Mid-term Evaluation of Swedish government funded Civil Society Support through the AGIR II Programme in Mozambique 2014–2020

Final Report
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Sida
Foreword

Development cooperation between Sweden and Mozambique started over 40 years ago, and the relationship with Mozambican civil society dates back even further. The main focus of the Swedish civil society support for poverty reduction has been to strengthen the capacity of Mozambican organisations and their respective local beneficiary communities so that they can participate in, as well as influence, decision making in ways that ensure more inclusive and participatory democratic governance. The support has been implemented with a result based management approach and cross cutting issues, as gender equality and environment been considered.

The last seven years Swedish support to civil society in Mozambique has been channelled through a programme called AGIR (Programa de Acções para uma Governação Inclusiva e Responsável). It is currently within its second phase (2015-2020). The present document is the Mid-term evaluation of the AGIR II Programme. AGIR II incorporates lessons learned from the first phase of AGIR (2010-2014) and further develops the mechanism of supporting more than 70 civil society organisations in the country via four intermediary partner organisations.

The Embassy of Sweden’s objective with this evaluation has, primarily been to help the donor partners (The Embassies of Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands) and their intermediary partners (Oxfam IBIS, Oxfam Novib, Diakonia and We Effect) to assess progress of the on-going AGIR II programme and to learn from what works well and less well in order to inform decisions on how programme implementation can be adjusted and improved. Furthermore, another purpose is to provide input for upcoming discussions concerning the preparation of possible continued civil society support beyond 2020.

This evaluation covers the first three years (out of six) of the second phase of the programme. The Embassy of Sweden has learned from this evaluation that the programme remains relevant by addressing themes/issues that are highly relevant for Mozambique’s development challenges and needs. During this period, the programme has commenced its effort to capture, and demonstrate common policy dialogue results in addition to results concerning organisational strengthening. The evaluation, however, highlights the continuous challenge the programme faces in terms of contributing to important successes, but without yet being able to ‘prove’ this in any fully systematic way. The evaluation also shows that the programme unfolds in a context with fragile government and civil society and that the government to a greater extent now has insufficient economic and human resources to respond to the advocacy and other types of efforts/activities by the supported organisation, and that this may affect the future impact of civil society.

The picture that emerges from the evaluation is that of a relevant risk-prone programme that can gain further in effectiveness within areas such as, for example, results based management and geographic spread. It moreover gives food for
reflection in terms of the size of the programme. From the Embassy of Sweden’s perspective, many of these challenges illustrate the complexity with a programme that has made an informed strategic choice to support civil society in its own right in line with the aid effectiveness principles. It also confirms that the environment in which local civil society acts is changing and becoming more challenging. The Embassy of Sweden, together with other donor partners of the programme, will need to carefully reflect on the funding modality it represents and all above aspects for its potential future support to civil society in Mozambique. Moreover, continue the ongoing efforts with the programme’s results based management, which will constitute an ever-present challenge as a result of the complexity of the programme, not least due to the fact that it focuses on core support.

The Evaluation has been led by a team from FCG, using Sida’s framework agreement for evaluation services. Sida’s Evaluation team and Sida’s Civil Society Unit have been involved and provided relevant inputs during the process.

Mikael Elofsson
Head of Cooperation
Embassy of Sweden in Maputo.
March 2018.
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<td>CAICC</td>
<td>Centre for Support of Community Information and Communication</td>
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<td>CBO</td>
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<td>CEP</td>
<td>Citizens' Engagement Programme</td>
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<td>Civil Society Learning and Capacity Centre</td>
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<td>CIP</td>
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<td>FORCOM</td>
<td>Community Radios Forum</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
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<td>HRBA</td>
<td>Human Rights Based Approach</td>
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<td>HQ</td>
<td>Headquarters</td>
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<td>ICC</td>
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<td>IESE</td>
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<td>JA</td>
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<td>KUKUMBI</td>
<td>Mozambican CSO based in Zambézia</td>
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<td>KUWUKA JDA</td>
<td>Youth, Development and Environmental Advocacy</td>
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<tr>
<td>LGBTI</td>
<td>Lesbian, gay, bisexual, transsexual and intersexual</td>
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<td>MASC</td>
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<td>Mozambique Assets Management</td>
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<td>ODI</td>
<td>Overseas Development Institute</td>
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<td>PLASOC</td>
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<td>PLWHA</td>
<td>People living with HIV and Aids</td>
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<td>Partner organisation</td>
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<td>RECAC</td>
<td>Children’s Friend Communication Network</td>
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<td>Right to Information</td>
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<td>US</td>
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<td>WLSA</td>
<td>Women and Law in Southern Africa</td>
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Preface

Acknowledgements

This evaluation report has been prepared by a team selected by FCG Sweden – Stein-Erik Kruse as team leader from Nordic Consulting Group (NCG Norway) working in association with Inge Tvedten from Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI) in Norway and José Jaime Macuane, Map Consult, Mozambique.

The team has benefited from the support and assistance of staff and programme managers from the four IPOs: Oxfam Novib, Oxfam Ibis, We Effect and Diakonia and representatives from a large number of their partner organisations in Maputo and the province of Zambézia. We are also grateful to the support from the Swedish Embassy in Maputo and Eva Lithman as the Quality Reviewer.

The team has attempted to address all the evaluation questions in the Terms of Reference. The present report has been prepared by a team of evaluators and the content, findings, and recommendations reflect the views of the evaluators, and not necessarily that of the Swedish government, the Embassy of Denmark and the Embassy of the Netherlands.
Antecedentes

O apoio da Suécia à sociedade civil em Moçambique é canalizado através do programa AGIR (Programa de Acções para uma Governação Inclusiva e Responsável), no qual quatro OSCs internacionais (Diakonia, Oxfam Ibis, Oxfam Novib e We Effect) actuam como organizações parceiras intermediárias (OPIs) com um objectivo geral comum de apoiar organizações parceiras locais Moçambicanas. O programa foi também financiado pela Dinamarca e pela Holanda. A primeira fase do programa teve início em 2010 e a segunda fase actualmente em curso cobre seis anos (Dezembro de 2014 – Dezembro de 2020). Esta avaliação de médio prazo cobre os primeiros três anos da segunda fase. Actualmente o programa dá apoio a 108 organizações parceiras (OPs) – 59 parceiros principais e mais 49 parceiros de projectos (pequenos projectos). O orçamento total para a segunda fase é de 862,5 Milhões de Coroas Suecas (SEK).

O objectivo geral do AGIR II é: “Uma sociedade Moçambicana onde os seus cidadãos, em particular os grupos mais marginalizados, desfrutem plenamente dos seus direitos à inclusão e igualdade, à redistribuição da riqueza gerada a partir do património do país, a serviços públicos acessíveis, de preço abordável e de boa qualidade, às liberdades civis fundamentais e à representação e participação política, num ambiente pacífico e ecologicamente sustentável”.

Para além do quadro de resultados globais do programa AGIR II, há quadros separados para os quatro subprogramas implementados por cada organização intermediária a um nível de agregação mais baixo. O quadro inclui indicadores quantificados que procuram agregar os resultados a longo prazo dos subprogramas relacionados com cinco desafios baseados em direitos essenciais:

- O direito à inclusão e igualdade.
- O direito à redistribuição da riqueza criada a partir do património do país.
- O direito a serviços públicos acessíveis, de preço abordável e de boa qualidade.
- O direito às liberdades civis fundamentais e a desfrutar do Estado de direito.
- O direito à representação e participação política.

Objectivo da avaliação

O objectivo desta avaliação de médio prazo é:

(a) Ajudar os doadores e os seus parceiros a avaliarem o progresso alcançado na primeira parte do programa AGIR II em curso (2014 - 2020), para aprender o
que funciona bem e não tão bem, a fim de contribuir para decisões sobre como pode ser ajustada e melhorada a implementação do projecto.
(b) Proporcionar aos doadores e aos seus parceiros um contributo para futuras discussões sobre a preparação de uma nova fase do programa AGIR (depois de 2020).
(c) Aconselhar mudanças necessárias nas directrizes do programa e no funcionamento geral do programa.

Contexto

Moçambique é um dos países mais pobres do mundo e os recentes desenvolvimentos realçaram também os desafios resultantes da má governação e da corrupção. Moçambique foi durante décadas um grande beneficiário de ajuda mas a antiga relação de confiança entre o governo e os doadores passou a estar sob pressão. Embora a constituição de Moçambique contenha um conjunto diversificado de direitos de participação política e a sociedade civil tenha uma longa história no país, há indicações de que o espaço de advocacia está a encoller – ao mesmo tempo que a necessidade de a sociedade civil ajudar a resolver os desafios relacionados com o desenvolvimento de Moçambique é mais clara do que nunca.

Observações e conclusões

Relevância

• O AGIR II procura tratar temas/questões que sejam altamente relevantes para os desafios e necessidades do desenvolvimento de Moçambique.
• O AGIR II é um programa grande e suscetível de risco, num contexto em que o governo e a sociedade civil são frágeis – pelo que se deve elogiar a Suécia.
• O AGIR II é relevante para as políticas do governo nas áreas focadas pelo programa, mas as suas componentes de advocacia são um alvo com o actual clima político.
• O AGIR II está bem alinhado com as prioridades da ASDI de uma abordagem ao desenvolvimento alicerçado nos direitos, mas a sua dimensão e complexidade coloca desafios em termos de implementação e resultados.
• O Programa pretende desafiar, monitorar e avaliar as políticas e actividades de um governo que é cada vez mais fraco e menos receptivo, em particular aos níveis local/distrital.
• A abordagem de advocacia, direitos e responsabilização é um desafio para os actores envolvidos e em geral é mais relevante/fácil de implementar em combinação com intervenções tangíveis de prestação de serviços.
• A redução da pobreza, a igualdade de género, o ambiente e os direitos humanos enquanto questões transversais não são sistematicamente acompanhados pelas OPIs e OPs, mas os parceiros/projectos individuais realizam um trabalho importante nestas áreas.
Eficiência

- As organizações da sociedade civil internacionais foram inicialmente consideradas as únicas organizações capazes de gerir um programa tão vasto – financeiramente e programaticamente. A solução escolhida traz consigo um custo (relativamente) elevado para o programa de 37 Milhões de Coroas Suecas, ou seja 25% do orçamento total em 2016, e inclui uma componente significativa de fortalecimento de capacidade, serviços comuns e administração.
- Não houve uma análise sistemática de até que ponto existem organizações da sociedade civil Moçambicanas que tenham “amadurecido” o suficiente durante o AGIR II para assumirem o papel de intermediários no programa.
- As OPIs queixam-se que gastam uma parte cada vez maior do seu tempo a gerir fundos relacionados com a planificação/monitoria e a fazer relatórios sobre o AGIR, quando comparada com diálogos estratégicos com os parceiros e criar e manter relações no programa.
- Houve algumas queixas de organizações parceiras entrevistadas sobre procedimentos financeiros do programa, mas poucas eram sérias.
- A execução global do orçamento para os parceiros principais foi de 91% em 2016, embora para subvenções mais pequenas e fundos âgeis e inovadores tenha sido baixa, com respectivamente 31% e 13%.
- A relação entre as OPIs e a Embaixada da Suécia parece ser boa, mas as primeiras estavam preocupadas com a frequente mudança do pessoal responsável pelo AGIR e as crescentes exigências em termos de relatórios sobre resultados.
- O funcionamento do Comité de Coordenação Intermediário foi reforçado, mas ainda não é um mecanismo forte e eficaz de coordenação e gestão estratégica do programa.
- Com o AGIR II foi feito um esforço deliberado para descentralizar a selecção de parceiros e incluir também organizações da sociedade civil baseadas na província/distrito. No entanto, a maior parte do orçamento é ainda canalizada para organizações da sociedade civil nacionais baseadas em Maputo (em 2016: Novib 71%, We Effect 58%, Ibis 53% e Diakonia 88%).
- Há em Moçambique vários programas e iniciativas paralelos, financiados por doadores, na área de governação, participação e responsabilidade social. Não está actualmente instituído um mecanismo eficaz de coordenação dos doadores.

Eficácia

- Muitas OPIs reportam que “com base nas actividades realizadas e nos resultados alcançados, o subprograma está no bom caminho para cumprir os seus objectivos de médio e longo prazo”.
- É provável que o AGIR tenha contribuído para o que a equipa de avaliação vê como os sucessos mais importantes da sociedade civil/do programa nos últimos cinco anos, mas isto não pode ser “provado” de forma sistemática.
- O programa conclui que “um grande número de indicadores mostra progresso e estabilidade e evidencia o facto de que o programa AGIR é crucial para
desenvolver uma forte e vibrante sociedade civil em Moçambique”. Mais uma vez, não podem ser verificadas ligações causais directas entre os indicadores e as metas dos resultados a médio e longo prazo.

- Todas as OPIs contribuíram para o fortalecimento da capacidade organizacional dos seus parceiros. Acrescentaram também valor em áreas estratégicas/profissionais, mas em menor grau. A contribuição para desenvolver a capacidade de trabalhar em rede afigura-se irregular e variada.
- Há limitações e desafios no sistema abrangente e complexo de monitoria e reporte sobre resultados e impacto. A ideia de que agregando resultados “de baixo para cima” o programa conseguirá mostrar uma hierarquia de resultados e chegar a um “impacto global” é problemática.
- O uso alargado de indicadores tende a excluir os resultados intangíveis e não inclui suficientemente a descrição/análise de como o programa realmente influencia os processos políticos, especialmente nos relatórios globais.

**Sustentabilidade**

- Não obstante a sua limitada base popular, a sociedade civil, que tem uma longa história em Moçambique, tem mostrado resiliência em relação à pressão do governo e as OSCs melhores/mais relevantes prevalecem.
- A dependência econômica dos doadores é grande, demasiadas organizações da sociedade civil tornaram-se fins em si mesmas e plausivelmente só as mais fortes e mais visíveis sobrevivem à redução do financiamento.
- A concentração de organizações da sociedade civil e da ajuda em Maputo é ainda demasiado forte para assegurar uma descentralização/representação das províncias, que é necessária para garantir a sustentabilidade/impacto a mais longo prazo da sociedade civil em todo o país.
- O impacto futuro da sociedade civil dependerá de um estado com suficientes recursos económicos e humanos para responder à advocacia e a outros tipos de esforços/actividades.
- O factor mais iminente que define a sustentabilidade das organizações da sociedade civil – em particular as envolvidas em advocacia política – será a tendência da futura Lei das Associações.
- Em relação à sustentabilidade a mais longo prazo, a sociedade civil em Moçambique continuará a depender do financiamento externo.

**Recomendações a Curto Prazo**

1. Os quadros de resultados devem ser revisitados. Para a restante parte do programa AGIR, a actual lista de indicadores deve ser criticamente avaliada e simplificada. As mudanças políticas e sócio-económicas influenciaram significativamente a probabilidade de se realizarem os resultados esperados. Isto não significa necessariamente que as ambições devam ser reduzidas, mas sim que devem ser encontradas formas novas/innovadoras de trabalhar. Pode ser produzido um relatório separado pelas quatro organizações intermediárias, referindo as
SUMÁRIO EXECUTIVO

recomendações constantes da actual avaliação. (tomando as OPIs a liderança em consulta com os doadores).

2. No período 2017-2020 podem ser abandonados os relatórios globais no seu modelo actual. Uma alternativa é escrever um breve relatório separado de monitoria e análise de dados relevantes ao nível nacional/agregado que possam ser usados como pontos de referência por relatórios ao nível mais baixo. A tarefa pode ser entregue às OPs de pesquisa. (as OPIs tomam a liderança em consulta com os doadores).

3. Ao nível das organizações intermediárias, a monitoria deve combinar mais explicitamente os indicadores qualitativos e quantitativos através de: (a) levantamento, num formato específico, de um número limitado de análises narrativas incluídas nos relatórios das OPs e (b) enfoque em indicadores quantitativos que sejam mensuráveis. (as OPIs tomam a liderança em consulta com os doadores).

4. Os relatórios anuais devem incluir uma análise e avaliação das organizações parceiras, dado que a selecção e composição destas organizações é crucial para o desempenho do programa. Esta análise pode ser uma combinação de “auto-avaliação”, em que cada organização parceira responde a um número limitado de indicadores de desempenho institucional, com uma avaliação global feita pela organização parceira. Esta análise deve constituir a base de uma reunião individual anual entre as organizações intermediárias e os seus parceiros. (as OPIs tomam a liderança em consulta com os doadores).

5. O número actual de organizações parceiras é elevado, com grandes variações no que respeita a competência e capacidade. Devia ser iniciado um processo para reduzir o seu número, através da separação entre (a) organizações que são avaliadas como sendo sustentáveis e relevantes para continuarem a ser apoiadas depois do AGIR II e (b) organizações que ainda não têm a capacidade necessária para se “diplomarem”, e devem ser gradualmente afastadas através da concessão de financiamentos a projectos específicos que podem terminar no final do AGIR II. (Doadores em consulta com as OPIs).

6. No processo de selecção das organizações da sociedade civil elegíveis para continuarem a ser apoiadas depois do AGIR II, deve haver o cuidado de encontrar um equilíbrio entre as organizações situadas em Maputo e as baseadas nas províncias. Idealmente, deve ser identificada uma organização da sociedade civil em cada uma das províncias onde o AGIR está activo, como candidata a desempenhar o papel de agência intermediária/líder num possível AGIR III a fim de assegurar um programa mais descentralizado e mais próximo dos beneficiários finais. (as OPIs tomam a liderança em consulta com os doadores).
7. As pequenas/ágeis/inovadoras modalidades de financiamento devem continuar, mas com procedimentos simplificados e maior envolvimento/apoio contínuo das OPIs ou de uma OP “mentora” e com indicadores de progresso/realização de objectivos que sejam relevantes e realistas.

8. Devem ser feitos mais esforços de coordenação com outros doadores que apoiam a sociedade civil, durante a fase restante do AGIR II – em particular com os envolvidos em programas de advocacia similares – a fim de reduzir os custos de operação (requisitos de reporte múltiplos/diferentes), evitar sobreposição de financiamentos e sobrecarregar a capacidade das melhores organizações parceiras.

9. Ao mesmo tempo, o AGIR e os outros programas similares devem desenvolver uma estratégia para a eventualidade de a nova Lei das Associações copiar a da Etiópia e de um número crescente de outros países Africanos e definir um limite à proporção do financiamento externo permitido para organizações da sociedade civil que trabalham em advocacia política (não há um tecto similar para as organizações da sociedade civil que trabalham na prestação de serviços). (Doadores).

10. Finalmente, devem ser feitas avaliações da relevância/possíveis vantagens de incluir novo(s) doador(es) em substituição da Dinamarca que está em processo de terminar o seu envolvimento em Moçambique. Mais doadores terão a vantagem não apenas de reduzir os riscos relacionados com a continuidade do financiamento do programa (no caso de a Suécia decidir reduzir o seu envolvimento), mas também de alargar o âmbito/experiências dos doadores do AGIR. A Noruega seria uma candidata, havendo actualmente sinais políticos de aumento substancial do seu apoio à sociedade civil em África. (Doadores).

**Cenários futuros**

O programa AGIR começou em 2010 e em 2020 terá completado dez anos, sem grandes mudanças no desenho e abordagem do programa. Esta avaliação documentou vários resultados e desenvolvimentos positivos, mas o programa ainda sofre de ineficiências internas e externas. A questão mais crítica e difícil é contudo saber até que ponto há necessidade de mudar para que os mesmos recursos possam no futuro ser usados de forma mais eficiente e eficaz. A recomendação é que se comece a discutir o futuro AGIR nesta perspectiva. Os cenários abaixo são apresentados como base de reflexão – como contribuições fundamentadas nas constatações e observações desta avaliação, mas também na experiência dos avaliadores noutros países. As opções não são necessariamente mutuamente exclusivas e é possível uma combinação das mesmas. Os cenários são de natureza estratégica geral – desde mudanças incrementais a grandes reformas:

(a) **Tornar os subprogramas mais independentes**

Retirar do AGIR os objectivos globais e o quadro de resultados comuns do AGIR e transformá-lo em quatro subprogramas independentes com os seus próprios
objetivos e resultados. Os serviços e actividades comuns e partilhados pelos subprogramas, em termos de apoio administrativo, bem como profissional, podem continuar de acordo com as necessidades. Os resultados por subprograma não devem ser agregados a um nível global de programa. Este cenário está também em conformidade com a actual situação – o quadro global não é funcional e acrescenta mais problemas do que valor. Um novo AGIR pode tornar-se mais efectivo e focalizado se for organizado em quatro subprogramas, possivelmente com um “secretariado” comum para apoio administrativo e profissional.

(b) Menos objectivos e mais realistas
O primeiro cenário pode ser combinado com a introdução de menos objectivos e o tratamento em cada subprograma de um conjunto de áreas de problema mais manejável, para o qual existe experiência/evidência de soluções exequíveis. O programa terá melhor desempenho se tiver metas mais mensuráveis com ligações mais claras entre esforços e resultados. O programa deve medir produtos, bem como resultados a curto prazo através de indicadores qualitativos e quantitativos, enquanto que os resultados e o impacto das políticas a longo prazo devem ser medidos/analisados separadamente comparando-os com indicadores relevantes a nível nacional, contextualizando as contribuições das OSCs (i.e. juntamente com as tendências internacionais, a economia política de Moçambique, o sector privado, etc.). Deste modo, será reconhecido que a sociedade civil tem contribuições importantes para a mudança sem a procura fútil de atribuição.

(c) Mais concentração
O segundo cenário também pode ser combinado com uma concentração geográfica e temática mais forte e menos organizações parceiras. O actual programa não tem políticas/estratégias claras sobre a importância relativa de cada uma das três variáveis. Os recursos são repartidos pelas províncias, por um grande número de áreas temáticas/questões transversais e organizações, o que conduz a um programa altamente fragmentado. Um enfoque mais forte e a concentração em termos de áreas geográficas/temáticas e parceiros têm potencial para serem mais eficazes. Nesse cenário, será possível distinguir diferentes tipos de programas – e.g. estabelecer modalidades de financiamento separadas para diferentes tipos de organizações: (a) OSCs altamente profissionais/fortes baseadas em Maputo, (b) Redes nacionais/locais, (c) OSCs baseadas na província/distrito com necessidade de mais reforço da capacidade. É essencial estabelecer uma modalidade separada para atingir mais OSCs ao nível local e provincial – se isto vier a ser uma prioridade.

(d) Nacionalizar e diferenciar a selecção de organizações intermediárias
Os programas AGIR I e II usaram OSCs internacionais como organizações intermediárias – com uma forte componente Moçambicana em termos de pessoal também em posições de gestão. Este modelo deve ser revisto em termos de valor acrescentado e de custos. Embora a “nacionalização” das organizações intermediárias em termos de pessoal seja recomendável, devem ainda ser feitas avaliações sistemáticas para determinar até que ponto as organizações nacionais da sociedade
civil atingiram um nível de competência e capacidade onde possam vir a tornar-se futuras organizações intermediárias por direito próprio. Modelos diversos e mais diferenciados podem também ser aqui incluídos – um com organizações nacionais da sociedade civil actuando como organizações intermediárias de uma selecção de organizações parceiras; e outro em que as organizações da sociedade civil internacionais continuam como organizações intermediárias com base nas suas vantagens comparativas (competência especial) e nas necessidades das organizações parceiras.

(e) **Instituir um fundo fiduciário (trust fund) competitivo para a sociedade civil com múltiplos doadores**

O nível de coordenação efectiva entre doadores que apoiam a sociedade civil em Moçambique é baixo e existem vários programas paralelos. A actual estrutura do programa pode ser substituída por um fundo financiado por vários doadores de um tipo estabelecido noutras países. O fundo será dirigido por um secretariado comum e um conselho de administração com representantes dos doadores e da sociedade civil, que verifique as propostas e tome as decisões sobre financiamento. O fundo pode ter várias prioridades temáticas/subprogramas e deve apoiar uma combinação de projectos a curto prazo (1-2 anos) e programas a prazo mais longo (3-5 anos). As organizações da sociedade civil de nível nacional e local candidatam-se a financiamento com base em directrizes técnicas, orçamentais e de calendário, com abertura para parcerias com parceiros externos/internacionais. O Secretariado revê todas as propostas e sugere/recusa o financiamento. O Secretariado é responsável pela monitoria e avaliação e pode também prestar aconselhamento e fortalecimento de capacidade às organizações nacionais da sociedade civil.
Executive Summary

Background

The Swedish support to civil society in Mozambique is channelled through the programme AGIR (Programa de Acções para uma Governação Inclusiva e Responsável) in which four international CSOs (Diakonia, Oxfam Ibis, Oxfam Novib and We Effect) act as intermediary partner organisations (IPOs) with a common overall objective to support local Mozambican partner organisations. The programme has also been funded by Denmark and the Netherlands. The first phase of the programme started in 2010, the current ongoing second phase covers six years (December 2014 - December 2020). This mid-term evaluation covers the first three years of the second phase. The programme currently provides support to 108 partner organisations – 59 core partners and 49 project partners (small projects). The total budget for the second phase is 862.5 Mill SEK.

The overall objective of AGIR II is: “A Mozambican society where its citizens, particularly the most marginalized groups, fully enjoy their rights to inclusion and equity, to redistribution of wealth created from the country’s patrimony, to accessible and affordable public services of good quality, to basic civil freedoms and to political representation and participation; in a peaceful and ecologically sustainable environment”.

In addition to the overarching results framework for the AGIR II programme, there are separate frameworks for the four sub-programmes implemented by each intermediary organisation at a lower level of aggregation. The framework comes with quantified indicators that seek to aggregate the long-term outcomes of sub-programmes relating to five main rights-based challenges:

- The right to inclusion and equity.
- The right to retribution of wealth created from the country’s patrimony.
- The right to accessible and affordable public services of good quality.
- The right to basic civil freedoms and enjoyment of the rule of law.
- The right to political representation and participation.

Purpose of evaluation

The purpose of this mid-term evaluation is to:

(d) Help the donors and their partners to assess progress in the first part of the ongoing programme AGIR II (2014-2020) to learn from what works well and less well in order to inform decisions on how project implementation may be adjusted and improved.
(e) Provide the donors and their partners with an input to upcoming discussions concerning the preparation of a possible new phase of the AGIR programme (from 2020).

(f) Advice on changes needed in the program guidelines and in the general functioning of the programme.

Context

Mozambique is one of the poorest countries in the world, and recent developments have also highlighted the challenges of poor governance and corruption. Mozambique has been a major recipient of aid for decades, but the once trustful relationship between the government and donors has come under pressure. While the constitution of Mozambique provides a diverse set of rights for political participation and civil society has a long history in the country, there are indications that the space for advocacy is shrinking – at the same time as the need for civil society to help solve Mozambique’s development challenges is clearer than ever.

Observations and findings

Relevance

- AGIR II seeks to address themes/issues that are highly relevant for Mozambique’s development challenges and needs.
- AGIR II is a large and risk-prone programme in a context of a fragile government and civil society – for which Sweden should be commended.
- AGIR II is relevant for expressed government policies in the programme’s focus areas, but its advocacy components are under attack with the current political climate.
- AGIR II is well in line with Sida based priorities of a right-based approach to development, but its size and complexity poses challenges in terms of implementation and results.
- The Programme is meant to challenge, monitor and evaluate policies and activities of a government that is increasingly weak and unreceptive particularly at local/district level.
- The advocacy, rights and accountability approach is challenging for the actors involved and is generally more relevant/easier to implement in combination with tangible interventions of service delivery.
- Poverty reduction, gender equality, the environment and human rights as cross-cutting issues are not systematically followed up by the IPOs and POs, but individual partners/projects do important work in these areas.

Efficiency

- International civil society organisations were initially considered the only organisations capable to manage such a large programme – financially and programmatically. The preferred solution comes with a (relatively) high-cost for
the programme at 37 Mill SEK or 25% of total budget in 2016, and includes a significant capacity strengthening component, joint services and administration.

- There has been no systematic analysis of to what extent there are Mozambican civil society organisations that have ‘matured’ sufficiently during AGIR II to take on the role as intermediaries in the programme.
- The IPOs claim that they spend an increasing part of their time managing funds pertaining to planning/monitoring and reporting on AGIR, as compared to strategic dialogues with partners and creating and maintaining relationships across the programme.
- There were some, but few serious, complaints from partner organisations interviewed about financial procedures in the programme.
- The overall budget execution for core partners was 91% in 2016, while for smaller grants for agile and innovative funds it was low with 31% and 13% respectively.
- The relation between the IPOs and the Swedish Embassy seems to be smooth, but the former were concerned about frequent change of staff responsible for AGIR and increasing demands in terms of results reporting.
- The functioning of the Intermediary Coordinating Committee has been strengthened, but is still not a strong and effective mechanism for coordination and strategic management of the programme.
- With AGIR II a deliberate effort was made to decentralise selection of partners and include also provincial and district based civil society organisations. However, the largest share of the budget is still channelled to national Maputo based civil society organisations (in 2016 Novib 71%, We Effect 58%, Ibis 53% and Diakonia 88%).
- There are several parallel donor funded programmes and initiatives in Mozambique within the area of governance, participation and social accountability. There is no effective donor coordination mechanism in place.

Effectiveness

- Most of the IPOs report that “based on the activities performed and outcomes achieved, the sub programme is on track to meet both its mid- and long-term objectives”.
- It is likely that the AGIR has contributed to what the evaluation team sees as the most important successes for civil society/the programme in the past five years, but this cannot be ‘proven’ in any systematic way.
- The programme concludes that “a great number of indicators show progress and stability and substantiate the fact that the AGIR programme is crucial in building a strong and vibrant civil society in Mozambique”. Again, no direct causal links between the indicators and the medium- and long-term outcome targets can be verified.
- All the IPOs have contributed to strengthening the organisational capacity of their partners. They also add value in strategic/professional areas, but to a lesser extent. The contribution in building networking capacity appears irregular and varied.
There are limitations and challenges in the comprehensive and complex system of monitoring and reporting on results at outcome and impact level. The idea that by aggregating results ‘upwards’, the programme will be able to show a hierarchy of results and come up with a ‘global impact’ is problematic.

The extensive use of indicators tends to crowd out intangible results and does not sufficiently include description/analysis of how the programme actually influences policy processes in particular in the overarching reports.

**Sustainability**

- Despite a limited popular base, civil society has a long history in Mozambique, has shown resilience in relation to government pressure and the best/most relevant CSOs will prevail.
- The economic dependence on donors is strong, too many civil society organisations have become ends in themselves, and only the strongest and most visible are likely to cope with reduced funding.
- The concentration of civil society organisations and support to Maputo is still too strong to secure a decentralisation/representation of the provinces that is necessary to secure longer term sustainability/impact of civil society in the whole country.
- The future impact of civil society will depend on a state with sufficient economic and human resources to respond to advocacy and other types of efforts/activities.
- The most imminent factor defining the sustainability of civil society organisations – particularly those involved in political advocacy – will be the direction of the upcoming Law on Associations.
- For longer-term sustainability, civil society in Mozambique will continue to depend on external funding.

**Short-Term Recommendations**

1. The results frameworks should be revisited. For the remaining part of the AGIR programme, the current list of indicators should be critically assessed and simplified. Political and socio-economic changes have significantly influenced the likelihood of achieving expected results. This does not necessarily mean that ambitions should be reduced, but that new/innovative ways of working should be found. A separate report/revision could be produced by the four intermediary organisations with reference to the recommendations in the current evaluation. (IPOs take the lead in consultation with donors).

2. The overarching reports for 2017 to 2020 could be dropped in their current form. One alternative is to write a short separate report monitoring and analysing relevant data at the national/aggregate level that can be used as points of reference for the lower-level reporting. The task could be given to the research-based POs. (IPOs take the lead in consultation with donors).
3. At the level of intermediary organisations, monitoring should more explicitly combine qualitative and quantitative indicators by (a) lifting up a limited number of narrative analyses included in the reporting from POs in a specific format and (b) focus on quantitative indicators that are measurable. (IPOs take the lead in consultation with donors).

4. Annual reports should include an analysis and assessment of partner organisations, since the selection and composition of partner organisations is crucial for programme performance. This could be a combination of a ‘self-assessment’ where each partner organisation responds to a limited number of institutional performance indicators, and an overall assessment done by the partner organisation. This should be the basis for an individual annual meeting between the intermediary organisations and its partners. (IPOs take the lead in consultation with donors).

5. The current number of partner organisations is high, with strong variations in competence and capacity. A process towards reducing the number should be initiated, by separating between (a) organisations that are assessed to be sustainable and relevant for continued support after AGIR II and (b) those that still do not have the necessary capacity to ‘graduate’ and should be phased out by giving funding for specific projects that can be terminated by the end of AGIR II. (Donors in consultation with IPOs).

6. In the process of selecting the civil society organisations eligible for continued support post AGIR II, care should be taken to find a balance between Maputo- and provincially based organisations. Ideally, one civil society organisation in each of the provinces where AGIR is active should be identified as candidate to play an intermediary/lead agency role in a possible AGIR III in order to secure a more decentralised programme closer to the ultimate beneficiaries. (IPOs take the lead in consultation with donors).

7. Small/agile/innovative funding modalities should be continued, but with simplified procedures, more continuous engagement/support from the IPOs or a ‘mentor’ PO, and with relevant/realistic indicators of progress/goal achievement.

8. More efforts should be given to coordinate with other donors supporting civil society in the remaining phase of AGIR II – particularly those involved in similar advocacy programmes – in order to reduce transaction costs (multiple/different reporting requirements), avoid overlaps in funding and overstretching the capacity of the best partner organisations.

9. At the same time, AGIR and the other likeminded programmes should develop a strategy for the eventuality that the new Law of Associations will copy Ethiopia and an increasing number of other African countries and put a cap on the proportion of external funding allowed for civil society organisations working
through political advocacy (there is no similar cap on civil society organisations working with service delivery). (Donors).

10. Assessments should finally be made of the relevance/possible advantages of including new donor(s) to substitute Denmark that is in the process of terminating engagements in Mozambique. More donors will have the advantage not only of reducing risks related to the continued funding of the programme (in case Sweden should decide to reduce its engagement), but will also broaden the scope/experiences of the AGIR donors. Norway would be one candidate, with current political signals of increasing support to civil society in Africa substantially. (Donors).

**Future scenarios**

The AGIR programme started in 2010 and will in 2020 have lasted for ten years. There have been no major changes in programme design and approach during this period. This evaluation has documented several positive results and developments, but the programme still suffers from internal and external inefficiencies. However, the most critical and difficult question is to what extent there is a need for change so that the same resources could be used more efficiently and effectively in the future. The recommendation is to start discussing the future AGIR in such a perspective. The scenarios are presented as food for thought – as contributions informed by findings and observations from this evaluation, but also from the evaluators experience in other countries. The options are not necessarily mutually exclusive and a combination of them is possible. The scenarios are of a broad strategic nature – from incremental changes to major reforms:

(a) **Make the sub programmes more independent**

Remove the overarching objectives and common results framework from AGIR and make it into four independent sub programmes with their own objectives and results. Common and shared services and activities between the sub programmes in terms of administrative as well as professional support can be continued based on needs. Sub programme results should not be aggregated to an overall programme level. Such a scenario is also in line with the actual situation – the overarching framework is not functional and adds more problems than value. A new AGIR may become more effective and focussed being organised as four sub programmes possibly with a common ‘secretariat’ for administrative and professional support.

(b) **Fewer and more realistic objectives**

The first scenario can be combined with introducing fewer objectives and address a set of more manageable problem areas for each sub programme for which there is experience/evidence of workable solutions. The programme will perform better if it has more measurable goals with clearer links between efforts and results. The programme should measure outputs and short-term outcomes through qualitative and quantitative indicators, while long-term policy outcomes and impact should be measured/analysed separately against relevant indicators at national level putting the
EXE CUTIVE SUMMARY

CSO contributions in context (i.e. together with international trends, Mozambique’s political economy, the private sector etc.). With this, it will be recognised that civil society has important contributions to change without a futile search for attribution.

(c) More concentration

The second scenario can also be combined with stronger geographical and thematic concentration and fewer partner organisations. The current programme has no clear policies/strategies on the relative importance of each of the three variables. Resources are spread to provinces, a large number of thematic areas/cross cutting issues and organisations which lead to a highly fragmented programme. A stronger focus and concentration in terms of geography/thematic areas and partners have the potential to be more effective. In such a scenario, it would be possible to differentiate between different types of programmes – e.g. establish separate funding modalities for different types of organisations: (a) Highly professional/strong Maputo based CSOs, (b) National/local networks, (c) Provincial/district based CSOs in need of more capacity strengthening. It is essential to establish a separate modality for reaching more provincial and local level CSOs – if this becomes a priority.

(d) Nationalise and differentiate the selection of intermediary organisations

AGIR I and II have used international CSOs as intermediary organisations – with a strong Mozambican component in terms of staff also in management positions. Such a model should be further reviewed in terms of added value and costs. While the ‘nationalisation’ of the intermediary organisations in terms of staff is commendable, systematic assessments should still be made as to what extent national civil society organisations may have “graduated” to a level of competence and capacity where they can become future intermediary organisations in their own right. Several and more differentiated models could also here be included – one with national civil society organisations as intermediary organisations for a selection of partner organisations and another where international civil society organisations continue as intermediary organisations based on their comparative advantages (special competence) and partner organisations’ needs.

(e) Establish a competitive civil society multi-donor trust fund

The level of effective coordination between donor support to civil society in Mozambique is low, and several parallel programmes exist. The current programme set-up could be substituted with a multi-donor fund of a type established in other countries. The fund will be led by a common secretariat and a governing board with representatives from donors and civil society, screening proposals and taking funding decisions. The fund may have several thematic priorities/sub programmes, and should support a combination of short-term (1-2 years) projects and longer-term (3-5 year) programmes. National and local level civil society organisations apply for funding based on technical, budgetary and time guidelines, with openings for entering into partnership with external/international partners. The Secretariat reviews all proposal and suggest/decline funding. The Secretariat is responsible for monitoring and
evaluation and may also provide advice and capacity strengthening to national civil society organisations.
1 Introduction and Background

1.1 AGIR II – EVALUATION OBJECT AND SCOPE

The Swedish support to civil society in Mozambique is channelled through the programme AGIR (Programa de Acções para uma Governação Inclusiva e Responsável) in which four international CSOs act as intermediary partner organisations (IPOs) with a common overall objective to support local Mozambican partner organisations (POs)\(^1\). The first phase of the programme started in 2010, the current ongoing second phase covers six years (December 2014- December 2020). The mid-term evaluation shall cover the first three years of the second phase (December 2014- December 2017).

The total budget for the six-year period is 862.5 Mill SEK. So far – for three years between 2015-2017 – a total of 402.9 Mill SEK has been disbursed to the four IPOs. Sweden has contributed 362 Mill SEK, Netherlands 52 Mill SEK and Denmark 28.7 Mill SEK. OXFAM Novib is the largest recipient (138.4 Mill SEK) followed by Diakonia (112.8 Mill SEK), OXFAM IBIS (90 Mill SEK) and finally We Effect (61.7 Mill SEK). An overview of total budgets and disbursed funds can be found in Annex 5.

The overall objective of AGIR II is: “A Mozambican society where its citizens, particularly the most marginalized groups, fully enjoy their rights to inclusion and equity, to redistribution of wealth created from the country’s patrimony, to accessible and affordable public services of good quality, to basic civil freedoms and to political representation and participation; in a peaceful and ecologically sustainable environment” (Programme Proposal AGIR II, 2015).

The indicators/indexes for this objective include national improvements in social and gender development, poverty reduction and coverage of key public services, progress in achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals (SGDs), human freedom, democracy and governance. Programme monitoring and evaluation is done on the basis of outcome and impact targets at national level.

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\(^1\) An IPO is an organisation that receives and passes on funds to CSOs which implement development cooperation together with local partners. The IPOs are provided with programme funds (not core funds) and take on the role of the donor (Operational guidelines 2014).
The long-term thematic objectives for the programme in addition to strengthening the capacity of civil society are:

1. The extractive sector in Mozambique is transparent, responsible and accountable (fiscally, economically, environmentally and socially) and contributes as a result significantly to the socio-economic development of the country.
2. Female and male parliamentarians at sub national levels playing their oversight role and demanding accountability from the executive.
3. Female and male rights - holders and CSOs are able to make evidence-based suggestions to the improvement of quality and coverage of services in health and education sector in selected provinces and local governments.
4. Freedom of expression, press freedom and diversity and rights to information guaranteed in law and respected in practice.

In addition to the overarching results framework for the AGIR II programme, there are separate frameworks for the four sub-programmes implemented by each IPO at a lower level of aggregation. The reasons for having an overarching programme are explained in the footnote below. The framework comes with quantified and verifiable indicators that seek to aggregate the long-term outcomes of sub-programmes that relate to the five main rights-based challenges. The themes or rights are:

- The right to inclusion and equity.
- The right to retribution of wealth created from the country’s patrimony.
- The right to accessible and affordable public services of good quality.
- The right to basic civil freedoms and enjoyment of the rule of law.
- The right to political representation and participation.

The overall objectives and long-term outcomes should be in line with and support the objectives and outcomes in the results frameworks for each of the four sub-programmes.

The primary target group for AGIR II is the partner organisation. AGIR II employs a human rights-based approach (HRBA). Thus, the rights-holders are the partners’ ultimate target group. The duty bearers and other actors are also important for the achievement of the outputs, outcomes and impacts the partners, and AGIR II,

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2 Prior to AGIR I the Embassy of Sweden had a range of agreements with various civil society actors in Mozambique. This involved a lot of administration and little time for dialogue/follow up/monitoring. So, the modality that AGIR represents was found appropriate to reduce transaction costs and because it was in line with supporting civil society in its own right. The first years of AGIR I presented the Embassy of Sweden with a challenge - keeping the programme coherent, e.g. making sure that the programme officers at the Embassy treated the IPOs in same ways and more importantly, making sure that the IPOs treated the POs equally. Having four separate sub-programmes without a common structure would risk losing all that work with coherence.
envisage. They are therefore also regarded as target groups – of the partner CSO’ campaigns. The target groups for AGIR II are specified in detail in each of the sub-programmes.

The strategies for achieving the objectives are to support the four IPOs Oxfam IBIS, Oxfam Novib, Diakonia and We Effect to:

(a) Provide long term core-funding and capacity development support to POs, based on these organisations’ own strategic plans.
(b) Support and facilitate linkages, mutual learning and knowledge and experience sharing between civil society organisations.
(c) Actively promote the implementation of the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action in relation to civil society (“good donorship”).

The four IPOs implement four “sub-programs” with the following thematic focus:

(a) Diakonia focuses on the right to free and fair elections, multi-party democracy, and defence of the human rights of marginalised groups such as women, children and disabled, on legal assistance, SRHR and gender-based violence.
(b) Oxfam Ibis focuses on right to access to information, support to media including investigative journalism, support and strengthening to parliaments at all levels, and support to community-based change agents specially regarding monitoring the quality and coverage of the public services.
(c) Oxfam Novib focuses on budget monitoring, expenditure tracking, social audits, tax justice, state resource allocation, SRHR, the country’s mineral resources and gender-based violence, defence of marginalised groups such as LGBT and PLWHAs.
(d) We Effect focuses on rights connected to land and natural resources, on direct impact of extractive industries on surrounding communities, rural development policies, climate change and environment.
(e) The programme currently provides support to 108 partner organisations – 59 are core partners and 49 being project partners (small projects).

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3 There are four types of funding modalities: (a) Core funding, (b) Small funds, (c) innovative and agile funds and (d) process and networking funds (Programme proposal 2015).

4 Sweden is the main and lead donor to the AGIR programme. Denmark supports one intermediary (We Effect) and the Netherlands support two intermediaries (Diakonia and Oxfam Novib).

5 Based on data from IPOs presented in the Inception Report.
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<th>IPO</th>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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Source: IPOs

1.2 EVALUATION PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES

The purpose of this mid-term evaluation is two-fold:

(g) To help the donors and their partners to assess progress in the first part of the on-going programme AGIR II (2014-2020) to learn from what works well and less well in order to inform decisions on how project implementation may be adjusted and improved. Furthermore, the purpose is to provide the donors and their partners with an input to upcoming discussions concerning the preparation of a possible new phase of the AGIR programme (from 2020).

(h) To advice on changes needed in the program guidelines and in the general functioning of the programme.

The more specific objectives are to assess the relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, sustainability and results from the first part of AGIR II (2014-2017) and to formulate recommendations on how project implementation may be adjusted to better address the needs of civil society in Mozambique. The evaluation should meet the needs of and offer recommendations to intended users, such as the management teams of the IPOs, the local POs and at the Embassies of Sweden (including Sida’s HQ), Denmark and the Netherlands.

This is a formative evaluation focusing on learning and not a summative results/impact assessment of the programme. It is too early to expect long-term impact of ongoing interventions. A major purpose is to learn from what works well and what works less well. Such learning requires analysis of implementation processes and a focus on selected strategic issues considered important for the development of the programme.

The evaluation consists of two interlinked parts: One is the design and implementation of the overall programme through the partnerships between a group

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6 Four partners phased out in 2017 are not included.
of international intermediary and national civil society organisations, and the other the four individual sub programmes. The evaluation includes both programme- and sub programme questions.

1.3 EVOLVING CONTEXT

Development and poverty

Mozambique is one of the poorest countries in the world and has been a major recipient of aid for much of the last four decades, but at the time of writing the once trustful relationship between the donor community and the government of Mozambique has come under pressure. The combination of inadequate poverty reduction in the midst of massive aid, changing aid policies in the donor countries, large scale corruption in conjunction with undisclosed government debt and continued challenges of governance, raises fundamental questions about the future direction of aid to Mozambique (CIP 2016; Tvedten and Orre 2016).

Mozambique has consistently ranked among the ten least developed countries in the world in UNDP’s Human Development Index measuring income, educational attainment and longevity (UNDP 2016). The country also scores low on women’s rights and gender equality indicators (UNDP 2017; WEF 2017). The consumption-based poverty rate has remained persistently high, albeit with considerable differences in poverty between regions (north, central, south) and between urban and rural areas (INE 2015). The changes in official rates of poverty are shown in the figure below.

**Figure 1: Consumption-based Poverty Rates, Mozambique 1996-2014**

![Graph showing consumption-based poverty rates in Mozambique from 1996 to 2014](source: INE 2015)

Recent developments have also highlighted the challenge of poor governance and corruption. Mozambique has presidential and legislative elections under a multi-party system at the national and municipal level. Provincial and district governments are
appointed by the ruling party, and there is a system of Consultative Councils at the local level.

However, Mozambique is de facto dominated by the Frelimo party and its President in full control and with limited decentralisation of power (Orre and Rønning 2017). Despite holding regular elections since 1994, elections results have been contested by the opposition, which lately led to the reigniting of the armed conflict between the Government and Renamo, thus ending the relative political stability that the country enjoyed since the end of civil war in 1992.

Economically, undisclosed foreign loans by the state-owned companies EMATUM, MAM and ProIndicus at commercial rates from European banks amounting to about US$ 2.2 billion have led to a total public debt at an estimated 116 percent of GDP by the end of 2016 (Santos, Gallardo and Filipe, 2017). Not only has this debt hampered the Mozambican economy itself but also led to a confidence crisis and halt in payments and loans from IMF as well as from bilateral donors, which contributed to plunging the country into a severe fiscal crisis. Moreover, the pressure from civil society to hold officials involved in the hidden debt accountable was a key source of tension with the government and cause of the deterioration of the political climate, especially between 2015 and 2017 (Orre and Rønning 2017, see also Martini 2012).

For the AGIR programme, the most immediate effects of the current state of Mozambique’s political economy are: i) a government that is on the defensive and responding to advocacy and other activities by civil society by narrowing their space for action and clamping down on activities that questions its legitimacy and ii) a set of austerity measures that has had immediate effects on access to and quality of public services in key sectors such as education and health that will affect the impact/results of CSO activities in such sectors.

**Development aid**

Official Development Assistance (ODA) has played an important part in the economic development of Mozambique, representing an average of around 45 per cent of the state budget/government expenditure since independence in 1975. In 2014, the country received 2,103 million US$ in foreign aid, two-thirds of which was channelled through the state. However, tax revenue as a share of GDP increased steadily from 14 to 23 per cent from 2007-2013 and net aid declined from 19 to 12 per cent between 2003 and 2015 (Orre and Rønning 2017).

The figure below reveals the relative importance of different aid-channels in Mozambique over time, revealing the dominance of bilateral/public sector aid. Aid to civil society has remained relatively stable at approximately 10 percent of total ODA to the country. Recent developments (see above) has led to a dramatic reduction in bilateral aid to the public sector albeit not yet with any significant implications for the support to civil society – with donors apparently ‘sitting on the fence’ in order to see how the governments responds to calls for more openness related to the hidden debt (Ibid).
For the period 2010-2016, the United States, Sweden, United Kingdom and Norway have been the largest bilateral contributor to the CSO sector in Mozambique. Sweden and the United Kingdom have accounted for the largest relative increase in support to civil society during the same period (see figures, for full overview see Annex 4). There are also a number of programmes and initiatives within the area of governance, participation and social accountability. AGIR (funded by Sweden, Netherlands and Denmark) is by far the largest. Others include MASC (Civil Society Support Mechanism) funded by Irish Aid, Danida, SDC and DfID; CEP (Citizens Engagement Programme) funded by Irish Aid, Danida and DfID; PAANE (Non-State Actors Support Programme) funded by EU; and Diálogo funded by DfID that was recently terminated. As we shall return to, there is limited cooperation between the programmes.
Figure 3: Main Bilateral Donors to Civil Society in Mozambique (2010-2016)

Source: OECD/DAC

Figure 4: Changes in Support to Civil Society (2010-2016)

Source: OECD/DAC – Million USD

Civil society

‘Civil society’ is usually seen to consist of networks, voluntary organisations, trade unions, independent media, political parties, student organisations and religious communities, as well as sports, arts and cultural groups. They include registered organisations, informal grassroots and social movements. The private sector, commercial actors and public agencies are not regarded as part of civil society (Sida 2016; Norad 2018).

While civil society in other continents tend to be based on social or informal grassroots movements, civil society in Africa usually lack such a basis and consists of
organisations registered for a specific purpose often with external donor support. This means that their popular base in the outset is limited. Donors in Africa have historically seen CSOs as an alternative/additional way to support development and poverty reduction in developing countries, as a ‘watchdog’ or ‘corrective’ to state-to-state bilateral support (ODI 2014).

African governments/the African Union have established a strong normative basis for civil society participation through a number of key legal instruments, policy frameworks and specific organs. Many countries have had a large civil society with ample room for engagement. However, the past few years have seen a trend across the African continent where governments see civil society more as political opponents than organisations making positive contributions to social change. A turning point in the recent restrictions on civic space was the 2009 Charities and Societies Proclamation in Ethiopia, which severely constrained the room for advocacy and saw many countries follow suit (Oxfam 2016; Carothers and Brechenmacher 2014).

In Mozambique, civil society came relatively late on stage as a major actor in development cooperation with the bulk of aid being allocated through bilateral and multilateral channels following independence in 1975. Some aid was also given to organisations such as OJM, OMM and OTM that were closely linked to the ruling party. From the early-1990s and the enactment of the 1991 Association Law the focus became broader and support was also given to independent CSOs – initially primarily for special themes/topics such as gender and human rights with Forum Mulher and the Human Rights League being among the first to be established (Kleibl and Munck 2017).

The constitution of Mozambique provides a diverse set of rights for political participation, ranging from universal suffrage (right to vote), to participation in more operational governing processes, including freedom of association and assembly. The ‘decentralization’ legal framework also provides space for community participation in planning and government oversight and accountability in the state local organs (provinces, districts and municipalities) (AGIR 2015).

As part of the development of a comprehensive “Roadmap for Engagement with Civil Society», the EU produced a Mapping Study of Civil Society Organisations in Mozambique in 2015 (EU 2016). The overview estimates that there is a total of 10,000 formally recognized CSOs in the country – i.e. double the number recorded in 2004. The main categories identified are: research and advocacy organisations; knowledge-based organisations; faith-based organisations; international CSOs (INGOs) that have been “naturalized” as Mozambican and/or are affiliated with INGOs; organisations of defence of common interests; service provision

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7 The African Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights, the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance etc.
organisations; community-based organisations; movements; platforms; forums; and thematic networks.

Mozambican civil society has often been labelled as “relatively vibrant”, but also characterised by a concentration of civil society organisations in Maputo and the other larger cities. Many are also off-shoots of the financing opportunities created by the presence of the donor community in the country and its dedication to “building civil society”. Recent studies show that the more durable organisations are found in the advocacy-oriented CSOs in the cities, while the density of CSOs in rural areas is very low (EU 2016, see also AGIR 2015).

As late as 2015, AGIR (2015:10), argued that civil society organisations in Mozambique are “favoured by a number of enabling factors: the new spaces created by the decentralization process, the participation and consultation spaces, the progressive laws on gender, natural resource management and information; and the emergence of civil society organizations that are increasingly taken seriously” (see also Virtanen 2014 and Thörn 2016 for critical reflections on civil society in Mozambique).

However, the recent political and economic crisis has had immediate and negative effects on a broad set of conditions in Mozambican society – including those targeted by the AGIR II programme. The situation at the end of 2017 is different from 2014/15 when the programme documents were prepared. In this situation, civil society in Mozambique appears to have a more important and challenging role than ever – both for political and socio-economic developments in Mozambique at large and as a channel of aid for donors who are currently reluctant to commit funds through the government (Ibid).

CASE STUDY 1

Parlamento Juvenil (Youth Parliament – Diakonia/Core Funding/4.8 mn SEK).

The Youth Parliament was created in 2008, and became part of AGIR/Diakonia in 2011, initially getting funding to develop their strategic plan (which they, as opposed to most of the CSOs in the programme, did themselves). The idea was for young people to unite forces on issues that concerned people of their own age – including citizenship and democratic education, access to information and capacity building in monitoring policies. The organisation has offices in 11 provinces, boasts 300,000 members, and claims to engage up to 3 million people in its activities mainly via social networks. The Youth Parliament has grown into a political force and work through open events (such as the ‘Thinking Mozambique’ conferences) and closed meeting spaces (with government ministries, parliamentary bench leaders etc.). With their influence and broad outreach, the Youth Parliament has become a force to count with and come under considerable pressure. They have received threats (most recently in connection with their work around the Kroll Report), and the government is currently trying to influence the choice of a new leader after the previous leader withdrew. The case is a reminder about the continued risks of civil society engagement in Mozambique – particularly related to advocacy at the national level.
2 Analytical and methodological framework

2.1 ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

As noted above, the key approach to reach the overall and sub-programme objectives of AGIR II is that of advocacy. Advocacy includes every form of research, activist journalism, persuasion, coalition-building, and public relations, as well as lobbying and political pressure. When advocacy efforts succeed, the results can be transformative. If it fails the results can be marginal, absent or counter-productive by leading to political backlash despite the significant efforts (ODI 2014).

Advocacy requires an approach to evaluation and a way of thinking about success, failure, progress and best practices that is different from projects delivering services. The relationship between the work done as part of an advocacy effort, and the results or signs of progress are often complex and non-linear. Similar resources and strategies generate very different results. Outputs are sometimes reasonably proximate and traceable to inputs, results are often only indirectly related and take several years to come to fruition. Hence, evaluation of advocacy is often an elusive craft very different from evaluation service delivery programmes (Teles and Schmitt 2011). The challenges are reflected in the design and discussed in this evaluation.

The AGIR II programme has two basic sets of objectives (and two broad theories of change) that are mutually dependent: One is capacity development among Mozambican CSOs, and the second is for the CSOs to use their competence and capacity to accomplish a set of development objectives. In addition, the IPOs have theories of change and results frameworks for each of the four sub programmes. (For a summary of the objectives and theories of change see Annex 6.)

The AGIR II programme operates with a results framework at three levels: Overall in terms of impact on society at large (“Programme Level”); for each of the four sub-programme themes (“IPO-Level”); and at the level of each individual project (“Partner Level”). The idea is that by aggregating results ‘upwards’, the programme will be able to show a hierarchy of results and come up with a ‘global impact’ taking all levels into account.8

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8 The Sida Grant Agreement States that the IPOs should “ensure coordinated and aggregated for the overarching programme as well as aggregated reporting of the partner organisation’s operations within the thematic areas of the sub-programme. Reporting results should focus on development results and learning”.

The results framework comes with quantified and objectively verifiable indicators (see Annex 5), to be measured by baseline data and targets for the mid-term and end-line. It intends to aggregate the sub-programme’s long-term outcomes into five themes that relate to the five main rights-based challenges that the AGIR II programme intends to tackle. The programme proposal states that “The overarching document of AGIR II explicitly integrates and quantifies the outcomes of the IPO´s sub programmes and makes them subject to aggregation and attribution. This practice will be used throughout the full phase of AGIR II” (Programme Proposal 2015, p.14).

The Terms of Reference state that “The evaluation object is the AGIR II programme….. Sweden has individual agreements with the four IPOs, but the programme is considered as a whole….. All the four sub programmes work towards both an individual and common results framework, where each IPO operations contribute to the overarching goal for the AGIR programme...” (See Annex 1).

Historically, the sub programmes were developed first and the overarching programme at a later stage – making it into a programme with relatively autonomous parts. To be able to assess the programme as a whole, we have combined assessments of the four individual sub-programmes with how they contribute to the overall results-framework.

In order to be able to do this within the confines of this evaluation, a sample of partner organisations from each of the four sub-programmes/IPOs were selected for closer scrutiny (see table 2 below) – including key aspects of institutional competence and capacity and how the various partnerships have created results for ultimate beneficiaries (see chapter 2.2.). The selection of POs took into consideration size, location, thematic profile and accessibility.

The approach to the evaluation of the programme has been based on the logic and explicit/implicit assumptions in the overarching proposal: AGIR should make a change in the formulation and implementation of national policies so “the most marginalised groups can enjoy their rights to inclusion and equity, to redistribution of wealth, to accessible and affordable public services of good quality, to basic civil freedoms and to political representation and participation, in a peaceful and ecologically sustainable environment”.

Three international donors (Denmark, the Netherlands and with Sida as the lead) should provide funding to a joint programme for strengthening civil society in Mozambique based on “good donorship principles” such as ownership, harmonisation and alignment, mutual accountability and results. Hence, the programme is built on a joint set of overarching principles, priorities and objectives.

Funding has been provided to four international CSOs (intermediary partner organisations-IPOs) each implementing a sub programme that contributes to the overall goal of the AGIR programme. All the IPOs have overall managerial responsibility, but there is no formal lead. However, there is an ‘Intermediaries Coordination Committee’ (ICC), and joint management systems are established for planning, M&E and communication. Procurement is based on individual IPOs internal procurement systems.
The IPOs also provide core funding support to POs\(^9\) representing a variety of Mozambican civil society organisations. Their overall role is strengthening and sustaining civil society in Mozambique – resulting in:

- Strengthened and sustainable individual partner organisations.
- Strengthened national and sub national networks.
- Strengthened civil society (a vocal more vibrant civil society holding the government accountable through active advocacy).

The IPOs should add three types of value or competencies beyond financial support:

- Professional/thematic competence – including strategic advice and technical knowledge.
- Organisational and financial competence – including governance and accountability functions; and
- Networking competence – contributing to establish/strengthen local and national networks.

Each of the IPOs thus has a broad range of responsibilities:

- Select and assess the capacity of their partners.
- Prepare a thematic sub programme with its own results framework (reflecting the overarching framework) with the selected partners.
- Provide core and other types of funding to partners.
- Prepare and implement capacity strengthening activities.
- Be involved in coaching, counselling and technical support.
- Support networking and coalition building.
- Establish M&E and reporting systems and practices (among IPOs and to the back donor).
- Provide strategic management, assure quality, provide risk management and ascertain cost effectiveness.

Based on their experience and comparative advantage, the POs will implement a rights-based policy advocacy/dialogue programme based on their own strategic plan and not an external programme. The organisations will also be involved in three generic policy development processes emerging from the overall and sub programme documents:

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\(^9\) See Annex 6: Overview of partners. The Annual Report 2016 mentioned 60 partners, but there are currently 59 core and 49 project partners. As the team understands it, one partner has been dropped.
• Empowering poor people to exercise and claiming their rights using a broad range of instruments, such as documentation and research, sharing of information and training, networking and capacity strengthening, meetings, media and campaigns.

• Pro-poor policy development either through advocacy and campaigning (from outside) or through participation in policy preparation and formulation (from the inside).

• Monitoring policy implementation focusing on measuring effects on target groups and feeding data and information back to the duty bearers.

Theory of change

In sum, the logic in the programme is based on the idea of a three-legged process of change: i) Supporting and strengthening rights-based advocacy organisations should lead to a strong and more vibrant/vocal civil society. ii) Such a civil society will be involved in policy development and/or mobilise and empower poor people, so they understand and are able to claim their rights vis-à-vis the government (duty bearers). And iii), CSOs will be involved in monitoring the extent to which policies are being implemented – holding the government accountable to their promises. Together, the assumption is, this will contribute to the achievement of the overall goal for AGIR as stated above.

The validity of such a programme logic or theory of change is not obvious. There are challenges related to explaining causal linkages between donor principles, IPO and PO roles and functions and intermediate/long-term results; there is no guarantee that stronger CSOs will contribute to more pro-poor policies and/or that the government is receptive to advice/pressure; and the role and work of CSOs is not in itself sufficient to explain policy changes and results. Hence, it will be necessary to scrutinize the programme logic and assumptions in the theories of change for the overarching programme and each IPOs.\textsuperscript{10} The major components in the evaluation are presented in the following chart.

\textsuperscript{10} The programme has two types of ToCs – one for organisational strengthening of POs and one for social change (how the organisations contribute to policy change).
In line with the ToR, the evaluation covers the first four boxes in Figure 1. Assessments of long-term outcomes and impacts are not feasible at this stage. It is too early in the programme and – there are challenges measuring the results of several of the programme objectives.

2.2 METHODS

The evaluation looked at the overall Programme (IPO) and PO capacity development level, and a limited number of PO projects/activities for closer/deeper scrutiny. We believe this is the best way to assess the processes and dynamics making a project a ‘success’ or a ‘failure’ – rather than analysing a large number of projects/activities more superficially.

Data collection

The team has used a mix of methods to support triangulation and validity in the data collection:

(a) Document review

In the Inception phase, we reviewed relevant programme/project documents as well as wider literature on civil society in Mozambique to gain insights into country contexts (see Annex 2: References).

The documentation and assessment of results has primarily been based on data and information from available reports\(^\text{11}\) and verification/validation of findings through

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\(^{11}\) Annual progress reports are available from each of the IPOs for 2015 and 2016. There is also an overall summary of programme results for 2016, but not for 2015. Progress reports for 2017 are not yet available. Hence, results and achievements are summarised for 2015 and 2016 based on progress reports from IPOs and supplemented with information collected from interviews and visits to selected implementing partners.
selected visits to and interviews with POs, beneficiaries and stakeholders. The evaluation considered also the findings, conclusions and recommendations from the two reviews from AGIR I.12

(b) Interviews and group discussions

The interviewees included representatives from i) the donors currently involved (Sweden and the Netherlands, ii) the four international NGOs (Diakonia, Oxfam Ibis, Oxfam Novib and We Effect); and iii) a selected sample of eight partner organisations – two from each of the four sub programmes. In addition, the team interviewed a sample of representative ‘duty-bearers’ from relevant government institutions as well as external observers (e.g. journalists) in order to understand their perceptions of – and response to – the type of advocacy and activities that the AGIR II programme is based on (see Annex 3: People interviewed).

In collaboration with IPOs and POs, the team sought to ensure a balanced representation of men and women for interviews and provide information on how the programme has addressed gender equality, and how this was incorporated in the results-based management adopted by the partner organisations and in the results matrix of the programme.

(c) Case studies

A sample of POs from the four international NGOs/themes were selected for interviews (Table 2)13, from which a further selection of eight case studies was done for more in-depth scrutiny about processes, dynamics and results. Fieldwork was also carried out in the province of Zambézia, representing one of the most populous and poorest areas in Mozambique.

13The criteria were: i) coverage of the main thematic areas of the sub-programmes; ii) localization and coverage; iii) size of the project; iv) time in the programme; v) type of organization; and vi) modality of funding).
### Table 2: Key informants/interviewees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IPO / PO</th>
<th>Thematic Focus</th>
<th>Geographical Location</th>
<th>Project Size</th>
<th>Time in AGIR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>We Effect - Core funding</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>UNAC</td>
<td>Strengthening of local farmers’ organizations; influence agriculture policy; access and control land and natural resources; services for production; access to market; Gender and environmental mainstreaming.</td>
<td>Maputo/National coverage</td>
<td>Large (SEK 5.5 million)</td>
<td>Since 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JA</td>
<td>Lobby and advocacy; Land rights; Community Empowerment; Industrial pollution; Environment; Water management (dames and basins); Biodiversity conservation.</td>
<td>Maputo / Maputo, Tete, Zambézia</td>
<td>Large (SEK 4 million)</td>
<td>Since 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OMR</td>
<td>Agriculture sector; extractive industry; natural resources and environment management.</td>
<td>Maputo / Research all over the country</td>
<td>Midium (SEK1.8 million)</td>
<td>Since 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>We Effect - Small funds</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPCM</td>
<td>Institutional capacity development of UPCM</td>
<td>Maputo/District of Marracuene</td>
<td>Small (SEK 213.000)</td>
<td>1 year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NADEC</td>
<td>Gestão dos Recursos Naturais no Distrito da Manhiça</td>
<td>Maputo/District of Manhiça</td>
<td>Small (SEK 256.000)</td>
<td>1 year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Oxfam/Ibis – Core funding</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>CAICC</td>
<td>ICTs in a Governance Perspective, work with local and community radios</td>
<td>Maputo/National coverage</td>
<td>Large (SEK 4.6 million)</td>
<td>Since 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IESE</td>
<td>Transparency and Duty Bearers Accountability</td>
<td>Maputo/National coverage</td>
<td>Large (SEK 3.8 million)</td>
<td>Since 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Oxfam/Ibis - Local level core funding</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>KUKUMBI</td>
<td>Transparency and Duty Bearers Accountability</td>
<td>Zambezia province/Zambezia and Tete</td>
<td>Midium (SEK 4.2 million)</td>
<td>Since 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Oxfam/Ibis - Small funds</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>MozApp Live</td>
<td>Assessment of the degree of knowledge and application of the right to information</td>
<td>Maputo/National coverage</td>
<td>Small (SEK 416,100)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teatro Gungu</td>
<td>Disclosure of the advantages of the Right to Information Law</td>
<td>Maputo/National coverage</td>
<td>SEK 485,3 thousand</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Oxfam Novib Core funding</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>WLSA</td>
<td>Monitoring of basic services, Gender &amp; SRHR and Human rights for marginalized groups.</td>
<td>Maputo/National coverage</td>
<td>Large size (Euros 940,563)</td>
<td>Since 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIP</td>
<td>Monitoring of basic services</td>
<td>Maputo/National</td>
<td>Large size</td>
<td>Since</td>
</tr>
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<td>Project Name</td>
<td>Funding Agency</td>
<td>Project Description</td>
<td>Sector</td>
<td>Coverage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>NWETI</td>
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<td>Monitoring of basic services, Gender &amp; SRHR and Human rights for marginalized groups, budget monitoring</td>
<td>Basic services, Gender &amp; SRHR</td>
<td>Maputo / National coverage</td>
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<td>AMME</td>
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<td>Gender &amp; SRHR and Human rights for marginalized groups.</td>
<td>Gender &amp; SRHR</td>
<td>Zambezia Province/ Provincial coverage</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAFEZA</td>
<td></td>
<td>Gender &amp; SRHR and Human rights for marginalized groups.</td>
<td>Gender &amp; SRHR</td>
<td>Zambezia Province/ Provincial coverage</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kwukuka JDA</td>
<td>Oxfam Novib</td>
<td>Extractive Industry</td>
<td>Extractive Industry</td>
<td>Maputo/National Coverage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANAMM</td>
<td></td>
<td>Good Governance</td>
<td>Governance</td>
<td>Maputo/National Coverage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FORCOM</td>
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<td>Governance and human rights, community radios</td>
<td>Governance</td>
<td>Maputo/ Maputo, Inhambane, Nampula, Niassa, Zambezia and Sofala</td>
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<tr>
<td>Parliament Juvenil</td>
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<td>Governance and Democracy (Youth participation)</td>
<td>Governance</td>
<td>Maputo/Maputo, Gaza, Inhambane, Manica, Sofala, Niassa, Cabo Delgado</td>
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<td>CESC</td>
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<td>Human rights: education and health</td>
<td>Human rights</td>
<td>Maputo/ Maputo, Gaza, Zambezia, Cabo Delgado, Niassa</td>
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<tr>
<td>NANA</td>
<td></td>
<td>Health services (SRHR) and HIV/AIDS, education and governance.</td>
<td>Health services</td>
<td>Zambézia Province (Mocuba)/ Districts of Mocuba, Lugela, Mugeba</td>
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<td>Progresso</td>
<td></td>
<td>Capacity building</td>
<td>Capacity</td>
<td>Maputo/ Cabo Delgado, Niassa, Maputo</td>
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<tr>
<td>OREC</td>
<td></td>
<td>Governance and Human rights</td>
<td>Governance</td>
<td>Maputo/ Maputo, Gaza, Inhambane</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2.3 LIMITATIONS

Time for collecting data and information in Mozambique was limited. All four IPOs were interviewed, but only a small sample of their partners (POs). It is difficult to generalise findings and conclusions based on such a sample, but an in-depth analysis of a limited number of partner organisations was found to be most useful for the objectives of a mid-term evaluation.

To address the challenges related to the limited time available for the field work, the team prepared all meetings with key informants in advance preceded by a thorough reading of the available reports providing an understanding of programme performance. This allowed the team to focus on those interviewees that were key to fill the information gaps, to triangulate the information that was gathered and to provide insights for analysis that could not be captured through the reading of the reports and related documents.

It is an inherent problem that the assessment of wider impact not only requires data on inputs and outputs, but also information on outcomes and the relationship between these (see also chapter on Lessons learnt). Insufficient and lack of quality data makes it often difficult to judge whether the interventions had resulted in attainment of core organisational and programmatic goals – even if it is easier to assess results in the area of capacity strengthening than thematic results – as exemplified in the Annual Reports. In trying to assess the contribution of interventions from partner organisations to wider and long-term development outcomes, attribution problems abound and escalate, as the number of factors that influence development outcomes increases, and it becomes more and more difficult to trace the causal relationship between the CSO contribution and the development outcomes.14

14 The current monitoring system as reflected in the overarching annual reports is base don the assumption that – if and when the performance of the majority of the selected output and outcome indicators improve – the successful macro/aggregated achievements are proven.
3 Findings

3.1 RELEVANCE

**DEFINITION**

The extent to which the objectives of a development intervention are consistent with beneficiaries’ requirements, country needs, global priorities and partners’ and donors’ policies (Sida 2007).

**KEY FINDINGS**

- AGIR II seeks to address themes/issues that are highly relevant for Mozambique’s development challenges and needs.
- AGIR II is a large and risk-prone programme in a context of a fragile government and civil society – for which Sweden should be commended.
- AGIR II is relevant for expressed government policies in the programme’s focus areas, but its advocacy components are under attack with the current political climate.
- AGIR II is well in line with Sida based priorities of a right-based approach to development, but its size and complexity poses challenges in terms of implementation and results.
- The Programme is meant to challenge, monitor and evaluate policies and activities of a government that is increasingly weak and unreceptive particularly at local/district level.
- The advocacy, rights and accountability approach is challenging for the actors involved, and is generally more relevant/easier to implement in combination with tangible interventions of service delivery.
- Poverty reduction and gender equality as cross-cutting issues are not systematically followed up by the IPOs and POs, but individual partners/projects do important work in these areas.

**Country needs.** The AGIR programme seeks to address inclusion and gender equity, redistribution of wealth, accessible and affordable public services of good quality, basic civil freedoms and political representation and participation, in a peaceful and ecologically sustainable environment. The themes mirror key challenges in Mozambican society as these were outlined above and are hence relevant for country needs. Studies from Mozambique show that the right to employment/livelihood comes out highest on the list of priorities for the population at large (Tarp and Jones 2013). The only Programme components/POs that directly addresses this issue employment and workers’ rights are the farmer’s union (UNAC)
and professional networks (such as Mozambican Association of Women Legal Professionals, AMMC).

**Programme relevance.** Mozambique is one of the poorest countries in the world with a relatively weak and dependent civil society (see above), and with a government that in the outset limits the space for civil society advocacy and hence the options for reaching programme goals. The relevance of the support lies in the importance of having alternative voices and interventions in order to hold a government accountable that i) does not deliver on the basic rights that the programme focuses on and ii) has put itself in a position where direct bilateral support has become less relevant. In fact, Sweden, the Netherlands and Denmark should be commended for taking the risks that such a programme entails.

**Government policies.** The programme and its objectives are also in line with government policies, as these are expressed in key documents for political participation, poverty reduction, gender equality etc. However, as seen from the government the relevance of the programme varies with the type and level of programme interventions. Advocacy at the central level and in areas that challenge central government policies is not considered relevant and often negatively sanctioned – and increasingly so after the onset of the hidden debt crisis. POs such as CIP and the Youth Parliament have seen their space shrink in terms of basic political participation and freedom of expression.

At the lower end of state administration, the ongoing crisis and its accompanying austerity measures have weakened the local government at the levels of Administrative Posts, Districts and to some extent also Provinces. This means that the government entities the Programme and its POs are to hold accountable through their advocacy are hardly able to respond. At the same time, the relationship between the Programme/POs and government is much more direct and personal and less ‘ideological’ at this level with more space for cooperation. In one case, good work was done by a PO in relation to the right to accessible and affordable public services – but towards government institutions without means to deliver.

As seen from the government, the most relevant components of the programme are those that either combines advocacy with tangible interventions or deliver services directly to government institutions. Among the former are mainly POs working on the district/local level such as NANA and NWETI. Among the latter is direct support from IPOs to government programmes, as is the case of Oxfam IBIS to the Ministry of State Administration and Public Service and its Centre of Documentation of Mozambique in the implementation of the Right to Information law. In interviews with relevant staff, it was acknowledged that the promotion of the Law of Rights to Information would not have been possible without the professional and economic support from Ibis. And meetings between stakeholders related to resettlements following from extractive industry activities (the government, the industry, civil society and the populations affected) would not have taken place without support from [We Effect]. While such direct support is useful, it also raises issues of the independence and legitimacy of CSOs.
**Sida priorities.** AGIR is in line with Sida-based priorities for development cooperation and a ‘rights-based approach’ to development as these are expressed in key documents. It is also in line with the Swedish strategy for development cooperation with Mozambique. The ‘rights-based approach’ to development is complex, and the issue of ‘human rights’ does not figure prominently neither in PO reports nor in our interviews with IPOs/POs. One reason for this may be the possible contradiction between this and the Result Based Management approach – with the former being related to intangible issues of power and participation and the latter to tangible indicators and outputs. This is discussed further in chapter 3.3.

**Ownership, harmonisation, results orientation and accountability.** The primary ownership of the AGIR programme rests with the Swedish Embassy/Sida, with Netherlands playing a minor role (in relation to Oxfam/Novib and Diakonia) and Denmark, having supported We Effect, being on the way out. The Netherlands has recently committed to fund the last phase of the AGIR II programme, and there is apparently no active attempts to find a substitute for Denmark as co-founder. Both IPOs and POs primarily see “AGIR” as primarily a Swedish programme, and Sweden is adamant that AGIR is linked to Swedish aid – except for issues of particular controversy.

At the same time, each IPO has a long history in Mozambique, has largely developed their own individual sub-programme, and has a strong sense of ownership to their particular AGIR component. Interestingly, the IPOs are not fully ‘international’ as they are largely staffed with Mozambican personnel, with all four having Mozambican national coordinators of the AGIR supported activities. This reflects a combination of Mozambican employment policies and the high capacity of many Mozambicans with a long history in civil society, but the issue of possible impartiality in a close-knit civil society sector has also been raised.

The extent to which each individual PO claim and perceive ownership of their programme component vary with their size, competence and capacity: The larger/stronger POs (for example, CIP, N’Weti) own their projects, and see the IPO more as a facilitator of networking and source of funding for strategic organisational strengthening than a professional counterpart that can support them with capacities they lack. The smaller/weaker POs seem, as the team sees it, overwhelmed by administrative burdens/requirements and economic dependence on AGIR that weaken their sense of ownership. The sense of ownership is affected by what seems to be a general system of involving external consultants in the development of the Strategic Plan that is the basis for their engagement in AGIR. Alternatively, a Strategic Plan is a way to consolidate an organisation and prove that it is in control of planned activities.

IPOs (and hence POs) have experienced a change from AGIR I to AGIR II in the form of a gradual move from a relatively strict adherence to Paris Declaration principles (in particular ownership and core funding) to a stronger focus on capturing results, accountability and donor visibility (more strict requirements). There is an increased tension between the principle of ownership (core funding) on the one hand and the overall programme objectives and comprehensive result frameworks on the
other (“Core funding with strings attached”) – which limits the de facto freedom to choose.

**Theories of change.** There are multiple and elaborate theories of change for the overarching programme – and some of them are difficult to sort out (see Annex 5). Each IPO is expected to account for the linkages between inputs, activities, outputs, outcomes and impacts on the basis of reports/data received from the individual partner organisations (POs). The challenges with the ToCs and their relevance for the AGIR programme are:

- They are based on assumptions of causal linkages between activities and outcomes/impact that are not all equally valid/possible to verify due to changes in the political/economic context and changes in the government/CSO relationships and opportunities/likelihood of successful advocacy.
- The ToCs are broad – illustrating complexity and interconnectedness, but providing less practical/manageable guidance on what will be effective advocacy strategies and lead to expected results.
- They represent significant challenges in terms of the monitoring/verification of causal links (attribution and contribution) between actual interventions (advocacy and activities) and output/outcome indicators particularly at higher levels of aggregation.

**Concentration vs. diversification.** To reach the overarching goals of AGIR of strengthening civil society as well as reaching specific development objectives (see above), the programme has opted for a strategy of diversification rather than concentration.\(^\text{15}\) It includes four international IPOs, and a total of 59 core partners and 49 project partners. After having been criticised for having a strong focus on the capital city Maputo (Holmberg et al. 2014), the programme decentralised significantly with the transition from AGIR I to AGIR II at the same time as it increased the number of partner organisations from 56 to 108.

There has also been a diversification in terms of the assumed quality and direct relevance of POs for goal attainment: While most of the POs involved in AGIR I were – or became – well established with capacity and competence to implement programme activities, AGIR II has involved a larger number of smaller emerging CSOs with need for capacity development. The support is given in the form of two main modalities: core funding and project funding. 59 of the 108 POs receive ‘core funding’ with a high degree of freedom in terms of interventions and alignment with 15The Swedish Embassy has commented that the programme, by having support to ‘a broad, strong and pluralistic civil society’ as a main objective, deliberately has aimed at supporting many organisations of different types and capacities working in many different fields – and that this is “what makes AGIR unique".\hfill
AGIR principles, while 49 of the POs receive smaller project funds based on applications for specific projects (see Table 1).

The relevance of such an approach for the goal of strengthening/broadening civil society in Mozambique is considerable. However, the relevance for attaining the defined objectives of AGIR is more questionable. Many partner organisations have problems delivering beyond building their own organisation due to limited capacity, limited access to the government institutions they are to affect and/or limited staff for project implementation.

**Advocacy vs. activities.** Another key aspect of the AGIR approach is the emphasis on advocacy at the partial expense of tangible interventions/activities. AGIR is basically seen to be about advocacy, but advocacy takes many forms. There is a significant variation between advocacy organisations and they are often divided between:

- Controversial CSOs supporting confrontational advocacy (vis-à-vis the government) through activism/demonstrations focusing on politically sensitive issues. Usually national in scope.
- More low-profile collaborative CSOs providing the government with advice and findings from evidence-based research, monitoring policy implementation and lobbying for change on less sensitive/controversial issues. Usually national and regional.
- CSOs combining advocacy with service delivery.

The focus on advocacy is relevant for reaching the overall and long-term objectives of putting CSOs and right-holders in a position to hold central government and the private sector accountable. It is also relevant for the objective of freedom of expression, press freedom and diversity. However, the relevance of advocacy for improvement of the quality of social services in education and health at provincial and local government level is less self-evident because major decisions on resource allocations are taken at higher levels. The challenges in these sectors would probably be most effectively met through a combination of advocacy and concrete interventions to ‘lead by example’ in schools and health institutions.

**Cross-cutting issues.** Poverty reduction and gender equality as cross-cutting issues are not systematically followed up by the IPOs and POs in the sense of ‘mainstreaming’ them into all aspects of the programme and project development cycles. Except for general statements in introductory chapters on context, there are

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16 As per the guidelines (2014), the key partner organisations in AGIR should be selected on the basis that they primarily work with advocacy/policy dialogue. As the guidelines state, the AGIR donors are aware of the benefits of also combining with service delivery and the AGIR donors do not prohibit this. Still, focus is on organisations that primarily work with advocacy because: such organisations have more limited opportunities to obtain support from public funds, are more challenged by the government side, and are hence in need of both financial and moral support from external donors.
few if any examples of systematic references to Mozambique’s poverty reduction strategies and relevant/updated data on the distribution of poverty in different parts of the country where AGIR is active. However, there are examples of individual PO projects that directly address issues of poverty/social protection (such as AMME in Zambézia).

Gender is not mainstreamed, and lack of gender mainstreaming is one of the most common critical remarks given to POs by the IPOs – who tend to be more aware of Swedish/donor emphasis on this issue. Gender equality is also reported as being among the most difficult issues to advocate for in project implementation at the local level. Having said this, there are a number of POs explicitly working on issues of gender equality and women’s rights and some of them are among the strongest POs in Mozambique (Fórum Mulher, WLSA).

**CASE STUDY 2**

**NAFEZA** (Núcleo das Associações Femininas da Zambézia – OxfamNovib/Core Funding/1.9 Mill. SEK) was established in 1997 and joined AGIR in the second phase. It is located in the provincial capital Quelimane and consists of 63 members associations working on issues of gender equality, gender based violence and SRHR. It is considered a strong women’s association network with a focus on Quelimane as well as districts – albeit with an ambivalent distinction between its role as coordinator of other (smaller) CBOs and implementation of own activities. NAFEZA has developed a strong system of **monitoring and evaluation** of its activities – but which also exemplifies some of the challenges in AGIR’s approach to these issues. At the local level of implementation in bairros and villages, there is a minute written recording of everything done by activators – against a wealth of indicators including the number of meetings and names of participants – as well as elaborate recording of case-studies. These data are carefully entered into computers by the NAFEZA office in Quelimane. However, in transforming these data into annual- and other reports to Oxfam/Novib and ultimately AGIR, much of this is difficult to use in a constructive way: Figures on meetings/number of participants do not really say much about actual outcomes, and there is limited room in the reporting on impact through case-studies and other qualitative data.

**CASE STUDY 3**

**Various small-scale partners.** Among the recipients of small grants/innovative/agile funds, the team found a very mixed picture. We met with organizations that due to delays in the approval of funding eventually were forced to reduce the timing and scope of their projects (e.g. Kuwuka); some that had worked with the IPO to adjust the project to the programme objectives (e.g. Gungu/Oxfam Ibis); and a small grant beneficiary (Solidariedade/Diakonia) that considered the funding essential to reassess its strategic plan, hold a general assembly that was long overdue, and allow it to mobilize additional funds. Another organization (NADEC/We Effect), considered the support vital for creating conditions for the communities where they worked to better manage their resources. A relatively new
organization used small grants twice to restructure itself and implement activities to reach out to its actual and potential membership base (UPCM/We Effect). Some of these organisations have applied for core funding without getting it, some are considering applying for core funding in the next window of opportunity – and all expressed preference for core funding as it is seen as potentially larger and with more flexible.

3.2 EFFICIENCY

DEFINITION

“A measure of how economically resources/inputs (funds, expertise, time, etc.) are converted to results” (Sida 2007).

KEY FINDINGS

- International IPOs were considered the only organisations capable to manage such a large programme – financially and programmatically. The preferred solution comes with a (relatively) high-cost for the programme at 37 Mill SEK or 25% of total budget in 2016, and includes a significant capacity strengthening component, joint services and administration.
- There has been no analysis as to what extent there are Mozambican CSOs that have ‘matured’ sufficiently during AGIR II to take on the role as intermediaries in the programme.
- IPOs claim that they spend increasingly more time managing funds - meeting bureaucratic requirements from the donors pertaining to planning/monitoring and reporting of AGIR as compared to strategic dialogue with partners, and creating and maintaining relationships up, down and across the programme.
- There were some (identified in the report), but few serious complaints from partner organisations interviewed about financial procedures in the programme.
- The overall budget execution for core partners was 91% in 2016, while for smaller grants for agile and innovative funds it was low with 31% and 13% respectively.
- IPOs relations with the Swedish Embassy seem to be smooth, but IPOs were concerned with frequent change of staff responsible for AGIR and increasing demands in terms of results reporting.
- The functioning of the international coordinating committee (ICC) has been strengthened, but is still not a strong and effective mechanism for coordination and strategic management of the programme.
- With AGIR II a deliberate effort was made to decentralise selection of partners and include also provincial and district based CSOs. The largest share of the budget is still channelled to national Maputo based CSOs (in 2016 Novib 71%, We Effect 58%, Ibis 53% and Diakonia 88%).
- There are several parallel donor funded programmes and initiatives in Mozambique within the area of governance, participation, social accountability. There is no effective donor coordination mechanism in place.
The questions in this section are about efficiency – qualitative and quantitative outputs in relation to inputs - or to what extent the AGIR programme uses the most cost-effective solutions to achieve the desired results. The section addresses various aspects of efficiency from organisational arrangements to financial systems. However, it is inherently difficult to assess the cost-efficiency of advocacy work and capacity strengthening interventions as such. There are also limitations in the available data that make systematic assessment of cost efficiency difficult.

What is done is to assess selected aspects of efficiency by judging if the solutions and investments appear reasonable compared to results.

Allocation of resources. The following pattern appears in the allocation of AGIR resources in 2016 to different components in the budget (Annual Report 2016. For full budget costs for the period under evaluation see Annex 4):

- 25% or 37 Mill SEK covers IPO activities, such as IPO lead interventions, joint programme costs, M&E, programme management incl. staff costs, support costs and overhead.
- 75% of all funds are transferred to POs.

**Table 3: Allocation of resources 2016 (in Mill SEK)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Budget items</th>
<th>Total 2016</th>
<th>% budget execution</th>
<th>% of grand total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Funds transferred to partners</td>
<td>116,480,506</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPO lead baselines, evaluations and studies</td>
<td>5,565,549</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint costs (studies, specialists, seminars)</td>
<td>1,521,679</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitoring and evaluation</td>
<td>2,932,064</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programme management and staff costs</td>
<td>13,077,252</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programme support costs</td>
<td>3,379,232</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7% IPO overhead</td>
<td>10,806,920</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Grand total</strong></td>
<td><strong>153,763,202</strong></td>
<td><strong>83</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Annual report 2016

Figures and percentages for each individual IPO largely follow the same pattern of resource allocations. For We Effect, for example, 76% was transferred to partners and 24% is spent on IPO activities in 2016.

International CSOs as intermediaries. As discussed above, international CSOs based in Mozambique were selected as intermediary organisations for both AGIR I and II – justified by weak capacity among local Mozambican organisations and fear

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of corruption if they should take on such a role. The international IPOs were considered the only organisations capable to manage such a large programme – financially and programmatically. The preferred solution comes with a (relatively) high-cost for the programme at 37 Mill SEK or 25% of total budget in 2016 even if a significant capacity strengthening component and shared services are included in addition to administrative costs.

There is no systematic assessment of alternative models in documents available to the evaluation team. There is also no analysis of to what extent there are Mozambican CSOs that have ‘matured’ sufficiently to take on the role as intermediaries in the event that all or some of the international organisations should be phased out from the programme. Among our interviewees opinions differed, but one PO emphatically stated that donors have said that national CSOs are unable to take on such a role for decades and that it is now high time and a question of ‘managing risks’.

Planning and reporting absorbs increasing time and resources. IPOs report that they spend increasingly more time managing funds – meeting bureaucratic requirements pertaining to planning/monitoring and reporting of AGIR as compared to strategic dialogue with partners, and creating and maintaining relationships up, down and across the programme. The time available for proactive engagement from the IPOs and the quantity and quality of interactions and relationships in and between organisations seems to suffer.

“Much more time are used to administration than liaising with the partners. The accountability systems are becoming tighter and consuming more time” (IPO informant).

This trend has also implications for the type and level of added value of the intermediary IPO level for partner organisations for their core tasks (see Chapter 1.1), as will be discussed in the section on effectiveness.

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18 There was an assessment of the systems of the four IPOs made by More Stephens in the beginning of AGIR I. Again, in the end of AGIR I (2014) an update was carried out as to ensure that the four IPOs still had the capacity to manage those funds.

19 The Operational Guidelines (2014) state that ‘In 2008, the Embassy of Sweden took the informed decision to adopt a partnership approach rather than a traditional procurement approach when selecting the intermediary organisations for implementation of the programme…. The option of national intermediaries was considered, but the level of capacity to e.g. be able to provide capacity development support in financial management or to be able to handle the extensive transfer of funds down funding chains would be insufficient for a civil society strengthening programme. Additionally, it was not in the interest of the Embassy of Sweden to turn a national organisation with its own development cooperation operations into a funding mechanism and, thereby distracting its attention away from its core business’.

20 The AGIR I evaluation (2013) requested the programme to consider and explore working with national CSOs as intermediaries. Several of the IPOs have also become dependent on AGIR for their continued operational existence in Mozambique.

21 The Swedish Embassy commented that this is what the IPOs see. What donors see is four IPOs selected (and provided a lot of funds) to be able to ensure a certain level of quality in their own work and in their quality assurance of others work (e.g. POS, auditors) that, unfortunately, often is not ensured. The requirements are not too cumbersome, but when they are not done first time processes of QA become long and IPOs see it as “bureaucracy”.

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**Delay in funding.** There were some, but few serious, complaints about financial procedures. Funding was agreed for a three-year period. Transfer of funds to POs depends on the approval of report and audits. In general, funds were released on time, but there were also delays when IPOs received payments in October (for the second instalment) followed by delays in payments to POs. The audit companies were also said to underperform, creating further delays in payments to the POs.

“There are delays in financial disbursement because of the process. The first tranche comes only in April. These delays have negative implications for the programme implementation. What are the solutions: (i) transfer part of the funds while the plan is being discussed; (ii) the Embassy should respect deadlines defined in the contract, sometimes the IPO delays sending the report, but sometimes the embassy delays the analysis too” (PO informant).

“The timeline related to financial reporting must be improved. As it now functions, the (I)POs are without money/cannot implement activities for the period January to March” (PO informant).

“When the donors approve the report and the plan, they transfer the fund to the headquarters account and from there directly to the partners. The rest of the funds come to Mozambique for other costs. This process takes some time. The communication is good, but needs to be improved” (IPO informant).

The principle of core funding was highly appreciated by partner organisations, and in their view separated AGIR from all other funding they received. In some cases, however, there were uncertainties and dilemmas related to its operationalisation. POs have for instance only been allowed to use a certain percentage on administration (usually defined as 30% for salaries and administrative costs and up to 15% for capacity development – leaving 55% to PO activities) with all staff costs defined as administrative costs. However, in some cases – such as with research institutions – staff were also engaged in programme implementation making the POs argue that in such cases personnel costs should not be counted as administrative overhead.

**Budget execution and funding modalities.** The overall budget execution for core partners was 91% in 2016, while for smaller grants for agile and innovative funds it was low with 31% and 13% respectively (Annual Report 2016). The reason was said to be PO problems in applying their proposals to the latter two mechanisms. Also, the IPOs found the rules cumbersome and time consuming, they have received few proposals, and several of them did not meet the defined criteria and standards. It may
also be part of the picture that the IPOs have not been sufficiently active in searching for and encouraging submission of proposals. 22

“The small funds mechanism needs to be simplified – too cumbersome/time consuming” (IPO informant).

“Small funds mechanism should be rethought, because it takes a lot of time with those organisations without systems. It could be reformulated to be more quality than quantity. May be more simplified. Diversifying funds for a lot of organisations does not necessarily work and there is risk for corruption (IPO informant).

From the POs perspective, the application process is long with insufficient time being left for the implementation of the projects. In the case of the small grants, most of the POs had to reduce the implementation time to less than one-year, the time allowed for this modality of funding. In some cases, projects had to be shortened to less than six months, because the funds were could not be transferred to the subsequent year.

**Quality assurance and risk management.** The AGIR programme has a common risk matrix applicable for all IPOs. The risk management process was modified early 2017 to enhance the harmonisation efforts. Non-thematic risks are handled within the mutual AGIR programme risk matrix and thematic risks within sub-programmes.

The risk matrix contains six different areas, including institutional capacity of POs, financial risks, cross-cutting issues, dependency on AGIR and political context. The IPOs have conducted training and provided technical assistance in these areas. The risk- and quality assurance also includes assessment of technical and management aspects (financial accountability/reporting). The evaluation was not able to assess the effectiveness of the system in any detail. There were examples of IPOs cancelling contracts with POs due to weak capacity/mismanagement – reflecting solid management of financial and administrative risks by IPOs. The external political risks are much more difficult to handle.

In general, there were few complaints about the quality assurance system except that it is time-consuming. However, one PO argued for the need to be realistic in quality expectations. The PO, working with community radios, developed its own ‘community-based’ quality standard criteria as it felt there was a trend to judge community radios’ contents according to national radio standards.

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22 The Swedish embassy commented that there had been a difference between how the AGIR donors wanted the "small funds" to be handled and how the IPOs chose to handle this. The AGIR donors wanted the small funds to be a funding window open the whole year around. This would mean that the IPOs would have to handle a proposal whenever it was submitted. The IPOs chose to do Call for Proposals counteracting the idea of having a funding window open for small good proposals. It also meant that a lot of proposals would be submitted and very administratively heavy for the IPOs to handle.
**Coordination and communication systems.** IPOs relations with the Swedish Embassy – the main donor seem to be smooth according to feedback from IPOs, but IPOs were concerned with frequent change of staff responsible for AGIR at the Embassy and increasing demands in terms of results reporting. The Embassy has more recently encouraged higher visibility of AGIR as a programme (as compared to individual IPOs) to avoid that AGIR is seen only as Diakonia, Oxfam Novib and Ibis and We Effect.

“The relation with the Embassy has been smooth. There was a problem in 2015 with the audit that delayed the disbursement. There is a system being developed and their current financial management system is based on an excel spreadsheet and this has raised problems with the auditors” (IPO informant).

“Time dedicated to administration has increased. The demands from the Embassy has increased the last two to three years” (IPO informant).

“The guidelines for reporting should be reassessed to become more realistic/ manageable. A common feedback from the Embassy is: You are not responding to the guidelines” (PO informant).

“There has been high turnover among AGIR programme officers in the embassy over the last two years, impacting on continuity and predictability. There needs to be quicker feedback on annual/financial reports” (IPO informant).

“Stability in the communication at the Embassy, even if there is a change of staff. Four coordinators at the Embassy so far (IPO informant).

“The Embassy needs to visit more POs and show more interest” (PO informant).

The programme is coordinated between the IPOs through the Intermediaries Coordination Committee (ICC) and has also several technical working groups. The AGIR I evaluation (Sida Evaluation 2013) found that AGIR was conceived as a programme, but operationalised as four sub programmes. Sub programme cohesion/coordination was found higher than programme cohesion/coordination, and there were several barriers to coordination due to different procedures and policies among the intermediaries.

The ICC currently seems to be functioning better, but based on selected interviews still not a strong and effective mechanism for coordination and strategic management of the programme. There have been shared and joint activities such as development of
the overarching objectives and results frameworks, M&E\textsuperscript{23} and communication advisers, evaluations and studies, annual meetings, thematic workshops/seminars and training, etc.

The AGIR I evaluation also found that networking within the programme (i.e. between the IPOs as well as between POs) was generally weak, although some organisations had created networks and linkages and annual meetings, ‘platforms’ etc. constitute meeting points. There were relatively strong vertical networks within each sub programme, while weaker horizontal networks between sub programmes. There have been changes and improvements also in this regard, but networking between IPOs still seems to be inhibited by different organisational/thematic focuses and a certain degree of competition between them for funding and attention. For POs, networking is also inhibited by funding and organisational capacity.

“There should be more sharing of activities among the POs to ensure that they understand each other’s plans” (PO informant).

Centralisation/decentralisation of partners and resources. In its initial phase, AGIR I prioritised the selection of national Maputo based partner organisations with provincial/district outreach, based on the assumption that CSOs in the capital had higher capacity combined with an efficient and effective outreach to all parts of the country. The evaluation (2014) concluded also that “geographically, AGIR covers all provinces through direct partners and AGIR CSO branches. While the vast majority of direct AGIR partners are central level organisations, local direct strategic partners have been recruited in the central and northern parts of the country....”

With AGIR II a deliberate effort was made to decentralise selection of partners and include also provincial and district based CSOs. It is difficult to get an exact picture of the current situation, but the list of partners provided by the IPOs show that 37 of the POs HQs are located outside Maputo while the majority (58) are Maputo based. Almost all the Maputo based organisations have programmes in provinces and districts.

\textsuperscript{23}The M&E Adviser was recruited in 2016, but left due to underperformance.
### Table 4: Location of HQ for partner organisations for IPOs (core and small fund partners)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>HQ in Maputo</th>
<th>Provincial HQ</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Oxfam Novib</strong></td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Oxfam Ibis</strong></td>
<td>19</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>We Effect</strong></td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Diakonia</strong></td>
<td>17</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>58</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: IPOs – total number should be 108 so the list is incomplete.

Data were also collected from the four IPOs about the level of centralisation/decentralisation of funds. The table below contains figures on three variables; i.e. i) % of budget for POs allocated to CSOs located in Maputo, ii) % of the budget transferred to provincial level CSOs, and iii) % of the budget allocated to national/Maputo based CSOs transferred to partners/programmes in provinces.

### Table 5: Transfer of financial resources transferred to partners 2015-2017 (Percent)\(^{24}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisations</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>2017</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Oxfam Novib</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of budget to Maputo CSOs</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of budget to CSOs in provinces</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of budget to Maputo CSOs transferred to provinces</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>We Effect</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of budget to Maputo CSOs</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of budget to CSOs in provinces</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of budget to Maputo CSOs transferred to provinces</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Oxfam Ibis</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of budget to Maputo CSOs</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of budget to CSOs in provinces</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of budget to Maputo CSOs transferred to provinces</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Diakonia</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of budget to Maputo CSOs</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of budget to CSOs in provinces</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of budget to Maputo CSOs transferred to provinces</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{24}\) Data for Oxfam Ibis and Diakonia for 2015 and 2017 not available.
The largest share of the budget is still channelled to national Maputo based CSOs (in 2016 Novib 71%, We Effect 58%, Ibis 53% and Diakonia 88%). The shares of the budget to provincial level CSOs were consequently lower (Novib 29%, We Effect 42%, Ibis 37% and Diakonia 12%). However, the Maputo based CSOs had partners and programmes in several provinces and transferred some of its resources to them (Novib 14%, We Effect 3%, Ibis 87% and Diakonia 7%).

**Donors and donor funding of civil society.** AGIR started with Sweden as the first donor, followed by the Netherlands and then Denmark with Sweden as the main and lead donor (some other donors, like Norway, have been approached but declined participation). As such, AGIR was a multi-donor fund with the potential to attract more donors. For AGIR II, all the three donors were on-board from the beginning, but it was clear that Denmark would fund for only three years, since they were closing down their Embassy in Mozambique. The Netherlands will continue funding AGIR for the next two years.

There are several donor funded programmes and initiatives in Mozambique within the area of governance, participation, social accountability (see table). A donor group connected to the EU Road Map for civil society meets for sharing information, but there is no active donor coordination mechanism in place. Each donor works to a large extent independently. It may be an advantage for national/local CSOs to access money from several donors working in parallel and often with the same CSOs, but a disadvantage if it leads to double/parallel funding (a few examples were found) without transparent sharing of information. Multi-donor funding translates also into several different reporting requirements (not in tune with the principles of alignment and harmonisation). It is noteworthy that the concept of a multi-donor civil society fund was not considered feasible in Mozambique by several of the donors interviewed.

**Table 6: Donor funded civil society governance programmes**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National organisations</th>
<th>Programme</th>
<th>Where</th>
<th>Donor(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MASC Foundation</td>
<td>Civil Society Support Mechanism</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>Irish Aid, SDC, DFID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEP</td>
<td>Cidadania e Participação/Citizens Engagement Programme</td>
<td>Gaza, Manica, Nampula, Zambezia</td>
<td>Danida, Irish Aid, DFID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N’weti/CESC/CIP</td>
<td>Citizens Demand for a Better Public Health Service Delivery</td>
<td>Cabo Delgado, Niassa</td>
<td>Swiss Development Cooperation, AGIR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diálogo</td>
<td>Diálogo Local Para a Boa Governação</td>
<td>Beira, Maputo, Nampula, Quelimane, Tete</td>
<td>DFID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIP/IESE/MASC/Fórum Mulher</td>
<td>Local Governance Monitoring Initiative</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>SDC, Danida, Norway, DFID, Sweden, the Netherlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAANE</td>
<td>Support Programme for Non-state Actors</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>EU</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
There are also other CSO programmes supporting service delivery. The clear separation between advocacy and service delivery programmes in AGIR, but also in the other programmes mentioned above, is notable. Some informants were of the opinion that such a dichotomy between advocacy and service delivery was created by donors. It is logical that the national high-level research and advocacy CSOs are not involved in providing services. However, smaller CSOs and in particular provincial and district level CSOs are sometimes involved in combined advocacy/service delivery – giving such CSOs higher legitimacy and credibility vis-à-vis the government. The involvement in programme implementation is also an important source of evidence for effective local level advocacy – a fact not reflected in the AGIR programme document (as explained earlier AGIR decided to focus on advocacy organisations mainly because they had few other sources and funding and challenged by the government).

CASE STUDY 4

JA (Justiça Ambiental – We Effect/Core Funding/5.5 Mill SEK was founded in the late 1990s, became part of the AGIR II programme in 2015. It undertakes evidence-based advocacy on issues of the environment through advocacy/community empowerment in relation to deforestation, pollution, dams, oil exploration, access to clean water etc. JA demonstrates the potentials of advocacy at different levels of intervention. In August 2012, JA joined activists from social movements and organizations in Mozambique, South Africa, Lesotho, Malawi, Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe in a ‘Peoples’ Summit’ to influence the SADC meeting in Maputo in 2012 on environmental issues with impact. In 2016, JA worked actively to reduce land grabbing in the Gaza Province through demonstrations and petitions to the Provincial government, resulting in some of the land being returned. JA has maintained contact with the farmers, intervened in critical conflict, provided moral support and organised meetings with public officials with success.
CASE STUDY 5

FORCOM (Fórum Nacional de Rádios Comunitários – Diakonia/Core Funding/4.8 Mill SEK) was established in 2004, with the purpose to canalise funds and give support to community radios throughout the country. FORCOM has been an AGIR partner since the beginning of AGIR, first with Ibis then with Diakonia and finally with Oxfam/Ibis – acknowledging that community radios are one of the most effective tools to give voice to citizens. FORCOM represents a total of 46 community radios, covers 35 percent of the national territory and is probably the most comprehensive programme in AGIR in terms of outreach. FORCOM is located in Maputo and decentralised through Regional Nucleons and member radios in [eight] different provinces. FORCOM demonstrates the challenges of centralisation/decentralisation in AGIR. As seen from one of the regional nucleons/member radios, there are critical issues related to the central organisation in terms of inadequate information about the programme, too much ‘hands on’ management on central issues including programming, as well as irregularities in transfer of funds (ref. to annual report). The member radio does important work on issues related to access to justice and would like to see funds allocated directly to regional partners.

3.3 EFFECTIVENESS

DEFINITION

“The extent to which the development intervention’s objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance” (Sida 2007).

MAIN FINDINGS

- Most IPOs report that “based on the activities performed and outcomes achieved, the sub programme is on track to meet both its mid- and long-term objectives”.
- The evaluation found that the sub programmes were to a large extent successfully implemented. It is also likely that the AGIR has contributed to what the evaluation team sees as the most important successes for the programme in the past five years. This is illustrated through examples, but cannot be ‘proven’ in any systematic way within the confines of this evaluation.
- The programme concludes that “a great number of indicators show progress and stability and substantiate the fact that the AGIR programme is crucial in building a strong and vibrant civil society in Mozambique”.
- However, there are no direct causal links between the indicators and the medium- and long term outcomes and impact.
- All IPOs have contributed to strengthening the organisational capacity of their partners. They also add value in strategic/professional areas, but to a lesser extent. The contribution in building networking capacity appears irregular and varied.
This section addresses questions pertaining to what extent the programme has achieved its objectives or is likely to achieve its objectives – i.e. the short- and intermediate outcomes and not long- term outcomes and impact – since it is too early to expect results at that level. The section starts by providing a summary of results from AGIR I and up to 2016 of AGIR II. This is followed by an assessment of added value of the four IPOs and ends with an analysis and discussion of the challenges in the current monitoring and results framework. The latter discussion is influenced by statements from IPOs and POs about the need to revise the results framework.

“The results matrix should be revised, taking into account the context, the change in partners and the readings of the plans (realizing that plans are ambitious). With the current setting the IPOs cannot change because they are contractually bound” (IPO informant).

Results achieved AGIR I

The evaluation of thematic results of AGIR I (Holmberg et al, 2014), takes stock of results from the four thematic sub-programmes based on a review of documents and 150 stakeholder interviews in five provinces. The evaluation analysed the results as changes in the behaviour of right-holders, duty-bearers and civil society organisations as well as the changed relations among these actors.

The evaluation found that civil society during the period of implementation had strengthened its role as bearer of collective claims on specific rights and on accountability of duty bearers. The partner organisations had been able to raise evidence-based claims, combining the efforts of more research oriented and the more activist oriented partners.

The evaluation concluded that the thematic sub programmes had achieved many results at output level. There were visible changes in the behaviour of duty bearers, civil society itself and to a certain extent among right holders. This means that the programme has contributed to change at outcome level. There were also examples of success stories where POs had contributed to processes leading to changes in legislation and increased transparency, as well as examples of positive shifts in relations between CSOs and government at different levels and with the Parliament despite serious setbacks in the climate for dialogue.

However, the management of results continued to be a major challenge for the involved actors. The reporting had been primarily activity oriented and not on the progress of results. “AGIR is a complex programme that deals with social change. It is therefore important to be clear, not only regarding how the partner organisations
can stimulate change, but also to clarify the limits of their influence on political and
development processes” (Holmberg 2014, p. 8).

**Results achieved AGIR II**

The combined Annual Report 2016 (for all IPOs) seeks to explore and document
results for the five thematic areas and PO capacity strengthening. The following
presents the level of goal achievement as this is presented by AGIR itself (AGIR
2016, a and b). Overall, the report concludes that the results are satisfactory and in
some cases exceeding the targets:

“A great number of indicators show progress and stability and substantiate the
fact that the AGIR programme is crucial in building a strong and vibrant civil society
in Mozambique….. Given the critical political, social and economic context of
Mozambique, the AGIR programme plays a fundamental role in providing
accountability and good governance in the country. It is difficult to comprehend how
the country can develop without a strong and vibrant civil society”.

For the thematic areas and their indicators, we refer to Annex 5. Below, the
thematic goal fulfilment is presented as these were reported by AGIR II in the 2016
Annual Report – noticing that for one theme (2) data are considered inadequate; for
one theme data indicate a negative development (3), while three themes (1, 4 and 5)
are seen to move in the right direction. As such, the overall thematic results build on
information from the IPOs themselves. The challenges in the current aggregate
reporting are discussed at the end of the chapter.

**Theme 1: Right to Inclusion and Equality.** The goal for theme one is “A
political ecosystem in which all the rights-holders (women, girls and other
marginalized groups) are equally included in the socio-economic development
process is established and functioning”. 16 indicators present data that mostly
exceeded the numbers achieved in 2015. Four of the indicators were not evaluated
because their data can only be collected from that will happen in 2018 or from
specific studies that will be developed at a later stage.

**Theme 2: Right to Retribution of Wealth Created from the Country’s
Patrimony.** The main goal for this theme is “As a result of rights holders’ access to
information, these claim for fair distribution of resources and duty bearers improve
wealth retribution created from the country’s patrimony”. This outcome is composed
of 13 indicators in which 8 were not evaluated due to the lack of information.

**Theme 3: Right to Accessible and Affordable Public Services of Good Quality.**

For this theme the main goal is “Empowered CSO (partner organization’s)
defending the rights-holders (women and men) right to accessible, affordable and
high quality public services and to a safe and healthy environment”. 24 indicators
contributed to the evaluation of its performance. Indicators related to the state budget
allocated to the sectors registered a relative reduction when compared to 2015. This
situation could jeopardize the achievement of the targets set for the year 2017, since
even in 2015 there was no significant increase in the sectors covered by this theme.
**Theme 4: Right to Basic Civic Freedoms.** The overall goal for this theme is “To contribute for an environment where people’s rights to expression, freedom and information’s is guaranteed by law and respected all duty bearers”. All the outcomes related to free access to information, free expression of opinions as it was conceived that Right to Information Law (RTIL) was the cornerstone for the achievement of the results foreseen in this theme. All three indicators defined for this theme had shown progress in 2016 and indicated that the goals set for 2017 could be achieved.

**Theme 5: Right to Political Representation and Participation.** The goal of this theme is “To contribute for an improved, transparent, participative and gender inclusive democratic and political processes in Mozambique”. Analysing the progress made in relation to the nine indicators in this theme, seven of them were showing progress in relation to 2015 and could reach target by 2017. Two indicators were not possible to measure. Most indicators showed a growth trend in relation to 2015, which – still according to the Report – would ensure that the targets set for 2017 would be achieved.

In the area of **CSO capacity building** – with the outcome: “POs are effective and sustainable agents of transformational change” – indicators on good governance are on track, mainstreaming of gender show progress (e.g. existence of gender policies), as does networking and use of social media – but there are problems in level of collaboration between POs, submission of audit reports, reaching the 50% quota payment from members and financial dependency on AGIR was found very high – with marginal success in mobilising from other sources. The realism of these claims will be discussed later.

The principles of **ownership, harmonisation and alignment**, managing for results, partnerships, transparency and mutual accountability have been adhered to – with core funding supporting ownership, the use of consolidated reports based on POs own format support alignment, while many POs struggle to use and follow sufficiently robust M&E systems ensuring high quality data collection with increased focus on outcomes beyond activities and outputs.

**Donor coordination** remains a challenge. A partner satisfaction test was conducted in 2016 (Keystone accountability test) – with low participation, but gave positive results in terms non-financial support and monitoring, but less in communication and financial support (e.g. delays in disbursement). Transparency and accountability were supported through sharing of information and keeping an open dialogue.

**Financial execution** decreased from 74% in 2015 to 69% in 2016. Non-core funding modalities had been unsatisfactory – with Small funds 68%, Innovative funding 31% and Agile funding 13% (2016). Implementation of joint activities was below targets, such as joint capacity strengthening, studies, M&E, seminars and workshops.
Looking at the results as stated by each of the IPOs in their 2016 annual reports, the IPOs reported that:

**We Effect** concludes that the space for civil society has shrunk, but that “at the end POs could reach most of their results”. We Effect worked in 2016 with thirteen partners in five provinces. In the area of “Right to land” (Goal: Empowered partner organisations that support the rights of people to land, secure land tenure and sustainable management of natural resources.), most indicators are said to exceed the targets for 2017, e.g. “7743 right holders know their rights”. There is also evidence of improved policy since “indicators in progress are related to number of proposals made by partners to influence policy and policy action”. There had been 69 dialogue sessions with the government. The same positive trends are reported for “Right to food” (“POs are contributing positively to changing the government’s approach on agriculture and effectively prioritising food production for internal markets”.)

Regarding increased agricultural production, POs report and statistics indicate that from 2015 to 2016 more than 18000 farmers increased their agricultural production due to technologies transferred to them by POs. In environment and climate change, the programme has shown improvements in the conservation and regeneration of biodiversity and sustainable use of energy, several positive results are noted. The results of policy and advocacy relating to environment have also been positive. For civil society strengthening most of the indicators are on track, but AGIR contributes to a high level of PO administrative costs.

**OXFAM Ibis** explains in their 2016 Annual Report the level of capacity building efforts, but not much on results (page 19). In terms of accountability of extractive industries, it is reported that the level of awareness of communities, duty bearers and companies have been through “a paradigm shift”. There is also positive feedback on right holders’ access to information and improved understanding of the dynamic and consequences of extractive industries which is used in dialogue and bargaining processes with duty bearers and companies. Communities are also increasingly voicing their concerns on the extractive industries – leading to more transparency of the extractive sector. The report claims also evidence of improved quality and coverage of basic public services for female and male right holders as a result of more evidence-based advocacy. Positive changes are also expected in freedom of expression and press freedom.

**OXFAM Novib** reports for 2016 from 20 partner organisations that “based on the activities performed and outcomes achieved, the sub programme is on track to meet both its mid- and long-term objectives” – even if it is recognised that “most POs still report on activities and not on results”. In general, 2016 was marked by a significantly increased capacity of community members to demand their rights: For instance, 411 communities participated in monitoring of quality services and many of their complaints and suggestions were included in the Province/District Development Plans and were actually implemented. Several policies to promote gender equality were revised and implemented in cooperation with the government. More duty bearers displayed positive attitudes towards the rights and inclusion of LGBTIs. Several POs are also working in the area of SRHR and HIV/AIDS, seven pro-poor
policies were developed, systematic increases in budget for social sectors could be found, verifiable changes in the lives of poor and marginalised groups.

**DIAKONIA** starts its Annual report for 2016 with some sobering remarks: “After more than two years of AGIR II, we can say that CSOs are more aware of their role for changing the structures that are hindering the efforts of the citizens to change society towards a more democratic setting. It is not to say that AGIR in general and DIAKONIA in particular can claim the good results. However, we consider that our sub programme has been contributing, through the active role played by many of the partners, to the increasing debate about democracy and democratic rules as well as the respect for the rule of law pointing to the advancement of human rights…” In the area of rights to inclusion and equality, a reduction in public resource allocation for improved access to key public services was acknowledged – due to factors external to the programme. 2016 was less productive than 2015 in preparing new policies and laws creating an enabling framework for broader social inclusion. The process and results for making elections more transparent, reliable and complying with international standards were slow. CSOs contributed to enlarge the space for participation in the political debate, but the policy space has shrunk. Partners have also made effort to strengthen the rights to accessible and affordable SRHR services and HIV/AIDS. Capacity on gender mainstreaming was provided to all partners.

As summed up by the IPOs themselves, the main successes and failures of their partners and their advocacy/interventions are:

**Table 7: IPO’s summary of partners main successes and failures:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Diakonia</th>
<th>PO</th>
<th>Reasons Given</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Successful Case</td>
<td>AMMCJ</td>
<td>Carried out advocacy work on safe abortion regulations, leading to the approval of the Clinical Norms on Safe Abortion and Post-Abortion Care</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unsuccessful case</td>
<td>REDE CAME</td>
<td>Advocacy work on preventing child abuse and trafficking by providing protection. Few reported advocacy initiatives and deviations from the thematic focus.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Oxfam/Ibis</th>
<th>PO</th>
<th>Reasons given</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Successful Case</td>
<td>Solidari-edade</td>
<td>Advocacy initiatives at local level led to a positive process of participation in communities affected by extractive industries in the design and implementation of the private company Kenmare’s corporate social responsibility plan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unsuccessful case</td>
<td>SEKELEKANI</td>
<td>A long advocacy process carried out by various CSOs and led by SEKELEKANI to create a dialogue forum between the CSOs and Parliament did not produce the expected results and the Parliament remains silent on the matter.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Oxfam/Novib</th>
<th>PO</th>
<th>Reasons given</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Successful Case</td>
<td>GMD and FMO</td>
<td>Work on the Budget Monitoring Forum and Mozambican Debt Group, advocating for the importance of IMF considering civil society in the lending process in Mozambique.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The team does not have an adequate basis to assess the relative strengths and weaknesses of the four IPOs in terms of results as these are reported above. On the one hand, they are difficult to measure with accuracy, and on the other contextual/structural constraints may have affected the possibility of reaching the goal. Based on interviews with IPOs/POs about the challenges related to demonstrating the extent to which goals and targets of each sub-programme have been fulfilled, the team has no reason to doubt that this is done in the best possible way.

At the same time, several interviewees have said that there may be a tendency to “inflate” actual results reported upwards when the targets are as ambitious/tenuous as they are. It is also problematic when the achievement of overall objectives (in the overarching annual reports) is based on the progress in a summary of lower level output/outcome indicators – assuming that micro changes will automatically translate into macro changes.

The relation with the Swedish embassy is generally good and effective. The overall concept of AGIR is “beautiful but challenging” – including the notion of core funding where funding CSOs to develop their own priorities is to be combined with a set of AGIR objectives and targets. Smaller grants are in the outset a good idea to assess quality and options for ‘graduation’, but are cumbersome to manage/relate to.

Working as an international NGO in Mozambique has become increasingly challenging, particularly in advocacy. Funding has shown a downward trend and some IPOs have had to reduce staff. The context/basis for programme assumptions have changed, which makes it necessary to revise programme goals. Duty-bearers are on the edge, marches and demonstrations are risky to carry out, and there are cases of intimidation of journalists in particular. There is more space for activities that the government sees as useful and that deliver services.

“While there is a lot of networking between the POs, this is not the case between the IPOs which is a shame because we have a lot to learn from each other” (IPO Manager).
“AGIR is basically a policy-advocacy based programme, where the POs try to influence policies. But at the same time it is expected that they produce something concrete for the beneficiaries” (IPO Manager).

**The value added of IPOs:** What is the added value of IPOs beyond transferring funds to partners? The interviews suggested that the IPOs themselves are relatively confident of their value. Also, the interviews with partner organisations revealed constructive and beneficial relationships with their intermediary partners. The added value is discussed and summarised under three dimensions: organisational, professional/thematic and contribution to networking and civil society.

**Organisational and financial competence:** All IPOs have a focus on institutional competence and contributed to strengthening the organisational capacity of their partners. The dominant dimensions include strengthening M&E, administrative and financial capacities and programme implementation – all what is needed to meet donor requirements better. Based on feedback from interviews, there had been limited attention to internal governance and accountability issues in many partnerships. This may be linked to the fact that these issues are highly sensitive. It will often be easier for an IPO to focus in on financial or programme management. The evaluation found a noticeable shift in many partnerships over time. Many local partners got initial support for organisational development, which gradually gave way to a stronger focus on programmes.

**Professional/thematic competence:** IPOs provide also value added in these areas, but to a lesser extent than administrative/organisational competence. For some, this is linked to thematic advice and transfer of technical competence in programme development and implementation. IPOs ability to contribute professionally depends on their own internal competence and/or ability to utilise national/international networks and expertise. The professional/technical added value was found limited and unsystematic by many of the POs. Some IPOs have been able to provide added value and initiate strategic initiatives with international partners, but the examples were few and the potential underutilised.

**Networking competence:** IPOs should also help to strengthen the networking capacity and opportunities of their partners, although the contribution in this area appears less dominant and irregular. This depends on deep knowledge of the country context coupled with an extensive network and contacts in the country and internationally. Several of the IPOs have such networks, but they could have been shared and used much more proactively – according to interviews with POs. Some organisations referred to the opportunities of networking with other organizations of the same sub-programme in the annual partner meetings organized by their respective IPOs. Networking across the sub-programmes continues to be weak. A smaller number of partners referred to the Programme Annual Forum, where networking across sub-programmes partners should occur, as equally relevant/useful.

**Monitoring and reporting challenges**

AGIR started as a programme that basically monitored capacity building results (AGIR I). This was because its principal aim was and still is supporting civil society in its own right and supporting a strong, effective and pluralistic civil society in
Mozambique. However, after supporting several organisations with core support for a long period of time, the programme felt as a huge missed opportunity to not also get data and information about thematic results. Thematic results were not reported to donors in any comprehensive or systematic way since the results framework only focused on capacity building. This is the reason that considerable work was invested in building and strengthening comprehensive results frameworks and monitoring systems for AGIR II.

However, there are still challenges with the aggregate programme and sub programme reports that need to be discussed in this mid-term evaluation.

The AGIR II programme operates with comprehensive results frameworks at three levels: Overall in terms of impact on society at large; for each of the four sub-programme themes; and at the level of each individual sub programme. The idea is that by aggregating results ‘upwards’, the programme will be able to show a hierarchy of results and come up with a ‘global impact’ taking all levels into account. This is problematic for a number of reasons:

- The results at lowest level will have to use similar indicators which is difficult within a system of core funding and principles of alignment (using POs own planning and reporting systems). The overarching reports explain that objectives and indicators have shifted from year to year and between annual work plans and reports making comparison difficult. It is also problematic to assume that a set of common/generic indicators at an overarching level can capture and be used to add up the complexities in the large number of different organisations and projects.
- All IPOs and POs need solid monitoring systems and capacity to collect data regularly, while we did not find evidence of systematic data collection systems/tools (including surveys) in all partnerships. Pre- and post-surveys are for instance required to assess change over time.
- The reporting on results is still focusing on what the programme has done and not what kind of changes the programme has contributed to.
- It is questionable whether many of the objectives are attainable within the confines of a civil society accountability programme, such as for instance: “Duty bearers increasingly take citizens ‘demands into account and as a result, the State Budget to key public service sectors (health, water, public transport and social protection) has increased with 25% as compared to 2015” (Oxfam Novib).
- The programme document seems to be based on a notion that aggregate results can be attributed to AGIR interventions while the projects (in most cases) can

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25 The Sida Grant Agreement states that the IPOs should “ensure coordinated and aggregated reporting for the overarching programme as well as aggregated reporting of the partner organisations ‘operations within the thematic areas of the sub-programme’. Reporting should focus on development results and learning”. The Operational Guidelines (2014) states that The Embassy of Sweden expects the IPOs to be able to aggregate what their partner organisations plan to deliver in terms of products, goods and services (outputs) and what they expect to achieve in terms of short-term and medium-term effects (outcomes). Aggregation means that the IPOs should… for each planned result at any of the results level, to present single planned results from a collection of input values…. Knowledge concerning inputs and activities are not necessary for the Embassy to obtain, but rather development results”.

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only contribute to end results in combination with other often more important factors. On the other hand, most of the IPOs in their reports and interviews talk more about contributions than attribution.

“Attribution is more difficult to ascertain in the civil society support. The contribution of civil society to some outcomes is inflated in the reports” (IPO informant).

“We consider only contribution. When working on advocacy, we are doing the work with other organisations and if a policy is approved they are involved as well. We claim more direct results for sexual minorities such as for Lambda” (IPO informant).

The extensive use of indicators (within a result-based framework) tend to encourage linear, rational thinking in change processes and to express, simplify and reproduce complex processes by using numbers for comparison. The AGIR results framework comes with quantified and objectively verifiable indicators, to be measured by baseline data and targets for the mid-term and end-line. Such frameworks are used as a basis for the overarching reports and tend to crowd out intangible results. The frameworks do not sufficiently open for/allow information/description of how the programme (POs) actually influence policy processes. Such information about policy implementation/processes is often more important to know than using indicators on to what extent a policy is in place, how many policies are being developed, etc.

Such information can be found in reports from POs, but tend to get lost in the “aggregation process” and are not adequately presented in annual reports. The rights-based, transformational approaches to development supported by AGIR (where “how” matters as much as “what”) and the results-based management practice are to some extent conflicting. The “how” questions and examples can be found in reports from POs, but to a much lesser extent in the aggregate programme reports. This is also in line with the Embassy’s guidelines (see footnote 21) – emphasizing the “what” (results) and not process information should be reported on.

Other reporting mechanisms are required to capture programme outcomes and impact in the area of policy dialogue results than indicators – to what extent the programme has contributed to more/better inclusion, gender equity, redistribution of wealth, accessible and affordable public services, basic civil freedoms and political representation. The reporting of results need to show how the organisations manage

26 The programme intends to aggregate the sub-programme’s long-term outcomes into five themes that relate to the five main rights-based challenges that the AGIR II programme intends to tackle.
to participate in and influence policy processes through their interactions with duty bearers and support to right holders.

The overarching performance indicators (all impact and several outcome indicators) include increases in national gender/human freedom/democracy/governance development indices or % of state budget allocated to key public service sectors. Such indicators provide useful data and information about national trends, but do not reflect and cannot be used for monitoring AGIR performance. They are all measures of the combined efforts of a wide variety of internal and external dynamics. At best, the AGIR programme makes a contribution to changing such indicators and it will not be feasible to quantify its relative contribution, but a proper description/explanation of the influence is adequate and sufficient.

A change in achievement (based on a numerical target) from one year to the next shows a change, but not the scope and quality of that change (since it depends on how targets are set – high or low). There is no/marginal information/discussion about how far the programme has reached the expected outcomes.

There is no systematic data and information to assess the scope and level of empowerment, pro-poor policy development and monitoring – in other words to what extent and how well AGIR has achieved or is in the process of achieving its objectives and end results – the level of more and better inclusion, gender equity, quality public services, civil freedoms, political representation, etc. Some suggestions are in the final chapter on recommendations.

Several of the assumptions in the ToCs are increasingly questionable due to political and socio-economic changes. There is no guarantee that stronger CSOs contribute to more pro-poor policies and/or that the government is receptive to advice/pressure; and the role and work of CSOs is not in itself sufficient to explain policy changes and results.

All this does not mean that the AGIR programme has not contributed to the type of overarching changes that are envisaged, but rather that such a link cannot be verified within the current programme structures. To be more precise: It is likely that the AGIR programme has contributed to what the evaluation team sees as some of the most important achievements by civil society the past five years – but this cannot be ‘proven’ in any systematic way.

1. **Improved capacity for evidence-based advocacy** – research institutions have emerged in Mozambique providing evidence that can inform policy debates and advocacy work. Some of these research institutions from AGIR are: IESE (on electoral studies, public debt, extractive industries and fiscal policies); OMR (agriculture and rural development) and WLSA (on gender issues).

2. **Improved policy dialogue with duty-bearers** – some organisations and networks have managed to have a stable relationship with duty-bearers by being ‘sector partners’: In education through the networks Movimento Educação para Todos (MEPT) with CESC and NANA as participants; in the health sector through the platform PLASOC in which N’Weti participates; and with Parliament
a partnership with the Planning and Budget Committee was developed through the Budget Monitoring Forum in which CIP, N’Weti, CESC, GMD and others have been involved.

3. **Enhanced influence in policy debate and decisions** – there has been a substantial change in the public debate on development/sector policies due to the contribution of civil society: The discussion of the fiscal policy for megaprojects changed considerably informed by IESE’s studies of fiscal exemptions; the participation of the communities in the monitoring of service delivery in health and education sectors has increased with support of civil society to capacity building of community participation (N’Weti, CESC, AMME and Kukumbi); and civil society activism has influenced the budget allocations in priority sectors through good technical work and participation in the planning and budgeting process (ANAMM).

4. **Revision of the Criminal Code (2014)** – the decriminalization of abortion, rights of sexual minorities, the elimination of decriminalization of rape when the rapist accepts to marry the victim. These revisions were due to lobbying and advocacy from civil society – including AGIR partners such as WLSA and Fórum Mulher.

5. **Approval of National Strategy Against Early Marriages (2016)** – resulting from civil society organizations advocacy and activism in this area including FORCOM, Fórum Mulher and WLSA.

6. **Higher capacity of fund-raising** – despite still facing sustainability problems, some civil society organizations have improved their capacity of fund-raising, which allowed them to diversify the sources of funding (IESE, N’Weti, CAICC).

7. **Civil society has influenced democratic accountability** – through initiatives such as participation in electoral reform and observation (vertical accountability), growing activism in public financial management and public integrity (horizontal accountability) and support to initiatives of social accountability at the local level including social audits – CSOs including CEDE and NANA have contributed to an area of increasing importance in Mozambique.

**CASE STUDY 6**

**WLSA** (Women and Law in Southern Africa – Oxfam Novib/Core Funding/9.2 Mill-SEK) was originally part of a regional Southern African network but established itself as a national NGO 2002. It has a current staff of 13 (9 professionals), and funding from AGIR currently represents 55 percent of the budget with EU, UNICEF, MASC and Embassy of France being other donors. WLSA has been in the frontline of research and advocacy on issues such as sexual and reproductive rights, the right to abortion, early marriages and gender-based violence. WLSA joined AGIR in 2010, and is a good example of the potential importance of research-based advocacy. Their publications are widely read and consulted, and they have managed to become an
organisation that cannot be ignored by the government despite the contentious issues they raise. WLSA has also been directly involved in the development of central laws and regulations concerning women’s rights. However, the work of the organisation also highlights some of the challenges of working with a rights-based approach on issues/rights that may – in fact – not be universal. One example is WLSA’s work on the Family Law and its prohibition of polygamy. Some commentators (refs) have argued that in a country where 25 percent of all women are part of polygamous relationships (ref) making polygamy illegal actually jeopardises the situation for these women and makes it difficult to take their husbands to court.
CASE STUDY 7

FORCOM (Fórum Nacional de Rádios Comunitárias – Diakonia/Core Funding/4.8 Mill SEK) was established in 2004, with the purpose to canalise funds and give support to community radios throughout the country. FORCOM has been an AGIR partner since the beginning of AGIR, first with Ibis then with Diakonia and finally with Oxfam/Ibis – acknowledging that community radios are one of the most effective tools to give voice to citizens. FORCOM represents a total of 46 community radios, covers 35 percent of the national territory and is probably the most comprehensive programme in AGIR in terms of outreach. FORCOM is located in Maputo and decentralised through Regional Nucleons and member radios in [eight] different provinces. FORCOM demonstrates the challenges of centralisation/decentralisation in AGIR. As seen from one of the regional nucleons/member radios, there are critical issues related to the central organisation in terms of inadequate information about the programme, too much ‘hands on’ management on central issues including programming, as well as irregularities in transfer of funds (ref. to annual report). The member radio does important work on issues related to access to justice and would like to see funds allocated directly to regional partners.

3.4 SUSTAINABILITY

DEFINITION

The continuation of benefits from a development intervention after major development assistance has been completed. The probability of continued long-term benefits. The resilience to risk of the net benefit flows over time (Sida 2007).

KEY FINDINGS

- Despite a limited popular base, civil society has a long history in Mozambique, has shown resilience in relation to government pressure and the best/most relevant CSOs will prevail.
- The economic dependence on donors is strong, too many CSOs have become ends in themselves, and only the best will be able to cope with reduced funding.
- The concentration of CSOs/CSO support to Maputo is still too strong to secure a decentralisation/representation of the provinces that is necessary to secure longer term sustainability/impact of civil society in the whole country.
- The future impact of civil society will depend on a state with sufficient economic and human resources to respond to advocacy and other types of efforts/activities.
- The most imminent factor defining the sustainability of CSOs – particularly those involved in political advocacy – will be the direction of the upcoming Law on Associations.
- For longer-term sustainability, civil society in Mozambique will continue to depend on external funding.
Civil Society at Large

The sustainability of civil society in Mozambique in general and the outcome and impact of the AGIR programme in particular will depend on factors both external and internal to civil society itself.

Popular base. In line with civil society in most parts of Africa, ‘popular’ movements (such as voluntary organisations, trade unions and religious communities) are relatively weak and civil society has largely been ‘created’ and ‘maintained’ by external stakeholders such as multilateral agencies, international donors and CSOs. This challenges their popular basis – and hence their sustainability.

Donor funding. Sweden and other major supporters of civil society such as the US, the UK and EU are likely to continue their aid to Mozambique despite increasing pressures from conservative governments and home constituencies for results and more attention to the private sector. Sweden is probably the most consistent development partner for Mozambique. However, additional ‘crises’ in line with the hidden debt will make some countries rethink their aid to Mozambique altogether.

External funding to Mozambique by international donor agencies has seen a downward trend the past few years, and represents a decreasing part of the national budget. The ongoing crisis related to the hidden debt has largely halted bilateral cooperation/budget support, but there is still no clear sign of funds being reallocated to the civil society. Rather, donors seem to have taken a ‘wait and see’ attitude.

Government role. The Government of Mozambique is likely to ‘tolerate’ the civil society, albeit with less patience and understanding for national and vocal advocacy organisations than with lower key CSOs combining advocacy with tangible activities/service delivery at local level. Preliminary information from the development of the new Law on Associations (that will regulate civil-society activities) indicate that the government may prefer a solution where civil society is ‘co-opted’ into the government and have an approach in line with the PAANE programme.

PAANE (Programa de Apoio aos Actores Não Estatais). The programme is financed by the EU. Funding for the current (2015-2018) period is 5 million Euro, and a total of 29 civils society partners and projects are supported. There are two funding mechanisms, one for smaller grants and one for larger-scale projects. The main focuses of the programme are practises of citizenship for young people, and dialogue between civil society and public authorities. The programme is special in that it is managed/administered through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, with a small secretariat with an external advisor and ministry staff and incorporated into its structures. One important focus has been on the development of District Development Plans, and according to PAANE representatives the fact that it is linked to government has made local government more receptive than it otherwise would. The PAANE results framework is built around 13 indicators, with each partner expected to adjust their framework accordingly. A second phase of PAANE is already agreed upon. This will be managed directly by the Ministry, and PAANE uses the fact that funding for the new phase will increase to 22 million Euro as a sign of success. The programme reflects a trend of African Governments having a more
At the same time civil society in Mozambique has shown resilience in the face of government pressure as well as changes in funding circumstances for decades. In a comparative African perspective, the media is particularly strong and vocal, but also larger national organisations such as UNAC and more recently applied research/advocacy organisations such as IESE and CIP are strong in such a perspective.

**Internal challenges.** A ‘shrinking’ of the sector to a lower number of higher quality CSOs is, in fact, likely to be important for the sustainability of civil society as a whole. This should be done by finding a good balance between Maputo-based CSOs with a national mandate and a sufficient number of CSOs based in the provinces. To be sustainable, donor programmes for civil society support should identify one CSO in each province as a ‘hub’ with an intermediary/coordinating function. The sector should maintain a relatively broad spectrum of types of organisations – with particular emphasis on supporting emerging popular movements such as voluntary organisations, trade unions and religious societies.

**The AGIR Programme**

The sustainability of the activities under AGIR I and AGIR II will depend on the continuation or not of the programme under a possible third phase. As we will return to under ‘Recommendations’, a possible continuation should consolidate the best aspects of the programme and terminate/phase out aspects that have not functioned equally well – which will enhance the options for longer-term sustainability.

The sustainability of the programme components (CSO capacity development as well as advocacy and concrete activities) will also depend on the continued presence of the international IPOs that currently function as intermediaries. As argued above, the implementation of the programme components is largely carried out by the IPOs and their CSO partners and is likely to continue in some form even if the overarching AGIR framework should be discontinued – even though it may become less coherent.

The sustainability of the partner institutions will also depend on the continued presence of other donors/funders. Some POs (mainly the smaller ones) are near-totally dependent on AGIR funding, while for others the support from AGIR represents a relatively small part of their budget – even though it is considered important due to the core support and the flexibility it implies.

Assessing the sustainability of the benefits of the programme as they now stand in terms of capacity development, there is little doubt that the AGIR programme has

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27 The credit for this is often given to the late Carlos Cardoso, for the work he did in preparing the ground for a strong and critical press in the country (ref).
enhanced capacity at the organisational/individual level. Some of the larger institutions (such as CESC) are capable of standing on their own feet and grow; some are too weak to continue without external support (examples); while the majority are likely to be able to continue to work at the level they are but without further growth/consolidation in a situation of lower/no external support.

The AGIR programme emphasises the importance of institutional networks and mutual learning. As we have seen, the main meeting-points for the POs involved in the programme are organised events by AGIR (including the Annual Meeting). AGIR does support a number of networks organised by the POs themselves (such as Rede CAME and RECAC), but with the exception of organisations with strong thematic focus such as gender they do not seem to be very effective. There are even fewer POs involved in international networks, due to a combination of inadequate funding and little knowledge of the relevant international networks that exist. At the provincial/district level, different types of Platforms involving civil society, the government and (in some cases) the private sector seem sustainable due to their varied membership.

These organisational challenges will have implications for the sustainability of a vibrant civil society, involved in policy development and the empowerment of people to claim their rights and the monitoring of the extent to which policies are being implemented. As argued above, the two types of organisations that are likely to be most sustainable and continue to have the strongest impact are the larger POs with a national mandate that are too important to disregard/touch, and the best POs with a solid local base that have developed constructive relations with the local government institutions and the local population.

Sustainability has been an increasing concern of the programme, and IPOs as well as POs have developed an exit plan to strategize and mobilize/diversify funding for a future after AGIR (of which CAICC is a good example). However, the majority of the stakeholders interviewed are not very optimistic: They see national funding as virtually impossible, and a situation where external funding is becoming more difficult. This will be further accentuated should the Government decide to follow current African trends in the new Law on Associations of making a cap on external funding (maximum 10 percent in the case of Ethiopia) for CBOs involved in political advocacy. The ‘unknown’ factor in this picture is the possible change in funding channels of the major donors in the aftermath of the hidden debt crisis.
CASE STUDY 8

CESC (Centro de Aprendizagem e Capacitação da Sociedade Civil – Diakonia/Core Funding/4.0 Mill.SEK). CESC was established in 2009, and became part of AGIR initially through IBIS in phase one, and eventually through Diakonia since 2014. It is a large and strong CSO staffed with 40 people working at the headquarters and in its provincial representations in Gaza, Zambézia and Cabo Delgado, and with funding from [9] different donors. CESC’s overall objective is to i) encourage duty-bearers directly to strengthen their accountability and inclusion of disadvantaged groups and ii) to strengthen the capacity of civil society to monitor public service providers and services with a special focus on education, health and the state budget. CESC seeks to use its grass-roots work to produce evidence to inform its intervention in the spaces of dialogue with duty-bearers at the provincial and national levels. It has been an active member in the Movement Education for All (MEPT), a key partner of the education sector. CESC is a large actor in the AGIR programme, and although the contribution of the programme to its budget has reduced from 35% to about 12% between 2012 and 2017, this funding is considered strategic, because it is stable, continuous and is the only one that can be used for organizational strengthening. CESC’s is currently in discussions with the Canadian Embassy for a possible intermediary role for a new NGO network on gender, in which it will play the role of a grant-manager. Thus, the organization provides an example on how to build synergies between local and central level interventions, combining service delivery support and advocacy, and of the growing capacity of some Mozambican CSOs that could allow them to play a possible role as intermediaries in future civil society support programmes.
CASE STUDY 9

UPCM (União dos Camponeses da Província de Maputo – We Effect/Small Grant/USD20k + USD16k). UPCM, the Maputo Province Farmers’ Organization, is a membership organization aimed at promoting farmers’ interests. The organization has a strategic plan covering the period from 2013 to 2018, which includes a baseline study that analysed the potential membership of the union in the province. AGIR small grants funded two UPCM projects. The first was in the 2016-2017 period (MZN 1.2 million), and the second was in 2017 with a budget of MZN 1 million. The first support (2016/2017) focus was for the organisation of an electoral assembly, production and protection of native seeds, training in climate changes, and creation of saving groups in rural areas. The focus of the second project (2017) was training in advocacy and organization of study circles on issues relevant to the farmers. Advocacy included dealing with a problem that affect the organisation’s members very directly, i.e. land grabbing. In 2016 UPCM was in the process of its establishment and was not even legalized. Thus, through support to the election and governing bodies the project has contributed to the institutionalisation of the organisation. It also contributed to improved outreach, supporting its members in the defence of their land- and other rights and improving their knowledge about relevant issues such as agricultural production in a context of climate changes. From an organization that had only a few members and was not known in the province of Maputo amongst its potential membership, currently UPCM has become a central actor in the defence of farmers’ rights and in addressing key problems as land rights, agricultural production and climate change. However, the organization still faces the challenge to expand its initiatives to other districts of the province due to resource constraints. The UPCM case is an example of the potential small grants has to strengthening small organizations through strategic interventions. However, it is also a reminder of the need to complement such funding with other sources for the best CBOs in order to ensure that the results obtained through the small grants can be sustainable over time.
4 Conclusions and Lessons Learned

4.1 MAIN CONCLUSIONS

A relevant programme with potential, but still unproven impact. AGIR II is highly relevant for expressed government policies in the programme’s focus areas, but its advocacy profile is under attack within the current political climate. Sweden and the other donors should be commended for its long-term support to a large and high profile civil society support programme in Mozambique in line with good donor principles (harmonisation, alignment, accountability and results orientation). AGIR II is well in line with Swedish rights-based approach to development, but its complexity poses challenges in terms of implementation and results.

The programme is on track when it comes to activities performed and short-term outcomes achieved. The IPOs have also contributed to strengthen the capacity of partner organisations and civil society in the country, in some cases resulting in the enhancement of their sustainability. On the other hand, there is no systematic data and information to assess how well AGIR has achieved or is in the process of achieving its long-term objectives – more and better inclusion, gender equity, quality public services, civil freedoms and political representation. It is likely that the programme has made contributions in terms of improved capacity for evidence-based advocacy, policy dialogue with duty bearers, enhanced influence in policy debates, influenced democratic accountability, etc., but this cannot be “proven” in any systematic way within the confines of this evaluation.

A complex programme design and structure. AGIR II operates with comprehensive results frameworks for the overall programme, each individual sub programme and partner organisations. Resources are allocated to all provinces, a large number of thematic areas/cross cutting issues and partner organisations – which leads to a fragmented programme. International CSOs were selected as intermediary organisations for both AGIR I and II – justified by weak capacity among local Mozambican organisations. The model comes with a high-cost as compared to its added value in terms of strengthening administrative, technical/strategic and networking capacity among partners. The incapacity of local organisations to play the role of the IPOs has been questioned with the argument that it is time to test the former’s capacity as well, after years of capacity development and experience in managing similar programmes. A multi-donor fund could also be discussed and tested. The value of the overarching programme structure is questionable. Each sub programme could function well without such a structure, but benefit from shared/common services.
Linger ing question about sustainability. Civil society in Mozambique has shown resilience in relation to government pressure and will prevail, but their economic dependence on donors is high – in particular for advocacy organisations. Many CSOs have become ends in themselves and only the strongest and most visible are likely to survive with reduced funding from donors. The future impact of civil society will depend on continued space for advocacy currently potentially threatened by the up-coming Law on Associations, the presence of a state with sufficient human and financial resources to respond to advocacy from civil society, and the ability of civil society itself to adjust to continuously changing circumstances.

4.2 LESSONS LEARNT

The following high-level lessons learned are reflections based on the experience from this evaluation and the literature on evaluating policy advocacy and capacity strengthening.  

The importance of context

Political and economic context is crucial for civil society’s space for advocacy and interventions – and hence for the results of AGIR II. In Mozambique, the current economic crisis and the ensuing austerity measures have negative effects on the options for reaching targets related to socio-economic developments. Following pan-African trends, and further instigated by the ongoing hidden debt crisis, the political space for advocacy questioning government policies is shrinking. This means that a vibrant civil society is more important than ever, but also that the way of working needs to be adjusted to relate to changing circumstances. But an unfavourable context can be an opportunity too. For example, lack of resources is contributing to more openness from government to establish partnerships with civil society to implement some of its programmes. This suggests that it is possible to use some of these windows of opportunity to influence changes and to elicit cooperation from the Government.

There has also been a change in the type of space for engagement (Joint Evaluation of Support to Civil Society Engagement 2012), initially with “invited spaces” where the government created and encouraged engagement with civil society at national/regional level through various ‘observatories’ and at local level e.g. through the consultative councils (Tvedten et al. 2015). However, partly due to the de facto cooption by government of such arenas for dialogue civil society has found alternative channels for influence. They have increasingly “claimed space”, for example by working through independent media and investigative journalism, and by

28 See Annex 2: References for a sample of literature.
seeking influence through powerholders and confronting government through open policy dialogue around specific topics at national level. Research and academic CSOs have supported these processes by providing evidence and documentation.

**Quality of relationships**

The evaluation found that IPOs and POs spend an increasing amount of time meeting necessary planning and reporting requirements from donors. It is often the quality of relationships in and between organisations that is crucial for determining performance. Processes and building relationships must not only be seen as a transaction cost undermining efficiency, but as factors promoting learning and performance. IPOs should invest more time in their relationships up, down and across the programme than they spend in managing money. A particular challenge in AGIR is to strengthen relations between CBOs in Maputo and in the provinces, with the former having a comparative advantage in being close to centres of (political) power, and the latter in having closer relations with the ultimate target groups. A small budget does not necessarily constitute a major constraint to making a difference in advocacy. It is how the money is spent that matters. It should also be explored how to use IPOs networks to promote regional and international networking, which is on demand in some POs. Relationship building rather than financial management should be a major concern for AGIR.

**The elusive craft of evaluating advocacy**

Advocacy requires an approach to evaluation and a way of thinking about success, failure, progress, and best practices that is different from projects delivering services. The relationship between the work done as part of an advocacy effort, and the results or signs of progress is complex and non-linear. Similar resources and strategies may generate very different results. Sometimes outputs are reasonably proximate and traceable to inputs, but sometimes results are quite indirectly related and take several years to come to fruition. Advocacy work requires considerable efforts that may seem wasted, in that it may turn out not to have been essential to the final outcome. This ‘waste’, however, is often unavoidable, because neither donors nor the organisations they support can know which strategy will be most effective – and efforts and relations may also have positive unintended effects.

**From attribution to contribution**

It is difficult – and often impossible and unnecessary – to accurately attribute the outcome of any advocacy project to a particular organisation or intervention since much of its success or failure may be due to the presence or absence of spill overs from other areas and actors. Attribution in advocacy evaluation runs up against some profound obstacles, the most important being structural forces and the density of organisational activity around any issue. What is possible is to carefully account for the various actors that are involved in a particular advocacy, position the particular AGIR/IPO/PO efforts in such a context – and then demonstrate the contribution of own activities to all or parts of the final outcome/impact.
The challenge with replication
The fact that one organisation succeeded with a particular strategy may be a
function of the enthusiasm or skill with which it was implemented, rather than its
general applicability. What worked yesterday may not work tomorrow. Despite the
number of organisations that will present themselves as the decisive force behind any
legislative accomplishment, no successful advocacy effort is the result of any one
organisation or initiative. This does not mean that IPOs and POs in the AGIR
programme cannot learn from each other, but that the experiences and lessons from
one advocacy activity or intervention must be carefully adjusted to the particular
circumstances in which the partner organisation works.

What is a good advocacy organisation
In conclusion and based on reflection from this evaluation, we believe that good
advocacy is the product of how an organisation thinks and acts collectively. A good
advocacy organisation has a coherent and inspiring internal culture, the ability to
consistently identify and motivate talented people, deliberate as a group, acquire
intelligence on the environment and process it intelligently, and to devise sometimes
unexpected responses and to effectively coordinate its actions. In addition, such
organisations have the ability to innovate and reorganize when their key tactics have
grown stale or have been proven to be ineffective—in short, to learn and reallocate
capital internally in response to feedback. Several of the IPOs/POs involved in AGIR
are close to fulfilling such requirements. While size and general level of
qualifications are important, there are also smaller CSOs working at the
province/district/community level who compensate with close and constructive
relations with local authorities and a thorough understanding of local conditions.
There are, however, also CSOs who do not seem to have the critical mass necessary
to relate to the government- and other institutions that they are to direct their
advocacy towards.
5 Recommendations

On the basis of the preceding mid-term evaluation of AGIR II, the evaluation team presents two types of recommendations:

1. Operational recommendations to be implemented in the remaining period of the current programme period (2018-2020).
2. Overarching recommendations through a set of scenarios or alternative ways to design and organise a possible future AGIR III programme.

5.1 SHORT-TERM RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The results frameworks should be revisited. For the remaining part of the AGIR programme, the current list of indicators should be critically assessed. A separate report could be produced in collaboration between the four IPOs and with reference to the recommendations in the current evaluation. Political and socio-economic changes have significantly influenced the likelihood of achieving expected results. This does not necessarily mean that ambitions should be reduced, but that new/innovative ways of working should be found. (IPOs take the lead in consultation with donors).

2. The overarching reports for 2017 to 2020 could be dropped in their current form. One alternative is to write a short separate report monitoring and analysing relevant data at the national/aggregate level, that can be used as points of reference for the lower-level reporting. The task could be given to the research-based POs. (IPOs take the lead in consultation with donors).

3. At the level of IPOs, monitoring should more explicitly combine qualitative and quantitative indicators by (a) lifting up a limited number of narrative analyses included in the reporting from POs in a specific format and (b) focus on quantitative indicators that are measurable. (IPOs take the lead in consultation with donors).

4. Annual reports should include an analysis and assessment of the PO partner, since the selection and composition of partner organisations is crucial for programme performance. This could be a combination of a ‘self-assessment’ where each PO responds to a limited number of institutional performance indicators, and an overall assessment done by the PO. This should be the basis for an individual annual meeting between the IPO and its partners. (IPOs take the lead in consultation with donors).
5. Continue with small/agile/innovative funding modalities, but simplify their procedures.

6. The current number of POs is high, with strong variations in competence and capacity. A process towards reducing the number should be initiated, by separating between (a) organisations that are assessed to be sustainable and relevant for continued support after AGIR II and (b) those that still do not have the necessary capacity to ‘graduate’ and should be phased out by giving funding for specific projects that can be terminated by the end of AGIR II. (Donors in consultation with IPOs).

7. In the process of selecting the CSOs eligible for continued support post AGIR II, care should be taken to find a balance between Maputo- and provincially based organisations. Ideally, one CSO in each of the provinces where AGIR is active should be identified as candidate to play an intermediary/lead agency role in a possible AGIR III in order to secure a more decentralised programme closer to the ultimate beneficiaries. (IPOs take the lead in consultation with donors).

8. More efforts should be given to coordinate with other donors supporting civil society in the remaining phase of AGIR II – particularly those involved in similar advocacy programmes in order to reduce transaction costs (multiple/different reporting requirements), avoid overlaps in funding and overstretching the capacity of the best POs. At the same time, AGIR and the other likeminded programmes should develop a strategy for the eventuality that the new Law of Associations will copy Ethiopia and an increasing number of other African countries and put a cap on the proportion of external funding allowed for CSOs working through political advocacy (there is no similar cap on CSOs working with service delivery). (Donors).

9. Assessments should finally be made of the relevance/possible advantages of including new donor(s) to substitute Denmark that is in the process of terminating engagements in Mozambique. More donors will have the advantage not only of reducing risks related to the continued funding of the programme (in case Sweden should decide to reduce its engagement), but will also broaden the scope/experiences of the AGIR donors. Norway would be one candidate, with current political signals of increasing support to civil society in Africa substantially (such support currently represents 25 percent of the country’s total ODA of 36bn NOK). (Donors).
5.2 FUTURE SCENARIOS

The AGIR programme started in 2010 and will in 2020 have lasted for ten years. There have been no major changes in programme design and approach during this period. This evaluation has documented several positive results and developments, but the programme still suffers from internal and external inefficiencies. However, the most critical and difficult question is to what extent there is a need for change so that the same resources could be used more efficiently and effectively in the future.

The recommendation mainly to the donors and IPOs is to start discussing the future AGIR III in such a perspective. The options are presented as food for thought – as contributions informed by findings and observations from this evaluation, but also from the evaluators experience in other countries. The scenarios are not necessarily mutually exclusive and a combination of them is possible. The scenarios are of a broad strategic nature – from incremental changes to major reforms:

(a) Make the sub programmes more independent

Remove the overarching objectives and common results framework from AGIR and make it into four independent sub programmes with their own objectives and results. Common and shared services and activities between the sub programmes in terms of administrative as well as professional support can be continued based on needs. Sub programme results should not be aggregated to an overall programme level. Such a scenario also reflects the actual situation – that the overarching framework is not functional and adds more problems than value. AGIR III may become more effective and focussed being organised as four sub programmes possibly with a common ‘secretariat’ for administrative and professional support.

(b) Fewer and more realistic objectives

The first scenario can be combined with introducing fewer objectives and address a set of more manageable problem areas for each sub programme for which there is experience/evidence of workable solutions. The programme will perform better if it has more measurable goals with clearer links between efforts and results. The programme should measure outputs and short-term outcomes through qualitative and quantitative indicators, while long-term policy outcomes and impact should be measured/analysed separately against relevant indicators at national level putting the CSO contributions in context (i.e. together with international trends, Mozambique’s political economy, the private sector etc.). With this, it will be recognised that civil society has important contributions to change without a futile search for attribution.

(c) More concentration

The second scenario can also be combined with more geographical and thematic concentration and fewer partner organisations. The current programme has no clear policies/strategies on the relative importance of each of the three variables. Resources are spread to provinces, a large number of thematic areas/cross cutting issues and organisations which lead to a highly fragmented programme. A stronger focus and concentration in terms of geography/thematic areas and partners have the potential to
be more effective. In such a scenario, it would be possible to differentiate between different types of programmes – e.g. establish separate funding modalities for different types of organisations: (a) Highly professional/strong Maputo based CSOs, (b) National/local networks, (c) Provincial/district based CSOs in need of more capacity strengthening. It is essential to establish a separate modality for reaching more provincial and local level CSOs – if this becomes a priority.

(d) Nationalise and differentiate the selection of intermediary organisations

AGIR I and II have used international CSOs as intermediary organisations – with a strong Mozambican component in terms of staff also in management positions. Such a model should be further reviewed in terms of added value and costs. While the ‘nationalisation’ of the IPOs in terms of staff is commendable, systematic assessments should still be made as to what extent national CSOs may have “graduated” to a level of competence and capacity where they can become future IPOs in their own right. Several and more differentiated models could also here be included – one with national CSOs as IPOs for a selection of partner organisations and another where international POs continue as IPOs based on their comparative advantages (special competence) and PO needs.

(e) Establish a competitive civil society multi-donor trust fund

The level of effective coordination between donor support to civil society in Mozambique is low, and several parallel programmes exist. The current programme set-up could be substituted with a multi-donor fund of a type established in other countries. The fund will be led by a common secretariat and a governing board with representatives from donors and civil society, screening proposals and taking funding decisions. The fund may have several thematic priorities/sub programmes, and should support a combination of short-term (1-2 years) projects and longer-term (3-5 year) programmes. National and local level CSOs apply for funding based on technical, budgetary and time guidelines, with openings for entering into partnership with external/international partners. The Secretariat reviews all proposals and suggest/decline funding. The Secretariat is responsible for monitoring and evaluation and may also provide advice and capacity strengthening to national CSOs.
Annex 1: Terms of Reference

Mid-term evaluation of Swedish government funded Civil Society support through the AGIR II Programme in Mozambique 2014-2020, in cooperation with the Embassy of Denmark, and the Embassy of the Netherlands.

1. Evaluation purpose: Intended use and intended users

The purpose or intended use of the evaluation is:

- To help the donors (The Embassies of Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands) and their partners (Oxfam IBIS, Oxfam Novib, Diakonia and We Effect) to assess progress of the on-going programme AGIR II to learn from what works well and less well to inform decisions on how project implementation may be adjusted and improved. Furthermore, the purpose is to provide the donors and their partners with an input to upcoming discussions concerning the preparation of a possible new phase of the AGIR programme.
- To advice on changes needed in the program guidelines and in the general functioning of the program.

The primary intended users of the evaluation are:

- The programme management team at partners organisations (IPOs and its POs) the programme management team at Embassies of Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands,
- The Civil society unit and Africa department at Sida HQ assessing civil society support in Mozambique.

The evaluation is to be designed, conducted and reported to meet the needs of the intended users and tenderers shall elaborate on how this will be ensured during the evaluation process. the embassy of Sweden will be responsible for keeping all parts informed on the evaluation process.

2. Evaluation object and scope

The evaluation object is the AGIR II programme December 2014- December 2020. The time to be evaluated is December 2014- December 2017.

Programme description:

The Swedish support to civil society in Mozambique is structured through a program called AGIR whereby four international NGOs (INGOs, hereby called IPOs-Intermediaries partner organisations) with a common overall objective, support Mozambican local partner organisations (from now POs). The first phase of the program started in 2010, the current ongoing second phase covers six years.
ANNEX 1: TERMS OF REFERENCE

(December 2014 - December 2020), attached. The Mid-term review evaluation will cover the 3 first years of the second phase (December 2014 - December 2017)

The joint overall objective of AGIR II is: “A Mozambican society where its citizens, particularly the most marginalized groups, fully enjoy their rights to inclusion and equity, to redistribution of wealth created from the country’s patrimony, to accessible and affordable public services of good quality, to basic civil freedoms and to political representation and participation; in a peaceful and ecologically sustainable environment”.

The four IPOs are Oxfam IBIS, Oxfam Novib, Diakonia and the We Effect, and they implement four “sub-programs”, as follows:

**Diakonia**: focuses on the right to free and fair elections, multi-party democracy, and defence of the human rights of marginalised groups such as women, children and disabled, on legal assistance, SRHR and gender-based violence.

**Oxfam IBIS**: focuses on right to access to information, support to media including investigative journalism, support and strengthening to parliaments at all levels, and support to community based change agents specially regarding monitoring the quality and coverage of the public services.

**Oxfam Novib**: focuses on budget monitoring, expenditure tracking, social audits, tax justice, state resource allocation, SRHR and gender-based violence, defence of marginalised groups such as LGBT29 and PLWA30s.

**We Effect**: focuses on rights connected to land and natural resources, on direct impact of extractive industries on surrounding communities, rural development policies, climate change and environment.

Sweden has individual agreements with the four IPOs, but the program is considered as a whole and parts of the activities and the reporting are done jointly. The embassies of Netherlands and Denmark delegated funds to Sweden for the programme. All the four sub-programmes work towards both an individual and a common results framework where each IPO’s operations contribute to the overarching goal for the AGIR-programme. Each of the “sub-programs” has established partnerships with a number of local CSO partners active in the specific thematic area. Each partnership is regulated by agreement between the IPO and the local partner organisation (PO). The nucleus of these partnerships should be core-funding, with a strong focus on capacity development.

The overall objectives with this programme, in line with Sweden’s development cooperation strategy with Mozambique, and in accordance with Netherlands and Denmark’s cooperation decisions for Mozambique; are to strengthen the capacity and increase the space for civil society to demand respect for human rights, to demand accountability for political and economic decisions that affect their lives and the

29 Lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender.
30 People living with HIV and AIDS.
environment within which they live, and to increase women's and men's access to information about such decisions, since this is a prerequisite for claiming rights, as well as for participating and demanding accountability. This is done by supporting the intermediaries to:

a) Provide long term core-funding and capacity development support to civil society partner organisations, based on these organisations’ own strategic plans.

b) Support and facilitate linkages, mutual learning and knowledge and experience sharing between civil society organisations.

c) Actively promote the implementation of the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action in relation to civil society (“good donorship”).

Sweden is - the main and also lead donor to the AGIR program. Denmark supports one intermediary (We Effect) and the Netherlands support two intermediaries (Diakonia and Oxfam Novib).

The scope of the evaluation is:

The implementation of the AGIR programme phase II, during December 2014-December 2017 for a total amount of 442 886 800SEK approx. (Sweden approx. 361.929.495 SEK, Netherlands approx 52 260 615 SEK and Denmark approx 28.696.690 SEK) during the evaluation period, invested to support Moçambique civil society organisations at national, provincial and district levels. The main targets groups are men, women, and youth.

For further information, the programme/programme proposal is attached as Annex D.

3. Evaluation objective and questions

The objective of this mid-term evaluation is to assess the, relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, sustainability and results of AGIR II, to formulate recommendations on how project implementation may be adjusted, and to serve as input to discussions on how to better address continued support to the civil society in Mozambique”.

The specific evaluation questions are:

Relevance
1. To which extent has the programme addressed the rights and priorities of the beneficiaries? i.e. Have target groups participated in programme planning, implementation and follow up? Has anti-discrimination measures being implemented by the programme? Has the programme been implemented in an open and transparent fashion? Are there accountability mechanisms in the programme?

2. Has the programme been implemented in accordance with the human rights based approach? i.e. Does the program further the realisation of human rights as laid down in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international human rights instruments? Do human rights standards contained in, and principles derived from, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international human rights instruments guide all phases of the programming process? Does the
program contribute to the development of the capacities of ‘duty-bearers’ to meet their obligations and/or of ‘rights-holders’ to claim their human rights?

3. Has the programme been implemented with Result based management approach? Has cross cutting issues been taken into consideration in the programme implementation? as the programme been designed and implemented in a conflict sensitive manner? Has the programme had any positive or negative effects on gender equality? Has the programme had any positive or negative effects on the environment?

4. To what extent is poverty, in its different dimensions, addressed in the design, implementation and follow up of the intervention?

**Efficiency**

5. Can the costs for the programme be justified by its preliminary results?

6. Are the current AGIR IPOs quality assurance mechanisms and guidelines/regulations effectively used in practice? Has the management of risk been adequate considering the context?

**Effectiveness**

7. Is the implementation and the monitoring system of the programme effective/ cost effective?

8. Is the partners composition (IPOs and POs) adequate to reach expected results?

9. Are POs developing adequate advocacy skills and strategies? Are POs using effectively the existing spaces for policy dialogue?

10. Is the programme contributing to strengthening synergies and relations between CSOs within AGIR and or outside AGIR at local regional/national level?

11. What role have the small fund grants played to contribute to the programme results?

12. Is the relation between local partners (POs) and IPOs good and effective, fostering the base for reaching the expected programme results?

13. Is the AGIR programme model effective in terms of back donor management? i.e. more time for embassy officers to focus on content and qualitative follow-up of local partner organisations?

14. Are there any unplanned results that have affected the programme either positively and or negatively?

**Sustainability**

15. Is it likely that the benefits of the programme (capacities developed; linkages, mutual learning and knowledge and experience sharing; and good cs0 donorship) are sustainable? What are the main factors/components that can influence or contribute to ensure the sustainability of CSO in Mozambique? Is the AGIR sustainability plan addressing those factors correctly?

16. Is the programme contributing to local CSO (referring to POs but not exclusively) improved internal democracy and management?
17. Is the level of interaction and co-operation amongst the intermediaries effective? Do the IPOs recognize themselves as active partners in a joint initiative? Do the IPOs take advantage of their individual capacities to reach optimized results?

18. Who has the ownership of the intervention?

19. To what extent have national, regional (Mozambique level) and local collaborations amongst civil society organisations been established?

Questions are expected to be organised and developed in the tender by the tenderer and further developed during the inception phase of the evaluation. Answers are expected to be developed with recommendations for improvement.

4. Methodology and methods for data collection and analysis

It is expected that the evaluator describes and justifies an appropriate methodology and methods for data collection in the tender. The Embassy of Sweden would like to encourage a mixed methods approach (qualitative and quantitative approaches to theory, data collection, data analysis and interpretation). Further, the Embassy of Sweden would encourage participatory methods. The evaluation design, methodology and methods for data collection and analysis are expected to be fully presented in the inception report.

Sida’s approach to evaluation is utilization-focused which means the evaluator should facilitate the entire evaluation process with careful consideration of how everything that is done will affect the use of the evaluation. It is therefore expected that the evaluators, in their tender, present i) how intended users are to participate in and contribute to the evaluation process and ii) methodology and methods for data collection that create space for reflection, discussion and learning between the intended users of the evaluation, iii) field visits and dissemination activities.

Evaluators should take into consideration appropriate measures for collecting data in cases where sensitive or confidential issues are addressed, and avoid presenting information that may be harmful to some stakeholder groups.

The Mid Term evaluation process is seen as a process of learning and improvement and thus participatory methods are perceived critical. This implies that representative samples of stakeholders (such as other donors, IPOs coordinators; CSO researchers; among others) should be consulted. The evaluators should describe the groups (gender disaggregated data) that have been consulted and why they were selected. It is important that “second opinions” are gathered from other sources than actors involved in the program.

5. Organisation of evaluation management

This evaluation is commissioned by the Embassy of Sweden in Maputo. The intended user(s) are The Embassy of Sweden in Maputo, The Embassy of Denmark in Maputo, the Embassy of the Netherlands in Maputo, the Civil Society Unit, and the Africa Department at Sida’s Office in Stockholm, and the AGIR II partners (IPOs and POs) The intended users of the evaluation form a steering group which has contributed to and agreed on the ToR for this evaluation. The role of the steering group is to evaluate tenders and approve the inception report and the final report of
the evaluation. The steering group will be participating in the start-up meeting of the evaluation as well as in the debriefing workshop where preliminary findings and conclusions are discussed.

6. Evaluation quality

All Sida's evaluations shall conform to OECD/DAC’s Quality Standards for Development Evaluation\(^{31}\). The evaluators shall use the Sida OECD/DAC Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation\(^{32}\). The evaluators shall specify how quality assurance will be handled by them during the evaluation process.

7. Time schedule and deliverables

It is expected that a time and work plan is presented in the tender and further detailed in the inception report. The evaluation shall be carried out between 2nd of November 2017 and 28 of February 2018. The timing of any field visits, surveys and interviews need to be settled by the evaluator in dialogue with the main stakeholders during the inception phase.

The table below lists key deliverables for the evaluation process. Please note that the dates are desirable but can have minor modifications (to earlier dates if possible and convenient for both parts).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Deliverables</th>
<th>Participants</th>
<th>Deadlines</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Start-up meeting via video call.</td>
<td>Evaluators, Steering committee (Embassies, AGIR ICC representative, Sida Civil Society Unit)</td>
<td>2 of November 2017.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Draft inception report</td>
<td>Evaluators</td>
<td>20 of November 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Steering Committees response to the draft inception report</td>
<td>Steering committee (Embassies, AGIR ICC representative, Sida Civil Society Unit)</td>
<td>24 of November 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Inception meeting video call.</td>
<td>Evaluators, Steering committee (Embassies, AGIR ICC representative, Sida Civil Society Unit)</td>
<td>27 of November 2017</td>
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</tbody>
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32 Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results Based Management, Sida in cooperation with OECD/DAC, 2014.
The inception report will form the basis for the continued evaluation process and shall be approved by steering committee before the evaluation proceeds to implementation. The inception report should be written in English and cover evaluability issues and interpretations of evaluation questions, present the methodology, methods for data collection and analysis as well as the full evaluation design. A specific time and work plan for the remainder of the evaluation should be presented which also cater for the need to create space for reflection and learning between the intended users of the evaluation.

The final report shall be written in English, and be professionally proof read. The final report should have clear structure and follow the report format in the Sida Decentralised Evaluation Report Template for decentralised evaluations (see Annex C). The methodology used shall be described and explained, and all limitations shall be made explicit and the consequences of these limitations discussed. Findings shall flow logically from the data, showing a clear line of evidence to support the conclusions. Conclusions should be substantiated by findings and analysis. Recommendations and lessons learned should flow logically from conclusions. Recommendations should be specific, directed to relevant stakeholders and categorised as a short-term, medium-term and long-term. The report should be no
more than 35 pages excluding annexes. The evaluator shall adhere to the Sida OECD/DAC Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation.

The evaluator shall, upon approval of the final report, insert the report into the Sida Decentralised Evaluation Report for decentralised evaluations and submit it to Sitrus (in pdf-format) for publication and release in the Sida publication database. The order is placed by sending the approved report to sida@sitrus.com, always with a copy to the Sida Programme Officer as well as Sida’s evaluation unit (evaluation@sida.se). Write “Sida decentralised evaluations” in the email subject field and include the name of the consulting company as well as the full evaluation title in the email. For invoicing purposes, the evaluator needs to include the invoice reference “ZZ610601S,” type of allocation "sakanslag" and type of order "digital publicering/publikationsdatabas.

8. Evaluation Team Qualification

In addition to the qualifications already stated in the framework agreement for evaluation services, the evaluation team shall include the following competencies:

- Extensive relevant professional experience from development cooperation in the areas of democracy, accountability, human rights, governance, gender equality, national resource management and/or civil society support.
- Knowledge of Portuguese
- Knowledge of other local languages is an asset.
- Experience working in Mozambique
- Experience working with Sida

It is desirable that the evaluation team includes the following competencies

- Knowledge of Mozambique local languages.

For team members that are not core team members, or a quality assurance team member, a CV shall be included in the call-off response and contain full description of the evaluators’ qualifications and professional work experience.

It is important that the competencies of the individual team members are complimentary. It is highly recommended that local consultants are included in the team.

The evaluators must be independent from the evaluation object and evaluated activities, and have no stake in the outcome of the evaluation.
9. Resources

The maximum budget amount available for the evaluation is SEK 1.000.000.- including fees and reimbursables.

The Program Officer/contact person at Sida/Swedish Embassy is Lucy Andrade, Programme Officer for Democaray and Human Rights at the Embassy of Sweden in Maputo. The contact person should be consulted if any problems arise during the evaluation process.

Relevant Sida documentation will be provided by Lucy Andrade, Programme Officer for Democaray and Human Rights at the Embassy of Sweden in Maputo.

Contact details to intended users (cooperation partners, Swedish Embassies, other donors etc.) will be provided by Lucy Andrade, Programme Officer for Democaray and Human Rights at the Embassy of Sweden in Maputo.

The evaluator will be required to arrange the logistics for travel, visa, accommodation, preparing interviews and any other issue regarding logistics.
Annex 2: References


Neilson, Stephanie (2001). IDRC-supported research and its influence on public policy. Evaluation Unit IDRC. Ottawa: IDRC


Swedish Embassy (2013). Management Response to AGIR Mid-Term Review. Maputo: Swedish Embassy


Swedish Embassy (2014b). Grant Agreement with IBIS. Maputo: Swedish Embassy


Swedish Embassy (2014d). Grant Agreement with We Effect. Maputo: Swedish Embassy


We Effect (2015). Natural resources, agriculture, climate change and environment (NACE). Sub-programme, AGIR Phase II.
Annex 3: List of persons interviewed

Abel Manhique, Programme Officer, ANAMM
Adélia Raimundo, administrative staff, NAFEZA
Adriano Nuvunga, Executive Director, CIP
Alda Salomão, Legal Advisor, Centro Terra Viva
Alice Muianga, programme officer, Kukumbi
Alves Manhiça, Finance Officer, AICE
Ana Cláudia Machava, Administrative assistant, AICE
Ana Maria Loforte, WLSA
Anabela Rodrigues, Country Director, WWF Mozambique
Anabella Lemos, Board Director, Justicia Ambiental
Andes Chivangue, Budget Monitoring Forum
Angelo Amaro, Executive Director, Kukumbi
Antoinette Van Vugt, former coordinator, Oxfam Novib
Antonio Armando, Head of Department of Environment Education, MITADER
António Zumbira, Director Quelimane Radio (a FORCOM member)
Arlanza Dias, Director, CEDIMO, MAEFP
Augusto Uamusse, Programme Officer, AICE
Bartolomeu António, Project coordinator, UNAC.
Camilo da Silva, MozApp
Camilo Nhancale, Executive Director, Kuwuka
Candida Quintano, NAFEZA, Executive Director
Carla Pereira, Technician, MITADER/Climate change Department
Catherine Berard, First Secretary, Canadian Embassy
Celia Ennosse, Programme Officer, We Effect
Claudino Tivane, Multimedia Assistant, CAICC
Clotilde Couto, Programme Officer, Kukumbi
Cristina Achimo, Project Officer, AMME
Daniel Mugaveta, Communication Assistant, Kukumbi
Denise Namburete, Executive Director, N’Weti
Diamantino Nhampossa, Programme Director, We Effect
Dino Paiva, Coordinator M&E, NAFEZA
Douglas Madjila, Permanent Secretary, Youth Parliament
Eduardo Nguenha, Executive Director, ANAMM
Efraim Matsolo, ICT technician, CAICC
Eleasara Antunes, Policy Officer Social Protection, Gender and HIV/AIDS, Netherlands Embassy
Elisa Mucavele, Small grants beneficiary, Progreso.
Elisa Mutisse, Head of Department of Gender Promotion, Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Assistance
Elisabeth Sequeira, Chair of Progresso,
Elvira Matsinhe, AGIR sub-programme coordinator, Oxfam Novib
Elvira Matsuke, Programme Coordinator, OXFAM Novib
Emanuel Mavie, Director, Ministry of State Administration and Public Service (MAEFP)
Emma Norrstad Tickner, M&E Officer, We Effect
Fauzia, Financial Control, We Effect
Ericino de Salema, former Coordinator AICE
Ernesto Saúl, Programme Director, FORCOM
Esménia Naiene, Headquarters Staff, UNAC
Eusebio Teodoro, Senior Officer, Oil and Gas, WWF Mozambique
Fernanda Farinha, Critical friend
Filipa Carimo, Project Officer, AMME
Filipe Alexandre, M&E officer, NADEC
Flaida Macheze, Gender Programme Officer, UNAC
Francisco Sambo, Head of Department of Climate Change Meeting Ministry of Land, Environment and Rural Development (MITADER),
Franzia Pereira, Financial Controller, We Effect
Gilberto Mendes, Gungu Executive Director, Small Grants
Hélder Gonçalves de Araújo, Director, Education Technology and Youth District Services of Quelimane
Helena Chiquele, Gender Officer, AICE
Henriques Jarre (focal point, General Education), Education Technology and Youth District Services
Hipólito Benfica, President, NADEC
Hodhaifo Gulamo, Finance Officer, OXFAM Novib
Inácio Manuel, Coordinator, Training Team and Supervision, UNAC.
Iazalde Martins, Helpdesk Manager, CAICC
Jaime Abudo, Programme Manager, AMME
Jaime Pinto, Financial Management, Radio Quelimane
Janice Lemos, Gender advisor, Justicia Ambiental
Jeremias Benjamim, Governance Programme, NANA
Jeremias Langa, Critical friend Journalist
João Feijó, Coordinator, Technical Council, OMR
Joao Mosca, Executive Director, OMR
Jonas Pohlman, Governance Advisor, DFID
Jorge Cardoso, Executive Director, NANA
Josefa Brás, Programme Office, AMME
Jose Muianga, Resettlement expert, National Directorate for Land (DINATER)
Josué Muchanga, Senior Finance Officer, AICE
Júlia Zita, Monitoring, Evaluation, accountability and learning officer, Oxfam Novib
Laurence Burckel, Manager, PAANE
Lázaro Bamo, Coordinator, CAICC
Lázaro Sampo, representative, CESC, Zambézia
Lucy Andrade, Acting Programme Coordinator, Swedish Embassy
Luís Muchanga, Executive Director, UNAC.
Margarida Martins, Staff member, OMR
Maria Bernadete Miguel, Administration and Finance Manager, AMME
Maria Isabel Ligonha, Directora Executiva, AMME
Maria Manuela Kataoo, Coordinator of Administration and Finance, AMME
Miguel Rombe, Development Officer, Canadian Embassy
Mutifoco General Director, MozApp
Naldo Chivite, Communication Officer, FORCOM
Natália Zimba, Senior Financial and Administrative officer, Diakonia,
Neide Marinho, District Officer, AMME
Nazario Paunde, Communication Officer, AMME
Odete Pedro, coordinator of two areas (de olho na política and sustainable resources);
Paula Monjane, Executive Director, CESC
Paulina Inácio, financial officer, NAFEZA
Paulina Macamo, Administration and Finance Officer, CAICC
Paulino Chinunga, Financial Officer, NADEC
Philippe Machon, Grants Manager, MASC
Piergiorgio Calistri, Civil society advisor, European Union
Pilatos Matusse, Coordinator, NADEC
Quitéria Guirrengane, Programme Manager, Youth Parliament
Rebecca Mabui, President, UPCM
Rosália Pedro, MITADER
Salvador Forquilha, Executive Director, IESE
Sara dos Sitoe, M&E officer, CAICC
Sélcia Lumbela, AICE Programme Coordinator
Sulton Escarma, Administrative Assistant, CAICC
Tania Pereira, Programme Director, Terra Nova
Tânia, Programme Coordinator, Centro Terra Viva
Terezinha da Silva, WLSA
Teresa Sumbane, Secretary, UPCM
Vitor Amade, Financial Officer, ANAMM
William Mulhovo, Senior Programme Office, Diakonia
Yolanda Sithoe, Gender and SRHR Programme Officer, OXFAM Novib
Zénia Cardoso, staff, UPC
### Annex 4: Budgets and disbursed funds

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<td><strong>Budget</strong></td>
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<td>25 000 000</td>
<td>38 000 000</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Oxfam Novib</strong></td>
<td>53 500 000</td>
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<td>58 051 000</td>
<td>57 051 000</td>
<td>138 500 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Diakonia</strong></td>
<td>39 617 400</td>
<td>49 617 400</td>
<td>33 500 000</td>
<td>23 500 000</td>
<td>47 324 154</td>
<td>170 058 249</td>
<td>112 734 800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>We Effect</strong></td>
<td>24 147 000</td>
<td>26 170 000</td>
<td>18 669 000</td>
<td>11 335 000</td>
<td>32 333 615</td>
<td>30 537 995</td>
<td>61 652 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub total</strong></td>
<td>147 264 400</td>
<td>170 787 400</td>
<td>126 169 000</td>
<td>84 835 000</td>
<td>178 402 793</td>
<td>123 284 615</td>
<td>862 497 203</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total Swedish contributions 2015-2020: 147 264 400
Total Danish contributions We Effect: 11 185 225
Total Dutch contributions Novib: 11 541 240
Total Dutch contributions Diakonia: 9 617 400
Annex 5: AGIR II objectives and theories of change

The overall objective of AGIR II is: “A Mozambican society where its citizens, particularly the most marginalized groups, fully enjoy their rights to inclusion and equity, to redistribution of wealth created from the country’s patrimony, to accessible and affordable public services of good quality, to basic civil freedoms and to political representation and participation; in a peaceful and ecologically sustainable environment” (Programme Proposal AGIR II, 2015).

The indicators for this objective include national improvements in social- and gender development indexes, poverty reduction and coverage of key public services, progress in achievement of SDGs, human freedom, democracy and governance indexes (AGIR 2015) (see box below).

Indicators for these goals are:
- Increase in gender development index, above the SADC countries’ average (mid-term target: +3%; end-term target: 10%).
- Increase in social institutions and gender index, above the SADC countries’ average (mid-term target: +3%; end-term target: 10%).
- Increase in social development index, above the SADC countries’ average (mid-term target: +2%; end-term target: +5%).
- Coverage of strategic poverty reduction and key public services operational budget from tax revenues (mid-term target: 40%; end-term target: 95%).
- Progress towards linearly extrapolated (post-2015) MDGs, above the SADC countries’ average (mid-term target: +5%; end-term target: +20%).
- Increase in human freedom index, above the SADC countries’ average (mid-term target: +5%; end-term target: +15%).
- Increase in democracy index, above the SADC countries’ average (mid-term target: +5%; end-term target: +15%).
- Increase in African governance index, above the SADC countries’ average (mid-term target: +3%; end-term target: +10%).

The long-term objectives for the programme are (AGIR 2015):
1. The extractive sector in Mozambique is transparent, responsible and accountable (fiscally, economically, environmentally and socially) and contributes as a result significantly to the socio economic development of the country.
2. Female and male parliamentarians at sub national levels playing their oversight role and demanding accountability from the executive.
3. Female and male rights-holders and CSOs are able to make evidence based suggestions to the improvement of quality and coverage of services in health and education sector in selected provinces and local governments.


The specific long-term outcomes are specified in the result framework (AGIR 2015&IPO programme documents). They should coincide with the outcomes in the IPOs’ sub-programmes. Indicators and targets have been harmonised in order to make them compatible to each other.

The overarching framework comes with quantified and verifiable indicators that seek to aggregate the long-term outcomes of sub-programmes that relate to five main rights-based challenges.

The themes or rights are:

- The right to inclusion and equity.
- The right to retribution of wealth created from the country’s patrimony.
- The right to accessible and affordable public services of good quality.
- The right to basic civil freedoms and enjoyment of the rule of law.
- The right to political representation and participation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators for the final outcomes are:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Number of CSOs who score positive on their governance, social legitimacy, management, financial systems and sustainability assessments (mid-term target: 45%; end-term target: 95%).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Number of CSOs whose campaigns reach more than 85% of their strategies targets for two consecutive years (mid-term target: 20%; end-term target: 85%).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Number of CSOs whose campaigns were designed in direct and decisive participation with (a representation from) the right holders (of the right holders’ choice) (mid-term target: 70%; end-term target: 100%).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Number of CSOs who are regularly (at least once a month) invited by duty bearers to contribute to relevant documents (e.g. poverty reduction)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition to the overarching results framework for the AGIR II programme, there are separate frameworks for the four sub-programmes implemented by each of the four IPO (refs). The objectives and long-term outcomes for each IPO/sub-programme should be in line with and support the objectives and outcomes in the results frameworks for the AGIR II programme as a whole (see above).

**Theories of change**

AGIR II aims at enabling civil society organisations to bring about structural and sustainable changes that improve the optimal fulfilment of Mozambicans’ rights to inclusion and equity; retribution of wealth created from the country’s patrimony; accessible and affordable public services of good quality; basic civil freedoms; and political representation and participation (AGIR 2015).
The programme actually has two theories of change:
(a) A theory on how partner organisations’ capacity can be enhanced to increase their effectiveness and relevance as civil society organizations, and
(b) a theory on how the partner organisations can bring about such structural and sustainable change.

The first theory is in essence a theory about organisational and institutional development. The second one is about social change dynamics. The ToCs are built on several explicit assumptions such as:

- Relative peace and stability in Mozambique and that international and national CSOs will be able to continue to operate freely in the country for the next six years.
- That a major part of the progressive legislation and policies will lead to a changed implementation practice.
- That governance and leadership styles will not change fundamentally, and that especially the media, right holder representations and socially legitimate civil society organisations will manage to play a more pronounced role in influencing the policies and policy-implementation practice, and in questioning the underlying causes for exclusion and inequality.
- That politicians are sensitive to evidence-based advocacy and dialogue, when right holders are mobilised in big numbers or when the public opinion is very pronounced on issues.
- That CSO partners will further mature in their organizational and institutional development.
- That the targeted partner NGOs manage to work effectively in alliances and coalitions and manage to mobilize all the civil forces that are required to provoke structural changes on the five priority rights.
- That normative values such as cultural behaviour are changeable, that norms values and beliefs can be influenced.
- That there will be a continued recovery in the world economy, continued donor commitment within the accountability area, and that the extractive resource economy actually becomes a reality in Mozambique.

**ToC for strengthening civil society organisations**

It is acknowledged that the organisational and institutional development of civil society organisations is not a linear and fully predictable process. The theory of change – with its steps and assumptions are formulated as follows (AGIR 2015):

- If civil society organizations have a proper social legitimacy with the rights-holders whose voice they channel and on whose behalf they undertake their advocacy and dialogue; and
- If they are well governed and managed and have an impeccable accountability reputation; and
• If they have a strategic vision, pick up the core issues and develop an insight in the dynamics of these issues they pursue and the dynamics of power surrounding them;
• If they are not distracted from their original mandate by donor priorities or short-term concerns; and
• Then they can formulate a coherent and relevant long-term strategy about what they want to achieve for the right-holders, formulate a theory of change and design advocacy and dialogue campaigns; and
• If they have the institutional resources to carry out these strategies; and
• If their staff’s professional capacity is developed in-practice;
• Then they are capable of staging an advocacy and dialogue practice; and
• Then they collect evidence and measure outcome, outreach and impact of their campaigns; and
• Then they learn from its results, revisit their context and actor analysis, ToCs and campaign strategies; and
• Then, they continue to read the context and the issues and pick out the rights issues, focus on the actors who can actually swing the duty bearers’ norms, policies and practices; and
• They adopt their strategies based on what they learned and the most likely scenarios they foresee happening
• Then they gradually improve their advocacy and dialogue practice; and
• Then they develop more and better knowledge than anyone else about what is happening among the right holders and have all the facts and figures and intrinsic details about the issues they wish to influence; and
• Then they become increasingly more mature and influential players; and
• If they then add the following strategic innovations to its advocacy practice:
  – They work in coalitions and alliances, where other complementary civil society actors cancel out their weaknesses, add additional networks, skills and entries, innovate the advocacy practice or scale it up
  – They horizontally and vertically link their advocacy and dialogue (articulating and acting at different levels and operating on different fronts),
  – They link up with other actors who can innovate their practice in terms of impact and outreach

34 This actually a circular loop where the CSOs individually and in alliances learn from their advocacy and dialogue practices, update their strategic analysis and sharpen their practice.
They focus their campaigns strategically (and do not wish to influence a lot of different issues at the same time)

- Then they are likely to strengthen their role and are recognized as key players in civil society; and
- Then they can easily be made sustainable.

This ToC is summarised as follows:

**ToC on effective social change**

Mozambican political and social context is acknowledged as fluid and hard to predict. Each year the IPOs should sit with the partner organisations and go through and update their analysis of the context.

The changes the CSO organisations (POs) pursue fall into three categories:

- **Policy practice changes**: Changes that are linked to making the duty bearers implement progressive policies and legal frameworks that have been adopted.
- **Policy changes**: Changes that are linked to convincing duty bearers to adopt new policies and legal frameworks for issues that are at play in society, but that have not yet been adequately regulated.
- **Normative changes**: Changes that are linked to norms, values and beliefs that inhibit duty bearers, but also other Mozambicans, to perceive them as problematic or unjust issues. This is typically the case with a lot of social exclusion and discrimination issues.
- The generic theory of change for policy practice looks as follows:
The main and assumptions are:

- If the right-holders are made aware of the rights that the policies, laws and ratified international protocols give them; and
- If they are mobilized and organised;
- Then they can monitor the implementation of these policies, collect evidence, file complaints and denounce cases when their rights are infringed or the promised services are below standard; and
- Then they can monitor the budgets and expenditures, track state revenues and pleas for better and more adequate budget allocations; and
- Then they (or the CSOs on their behalf) can take part in consultative and participation platforms and express the priorities that the duty-bearers’ plans, budgets and services should have; and even propose counter plans and counter budgets; or proposals to structurally gain more direct influence in the way services are provided;
- And if the CSOs effectively advocate and dialogue for these claims and proposals with the parliaments, policy-makers and the executive using hearings, petitions, shadow reports and many other advocacy and dialogue strategies; and
- If the CSOs engage media to mobilize public and political opinions and/or reach the key central and local political actors and convince them to change
their stance on budget allocations, policy practice priorities, and service delivery and accountability standards;

- Then progressive changes in the policy practice can be achieved: with better budget allocations for the issues and services that matter to the right holders.

IPO objectives and theories of change

OXFAM IBIS

The overall sub programme objective is:

- The Mozambican civil society, media and male and female rights holders have access to information, increased space, voice and capacity to intervene in public debate on policies and resource allocation related to extractive industries and public social services.

The four thematic priority areas, reflected in AICE’s Results Framework are:

- Strengthening CSOs to monitor, via ICT platforms, the process and impact of mineral and energetic resource extraction.
- Strengthening parliaments (at national, provincial and municipal level) to access relevant information for monitoring plans and budgets.
- Strengthening communities and CSOs in monitoring, via ICT platforms, quality and coverage of public services, notably primary education and health care.
- Strengthening media associations and their members in their organizational and professional capacities.

The long-term expected outcomes are:

- The extractive sector in Mozambique is transparent, responsible and accountable (fiscally, economically, environmentally and socially) and contributes as a result significantly to the socio economic development of the country.
- Female and male parliamentarians at sub national levels (provincial and local) playing their oversight role and demanding accountability from the executive.
- Female and male rights - holders and CSOs are able to make evidence based suggestions to the improvement of quality and coverage of services in health and education sector in selected provinces and local governments.
- Freedom of expression, press freedom and diversity and RTI guaranteed in law and respected in practice.

In the Annex to the Proposal there is an overview of objectives, outcomes, indicators and baselines.
IBIS will work with key actors of four levels:

(a) National CSOs or forums which work on influencing policy dialogue targeting the central government, but with suitable forms of representation or linkage with provincial or district associations, universities, etc.).

(b) Regional and/or provincial CSOs or forums/networks.

(c) District or municipal organizations, only aimed at having voice at those levels.

(d) CBOs or small associations.

**Target groups**

AICE’s target groups are the following:

- Individual rights holders across the country, but with particular focus on rural areas.
- Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) working on issues related to democratic governance in a rights based approach and human rights perspective.
- Community Based Organizations (CBOs) aimed at influencing the decision making process or monitoring public management in their locations.
- Journalists and media houses, with focus on independent media and democratization of public (TVM and RM) and local state media (local radios).
- Government and municipal officials, via their inclusion in some thematic trainings and awareness raising activities.
- Members of the 10 provincial assemblies and members of the 53 municipal assemblies, in general, and especially those from the four priority provinces (Zambézia, Tete, Nampula and Cabo Delgado), concretely the provincial capital cities and two districts/municipalities per targeted province.

**Theory of change**

IBIS explains initially that for the six-year period of AGIR II a diverse set of scenarios are perceivable, depending on the assumptions concerning key economic, political and social parameters as well as on the progress and outcomes of the conflict resolution process. Several scenarios are possible ranging from ‘chaos’ via a ‘strengthened Frelimo rule’ to ‘a reform initiative within a multi-party context’.

From the perspective of IBIS, it is assumed that CSO’s in Mozambique will increasingly face challenges, such as funding, capacity and invited/conquered space. On the other hand, new opportunities for CSO actors may emerge, which allow them to continue to play a role as agents for monitoring. The AICE programme follows the four generic models of change which are elaborated in the overarching proposal.

The illustration below from the IBIS proposal is an illustration of how AICE can play two different roles within the three generic models of ToCs.
Extractive Industries: CSO as Monitor of Change

The key role of CSO is to monitor compliance with established rules of the game, in all phases of an extractive project, for inclusive socio-economic development, through producing evidence, dissemination and debate. Under specific circumstances this monitoring role of CSO may lead, through advocacy, lobbying and national and international campaigning to a change of the rules of the game.

The illustration indicates that the CSOs play an important role as an agent and monitor of change. AICE’s expected contribution to change in Mozambique in the present context would imply a gradual move toward progress in achieving the objectives of the result framework. This implies that IBIS and its partners, through AICE will contribute to qualitative changes in the relations between duty bearers and rights holders in favour of the latter, notably with regard to access to information, awareness of their rights as well as claimed space for the organized, informed and articulated voicing of concerns and demands.

DIAKONIA

The overall goal of Diakonia’s Subprogramme is: “By end 2020, marginalised people (vulnerable children, women and men of all ages and disabled people) have increased (%) the access to basic rights (education, health care, justice, social security and SRHR) (Diakonia 2015).
### Themes, intermediate/bridging and long-term expected outcomes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Themes</th>
<th>Accountability area</th>
<th>Expected Results</th>
<th>Intermediate/ Bridging outcomes</th>
<th>Long-term outcomes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Theme:</strong> Right to accessible and affordable public services of good quality</td>
<td>Legal accountability, the rule of law and respect for human rights</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>Semi-annual national thematic workshops institutionalised with duty bearers and CSOs to review performance and coverage of public services, including recommendations for action in each sub-sector.</td>
<td>A. Duty bearers increase state budget to key public sectors (health, education, water, public transport and social protection) with 25% as compared to 2015. B. Public policy on SRHR in place and effectively disseminated, including corresponding resource allocations. C. Legal and institutional frameworks for fighting corruption and mismanagement of public resources are effective.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theme: Right to political representation and participation</td>
<td>Political accountability and multiparty democracy</td>
<td>A. Devolution and sharing of power between central, provincial and district level. B. Equitable and transparent allocation of resources – regional and over key social sectors. C. Level of mobilisation and articulation of rights holders have increased. D. Political tensions between contending political actors is decreased.</td>
<td>Politicians (parliament and civil servants) political legitimacy and performance resulting from improved accountability to legislative bodies and to the public has become a new practice in State policies;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Theme:</strong> Right to inclusion and equality</td>
<td>Participation and social accountability</td>
<td>National level</td>
<td>A. Basic social rights have been increasingly recognized in judicial processes and public information systems. B. Gender based violence is increasingly prevented and victims of GBV are supported by government structures and non-government initiatives. C. International conventions and protocols on the rights of women and children ratified.</td>
<td>A set of basic social rights (including equal access to basic education and health services) demanded by the rights holders, have been incorporated into State policies and used for political decisions by the duty bearers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Provincial level</td>
<td>Citizens fora and networks for advocating and monitoring basic rights have been created.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>District &amp; Community levels</td>
<td>Information on basic rights available and accessible to the general public.</td>
<td></td>
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</table>
Mid-term Evaluation of Swedish government funded Civil Society Support through the AGIR II Programme in Mozambique 2014–2020

This report presents findings, conclusions and recommendations from the Mid-term Evaluation of Swedish government funded Civil Society support through the AGIR II Programme in Mozambique. The Swedish support to civil society in Mozambique is channelled through the programme AGIR in which four international CSOs (Diakonia, Oxfam Ibis, Oxfam Novib and We Effect) act as intermediary partner organisations with a common overall objective to support local partner organisations.

The Swedish Embassy in Mozambique commissioned this evaluation to assess the progress of AGIR II in order to inform decisions on how project implementation may be adjusted and improved. The evaluation finds that AGIR II is highly relevant for expressed government policies in the programme’s focus areas, but its advocacy profile is under attack within the current political climate. AGIR II is also well in line with Swedish rights-based approach to development. The evaluation also finds that the complexity of the AGIR programme poses challenges related to implementation and results and the evaluation recommends that the programme results framework and list of indicators should be revisited and simplified.