. This interview guide is most accurately tied to the model and the characteristics we wish to examine. The six characteristics of the model, plus people, are the themes of this interview guide, see appendix 4. This interview guide had 55 questions excluding follow-up and closing questions. This is a large number, however, some of the questions may have overlapped and it was difficult for us to know on beforehand how the respondents would react to specific questions. We were afraid that we would miss important data if not all questions were present in the guide. Instead we chose to be more adaptable during the actual interview situation and could from there on skip or change up the order of the questions. Total number of respondents for the last interview guide were 6.

Reflecting back on our collected data, we were largely informed in detail about specific regulations, sanctions, goals, problems across the entities and so on. Naturally, the respondent’s answers were coloured by their own entity affiliation and personal opinions, and resulted in various outcomes. However, the data surpassed the amount we had imagined, but we believed that going deep into detail about specific themes further increased our validity. Because of our curiosity we may have gained trust from our respondents to answer openly and truthfully. Further, we have tried our best to interpret all respondents correctly, especially in the aftermath while transcribing. This has been done by that we as researchers have cross-checked with each other, and to avoid misunderstandings we sent additional follow-up questions to some respondents.

5.3.3 Secondary Data

Secondary data have been used throughout the whole thesis for legitimate definitions and reference accreditation. Our secondary data consists of books, articles, organizational
documents, and journals of scientific research. Examples of secondary data are The Rokkan Report (2017), The Situasjonsbeskrivelsen (2017), and ICC Model (2010) which were used to get an early understanding of the topic, and later inspired our model and theory chapter. The data retrieved online were carefully reviewed. We have also received documents from the respondents, either on e-mail or at the interviews. These documents were mainly about their respective entity and joint collaboration reports that were newly published spring 2018, for instance the 2017 Annual Report of the a-krim centers and Styringsmodellen. Secondary data enriches the study and is necessary due to our combinational research approach.

5.4 Data Analysis

Data analysis is usually the most extensive chapter and fundamental background for a master’s thesis, here we explain how the data will be analyzed. A general approach from Saunders, et al. (2012) is to first identify categories that allows us to understand the data better. Further follows the integration of the data obtained as well as related data from other sources such as self-memos, observations made or progress summaries into categories. Next is to develop analytical codes to identify patterns. Based on the patterns, one can develop propositions and draw final conclusions. We have used Saunders et al.’s (2012) general approach as a guiding framework, but we have some deviations when it comes to development of categories, analytical codes and patterns.

The amount of qualitative data was substantial after conducting 12 interviews, as the length of some interviews exceeded more than 2 hours. Since we collected the data through an audio-recorder, we subsequently had to transcribe the data. We ended up with approximately 21 hours to transcribe which amounted to 80+ real time hours and 400+ pages of data. While transcribing, we used the free web app oTranscribe recognized by The Guardian, which was easy to use for playing back and forth on the audio files. The data was safely stored with individual key codes, so only we were able to access and identify the data.

After transcribing, we categorized each interview based on the preliminary model. At the time of the third interview guide was being developed, we created the six characteristics of the model that we regard as umbrella categories. In so, it enabled us to create specific analytical codes within the umbrella category. We made a table with the umbrella categories, codes and level of analysis. We used 11 categories that reflected our characteristics, and they
were color coded. We also had pre-assumptions for sub-categories in each category. Along
the way we had to make additional sub-categories, as every interview differed. It was also
possible for us to reduce some data when categorizing. After all interviews were categorized
individually, we gathered all the data from each interview categorically into documents. Our
initial plan was to further reduce data. However, due to time constraints we had to continue
with data analysis and findings.

We have used quotes in our analysis part to strengthen reliability. However, these quotes are
originally told in Norwegian, so when translated to English there may be to some extent a
risk of misinterpretation. The quotes used were translated in relation to their context and
therefore we believe they are interpreted to their meaning. We got a very good relation to all
out interviewees, and since we asked numerous follow-up questions and dug deeper at many
occasions, we believe our understanding of the respondent has come out in the most correct
manner, see next subchapter.

5.5 Quality of Research & Ethics

The quality of research is also a critical part of any research and is often described in terms
of validity and reliability (dependability). We also tie this subchapter up to ethics, where we
summarize the most important ethical aspects. Validity is usually divided into internal and
external validity, whereas internal validity is called credibility and external is called
transferability (Saunders et.al., 2012). We will discuss dependability and credibility in the
following paragraphs, while transferability will be mentioned in a broad manner in the end.

The dependability of the data is connected with the data used and how it is processed, which
is why it is important for the researcher to give a detailed description of the research process
(Johannessen et al., 2011). We have tried to describe in detail how we conducted the
interviews and how we analyzed the data, thereby reflecting dependability of the research in
the data collection and analysis part, see section 5.3 & 5.4. Dependability is connected with
consistency in research. In regard to concern of dependability in qualitative studies one has
to be aware of interviewee-, interview-, and participation bias (Saunders et al., 2012).

In our collection of data, we have some overall impressions concerning the dependability of
the interviews. Firstly, the quality of the interviews is dependent on the person being
interviewed, i.e. interviewee bias. We experienced a variety of responses to the same question because people have different personalities, backgrounds and perceptions of a given context. Moreover, the interviewees were not equally prepared which may mean that we would get “better” answers if all were prepared the same. We do, however, not believe this weakens our reliability, as this is a normal contingent factor and because we ultimately got consistent information. Some respondents may have interpreted the questions differently, but in the gave us in the end the same information but to different questions in the interview guides.

Secondly, the chemistry between us as the interviewers and them as the interviewee fluctuated during the interviews. For example, in the beginning of each interview the tone may have been quite formal and perhaps some nervousness was present, this later changed during the interview as we gained more trust and became more comfortable with one another. We therefore tried to encourage more specific answers the longer into the interview. This may have influenced the respondents reply, i.e. interview bias. However, we are left with the impression of having a good tone with every respondent. When it comes to participation bias we believe we have not experienced this, since all respondents we asked said willingly yes to participate in the research.

In regards to credibility, which in qualitative studies means that the researcher is able to reflect and interpret the interviewees answers in the way he or she intended (Saunders et al., 2012). Credibility has partially been reflected earlier in this chapter, but we would like to emphasise that credibility is also reflected through us as researchers. We have gained credibility to our respondent from initial contact, where we had well-formulated telephone conversations as well as well-informed e-mails regarding the research. We believe this has strengthened our relationship to the respondents, as we have been transparent along the way and been quick to reply to any inquiries. We believe it was clear that we had high motivation and interest in their work and contribution towards the fight against a-krim in Norway, and we believe this has helped us along the way.

To avoid misinterpretations of the respondents meaning, we have been good at asking follow-up questions to clarify what the respondent meant in their previous answer or to confirm their previous answer. We have also sent the transcribed interview to the respondents that wanted it for a read through and for the opportunity for corrections. This is
something we have considered important since it is only the respondent that holds the true meaning. During the data collection we have used former obtained information and cross-examined with some respondents to check if the information is correct.

We have also anonymized our respondents in the analysis part to our best ability, and they were informed about this prior to research participation and through our consent form. This strengthens the research quality and ethics in the way that respondents may have felt more freedom of speech and transparency. According to The Personal Data Act §31, all personal data which is processed shall be notified to The Norwegian Data Protection Authority. This can be done by registering the research project to The Norwegian Center for Research (NSD), whom grants permission for such projects through an electronic application form. We have done this prior to data processing, and where granted permission from NSD. Our research reference number is 60268, where we follow The Personal Data Act to its full extent. This should strengthen our research ethics, together with our full transparency with our interviewees regarding the purpose of the thesis.

\[4\] Personopplysningsloven
\[5\] Datatilsynet
6. Findings & Empirical Analysis

We will base this chapter on the characteristics of our model, and draw on the main findings that have appeared through our extensive data collection. To give a brief reminder, we have added our model once again below;

![Figure 11 - Model; repeated](image)

The chapter is structured into the six characteristics from our model, and within each characteristic we start off by presenting an aggregated finding illustrated in a figure that easily summarizes the total findings in the characteristic. The figure gives an overview of how and why A) entities’ characteristics affect B) the a-krim collaboration. In some instances, C) society as a whole will be incorporated. The overall aim of the chapter is hence to answer our research question:

“To analyze how and why characteristics of the different public entities affect the interorganizational collaboration on a-krim?”

6.1 Mandate & Authority

Mandate and Authority are important to consider as we study an interorganizational collaboration between public entities. Since public sector is organized in a way where entities hold responsibility and legal mandate over a certain domain, it is challenging to
address zones that fall between, like a-krim does. The Mandate and Authority characteristic is therefore a key characteristic in our research as it is the origin of the other characteristics. We focus on the following aspects in this characteristic; social mission, mandate, regulation, and lastly sanctions.

Our aggregated finding, see figure 12, is that mandate, regulation and sanctions are closely tied to the respective entities’ social mission. E.g. sanctions provided derive from entities’ social mission and mandate. Mandate and authority as a whole and goals mainly affects the collaboration through work practices on operative level. It entails sanctions used and prioritization of cases, where the entities have different sanctions and views. Sanctioning is affected by both goal objectives to fulfill and resource availability. This further affects the prioritization of cases in the IoC. Another intervening factor is the dependency on each other’s efforts, where we find Politiet to be the most important. Whether sanctioning in the IoC is efficient or not is another question. Further, work practices are influenced by people who practice sanctioning differently due to different interpretations of regulations.

According to The Government Strategy (2017) the collaboration is supposed to use the most efficient means and sanctions to hinder or reduce a-krim from happening, and we see this as a vague description, and perhaps the root to the mixed management signals occurring. Hence, we believe different mandate & authority and goals in the entities has led to confusion at operative level. Even though there are mixed management signals on operative levels, the IoC still manage to endeavor tasks in a good manner. However, we see it as a hampering effect that they are indirectly bounded by entity mandate and goals requirements.
In so, we believe that being free from entity mandate and goals requirements will lead to better outcomes, effective sanctioning and results in the a-krim centers.

We find that social mission influences the anchorization of a-krim in the individual entities. As it linked to extent of tasks, and how “important” a-krim is in comparison to other areas in the entity. A-krim anchorization plays an enormous part in how the collaboration functions, since a-krim anchorization positions a-krim on the prioritization list and allocation of resources to the IoC thereafter. Thus, the entities different a-krim anchorization affects the IoC.

**Social mission**

All the entities are under different social missions, where a-krim is the common denominator because it touches several entities’ domains. “So it’s various aspects of a mission, but when we get down to what a-krim is, there will correspondingly be different sides and regulations we have to follow. And it’s the sum of violations that makes it a-krim” (Local level).

What we see is that the entities’ social missions differ both in size and scope, and affects the collaboration in different ways, especially the anchorization of a-krim. For instance, NAV manages the Norwegian welfare system and have control over a large part of the state budget, here a-krim touches the issue of control and quality requirements of their benefits given out to society. Politiet has the scope of crime, however it is wide and a-krim constitutes only a small part of all crime and holds varying degree of severity. Skatteetaten on the other hand has the focus to ensure income to the welfare state, while Arbeidstilsynet ensures health and safety in the labor market. In so, we can say the entities hold different social missions, although collaborating together. “The social missions are quite different. There is not so many of them who has “fight crime” in it, it’s really just Politiet” (National level). We find that Politiet has a very wide social mission, resulting in challenges in terms of prioritization of cases even though Politiet is the only entity that specializes in “crime”. A-krim may come far back in the prioritization list in Politiet, since their social mission is so wide as it is.

We find that separate social missions may also be in conflict with the collaborative mission, to fight a-krim by reducing or preventing it. An example can be Arbeidstilsynet whose social mission in closely related to workers protection, and not to oppose workers. “So we can
sometimes come into difficult situations because we are to protect employees, which is what we are meant to do and why we exist. Then suddenly the same employee experience expulsion or penalty by Politiet for instance” (AT). The respondent further conveys that there are difficulties of understanding a-krim and the fight against it in the entity line, and believe this has to do with culture, as this is not what they have previously been doing, and thereby need to shift their focus in accordance with the labor market.

We find that the social mission ultimately affects work practices in the collaboration, which can further lead to issues on operative level. Due to the tasks involved in the social mission, it results in different ways to approach the collaboration goal to fight a-krim. “It affects the collaboration by that some work reactive and other proactive. And like Skatteetaten who works very reactive, it often leads to conflicts” (Politiet). Different work practices will be further discussed in section 6.6 A-krim Strategy & Practices.

**Mandate**

Mandate is the power and task given to execute the social mission. The mandate given to the a-krim collaboration is The Government Strategy Against A-krim and The Joint Action Plan given by the national steering group. The entity mandate is the Letters of Award, distributed by the entities’ respective directorates and ministries. A-krim is a prioritized area in all of these, and respondents have expressed that their own “a-krim” mandate is clear and precise.

However, some respondents have explained the issue of anchorization of Styringsmodellen in the entities’ Letters of Award has led to mixed management signals between the entities; “...what we struggled with and which we uncovered as part of the new Styringsmodell, is that The Joint Action Plan for 2017 to 2019, which is signed by 4 of these top managers, was not in accordance with what was sent in the entity line from the individual director. So I from the center got The Joint Action Plan, and then my boss got other management signals, which again was something else than what Arbeidstilsynet got, which again was something else than NAV got. So we were sitting there with four or five different management signals and were supposed to try to get to one” (Local Level).

We see that somewhere along the way the management signals change, which again results in issues and confusion at operative level. “I think maybe clearer signals are needed. That
the entities or leaders agree better on the management signals...because it’s important that we then are loyal to The Joint Action Plan” (Regional Level).

Following, a respondent believed it was dependent on the scope of the social mission, whereas larger missions might miss the transition of the degree of prioritization of a-krim as a whole compared to other focus areas. “It’s this translation, it can become different because even though it is stated in the original Letters of Award, even though there are homonymous formulations, the translation can differ because one has different social missions and various extents of other areas” (Regional level). We believe this is a key finding, as interpretation of the a-krim mandate may come out differently in the entity due to the scope of social missions of the entities together with their goals, and perhaps due to the long line of communication that some public entities are exposed to. We can link this to section 6.3 Structure.

When we addressed another respondent with the above as a preliminary finding, that the transition of the a-krim mandate somewhere along the way changes, the answer was: “Mhm, that’s right...There lies a lot of power in the directorates without saying more. But it’s true, interpretation probably plays a role, and then there’s probably contradictory interests in the directorates which suddenly results in small compromises there and then, which ends up with signals that we operatives cannot make sense out of in the end” (Local level).

To sum up, we find that mandate is clear on national (ministry) level, but that it in practice changes further down the entity line. In the end, it is the operatives on local level who are left with mixed management signals. We believe the reason for this is due to different interpretations on directorate level and due the scope and size of the entities social mission and prioritization of goals to be fulfilled, as compared to other areas. In short we can say that mixed management signals further leads to mixed goals to ensue, leading to different prioritization in the a-krim centers and thereby different usage of sanctions. Ultimately it affects the operative work practices. We hence believe different prioritization is tied to a-krim anchorization in the entity, see section 6.6 A-krim Strategy & Practice.

The majority of our respondents, independent of entity affiliation, believe the people working in the centers feel bound by own mandate and internal instructions from their
respective entity. However, the people in the centers are free to act beyond this. This will be further addressed in section 6.2 Goals & Performance.

Another thing to consider when it comes to mandate and jurisdiction is especially in light of Politiet, because they have different roles to play in the collaboration. Whether they assist or are an active part of the collaboration when they go out on controls. What makes this further multiplex is that these two roles hold different regulations and thereby different jurisdictions. “Which hat does Politiet put on when they are out? Are we on an assistance role, are we leaders...? We must either suspect crime or we must have the assistance role” (Politiet). Based on the above, we can say that mandate has consequence for which regulation and work practice to exercise. Further, respondents said that there were no constraints in their mandate or authority to perform the tasks given, and that the constraint lays more in the regulations.

**Regulation**

We find that regulations often limit the collaboration, where practicing information sharing is probably the biggest challenge due to strict regulation, see section 6.4 Information Sharing. We address other parts of regulations in this part. The entities hold different regulations because of their social missions and mandate. This is why they follow-up different parts when they are out on controls. Skatteetaten can for example not follow up on general wage, this is something that only Arbeidstilsynet can do because they hold authority over The General Application Act⁶.

We found differences in the interpretation of one’s own regulation across a-krim centers, organizational levels, and between roles in a specific entity. An example of this can be seen from Politiet. Politiet has a more special regulation system than the others because they have a two-tracked system, where prosecution with respect to The Criminal Procedure Act⁷ is one, and the “ordinary police service” with application of The Police Act is the other. A policeman can do certain things when he is out on a control, but when he starts investigating the prosecution track comes into play and he has to involve a jurist for approval. Several of our respondents explained that there is disagreement between jurists when it comes to the

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⁶ Allmenngjøringsloven
⁷ Straffeprosessloven
use of The Police Act on financial crime. “There is disagreement about the use of the Police Act, and it is stated that Politiet can stop ongoing crime. This is something not all jurists agree upon” (Politiet).

In the midst of our data collection, there was an article published in the newspaper Klassekampen, where the issue was whether Politiet could use The Police Act to stop financial crime and whether they could report financial crime when they were out on controls in the collaboration. A policeman was told he had to report it as tax fraud to Skatteetaten so that they could take the case further because of issues related to administration information getting into a criminal case, as well as the issue of whether Politiet is an active collaborative member or at assistance. However, a local respondent explained that it depends on capacity and prioritization of cases, because if everyone reported on a free basis it would have consequence for the priorities. “No, it’s wrong. But what’s right is that it goes back to the fact that we have more criminals than public control and regulation authorities are capable to act upon. So, the answer is both yes and no, it is not free forward to report everything, but what is police worthy to report shall be reported” (Local level).

The interpretation of whether Politiet can lawfully report financial crime or not, is also interpreted differently between the police districts. “I have said that Oslo is a world for itself. We have jurists who support the use of The Police Act, this is for example not supported by the jurists in Oslo. But I agree with both parties in Oslo because it is not that easy, it’s a discussion between the managers in the Financial section and the operative part of Politiet. But Politiet can report for tax fraud, they do not need help from Skatteetaten to do it” (Politiet). The respondent believed the misunderstanding from the article had to do with culture, and that many believe financial cases should go the long way. He also stressed the fact that one have to communicate and ask if there are resources available to a case. In so, this dispute in Politiet can be linked to resource scarcity and performance measures which we have more findings on in their respective sections.

We also found lacking understanding of others regulation and mandate through our interviews, which we see as a big challenge in the collaboration as it affects work practices

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8 Forvaltningsopplysninger
in the a-krim centers. For instance, NAV’s unemployment benefits are designed for the whole society, and it is not only a-krim criminals who exploit it. A NAV respondent said that some collaborative members from other entities did not understand that if someone has a verdict or NAV benefit, they are still members of The National Insurance\(^9\), and that they hold lawful work relationships even if they are suspects on a control done by the IoC. This is further challenging in respect to information sharing regulation, as NAV is put in a squeeze and cannot always share with the collaboration whether a person holds a benefit lawfully or not.

The issue of understanding one another’s regulation and legislation can be connected with complexity and size of the entity in question. It appears for us that especially NAV and Politiet struggles the most with this issue. They also have the most complex regulations, which in return results into different usage of sanctions.

Sanctions

An important factor in the collaboration is sanctioning. The sum of sanctions the collaboration disposes is one of the key outcomes the collaboration gives. If used correctly, the purpose of the collaboration thrives, as tackling a-krim will be more effective. “*When you have different sanctions the sum of this becomes much better than every entity going out alone. So, I think this has been the success, that we fulfill one another with sanctions*” (NAV).

We see the sanctions complement each other, for instance Arbeidstilsynet who is not allowed to check ID, but can however check HSE cards accomplishes more when combined with Politiet or Skatteetaten who lawfully can have ID-controls. “*The point with the a-krim collaboration is basically when everyone really puts in all efforts on one actor or one network, we bring them down on their knees*” (Local level). Another respondent did however convey that a-krim is challenging to tackle, no matter what and how many who collaborate, but that this is still the right way to go about it.

Joint sanctioning in the collaboration is by no doubt one of the success factors. However, there are several factors that come into play when one starts to employ sanctions, which can

\(^9\) Folketrygden
be looked upon as restraining factors for the collaboration. These are; effective sanctioning, dependency, time-aspect, and divergent motives.

Effective sanctioning
The collaboration mission is to fight a-krim. From our interviews many talked about effective sanctioning, and how to deal with it. In sum, respondents agreed upon that sanctioning should reduce the “room of action” for criminals, and that this is done best by taking the money as a-krim is profit-motivated. “What it boils down to is how one can take values from the criminals, either assets, money, blocking accounts...as quick as possible. Criminals would rather sit in jail than to give up money. So to take and secure the values are most important” (Local level). The respondent said it is difficult to assess what is effective, but by capturing values one takes away the main drive for committing crime.

The challenge lies in coordinating and choosing the most effective sanctioning. This is why knowledge building is important. When, who, and how. A local level respondent emphasized the importance of knowledge building in order to capture the “right” actors as a goal, not only actors that are easy to take out because they are visible or because it gives results. “To have effective sanctioning, preferably with both the criminal track and bookkeeping. But then we need to know so much more...” (Skatt).

Dependency
We also see that the entities are dependent on each other’s efforts, in order to follow-up on other’s sanctions, and that one needs to evaluate each case individually in regards to effective sanctioning. “But which sanctions to use, it is sort of, what will be effective to fight crime, right...” (AT). Following the respondent told about the fact that if only Arbeidstilsynet imposes an injunction, this does not give much if the other entities do not follow up with anything else. In so, we believe coordination of joint sanctioning is important for the IoC to succeed, and to further fight a-krim in the most proper and adequate manner. We further find the most dependency on Politiet, since they have essential means to fight crime, however we also find Politiet’s efforts to be limited.

Time aspect
Another aspect to consider within joint sanctioning is the time aspect. As a-krim moves quickly it is necessary to respond quickly, however the stricter sanctions are, the more time
consuming and resource demanding they are. This may be seen as a limitation to the IoC, and it is thus important not to neglect the time aspect of a-krim and whether it is efficient or effective. “This with bookkeeping comes long afterwards, the criminal can shift or move back, or have moved themselves, or into other industries and so forth” (Skatt). NAV has no “quick” sanctions, meaning they require time for investigation and evidence collection, such as to stop a benefit or demand refund of benefits. However, NAV can avoid going through the time consuming administrative track\(^{10}\) in their entity line by direct police reporting if they hold sufficient suspicion and grounds. A NAV respondent told us that direct police reporting gives faster results, and is why the IoC is good as they can more easily provide Politiet with the correct information. On the other side, resources scarcity, i.e. capacity in Politiet is another issue that restrains the follow-up of sanctions. A NAV respondent regarding the Politiet and resource scarcity: “That’s right... Yes, always, and a challenge it is”.

Arbeidstilsynet has an important role out on controls because of their quick and on-site means. One AT respondent even said they impose injunctions in every single a-krim case. “There will always be something for us there. Always... If a case in the a-krim center would be without any gains for Arbeidstilsynet, no it cannot happen” (AT). However, we see that AT may come out too short with their sanctions alone, hence the following-up part done by the other entities are important, which is further dependent on resources. “It’s important that for example Skatteetaten follow-up with bookkeeping or that Politiet investigates after our sanctions. But then there is more need for resources in what is called the entity line” (AT). The focus in Stavanger has from day one been to stop criminal activity and to avoid criminal case in order to not bind resources in Politiet. Hence, Politiet in Stavanger was the first to use on-site expulsions as a mean in a-krim. We thus find that some centers take into account the resource scarcity Politiet has when sanctioning in the IoC.

We find that sanctions are impacted by the individual entities social mission, as NAV is the only entity being an administrative entity and not a control entity. And, that there is sanction-dependency among the collaborative entities together with concurrent resource-dependency. The value of Politiet comes without questions as they have the most and hardest means and sanctions, as well as the fact that other entities are dependent on them for investigation. “It is

\(^{10}\) Forvaltningssporet
clear that Politiet has opportunities the others do not have” (Politiet). However, we see that police sanctioning varies greatly across the different centers.

We see that there are many sides to take into account when sanctioning, and that quick and efficient sanctioning does not necessarily mean effective sanctioning. “It’s the combo of this which is a challenge. Because, it’s efficient to get a criminal out of play fast, but not if two more takes his place” (National level). Hence, we believe knowledge based methods in the a-krim collaboration is vital in order to get an efficient outcome, both in terms of resources used and dependency thereof, as well as the effect in society. Through our interviews we also got the feeling that more and more understood the value of the newly established knowledge building group at local level, and hence we see the IoC moving the right way in terms of effectiveness. “If we know more about the actor, his faults within our area and other entities’ areas, then we know better which means we can put in, that are effective, because we aim for effective sanctioning” (Local level).

Divergent motives
There may also be divergent sanctioning motives, which can make coordination challenging. For instance, Arbeidstilsynet and Politiet, protecting versus sanctioning employees, as mentioned in the regulation part above. An AT respondent emphasized the positiveness of all the sanctions the collaboration has, however that the sanctioning motive may be different between the entities. “In the beginning it was problematic because Arbeidstilsynet has a protection law. And they were very negative when Politiet were asking companies or employees to leave the work-site, because then we took away their opportunity to work” (Politiet). We believe this has to do with culture and understanding of others’ motives. Politiet’s motive is not necessarily to take away work opportunities, but rather that workers abide the law. We further believe it is unfortunate that still after 3-4 years of collaborating, the understanding of different entities’ motives is not fully understood.

6.2 Goals & Performance

In this characteristic we address the different entities’ goals and objectives in relation to a-krim, how the collaboration efforts are measured and the difficulties this entails in regards to reporting and effect on society. We also look at the development over time. When it comes to goals and performance, there are several challenges in the collaboration, challenges that
even surpass the collaboration itself, namely the effect on society. We start off soft with explaining that the entities hold different goals and performance measures due to their social mission and corresponding mandate and authority, see figure 13. This is again drawn back to the fact that the Norwegian State is result-oriented in how they govern the country.

![Figure 13 - Findings: Goals & Performance](image)

We find that goal and performance (GnP) measures of the individual entities are further put over on employees, which again affect the overall daily work practices in the collaboration. This is done through prioritization of activities, which again is resource dependent and reliant on the crime picture. The IoC collaborative goal is only in text format, as it is difficult to define effective GnP measures. This has led to own entity goals being pursued in the IoC. Further, the IoC performance measuring is difficult since there is no common reporting system, as well as the crime picture across centers varies which lead to different interpretations of definitions. Finally, all this has consequence on C in the figure, the effects on society, as it is difficult or if possible at all, to measure.

**Goals**

Since the entities have different GnP measures, we see that this influences the collaboration mainly through work practices. A clear aspect is that all the entities are result-oriented. When we say “result-oriented” it means that the entities want to achieve their performance objectives in which they are evaluated on by the government who then delegates resources accordingly (based on performance). This means that own entity goals are tried to be met or usually prioritized individually from entity to entity in the IoC.
The entity goals seem to be divided on regions and further on number of individuals in the entities. “An entity is anyhow measured per “head” and the result is calculated thereof, so everyone has to contribute” (Local level) and “We do not have individual goal requirements... but of course the sum of all in our region must deliver what they need to” (Regional level).

Even though the participants in the a-krim centers say they are freed from entity goals, they are still contributors for meeting entity goals, and we then question their freedom. Each individual will therefore still be evaluated for the work he/she has done, and thereby it affects how the centers operate.

**Entity Goals**

NAV has no direct goal requirements on an overall level. “We have not specified any goals for a-krim, it is just pure textual that we are to contribute” (National level). However, it seems like the further down the entity line you go, from regional level and down, there are put in GnP requirements. “We have some GnP measure, we do have that. And they are stated, or you can say built on the management letter from the directorate” (Regional level).

For NAV Kontroll we see that retrieval of wrong payments and stopping benefits are the most important objectives.

Politiet are traditionally measured on clear-up rates and case processing time, where clear-up should be high, and processing time low. Following, there are no specific GnP measures directed towards a-krim. “Politidirektoratet has not put in any goal requirements for a-krim, so we can basically do what we want” (Local level). However, a-krim is crime and Politiet still assess all crime prevention and fighting of crime to be a goal in itself. “We are supposed to prevent and fight crime, and that entails all crime areas/dimensions. So a-krim is actually a small part of the large social mission Politiet has” (National level). Moreover, Politiet is now turning towards preventive activities instead of traditional GnP measures.

The directorate of Arbeidstilsynset makes goal and allocation letters for each region. Some goal objectives are reaction degree and number of controls which is reported to the directorate. The goal objectives are aggregated on regional level, but when it comes down to the region it is further divided on individual level. “We report on what we have achieved, i.e. everything from the number of controls and so and so on, but this doesn’t go on individual
persons, it is on the region. They get their own performance plan, everyone gets that. So it will eventually be the individual employees” (AT). The individual employee performance plan states how much resources should go to specific areas, and respectively how many controls there should be on those areas.

Skatt has specific goals on a-krim, for instance number of police reports within a-krim, number of convictions, how much in disbursements and arrests. “We have a very comprehensive reporting system, almost a little bit freaked” (Skatt). Further Skatt has performance measure on internal procedures, like bookkeeping, which is the hit rate of a bookkeeping. This is because a bookkeeping is a resource demanding and time consuming process as well as it is a burden for those being controlled. “When we first take a case for control, it has to be a hit rate in many of those cases. I am unsure what the official hit rate is, but I have said it should start at 90%, for a-krim which is probably higher than Skatt has, because we need to defend what we are actually doing” (Skatt).

We find a development in Skatt performance measures, by earlier focusing on numbers, NOK, scope of controls, volume on disclosure/detection and so, are now focusing more on user- and socio-effects. “Luckily the last years we are more freed from such demand, but maybe other entities have it in a larger degree. And this is what we see, that sometimes it steers where the entities want to go, which actors we go on” (Skatt).

Although a collaboration is good there are challenges that lies within the “how” to measure GnP in a orderly manner. Per today’s date, the only common collaboration goal is in a text-format; combat and reduce a-krim, no specific numbers or performance measures are issued. This may have been the root to why the centers have been practicing different workstyles, as they have incorporated their own entity goals while working on a-krim.

**Effect of entity goals**

We find Arbeidstilsynet and Politiet to be the ones most affected by their performance measures in the IoC, whereas Skatt is very GnP aware but are more freed from entity goals in the a-krim IoC.

Looking at Arbeidstilsynet, they are bound by the number of controls executed and reporting of this. “It is said that AT is released from entity goals, but in practice it depends on which
level you are on. When you are at the lowest level then they are probably not completely released yet, but if you ask the regional directors, they are” (Local level). We find the quote to be true, as the majority of our respondents stated they are free from entity goals in the collaboration, while they also stated that there are entity goals needed to be fulfilled cf. previous quotes from AT on entity goals. This is contradictory. It therefore affects how AT practice and prioritize their work in the a-krim centers. However, since AT has a concise social mission which is closely linked to a-krim, their boundedness to their entity performance measures do not affect the collaboration in a necessarily bad way.

Politiet on the other hand has another dilemma, since they are traditionally measured on clear-up rates and case processing time. This may look good on paper, but we question their GnP measures effect on society, because it may steer the focus towards quantitative and not quality cases, which usually has short and long processing time respectively. A Politiet respondent told us that there would arise a diverging issue now that Politiet had changed a-krim to being under the Foreigner Section and not the Financial Section, because the GnP measures from the immigration authorities is set to expel a certain number of people. “I’m very little fond of target requirements, for example, the Foreigner Section shall supposedly expel 9000 persons a year and why it that? I mean, who was it that came up with that number?” (Politiet).

In the centers where Politiet are under the Foreigner Section, they are for example measured on number of expulsions from the Kingdom. So, the fact that they in some centers are bounded by such section specific GnP objectives sounds unfortunate. This is also connected to resources, whereas smaller cases of less complexity use less resources than larger cases. We thus find that how Politiet spend their time and resources are reflected in the quality of cases that comes from the collaboration, i.e. it affects work practices in the centers. “If you can choose between a real criminal which takes much longer time to take out, or a family of five. Who do you choose then? You choose the family. And actually I think that’s not always okay” (Politiet). We see that sanctions of low processing time might overshadow quality sanctions which may be the rightful path to follow.

In so, entity GnPs may have a negative effect on the collaboration in whole as the efforts will vary between centers. It entails that the entities have different focus, some might put more weight into number of controls executed as this is a performance measure they have to report
in, or that their focus areas for a-krim is dependent on industry orientation thereby pursuing a
certain industry to fulfill the entity’s wish. A quote reflecting criteria for the employees in
Skatteetaten: “We have a lot of numbers on different stuff, and in addition they have a lot of
explanation variables they need to report on. What has the resources gone to, how many
shifts has gone to that and that, do they follow our management signal to prioritize the
construction industry? Or are they doing other things...” (Skatt).

We therefore see that entities’ GnP objectives are prevalent in the a-krim collaboration and
we can tie the entities’ GnP measures to the mixed management signals occurring in the IoC,
although the entities are supposed to be exempted from entity goals. “It has been a challenge
that the management signals in the entities have come out differently in relation to GnP
measuring. This has been discussed a lot, but the most important is to get an effect and to
achieve results through a joint approach. But then all need to be free to go together, and do
what is most effective independent from own entity GnP measures” (Local level).

**Reporting**

Reporting in another challenge in the a-krim collaboration. The IoC does not have any
common system to report in GnP measures, and hence it is another impractical issue for the
centers, this is further discussed in section 6.4 Information Sharing. Currently the centers
report their activities in statistics that are then sent to NTKG whom assemble a joint annual
report for the a-krim IoC. However, since there in no common reporting system, the centers
report their activities manually, which again brings its concerns. “There is great uncertainty
attached to those numbers because it’s based on manual counting” (National Level).

Additionally, we can exemplify with the fact that centers are also under influence of the
current crime picture in their respective regions at any given time. The centers seem to report
differently in terms of how they define certain activities. “You may get different answers,
and thus we cannot use that data because 7 networks in Kristiansand are not the same as 7
networks in Oslo” (National Level). However, respondents also recognized that there is need
for flexibility in the different centers due to the local adaptation approach, but that there also
is need for more standardization for how the a-krim centers should report in their
performance. “Sometimes we wonder what is actually behind certain numbers. I think we
need to be more aware of how much flexibility there should be in the reporting part in the
future” (National level). We find that measuring the a-krim collaboration is thus challenging
in itself, mainly due to no common reporting system, inconsistent reporting which is both 
manually counted and that definitions vary between centers due to location.

Lastly, we address that the entities also report in their respective entity line whenever an 
activity is executed, as it counts as a GnP measure for the individuals working in the 
collaboration and which they are obliged to do. In some cases, this results in quadruple 
reporting, in addition to reporting to NTKG for the collaboration alone. We find this to be a 
little bit odd in accordance to the government being result-oriented, and hence is prone to 
“double-counting”. “It is a numbers game” (Local level).

Measuring the collaboration efforts
The IoC’s goals reflect their social mission, to fight a-krim. The goals are listed below;

1) Put criminals out of function to continue their business in the labor market, or reduce 
their capacity to conduct criminal actions over longer periods
2) Reduce criminals’ room of action
3) Influence the non-serious to abide the law

Through the interviews we found that there was emphasis on the preventive part, as this 
stops crime at an early stage and thereby prevents the criminals to grow big and damaging, 
thus more difficult to catch. As the IoC work to reduce and hinder a-krim from happening, 
i.e. they work preventive, how can one measure the effects this gives? This brings us to 
probably the biggest challenge in the collaboration these days, to actually measure the real 
effects of the a-krim collaboration efforts on society. “That's what's so hard. How do you 
measure prevention? How do you measure things that are not happening? And you cannot 
measure per criminal case, like Politiet has done in all years, right. The clear up rates 
increase, but tells nothing about the crime picture” (Local level).

Another respondent tied preventive actions towards cost efficiency and thereby effects on 
society. “To work preventive is compliance by low cost11” (Skatt). The respondent meant 
that if one works preventive, i.e. hinder crime to happen, one can use the more resource 
heavy sanctions or tools on the more severe criminals whom you cannot otherwise seem to 
influence. We thereby see that effects on society and a-krim goals are tied to resources.

\[11\] Etterlevelse etter lavkost
Another aspect is that when a criminal is taken out, for instance put into jail and has served his/her time, what then? Several of our respondent noticed that there is obscure follow-up of criminals in the aftermath of being detected. “*But then nobody is checking what he/she is doing now. Because now the entities are finished. We need to know what works, what effects it gives to the market*” (National level). The respondent meant that if one only looks at GnP measures alone, the collaboration efforts will perhaps not fulfill their actual mission, to fight a-krim. Because the entities will have reached their goal, while the effect on society is still the same, since crime is still taking place. In so, the collaboration measures need to reflect the effects on society in order to combat a-krim in the most proper, justified and effective way. This is something the collaboration per today's date is struggling with, and do not have any good solution to.

We find that GnP measures that are put forward in numbers or specific objective to fulfill will only be a checkmark in the book, and as it stops there it says nothing about the crime picture in the following time. It may also incentivize the collaboration to take on smaller and easier cases. We thereby understand that the knowledge building group is vital to stay strong in the game and not deviate from the real mission to fight a-krim.

**Development over time**

As the collaboration is currently struggling with GnP measures, there is a working group that is looking at the issue as we speak. The group is supposed to find suiting goals and performance measures for the IoC, and their deadline was 12th of June. However, this is not an easy task, and several respondents has expressed their concern regarding it. “*It’s important they don’t derail completely, because it’s easy to become a bit too technical with these entity GnP measures*” (Local level).

Another quote exemplifying the difficulty of measuring the collaboration efforts: “*It’s hard to highlight the value-adding factor of working together. If AT uses a sanction or tool so that NAV stops paying out wrongful benefits, how can this be captured?*” (Skatt).

Some respondents emphasize that effects in the market or on society should be duly noted, and that this is the only way they will know how the collaboration efforts can be seen as effective or not. “*By having a mapping/assessment action, we can measure the development*
in the market, as well as use it for working knowledge based. We can see the development of crime, has it shifted, increased or reduced, and so on” (Local level).

On top of all these difficult challenges, we summarize by saying the challenges compound when we are in the public sector, due to its responsibility over citizens and society as a whole. “To measure things in The State is like others have said something about before, it's not that easy” (National level).

We can end this characteristic with saying that it is a challenge that the collaboration does not have any own GnP objectives other than a textual description saying to fight a-krim. This means that the collaboration is under influence of the entities’ GnP objectives instead, which may further divert prioritization of cases and work practices in the centers in order to fulfill entity wishes. Furthermore, when the collaboration has performed and fulfilled a goal, what effects does this have on society? We find this to be an important aspect of the a-krim collaboration establishment, and which is very difficult to solve.

6.3 Structure

In this characteristic we present aspects of the entity structure that influences the collaboration, where we will first address aspects of sole entity structure and then moving on to collaboration structure.

![Figure 14 - Findings: Structure](image-url)
In figure 14 we try to show the relation of the different factors and how the entity structure affect the collaboration structure. Social mission as overarching because it affects the entity structure. We find that the sole entity structure has three important factors in relation to the collaboration: national management, regional divisions and size & complexity. The latter includes entity line’s involvement and organization of a-krim internally in each entity. The main effects of this characteristic is prioritization and involvement in the IoC, which further affects work methods. We find coordination challenges due to mismatch in the regional borders between the entities. Further we find that national management carry on the a-krim anchorization in the entity, where strong anchorization and national management contributes to prioritization of a-krim.

The collaboration structure derives from Styringsmodellen, cf. empirical context 2.2. At local level a-krim anchorization is represented though RSG and LKG. Ultimately, the structure affects the IoC. Resources and the crime picture are “complicating” factors, as activities in the a-krim centers depend on both. The challenge of the IoC structure is that there is no common decision-making authority, this means decisions have to be done in the entity line or jointly in RSG or LKG.

**Sole Entity Structure**

The sole entity structure of all the collaborative entities has consequence for the collaboration, as the entity structure is fitted to each individual entity and not the problem at hand. Our findings that had an effect on the IoC were especially these structural aspects: national management, regional division, size & complexity. The latter includes organization of the entity line and organization of a-krim. These findings will be presented below.

**National Management**

We find that social mission & mandate influences the anchorization of a-krim. Furthermore, the national management is tied to a-krim anchorization. When we talk about national management we look at how the a-krim collaboration is run from the top and to the bottom in each entity, see illustration: (ministry) → directorate → entity → collaboration

The different directorates governing Arbeidstilsynet and Skatteetaten have close ties with a-krim activities concerning their entities. Both the directorates follow-up a-krim effort
through reporting and communication. In addition, they have entity gatherings for the employees involved in a-krim work.

Since Arbeidstilsynet is small in size, they also have short communication lines from top to bottom. “So there are relatively short lines, but that is because we are a small entity” (AT). In the a-krim collaboration this has contributed to more involvement from top, whereas the directorate manage and is in close contact with both the regional and local level, i.e. regional directors and supervision leaders. The Directorate of Arbeidstilsynet has an own unit who has responsibility for a-krim among other areas, and they have monthly meetings with the supervision leaders who follow up a-krim. In so, we see that the national management (the directorate) tries to keep track of what is going on in the a-krim centers, as well as they assist in clarifying questions to ensure that Arbeidstilsynet conduct similar work throughout the collaboration. “I know exactly whom I shall relate to, and it is those who run us who have responsibility for a-krim” (AT). In so, we see that both the regional and national management have strong anchorization of a-krim, leading to more involvement and priority of the IoC.

The Directorate of Skatteetaten has regular meetings with the regional coordinators, so that they have the opportunity to discuss a-krim, whether it is expectations, challenges or development etc. “I think it is great to have the good connection with the interdepartmental collaboration and the entity. So that I have someone to relate to in a system around a-krim, up in the directorate. This is an advantage, a great advantage” (Skatt).

NAV sends autonomous management letters that are flexible in how the tasks are being performed, this is in relation to their a-krim goals mentioned in previous characteristic. Late fall of 2017, NAV created a group for the a-krim leaders in NAV and NAV Kontroll, so that they have mutual exchange of information. NAV Kontroll also has information exchange at team meetings between the operatives at the different centers.

It seems on the other hand like Politiet has weaker national management and less clear communication lines when it comes to a-krim than the other entities. This can be a restraining factor in the collaboration. “What I miss is a national management of things. Like

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if we had a joint gathering for Politiet, where we could for example discuss methods and stuff. It’s too bad management from POD. Now there will be regional steering groups, so I guess there will be six different regional ways to do it” (Politiet). There are no joint gatherings for a-krim which may have led to mixed methods within Politiet. We also found that the national level, i.e. directorate, does not have much contact with local levels in a-krim, thereby leading to further misunderstandings and mixed methods. “For Politiet’s part, it is not a goal in itself to have contact with the operatives. We are probably more or wish to be, strategical. Thus, we do not have an organization that can follow up every box in the police districts” (Politiet). Following we found that local level in Politiet try to help each other across districts to clarify questions and/or methods regarding a-krim, instead of going the hierarchical way.

At the same time, Politiet has a greater extent of tasks and priorities. Politiet may view other tasks as more important than a-krim, this may explain the weaker national management. As well as Politiet’s lack of resources (capacity) thereby demanding larger priorities. National management may be easier in smaller entities because less extent of other tasks and shorter communication lines. However, this is inconsistent with Skatteetaten since they are a much larger organization than Arbeidstilsynet, but have still managed to create a good communication system in their entity. We can also tie this to the fact that Skatteetaten is resource strong.

On our findings we conclude that the extent of tasks relative to a-krim affects anchorization of a-krim in the entity line. This further influences national management, which in turn puts a-krim priority at a certain place in the “priority chain”. Strong national management will thus have positive effect on the collaboration. While the underlying factor of resource scarcity becomes a restraining factor for the collaboration, see section 6.5 Resources.

**Regional Divisions**

The entities in the collaboration are divided differently regionally; NAV Kontroll with three, Arbeidstilsynet with seven, Skatteetaten with five (planning to have zero), and finally Politiet with twelve regions. We find that different borders lead to challenges in the a-krim collaboration. “It is a huge challenge that each public entity has different regional borders” (Local level). Clashing borders can have the following scenarios: 1) the same person being in several centers, 2) several entities’ representatives in the same center, and 3) the need to
employ people on-site. The current division of RSG follows the police districts, because the collaboration wants to get the police chiefs more connected to the cause. However, the RSG structure affects the other entities negatively due to their different regional borders. Thus, we find the collaboration structure not to be in line with the entity structure. For further thought, it is difficult to say how the IoC will be affected when Skatteetaten is without regions.

Scenario 1) is especially challenging in the RSGs and for NAV Kontroll with few regions. “Clearly, our organizational structure is demanding in the a-krim work because we are localized very few places” (NAV). NAV therefor has the same regional director in several centers. Scenario 2) comes into play when an entity has several regions, for example, a RSG may have two regional directors from AT. Scenario 3) may lead to lack of entity affiliation and remote management. We see there is overlap as well as mismatch, which can be challenging for the collaboration.

Another issue to consider is what regional area a specific center has when regional borders are clashing. “A common denominator is that they do not know exactly what geographical area a specific center has, because all the entities have different regions” (National level).

However, criminals may operate in several regions simultaneously as well as the issue that some geographical areas are small. Take Oslo a-krim center as an example, who operates over larger parts of Eastern Norway and thus cross several police districts, due to the regional environment, i.e. small geographical areas that are largely urbanized. Oslo a-krim center is hence under scenario 2.

**Size & Complexity**

The entities differ in size, this is connected with how big their respective social missions are. The bigger the organization is, the more complex the structure is. Size and complexity also involves the entity line, and are based on tasks needed to perform. We also present findings on the entity line and organization of a-krim. The organization of a-krim in own entity means which unit that takes on the a-krim cases from the IoC. Here we find a difference in Skatteetaten and Politiets internal organizations of a-krim cross regions.

NAV, Skatteetaten and Politiets are big in size and have complex structures, thus a-krim anchorization may be more difficult in larger entities due to the greater extent of tasks that
needs to be taken care of and prioritized. “It is a large organization and there will be more people involved, and anchorization can be more challenging than in a smaller organization” (NAV). The bigger the organization is, the more tasks to do. NAV and Politiet have a lot to address besides a-krim. However, it is important to remember that NAV Kontroll for itself is small in size compared to NAV in general. NAV does not have an own a-krim section, but it goes under the benefit line. Most of the a-krim cases in NAV goes to NAV Kontroll. Skatt is big and competence heavy, this also leads to more resources being used.

Today Skatteetaten is divided into several departments and units, and because of this complex structure Skatteetaten has chosen to organize itself by incorporating a-krim into the different sections as the sections may be dependent on another, and there is need for coordination between them. “A-krim is now one of the most important areas we will be working with in Skatteetaten. The region also had to relate on how we should organize the efforts so that it covers everyone who is a part of the problem” (Skatt). However, the organization of a-krim differs across regions in Skatt. Skatt East has chosen to create an own a-krim section, which has 30 employees who all come from different departments in Skatt East. The a-krim section has responsibility for staffing the a-krim centers that cover the region, as well as selection of what cases that are control worthy. On the other side, Skatt West has chosen project organization of a-krim, to bring the sections in Skatt together. The project organization in Skatt West will end when Skatteetaten has reorganized. However, the different organization in Skatt looks similar, because both solved the issue of incorporating all the sections that are needed to tackle a-krim tasks. This also shows that a-krim is a prioritized area in Skatteetaten, as they even adapted their own organization for a-krim.

The entity line is the line which takes on a-krim cases sent from the collaboration. We see that the entity line differs between the public entities. AT stands out because they do not have an own entity line for case processing. “We have only one line. So, those who sit in the a-krim center, they need to take their own case and finish it” (AT). While the other entities in the collaboration are dependent on their entity line for further case processing. Case processing will require resources from the entity line, as well as the case may be one of several cases, thus prioritization will need to happen. The support in the entity line varies between the entities, and we have an impression that Politiet has the weakest support in their entity line, see section 6.5 Resources.
We find that Politiet’s functional oriented structure when it comes to organization of a-krim differ across police districts. Namely, if a-krim case processing is put into Financial or Foreigner section, or in a combination of these two. Often a-krim is a violation on both fields. A respondent at national level said that this variation in organization is due to the crime picture and what toolbox in Politiet is needed in a certain district.

Oslo and Stavanger a-krim center is organized under the Foreigner section. We find that the organization of Politiet can drive the focus in the collaboration, where The Foreigner section puts focus on foreigners and violations of The Immigration Act, which influences the work methods and priorities in the IoC. Whereas The Financial section is suited for the more serious financial cases that are resource heavy. “In Stavanger it is Politiet’s Foreigner section that handles a-krim and they have goals on one thing which is number of expulsions, to put it bluntly. These cases are usually non-cases for NAV... While in Bergen, a-krim lays under the Financial section and then it became quite different right away” (NAV). So we see that the organizational structure drives the focus towards GnP measures for Politiet as well as other entities GnP measures.

The police district of Oslo had a-krim initially in the Financial section, however in the midst of our data collection Politiet moved it to the Foreigner section. This “reorganization” happened right after the writings in Klassekampen, but several respondents stated that this was decided prior to the article. According to local level, Politiet reorganized due to work methods and the crime picture. “It’s maybe because of up to 90% of those we meet out on controls are immigrants. So you actually get more hits on The Immigration Act, but those cases are very small. Often an expulsion, then done. While a money laundering case is bigger, and a bit more complicated… The Foreigner section and Financial section are both essential, and there are very few who know both. So you can say that you either put it on Foreigner or Financial, or you can create an own where you gather people from both” (Local level).

In Bergen, we find that Politiet have sort of incorporated the foreigner field into the Financial section to tackle a-krim. Our findings tell us that Bergen prioritize a-krim the most. “Bergen Politiet has had another thought for their a-krim organization.... I think we have a great relation to Politiet and they wish to have a good collaboration” (Local level). We believe this may be due to their internal organizations of Politiet, and that a incorporation of
both fields is the best way to fight against a-krim. Hence, a-krim cases are not swallowed by other priorities. Next we present findings on the collaboration structure, which is related to the empirical context cf. Styringsmodellen. We go deeper into the main findings of; standardization versus flexibility, RSG & role descriptions, and the Coordinator role.

**Collaboration Structure**

The collaboration started without any pre-strategic planning, where money was thrown at the entities to establish a-krim centers. “It’s crazy how we started, it was not written a single word, such a structure change” (Local level). Prior to Styringsmodellen the a-krim centers had a lot of freedom, which is why they have come out differently. “The a-krim centers are established on different times so they have come out very differently and that has been a policy, that we should let it blossom. But now we see that both the collaboration and the entities wish to add more frames” (National level).

Styringsmodellen was implemented from 1th of January 2018 and defines units, roles and contacts points, and acts as a frame for the collaboration. So it gives more standardization in the IoC, which has been appreciated. “I think it’s great. I don’t want the box thinking, but Styringsmodellen gives us freedom. We now know who can make decisions, which is something we’ve missed” (Local level). When we asked informants about the trade-off of standardization versus flexibility in regards to Styringsmodellen, it was pointed out as a good thing and not an issue. With standardization the centers get more similar, additionally it will be easier to gradually start up more centers.

**RSG and Role Descriptions**

RSG is a new steering group as a result of Styringsmodellen. Disagreements in LKG are lifted to RSG. Styringsmodellen has also given role descriptions which has made reporting in the collaboration easier. “Now we have the steering group (RSG), which is gold worth. As well as the role descriptions that are very good, it clarifies the different roles in the center” (Local level). In RSG, decisions and priorities can be made, as well as questions that affects the entity line. For instance resource prioritization, since RSG consists of regional directors with authority. “It is important that the steering groups have leaders who can take decisions and say: now are we going to have resources and I have the authority to make that decision. Too much coordination weakens the clarity” (National level). Hence, it looks like much of the challenges, like prioritization of cases and decision-making authority, are solved by
RSG. However, one question remains concerning RSG, if the entities will contribute equally and if they can come to agreements. How this goes will presumably be affected by anchorization of a-krim in the entity line.

The Coordinator Role.
Since the IoC consists of separate entities, the entities do not hold any power over one another's resources or decision-making, hence the IoC cannot have a formal leader who can prioritize cases over other cases. This is why the centers have Coordinators and not leaders.

“There are some practical challenges when people come from different entities. One entity does not own the total resources, so what decision-making authority could you then have over another entity. We have emphasized equality, consensus and cooperation as important values in the collaboration” (National Level). This means that the Coordinators in the a-krim centers cannot give instructions on behalf of the whole center, which we find challenging for coordination. This is why LKG and RSG need to come to collective solutions, as they hold decision-making authority in their entity line.

The Coordinator roles are often taken by Arbeidstilsynet, Skatteetaten and Politiet, and p.t. NAV does not have any. This can be explained by people factors, lack of resources, and the wish of Politiet to be more connected. “It’s clear that being a Coordinator is an import role, and p.t. NAV does not have any Coordinators. But we see it is wise that Politiet has the role because then we connect Politiet much closer to us, so then I think what will be best for a-krim instead of what is best for NAV” (NAV).

6.4 Information Sharing
Information sharing naturally plays a vital part in any organization, group, or collaboration, in order to function properly. It is also stated in The Government Strategy that better information sharing is necessary to have an effective a-krim collaboration. In so we consider three aspects we believe are important for the a-krim collaboration: regulation, practice of regulation, and systems. We also address development over time in this characteristic.
In aggregate terms, see figure 15, we find that information sharing in the collaboration is highly affected by the entities’ purposes. Due to their varying social missions and mandate, regulations respectively follow. Regulations stand out in this characteristic as it is something the public entities needs to operate under, and thus clearly impacts the collaboration through work practices. It inhibits efficient collaborative work and further alters practices to differ from one center to another. Thus, we see that information sharing practices even though regulations are standardized, depend and differentiate between entities and centers, as they inhibit different individuals and/or norms. Secondly, regulations inhibit the collaboration due to organizational differences which has left the collaboration with no common IT systems to use. No common systems further complicate the GnP reporting of the IoC, cf. section 6.2.

**Regulation**

We find that information sharing regulation strongly influences the IoC’s work practices, and that it has a negative impact or puts a limit to the collaboration. Here we present some of the findings, which mainly concerns the limitations between the different regulations as well as the lacking understanding of others’ regulations. “We have had this knot for three years now, and it is a challenge for the practical work and it means that we have to go around and about, and think alternatively and so on, instead of being able to go straight ahead. It hinders us in the practical work” (Local level).

The entities have varied degree of limitations in their info-sharing regulation. This is particularly in concern to NAV, who holds wide permits for collecting information. NAV
Kontroll is under the regulation of The National Insurance Act\textsuperscript{13} §21-4, which allows them to collect information from other entities, third parties, banks, the user him/herself and so on. Further NAV can merge multiple registers. They therefore have access to a lot of sensitive information, which is also why NAV is under strict information sharing regulations. “We in NAV are very concerned about this with regulation... So, we are not even allowed to say if you are on sick benefits or not” (NAV). The issue of NAV’s strict information sharing regulations was a classic issue throughout the interviews, since they lack the authorization to exchange information in the daily work at the a-krim centers.

We see that Arbeidstilsynet is positioned to share information to a great extent. AT has less limits to share information but smaller mandate to receive information reflected by their smaller social mission. Since Arbeidstilsynet mainly focuses on adherence of the Working Environment Act, they do not hold sufficient mandate to know sensitive information. “Arbeidstilsynet is the one we can share the least with..., so it has been very challenging” (Regional level).

So what we see is that regulation and information sharing is dependent on whether one is on the receiving side or on the sending side of information sharing, referring to NAV and AT as two opposites. This is where we believe that the entity’s social mission and mandate comes into play. In so, we see that the more sensitive information (i.e. person level) an entity holds, the stricter the regulations are. For Skatteetaten, information sharing and regulations are not that big of an issue. Politiet has less limitations when it comes to sharing information in the IoC. “We have a pretty wide authorization to share information with others, if we believe it can contribute to prevent crime. So in concrete cases, we have a lot of opportunities” (Politiet).

We also find that information sharing depends on where one stands in the timeline of a case; where info sharing is more restrained in the beginning of a case when in a sphere of uncertainty, since different regulations apply at certain times. “There is a difference on sharing information when one is out on control rather than at a preliminary stage and at an investigation stage. Then there are other rules” (National level). As we understand it, when a case holds a narrow focus, on a person level with actual suspects, there is more latitude for

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sharing. However, this may seem confusing since we just stated above that when on person level there are stricter regulations in play. To sum up, sensitive info is strictly regulated ex ante a case (in a sphere), while ex post (case is specific) there is more room for sharing.  

“Much of the challenge is to come from a sphere to a social security number. But immediately when you have a social security number, that means, you are criminal, something is wrong with you, we have a suspicion, then we can talk quite loud and hard and long because then you are in a specific case” (Local level).

Asymmetry in regulations  
We find there is asymmetry in the regulations for information sharing between the collaborating entities, in regards to what to be shared and to whom it can be shared with. What one entity can share with another entity may not be possible to share with some other entity. For example, NAV can in most cases share info with Skatteetaten, while they cannot share the same information to Arbeidstilsynet. Arbeidstilsynet is the entity the others can share the least with, which often results in them having to leave the room due to confidentiality regulations. At the same time Arbeidstilsynet is the entity that can share the most with the others, and are only bounded by one rule that is further not perceived to be a hinder for the collaboration. “The only special rule we have is that the tipper’s name is kept secret...Which is something that we are not burdened by” (AT).

Another respondent further explained that there is a difference in what one “needs-to-know” versus what is “nice-to-know”, where Arbeidstilsynet falls under the latter on many occasions. An AT respondent looked at this as an impediment in the collaboration, especially when it comes to the regulation of Skatt and NAV. “They have very strict regulations of confidentiality, and it’s a hinder, definitely a hinder in the collaboration. It is okay to share with Politiet, but not with us” (AT). This can also be viewed as lacking understanding of others regulations. Again, the understanding of what is nice-to-know or needed-to-know is reflected. However, we believe reduced info sharing can hamper the IoC as some might not see the full case context, and ultimately it may affect the daily work at the a-krim centers.

Through our interviews there was clearly frustration and some misunderstandings of the regulations, and AT’s role was a constant topic, this was discovered independently of entity affiliation. “It has been challenging that AT has not understood other’s restrictions. They have been annoyed at Skatteetaten, and then Skatteetaten has to explain that this is actually
our confidentiality regulations” (Regional level). On the other side we have AT who looks at it differently and indirectly points to culture. “Skatteetaten may be a bit traditional, a bit challenging in relation to exactly this with confidentiality” (AT).

Even though NAV can in most cases exchange information to Skatteetaten, there are still times when the shared understanding issue comes into play, especially when it concerns individual privacy. Skatteetaten can in their own registers see that a person has benefits from NAV, but Skatteetaten cannot specifically see what type of benefit it is. “We cannot say that Ole Olsen has benefits, while Skatteetaten says “we know he has benefits”. Because of our regulation we cannot say anything then. So it is clear that things like that are completely nonsense” (NAV). The previous quote reflect that it is unfortunate that NAV cannot tell Skatteetaten that certain persons hold benefits rightfully or not due to regulations, which thereby could have avoided irritations and impractical practices in the centers (double work).

Practices

How the regulations of information sharing are practiced varies across entities, centers, and persons. In other words, how and what type of information is being shared may be person and/or location dependent, and/or entity dependent. “Although it is the same entity, it may be perceived differently from place to place” (National Level).

We find that people deriving from the same entity practice information sharing differently across the a-krim centers. This dissimilarity within the same entity seems to have contributed to misunderstandings and irritations. “It creates a bit bad graces, right...because they say something one place, while they say something completely different, at the other center” (Regional level). Several talked about Skatteetaten, and that their practices vary because of different interpretations of own regulation. “Many in Skatteetaten believes; “yes we can do that” while others believe “no we cannot”” (Politiet). This can be connected to people, where Skatt in one center may have had dogmatic persons participating in the collaboration. “There is also extreme variations within Skatteetaten and how they interpret regulations. But it’s something with the basic attitude in relation to confidentiality, where some believe there is room for action, and others do not” (Skatt).

Another interviewee believed that information sharing is based on personal interpretation of regulation, following tying this to possible use of gentleman agreements. “It is very person
dependent this again. Regulations can always be interpreted. In some places they might have some kind of gentleman’s agreement about this and that, and that this is how we say we do it here” (Regional level).

We also witnessed that there are misaligned perceptions within the same center, and that some centers manage to stay on the lawful side even though practice differentiate. We have the impression that Oslo exchanges more information than Stavanger and Bergen. “It is different culture whether it is in Stavanger or in Oslo, to put it that way” (National Level). Many of our respondents believed that Oslo a-krim center practice sharing the most. We asked an informant from Oslo if info sharing had been a challenge and the answer was: “Haven’t really been an extremely big issue... It’s probably because we have stretched the regulation a bit, to say it mildly” and that “We find a solution, we always find a solution” (Local Level). Another Oslo interviewee reassured that information sharing in Oslo was done under full accordance with the intention of the law, as they had had jurists from Skatt’s legal department and Økokrim assessing their ways of working at an early stage of the a-krim center establishment.

The majority of our respondents said that information sharing differ between centers, even though the entities and their regulations are the same. Hence, we see that some bend the rules more than others with gentlemen agreements, or that some are dogmatic by following the rules to their best ability.

**Systems**

To ease information sharing in the collaboration, there are especially two systems or products that have been handled. The first is a guide for information sharing, and the other is a digital platform to gather information/intelligence. These two will be addressed, but first we confer with the fact that the collaboration has no common storage system.

“We have no common data tool, we do not have a common data system, there is no place where we jointly can register. It is very challenging to report like this, so now we do a lot of manual counting” (Local level). The interviewee further said that manually counting could be dangerous: “Because now it’s kinda like “what’s on this piece of paper” and if you’re sick one day, then it’s unfortunately gone...” (Local level). As we talked about in the GnP characteristic, it is an issue with no common system in regards to reporting performance.
measures, making statistics for the collaboration uncertain. We see that the lack of common storage or IT systems for information is an impracticality. Even if information is being shared lawfully the next challenge lies within how to access it, because the collaboration has no common tool or system to register their intel in. Hence, it affects the daily work practices at operative level.

On the contrary, there have been created two products to help ease information sharing in the collaboration. In 2015 all the entities teamed up and created a guide for best practices on information sharing in the a-krim IoC. The guide is a pamphlet that explains what may be shared or not, and to whom it can or cannot be shared to. Through our interviews there was an impression of mixed usage of the guide, mainly that the guide was a nice overview, but that this was not really giving anything 3-4 years later, at present time.

The digital a-krim platform, also referred to as “the tablet”, is meant to be a tool only for the a-krim collaboration. It is meant to give equal and relevant information on a-krim cases across the country, and by so work knowledge based. “It’s based on the intelligence doctrine. Among other things, there is a “filter” between the entities so that one cannot share with other entities - unless the regulations indicates it” (Local level). When a specific entity logs on, the user can only see what their respective entity is allowed to access in relation to their regulation, and combine the knowledge with what they see out on controls. The platform is owned by the entities together due to equal contribution, however it is Skatteetaten who is the project manager of the platform. Skatt usually takes the leading role for development tasks and is resource rich. The system is stated to be very good by the respondents, but the issue mainly relates to Politiet. Due to strict regulation from The Police Directorate, the tablet is not legally accepted to use by Politiet. “The main thing about it is that you get a common system...The technology is in place, but the law is not completely in place. And it’s probably something that could’ve made things a bit easier” (Local level).

The a-krim platform is approved by all other directorates except The Police Directorate (POD), hence Politiet uses their own systems in the IoC. We addressed the issue at national level, and the response was that p.t. Politiet does not insert any information on the platform, but the intention is to use the platform as far as regulations allow. They also said there is ongoing development work in place. According to an operative, the situation is that they have been waiting for approval from POD to use the tablet. “We have prompted 100 times...
We have even got a bunch of screens... for millions of NOK. It just lays there, and it cannot be used” (Politiet).

The challenging aspect that Politiet does not use the tablet seems to be a huge hinder and frustration for the collaboration on local level, and we see that the use varies across centers. “In Stavanger they have not used it in any degree, because Politiet does not use it, so it has just been put away... In Kristiansand they have been very loyal to it and used it a lot. Up in Bergen I think it has been a mix” (Regional level). We therefore find that the platform and practicing information sharing is highly affected by Politiet and their regulative restraints.

To sum up regulations and systems, we find that no common system leads to an additional challenge in the IoC, namely that if regulations are in fact adapted and made more convenient for the collaboration, there is still the problem of no system to facilitate information sharing.

**Development over time**

From the interviews it is clear that the collaboration feels safer with sharing now compared to when the collaboration first started, but that there are still challenges. As we speak, the information sharing regulations are under development and the Ministry of Justice have put forward an amendment for those who work in the a-krim centers. However, several respondents complained about how long it took for an amendment in the regulations, and several believed that a new law would not come before year 2020/2021. On the other side, a-krim moves fast. “Everything takes so long time and in a-krim it does not...so for us this has been a big challenge” (Local Level). NAV has for example reported for a softening in their regulation since 2014. “We’ve been working with this for a long time, since 2014 when we reported it in” (NAV).

A large majority of the respondents believed that if there will come any changes in the regulations that made information sharing more feasible in the IoC, it would most definitely make the practical work easier. “Because then we could have worked not only on our work, but for the whole area’s work, because then we would have work better together” (AT).
6.5 Resources

The collaboration is created for the purpose of fighting a-krim in accordance with The Government Strategy, and resources are needed to execute these activities. Further, resources are scarce so priorities need to be made, which further affects prioritization of activities. In this characteristic we address resource allocation and flow, contribution of resources, and finally resource dependency with Politiet.

Since the entities have larger social missions and mandate than a-krim alone, they are recipient to other tasks as well, which leads to prioritization. Further resource scarcity has consequence for the priorities. This means that one task may be chosen over another, and the degree of prioritization is affected by the magnitude and importance of tasks. Here we see Politiet struggles the most. We find that a-krim resources varies between the entities, thereby reflecting the variety in prioritization of a-krim as well, see figure 16.

Resources for the IoC equals granted a-krim funds plus own entity resources. Although, we find that not all of these resources are put directly into the collaboration. Further, resources put directly into the IoC are affected by entity priorities and structures (work methods). Thus, case processing in the entity line affects how much resources that are directly put into the collaboration. Further we find that if there is no case processing in the entity line there will be more participants put into the a-krim centers. We find that more resources put towards a-krim increases the entities’ influence in the IoC, and connect it with degree of a-krim anchorization. Finally, we see that resources in the collaboration affects the work methods in the IoC since the entities are dependent on each other to execute tasks.
We discovered that there is great variety between the entities on how many representatives they have in the a-krim centers. However, we find the reason for this variation is related to entity social mission & mandate, structure which further affect work methods. We find Skatteetaten and Arbeidstilsynet to be the entities who hold the most people in the centers. Hence, there is imbalance between the entities at the centers, which has consequences for the entities’ influence in the IoC.

**Resource allocation and flow**

Every directorate in the collaboration are granted equal amounts of resources, or funds, from the government through the ministries, for the purpose of strengthening the fight against a-krim. In 2017, the collaborative entities were granted 6,25 million NOK each for the specific purpose of establishing a-krim centers. The total granted a-krim funds in 2017 for Arbeidstilsynet, Skatteetaten, Politiet were 20,4 million NOK each, and 12,1 million NOK for NAV. These resources were specifically designated for the a-krim collaboration.

The meaning of the sums differs between the entities, thus it will mean more for a small entity than a large entity. “Clearly 6 million is a lot for us, but for Politiet and Skatt it may just be a drop in the ocean” (AT). With the designated funds, Arbeidstilsynet has recruited several new positions for a-krim both in the regions and in the directorate. We can explain that AT were granted as much as Politiet and Skatt because a-krim is a big part for their mandate. However, even if the entities are granted equally the entities do not use the same amounts in the IoC. This can be explained by different resource flow in the entities. “Yes, everyone was granted equally, but everyone has not spent equally. For example, Politiet has probably used it everywhere.” (Regional level).

The directorate of NAV allocates the a-krim funds directly to the NAV Kontroll regions, so that the regions can further decide how to use and allocate the resources towards the a-krim centers. We find that The Directorate of NAV do not care how exactly the resources are spent, as long as the requirements of Styringsmodellen are followed.

The Directorate of Skatteetaten allocates the a-krim funds to the different regions, and the regions have freedom in how they are spent as long as they are turned towards a-krim. “*We put it in the regions, do as you want with them. But you are obliged to turn them*” (Skatt).
The directorate also follow up if the resources are not turned. Moreover, Skatteetaten has an
own management system for a-krim, which tells what should be done. For instance, they
have own time bank codes which says that one is working with a-krim, as well as different
codes within a-krim. “We see where the resources have gone to, how many shifts have gone
to this and that, how many shifts is it in relation to the whole and so on” (Skatt). Clearly
Skatt has great control over their resources. This shows strong national management of a-
krim cf. section 6.3.

The Directorate of Politiet sends allocation letters to the police districts, which further have
to plan within the frames of funds granted each year. It is the police chief of each district
who is responsible for the resources, and the disposal of what he/she is granted each year.
The designated funds are stated to not be a limitation for the efforts against a-krim within
Politiet. “Designated funds are no limitation for how much effort a police district can put
into this” (Politiet). However, some of our respondent said that these designated funds are
not followed up in how they are spent. “It has been some of the criticism, earmarked funds
for a purpose is not followed up, at all. Then there are consequences” (Politiet). Hence, we
find that Politiet lacks management of their resources, and that there is no quality controls
and follow-up on resources that deviates from Styringsmodellen. Further, this can be tied our
previous finding that Politiet has weak national management of a-krim, cf. section 6.3.

We also heard from several respondents that Politiet lack efforts against a-krim, and that
granted a-krim funds does not necessarily go to a-krim. “That’s how it is in every public
entity, that funds are used to other things than they are supposed to” (Local level). In 2015,
Stavanger, Oslo and Bergen were granted 4, 2 and 2 million NOK respectively. This
distribution of funds between the police districts have been viewed as partly unfair. “I have
seen that the police district have had an uneven distribution, and we’ve wondered why
they’ve done that” (Skatt). Again, this shows weak management of resources in Politiet. In
Stavanger they decided to hire two operatives and one jurist in 2015. According to our
respondents the “a-krim” jurist has not been used for a-krim tasks, and it was said that the
Foreigner section got an extra jurist due to the a-krim funds in Stavanger. Thus, other
priorities have led to a decrease in resources into the IoC.

At the Oslo a-krim center, there was only one policeman represented in 2,5 years (from
2015). During this time The Joint Action Plan was in place, and this one police
representative could not have used 2 million each year. Respondents believed this had to do with the section chief who had chosen to use the funds on something else, but further respondents said a-krim cases were not prioritized in the entity line in Oslo. Hence, the argument that granted funds goes to the entity line is invalid. Therefore, we can clearly say that a-krim funds have gone to other areas in Oslo Police District. However, it looks like Politiet is increasing their efforts towards a-krim, because of the implementation of Styringsmodellen. We thus conclude that Styringsmodellen has enhanced the resource allocation and flow in the a-krim IoC. We thereby find is has been different contributions between a-krim centers as well as unequal contribution by the entities, and we tie this to strategic anchorization of a-krim.

**Contribution of Resources**
There are two important aspects in regards to a-krim resources; 1) if the entities have enough resources to follow-up Styringsmodellen, and 2) if the entities have enough resources to follow-up a-krim cases in the entity line.

NAV Kontroll distributes the funds to the “actual” a-krim collaboration, meaning centers, NTAES and NTKG. They have also committed to take on cases in the entity line, hence there goes more resources to a-krim than the designated funds. “We use more resources in entity line, almost all granted funds goes to resources we have in the a-krim centers” (NAV). According to NAV Kontroll, approximately 60-70% of all their resources goes to a-krim work. However, they state they do not have enough resources to follow up Styringsmodellen, but are able to take on the minimum staffing in the a-krim centers.

NAV experience it as challenging to find people for the knowledge building group, because several of their resources are locked into two national teams. This challenge may be especially challenging for NAV Kontroll West and North. Since they are the smallest regions in terms of employees, with 22 and 16-17 people to play on respectively, compared to NAV Kontroll East who has 45 employees. NAV Kontroll West is also the region who holds the most a-krim centers. So, we see that entity size, structure and tasks influence how a-krim resources are spent, in the way that allocation of a-krim resources and instructions may be more difficult to fulfill in a small entity that is localized few places. Moreover, this can also explain why NAV Kontroll has fewest people represented at the a-krim centers.
For Politiet it is hard to “estimate” how much resources goes where, since a-krim is handled in several contexts, and as all a-krim efforts may not be easily recognized. “We use a lot more time on a-krim than it looks like in the a-krim collaboration. We deal with all crime, so it’s not like what doesn’t fall under the a-krim center we just ignore. We do as much with that as well” (Politiet). Several respondents stated that Politiet does not hold enough resources to follow-up on the instructions in Styringsmodellen. For instance, there should be six Politiet representatives in Stavanger a-krim center cf. Styringsmodellen. However, we were told that it had been four police representatives, and that it actually has gone down to only three now. “Yes, negative development yes, 25% less, and that’s actually quite a lot” (Politiet).

Arbeidstilsynet has increased their resource spending strongly towards a-krim the last years. “Oh yes yes yes, it increases dramatically each year” (AT). In the West region, which includes the formalized centers Stavanger and Bergen, as well as the unformalized collaboration Haugesund, Arbeidstilsynet hold ca. 15 positions for a-krim in total. Arbeidstilsynet is thus a big “investor” in the IoC, even though they are a small entity compared to the others. But, it is important to remember that Arbeidstilsynet does not have an entity line for further case processing, this means that almost all a-krim funds goes to the centers. “Arbeidstilsynet has a lot of resources in the centers, because they can do a lot of tasks in the centers” (National level).

However, we find that AT may influence the center in terms of prioritization of cases since they are large in number compared to the other entities. “Arbeidstilsynet contributes with the most, which influences that their cases are lifted more than others cases” (Local level). Another respondent recognized Arbeidstilsynet’s flat structure to be the problem instead of number of representatives in the center in regards to center influence. To illustrate, there may be six people from AT who are all fighting for several cases, and at the same time only two from NAV. This puts AT in a greater position to influence over cases that are handled in the IoC. Thus, the more people from one entity there are in the centers, the stronger their influence is, which in aggregate terms makes sense. However, we find this not to be necessarily the best way to deal with prioritization of cases as their sanctions are of low deterrence. Moreover, AT may feel they use more resources towards a-krim than the other entities since their contribution of participant are more visible. We look at this to be wrong, as one also need to take into account the resources that are used in the others’ entities lines.
It is clear that Skatteetaten invest big on a-krim, this means both in the collaboration (centers) as well as internally in the entity line. Skatteetaten is thereby viewed as more dominating by some. “Skatteetaten is the largest entity in terms of the number of people used, and some may feel several places that they are very dominant” (Regional level). Clearly, both AT and Skatt have enough resources to follow-up Styringsmodellen’s instructions, and have stated this.

Following we address whether the entities have enough resources to follow up a-krim cases in the entity line. According to NAV, Skatteetaten and Arbeidstilsynet the answers have been yes, they have enough resources in their entity lines to prioritize a-krim cases. However, we know that when cases are prioritized there has to be an “un-prioritization” of other tasks. “Clearly, this means that we must find what other tasks we should prioritize away. So that this is highly prioritized, there is no doubt about that” (NAV).

In contrast, Politiet has said no, and that this is due to priorities. A respondent from Politiet gave us an example of violence in close relations and abuse of children, and said: “There will always be a discussion on how resources are spent within Politiet. But that’s probably how it’s like in every other entity as well” (Politiet).

So, even though designated funds are given out to the entities in the IoC, there will still be prioritization made due to resource scarcity. Hence, we find that the entities contribute unevenly with resources towards a-krim. We also see that the entities have different tasks and structures, which again leads to different outcomes in where resources are directed to. For Politiet the issue further escalates, as they deal with tasks that are serious and society damaging to another dimension, thereby making it more difficult to prioritize one case over another.

**Resource dependency with Politiet**

It is emphasized from the majority of respondents that Politiet should be more represented in the centers, due to the other entities’ dependency on Politiet’s efforts and means. That Politiet has fewer people in the centers may be seen as odd, since Politiet plays such a superior role in combating a-krim. However, the number of representatives in the centers are
not necessarily the most important factor. “Even though one is a crucial entity, it does not necessarily mean that one has to be most” (Politiet).

Since the entities are sometimes dependent on Politiet’s efforts like investigation and prosecution, it is unfortunate that they lack suitable resources. Several centers experience it as difficult, some have also found ways to not bind resources in Politiet. “It’s a continuous headache. But we have gone around it, the main focus is putting criminals out of function, and not to police report it in order to get a police investigation... We need to look if there are resources available, and that’s difficult... The big financial cases, they paralyze us for months” (Local level). The quote exemplifies and support our previous findings, that sanctioning is linked with resources availability. We find it not to be a good approach to “overlook” the big financial cases that are of quality. However, the centers are doing as good as they can with the resources at hand.

The Financial section in Stavanger lacks resources, which is why they do not create financial cases. “I know that they do not create as much financial cases in Stavanger either, because the Financial section in Politiet doesn’t have capacity” (Local level). Politiet in Bergen has increased their efforts against a-krim, and the a-krim center in Bergen send cases to Politiet if they have resources available, which are communicated on beforehand. “We can agree with Politiet on which cases that rightfully should be sent to the penalty track in relation to capacity, because that track may be very demanding” (Bergen). We can also tie this to Politiet’s internal organization, mentioned in 6.3 Structure. Whether a-krim is under the Foreigner or Financial section, or a combo of both seem to influence the priority of it.

We thus see that resources steer the way in how one goes about a-krim, quantity or quality, however, it is a difficult tradeoff taking into account four entities and their respective goals and missions. It is all about finding the right way to prioritize correctly, i.e. coordinate correctly.

6.6 A-krim Startegy & Practices

This characteristic is influenced by the majority of the above mentioned characteristics. Here we address a-krim strategy in terms of strategic anchorization and priority, industry focus
and small versus big cases. A-krim practices is addressed through work methods, time aspects and case processing time, see figure 17.

Figure 17 - Findings: A-krim Strategy and Practices

We have the entities own strategies and practices, as well as the collaboration strategy (Government Strategy). The degree of strategic anchorization of a-krim in the entity depends on their responsibility in society, i.e. their mandate & authority. Following, the anchorization of a-krim may be steered by GnP objectives to be fulfilled, thus influencing work practices and prioritization, which is further dependent on resource availability. As we concluded earlier, we see that strong anchorization of a-krim influences the structure in the way that it strengthens the national management of a-krim, and thereby also making sure resources are allocated accordingly, hence a-krim cases are prioritized.

In short, strategy influences the practice. Further, the different practices lead to coordination challenges in the collaboration due to different time aspects and prioritization in the different entity lines. Moreover, the crime picture will both influence practice and strategy, so naturally the IoC centers are affected by this. Two underlying factors here are culture and people, which can also explain some of the differences across entities, regions and centers.

A-krim Strategy
Here we look at a-krim strategy as the collaboration strategy. We tie this to strategic anchorization and priority of a-krim in the entity, and its development over time. Following we look at industry focus and small versus big cases.
Few years ago the term a-krim was not high on the agenda, and earlier work against a-krim in the entities were conducted under other terms. “Earlier it was looked at just some black work and alike, to put it bluntly. But now it is put into a system, and it is traffickers, actors and all this” (Regional level). Moreover, the entities did not have any a-krim strategies prior to the IoC, as it was not a defined sole area. The definition of a-krim came in 2014 with The Government Strategy and got more targeted.

Overarching, all the entities receive management signals, and these signals are based on entity goals. However, a reminder: the entities’ GnP measures differ. The a-krim strategy for the IoC is decided by the government, cf. Government Strategy Against A-krim (2017). One important aspect of the a-krim strategy is prevention, because it is more effective in the long run. Further it is much more efficient in terms of resources if a benefit is stopped before it is mistakenly paid out, referring back to sections 6.1, 6.2 & 6.5. Hence, the IoC is increasing its efforts towards knowledge building in order to work more systematically.

The Government Strategy leads to homogenous Letter of Awards to the entities directorates. Further, this should be manifested in the entities allocation and management letters. In so, commitment to a-krim comes through 1) The Government Strategy, 2) The Letters of Award, and 3) The Joint Action Plan (who all the entities have signed under). Based on those three the entities create management letters and allocation letters. But here entity goals and other tasks also come into play. We find that this results in some similar and some dissimilar formulations because of possible silo orientation in the directorate, also pointed out in section 6.1. Hence, the entities are not given identical signals further down, in relation to what is important to prioritize. This leads to prioritization challenges in the collaboration. “I believe it is the Ministries, or all the way back to the legislator, because it is those who initially gives the frames. So then we have to try to administer this to our best ability and make it work in practice. And that is not always that easy, no it isn’t” (Regional level).

We thus find the priority of a-krim is affected by the social mission and mandate, and that the priority of a-krim therefore differs between the entities. “It affects the work, and not least in relation to how it affects the priorities, because this field has different degrees of prioritization in the different entities, which makes it more prioritized in some than others. This can be challenging” (Regional level). For instance, Arbeidstilsynet has less to prioritize than Politiet. To better tackle priorities in the collaboration, LKG and RSG have got more
responsibility on this manner from Styringsmodellen. In addition, The Joint Action Plan is interpreted differently across the a-krim centers, which may be of challenge in the IoC, and explains some of the reason why the centers differ in work practices.

**Strategic anchorization and priority of a-krim**

For NAV Kontroll, a-krim is very prioritized and the focus of a-krim has increased during the years. “Yes, a-krim is highly prioritized, we have received it from our supreme leader, the Labor and Welfare Director, that it stands very high. And it is the Government’s Strategy, so we have to follow it” (NAV). NAV emphasizes that the a-krim work is important, because they want a serious labor market. However, a-krim is in general in competition with other tasks when we look at NAV wholly. This can explain why there is less participation from NAV in terms of resources in the centers, cf. 6.5 Resources.

For Politiet, we saw a clear mismatch between national level and local level on the consideration of a-krim as a prioritized area. Even though the national level considers a-krim as important and prioritized, it can be difficult when a-krim is in competition with violence-related cases, as well as resource scarcity local level experiences, cf. section 6.5. “It is simply lack of resources. But at the same time, we compare us with radicalization, violence against minors, sexual violence, so I do not disagree with the priority. We have to do the best with what we have. However, if we get twice as much, we would have saved severe sums for Norway, but they have to choose” (Politiet).

But, as mentioned earlier Politiet’s effort may not be as visible since a-krim is fought in several circumstances and areas, for instance in the Financial section, Foreigner section and Økokrim, in addition to the a-krim centers. “A-krim is highly prioritized. Especially the last years financial crime has been prioritized very high. So if you look at the definition of a-krim, it’s mainly what we call traditional financial crime” (Politiet). According to another respondent, a-krim is of high priority in theory, but not in practice. “Yes, one of the things I have complained about internally in Politiet, is that this is politically decided. They write plans on it, and they actually pay for it. Then we should actually do it. Then nothing happens, well yes okey” (Politiet). We find weaker strategic a-krim anchorization in Politiet due to resource scarcity and fierce competition of other prioritized areas.
Arbeidstilsynet has strong strategic anchorization of a-krim, and a-krim is a high priority. They have made plans for how to work with a-krim in 2018, where a-krim is an own focus area. “From being a much smaller task for the entity, it has become one of our 2-3 main tasks” (AT). AT has worked against a-krim since 2005, but previously under the term social dumping and with the perspective to help workers’ rights. Now it is more in the perspective of fighting crime, however exploitation of workers is still an important part of a-krim.

Skatteetaten started to work against a-krim in 2008 under fictional billing in networks. Skatt has strong anchorization of a-krim, cf sections 6.3 and 6.5, and a-krim is defined as an important area. They have strategies for a-krim and as mentioned, own reporting systems. However, the use of the entity line requires prioritization, and if an a-krim case is sent to the line, there might already be a more important case there taking up all the resources.

What we see is that the strong anchorization and priority of a-krim within Arbeidstilsynet and Skatteetaten has led to them to be viewed as drivers in the IoC, which has led to more influencing power and dominating positions. Additionally, we see that they in most scenarios are in front of the centers, meaning they usually hold the Coordinator role. “It is clear that Skatteetaten is a major driver. That’s no secret, and they have been for some time. As well as Arbeidstilsynet within their area. They are not that big, but they have a good driving capacity” (National level). We also find that Skatteetaten is responsible for several development tasks in the IoC, which can be explained by that Skatt is big and resource strong. “It is sort of Skatteetaten who has taken responsibility for a lot of development activities, which is great. They have kind of been sitting in the driving seat” (National level).

Industry focus

Styringsmodellen has taken away the industry focus, as the IoC was earlier industry oriented in terms of cases, especially within the construction industry. Now the focus is more actor based since a-krim has evolved to become more multiplex, and thus seen across industries. “We are going to have more of the actor perspective. It’s not so important which industry, but the actor behind is. We nevertheless see more (a-krim) in some industries” (Regional level). The focus of being actor based is stated in Styringsmodellen and in the Letters of Award. The entities own strategies for industry focuses varies, where some specialize on industries, while others do not thus supportive of the actor based perspective.
NAV and Arbeidstilsynyet supports the actor based focus because it is in coherence with their own strategies. On the other hand, Skatt and Politiets are more for the focus being industry based. Since Skatteeetaten has a-krim as a performance area, it is stated that the focus is especially towards the construction industry and professionalized marked. We find the reason for variation in the entities’ focus areas, is related to their strategies and what they get “hit” on. We can tie these “hits” to the entities’ GnP measures.

However, this variation has led to some challenges in the collaboration. “Skatt for instance has an instruction that they should prioritize the pro marked in the construction industry. This crashes with us, because NAV has least hits in this industry, while we have lots of hits on private marked construction. So, from there we get contradicting interests, and some entities are very strong on this” (NAV). Nevertheless, a Skatt respondent said that if a-krim is in more than one industry than another it will show on the results. Furthermore, if there would be focus in every industry, i.e. actor based and not industry based, the fight against a-krim could be viewed as cosmetics, becoming only superficial work. This is why the actor based perspective is talked down, as there will always be some industries that holds more a-krim crime than other industries.

However, we see that the focus areas differ across centers, and that not all centers are true to Styringsmodellen. “We all get instructions from our own entity, but in The Joint Action Plan the industry focus is taken out. Before it was mainly construction industry. Now that’s gone, but it still lingers” (Local level). Some centers still have focus in the construction industry, and very little elsewhere. Other centers have taken “everything”, and not had an overarching industry over others. We then question whether the dilemma of quality over quantity of a-krim cases comes into play when all industries are in focus. But we need to remember the crime picture also varies between place to place, i.e. center to center, and thus affects the centers’ focus. However, since a-krim is as dynamic and shifting as it is, it may be good to take away the industry focus. “The criminal actors move from industry to industry. They follow the money. So we have said that from 2018, we don’t have an industry focus at all, we look at the crime” (Local level).

To sum up we see that the entities’ industry focus strategies affects the IoC, as some centers have it while others do not. Further, the fact that Skatteeetaten holds a dominating position in the IoC could explain why some centers still operate under industry focus. However, it is
hard to say what is right, as one might want to take an actor perspective, but then again there will always be some industries that stands out, as well as it depends on the crime picture in the respective center locations.

Small versus big cases
The size on the different a-krim cases varies. NAV Kontroll complained about small cases from the collaboration, and that they want bigger cases which leads to more results. “Many cases that come from the collaboration are really cases we should not have because they are too small, and gives us little results” (NAV). Additionally, many small cases take up a lot of resources. We link this to GnP measures in one entity, as well as other entities’ GnP measures. For instance, AT wants to control as much as possible, but NAV Kontroll is counted on the amount they spare or refunds they get. Here we see there might be contradicting interests on small versus big cases, due to the entities’ GnP measures. Further we can say this leads to prioritization of cases, which is again linked to resources.

Skatteetaten also emphasized that they want bigger cases, because then it is easier to prioritize them in the entity line over other important cases. Hence, this is where the knowledge building group in the collaboration comes in, meaning there has to be conducted work in regards to inputs and tips before a case is sent to the entity line. The knowledge building group in the IoC therefore facilitate for easier prioritization in the entity line.

However, bigger cases require a lot of capacity and resources, and therefore it is important that the entities have resources for them in the line, especially in concern for Politiet. For instance, a police report does not come from the center, it comes from the entity line. So, if Skatt or NAV have case processed a big case in their entity lines and further decides to police report it, then it is important that Politiet has resources available for it, or else there is a mismatch. On the contrary, we clearly see that Politiet initially wants small cases due to their GnP measure and lack of resources. This is obviously not expedient for the IoC in the fight against a-krim, due to the general dependency of Politiet after other entities’ efforts, i.e. there may occur waste of resources.

There is also lack of understandings of others’ priorities in the entity line, where there may occur unfortunate situations where the line has promised to take a-krim case, but suddenly un-prioritize it due to another more important case. “Then I am between a rock and a hard
place, since I’ve promise the IoC that we will take it in the entity line. But then it is prioritized down instead. So there are some sparks here” (Politiet).

A-krim Practices
Here we will look at mixed work methods and time aspects between the entities, and case processing time in entity line. This variation may lead to coordination challenges in the IoC. The entities have mixed work methods, and vary especially in regards to the time aspect, i.e. working proactive or reactive. Work methods are affected by the social mission, and what sanctions and means the different entities possess. “Arbeidstilsynet takes a lot of space and most of the cases that we followed-up come from them. But at the same time, I like that people are forward-looking and active. I also think that Skatteetaten are too reactive” (Local level).

Skatteetaten works past time on bookkeeping and has standardized processes. The time aspect can be challenging in the fight against a-krim, because while Skatt is doing their research on what happened past time, the time moves forward and the criminals may have shifted industry or taken the company bankrupt. “Who is it that checks what they are doing now then? Well, none.” (Politiet). So criminals can use this to their advantage, by constantly emptying their accounts so that Skatt has nothing to take arrest in. A police report is received from Skatteetaten after a bookkeeping is done, which according to our interviewees usually takes at least half a year. While in the a-krim context, it is important for Politiet to collect evidence early (since evidence can disappear), thus evidence can easily vanish after Skatt has done a bookkeeping. So, here we find that there is a mismatch in time aspects for efficient and effective fight against a-krim. Bookkeeping is also a heavy task which requires a lot of resources, so therefore Skatt works systematically and is conscious when selecting which cases that should be prioritized based on their means.

Politiet is more proactive in the a-krim operative group. “The other entities go out on a control, then examine, and finally come with a conclusion. While Politiet wishes to solve the problem on-site, by using The Police Act” (Politiet). Politiet is used to a changing environment and to act fast, and they can easily put away what they are doing now if something else shows up. For instance, on a control where they suddenly have to interrogate suspects. However, another respondent stated that Politiet also work very reactive in terms of
working with police reports that date back in time. This might be a reason for why Politiet continuously lack capacity, as they are overwhelmed with earlier cases to follow up.

“I can say that findings show that we have worked very reactive, and Politiet had not uncovered a single case themselves. Ca. 70% of the findings were police reports concerning bankruptcies dating several years back” (Politiet).

Arbeidstilsynet also have on-site measures and are quick in their reaction, but at the same time their sanctions are small in severity, but easier to evaluate on-site. “So if you are checking if a scaffold is wrong, I’m guessing that you have to write a much shorter report than if you are doing a bookkeeping” (Skatteetaten). In addition, we see that there may be challenges related to AT being many representatives, as their quick means may be in mismatch to the other entities slower means. Often AT want more tasks while others need time to finish, thus leading to coordination challenges in the IoC.

The case processing time differ between the entities, and is to some extent affected by how demanding their work is and the case queue in the entity line. For instance, a criminal case requires a lot of proof, hence a longer case processing time. Arbeidstilsynet’s tasks does not require any investigation, they may need assistance from a jurist but it is only talk about a few hours. For NAV, dependent on the case, it may take all from one week to three years. Skatteetaten says that they use approximately ten months on average, but that some big cases can take up to three years. Hence, there may be a challenge in the IoC since entities are dependent on each other, e.g. there has been experiences that police reports have been sent and due to long case processing time (or lack of capacity) in Politiet, resulting in the punishment to be halved, or case dismissed. This questions the IoC’s efficiency and effectiveness.

We see that it can be difficult to coordinate work in the collaboration due to the time aspect, seen from two views: which time one works in (past-time vs real-time) or how long the case processing in the entity line is (big vs small cases). “Arbeidstilsynet has a short time period and works real time. Skatteetaten and NAV Kontroll often work backwards in calendar time. This creates challenges. What if Arbeidstilsynet chooses to police report early, right?” (Local level). The quote above reflects that fact that while AT is done with their work before the other entities, and police reports their work early, the IoC may be prone to violate the double penalty principle. And as a-krim often entails multi-crime, one might overlook more
important aspects and lose the opportunity to sanction accordingly. So, obviously the different work practices have consequences for the collaboration, where we see mismatches, huge coordination challenges and different time aspects to consider.

But, what entity affects the work method in the collaboration the most? The majority of our respondents said Arbeidstilsynet, and to some extent Politiet. Politiet influences because they have good on-site means, as well as they are very operative in nature. In addition, Politiet’s intelligence doctrine is meant to be a basic foundation for the a-krim IoC, and they are in the process of making it as interdepartmental methodology. Not to forget that the other entities are dependent on Politiet to continue or follow up their work.

Arbeidstilsynet is also used to be out on controls. Further, Arbeidstilsynet is a small organization and has short distance to decision-makers, cf. section 6.3. Almost all their a-krim efforts are put into the a-krim centers, i.e. they have most people in the a-krim centers and hold several Coordinator roles. While, the other entities have to keep people in the entity line. “We could never put everyone in the center. We have to pick out someone who is fit to participate on the activities in the center, and we need to have the other line. Our sanctions are neither convenient to be done in the center” (Skatt). But an interesting aspect is if we look at Ministry level, and the different “a-krim” tasks they are subject to. The primarily responsibility to establish and run the a-krim centers lays at the Labor and Welfare Ministry. Thus, the L&W Ministry gets a bigger responsibility to take initiative, and AT is known to be the initiator, especially in Bergen and Stavanger. We therefore find that AT’s initiative may be linked to the ministerial responsibility, straight from The Government Strategy (2017).

A final thought which we have limited ourselves in is the underlying factors of culture in which the entities are entrenched in, and the people who ultimately perform the work. “Due to mandate and regulations, there is created unique cultures in every entity. And regulations are one thing, but it is very clear that the culture affects the way one works. This is very normal, right, and not necessarily wrong” (Local level). Culture and people may be the explanations to some of the challenges, differences, misunderstandings that we see across centers, regions and entities.
6.7 Summary of Findings & Empirical Analysis

From our findings we can clearly see there are a lot of challenges and aspects to consider in the a-krim IoC. We find the entities’ characteristics to definitely affect the collaboration. We have accumulated seven main findings that contains several aspects from the characteristics, and some are in relation to another. They can be looked upon as overarching findings. We present them below in short format.

1) Equivocal Governance Flow
We find the governance flow of the a-krim IoC to be vague, as the entities’ management and allocation letters deviate from The Joint Action Plan (the IoC) and Letters of Award (the entities), leading to mixed management signals. The intention is that a-krim shall be prioritized high, but the entities have a larger extent of other tasks that are incorporated in their mandate and goals. What is stated by the government and ministries looks fine on paper, but is difficult to execute in practice.

...thus, we find equivocal governance flow to be apparent

2) Compounded Complexity
We find great complexity in the a-krim IoC, because it consists of several large public entities with their respective structures. Further, the collaboration structure (cf. empirical context) spans over several hierarchical levels, together with a-krim’s complex features in itself, like multi-crime and constantly shifting form. Finally, all these variables are connected.

...thus, we find compounded complexity in the IoC

3) Politiet’s Dilemma
We find that Politiet stands in a dilemma. Politiet has distinctive authority compared to the other entities, and are well equipped to fight crime. Further, the a-krim IoC is dependent on Politiet in order to get results, effects and deter crime. However, Politiet lacks resources and capacity, and have to make the most difficult trade-offs compared to others. This may lead to un-prioritization of a-krim and the collaboration thereafter.

...thus, we find Politiet holds a superior role while in a predicament
4) Effects and Efficiency
We find it hard to measure the effects of the efforts done by the IoC, as well as the efficiency thereof. The IoC has a strategy to prevent a-krim in addition to effective sanctioning. The preventive part is challenging to measure because of the complexity of a-krim and no baseline to compare the efforts to. Furthermore, when it comes to effective sanctioning there are tradeoffs in; value for money, crime deterrence and a fair process.
...thus, we find effects and efficiency of the IoC questionable

5) Dominantors and Influencers
We find Skatteetaten and Arbeidstilsynset hold large influence over the IoC. This is because they have strong anchorization of a-krim throughout their entity, and have invested heavily towards a-krim. This has consequence for the IoC’s focus, priorities, and work methods.
...thus, we find Skatteetaten and Arbeidstilsynset as dominators and influencers

6) Misaligned Time Aspects
We find coordination challenges in the IoC due to mismatch in the entities’ work methods. Some work proactive while others reactive. On top, there is dissimilar case processing time between the entities. This is misaligned with the nature of a-krim itself, since time continuously ticks and criminals flee.
...thus, we find the IoC’s time aspects as misaligned to fight a-krim

7) A Collaboration That Lacks Communication
We find information sharing important because it is necessary to exchange information in order to collaborate. But, the entities are under strict regulations thereby hindering an efficient and effective fight of a-krim. The regulative restraints have led to different interpretations, resulting in various practices to appear across centers, entities and within entities.
...thus, we find a collaboration that lacks (common) communication
7. Discussion

We will base our discussion chapter on the overarching findings above. Here we draw on the empirical context and literature from the theory chapter.

7.1 Equivocal Governance Flow

According to The Government Strategy Against A-krim (2017), all the entities are supposed to prioritize their efforts against a-krim. This is done through homonymous management signals stated in The Letters of Award sent from the ministries to the directorates, which are further supposed to carry it forward to local levels. This type of hierarchical governance can be seen as traditional public administration (cf. section 3.1). Further The Government Strategy states that collaborative goals and parameters should be incorporated in the entities’ performance measures. Thus, The Government is result-oriented, and this type of performance measured governance can be looked upon as New Public Management (3.1).

What we see from our findings is that there has been developed mixed management signals in the governance flow, where we believe the void or error is done at directorate level or below this level. We believe this is a consequence of the differentiated social missions and mandates of the entities, whom all have other tasks to execute next to a-krim, as well as specific objectives to fulfill. Earlier research on a-krim (3.3.4) stated that perhaps the collaboration goals were not properly incorporated in the entity “goal structure”. We believe this to be true, as it has consequences down the hierarchy lines and we find different work practices in the a-krim centers. Since, it is ultimately local level who conducts the work to fulfill GnP objectives.

However, we want to point out that the directorate level or levels below are not to blame for the mixed management signals to occur, but rather the fact that the Government is equivocal in terms of their governance. Firstly, it is hard to prioritize something “high” in comparison to other tasks that are also “highly prioritized”. Secondly, goals and control parameters in the a-krim IoC context are challenging to define in itself, as earlier research also has found (3.3.4). Hence, the directorates or levels below have to weigh all their responsibilities up against each other, while at the same time try to achieve their objectives in all the areas. So, no wonder there are different work practices across centers and issues related to this in the
operative part of the IoC. We find that the larger and more complex an entity and their mandate is, the bigger deviations towards The Government Strategy. We therefore question the effectiveness of the governance flow as there are mixed, irrational and overlapping management signals from The State.

Neby et al. (2017) found the governance structure in Norway unsuited to the problem structure of a-krim, as it hits several domains and jurisdictions. We stand by their finding, but do however disagree with their statement that strategic conditions for good interdepartmental collaboration is present. We draw it further by addressing the fact that although Letters of Award and The Joint Action Plan are pulling the same way, it does not do so in practice from directorate level and below. This may be because both PA and NPM are in play, while features of New Public Governance that facilitates interorganizational governance are not implemented reasonably (3.1).

Previous research state the importance of Letters of Award to be key instruments cf. Gressgård et al. (2017), and further that homonymous signals in these represent strong strategic anchorization cf. Neby et al. (2017). We agree on strategic anchorization of a-krim to be present at ministry level, but do however find that the a-krim anchorization weakens further down the hierarchical line in some entities. We believe this is due to equivocal governance flow that demands too much, and ultimately prioritizations has to be made.

### 7.2 Compounded Complexity

A-krim can be numerous types of crime and contains a feature of multi-crime. Together with the adaptiveness of criminals and shifting of industries, they find ways to evade the controls agencies methods cf. NTAES (2017). Hence, there is no doubt that a-krim is a complex form of crime. We define a-krim as a wicked problem since it cannot be solved “once and for all”. Here the IoC comes in because the problem a-krim spans across entities and their corresponding jurisdictions. Gressgård et al. (2017) characterizes IoC as a relative stable set of participants who all are linked to the problem. In so, we can also say that the entities have a felt need to collaborate according to Hocevar et al. (2006).

Task and activities to perform leads to entity structure, and the individual entities structures do not match the problem structure (3.3.4). Earlier the Rokkan Report (2016) identified
characteristics to the entities that all were related to structural differences regarding; jurisdictions, field of work, domains, regulations, practices and goals. Thus there is apparent complexity in the entities and between them. RR (2017) also found that interdepartmental collaboration between independent entities is demanding on operative level.

Further, Gressgård et al. (2017), emphasizes that the structural design should be adapted to the task to be solved, i.e. if high uncertainty one chooses less bureaucratic organizational forms. This is supported by Jansen (2013), who describes task uncertainty as a combination of complexity and equivocalness of task environment, and the more uncertainty the more un-hierarchical structures are recommended to apply. We find this to be followed by the IoC for the first years, as they along the way got to try and fail to figure out what worked best. This is in relation to the complexity of the problem, and hence supported by IoC literature. As a result of little standardization in early phase, the centers have come out very differently.

IoC theory suggest that collaboration structure should be formalized, both in the coordination of roles and the coordination of processes (3.3.2). From our empirical context, we see the collaboration structure became formalized and is still in implementation mode. Hence the collaboration structure in terms of defined roles and process for coordination and structural flexibility in terms of the entities’ internal adaptation to the collaboration in order to simplify coordination, is present cf. Hocevar et. al. (2006). Finally support for individual efforts link boundary-spanning roles between the entity and the collaboration (3.3.1), for instance through RSG. So, according to IoC literature we have driving forces for an efficient collaboration. Moreover, Neby et al. (2017) says that standardization in the collaboration needs to be weighted with the amount of flexibility at operative level, and found there was more need of standardization on central level in the a-krim IoC. We believe that the collaboration has solved this dilemma wisely, as the new structure gives operatives freedom in how to perform their tasks cf. 2.2. However, the collaboration structure adds additional complexity at an already complex phenomenon with complex entities. Hence we find compounded complexity in the a-krim IoC.

The compounded complexity in the IoC can be connected to organizational, structural, cognitive and geographical distances cf. Gressgård et al. (2017). Organizational due to the difference in structure and processes. For example, we find the collaborative entities have different roles and are at different hierarchical levels. Structural distance because of entities’
different purposes, mandates, responsibility areas and so on. Further, cognitive distance since the entities’ participants hold different organizational and professional affiliation. Finally, geographical distance is present due to the entities and IoC’s various locations. However, we find geographical distance to be a small matter in todays digitalized world. Ultimately, all the distances add complexity to the IoC, and have consequences for coordination. Thus, compounded complexity leads to great coordination challenges in the collaboration.

7.3 Politiet’s Dilemma

It is stated in both The Annual Report (2018), The Situasjonsbeskrivelsen (2017), and in Riksrevisjonen’s Assessment (2016) that Politiet plays a superior role in tackling a-krim, as they hold the opportunity to follow up cases from the IoC with investigation and criminal proceedings. Hence, the reports find that Politiet is a central player in the a-krim IoC since the other entities are in several cases dependent on them to continue their work and produce effective results against a-krim. On the other side, the reports also find that Politiet’s contributions vary and are sometimes limited between a-krim centers because of lack of resources and capacity.

We definitely support the reports regarding Politiet being a central player, but want to address why Politiet lacks resources and capacity. From our findings, we believe their limited capacity is due to their wide social mission and mandate, and because they are continuously dependent on the current crime picture. This means that Politiet has a great extent of other tasks to take care of next to a-krim, and that they need to weigh cases up against each other and prioritize thereafter. This includes to take into account the severity of crime in order to prioritize correctly, which is challenging in itself and may be why Politiet’s role in the IoC is deficient. This can be supported by Hocevar et al. (2006) who states that inadequate resources that are in competition with other tasks and territorialities are a restraining factor in an IoC.

In our analysis we found Politiet as the entity with weakest national management of a-krim, due to weak a-krim anchorization based on their social mission. Moreover, Politiet has a functional oriented structure in their regional division cf. Neby et al. (2016), which we find to have led to a weaker prioritization of a-krim cases as Politiet do not hold an own a-krim
“box”. We find this to be an impediment for the efforts against a-krim, since a-krim then falls between specific functions in Politiet, and which has ultimately lead to different approaches of dealing with a-krim across centers (Financial section or Foreigner section). The structure matter as resources will correspondingly follow, where Politiet’s designated a-krim funds is divided in function-oriented sections. In so, we found that a-krim funds came astray and were not all allocated to their “rightful” area in some districts. We can thus say that Politiet’s dilemma may be influenced by their organizational structure.

In addition to this, Politiet’s regional division do not match any of the other collaborative entities (3.3.4), which we find to have affected the current collaborative structure in terms of newly established RSGs who follow Politiet’s districts, cf. empirical context. The RSG organization is directly linked to that the IoC want to connect the Police Chief in order involve Politiet more, and resource allocation thereof. Hence, we find that the IoC have clearly made efforts to engage Politiet, and we believe this is due to Politiet’s central role.

However, RR (2016) emphasized it was serious that Politiet had not taken into account that the a-krim collaboration would lead to increased reports for Politiet to handle. We agree, and find that this can be linked to Politiet’s weak national management, thereby weak strategic anchorization, resulting in a-krim cases not being prioritized. Neby et al. (2016) pointed out that to accomplish goals, the entities need to make priorities based on resources, competence available, in addition to political priorities. Further, RR (2016) addressed that Politiet’s long processing time of a-krim cases was linked to case complexity, lack of resources and the right competence. We bring the two together and believe that this explains the poor a-krim prioritization in Politiet. A-krim cases are complex thus more resources are needed. Further we link the issue to the functional structure of Politiet, where we believe the sections may not have the appropriate competence to solve complex a-krim cases, e.g. the Foreigner section.

We tie the entities dependency on Politiet to structural distance (3.3.3) since there is asymmetry in power or resources present in the IoC. We find Politiet to have power due to dependency, but since they are deficient in resources it leads to a great challenge in the IoC, putting Politiet in a dilemma. Following, we see that Politiet’s structure may be a hinder in the IoC as their section-orientation may not hold adequate competence to solve a-krim cases,
which further affects prioritizations made. Hence, we find Politiet holds a superior role while in a predicament.

7.4 Effects & Efficiency

Neby et al. (2016) believed that the system (governance flow) is well suited to capture results and outcomes on ministries’ domain, but not so much on capturing outcomes across sectors and entities. Further they found that there were especially two major challenges related to measuring results; 1) measurement of goal achievement, i.e. difficult to measure a-krim, and 2) connecting results to its origin, i.e. where and who goal achievement derive from. On the second challenge, we do not find it as a significant challenge. However, the first challenge to measure the reduction of a-krim, is still today a great challenge in the IoC. Further, Neby et al. (2016) stated that the challenges of measuring results on a-krim was based on objectives that primarily catch activities, but not market effects. We find the same.

*Metrics* (3.3.2) can be a driving force in a collaboration, and includes performance- and management parameters for evaluating IoC efforts and outcomes. However, to measure the effects of the a-krim IoC is difficult, and we dare to say possibly impossible, since one cannot measure the magnitude in its entirety. So if one cannot say anything about point zero, then efforts being done or results measured really do not say anything about the effect when there is nothing to compare it with.

An additional complicating factor when it comes to measuring the effect is the preventing perspective of the a-krim strategy, because how can one quantify prevention. For instance, it is hard to measure the difference of effect between a small case and a more time consuming big case that might lead to better results on society as a whole. Furthermore, to measure effects one need results, and the results reported from the a-krim IoC are based on manual counting, cf. empirical context, as well as what they are reporting on are to some extent based on interpretations of terms, making it more uncertain as cognitive distance is apparent (3.3.3).

So, we find that measuring effects of the a-krim IoC’s efforts are challenging. Moreover, since resources are scarce we also want to address if the IoC is efficient. Søreide (2006) address the challenging aspect of the efficiency in the criminal justice system (CJS) with
trade-offs between crime deterrence, fair process and value for money. Efficiency in the CJS is thereby also linked to the effects of the CJS, which is difficult to assess. We can link this to the a-krim IoC, as we find that there are various ways in how to tackle a-krim. Where the number of executed controls and easy sanctions gives value for money, but does not necessarily lead to good effects in crime deterrence or a fair process if they just sanction to meet GnP requirements.

In regards to a fair process, we find that Politiet is measured on number of expulsion, which puts them in an ethically challenging position. Since they may choose to expel a family of five instead of taking on a trafficker, because it gives good value for money but gives less crime deterrence and a lesser fair process in terms of ethical norms. Additionally, in the a-krim context, we find expulsions not to be crime deterrent as a new a-krim offenders can easily take over the open place, i.e. effects are unknown. On the contrary, if they had sanctioned the trafficker it may have resulted in more crime deterrence and fair process, but perhaps not value for money. Thus, we find Politiet’s efficiency and effects to be questionable. AT has low crime deterrence in their sanctions according to RR (2016), but at the same time their sanctions provide a fair process and value for money as their sanctions are quick and not especially resource demanding (value for money). However, since AT has low crime deterrence one might question if there they contribute to an effective fight of a-krim.

We therefore find effects and efficiency of the IoC questionable, as there are trade-offs and because of the complexity in a-krim and the involvement of entities’ GnP measures.

7.5 Dominators & Influencers

We find that Skatteetaten and AT have large influence in the IoC, due to strong anchorization of a-krim. Furthermore, strong anchorization is linked to national management of a-krim. Strategic Actions (3.3.2) emphasizes leadership as a driving force in a collaboration. Neby et al. (2016) also pointed out strategic anchorization as a success factor in relation to top management support. This involves clear goals and management signals down to entities. We find this to be supported, by that both AT and Skatt receives clear signals and goals to prioritize a-krim from the higher levels in their respective entities. Further, we find that the strategic a-krim anchorization in AT can partly be explained by that the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, cf. empirical context table 5, has establishment and
follow-up responsibility of the a-krim centers.

Håkansson (1982) states that organizational size gives the members of a collaboration a basic position to interact, and size and resources are often connected. Hence, an organization with large resources or size, will have a dominating position in a collaboration. We support Håkansson on this, since Skatt is resource strong and has a dominating position in the IoC. However, this does not explain why AT has a strong position, since they are the smallest entity in the IoC and still has a leading role. Hence, we tie dominating positions in the IoC to resources invested in the problem at hand, a-krim.

_Resource investment_ (3.3.2) is the extent a participant contributes with resources to an IoC, and resources can be budget, personnel or systems. Arbeidstilsynet and Skatteetaten, cf. empirical context, have the largest contribution of employees in the centers, where AT has the most. Neby et al. (2016), emphasizes that the section of the entity that handles a-krim have unequal affiliation in the entity as a whole. Furthermore, that the factors related to size and organization gives the entities different opportunities to make organizational dispositions to themselves, which is in relation to what we find.

We find that Arbeidstilsynet has put almost all a-krim resources directly into the centers since they do not have an entity line for case processing. For Skatteetaten on the other hand, it is more difficult to estimate how many who actually work with a-krim, since case processing are spread out in the entity line as well as tasks in centers. In addition, development and management tasks are done in the entity line. Skatteetaten also shows _structural flexibility_ which is a driving force (3.3.2), since they have adapted their complex structure to a-krim and task handling thereof.

Due to strong a-krim anchorization in Skatt and AT, we find them holding dominating positions in the IoC, which further they affect the IoC's focus, priorities and work methods. Additionally, they hold the most Coordinators roles. At the same time, Skatt and AT differ on several dimensions, making coordination challenging cf. organizational distance (3.3.3). The IoC has an actor based perspective, this suits AT's strategy while not Skatt since they have an industry focus. This can partly explain the reason why some centers deviate from Styringsmodellen. Since there is asymmetry in entity representatives at the centers, we find AT's cases to be lifted more than others. Further, we find work methods in the IoC operative
level’s to be inspired by AT means, i.e. going out on controls. In 2017, total controls amounted to ca. 8 000 where AT sanctioned the most. Thus, we look upon AT as an influencer in the IoC. While Skatteetaten has overseeing responsibility of several development activities, thus play a leading role on where the IoC is headed.

The dominators and influencers roles arise because of structural distance which is linked to asymmetry and power-difference between collaborating parties. Power is defined as the ability to get things completed in the way one wishes. When there is asymmetry in resources, the power to enforce becomes unevenly distributed in a network of organizations (3.3.3). We relate this to the IoC, since Skatt and AT have “control” and contributes with the most resources into the IoC, thus we find Skatteetaten and Arbeidstilsynet as dominators and influencers.

7.6 Misaligned Time Aspects

NTAES (2017) emphasizes that the entities have different strengths when it comes to fighting a-krim, following stating the IoC has a great toolbox when it comes to means. Means meaning work methods, sanctions and authorization. But, the entities’ means and work methods are tailored to their specific social mission and mandate. Henceforth, work methods are important premises for a collaboration, and the greater differences between the entities the greater adjustments one will need (3.3.4). Specifically, we find a mismatch in the entities work methods in relation to time aspects making coordination challenging, due to organizational distance (3.3.3).

Firstly, the entities differ in the variables proactiveness versus reactiveness. Politiet and AT are proactive and work in real time, their sanctions are also quick. While Skatt and NAV work more reactive, where Skatt particularly works backwards in time, e.g. with bookkeeping. Fighting a-krim and working past time simultaneously can be both ineffective and inefficient, as one may lose track of what the criminals are doing in real time.

Secondly, the entities have different case processing time of a-krim cases. This is connected to the amount of work that needs to be done and the requirement of proof, as Neby et al. (2016) pointed out that the different sanctions have different requirements in processes and proofs. Long case processing time can also be exploited by a-krim offenders by emptying
accounts, calling for “bankruptcy”, destroying of evidence and so on. Take Skatt for example who issues a police report after a bookkeeping, which can take up to three years. Further, it makes it harder for Politiet to find evidence, and thereby weakening the effect of the IoC. However, we also find that case processing time is affected by what initially lays in the entity line, thereby IoC cases may be prone to a case queue. This can play out in lower sanctioning and less effective a-krim deterrence due to long processing time, which RR (2016).

Under such circumstances, it is demanding to coordinate the different entities’ processes to get a joint “logistics” done. Thus, there exists dependency in the entities' efforts. However, NTAES (2017) found commitment and follow-up of cases in the entity line as challenging, which we stand by. Further, we can tie this to IoC theory where we find there is absence of structural flexibility and collaborative learning (3.3.2) in the a-krim IoC. Finally, we see there is need for great coordination, since the “a-krim clock” ticks and as criminals flee and do not wait for a sanction to be imposed. Thus, we find the IoC’s time aspects as misaligned to fight a-krim.

### 7.7 A Collaboration that Lacks Communication

According to IoC theory, information sharing is vital for an IoC to function properly. Hocevar et al. (2006) state that hard mechanisms, like systems, are prerequisites for collaborating. However, they also state that soft mechanisms like organizational values and norms for information sharing together with familiarizing oneself with other organization’s capabilities and limitations, are necessary factors to strengthen collaborative capacity. Previous research on the IoC find that information sharing affects the efficiency as well as the effectiveness of the a-krim collaboration cf. The Rokkan report (2017) and RR (2017).

In the a-krim collaboration we find there are several challenges in terms of information sharing, and that regulations mainly limit the collaborative entities to practice it. Further, the IoC is without any system that enables them to share information across entity borders. We thus find this as an issue because it hinders the efforts for fighting a-krim, which is the “real problem” at hand.
Neby et al. (2017) found that Skatteetaten were subject to the biggest confidentiality restraints, whereas other entities could share to a greater extent. We find otherwise and believe info sharing is indeed dependent on possession of sensitive information, i.e. confidentiality obligations, but rather assess NAV to be the entity that holds greater restraints due to their large social mission which puts them in a position to hold a lot of sensitive information on a person level. Hence, we find that info sharing is more difficult the more sensitive information one holds, which is further linked to the entities’ different administration acts (regulations).

Since there is no common system in the a-krim collaboration, which is a restraining factor according to IoC theory, it has led to several ways to practice info sharing as well as different ways to interpret regulations across the a-krim network. RR (2016) find that this is due to restrictive interpretation and lack of knowledge of general provisions, which we fully agree with. Hence, we find that the collaboration outcomes are subject to individuals’ cognitive differences and their different personalities and competence (3.3.1 & 3.3.2), i.e. cognitive distance is present (3.3.3). Because of individuals’ different understandings, we see it as the reason to why information sharing practices differ between entities, centers, and within entities. Moreover, we believe cultures within a specific a-krim center can affect how information is being shared, just like Neby et al. (2017) found.

We find that the biggest challenge of information sharing lays with the regulations and their non-flexibility in terms of inter-agency work. Further we see that it is the people in the collaboration that plays a big role to why info sharing is difficult and different. Entity culture may play a part, but ultimately it is the people who exercise the culture. In the end, work practices are affected. The legislative amendments that are currently under hearing are therefore crucial for releasing a more effective and efficient collaboration to happen.

We draw on the fact that the IoC does not hold any common IT system is due to strict regulations, which hamper effective inter-agency work to be conducted. Further, we believe that if regulations are softened, there will following come systems that enables smoother IoC work. Technological systems facilitate interaction and communication (3.3.1), and is necessary to collaborate (3.3.2). Hence, we find a collaboration that currently lacks common communication.
8. Conclusion

The purpose of this thesis was to answer our research question, and to give a reminder it goes as follows:

“To analyze how and why characteristics of the different public entities affect the interorganizational collaboration on a-krim?”

From an instrumental approach we expected the entities’ characteristics to be entrenched in the collaboration, while the entities were also using the collaboration as a tool to realize their own priorities. In the aftermath, this is consistent and coherent with our findings. We have verified our general proposition from our model; that the characteristics of the individual entities (A) affects the collaboration (B). To conclude in short terms, A affects B.

However, the “why” part of the RQ variates and we have tried to explain this thoroughly in our analysis, in which the overarching findings especially reflect on this. We can say that governance of a-krim anchorization and the entities’ social mission and mandate are particularly important to consider why the a-krim collaboration has turned out as it has. Moreover, since we see there is uneven participation in the IoC and on a-krim in general between the entities, it has resulted in several challenges such as dependency on each other's efforts which has not been met. Thus, there is need for better coordination on many dimensions for a more efficient and effective fight of a-krim.

Our contribution on the topic and theme is to shed light on how challenging it is to govern public entities, as they represent and serve society as a whole, and not only own realizations. But since The Government is result-oriented, realizations of GnP measures become an essential part of public entities management. We find this to be an inhibition, as it may not capture all aspects in the best and most justified manner.

In regards to methodological limitations, we have only interviewed a sample thus not the whole population. Following, we cannot generalize our data, since it is possible that we may have obtained other data from other respondents. The data collection was also held at a certain period, so circumstances happening at the specific times may have colored the respondents’ answers.
Further we have some critics to ourselves. Our interview guides turned out big, resulting in a large data set to analyze. We additionally experienced time constraints, as a master’s thesis has a specific time horizon. We hence criticize ourselves for not drawing larger limitations. However, it is then difficult to say if we would have gotten such big findings as we have.

8.1 Recommendations

We have some recommendations aimed towards further fight against a-krim and the IoC. They are listed below and are based on our empirical findings.

- To address the issue of GnP measurement and no baseline to compare the IoC’s efforts against, we recommend a national assessment of the market in order to better see effects. We believe this will ultimately make it easier for the a-krim collaboration to fight a-krim.
- Remove entity specific GnP measures in the IoC, as we find GnP measures may drive focuses in for example taking on smaller (quantitative) cases instead of bigger (qualitative) cases. This may lead to better results for the society in the end.
  - In order to make interorganizational collaboration function properly, there is need for more rational and coherent management in the State, that are not overlapping or contradicting. Need to address the fact that being result-oriented leads to challenges in complex structures where one try to combine several jurisdictions and domains. We believe GnP measures need to be taken out of the context in order to fight a-krim in the most effective way, and not necessarily in the most efficient way.
- We emphasize the importance of both internal and external follow up of resources for the collaboration, since we find there has been different contributions between a-krim centers as well as unequal contribution by the entities. These are designated funds that should go to their specific purpose, and since the funds derive from taxpayers’ money it should be followed up accordingly. We recommend Riksrevisjonen to look at this.
  - Increase resources for Politiøt, as they hold a superior in the a-krim IoC. As we find resources in Politiøt to come astray from their original purpose.
  - We question the resource allocation in the IoC, given that Politiøt, Skatt and AT all receive the same amount of resources to fight a-krim, even though it is known that Politiøt plays a central role and are subject to more dependency than the
others. We see this to be an impediment in the IoC, which may lead to a waste of the IoC’s efforts (if a-krim cases are not acted upon in Politiet).

- Since there are misaligned time aspects, there is need for more adaption and coordination between the entities procedures and resources availability, so they can fight a-krim in the most effective and efficient manner.
- We also question if Politiet is rightfully organized for a-krim tasks, due to their functional structure and following focus, competence and prioritization at the different sections. We recommend a own section for a-krim for an effective a-krim fight.
- The Government/legislator need to act swiftly on the information sharing regulations so that the basic need for a collaboration to function properly is in place.

Finally, we criticize The Government for no strategic planning of the a-krim IoC before establishment. This has ultimately lead to challenges during the time the IoC has unfolded.

8.2 Further Research

As this turned out to be a very interesting and comprehensive theme and topic, we have some thoughts about further research. Styringsmodellen is new, so it would be interesting to see how the a-krim collaboration develops further. We have mainly focused our findings on the local level of the IoC, but since we have also interviewed on national level, we know there are several interesting aspects to look upon there as well. Especially to look at the effects of NTAES and their role in the IoC. Moreover, several of the entities in the IoC are in the process of reorganization, hereby Skatteetaten and Arbeidstilsynet, thus look at how this affects the IoC.

One of our main findings concerned effect measurement of the a-krim IoC’s efforts. We found this to be really difficult, and there is currently no adequate solution to it. Several of our respondents also stated they needed more research on it, and wanted help.

Another interesting angle is to look at other countries’ interorganizational collaborations towards a-krim. For example, to compare the Norwegian IoC against Netherland’s IoC on a-krim where Politiet is more in front, and/or Sweden where information sharing regulations are opened. But this would be a research of much larger size than perhaps a master’s thesis would allow.
8.3 Reflection

We want to reflect on our trust based society in Norway. What kind of society do we want to live in? A trust-based society with greater freedom or a society with more rules, monitoring, stricter sanctions and powerful authorities? We can all individually contribute in the fight against a-krim by doing easy and preventive measures like not paying under the table. If everyone had done their own efforts, how big would The State Treasury been then and what society would we have? By refraining from such services, a-krim will at least be reduced, thus the supply comes with the demand.
9. References


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Appendix 1 – Consent Form

Consent Form - FOCUS research program
NHH Norwegian School of Economics

Re: Master’s thesis on interorganizational collaboration on a-krim in Norway, Spring 2018

The FOCUS-program is a collaboration between NHH Norwegian School of Economics and Norwegian-based multinational firms. One goal of the research program is to develop knowledge on the topics of international integration, managing knowledge workers, dynamic control systems and change capacity.

We invite you to participate in an interview lasting 60-90 minutes. The interview will be recorded and notes will be taken during the interview. The interview will then be transcribed. Any information that could identify individuals will be removed (e.g. your name). Only persons participating in the interviews will have access to material that can identity informants.

Participating in the project is voluntary. You can withdraw at any time. The researchers in the FOCUS program will have access to the transcribed interviews, and they have signed confidentiality agreements. In some cases a follow-up study will be carried out. If so, you will receive new information and a new invitation to participate.

The data will be used for research, i.e. production of scientific articles and reports. By signing this form you consent to participate in the study. If you have any questions regarding this invitation, or you wish to be informed about the results of the study, please contact us.

Kind regards,
Names: Rakel Olava Mørch & Maureen Kvistad
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Phone: +47 48170134 & +47 40461464
Supervisor: Torstein Nesheim

I have received written information and I am willing to participate in this study.

______________________  ______________________
Date and place                              Signature
Appendix 2 – Interview Guide I

Interview Guide - National Level

Entity:
Informant:

Thank you for your participation in this study and setting the time for an interview. As mentioned earlier, we study at the Norwegian School of Economics and direct our master’s thesis towards interorganizational collaboration in Norway against work-related crime (a-krim). To assess the collaboration, we will interview people on national level, in addition to some of the people working in the local a-krim centers in the second half.

Furthermore, we want to inform about anonymity and that we use an audio recorder with the intention of getting all information correctly interpreted for further analysis. The audio recording will only be heard by us and deleted after they have been transcribed. The information that appears during the interview will be anonymized to the extent possible.

Facts:
1) What position and duties do you have in your entity?
   a) Who do you report to?
2) What is your position/role in a-krim?
3) How is your employment rate divided between your own entity and a-krim collaboration?
A - My entity

1) What are the goals of your entity?
2) How does your entity work against a-krim (alone)?
   a) Own focus area/steering group with allocated resources?
   b) How prioritized is a-krim compared to other areas?
3) How long has your entity been working with a-krim as a theme?
4) Does your entity have experience with previous interorganizational collaboration?
   i) If yes, main impressions?
5) What are the most important rules and procedures for your entity (a-krim related)?
   a) Development over time?
6) What is the importance of the organizational structure (referring to organizational chart) for your entity?
   a) Large regional divisions or district divisions?
7) Can you briefly describe the freedom of action workers have in terms a-krim?
   a) Standardized or flexible (tasks/procedures)
   b) Decentralized/centralized decision-making authority?
8) We know that the entities in the collaboration are different, is there something you want to mention in relation to these factors that separate your entity from the other entities:
   - Resources (how much resources do you contribute to the others)?
   - Culture (work methods, behavior, etc.)?
   - Size?
   - Structure?
   - Case processing time?
   - Sanction possibilities?

Transition Questions: My entity’s contribution to the collaboration

1) Does your entity believe it is necessary with an interorganizational collaboration to combat the problem a-krim?
2) What does your entity want to achieve with the collaboration? (goals)
3) What is your entity’s role/contribution in interorganizational collaboration? (expertise, competence)
4) Has your entity committed to follow up cases identified in the a-krim collaboration?
5) Do you know how much (earmarked) resources are allocated to a-krim in total, and how much that goes to the interorganizational collaboration? (e.g. in 2017)
6) Do procedures in your entity become tailored to the collaboration? (flex/non flex)
7) Are your entity's participants rewarded/appreciated for their work in interorganizational collaboration? (since you/they have 2 units to relate to, a-krim and main tasks in your own entity)
   a) If yes, how? (career development, monetary rewards, praise?)
8) Does your entity encourage/support that the collaboration has joint training activities and that the entities share and build knowledge together?
   a) If yes, does your entity support this in relation to human and financial resources?

B - The collaboration between the entities at national level

1) Can you describe the a-krim "hierarchy"? See figure on page 1
   a) How is the reporting pattern in general in regards to the collaboration against a-krim?
   b) Are there also informal contact and relations between members?
2) How often does XXX meet to cooperate?
a) How does geographic distance play in?
3) What are the goals of XXX, and how have they evolved over time?
   a) Do you influence these goals, and to what degree?
   b) Can you explain how performance measurement takes place in the collaboration?
      (clarified cases, evaluation criterias, routines, how often)
4) Are there clear guidelines on goals and limitations of interorganizational work on a-krim?
   a) From the Government?
   b) To the local a-krim centers?
5) What is XXX role, authority and mission in the a-krim collaboration?
   a) How much influence do you actually have? Special cases/times
   b) How do you try to coordinate local a-krim centers?
6) Are responsibilities and roles formalized within XXX?
7) How are the interests of the different entities of XXX safeguarded?
   a) Do you have coordination challenges? If yes, why/which?
      (Various responsibilities, mandate etc)
   b) Varies the ability to get things done between the entities?
      (influence, pattern, initiative, resources)
8) Since XXX are from different entities, you also have different professions/backgrounds, how is it to collaborate with one another?
   a) For example, different concepts and language use, competence/knowledge, work methods
   b) Is the motivation considered equal between the members?
9) How are decisions in XXX made?
10) Do you have any sort of tool overview that you use in the collaboration?
    a) If yes, which?
11) Within the collaboration, what are the rules for information sharing?
    a) How is it practiced? (use of confidentiality, compatible systems)
    b) Is there a culture to share information with the other entities?
       (reciprocity among members?)
12) If there are suggestions from operational units (local a-krim centers), how are these followed up?
13) Is there any kind of joint training/activities between the entities in the collaboration?
    a) Do you share experiences and build knowledge together in the collaboration?
14) During the time XXX has been established, have there been any special/critical challenges/periods?
    a) How have these evolved over time?
15) How much contact and what is your relationship with XXX?

C - The collaboration between the entities on operative level - a-krim centers (main impressions)
The local a-krim centers have different environments, needs, and have different relations with each other before the collaboration started.
1) How do you outweigh standardization at national level in terms of flexibility at operative level?
2) Among employees, is there a great interest in working in collaboration?
   a) Easy/hard to recruit people?
3) Do you perceive that there is mutual respect and understanding of the expertise of the different entities in the collaboration?
Closing questions:

- What is the effect of the collaboration?
  - Internally in the collaboration/between the entities? (Coordination of measures, understanding each other better, information sharing)
  - Externally in society? (Fighting a-krim)
- What are the biggest challenges in the collaboration?
  - At national level?
  - At local level?
- Is there something you want to add or wonder about?
- Do you want us to send you the transcribed interview so you can read through and possibly comment?

Then we say thank you very much for your participation.
If any questions or anything is unclear, please do not hesitate to contact us.

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Appendix 3 – Interview Guide II

Interview Guide - National level

Entity:
Informant:

Thank you for your participation in this study and setting the time for an interview. As mentioned earlier, we study at the Norwegian School of Economics and direct our master’s thesis towards interorganizational collaboration in Norway against work-related crime (a-krim). To assess the collaboration, we will interview people on national level, in addition to some of the people working in the local a-krim centers in the second half.

Furthermore, we want to inform about anonymity and that we use an audio recorder with the intention of getting all information correctly interpreted for further analysis. The audio recording will only be heard by us and deleted after they have been transcribed. The information that appears during the interview will be anonymized to the extent possible.

Facts:
1) What role do you have in XXX?
2) What position do you have in your entity?
   a) Who do you report to?
3) How is your employment rate divided between your own entity and XXX?
A - The relation between characteristics of the entities and the collaboration (external observer)

Here are some questions based on the description of the current situation...

1) Can you briefly give some main impressions from these a-kirms centers, how they work, case orientation/industry, size, etc;
   a) Oslo
   b) Bergen
   c) Stavanger

2) According to a report, the following dilemmas were apparent in the collaboration: What is XXX understanding of these challenges/dilemmas. (Do they vary from the different a-krim centers and/or are they linked to the entities and who the initiator is?):
   i) Proactivity vs. reactivity
   ii) Industry orientation vs. flexibility across industries
   iii) Quality vs. quantity (cases)
   iv) Freedom of action vs. bounded mandate
   v) Entity goals vs. collaboration goals
   vi) Other dilemmas?

3) Do you feel that there is different prioritization/commitment towards a-krim between the entities?

4) Which entity differentiate the most in terms of influence/power of action?

5) The different entities have different sanctions, how does this affect the collaboration?

6) Can you briefly explain how cases revealed in the collaboration are being followed up?
   a) Who take the case to sanction/prosecution? (the entity that is most affected, the police?)
   b) Differs commitment to follow up the cases that are revealed in the collaboration between the entities?

7) How do you feel that the procedures of the entities adapt to the collaboration?

8) How is information sharing practiced in the a-krim collaboration?
   a) Challenges?

9) We know that the entities in the collaboration are different, can you mention from these factors how the entities differ from one another:
   a) Resources (how much resources do the entities contribute compared to the others)
   b) Culture (working methods, behavior etc.)
   c) Work process
   d) Size
   e) Structure
   f) Decision-making authority and freedom of action
   g) Case processing time (generally at each entity)

10) Can you explain how performance measurement takes place in the collaboration/a-krim centers? (cleared cases, evaluation criterias, routines, how often)
   a) Challenges? (The entities performance requirements, and the influence of this?)

11) Can you briefly explain how the use of intelligence doctrine to Politteet affects the collaboration? (used regularly, understanding of the other entities)

B - XXX role, tasks, interaction with other actors (as a participant)

We are now discussing questions related to your group XXX ...

1) Why was XXX established?

2) How is the report pattern/decisions and relations/division of labor with the following players and XXX:
a) The Central collaboration Forum (DSSF)  
b) Steering Group  
c) National Interorganizational Analysis and Intelligence Center (NTAES)  
d) National Interorganizational Coordination Group (NTKG)  
e) Local a-krim centers  
f) The labor market/the market (as part of a tripartite collaboration)  
g) For example, what happens with your work? (Promotion of DSSF, directed to the a-krim Centers, or who and where?)

3) What is XXX’s role, authority and task in collaborating against a-krim?  
4) How much influence do you actually have? Special cases/time  
5) Development over time?  
6) What are the goals of XXX?  
   a) Do you have any kind of performance measurement in XXX?  
   b) Is it XXX that measures the effect of the a-krim collaboration?  
7) How often do XXX meet to cooperate?  
8) Are responsibilities and roles formalized within XXX?  
9) Who and where do you get resources from? (DSSF or from the participating entities?)  
   a) Is this sufficient?  
10) Within XXX, what are the rules for information sharing?  
   a) How is it practiced? (use of confidentiality, compatible systems)  
   b) Is there a culture to share information with the other members?  
      (reciprocity among members?)  
11) Do you in XXX have anything to do with joint training activities in the collaboration or contributions?  
12) The members in XXX;  
   a) Are all employed 100% full time?  
   b) Do you perceive that there is mutual respect and understanding of the expertise of the different entities?  
   c) Previous experience of interorganizational collaboration?  
13) Are the members in XXX rewarded/appreciated for their work in interorganizational collaboration? Since you/they have 2 units to relate to  
   a) If yes, how? (career, monetary rewards, praise?)  
14) Since you in XXX are from different entities, you also have different backgrounds, what are the consequences of this?  
   a) Is motivation perceived equally among the members?  
15) How are the interests of the different entities safeguarded?  
   a) Do you have coordination challenges? If yes, why/which?  
      (Different responsibilities, mandate etc.)  
   b) Varies the ability to get things done between the entities?  
      (influence, pattern, initiative, resources)  
16) During the time XXX has been established, have there been any special/critical challenges/periods?  
   a) How have they evolved over time?
Closing questions:

- What is the effect of collaboration?
  - Internally in the collaboration/between the entities? (Coordination of measures, understanding each other better, information sharing)
  - Externally in society? (Fighting a-krim)
- What are the biggest challenges for XXX?
  - As an observer, to the local a-krim centers?
  - What about the a-krim collaboration in general, overall?
- Is there any kind of international collaboration? (frequency, explain)
  - Does XXX have any "role models" - in other countries or crime areas?
- Is there something you want to add or wonder about?
- Do you want us to send you the transcribed interview so you can read through and possibly comment?

Then we say thank you very much for your attendance.
If any questions or anything is unclear, please do not hesitate to contact us.

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Appendix 4 – Interview Guide III

Interview Guide - A-krim Centers

Entity:
Informant:

Thank you for your participation in this study and setting off time for an interview. As mentioned earlier, we study at Norwegian School of Economics and direct our master’s thesis towards interorganizational collaboration in Norway against work-related crime (a-krim). To map the collaboration, we will interview people on national level, in addition to some of the people working in the local a-krim centers in the second half.

Furthermore, we want to inform about anonymity and that we use an audio recorder with the intention of getting all information correctly interpreted for further analysis. The audio recording will only be heard by us and deleted after they have been transcribed. The information that appears during the interview will be anonymized to the extent possible.

Facts

1) What position and duties do you have in your entity?
   a) Who do you report to?

2) What is your position and primary task in the a-krim hierarchy?
   a) See Figure 1, who are you in contact with?

3) How long have you worked with a-krim, in your own entity and in the collaboration?

4) How is your employment rate divided between your own entity and a-krim collaboration?
Mandate and Authority

1) What mandate have you received from your entity in relation to a-krim?
   a) Is this mandate sufficient to carry out your tasks with the others in the collaboration?
2) What are the most important and most used sanctions for your entity, against a-krim?
   a) Can these be used in the collaboration?
3) What restrictions does your entity have in its own work against a-krim?
4) The entities have different social missions, how does this affect the collaboration?
   a) Challenges in regards to this?
5) Can you briefly explain how uncovered cases are being followed up?
   a) Who will take the case to sanction/prosecution?
6) The different entities have different sanctions, how does this affect the collaboration?
7) What are the most commonly used sanctions at your center?
8) How is the sanction to be used in a specific case assessed?
9) How is access to prosecution and investigation at the police?
   a) Is there any kind of prioritization of a-krim cases?
10) Do members in the centers feel that they are bound by mandates/management signals from their own entities?
   a) Need for more freedom of action/flexibility?
11) Do you feel it is dissimilar interpretation/degree of understanding of regulations and laws in relation to the mandate between the entities in the collaboration?
   a) Challenges?
   b) Is it correct that the police are not allowed to act if other control agencies does not get their effect, cf. §7, the Police Act; is this practiced at your center?
   c) Is it correct that the police has an instruction/management signal to not report financial crime?

Goals & Performance

1) What is the entity's overall performance requirements?
   a) Evaluation criteria for regions/departments?
   b) Evaluation criterias for employees?
2) Does your entity have any kind of goal towards a-krim directly?
3) What are the objectives/goals for the collaboration/a-krim centers?
4) How does these collaboration goals fit the entity's goals?
   a) Are they incorporated into your entity?
   b) Challenges/Deviations?
5) Can you explain how performance measurement takes place in the center?
6) Does the center operate with its own target goals in addition to the entities' target goals?
7) Which entity gets the "outcome" of the individual cases and how is this decided?

A-krim Strategy & Practices

1) What is your entity's strategy against a-krim (alone)?
   a) Own focus area/steering group with allocated resources?
   b) How prioritized is a-krim compared to other fields?
2) What is your entity's distinctive feature when it comes to working methods against a-krim in relation to the other entities? For example: work inside/outside, procedures, culture, general processing time
   a) Does this entail challenges for the collaboration?
   b) Development/adaptation over time?
3) Is there given clear guidelines on goals and limitations for the work in the collaboration from your entity?
4) How do you work at your a-krim center? (strategy, responsibility, members, focus area, delegation of tasks)

5) Which entity affects the working methods the most and how?

6) Do you have any templates for procedures that you use in your collaboration?
   a) Development over time?
   b) Are NTAES's products used?

7) Have you experienced different levels of commitment and/or influence between the entities in the center?

8) New Styringsmodell from 2018, how do these management signals affect your a-krim center?
   a) How far have you come with this implementation?

9) During the time the center has been established, have there been any special/critical challenges/periods?
   a) If so, how have these evolved over time?

People
1) How is it to work/relate to 2 units? (own entity and collaboration)

2) How is your participation in the interorganizational collaboration appreciated from your own entity?
   a) In relation to reward, further promotion (more responsibility) and career development?

3) Is there a common understanding of a-krim among members of your entity?

4) How are the relationships between employees in the center?
   a) Contact independent of entity affiliation at the center?

5) How do you work together with regards to different entity affiliations and professions/boundaries?
   a) For example; different concepts and language use, competence/knowledge?

6) Among the members of your a-krim center;
   a) How is motivation experienced?
   b) Does everyone have the same level of knowledge about a-krim?

7) In terms of recruitment to the collaboration;
   a) Who and how do you recruit members to the center? (short)
   b) Is it required with entity experience and/or competence with a-krim?
   c) Is there a great interest in working in collaboration?

8) Is there any kind of joint training between the entities in the center?

Structure
1) How does the organization structure of your entity affect the a-krim collaboration?
   a) Complexity?
   b) Communication and decision-making authority

2) Has the organization structure of your entity changed after the a-krim collaboration started?

3) Is it a good thing that there has come more standardization on local level?

4) Can you briefly explain the a-krim hierarchy at local level?
   a) Can you make decisions at your center?
   b) Industry divided?

5) How are roles and responsibilities distributed within the center?
   a) Formalized?
   b) Deviation from Styringsmodellen?

6) How often do you meet each other at the center?
7) Is it possible to clarify things face-to-face?
   a) with own leader in the entity line?
   b) With staff at the center?
8) How is it to work away from your own entity?

**Information Sharing**
1) How is information shared in the entity line? (In relation to regulations and culture)
2) Is your entity's IT systems compatible with the collaboration?
   a) Do you have common IT systems for information sharing in the collaboration?
3) Are there any restrictions on what information you/your entity can share with the collaboration?
4) How is the information sharing regulatory framework in the collaboration?
   a) Challenges in relation to regulations and laws?
5) How is the culture of information sharing at the center practiced? (variation between members, norms)
   a) Is it correct that there is different practice of info-sharing between the centers?
   b) Is Økokrims’s guide for information sharing used?
6) Other challenges related to info-haring in the collaboration that you want to mention?

**Resources**
1) Does your entity have enough resources to;
   a) follow up the management signals from Styringsmodellen?
   b) follow up cases revealed in the collaboration in own entity line?
   c) If no, why?
2) How much resources are going to a-krim from your entity, to the entity line and to the collaboration?
   a) Development over time (more/less after collaboration started)
   b) Does the entities contribute differently with resources into the collaboration and how does this affect the collaboration?

**Closing questions:**
- Do you think the collaboration has led to efficiency in the fight against a-krim?
  - Room for improvement?
- What do you think is the biggest challenge for the collaboration?
  - At national level?
  - At local level?

Now we are done asking the questions we wanted.
- Is there something you want to add or wonder about?
- Do you want us to send you the transcribed interview so you can read through and possibly comment?

Then we say thank you very much for your participation.
If any questions or if anything is unclear, please do not hesitate to contact us.

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