False Promises False hopes: Local perspectives on liberal peace building in north-western Pakistan

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ABSTRACT

The global discourse on “winning hearts and minds”, engages the United States, local governments and international actors in liberal peace building in conflict affected settings. In northwestern Pakistan, the Pakistani government supports this discourse by claiming to pursue a three pronged strategy based on dialogue, development and deterrence. This paper examines how peace building activities have been practiced in northwestern Pakistan in relation to development and humanitarian interventions that support community needs. Field data was gathered in Swat and Peshawar valleys between September 2010 to February 2011, through semi-structured interviews that covered peace building efforts in the form of local perceptions of development and humanitarian interventions, perspectives on development schemes, aid priorities, and the relationship between aid and security. Furthermore, the paper relies on secondary data sources such as development and humanitarian response plans, research briefs, and news events.
The paper closely examines the dynamics of liberal peace building in terms of humanitarian aid operations and development activities in North Western Pakistan. Empirical evidence from the region highlights the conflations in liberal peace concerning the imbalances in policies, plans and activities in north western Pakistan. The large disconnect between liberal peace building and effective development policies and practices in north western Pakistan reflect the diverse interests of different actors, states, development and humanitarian response actors and elites, in problematizing issues. The paper concludes that the liberal peace agenda has contributed to securitization of development assistance in the region, which in turn has significantly limited the impact of development assistance to crisis affected communities.
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1. INTRODUCTION

While living in Pakistan in 2006-2007, as the country was severely affected by insurgencies in different pockets of the North-west and Baluchistan, I was startled to observe a lack of appreciation by state authorities of the insecurities that were faced by the local populace. In spite of the gravity of the situation the state broadcaster reflected a recurring theme: they emphasized that state executives were actively promoting a development and modernization agenda that would usher in peace and prosperity for the common man. This continued even during the bleakest hours of 2007 and 2008, when suicide bombings were a common occurrence. Most striking, was the obvious disconnect between the government’s inability to provide basic security and services to people, and the way the official channels were portraying, a story that was full of hope.

This paper focuses on conflict-ridden North-western Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) province. Located on the border with Afghanistan, it manifests the greater conflict with the Taliban. The area has been subjected to continuous violence since 9/11, which has since resulted in several military offensives by the Pakistani military. As part of its peace-building efforts to contain the fallout from the conflict, and to curb increasing extremism and militancy, Pakistan’s government often claims to adopt a three-pronged strategy, based on the ‘3Ds’; namely dialogue, development and deterrence (APP 2009). The strategy is based on the need for combating militancy, and includes an enhanced development effort which intends to sway away disgruntled elements and strengthen the livelihoods of people affected by the conflict (ibid).

Footnotes:
1 Lead author - Kashif Khan, who has carried out this study. This article is co-authored with Ingrid Nyborg; however for consistency in relation to the narrative outlined in the introduction ‘I’ is used in this paper.
2 The conflict in north-western Pakistan worsened in 2004-5, but government officials attempted to downplay this by deflecting the focus to development schemes which they had initiated in the region.
3 Formerly known as North West Frontier Province (NWFP), the name was officially changed to Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa on 1st April 2010, Dawn. Source: http://www.dawn.com/from-nwfp-to-khyber-pakhtunkhwa
In the post-cold war period, it is generally assumed that societies affected by international conflicts, complex emergencies and development problems can be assisted by transitioning to a `liberal peace building agenda` (Donini 2007; Duffield 2010; Goodhand 2010; Richmond 2009). For instance, liberal peace transitions in countries such as Bosnia, East Timor, and Cyprus are often cited as cases where multilateral and Western actors have successfully implemented liberal internationalism, democratization of institutions and market development (Richmond 2009). The aims of the liberal peace enterprise are to stabilize conflict affected countries and reduce the incidence of civil wars (Collier 2003). It is claimed that the liberal peace agenda, as implemented by donor countries and associated international actors and institutions, promotes a scientific, technical process of peaceful governance, yet such programmes have often yielded mixed results (Richmond 2009). The consequences of these failures have influenced popular opinion: many now believe that pitfalls associated with the liberal peace agenda are a consequence of duplicitous intentions on the part of western donor countries (Richmond 2009; Stokke 2011).

`The Liberal peace agenda` strongly influences the global discourse on winning hearts and minds (WHAM) (Donini 2007; Stokke 2011). In Afghanistan and Pakistan WHAM is referred to as an instrument for turning people away from extremism by facilitating peace-building activities (such as development) and gaining the trust of communities affected by conflict (Donini 2007; Fair 2010). In relation to North-western Pakistan, however, official development practices and their impacts on security and development of communities have yielded mixed results in their targeting of the beneficiaries of peace-building activities (Whittal 2011). Official perspectives often differ from actual practices and what is said and what is actually implemented often differs in relation to the perspectives of local communities (Donini 2007). Gaining an in-depth appreciation of practices of liberal peace building that impact local communities can contribute towards increased understanding of donor agendas in conflict affected regions.

This paper addresses issues related to peace-building in communities that are influenced by the liberal peace agenda at three levels, namely the local, national and international levels.

1) The local perspectives of communities: to what extent are government claims (of support for the beneficiaries of developmental and humanitarian interventions in north-western Pakistan) in fact accepted by communities themselves?
2) To explore the connections between the liberal peace agenda, as promoted by international actors, and the policies and priorities of the Pakistani government and the authorities entrusted with reconstruction and revival programmes in the area.

3) How the liberal peace agenda influences development policies in the region and whether this has contributed to securitization of development assistance in the region.

2. THE STUDY AREA AND METHODS

North-western Pakistan has been adversely affected by varying conflicts that have led to large-scale internal displacements in the post-9/11 period. In 2004, the Pakistan Army intervened in Waziristan and a major battle ensued, leading to thousands of military and civilian deaths (Aziz 2007). When the Army launched full-scale military operations against the Taliban in Swat (2007-09), 2.3 million people or 11% of the total population were displaced (Cosgrave et al. 2010). Most of these people have since August 2009 returned to their homes and have since then been reviving their lives and livelihoods.

This study relies upon primary and secondary data. Primary data was gathered through semi-structured interviews and observations; and a qualitative textual analysis. The data was collected in the Peshawar and Swat valleys, as well as Islamabad over a six-month period from September 2010 to February 2011. Key informants were identified using a snowball-cluster sampling method (table 1). In district of Swat, respondents also consisted of IDP returnee households in villages and towns. Data from sixty respondents (n=60) was used for this paper. The respondents were chosen both to reflect differences in experience and perceptions, as well as triangulating data from multiple sources, with an aim to gauging local perceptions, since understanding the ‘perception gap’ between the recipients and the providers of assistance is central to gauging the impacts of policies (Donini 2007: 158). Addressing ‘perception gaps’ can therefore lead to constructive engagements and promote peace-building programmes that are reality-based and retain local ownership (Donini 2007).

[Table 1 about here]
Undertaking field work in a conflict-affected and traditionally conservative setting such as north-western Pakistan carries inherent risks. However, the Lead author of this study comes from the area and was able to gain the trust of communities, which enabled him to carry out interviews with the respondents in a challenging environment.

Secondary data sources for this paper include earlier studies from North-West Pakistan, reports, research briefs, news from printed and electronic media, and development policies and response plans formulated between 2006 to 2012. Policy analysis of developmental and humanitarian strategies and response plans was used to identify the goals and stated aims of various institutional actors (including national and international donors) and to compare these with perceptions of respondents at local levels.

3. CONCEPTUALIZING LIBERAL PEACE AND SECURITIZATION OF DEVELOPMENT

Intrastate conflicts are seen as significant obstacles to development and security, by the international community in the post-cold war period (Chandler 2010; Hoffman 2009; Raymond and Franks 2009; Richmond 2009; Stokke 2011). In countering chronic conflicts the global development discourse on conflict-ridden zones suggests that the incidence of civil wars can be reduced through economic aid, and military and political measures (Collier 2004). The key concern for the US-led efforts has been promoting effective transitions from conflicts to liberal peace-building (Hoffman 2009; Richmond 2009; Stokke 2011). Arguments of state failure and concerns for the security of local populations are used as justifications for employing hard (military) and soft (development aid) power, in promoting transitions from war to peace building (Paris 2004).

Liberal peace is traced back in history to the period, when liberal ideas entrenched in individual sovereignty, rights and equality gained hold in Europe in the seventeenth century (Fischer 2000). The liberal peace agenda relies on institutional reforms, such as political and economic liberalism, and state building (Richmond 2009; Stokke 2011) in conflict affected states, utilizing military, humanitarian, economic, and social interventions such as conflict management,
institutional reforms, governance and development interventions (Duffield 2010, Sabaratnam 2011). However, the application of this agenda during recent rebuilding efforts in conflict affected states has largely negated the principles of equality between donors and recipients that were followed during implementation of the ‘Marshall Plan’, in post-war Europe (Hoffman 2009; Richmond 2010). Liberal peace is directly linked to the global discourse on ‘winning hearts and minds’ (WHAM): where actors such as the United States, Western donors, and to a certain extent the United Nations attempt to win over local populations that are supposedly under the spell of Islamic extremism (Bennett 2011).

Richmond (2009) identifies three main graduations in the liberal peace approach. (i) Conservative peace that is a top-down approach that overwhelmingly relies on hegemonic means of domination. (ii) Orthodox elements of liberal peace correspond to local ownership and governance and reflect top-down and bottom-up approaches through INGOs, the UN and International Financial Institutions (IFIs). (iii) Finally, the emancipatory model of liberal peace seeks to ensure a close relationship between locals and the peace-process actors and calls for social justice and needs-based activities. The emancipatory model has greater appeal for local communities since it is based on local ownership in conflict-affected societies (Richmond 2009).

Drawing on experiences from a number of conflict zones, the liberal peace agenda has been pursued through a combination of development interventions and the application of military resources (Richmond 2009). Limits to the application of military power (also referred to as ‘hard power’) are well known and widely accepted (Lieven 2011; Nye 2011; Richmond 2009). The conservative and orthodox strands in liberal peace are manifested as hard and soft power resources, which affect the ability of donors and conflict-affected states and international actors (the WB, the UN, etc.) to achieve the desired outcomes by applying tangible and intangible resources (Stokke 2011). Tangible resources include the use of coercion and money, while intangible resources such as patriotism, legitimacy and sensitivity to local cultures, affect the military’s effort to prevail in the long run. Intangible resources or strategies include obtaining the desired outcomes through co-option, which focuses on local institutions, values and ideas and on the legitimacy of policies pursued in conflict-affected societies. According to Richmond (2009), lack of integration between foreign and local agendas has resulted in failure to meet the
needs of local populations and led to perception gaps between peace builders and local communities. This has led to a growing perception that the form of peace building imposed by outside actors is often `alien like` and leads to excluding local subjects that have implications for peace building and success of post-conflict recovery programs (Sabaratnam 2011). Furthermore, several studies have shown that the inability to meet the needs of local populations is a factor that leads individuals to join militias or become insurgents or resort to black markets (Khan 2007; Richmond 2011). Resultantly the proponents of liberal peace have struggled with the `hearts and minds` campaign to win over local populations; their efforts have been complicated by the use of military force in these regions (Donini 2007; Nye 2011; Richmond 2009).

The relationship between development and security seems straightforward: it relies on promoting local and international security by reducing poverty and generating well-being in conflict-affected areas (Duffield 2010). However in relation to current practice, liberal modes of development aim to achieve international security, often at the expense of self-reliance in countries of the south (Duffield 2010; Richmond 2010). Empirical evidence suggests that these policies and practices lead to divisive agendas that have had consequences for peace building and state building in conflict affected states (Sabaratnam 2011).

Military failures in Iraq and Afghanistan have necessitated a rethink of counter-insurgency mechanisms and have also led to overlaps between the WHAM campaign and peace-building approaches pursued by NGOs (Duffield 2010). The development-security nexus is characterised by promises that development contributes towards international security. The development aid sector is often wholly dependent on external funding and therefore has to tailor its agenda according to the goals of its funders, who in most cases are involved in liberal peace-making (Richmond 2011). In doing so they often become a vehicle for meeting the goals of their donors (Richmond 2011). Consequently this contributes towards decreasing the efficiency of programs directed at achieving post-war recoveries that get undermined because of continued conflict, insecurity and under development in conflict affected settings (Sabaratnam 2011). Moreover, since peace-building initiatives have often sought to isolate violent actors, this has contributed to increasing the violent divisions within conflict-affected societies (Duffield 2010). As a matter of
fact, effective use of aid needs to foster collective goals in conflict affected areas by increasing the cohesion of communities and ensuring that the social contract between local communities and the state remains strong (Duffield 2010).

The Copenhagen School’s securitization approach has influenced the understanding of security as a concept in contemporary international politics (McDonald 2008; Wæver 1995). It aims to achieve an understanding of what constitutes securitization phenomena and how security discourses are embedded in conflict contexts (Floyd, 2007). Securitization is seen as a process of presenting and highlighting issues, in security terms that are viewed as existential threats (Buzan et al 1998). Whenever issues of securitization are identified, either as speech acts, or as existential threats to a state, group or entity, this process is referred to as a ‘securitizing move’ (Buzan et al. 1998). Such actions form the basis of securitization phenomena and are usually followed by emergency like responses (including military actions) undertaken by the securitizing actor in order to neutralize the ‘existential threat’ (Ibid.). Applying the securitizing approach to the north-western Pakistan case, it is seen that the securitizing actors i.e. the Pakistani and U.S. governments undertake securitizing moves to keep insurgents such as the Taliban in check, while the referent objects are local communities of north-western Pakistan that often feel the consequences and fallouts during the course of these conflicts. The target audience that needs to be convinced for a securitization process includes the Pakistani public as well as international community.

The focus of this paper is on local perspectives of peace building and how peace-building efforts have been influenced by security concerns in the region. This does not ignore the process of securitization that is constructed by speech acts (Wæver 1995), but rather examines who in fact express the need for help during humanitarian crisis and emergency situations. In North-West Pakistan the state authorities are careful to ground threats in public opinion before initiating large-scale military operations. The US remains one of the biggest promoters of securitization in the region: it has continually prodded the Pakistani state to act decisively against militants (BBC 2010).

Failures in liberal peace building have led to increased scepticism as to whether the implementation of liberal peace can stabilize conflict-ridden zones (Goodhand 2010). The limitations of these strategies are evident in, for example, the failure to engage the Taliban, which remains a critical issue as the expected exit of allied forces from the region (scheduled for 2014) draws closer.
Solving complex and protracted intrastate conflicts tests the limits of the liberal peace discourse, which requires an understanding of politics of development from a decentralized vantage point that is not influenced by elitist perspectives (Goodhand 2010; Richmond 2009).

Evidence suggests that the accommodative agendas of liberal peace (such as human security, rights, and local ownership) are rarely pursued in communities that are supposedly the beneficiaries of this agenda (Richmond 2009). It is the interveners’ interests and agendas (i.e. the funders and promoters of liberal peace) that are safeguarded, often at the cost of the local populace (Hoffman 2009).

According to Richmond (2011), the contradictions in the liberal peace agenda are manifested in how liberal peace builders define civil society in conflict zones as fragmented and requiring mentoring and guidance – under the influence of liberalism. This thinking adversely affects the social contracts between local communities and conflict-affected states (Hoffman 2009).

Richmond (2010) argues that the contradictions and divisive tendencies within liberal peace have actually contributed to failures in relation to peace making in conflict affected societies. The lack of local perspectives in particular highlight the shortcomings in liberal peace and warrant a need for exploring alternatives that are grounded in local understanding of conflict contexts (Sabaratnam 2011). This process of self-reflection amongst local populations has enabled local voices to gain greater salience and credibility, something which can be regarded as the onset of a post-liberal peace. Post-liberal peace seeks to unite liberal and local thinking by building upon the linkages between them in order to safeguard local needs and sensitivities (Richmond 2010).

Post-liberal peace is embedded in local contexts and needs, in a manner that elicits support of international actors so that they facilitate capacity building of local communities, which translate into local ownerships by allowing local communities to identify their needs themselves (Hoffman 2009).

4. LOCAL PERSPECTIVES OF DEVELOPMENT AND HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTIONS

There have been major humanitarian emergencies in north-western Pakistan in recent years. Most notably the displacements resulting from the floods of 2009 and 2010 that led to emergency humanitarian responses through the UN clusters. The UN and the Provincial
Reconstruction, Rehabilitation and Settlement Authority (PARRSA) catered for the needs of populations displaced from areas of military operations; who all except for Waziristan have continued to be settled in the Peshawar valley (PHRP 2009). Humanitarian interventions in these regions are carried out mainly by UN agencies, local and international NGOs, which are in part directed by the federal and provincial governments, and in part by UN agencies such as OCHA, WFP, and FAO. The ‘humanitarian imperative’ is summarized as ‘independence, impartiality and neutrality’ in the provision of aid, underlining a commitment that humanitarian concerns come first, regardless of race, creed or nationality (HPG 2009).

Military offensives in KP have been followed by short-term humanitarian assistance (i.e. relief and rehabilitation) supplemented by mid-term stabilization efforts. The humanitarian community favours and remains engaged in short-term stabilization efforts rather than long-term assistance (Bennett 2011; Orakzai 2011). The humanitarian responses following the displacement in 2009 and the floods in 2010 addressed the pressing humanitarian needs of communities affected by these events (ibid). Since 2009 the humanitarian community has maintained a strong presence in the region in support of relief and rehabilitation activities following displacements induced by military operations. The military remains a powerful actor since it retains complete physical control of the humanitarian and recovery operations.

The international humanitarian responses have been led and coordinated by UN-OCHA according to the Pakistan Humanitarian Response Plans (PHRP 2009). The PHRP 2009 was formulated ‘during a workshop in Islamabad (15-16th September 2009); that involved eleven UN agencies and 43 INGOs. The government counterparts including donors were briefed later about the outcomes of the workshop and the Provincial Government got involved later on in the clusters where it participates as a co-chair.’ (PHRP 2009: 3). United Nations clusters carry out activities such as camp management, food distribution, education, health and early recovery (PHRP 2009). In most cases, UN agencies have outsourced their operations and projects to local and international NGOs. This has kept the provincial authorities (PDMA- PARRSA) out of the loop and has negatively affected relief initiatives, which have been largely restricted to the distribution of food and non-food items (NFIs). In fact, NGOs prefer distributional
activities since they are easy to undertake, include large financial transactions and involve sub-contracting.  

Relationship between development and humanitarian interventions in north-west Pakistan

Development and humanitarian operations are closely linked, and sometimes indistinguishable in north-western Pakistan. For instance the official discourse, as reflected in the Post-Crisis Needs Assessment (PCNA), describes humanitarian operations as, ‘lifesaving humanitarian efforts by federal and provincial governments, humanitarian agencies, donors that are enormously necessary, but not sufficient in themselves to transform the situation for the better and reversing support for violent change’ (2010: 1). This underscores the necessity for humanitarian lifesaving efforts, but shows that in themselves they are not enough to change the status quo and improve conditions in the long term. The line between developmental and humanitarian efforts seems to be blurred in this region, with humanitarian activities often lumped together with development and livelihood revival schemes in KP. For instance, out of the total 176 humanitarian relief and recovery projects implemented through the Pakistan Humanitarian Response Plan (PHRP), 16 had the stated aim of livelihood recovery in conflict-affected communities of KP, while 12 sought to strengthen economic recovery and the development of small businesses. Neither of these are conventional areas for humanitarian assistance.

The peace-building strategy for the region - the ‘3Ds’: development, dialogue and deterrence - has since 2004 remained the overarching foundation for the government’s policies and actions in north-western Pakistan, and was formally enacted into law by the Pakistani parliament in 2009. The strategies that are practiced in relation to the ‘3Ds’ include development interventions and are carried out by government authorities, INGOs and UN clusters. Since 2006 the Government has attempted to implement a number of sub-strategies, such as Malakand Stabilization Strategy (2009), and the KP Comprehensive Development Strategy (2009). Later on a Post-Crisis Needs Assessment (PCNA 2010) was undertaken. This envisages spending US$ 3.5 billion in Khyber

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4 This is based on the perceptions of majority of respondents, particularly those from the developmental and humanitarian sectors
Pakhtunkhwa over three years (2011 – 2013) aiming at infrastructure, social services delivery, reviving livelihoods and implementing a counter radicalization strategy.

However, in the past a number of strategies and plans have had mixed results. These include the FATA Sustainable Development Plan 2006-2015, which envisioned bringing the region firmly into the national mainstream by making key improvements to infrastructure, education and health provision (Talbot, 2008). Development is often regarded as a cornerstone of state policy, as evidenced by key plans and strategies in north-western Pakistan (Leghari 2008; PCNA 2010; PHRP 2009; APP 2009). The PCNA was formulated after extensive consultations with the local populations, under the direction of the federal and provincial governments. The assessment, which was sponsored by the World Bank (WB) and the Asian Development Bank (ADB), seeks to provide a peace-building strategy by addressing the social services and developmental needs and offers a road map as part of this process. This is central to all development, recovery and contingency planning, which regards the PCNA as ‘the end’ and underdevelopment as the primary reason for the current crisis. The preamble of the document (2010: 1) reads:

Years of regional instability underpinned by decades of poor governance have shaped the crisis unravelling in the north western border areas of Pakistan. Marginalization and inequity are sustained in the Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) through current legislation, and in both FATA and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa Province (KP) by underdevelopment.

Today, discussions of development in north-western Pakistan are dominated by the underdevelopment discourse: according to their proponents (i.e. the government and humanitarian agencies) needs to be addressed for stabilizing these regions (APP 2009; Khan 2007; Talbot 2008). Whether this discourse has the intended effect of supporting local communities affected by the conflict through state and NGO responses remains to be seen (Khan 2007, Talbot 2008). The discourse is most evident at the policy level, and can be identified by examining government policy documents and humanitarian plans, and discussions in the mainstream media, as well as speeches, policy briefs, strategies, responses and long-term plans. The PCNA, together with the PHRP and statements made by the Chief Minister and officials constitute policy statements that pertain to the promises made to the local communities. The development challenge in Northwest Pakistan is summed up by the PCNA and framed as
follows:

.....a vision within 10 years, where there is an emerging peace, greater prosperity and tolerance in KP and FATA. A historic transformation . . . , where voices of all people are being heard, the rule of law is deepening, and the State is increasingly accountable, providing equitable opportunities for better health, education and employment. Aimed at overcoming the consequences of conflict by establishing agreed social, economic, and development priorities, as well as articulating their financial implications on the basis of an overall long-term vision. The expected outcome is to meet the long-term development needs of north-western Pakistan. (2010: 1).

The PCNA had the stated aim of delivering four strategic objectives within a thirty-month Strategic Transitional Results Framework (STRF) from 2010-2013. It advised that ‘the Government kick start a number of proposed activities immediately and by doing so demonstrate tangible benefits to the people on the ground’ (PCNA 2010: 21). It further sought to integrate and frame all humanitarian, recovery and developmental assistance, by aligning existing and planned interventions around a peace-building strategy; and maximising the effect of all recommended interventions by developing them specifically to benefit from synergies with existing programmes (ibid). The minimum funding required for implementing the PCNA was estimated at US$ 2.7 billion. The PCNA was supposed to be implemented from September 2010, but due to lack of follow-up this hasn’t happened.

Breaking down government priorities on development

The official discourse of policy makers and executives highlights their contributions towards peace building and development. For example, the Prime Minister (PM) of Pakistan claimed during a visit to Swat (on 8 September 2009) that: ‘restoration and reconstruction of girls’ schools in Swat will be undertaken on a war footing which will be completed in the next year’. In January 2012⁵ the reconstruction of schools in the area remained incomplete and there were up to 400 destroyed schools that needed reconstruction. Similarly, during a meeting with parliamentarians from the region (on 9 April 2010) the Governor of KP confirmed the

⁵ Malala wants to rebuild schools in Swat. (Source: http://www.dawn.com/2012/01/16/malala-wants-to-rebuild-schools-in-swat.html.)
significance of socio-economic development in KP and FATA and directed the authorities to ensure smooth and unhindered development\(^6\) (on 2\(^{nd}\) October 2010). Jobs and employment opportunities have been repeatedly promised to communities in Swat; these promises include the rehabilitation of ex-Taliban fighters.

The multiple crises (conflict and disasters) which hit the region have increased the need for humanitarian emergency operations; and at the same time drastically affected long-term development and reconstruction initiatives. The government and authorities have continually attempted to play down the nature and scale of these crises, as reflected in the renaming of the Post-Conflict Needs Assessment, which became the Post-Crisis Needs Assessment when the government rejected the original wording\(^7\).

**Local perspectives of humanitarian delivery mechanisms**

The emergency responses in north-west Pakistan have led to situations where INGOs and UN clusters that are not sufficiently familiar with local needs are taking the lead role and side-lining the local line departments. Thus, the shifting roles of the state, the affected communities, INGOs, and the UN necessitate a deeper understanding of the humanitarian response mechanism. The humanitarian interventions by the UN in north-western Pakistan were highlighted by a development practitioner in this way:\(^8\)

*The UN response follows a model that is tailored to benefit contractors. What is needed here is to change the terms of provision of assistance and ensure that funds are not wasted. More of the aid should be handed over to communities directly – such as assets for rebuilding houses. Elders, communities and locals need to be involved proactively instead of imposing decisions from international clusters that don’t have first-hand knowledge of local needs.***

The provincial government (Provincial Disaster Management Authority - PDMA) and its line departments are the designated co-leads at the provincial levels. However, programming,

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\(^6\) Governor wants socio-economic development in Fata (source: [www.thenews.pk-Governor-wants-scocio-eco.html](http://www.thenews.pk-Governor-wants-scocio-eco.html))

\(^7\) The dominant perception in interviews with the key informants was that the Government wanted to downplay the gravity and magnitude of the conflict; in renaming the PCNA the Government succeeded in taking out the word ‘conflict’, even though realities on the ground might seem different. However, the UN’s humanitarian response to conflicts is always referred to as a ‘Post-conflict assessment’

\(^8\) Interview with a leading development and early recovery expert based in Peshawar
project calls and proposals are all channelled through UN agencies like UNHCR, UNICEF, and FAO (PHRP 2009). The local authorities (such as the PDMA) accused the UN of side-lining them during decision-making and the implementation of humanitarian operations. (This was the dominant perception gained from interviews.) A leading development and security policy analyst, with almost three decades of experience of KP and FATA, had this to say regarding the government’s shortcomings with regard to the emergency responses:

At the onset of the displacement crisis in Swat and Malakand the government expected only 0.5 million people to get displaced, against the 3.2 million who actually got displaced. It was only because of the local people that the Government’s reputation was saved, since 85% people were accommodated by their relatives and acquaintances. The government was ill prepared and had no idea. Thus, it cannot take any credit for these humanitarian operations.

Lack of early recovery and long term development interventions

There also seems to be a lack of ownership on the part of the local authorities when undertaking relevant actions and interventions. This is reflected in the provincial government and its disaster management authority, the PDMA. The PDMA and PARRSA were headed by a District Management Group (DMG) official who was replaced (after a gap of almost 30 months) by an officer from the Planning and Development (P&D) Department9. During this period the PCNA should have achieved all of its objectives under its Strategic Transitional Results Framework (STRF). Likewise the PDMA director general (DG) at the time of unveiling the PHRP in September 200910 defended the overwhelming focus and attention on food and non-food distribution and relief.

Local alternatives that are grounded in local knowledge and an understanding of contexts that are available to international actors are often ignored by the humanitarian agencies (Donini 2007).

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9 In extensive interviews at PDMA (Oct-Feb 10-11), I was informed that the P&D Department (which is the long-term development arm of the KP government) was solely responsible for development efforts. Additional secretary P&D Dept. was appointed DG PDMA/PARRSA on 18 January in place of the incumbent DG, who had held the position for almost four years, since 2008. (Source: http://www.pdma.gov.pk/AboutPDMA.php)

10 Interview given by DG PDMA to Duniya TV on the occasion of launching of the PHRP on 10th Feb. 2010.
For instance during the launching of the PHRP the humanitarian coordinator for Pakistan emphasised the need for transitions to longer-term recoveries (these had not taken place):

*Early recovery, agriculture and livelihoods pledges have been traditionally less, this year though we have given greater requests for these sectors to be incorporated in the PHRP 2009. Feeding communities in the long run instead of livelihoods should not be our primary aim, we will continue to meet the requirements and try not to create dependencies but strengthen capacities at the local levels, so that communities can survive and support themselves independently in the long run.*

**Creation of local dependencies**

Creation of local dependencies and loss of resilience was a major theme during the interviews. This was explained by a development and livelihood team leader as follows:

*Unfortunately as a result of the manner in which humanitarian responses have been carried out, people have in effect become care recipients, their resilience strategies have weakened, and [their] adaptation capacity has lowered substantially.*

More than 90 percent of the respondents to this study (54 out of n=60) agreed that an excessive focus on food distribution and relief had led to dependencies. This is reflected in the allocations for the PHRP, where out of a total of US$560 million, US$195 million was allocated for food distribution, while only US$24 million was provided for livelihoods and agriculture. A PDMA official with first-hand knowledge of relief and emergency responses had this to say:

*There are needless distributions and convenience targeting by NGOs. There is no coordinated structure and proper utilization of resources; I have seen in Charsadda after the floods that there have been multiple distributions which led to dependencies. NGOs always look for their suitability and easiness, e.g. they targeted only one village which was adjacent to the main road in Charsadda. Even though the village that lay on the other bank of the river Kabul that was most devastated, it was left totally unattended. There is no clear coordination between UN agencies, and OCHA doesn’t play any active role.*

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11 Interview with a development and livelihoods team leader who has more than two decades of experience in north-western Pakistan
A recurring theme from the interviews which reflected realities on the ground in terms of dependencies is highlighted in this quote from a village chief in the Swat valley:

Yes, the dependency syndrome has taken hold. I see that a lot of people would not find daily wage work and people left jobs and started sitting in tents to receive food distributions. Then there are families where the mother would go to one stockpile, the father to another, the brother somewhere else and then sell whatever they accrued and make money. Thus, people received adequate amounts of support after the flood, and displacements, however you can never fulfil their needs as they will never be judiciously utilized.

An IDP returnee in the town of Matta summed up as follows:

They (the NGO’s) go to each and every mohallah [hamlet], and are in a hurry to look after and find someone to hand and deliver something to. They take their own shares out of it and try to show quick progress, but make no mistake this has not been beneficial for the masses and communities at all.

Most respondents highlighted that short-term relief and responses that were directed towards meeting subsistence needs had an adverse impact on people’s capacity. Likewise a number of aid workers agreed that the livelihoods of communities in the Swat and Peshawar valleys had not been strengthened following the relief assistance after floods and displacements. Even the very few livelihood interventions that were carried out were unable to meet their expected outcomes and had been outsourced by their implementation agencies to local NGOs. Humanitarian response plans, such as PHRP 2010, included a number of programmes that were categorized as livelihood interventions but that were instead carrying out food distributions and did not provide any support for local livelihood recovery. The team leader of a vibrant NGO project in Swat commented as follows on livelihoods and longer-term opportunities:

During the relief phase distributions are very important but in the long term they have no utility. Thus, what you see here is that week after week guys have wrapped themselves in cloths (during the winter) and are always standing in front of the food hubs; instead of this if they [were to] utilize these five days and earn labour they can gain much more from it. I would thus strongly recommend that instead of these food distributions activities we need to develop their livelihoods so that they may stand on their own feet.
Insignificant attention had been given to rebuilding livelihoods among local communities and IDP returnees. An IDP-returnee farmer in the Swat valley pointed to the gap between the needs of local communities and farmers, and the shortcomings of the humanitarian and developmental responses of NGOs:

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\text{Since we have returned to the valley from the camps we have been hearing that the Government and NGOs will revive our agricultural livelihoods by providing us with high quality seeds, implements, tools and advice. But so far we have received nothing of this sort. On the contrary our communities have been flooded with food and non-food items; what we desperately need are the tools that will enable us to make an honourable living.}'
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**Lack of political leadership and appropriate monitoring structures**

There have been glaring omissions with respect to the strategic monitoring and quality assurance of projects carried out under the PHRP. The document (PHRP 2009: 25) states that:

\[
The \text{Humanitarian Coordinator}^{12} \text{(HC) with support from OCHA and Cluster leads, in consultation with the Government of Pakistan, will monitor projects based on indicators outlined below and where possible, use other appropriate monitoring tools. Individual agencies and organizations will conduct internal monitoring to assess the quality of project implementation in order to address projects’ specific indicators.}
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However, the facts on the ground contradict this. Most of the key informants, I interviewed pointed to a lack of accountability and monitoring of projects. In particular, concerned government officials in PDMA and PARRSA revealed that there was very little opportunity to carrying out any credible monitoring. They said UN-OCHA had deliberately withheld sharing of cluster-related data such as the ‘3Ws’ (Who, What and Where). According to them this was because of the poor feedback the UN agencies had received from NGO partners belonging to the various UN humanitarian clusters (Ahmed 2011). The humanitarian industry is often blamed for not having adequate baselines and not conducting proper impact assessments of humanitarian interventions in Pakistan (ibid), but this is not surprising as humanitarian

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12 The HC is the most senior- UN official in a country experiencing a humanitarian emergency, and is appointed by the United Nations Emergency Relief Coordinator at the onset of a humanitarian emergency.
activities are supposed be for the short term. Moreover, according to the key informants including government officials there were inadequate monitoring mechanisms to assess efficiency and address community needs through the PHRP. The flaws in the cluster response mechanism and the misplaced priorities were pointed out by a development practitioner:

There are serious flaws with the NGOs, government, the UN and donors. Corruption is rampant in the government and even more in the NGOs. The cost of the UN clusters regarding organization and logistics is very high, and they have problems with their priorities. They fail to consider the actual needs of communities but consider the priorities of cluster partners and donor countries. For instance, the needs are usually in one sector and they are intervening in another sector. In addition, there remains a big problem with lack of coordination between NGOs, government and the UN.

The PCNA seeks to consolidate, integrate and build up on the regional development plans such as the Damage and Needs Assessment (DNA), Annual Development Plan (ADP), and the Pakistan Humanitarian Response Plan (PHRP) (PCNA 2010: 9). It was endorsed as the official strategy by the federal and provincial governments (including the army), the donor community (western nations, with the exception of the US) and the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank. It is looked upon as the principal official policy document; when I interviewed the Chief Secretary of KP\(^1\), he strongly emphasized this point. The strategy however, is integrated and as such requires that all of its components are endorsed and implemented in full and that a logical follow-up is undertaken and the findings incorporated and implemented in future planning (PCNA 2010). This requires the establishment of institutional structures for implementation at all levels and the development of activity plans, timelines, etc., as well as an effective chain of command and leadership at the top levels.

The current provincial government claims to have initiated major reconstruction schemes that are adequately funded and well resourced (in comparison to the efforts of previous governments in KP’s history). Community perceptions however, have remained unchanged. According to most respondents, including humanitarian, development and aid workers, it was felt that most of these funds have either been misused or misappropriated since no large-scale schemes are visible on

\(^{13}\) The Chief Secretary is the administrative head of the province.
the ground. Many respondents pointed out that the Pakistani development machinery and line departments had a low absorption capacity, and that this was a major impediment for development in FATA and KP as there was no body able to formulate projects for natural resource development and no entity entrusted for executing them. In this case the non-provision of security was regarded as the main impediment to development. An IDP returnee who was associated with the humanitarian sector reflected upon this aspect as follows:

PCNA is a good plan; there are others as well, but in this climate of fear and mistrust and insecurity how can these ideas be properly implemented? There is a big question mark to this. Things are still not stable these days because of continued security operations and that is why I am pessimistic. How do you set up civil institutions, how do you do post-war reconstruction when you do not have any clear policies?

Nevertheless, there have been positive changes in certain areas, such as the provision of jobs for locals in the NGO sector. This has led to relatively increased job opportunities for women and has eased class relations in this largely conservative region. This was highlighted during an interview with a woman social organizer in Swat:

Of course it would have been impossible for my family to allow me to work in the NGO sector in Swat before 2009. The humanitarian responses over here and the activity they have generated have enabled a large number of females to actively participate in our daily lives and seek livelihoods outside [our] homes. We have managed to improve our education levels, seek better jobs and contribute effectively in the lives of our communities. However there is still a long way to go and it remains to be seen if we receive opportunities from the government when the NGO presence over here gets curtailed.

5. LINKAGES WITH INTERNATIONAL ACTORS

Post 9/11, development cooperation in conflict-affected areas has shifted from little considering of conflicts, to offering humanitarian relief and development aid as a peace-building tool in a conflict-sensitive manner (Richmond 2010; Stokke 2011). Discussions of development in north-western Pakistan are largely dominated by the view that development needs to be addressed in order to stabilize this region (PCNA 2010, Talbot, 2008). However, there is disconnect between
realities on the ground and official accounts. Rahimullah Yousafzai, a well-known journalist, pointed out during interview:

The ‘3Ds’ policy has been in vogue since the times of Musharraf. I do not think there is any change in this government. Where is the dialogue? It was held only in cosmetic terms sometime back. Secondly, development: how can you have development in such a situation? There can be some measures but not fully-fledged long-term development. Deterrence, that is the policy the army you know has at times tried reluctantly; since then they have shied away from carrying out new operations. But you are aware that Pakistanis take money from Americans and then get reimbursed based on the scale of military operations. The government claims that the operation in Swat was a success; however the reason was that the Taliban were never very strong there. The government and the international community as such do not have a clear-cut policy; their goals and objectives in this region are contradictory, and seem impractical and unbalanced.

USA, the most important promoter of the liberal peace-building agenda in the region, has been pursuing conflated goals without clear policies. It had no meaningful strategy for confronting militants and it failed to develop a comprehensive plan for dealing with the conflict in north-west Pakistan (GAO 2008; The Hill, 2009). Official US statements and policies have emphasized its commitment to meeting Pakistan’s development needs. USAID has consistently sought to project the US efforts in KP as effective in mitigating the suffering of communities, winning wider local support, providing jobs and initiating longer-term development and agricultural projects, amongst others.

US has repeatedly outlined its vision of focusing development assistance on north-western Pakistan in an attempt to win over disgruntled segments of the society from extremism (GAO 2010; Curtis, 2007). The US has at various times pledged to create Reconstruction Opportunity

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15 USAID ready to help rebuild restive Pakistan.(Source: http://archives.dawn.com/?s=+USAID+ready+to+help.)
Zones (ROZs) and to initiate livelihood revival programmes in north-western Pakistan (Dawn, 2009). President Obama’s ‘Af-Pak’ strategy also sought an ambitious development component. However, political conditionalities have prevented setting out a clear and practicable partnership agenda with their Pakistani counterparts. The failure of the much-trumpeted Kerry Lugar legislation to achieve its objectives is one important instance: despite the many commitments from both the Pakistani and American sides, this could not take off due to various institutional bottlenecks. The shift from relief to early recovery, and then long-term development, has not materialized and has led to repeated crises and a lack of institutional capacity (Ahmed 2011). There are a number of reasons for this. These include a lack of leadership vision at the government level, the heavy mandates of the UN system (UN agencies have exclusive responsibility for most donor commitments), the proliferation of national and international NGOs, misplaced priorities, the poor capacity of line departments, the lack of coordination between partners and the adverse security situation.

An assessment of US development assistance prospects for the region in the long term (Birdsall et al. 2010) recommended that development investments would require patience and insulation from short-term pressures. It emphasized that without following up on these recommendations, the United States could not expect the Kerry-Lugar legislation to positively influence peace building and development in the region, and this could adversely influence US interests and contribute to global insecurity (Birdsall et al. 2010). There were unresolved arguments with Pakistan over the status of audits as well as over the illicit activities of US diplomatic and security personnel in the country (BBC 2010).

There was a great deal of distrust in the policies of United States among most of the respondents interviewed for this study. It reflects the failure in liberal peace thinking as manifested in policies by

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16 President Bush, during his visit to Pakistan in March 2006, had announced a holistic development plan for the region which included the creation of Reconstruction Opportunity zones that would have free trade access to the US.
17 The Kerry-Lugar Bill, also called the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009 by the US Congress, authorizes releasing US$1.5 billion per year to the Government of Pakistan as non-military aid from 2010 to 2014. At the time of its passage it was considered a major shift in foreign aid policy to Pakistan. (Source: [http://www.cfr.org/pakistan/joint-explanatory-statement-enhanced-partnership-pakistan-act-2009/p20422](http://www.cfr.org/pakistan/joint-explanatory-statement-enhanced-partnership-pakistan-act-2009/p20422).)
18 Pakistan and the United States have not been able to synergize their efforts in terms of channeling development assistance to ensure optimal policy sequencing in the region.
Pakistani authorities and the United States to appreciate the needs of local communities, again linked to the disconnect between the two. The Pakistani peace-building strategies such as the PCNA are more suited to local needs and to retaining local ownership. The US has not extended significant assistance for implementing the PCNA, which is an integrated program and needs to be implemented as a whole to deliver the desired results. There has been some overlap of humanitarian goals between US and Pakistani authorities. However, in terms of longer-term development objectives there has been no meaningful relationship between the two sides.

6. CONFLATIONS AND CONTRADICTIONS IN LIBERAL PEACE BUILDING

In essence, the local discourses in the region are connected globally to liberal peace and neoliberal development through the ‘winning of hearts and minds’ discourse. This was highlighted by the DG PDMA in an interview: ‘This (donor assistance pledges, in most cases from the US) is part of the commitment we got that we will be readily supported if we undertake military actions against the miscreants.’ Furthermore, by linking political, military and humanitarian aspects; we see that there has been a policy of clear and hold, but no rebuild, as authorities have really only succeeded in consolidating control in areas captured from militants following military operations. Similarly, continued drone strikes and sustained calls by the US for Pakistani military operations have not been helpful in making the transition to longer-term development agendas. By employing military power resources and not engaging in emancipatory means, the development agenda in the region has in effect become securitized, since it is largely governed by security considerations.

The U.S. seems to have lost the hearts and minds battle in Pakistan. Almost all respondents blamed the U.S. for the ills facing the region. A leading professor from Peshawar University elaborated perceptions towards the US in these words: ‘People over here (in Pakistan) are not insane; they (like Norwegians, Japanese and others) . . . and must have some valid reasons why they hold these feelings towards US and its policies.’ Furthermore, development plans and projects by USAID have failed to make much headway because of weak institutional capacity, lack of adequate planning, security conditions and other bottlenecks.

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19 This was a major theme in interviews carried out with security and development sector officials and communities affected by military operations across the region
The exact relationship between humanitarian assistance and ‘stabilization’ efforts has not been finally established in north-western Pakistan (HPG 2009). Stabilization can be achieved through humanitarian programmes, but that is dependent on context-specific factors such as the scope and duration of the programme, and the overall goals of the intended beneficiaries and recipients (Goodhand 2010; HPG 2009). The role of the international community - with the exception of the US - particularly with reference to humanitarian support, was appreciated to some extent and regarded in a positive light by most respondents. However, external military and political objectives have emphasized stabilization of areas in north-western Pakistan that have mostly overridden purely humanitarian concerns. These approaches reveal the influence of conservative agendas on the liberal peace process (Chandler 2010). The US continues to make demands for continued military engagement and has often tied development assistance to the need to conduct new military operations in certain areas. These aspects of liberal peace (as it operates in practice) highlight the undervaluing of local social security issues, as compared to the international security concerns of promoters and effecters of liberal peace (Goodhand 2010). This has compromised humanitarian principles and also reflects the inherent tensions within liberal peace thinking.

Many civil society organizations (mostly funded by the U.S) have been engaged to cater to the need for humanitarian emergency responses and for carrying out public advocacy and awareness campaigns. They are often accused of violating local cultural norms and practices, something which is viewed unfavourably by most inhabitants in the region. Furthermore, there have been allegations that foreign-funded NGOs have been used for espionage purposes, most notably during the Bin Laden incident. The sincerity of emancipatory strategies is therefore increasingly being questioned from within the liberal peace agenda (Richmond 2010).

The emancipatory model of neo-liberal peace and development, which emphasizes people’s needs, local ownership and agency, has not been given the same priority as the orthodox and conservative models (Donini 2007; Duffield 2010; Richmond 2010). Thus, there remain structural issues when putting into practice the liberal peace agenda. In relation to practices, it is

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20 Pakistan warns US over unilateral military action
Source: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-15364956

25
observed that liberal peace largely ignores local ownership, which undermines legitimacy of peace building strategies and highlights the hold of top down perspectives in peace building (Newman et al 2009). The failure of liberal peace to sufficiently consider local perspectives of peace building in part stems from a lack of bottom up perspectives in liberal peace building (Hoffman 2010).

A plausible understanding of the inconsistencies of liberal peace building is the dominance of conservative approaches, which are highlighted by how international actors and local governments have overwhelmingly relied on using military means to achieve their aims in conflict affected states such as Afghanistan, Iraq and North-western Pakistan (Lieven 2011; Nye 2011; Rashid 2008). Empirical evidence suggests that the application of the liberal peace agenda has led to a merger of aid and politics in the region, even though humanitarian assistance is generally considered to be apolitical in nature (Duffield 2010). Based on experiences in conflict-affected countries, there have been major disconnects between local understandings of peace and security and the way these are viewed by outside actors, most notably promoters of liberal peace. The conflation and contradiction in this thinking has particularly affected longer-term development processes, which include infrastructure building programmes (Donini 2007; Orakzai 2011). Thus, conflict-affected societies increasingly need to rework the liberal peace-building agenda by recognizing local needs, rights and ownerships and addressing grievances and (where possible) building upon links with internationalists – these developments are being regarded as the onset of a ‘post-liberal peace’ (Richmond 2011).

7. CONCLUSIONS
This paper, attempts to understand the dynamics of liberal peace building in relation to humanitarian and development interventions from the perspectives of local communities in north-western Pakistan. The liberal peace agenda for conflict-affected regions is often said to be built around emancipatory means, such as local ownerships that support local communities through peace-building interventions. Empirical evidence gathered from north-western Pakistan in the course of this study questions this assertion. Local experiences indicate that the liberal peace agenda is largely contradictory in terms of meeting the local needs which translates in the form of imbalances in peace-building activities, since it overwhelmingly relies on military
means. This paper identifies the liberal peace perspectives in north-west Pakistan, which are initiated by the federal and provincial governments, the UN and the humanitarian community, and the United States and multilateral agencies, including the WB and ADB. During the course of the current conflict they have attempted a series of securitization and development approaches that have failed to achieve the desired results. A number of development and humanitarian response plans in the region since 2007 have been projected as ground breaking and laced with promises for a better future and better opportunities for the communities in north-western Pakistan. While there have been some achievements in assisting communities following the IDP and flood crises, they remain limited in scope. The case is that development and humanitarian interventions in north-western Pakistan are strongly linked to the security discourses of the Pakistan Army and the United States, even though the policy documents and plans do not explicitly identify these links.

An analysis of peace building policies and documents reveals that there remains some synergy between Pakistani and American military interests in the region; however, Pakistani and U.S. officials have failed to agree on a common set of implementation indicators for measuring longer-term development responses. Even though the US strongly emphasized the need for long-term development interventions in education, infrastructure and livelihoods. The provincial government in KP has attempted to channel some of its resources towards the PCNA, which offers a longer term response instead of the humanitarian activities that are mostly short-term. However, even if the US is one of the primary funders, it has not extended crucial support towards meeting the objectives of the PCNA. This raises unanswered questions about US intentions and its sincerity.

The disconnect between liberal peace building and effective development policies and practices in north-western Pakistan reflects the diverse interests of actors, states, elites and development and humanitarian institutions, which are unable to deal with local needs, which leads to retaining the status quo (Richmond 2010). Even though official policy recognizes the urgency of meeting the development needs of communities in the region, it still is unable to translate these into effective interventions at the local level. Furthering the liberal peace agenda indirectly contributes to the securitization of development assistance, since it forces the Pakistani military
to carry out military offensives in response to US pressure. This securitization of development also demonstrates the need to pay more attention to structural imbalances, contradictions and conflations in liberal peace. As this paper shows, the favoured response to the crises in northwest Pakistan has remained humanitarian relief, which is easy to carry out and does not require longer-term investments. However, these interventions often undermine local agency, create dependencies and lead to decreased institutional capacity. There continue to remain large gaps between the ‘false promises’ of development interventions promoted by the state and the actual development activities on the ground. Unless these gaps are addressed, they will continue to frustrate local communities in northwest Pakistan.

8. REFERENCES


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TABLES AND FIGURES ON SEPARATE PAGES:
Table 1. Primary data sources, Respondent affiliations, stratifications, and occupations

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<th>CLASSIFICATION</th>
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<th>PERCENTAGE</th>
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</table>

BIOGRAPHICAL STATEMENT

Kashif Saeed Khan is a PhD candidate at Department of International Environment and Development Studies, Noragric. He has experience from South Asia mostly from Pakistan and the Af-Pak. border region, his areas of expertise cover liberal peace building, development and humanitarian policies and interventions, post-conflict development, governance and livelihood security.

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