Global Governance and How Norms Travel: The Case of Gender Based Violence in Russia

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Declaration

I, Victoria Weber, declare that this thesis is a result of my research investigations and findings. Sources of information other than my own have been acknowledged and a reference list has been appended. This work has not been previously submitted to any other university for award of any type of academic degree.

Signature......................................

Date.............................................
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Abstract

The main purpose of this thesis is to understand why international norms on gender based violence are not completely accepted in Russia and thus are not fully incorporated into the Russian legislation framework.

Considering how norms can be localized and what mechanisms exist and can be used by international observers in order to press states to adopt international norms, it became possible to consider the case of traveling norms on gender based violence in Russia.

The main assumption is that the reasons why norms on gender based violence are not fully adopted in Russia are rooted in the domestic context, in other words in a set of internal factors like regime, legislation, traditions and religion. I will show that there is no domestic legislation on gender based violence, which means that international norms have no “ground” to be localized in. Besides this, the strong influence of the gender stereotypes and traditionalism of the Russian authorities, along with the role the Russian Orthodox Church, can also be considered as the obstacles for norm localization.

Key words: Russia, gender, gender based violence, CEDAW, identity, legislation, the Russian Orthodox Church, Pussy Riot, feminism, international norms, Global Governance, Transnational Advocacy Networks, crisis centers, activism
**Introduction**

Norms and rules are an essential part of the world and of the relations between states. In the era of globalization many of the norms are shared between the states. In order to promote global democratization on the global arena non-governmental organizations (NGOs) act as “norm entrepreneurs” (Sundstrom, 2005). It means that NGOs can influence governments with crucial issues, such as, for example, gender issues. NGOs and international organizations (IOs) play an important role in agenda-settings (Joachim, 2007). Actors from NGOs, representatives of IOs, politicians, lawyers and activists can form Transnational Advocacy Networks (TANs). TANs are committed to solve pressing problems that face the world. As norm entrepreneurs TANs make a huge contribution to the different types of norms and help both to regional and international integration (Keck & Sikking, 1999). Htun and Weldon (2012) claim that TANs encourage women to unite themselves into women’s organizations and by this implicitly affect changing of policies on violence against women.

Gender inequality evokes international cooperation of different states and actors. Gender norms are spread all over the world by different kinds of organizations and activists, such as the United Nations (UN). One of the results of the international collaboration is The Convention of the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) that was established in 1979 in order to protect women all over the world. It was ratified by USSR in 1981 and Russia, as the successor state of the USSR, has assumed all the obligations of the CEDAW (Bondarenko, 1996). But despite the ratification, the situation with addressing gender based violence in Russia is still very complicated. Russia has been repeatedly criticized for not doing enough. For example, critics point to lack of legislation and lack of shelters for women (“Russia: Bill to Decriminalize Domestic Violence”, 2017).

In this master thesis, I will consider the reasons why norms on gender based violence are not fully accepted in Russia. The main research question of this paper is: why are international norms on gender based violence not fully adopted in Russia?

Johnson (2007) claims that there are no special features of the Russian culture that can constrain reforms in domestic policies regarding gender based violence.

But my main assumption is that there are reasons why norms on gender based violence are not fully adopted Russia and these reasons are rooted in the domestic context, in other
words in a set of internal factors like regime, legislation, traditions and religion. I will consider the world norm diffusion and the localization of foreign norms in the domestic structure. I will also highlight the role of the national identity in norm acceptance, as the national identity is an important part of the domestic context. Likewise, I will explain how states construct state identity, how it affects the state behaviour and domestic political culture and norms. Through this I will consider the case of gender based violence in Russia and illustrate the obstacles that prevent the international norms to be implemented in the Russian legislation.

I will use qualitative research methods: qualitative text analysis of secondary data and a case study.

The structure of this thesis will reflect topics regarding my assumption mentioned above. But firstly, in the methods section I will discuss how the text analyses and the case study were used. With the literature review I will discuss the constructivists approach on norm diffusion and norm localisation and explain how norms travel and how they are localized in the domestic structure. Next, in order to illustrate obstacles in the norm diffusion process I will consider what is understood by a norm in this paper, the evolution of women’s right and gender based violence legislation in Russia, paying special attention to the situation in the Russian legislation nowadays. After this I will give an overview of women’s rights activism in Russia, as activists play an important role in promotion of norms. Then I will describe the concept of identity in International Relations and specially the construction of the Russian identity through gender perspective, because identity can be also considered as one of the obstacle on the way of international norms implementation. After that I will consider the impact of the Russian Orthodox Church on the Russian society, because I consider the Russian Orthodox Church as an important part of the identity and the domestic context. I will also look at the Church’s attitude to women’s right and gender based violence. Next, I will examine contemporary Russian regime as it can also affect the adoption of the international norms. Finally, I will conclude the paper analysing all mentioned above and provide the main findings of my research.
Norm Diffusion and Norm Localization

In order to answer the main research question, it is important to understand how norms actually travel all over the world. In this chapter I will consider how to study norms, define the concept of norm localization, how international norms become localized and what actors can help to make international norms local.

“Norms do not appear out of thin air” (Finnemore & Sikking, 1998, p. 896). But what is a norm? Different scholars define norms differently. For instance, Park (2005, p. 113) define norms as “shared expectations about appropriate behaviour held by community of actors”. Krook & True (2012, p, 103) state that norms are “ideas of varying degrees of abstraction and specification with respect to fundamental values, organizing principles or standardized procedures that resonate across many states and global actors, having gained support in multiple forums including official policies, laws, treaties or agreements”. In other words, a norm becomes a norm only when enough amount, some critical number of actors accept it as a norm (Finnemore & Sikking, 1998).

Norms can change the behaviour of states and shape international and national agendas. Transfer of norms is usually called norm diffusion. Finnemore and Sikking (1998) provide 3 stages of norm influence, so-called norm “life cycle”. This cycle includes the following stages: “norm-emergence”, “norm cascade” and “internationalization” (p. 895). The first stage is characterized by norm entrepreneurs and their attempts to make states accept a new norm. The second stage is more about the dynamics of norm acceptance by more and more states. And the third stage implies that new norms become widely accepted and integrated into domestic context. When we analyse, for example, the CEDAW through this perspective, it is obvious that the first stage, norm emergence, is the start of the United Nations Decade for Women in 1975. This decade included three major conferences on women. The first conference took place in Mexico City in 1975, the second was held in Copenhagen in 1980, followed by the third conference in Nairobi in 1985 (“World Conferences on Women”, n.d.). The adoption and widely ratification of the CEDAW can be considered as the norm cascade. And finally, the norm internalization, which unfortunately did not happen yet (Zwingel, 2012). Indeed, despite the fact that 189 countries have adopted the CEDAW, had the convention been successfully internationalized, the problem of gender violence would have disappeared.

Describing the norm “life cycle”, Finnemore and Sikking (1998) speak about the reasons why states accept democratic international norms. One of the reasons is “to be the
part of the group” (p. 903). It is also important for states to look better than they are, or in other words to make just an impression of better states. And last but not least, states can accept international human rights norms in order to change the image of human rights norm violators.

But are there any external reasons that make a state to accept a norm?

According to constructivists, international organizations play crucial role in the norm diffusion. International organizations work as initiators of transformations in many areas like human rights, gender equality, development etc. The constructivists approach considers international organizations not only like norm consumers, but also as norm diffusers “that are shaped by non-state actors” (Park, 2005).

As I have mentioned above, TANs are important actors in translating legislations and shaping norms and norm diffusion. According to Keck and Sikking (1999, p. 90), “network actors bring new ideas, norms and discourses into policy debates, and serve as sources of information and testimony”. Typically, NGOs take the central place in TANs, but other actors also can be involved (Zwingel, 2012). In order to promote the global democratization on the global arena NGOs act as “norm entrepreneurs” (Sundstrom, 2005). It means that NGOs can influence governments with crucial issues, such as for example, gender issues. NGOs and IOs play important role in agenda-settings (Joachim, 2007). According to Park (2005, p.13), “IOs spread norms through establishing regimes, forming international agendas, constructing discourse, enforcing rules, and mediating between states”.

But how does the norm diffusion occur? How local actors can take some international norms and make these norms local? Should such norms be taken as they are? Wholesale? Without any change? Here we come to a definition of norm localization. Amitav Acharya (2004) defines localization as “a complex process and outcome by which norm-takers build congruence between transnational norms (including norms previously institutionalized in a region) and local believes and practices” (p. 241). Localization includes “active construction (through discourse, framing, grafting and cultural selection) of foreign ideas by local actors, which results in the former developing significant congruence with local beliefs and practices” (p. 245). It means that the process of norm localization depends not only on the desire of norm-makers, but also on local context (like, for example, values and believes). Localized norms are the mixture of new international norms and existed local norms. The main purpose of localizing norms is to “strengthen, not replace, existing institutions” (Acharya, 2004, p. 246).
Acharya (2004) states that the acceptance of norms depends on different aspects like local believes, local structure, local norms and how foreign norms can be implement into the local structure. He also takes into consideration the strength of local norms and domestic regimes. He provides an example of newly established democratic regimes that promote human rights norms because the process of promotion and adoption of such norms confirm their authority.

Similarly, Zwingel (2012) points that the domestic context is essential for the acceptance of international norms. She defines the impact of international norms as “changes in the national discourse, the state’s institutions, and the states policies in reaction to the norm” (p. 118). She also stresses that so called “cultural match” (or “mismatch) is important in the process of norm internalization. It means that an international norm must be close to the cultural local context in order to be implemented in the local legislations.

I have mentioned that norms come into local legislations. There are several ways of such infiltration. A state can create its own laws that reflect one or several international norms. A state can also join international treaties. Abram and Antonia Handler Chayes (1995) suggest a very simple reason why states choose “to follow the established treaty rule” (p. 4) – efficiency. Chayes and Chayes (1995) claim that a state bureaucracy does not have unlimited resources and tries to use these resources for the most acute issues. Joining international treaties frees resources, the bureaucracy does not need to spend them on creating a law from scratch and on convincing and persuasion that the law is useful.

Chayes and Chayes (1995) add that a state adopts an international treaty because it satisfies a state’s interest. Moreover, “Modern treaty making … can be seen as a creative enterprise through which the parties not only weigh the benefits and burdens of commitment but also explore, redefine, and sometimes discover their interests” (Chayes and Chayes 1995, p. 4). The adoption of international treaties can be considered as a “learning process”. This process includes evolution of state’s points of view and even national interest. Chayes and Chayes (1993) claim that every-day decision making process in international relations serves present, ongoing issues and such decisions have to be developed within a certain amount of time and have short-run outcome. On the contrary, a treaty making process helps to determine long-term goals and objectives or to strengthen existing values. Or in other words, through a treaty making process, a state can learn and understand the further way of development.

In addition, Chayes and Chayes (1993) argue that states do not adopt treaties with an idea that they will routinely violate these treaties.
But Olga Avdeyeva (2007) claims that sometimes states adopt international agreements without any desire to follow them. She provides international human rights treaties as an example. She states that an amount of countries that ratify human rights treaties constantly increases. Ratifying such treaties makes the human rights regime “stronger and more legitimate” (p. 877), this makes the regime more attractive for states, which in its turn press even more countries to join it. However, many states ratify international human rights treaties just nominally, formally. It means that the ratification does not lead to significant changes in internal legislation and practices – states still trample human rights even though they officially adhere to international treaties. But at the same time the fact of the ratification puts a state in the spotlight of different observers: “IGOs, international and domestic NGOs, and domestic social groups” (p. 878). These observers begin to press and affect the state using different strategies of social influence.

Avdeyeva (2007) describes several mechanisms of social influence – coercion, persuasion and acculturation. She emphasizes the role of the acculturation which is defined as “the general process by which actors adopt the beliefs and behavioural patterns of the surrounding culture” (p. 879). The purpose of such behaviour is to show that a state that adopts these norms and believes is not a “deviant actor” (p. 881). Status of a deviant actor can bring additional difficulties to a state on the international arena, because other states can try to press the deviant actor, to force it to get into a compliance to the norms. There are several strategies of such pressure: “shaming, shunning and exclusion” (p. 881). But acculturation is not a real adoption of norms, it implies just simulation of other states’ “positions, norms and believes” (p. 881). That is, acculturation does not mean that the state will accept and follow new norms or really make any changes in its behaviour. Acculturation does not cause full recognition, adoption and introduction of international norms into local legislation. It leads to a possibility that a state will stop following international treaties when the pressure of the observers becomes weaker. Moreover, a state can actively try to reduce such pressure. I will provide an example later.

In this chapter I have reviewed the literature on norm diffusion and norm localization. This literature will help me to analyse the case of gender based violence in Russia and how and why the international norms on gender based violence were (or were not) accepted in Russia.
Methodology

In this chapter I will provide the information about the methodology that has been used. I will explain the choices that has been made in order to answer the main research question.

According to Bryman (2012, p. 380), “Qualitative research is a research strategy that usually emphasizes words rather than quantification in the collection and analysis of data. As a research strategy it is a broadly inductivist, constructionist, and interpretivist, but qualitative researchers do not always subscribe to all the three of these features”.

One of the types of qualitative research methods is the text analysis (Bryman, 2012). In this master thesis, I will analyse secondary data, such as analytical academic articles, books and reports of different organizations. According to Silverman (2010), text analysis as a research methods has to be detailed and requires the use of various data sources. For this reason, in this paper in addition to the already mentioned list of the secondary data, I will also use scholar articles, newspaper reports, official web pages and so on. This data will help to build up analytical framework for the further research.

The main purpose of this thesis is to figure out why international norms on gender based violence do not fully accepted in Russia. First of all, doing my research I will review literature on how international norms travel around the world from state to state, what makes a state accept a certain norm and how norms infiltrate into local legal systems. Next, I will trace the evolution of women’s rights and gender based violence legislation in Russia. In order to do this, I will go through the historical literature. I will also highlight progress of the activism in Russia from the soviet times to present.

In my research, I will also use the official reports of the Russian Federation, alternative reports, international laws, federal laws and amendments to the Russian Codes. These documents will help to analyse the changes that have been made on the state level and how Russia responds to the international community. I will examine the transformation in the Soviet and Russian society and identity.

According to Stake (1995) case study is one of the most widespread method in qualitative researches. This kind of method helps to get better understanding of the investigated question. The case of gender based violence in Russia will help to illustrate the theoretical investigations.
Some information about the Convention of the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)

The main research question of this thesis is about norms on gender based violence issues. In order to answer this question, firstly it is important to explain what is meant by the norm in the context of this paper. As already mentioned in the introduction, one of the main source of norms on gender based violence is the CEDAW that was created in order to protect women all over the world.

According to the United Nations web page, the history of the CEDAW goes back to the end of the 20th century. It was established in 1979 and since that time it was ratified by 189 states all over the world. The Convention consists of 6 parts and 30 articles.

As I have mentioned above, according to Olga Avdeyeva (2007) there are several reasons why states ratify international treaties without any desire to follow international norms. She provides an example of the phenomena of “acculturation”, when states ratify international treaty just in order to become a part of a group and to avoid sanctions and shaming by the other members of the group. Similarly, according to Foot (2000), compliance with human rights treaties helps to join the international community which in its turn help to get access to foreign aid, trades, etc. It is interesting to mention here that the United States is one of the states that has not ratify the CEDAW (Merry, 2006).

When it comes to the CEDAW, for example, it is quite easy to pretend that states fully accept it, because this treaty is the “law without sanctions” (Merry, 2006, p. 72). Moreover, some states cover up the reluctance to reform the local legislation by the financial difficulties. So how do states actually communicate with the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women? The State parties are obliged to submit their periodic reports every four years or after a special request of the CEDAW Committee. On the regular meetings of the CEDAW Committee these reports are discussed by the committee members (Merry, 2006).

When I was reading reports from Russia, I got some interesting findings, that can be considered as an illustration of acculturation. The communication between the CEDAW Committee and the Russian Federation looks like a ping pong game. Let me provide an example of such game. In the response to the Russian fifth periodic report the CEDAW Committee points that there was a huge problem of women trafficking in Russia. Moreover, Russia became the country of destination for trafficked women. Russia in its turn answered in the sixth and seventh periodic reports that the Russian Federation developed mechanism of preventing the problem of trafficking. The report contains the information that Russia ratified
the United Nations Convention against transnational organized crime, as well as the supplementary Protocol against the illegal importation of immigrants on land, sea, and in the air, as well as the Protocol on preventing and stopping the trafficking of humans, especially women and children, and on punishments for this. Also, according to the report, the Ministry of Internal Affairs in Russia (MVD) has made a great job in liquidation of the trafficking channels. But in this case with the CEDAW we can see one interesting thing – it seems that Russia tries to show the situation better than it really is. If we look at the Alternative report, made by ANNA National Centre for the Prevention of Violence, it becomes clear that despite the fact that Russia reported about the measures that were taking against the problem of trafficking, the situation is still outrageous.

These examples can be considered as an illustration of the acculturation. Indeed, as a State parties of the CEDAW Russia makes the periodic reports, but the data in these reports is far from the reality.

**Evolution of Women’s Right and Gender Based Violence Legislation in Russia.**

As already mentioned local legislation plays an important role in the process of norm localization. In this chapter I want to analyse development of women’s rights and legislation on gender based violence in Russia.

Violence against women is defined by the United Nations as:

any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or mental harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in private life. (“Full text of the Convention in English”, n.d.)

The history of women’s rights in Russia is very long. It goes back to the ancient times and women’s rights have been changed constantly all the time.

Before Christianity came to Russia, in pagan times, a woman was not considered better or worse than a man. A woman was just a human of another type. Both man and woman played their roles in the society and it gave a certain level of freedom. Legislation at that time was based on customs, traditions and believes (Clements, 2012).

After adoption of Christianity social status of women changed. By the beginning of the 15th century under the influence of the Christian literature and philosophy a woman began to be considered as “unclean”, as “the devil’s vessel”. Legislation at that time was under influence of Byzantine law. Beating of a wife was not pursued, but was considered as a duty
of a husband. If a man did not beat his wife and children he was seen as a man who did not take care of his household (Ivanitsky, 1995).

By the end of the 15th century appeared maybe one of the most famous ancient Russian books – Domostroi. This book contained a set of rules for a citizen and recommendations for everyday life. Domostroi also contained prescriptions about women’s place in society. The main aim of these prescriptions was to deprive women’s right to make independent decisions and even more – to give a man a right to control spheres that were traditionally under women’s control. As for domestic violence, it was considered not like violence, but like an answer to any disobedience. Domostroi contained “useful rules of beating”: “Do not beat in the ear nor in the face … Do not beat with the fist nor with stick, nor iron, nor wooden”. But it is important to stress that Domostroi was not a law, but a “recommendation” (Radzinsky, 2017).

The situation changed in the 18th century. Many stereotypes were broken in the Russian noble society. It caused, for example, women’s accession to power, the emergence of female leaders – Russian Empresses. But nothing changed in the lower classes (Ivanitsky, 1995).

The further development of this trend became «Zhenskoe patrioticheskoe obshestvo» (Women’s patriotic society) which was established in Russia in 1812. This society became the beginning of organized women’s political activity. Members of the society showed by their own example a possibility of women’s not only household but public activity. First demands for equality of men and women in social and political spheres appeared after 1850 (Stites, 1991). This time also was characterized by attempts to give women jobs and make them more economically independent and by struggle for women’s access to higher education. However, the first institutions of professional and higher education for women appeared only in 1870s. But, as before, here we talk about higher classes of the society. Lower classes – peasants and workers – did not play any significant role in this process (Kukhterin & Ashwin, 2000).

This period became the time of inception of the Russia feminism. Feminist did not try to brake, to completely change the existing social order. They tried to work inside the frames set by the Russian society of that time. They had moderate approach, they tried to change women’s position legally, peacefully, step by step. They did not pay much attention to questions of sex, marriage or family. They focused more on women’s economic status and educational freedom (Stites, 1991).

The revolution of 1905 created a new generation of feminists – suffragists – and a new wave of demands for equality in civil and political rights (Shnyrova, 2012).
The situation with women’s rights changed dramatically after the February Revolution and especially after the Great October Socialist Revolution in 1917. For example, the Russian Provisional Government ratified a law that gave voting rights to women, a law that guaranteed equal salaries to men and women and some other laws for the further equalization of rights. When the Bolsheviks came to power they began to reform the whole system of social relations, including gender relations. The Bolsheviks wanted to make women equal to men and to make women an essential part of industry. This was seen as an indispensable condition to create a new socialistic state. Such inclusion of women in public life radically changed women’s gender role. But if we consider legislation of the new state, surprisingly the new women’s role was not reflected in the Constitution. Only additional code of laws fulfilled some gaps regarding gender rights. However, factually by 1918 women in Russia could choose profession, place of residence, get education, get divorced and get equal pay for equal to men work. Men and women became constitutionally equal much later – equality of men and women was finally enshrined in the Constitution of 1936. The Constitution guaranteed “providing to a woman in the USSR equal rights with a man” (Maksimov, 2016).

After the Second World War, laws were changed and it became harder to get divorced. In addition, divorce could affect carrier as it was considered as “moral instability”. The role of a woman changed again – a woman became more focused on home and family. But at the same time a woman continued to work, mainly because most men earned not enough to support their families (Maksimov, 2016).

The legislation was changed again in 1968. The laws focused more not on women’s duties, but on women’s rights and encouragement of motherhood. The legislation actually had its aim to support a mother, but not a woman as such (Maksimov, 2016).

In 1977 happened a seemingly insignificant, but very important in its essence change in the Constitution. The phrase “providing to a woman in the USSR equal rights with a man” was reformulated to “Men and women in the USSR have equal rights”. It means that it was accepted that rights of a man were not a reference or a standard, that rights of a woman should not tend to rights of a man, that a woman and a man are completely equal (Maksimov, 2016).

The Soviet Constitution of 1977 was valid until the collapse of the USSR. It is worth to mention that in 1981 the USSR ratified the CEDAW. Despite that the USSR officially proclaimed the equality of men and women and ratified the CEDAW this equality was not reached in the real life. Human Rights Watch (1995) notes that “women and men were not afforded equal rights in practice and, in some areas, the law explicitly curtailed women's rights” (“RUSSIA NEITHER JOBS NOR
JUSTICE State Discrimination Against Women in Russia SUMMARY”, 1995). There were no independent organizations that could promote women’s rights, because the Soviet state controlled all spheres of life and restrained work of all NGOs. It led to the fact that independent organizations appeared in the USSR only towards the end of the Soviet era – in the late 1980s. This in its turn led to rejection of the concept of equality by many Russian men and even women, because they rejected the Soviet regime, its policy and initiatives (Johnson, 2009).

As for gender based violence legislation in Soviet times, the situation was maybe even worse. For example, domestic violence was considered as hooliganism without distinguishing gender based violence into a separate category of crime. However remarkably, domestic violence was usually ignored by the police because it was seen not like an illegal act, but as a “family scandal”, which was not under police jurisdiction (Johnson, 2009).

Analysing all above, it becomes clear that in ancient times men and women were somehow equal in their rights, but over time, especially after Christianity came to Russia, a woman lost most of her freedoms and her role reduced to role of mother and housewife. Some deviations in this field came on the scene only in the 18th century and only in the noble society. Even though the Soviet regime proclaimed equality of men and women from the beginning of its existence, legally such equality was enshrined only in 1977, but was never really achieved. Considering gender based violence legislation over the time, we can see that there were no specific norms protecting women from violence. Conversely the violence against woman was a norm before the revolution and was not taken seriously in the Soviet times.

What is the Legislation on Gender Based Violence in Russia Today? From Bad to Worse in the Post-Communist Era.

Equality is guaranteed by the Russian Law. According to the Constitution of the Russian Federation (1993), which is actually based on the Soviet Constitution, «Men and women have equal rights and freedoms and equal opportunities for their implementation» (Article 19). But in the real life, women’s rights are still violated everywhere – at work, at home and even on the streets – even though Russia, as a successor of the USSR, is one of the countries that participates in the CEDAW. In this case, similarly to the case of the human trafficking that I have mentioned above, the Russian authorities try to show the situation in a more positive way than it really is. According to the eighth periodic report of the Russian Federation on the measures taken to implement the provisions of the CEDAW, the level of all

In the 1990s, after dissolution of the USSR, Russia came into the turbulent era of instability – the time of economic, political and social turmoil. One of the consequences of this instability was an extremely high level of criminality. At the same time, all state institutions suffered of underfunding, including police. Police was overwhelmed by the number of statements and systematically began to reject statements concerning sexual violence without any attempts to investigate such cases. Moreover, policemen often did not believe that raped women were real victims. Policeman suspected that women just tried to slander men and extort money. Paradoxically, public opinion considered that raped women themselves provoked sexual violence. Some theorists claimed that the increasing number of rapes was due to the fall of communism, liberalization, western influence and, as a consequence, low level of morality of women. As mentioned above, the crime level was very high in 1990s, but at the same time official statistics said that number of rapes or rape attempts decreased. The rape rate became lower than in Europe. Ironically, even policemen thought that this rate was far away from the reality (Johnson, 2009).

Similarly to rape, domestic violence was also ignored by the police. More people lived in private (not state owned) apartments and the police did not respond to domestic violence calls saying that it was not in their jurisdiction and referring to the Constitution that protected private life (Johnson, 2009). Moreover, the police often denied to accept reports about domestic violence from victims, denied to investigate the cases described in the reports giving unreasonable rejections even if the fact of the crime commitment was undoubtable. The police could also dissuade victims to write reports. Furthermore, victims could be forced by the police officers to start a “reconciliation process” (p. 2) with violators. If two persons reconcile or pretend to reconcile the police must drop the case. Victim could decide whether the case should be further investigated. This means that an abuser could press a victim and force the victim to ask the police to stop investigation and revoke a report from the police. (Ziegeweid, n.d.).

And again, as in case of rapes it was women who were blamed as the main provocateur. Despite the fact that women were included into workforce throughout the whole Soviet history, only in 1990s theorists began to justify domestic violence as a reaction to
women’s labour activity and, as a consequence, financial independence and absence at home. The theorists saw this situation as a destruction of normal, “natural” order of things” (p. 31) and claimed that a woman could avoid domestic violence if she returned to her “natural” role of mother (Johnson, 2009).

In 1994 parliament fraction the Women of Russia tried to make a step towards improving legislation concerning gender based violence. They drafted a law against domestic violence, which was “the first gender-related issue raised in the new parliament” (p. 105). The draft defined the concept of family and different types of domestic violence – the concepts that are not defined in any legal documents even now, in contemporary Russia. But the draft was changed forty-eight times during several years and never became a functioning law (Johnson, 2009).

Meanwhile, according to statistics of the Independent Commission on Women's Rights and Violence Against Women, enforcement authorities declare that 8% of Russian women had an experience of domestic violence in their lives. Yet, this data can hardly be considered as precise because not all the victims of the domestic violence go to the police after an act of such violence. Moreover, approximately 22% of women in Russia were raped in a lifetime. Some of the Western criminalistics state that in the number of registered call to the police regarding domestic od sexual violence the one fifth or even one sixth part of these cases are not registered. From the end on 90th up till now the number of refuses to initiate a criminal case on sexual violence increased yearly. And in the period of 1997 - 2003, the amount of such refuses increased for 118% (Pisklakova-Parker et al., 2010).

Up till now there is no legislation against gender based violence in Russia. According to Human Rights Watch (2017), statistically, about 40% of all serious violent crimes in Russia happen in families. The same number was vocalized by Svetlana Aivazova, a specialist in the field of gender researches and a member of the Presidential Council for Civil Society Institutions Development and Human Rights, in an interview to Novaya Gazeta in October 2015. She also added that 25% of murders were committed within families. It means that a family is almost as dangerous place as a street. Aivazova mentioned that there was drafted a new law against domestic violence, but there were a lot of disputes about this law and it “floated” between the Russian government, ministries and departments. One of the obstacles on the way of ratifying this law was the position of senator Elena Mizulina (former Chairman of the Duma Committee on Family, Women and Children Affairs). Mizulina said that they (members of the Duma Comitee) would oppose the law, because it would be an intervention into family matters. Mizulina also mentioned that there was no equality in rights of parents
and children in a traditional Russian family, but there was only distribution of roles, and it was a Russian tradition, and this tradition should be protected. Moreover, Pavel Astakhov, former Children's Rights Commissioner for the President of the Russian Federation, said that violence in families was exaggerated and that a family was the safest place. The Russian Orthodox Church was also against such law as they considered family relations as a part of private life (Masyk, 2015).

Moreover, in summer 2016 the Russian parliament adopted a law that excluded beating that did not lead to injury from the Criminal Code. There were only two exceptions – beating of close relatives and beating on the basis of enmity, hatred or hooliganism (The Federal Law №323-ФЗ from 03.07.2016)

In January 2017 one of the exceptions – beating of close relatives – was also excluded from the Criminal Code. But it is important to mention that this exclusion works only if such incident happens for the first time. If someone beats relatives periodically it is still considered as a criminal issue (The Federal Law №8-ФЗ from 07.02.2017). In addition to this change in the legislation we can mention that there is no legislative mechanism to protect victims from abusers under investigation of a civil or criminal issue. Russian courts cannot give a protective order (Ziegeweid, n.d.).

It is interesting to mark here that mass media plays in this case an important, but a rather negative role. Media proclaims that domestic violence becomes decriminalized almost without any explanations. It leads to misunderstanding – people do not read the law itself, but “hear” that violence is not a crime now and thus can be acceptable.

Moreover, it is very difficult to get a real statistics on gender based violence because of the variety of articles in the Russian Criminal Code that can be used to describe a crime. For example, the Article 105 describes the criminal penalty for the murder, the Article 109 describes the penalty for involuntary manslaughter and the Article 111 describes causing serious harm to health, resulting in the death of the victim. Such a variety of articles triggers the question how was the statistics on domestic violence and murders collected by Svetlana Aivazova. Not doubting her data, it would be useful to know if all the cases were taken into consideration. For example, if a person #1 stabs a person #2 and the person #2 dies immediately, this will be prosecuted according to the Article 105 of the Russian Criminal Code. But if a person #1 stabs a person #2 and a person #2 dies in the hospital, this will be prosecuted according to the Article 111 of the Russian Criminal Code and will not be considered as a murder despite the fact that the person #2 is dead. Furthermore, the penalty
for those crimes is different. This illustrates the real necessity of the establishing of the special legislations on gender based violence issues.

To fully depict the situation with the legislation we must mention international treaties and Russia’s attitude to the international law. As mentioned above, international observers can press a state to follow international treaties, but a state can try to reduce such pressure. To weaken the pressure from “outside” the Russian government adopted several amendments to the legislation that limit opportunities of observers to affect the state behaviour. In July 2015, Russia adopted amendments to the Constitution of the Russian Federation which allow the Russian Constitutional Court to ignore the norms of the International Law, including the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights (The decision of the Constitutional Court № 21-Π/2015 from 14.07.2015, 2015). In addition, the Russian government accepted the amendment about including of NGOs and nonprofit organizations (NPOs), or non-commercial organizations (NCOs) as they are usually called in Russia, with foreign assistance in the list of Inostranny agent (Foreign agents) (The Federal Law №121-ФЗ from 20.07.2012). The term “foreign agent” has the obvious negative connotation in the Russian language. When an organization gets the label “foreign agent” this can provoke distrust from the Russian people. This in its turn makes the work of the observers more difficult in Russia now (“Russia: Government vs. Rights Groups The Battle Chronicle”, 2017).

The actions mentioned above can cast doubt on Russia’s interest to fully comply with the international treaties, to follow international norms and to protect human rights. Russia inherited the lack of the legislation on the gender based violence from the Soviet Union. Despite some attempts to create such legislation, there is still no laws addressing gender based violence.

But here it is interesting to analyse an article written by Christopher McCrudden (2015). He argues that domestic juridical systems refer to the CEDAW mainly not as local actors that take some international norms and implement them locally, not like norm makers that try to localize international norms by framing and adapting them, but as those who want to achieve their own goals. After reading this article it becomes clear that Russia is not the only state that has adopted the CEDAW, but refers to this norm only when it is possible to benefit from it.

McCrudden (2015) writes about comparative international law that focuses on common and distinct features of interpretation of international law by juridical systems on the domestic level. His analysis is based on “325 national judicial decisions across fifty-five jurisdictions, in which the CEDAW was referred to in the report of the case, including the
arguments made to, or the reasoning of, the court” (p. 2). He has made several main conclusions. First, it is not so often that courts refer to the CEDAW. But if they do so, the CEDAW is usually just one of the referenced international tools. Second, despite the fact that the CEDAW has different ways of interpretation and legal status in different legal systems, the main interpretation of the CEDAW is relatively common in all the states that were under consideration. Third, even though there are some important differences in the interpretation of the CEDAW, there is no difference when it comes to the attitude to the CEDAW. Finally, national juridical systems do not prefer to make references to interpretations of the CEDAW made by other national juridical systems. It means that in this case there is no significant transnational infiltration of the CEDAW interpretations even if these national systems have much in common in interpretations of national constitutional and statute law. McCrudden (2015) concludes that there may be a gap between the functions of international laws in the domestic jurisdictions and the functions that these laws have at the international level.

**Women’s Rights Activism from the Soviet Times to Present**

When I talked about norm diffusion I mentioned that there are several factors that can influence norm acceptance. I have just described the situation with one of these factors – local legislation in Russia. Now let’s talk about another factor – norm entrepreneurs, NGOs particularly. NGOs play important role in agenda-settings as they can influence governments with, in our case, gender issues (Joachim, 2007).

As I have already mentioned above, there were no independent organizations that could promote women’s rights in the USSR, because the Soviet state controlled all spheres of life and suppressed work of all NGOs. This was the reason why independent organizations appeared in the USSR only at the end of the Soviet time – in the late 1980s.

The policy of Glasnost, started by the soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in 1986, helped to show the scale of problems that were concealed during the Soviet period. Little by little Glasnost more and more highlighted dark sides of the Soviet past and present, including topics on violence, gender based violence in particular (Zabelina, 1995).

The collapse of the USSR created a variety of new possibilities for women’s mobilisation, it made Russia opened to the global feminism movement. Western feminist and advocacy groups could now come and work in Russia and vice versa local Russian activists could join global campaigns and networks (Johnson, 2009).
Such groups of local and foreign activists (TANs) according to Keck and Sikkink (1999, p. 93) can proliferate human rights norms using so called boomerang pattern. It means that local activists can request their foreign supporters to press their states from outside so as the states will act differently and move towards international norms compliancy. Or, to explain the whole chain, local activists ask foreign activists, the foreign activists ask their state, their state begins to press the state of the local activists.

One of the types of TANs that work particularly on gender issues are transnational feminist networks (TFNs). Moghadam (2005, p. 4) defines TFNs as “structures organized above the national level that unite women from three or more countries around the common agenda, such as women’s rights, reproductive health, violence against women, peace and antimilitarism, or feminist economics”.

The fall of the Soviet regime was seen as a victory of democracy by the Western community (Johnson, 2009). This generated a huge wave of foreign aid. Different funds and charity organizations could provide financial help to local activists and women’s organisations. Some of these organizations were successors of official Soviet structures, some called themselves independent, or as we call it now NGOs. Some of these groups adhered to the feminist movement. Members of these groups were well educated women, who knew foreign languages, who were familiar with Western, democratic, liberal ideas and concepts. Thus, they could easily establish dialog with Western funds and get assistance and support (Hemment, 2004).

But it is interesting to mark here that according to Johnson (2009) the already described boomerang pattern was not used. It means that there was no request from the local actors, but instead foreign actors “threw in” “fund, norms, diplomacy” (p. 155).

In the period of 1990-2002 Russia received about 860 million dollars from the USA and about 800 million euro from the European Union as a support of democracy. NGOs got approximately 10% of these sums (Johnson, 2009).

But does it mean that if foreign donors provide more funding then NGOs are more successful? Or even more – does access to foreign funds make NGOs successful at all? Is there any connection between amounts of foreign funds and, for example, number of international norms that would be localized?

Sundstrom (2005) claims that foreign grants are not enough. She states that foreign donors and a local society must have shared norms. If the norms are not shared, if the norms are not understood and accepted in the local society, if necessity of changes of existing norms is not recognized by the local society, foreign funding will create a variety of NGOs that will
try to promote and implement the norms, but they will not reach people’s minds and thus will fail. Women should realize their rights, not just have it! Vice versa, if NGOs promote some universal norms that are accepted by a local society, they will succeed anyway, but foreign funding will help to work faster and reach success quicker.

As Bertone (2004) claims that violence against women became the main issue during the Vienna World Conference on Human Rights in 1993. But not for all participants. Women from developing countries did not pay much attention to the violence against women, because that had more urgent problems, for example corruption and economic problems in their countries that led to poverty and backwardness. Here we can see some parallels with Russia. We can say that Russia is a developing country (or at least it was such a country in 1990s when the Soviet centrally planned economy was substituted by development of capitalism and marked economy). Russia still suffers from the corruption and economic problems. That is why violence against women is not the most urgent issue for Russian women.

According to Sundstrom (2005), there are not so many Russians who know about work of women’s organizations, these organizations does not get much attention and even if they get attention it has negative colours. But if we talk about domestic violence issues, according to Johnson (2007) there was a huge shift in people’s attitude throughout a decade after the fall of the Soviet regime. Thanks to a number of campaigns in 1990s people changed their position from complete denial of existence of violence in families to acceptance of presence of domestic violence.

Maybe one of the most successful types of women’s organizations that is well known and trusted among Russian women is crisis center. The history of crisis centers in Russia goes back to the beginning of 1990s. The first organization that was founded in order to help women was ANNA in Moscow. It was established in 1993 as a hot-line and in 1995 it was officially registered. In 1994 a similar centre was opened in Saint Petersburg. It was called Syostri (Sisters) and it began its work as an official hotline in 1995. While ANNA centre had domestic violence as a main focus, Syoustri focused more on sexual assault (Johnson, 2009). The period of the late 1990s was the most flourishing time for different organizations which aim was to work with domestic violence issues. By 2001 there were about 120 organizations, 80 of these organizations could be considered as crisis centers (Johnson, 2007).

According to Zabelina (2008) not every woman that became a victim of gender based violence can get help in a state crisis centre or refuge. The problem is in the place of registration of a woman – because such state crisis centres or refuge are financed by the regional budgets, everyone who seeks help should have registration in this region.
It is important to explain here the term “registration”. According to the Russian legislation (Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation from 17.07.1995 №713), each Russian citizen and even foreigner, who stay in the Russian Federation for more than seven days, has to be registered in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, that is, to submit an application and a document that gives a right to live in an apartment, a house, etc. If a person lives in own house or apartment, this person receives a permanent registration. If a person rents an apartment, this person has to receive permission from the apartment’s owner to be registered, and can get only temporary registration. But why this registration is so important? The registration gives many opportunities to receive different types of social help and support from the local authorities. The most important here is that a woman gets an opportunity to seek help in a regional crisis center. It means that, for example, if a woman moves to another city and does not have such registration there (or her husband has made her move and she cannot register herself) – she will not get any help.

Crisis centers that do not get financing from the state do not have such problem.

But many of these centers get funding from foreign sponsors. This creates new difficulties for them. As mentioned above, in 2014 the Russian government included NGOs with foreign assistance in the list of Inostranny agent (Foreign agents). NGOs and NPOs that participate in “political activities” and that are recognized as foreign agents will have the special system of reporting and checks. They also must specify the status of “foreign agent” on their web-sites and in the documentation (The Federal Law №121-ФЗ from 20.07.2012). Many lawyers and political analysts consider this changes in legislation as attempt to get rid of human rights organizations, because the term “political activities” is not defined in the Law and can be interpret in different ways (Kara-Murza Jr., 2014). In addition to the special system of reporting, the term “Foreign agent” complicates existence of human rights organizations, because this term has negative connotations – suspicion and mistrust – and builds up the discourse of treachery. Using this discourse, some organizations accuse ANNA in falsifications of the data concerning the number of domestic violence victims (Bolshakova, 2017).

But even before the law concerning foreign funding was created there was another problem – obtaining of funding. Crisis centers had to work in a framework set by their donors. Crisis centers had to show some outcome and to follow desires of their donors even if these donors proposed fairly bad solutions. Johnson (2007) gives an example: donors denied to give more money to establish extra crisis hotlines in Moscow, but instead insisted on establishing a hotline in a country side where not so many people had home phones. But despite the
described obstacles, Johnson (2007) insists that the foreign funding had a certain constructive impact. The foreign funding gave an opportunity not only to support people in need, but also to create networks and increase competence of heads of crisis centers. But unfortunately such funding had almost no impact on reformation of policies.

But women’s rights activism nowadays is not limited only by crisis centers. Since 1970 social movements has developed the terms of different types of violence all over the world. By social movements gender violence has been raised as a global problem. In order to address the problem to the global community, social movements help to define and distinguish different types of violence against women. Giving name for a problem is the first step to promote the solution of it (Merry, 2011). In the era of Globalization, the world politics nowadays involves many non-state actors besides states. Due to proliferation of the Internet, communication technologies and air-travel it is easy for these actors to cooperate and interact with each other (Amenta, Nash, & Scott, 2012). The Internet gave birth to one of the types of gender activism – the social media campaigns. The social media campaigns are not limited by government and any domestic context and can be considered as a new possible tool in changing norms in Russia.

During the last few years there have been domestic initiatives in Russia in which violence against women was addressed as a social and political problem. Most recently, in the #yaneboiysskasat-campaign. Flash mob #yaneboiys'skazat’ (#iAmNotAfraidToSpeak) started in the Facebook in Summer 2016. The flash mob was originally started in Ukraine, but it rapidly became very popular in Russia (Huetlin, 2016). Through this flash mob thousands of women of different age shared their own stories about the violence. These stories got a huge wave of responses not only from women, but also from men. The flash mob helped to emerge the problem of sexual violence, helped to understand the scale of the problem (Davies & Evdokimova, 2016). The main result of this flash mob was the overcoming of the shame and of the unwillingness to speak about the problem of sexual violence. Such acts of violence are often considered as shameful even by the victims of the sexual abuse. Moreover, sometimes victims of sexual violence begin to blame themselves. According to Anna Rivina (co-founder of the “nasiliy.net (“no to violence”) project, the changes that have occurred in people’s perceptions of the problem is the biggest victory of this flash mob (“#YaNeBouysSkazat: kak nauchitsa govorit o perezitom nasilii”, 2016).

Indeed, the problem of blaming the victims of the violence is very big in Russia. Even parliamentarians in their public speeches blame victims of the sexual violence in what
happened to them, saying that women could avoid the violence if they were dressed not that provocatively and did not walk alone at night (Golovanov, 2017).

But the reaction to this flash mob was not always positive. Thousands of people (both men and women) wrote comments, blaming the authors of those terrifying stories in all that happened to them too (Huetlin, 2016).

Speaking about activism in Russia it is important to mention scandalously famous Russian group “Pussy Riot”. This example will show, firstly, the variation of the activism in Russia, secondly, it will depict the role and the influence of the Russian Orthodox Church in Russia and finally, it will illustrate that sometimes acts of activists can make the problem of the attitude to feminism and women activism even worse than it was. In February 2012, the group of five women in masks on their faces came into the Moscow’s Cathedral of Christ the Savior and performed so-called “punk prayer”. They were singing this to the Mother of God, praying “oust Putin” and “become a feminist.” (Bernstein, 2013, p. 220). After this action, in March 2012, three women were arrested – first Maria Alyokhina and Nadezhda Tolokonnikova; Yekaterina Samutsevich was arrested 2 weeks later. All three were put in prison custody where they spent 4 months before the trial, which lasted from 30th of July till 17th of August 2012. This case was a real sensation. During the trial, Pussy Riots got support from the Western society (including stars like Madonna and Red Hot Chili Peppers), several European human rights activists and politicians (Prozorov, 2014). Surprisingly enough, they got a very negative reaction from the Russian community, even from those, who supported the ideas of feminism and opposed the Russian Orthodox Church. As an example of such reaction, Anya Bernstein (2013) cites Marat Guelman, the art critic and the owner of the art gallery, who wrote that “the punk prayer was offensive and inappropriate” (p. 223). At the same time, the feminist community separates itself from one of the members of Pussy Riot Nadezhda Tolokonnikova. The reason for this was that she participated in one controversial performance “Lobzay musora” (“Kiss the Cop”). During this performance, Tolokonnikova with another radical art group “Voina” (“the War”) tried to kiss policewomen on the streets. The feminist community condemned this performance, saying that this could be considered as an act of violence against women. The Russian society also negatively reacted to the punk pray. According to the statistics of the INTERFAX (2012), 70% of the respondents have a negative attitude to the action of Pussy Riot, each third respondent demands imprisonment for the members of the group.

Despite the fact that the actions of Pussy Riot were considered as “hooliganism”, which falls under the Administrative Code and cannot lead to the real imprisonment, all three
members of the group received a sentence of imprisonment in a General regime colony for 2 years each (Smyth & Soboleva, 2014).

Right after the Pussy Riot trial, the State Duma adopted the law about including of the insulting of the feelings of believers into the Criminal Code. This law is a new wording of the Article 148 of the Criminal Code of liability for obstructing exercise of the right to freedom of conscience and religion (“Gosduma priniala zakon ob oskorblenii chuvstv veruyshih”, 2013).

The example of Pussy Riot depicts the remarkable place that the Russian Orthodox Church has in nowadays Russian society and how it can influence political decisions. I will discuss the position of the Russian Orthodox Church and its attitude to the gender politics later.

Overall, we can say that there was some kind of success in changing domestic violence policy. Mazur (2002) argues that there are several stages of policy existence – “pre-formulation, formulation, implementation, and evaluation” (p. 4). I have shown that there exists a number of organizations that work with domestic and gender based violence issues, for example state and non-state crisis centers. There were several campaigns that emerged the problem of domestic violence. In addition, there was a social media campaign aimed to attract attention to the problem of sexual violence against women. Thus, Russia is now in the “pre-formulation” stage, how Mazur (2002) calls this. But despite the fact that there were created some drafts of legislation acts against gender based violence, there is still no working legislation on this topic. Consequently, we can say that Russia has not reached “formulation” and further stages.

Gender Stereotypes

Gender stereotypes play an important role in human’s perception of the reality. These stereotypes make people think about men’s and women’s characteristic features. Or, in other words, the gender stereotypes give representation of what is considered masculine and what is considered feminine. In a wider perspective, the stereotypes can determine men’s and women’s roles in a society and frame what is appropriate for men and what is appropriate for women (Riabova, 2001).

The gender stereotypes give emotional characteristics to objects or phenomena that they are assigned to. Such characteristics are nested in the stereotype itself. Riabova (2001) gives examples of these characteristics – feminine weakness, emotionality, sensitiveness and masculine courage, composure.
Riabova (2001) also claims that the gender stereotypes are very stable. For example, a medieval opinion that women cannot control their emotions is almost equal to a modern perception about women’s emotionality. We can see the same approach with the opposite gender – men were and are considered non-emotional. The gender stereotypes are also widely spread and accepted in a society. Furthermore, the stereotypes are shared both by men and women. The stereotypes create norms. For example, how should a man or a woman “normally” act in a certain situation or what roles a man and a woman should “normally” play in a society. A man can be seen as a worker, as a participant of public life, while a woman in her turn can be seen as a housewife, a wife and a mother.

When we talk about gender stereotypes we say, “a man” or “a woman” drawing some average men and women, but Riabova (2001) admits that there exist many factors that can influence a gender stereotype. The most studied of these factors is ethnical factor. Here we come to an interesting detail of Russian gender stereotypes. In such stereotypes a Russian woman receives characteristics of western and eastern women at the same time. In addition, a Russian woman gets some characteristics that in the western culture are usually correlated with masculinity. As a result, a Russian woman is described as kind, beautiful, sincere, but at the same time she is strong and hardy. Surprisingly enough, that there exists another gender stereotype in Russia – politics or leadership positions are not for women.

Knowing the stereotypes a society or a political institution or individuals can exploit these stereotype in order to construct desired discourse and to achieve certain goals. Moreover, the gender stereotypes can be used not only in relation to men and women, but also in relation to things and phenomena. Gender and the respective stereotypes can be assigned to a nation, for example (Riabova, 2001).

**Russian Identity through Gender Perspective**

In the last part of the chapter “Women’s Rights Activism from the Soviet Times to Present” I have described how individuals act in social media campaigns. But these individuals belong to some states. Further we can consider the term of state identity. Alexandrov (2003) claims that according to constructivists, identity plays very important role in creating state’s interests, state’s interests in their turn form state’s behaviour. It is interesting that constructivists approach accepts that state’s identity is not equal to state’s culture, but at the same time some constructivists use the terms like culture, norms and identity almost equally. It is hard to see relations and hierarchy of these concepts as many constructivists scholars understand the identity as a part of the culture. Moreover, there are
many disputes among constructivists about affiliation of state identity: whether it belongs to
the local or international culture. There are two more concepts that are not clearly defined by
constructivists – what is the difference between state identity and national identity.
Sometimes the term of state identity is substituted by the term of national identity. Sometimes
identity is split in two areas – internal and external. Wendt, as cited in Alexandrov (2003),
defines identity as “state’s self-understanding and a seemingly parsimonious view of state’s
interest and action” (p.38).

In this chapter I will consider the concept of identity, how it is constructed and
specially I will consider Russian identity in order to answer the main research question. By
the term identity here I will consider a wide range of features important both from internal
and external perspective, because it is hard to distinguish such features due to wide spread of
fast electronic means of communication (for example, the Internet) and the emergence of the
availability to exchange information, knowledge and experience over the globe.

In the previous chapter I have described the gender stereotypes and as I have
mentioned above the stereotypes can be used not only towards human beings, but also
towards a nation or even a state. Riabov and Riabova (2014) argue that gender is one of the
most important concepts that is used to construct identity. Gender is a corner stone of a
society, it is the basis of relations and hierarchies in the society, including hierarchy and
legitimation of power. Power is always depicted with distinctive features of masculinity:
“strength, reason, will, responsibility, vigor, fairness” (p. 24). At the same time femininity
with such features as “weakness, passivity, emotionality, bias, impressionability, indecision”
(p. 25) is connected to submissiveness. Gender is also often used to describe relations and
attitudes between states. Likewise, with the relations between genders of human beings
gender stereotypes play role in relations between states. Along with this, We are depicted as
masculine and They are shown as feminine. Or Friends are usually shown as they have a
normal gender system, while Foes are shown as they have deviations in their gender model
(Ryabova & Ryabov, 2011). Standard of masculinity and femininity is usually constructed for
the whole nation and thus any deviations from this standard are considered dangerous to the
nation (Riabov & Riabova, 2014).

As Zdravomyslova and Temkina (2013) state, gender order in Russia nowadays and
its transformations are influenced not solely by current changes in the Russian society, but
they are also influences by their origins. It means that in order to describe the gender
stereotypes in the modern Russian society we have to consider the gender stereotypes of the
previous historical period – the Soviet times.
The late Soviet times had some certain discursive opportunities for critique of the existent social order. The liberal critical discourse partly discussed defects of the soviet society and offered different ways to make changes in it. But the liberal critical discourse was framed by a number of restrictions. For example, not all topics were allowed to discuss publically. In addition, it was supposed that the allowed topics and ways of discussion should be “externally and internally censored” (p. 14), but one of the allowed topics was the relations between sexes and how men and women should act (Zdravomyslova & Temkina, 2013).

The Soviet regime was criticized for its unnatural gender order, for deformation of natural relations between men and women and for creating infantile men (Ryabova & Ryabov, 2011). Zdravomyslova and Temkina (2013) specify that women’s masculization and men’s feminization was considered as the social problems. The authors also admit that the man’s identity in the late Soviet period was established through opposing Us and Them. But who were Them in this discourse? With whom men could be compared? Here we can consider several variants. The first variant, so called “Hegemonic Soviet Masculinity”, is “the image of the father” (p.21). Here as an example of masculinity was a person who took part in the Soviet industrialization and participated in the Great Patriotic War. The image of such person was reflected in the positive way in the Soviet cinematography, literature and art. His life was meaningful and was dedicated to heroic and sacrificial service to his Motherland. The second variant is called “Traditional Russian Masculinity” (p. 23). This variant has two options – the Russian muzhik (peasant) and the aristocrat, both were praised in the Russian literature. The Russian peasant was seen as patriarchal man who had his own property, but at the same time he was a member of his community. The aristocrat had his own code of honour and was the defender of women’s honour. The third variant is called “Western Hegemonic Masculinity” (p. 25). Here Zdravomyslova and Temkina (2013) consider the image of man that was imposed by the foreign literature and movies – the image of “independent, noble, self-assured, solitary cowboy” (p. 25). He was independent, his life was interesting, replete of dangerous adventures and victories. The fourth variant is called “Soviet Femininity” (p. 26). Here masculinity is considered in the opposition to femininity because the consideration of masculinity is impossible without defining of femininity.

Adherents of the reforming of the Soviet regime portrayed the changes brought by Perestroika as the return to basics, “to the natural order of things, in which gender essentialism and the natural role of mothering have a crucial role” (Riabov & Riabova, 2014, p. 25). The process of Perestroika built up the discourse of returning to a woman her role of a keeper of the hearth and to a man his role of a breadwinner. In the USSR men were not
independent, because the Soviet regime made all decisions for its citizens, people could not rule their own lives, thus men were seen as demasculized by the liberals who conducted the ideology of Perestroika. Critics considered “private ownership with its attendant independence, sense of responsibility, and self-dependence” (p.65) as a foundation of masculinity (Ryabova & Ryabov, 2011). The liberals tried to make Russia (and its men) masculine again. They believed that Perestroika would create a new gender order that will make men independent economically and strong enough to become a patriarchal head of family which will give women an opportunity to become traditional mother and housewife (Ryabova & Ryabov, 2011). Liberals also criticized the image of a woman in the Soviet era. They claimed that women’s emancipation made them hegemonic cast of “super-women”. These “super-women” worked, earned money, took care of their families and by this they deprived the masculinity of men. Men became weak and not independent near such “super-women” (Riabova and Riabov, 2002). This discourse puts men into the position of victims.

There are three arguments to support this hypothesis. The first argument is about demography. Statistically, there were more women in the Soviet Union than men. Such gap was the consequence of wars, repressions and high level of lethality. This can give us a basis to call men the weaker sex. The second argument is biological. Men’s average life expectancy is ten years lower than women’s. This also gives us a reason to label men as the weaker sex.

The third argument is modernisation. The authors argue that “modernization and technological development pose a threat to men because their involvement in public sphere is greater than that of women” (p. 17). So, the remasculinization of men entails women’s demasculinization and return to the natural order of things (Zdravomyslova & Temkina, 2013). Riabova and Riabov (2002) also say that women worked in the Soviet times, but they add that women were “treated as unfeminine” (p. 3). Women did not only office work, but they also used for hard physical labour (the image of “super-woman” becomes even more stronger here). That is why, according to Riabova and Riabov (2002), going back to natural patterns of family, masculinity and femininity should be a part of the process of “normalization”.

The collapse of the Soviet Union that followed Perestroika has changed not only state’s borders, but has finally changed the national identity and deconstructed soviet gender order. But was Perestroika and the crash of the Soviet regime successful in the remasculinization of Russian men? On the one side, yes, because there were Russians who achieved independence, some kind of financial freedom and became breadwinners. On the other side, there were only few men who could reach this. If we talk about the whole society,
the collective identity of that time rather could be described as demasculized. There were several reasons for this. First of all, the weak international position after the end of the Cold war, the USSR dissolution and the loss of the status of the superpower. Second, military defeat of Russian troops in Chechnya. Another factor of the Russian demasculinization was the problem of sex trafficking. Moreover, Russia’s foreign policy was metaphorically called prostitution and Russia itself was depicted not as Mother anymore, but as a fallen woman. These images of suffering, raped, dishonoured Mother Russia created a prerequisite for the changes in Russian men’s gender identity (Ryabova & Ryabov, 2011) – so called “male trauma” (Riabov & Riabova, 2014, p. 25).

The new Russian authorities headed by Vladimir Putin had a response for requests from the society to reconstruct the sense of national dignity and men’s pride. From the beginning of his rule in September 1999 Putin used metaphor “raising from the knees” and started the process of remasculinization of Russia. This process got two forms: creating a good image of masculinity and assigning masculine features to the image of Russia (Ryabova & Ryabov, 2011).

Independence and self-reliance are the most important of these features. The concept of “sovereign democracy” is based on them. Sovereignty is understood here not only as inviolability of borders, but also as Russia’s financial independence, ability to decide where to go and what to do without advice and commands from abroad. To this we can add that the Russian authorities praise physical strength, sport victories and records, good physical form of the heads of the state, military power (Ryabova & Ryabov, 2011).

If we talk about symbols used in Russia today, we can clearly see that a bear is one of the most used. Bear has always been a symbol of Russia, but now it becomes more and more popular as this animal has all characteristics promoted by the Russian authorities (Riabov & de Lazari, 2009).

The concept of gender in constructing the images of Friends and Foes plays essential role. In 1990s the West was considered as an example for Russia as well as western masculinity, especially American masculinity. The West was seen as strong and rational. But over time, especially with the raise of “sovereign democracy”, the attitude to the West has been changed and now the western countries are seen not like Friends anymore, but like Foes. The post-Soviet states, especially those that have gone through colour revolutions, and Easter Europe are now in opposition to interests of Russia, thus they are also seen as Foes. These states are considered to be influenced by the US and it meant that they have lost their independence and consequently masculinity. Now the West is often described like it has
deviations in its masculinity. Even more, the West is considered to be in decadence and degradation (Riabov & Riabova, 2014).

The gender discourse helps not only divide Friends and Foes, but also it gives opportunity to create a system of assessments (Ryabova & Ryabov, 2011). Many Russians have negative attitude to homosexuality. Many Russians think that homosexuals are not masculine, not real men. That is why homosexuality is used to show western deviation from real masculinity. This point of view has given birth to a neologism “Gayropa”. This word obviously consists of two words “Gay” and “Europe”. This portrays view of the Russians on Europe as a degrading culture with destroyed natural gender order and traditional families, as “the triumph of homosexuals and feminists” (p. 29). All this is considered as a logical result of the evolution of the Western civilization. At the same time, Russia is presented as guard and promoter of traditional values. (Riabov & Riabova, 2014).

Usage of the gender concepts gives the Russian authorities an opportunity to create the needed self-image and images of other states. Nowadays these images are completely different and opposite to each other. This in its turn makes the western countries Foes. This makes it very doubtful that any western norms will be accepted not only by the Russian state, but also by the Russian people. Indeed, when feminism and human rights are put in one line with homosexuality it does not make any positive connotations in people’s minds (both men’s and women’s).

**Russian Orthodox Church and the Gender Politics**

When we speak about traditional Russian values we cannot forget to mention the Russian Orthodox Church. Despite the fact that according to the Constitution Russia is a secular state, which means that the church and the state are separated and there is no official religion in Russia, the Russian Orthodox Church plays a significant role in everyday and political life. Some parliamentarians try to make the Russian Orthodox Church even more important player. They try to give the Russian Orthodox Church a right to affect the state’s family policies. For example, already mentioned Elena Mizulina suggested a draft of a document that calls a family a “small church”, gives a description of a “normal family” (which consists of at least three children and where two generations live together) and also gives priests an opportunity to work in local commissions on children’s criminality (Makarychev & Medvedev, 2015).

According to Lo (2015) the Russian Orthodox Church is the most trusted institution in the Russian Federation. By using this trust, on behalf of the Church Patriarch Kirill through
separating Russian and international values appeals to that part of the Russian society that has the most conservative position. It affects perniciously the relations between Russia and the West. The Kremlin uses the Russian Orthodox Church as a tool for opposing Russian dignity and values to the decadent West.

Torbakov (2014) agrees that the Russian Orthodox Church propagates denial of western norms and adds that the Russian Orthodox Church’s authorities work in collaboration with the Kremlin in order to promote patriotism. Torbakov (2014) illustrates this with an example. When Patriarch Kirill spoke on TV in occasion of feast of the Icon of Our Lady of Kazan, he decided to give “a history lesson”. He spoke about the Time of Troubles and the Polish intervention in Russia. He said that the intervention was successful because the invaders had supporters inside Russia. These supporters believed that the new western power will be more effective and skilled. But the most notable thing in his speech was that Kirill drew many analogies with the modern times. He admitted that today there are many people in Russia who want to adopt “alien models of socio-political development” and have plans to adopt “unacceptable scenarios for the modernization of our life and for improvement of the living conditions of our people” (p. 147). According to Kirill these ideas are wrong, they can lead to new time of troubles and thus should be declined. This is not what you expect to hear in a preaching. Kirill used such contrasts as “modernization vs. tradition, and patriots of Russia vs. rootless cosmopolitans kowtowing to the West” (p. 147). So rather than to speak about religion and salvation of one’s sole, he actually spoke about politics and used the Russian history as an element of propaganda. It was not the only speech when he used this technic, it can be seen in number of his official preaches and speeches. Hence the Russian Orthodox Church can be considered as a tool of a state propaganda. This propaganda is built upon an idea that Russia has its own unique, exceptional way. The Russian Orthodox Church preaches that Russia should turn back to its traditions, to some historical roots. And, of course, that there is no sense to search for norms and ideas somewhere else. There has emerged a concept of “Russian civilization” (p. 154). This concept was created by Kirill and the main idea that he put in these words was uniqueness and exceptionality of the Russia way, but also supremacy over the West. The Russian Orthodox Church explains this supremacy of Russia “by virtue of its richer and more diverse cultural inheritance” (p. 154). The supremacy assumes that Russia should not have any feeling of inferiority and should not try to overtake the West (Torbakov, 2014).

As for the woman’s role in the Christianity – woman in the Bible is considered not like an independent person, but as a part of a man. The Bible establishes a hierarchy and in
this hierarchy men are above women. Clerical texts were created by men; thus, it is obvious that norms and rules were created in favour of men and women’s place in this patriarchal society was predefined. The attitude of the Russian Orthodox Church to women is dual. First of all, women embody Jesus’ mother Mary and thus are revered. But at the same time, according to religious traditions women bears the stamp of the original sin. Consequently, this creates an adverse relation to women. The idea of the original sin leads to a vision of a seducing woman and a man’s temptation. It means that a man must restrain woman’s sexuality in order to protect order in family and socium. This justifies discrimination of women, women have lower position in the society and family, women’s role reduces to a role of an obedient servant. Thus, women’s skills or desires do not get any attention. The Russian Orthodox Church strongly supports the stereotype of woman’s role as a mother and a wife and existing patriarchal order of things in the Russian society (Chernyak, 2016).

Summarizing all above it becomes clear that the Russian Orthodox Church can be considered as one of the obstacles in the process of norm localization and adoption.

Regime

I have mentioned that domestic context consists of legislation, believes, religion and regime. Now I will discuss the regime that Russia has nowadays.

According to Ekman (2009) many states that became democratic relatively not so long time ago failed to completely destroy connections with their former authoritarian regimes. Some scholars considered such regimes as democracies under development. But it seems not to be true. Such regimes had only a short term democratic development with a subsequent reverse reaction and moving back to authoritarianism with democratic institutions diminished to simulacra. It means that those scholars who assumed that the development of democracy moves only in one direction were wrong. Indeed, the described regimes are not badly working democracies, but a new type of authoritarianism.

Ekman (2009) calls this new type of authoritarian regimes “hybrid regimes” (p. 8). He also claims that there are several areas that distinguish hybrid regimes: “the electoral arena, the executive and legislative arena, and the judicial arena” (p. 8). In totalitarian regimes elections are not implied at all. In authoritarian regimes elections are used just to pretend that there is a competition. However, in hybrid regimes elections are used to justify validity of authorities. Elections here have some sort of competition, but the competitions are characterised by manipulations, not equal access to mass media, scare tactics toward opposition and power misuse. As for the executive and legislative arenas, authoritarian
regimes do not have systems of checks and balances due to rigid control over legislation by executive bodies. In hybrid regimes legislative branches are limp, but there is still some opportunities that they can be used by opposition. The judicial arena in hybrid regimes is formally independent, but is under control of the executive authorities.

Ekman (2009) defines hybrid regimes as “political systems that combine regular democratic elections with a number of democratic deficits, such as corruption, lack of press freedom, and poorly working systems of checks and balances between the executive and legislative branches of government” (p. 9).

Despite the fact that Freedom House defines Russia as consolidated authoritarian regime, Ekman (2009) argues that the Russian regime has features of a hybrid regime – it is not a developing democracy, but at the same time is not fully authoritarian. He claims that the Russian regime emerged after fall of the previous authoritarian regime and now it an hybrid regime with a strong presidential power, raising authoritarianism, but some economic progress.

Indeed, as I have mentioned above one of the features of hybrid regimes is that such regimes had a short period of true democracy. The policy of Perestroika and the following collapse of the Soviet Union created new opportunities for Russia to join the western way of development. The country could not only switch from the soviet planned economy to the western capitalism, but also make huge changes in its identity and move towards western norms and values. The government of the new Russia were “seized” by liberal internationalists and many of them promoted westernization of Russia. In 1992 Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrei Kozyrev issued a strategy of radical rebuilding of the Russian identity in order to make Russia a market democracy (Clunan, 2014).

The level of democracy began to decrease after Putin came to power. Torbakov (2014) writes that each Putin’s presidential term had its own main idea, or aim. During the first term Putin worked on building the “control” system of Russia, known as “the power vertical”. This vertical led to concentration of power. Putin in 2004 abolished the elections of heads of the Russian regions, instead the heads of the regions are now appointed. Furthermore, Putin made it more difficult for small parties to participate in the political life, because he changed rules of participation in the Duma elections (Ekman, 2009).

The main Putin’s aim during his second term was to build state capitalism. The third Putin’s term is influenced by the idea of ideology (Torbakov, 2014). The reason of this turn can be found in a new challenge that Putin faced at the beginning of his third term – the collapse of the Putin’s majority. The collapse came to light in a form of protests against Putin
and his regime when thousands of citizens of big Russian cities went out to the streets in order to show their disagreement. The Russian authorities answered with new domestic politics based on “Russian traditional values, morals and spirituality” (Sharafutdinova, 2014, p. 616). They try to turn to history and to show that the Russian way was different from the Western way (so called “special path”) and even more – that Russia is a different civilization. The past is the key factor of Russia’s difference as “the country had to face choices quite different from Europe’s” (p. 152). As Putin said to the Federal Assembly in 2012 (as cited in Torbakov, 2014, p. 153): “Russian democracy is the power of precisely the Russian people with its own traditions of popular self-government – and not the realization of standards imposed on us from the outside”. In addition, European political and social crisis challenge the sustainability of patterns and norms that form the core of the European Union project (Torbakov, 2014). This helped to expand originally domestic politics over Russia’s borders and made it a part of international discourse where Putin was seen as “the champion of conservative values worldwide and positioned Russia as the savior of the moral foundations of the Western civilization” (Sharafutdinova, 2014, p. 616).

Actually, the turn to the ideology was not something new for Putin’s regime. Sharafutdinova (2014) mentions that already in 2000s Putin returned to life Soviet-era youth games, the Soviet anthem and proclaimed the pro-birth policies. But the new phase of ideological politics was different from the early steps in this field when we talked about “intensity, scope and political significance for the regime” (p. 616). The beginning of this new phase can be seen in the trial of Pussy Riot. Pussy Riot’s radical feminism point of view, gay rights support, strong opposition to the very close relations between the Russian Orthodox Church and the state and the Western way of art performing became a target of the new ideological politics. The court verdict in their case marked that feminism is antipodal to traditional Russian values based on religious world perception. Here we again come to an illustration of how close the relations between the Russian Orthodox Church and the Kremlin are. The members of the group were involved in other art performances (like the action “Kiss the Cop” that I mentioned before), but this did not receive a lot of public attention. So, it seemed like their new performance in the Cathedral could get the same low level of attention. But after the protests in 2011-2012 Kremlin could not ignore this action and the show trial with the real prison sentences helped to unite people to form a new Putin’s majority.

The attitude of the Russian authorities towards NGOs has changed dramatically since Putin came to power. I have already mentioned the new laws and changes in the Russian legislation that make work of NGOs more difficult.
It worth to mention also that Putin’s regime has strengthen control over mass media by seizing private media companies and persecuting journalists (Ekman, 2009). According to Reporters without Borders (2017), since 2012 when Putin became the president again independent sources of information suffer from growing pressure. Now not only traditional mass media, but also Internet in Russia faces a state control.

It becomes obvious that Putin’s regime makes the proliferation of democratic human rights norms more difficult. Total control over mass media makes it hard to propagate norms that are not “interesting” to Putin’s regime. The lack of free elections leads to lack of independent norm proliferators in the Russian government. New laws and changes in the Russian legislation create obstacles for NGOs that can propagate international norms. The emphasis on the Russian “special path” makes it difficult to reach people’s minds.

Conclusion

In this thesis, I have considered how international norms can be implemented into local legislation and what factors affect the process of localization. The main research question of this paper was why norms on gender based violence are not fully adopted in Russia.

Amitav Acharya (2004) gives a solid explanation of the process of norm localization. He states that each society has its own unique domestic context and this context plays an essential role in this process. Indeed, local believes and values can affect the acceptance of the international norms. In the situation in Russia, national gender stereotypes that the role of a woman should be reduced to the role of a housewife and a mother are important. The propaganda of the “Russian traditional values” and the “traditional Russian family” and portraying the West values as something alien, bad, unnatural for the Russian people builds an additional barrier on the way of acceptance of the international human rights norms.

As was mentioned, local legislation and local norms play essential role in the process of norm localization. But there is no special law in Russia, no norm in Russian Codes that could protect women from gender based and domestic violence. Several times parliamentarians tried to introduce the draft of the law on the gender based violence, but they met a resistance from the State Duma. Elena Mizulina considers this law as intervention in families and as the threat to traditional family values. Moreover, the amendments that were adopted by the Russian government make women even more vulnerable. Despite the fact that after the collapse of the USSR the situation with gender issues began to get better thank to feminist intervention and foreign assistance, nowadays there are many obstacles for work on
gender issues. I have provided an example of the labelling the organizations with foreign funding as “foreign agents”. These organizations have a lot of additional audits, they have to mark all their documents as they were created by the “foreign agents”. This title has a strong negative connotation in Russian language and builds up the discourse of national betrayers. Using these connotations states authorities and mass media can try to refute data of NGOs. I have provided an example when one of the newspapers wrote an article in order to disprove statistical report of ANNA, which contained horrible data about the amount of domestic violence victims.

As a part of the literature review I have considered the phenomena of acculturation provided by Olga Avdeyeva (2007). She described the situation when a state, that ratified an international treaty, pretends to fulfil the requirements of this treaty just in order not to be punished by the other states or in order to be the part of the group of states. In the case of CEDAW, Russia seems to illustrate the acculturation. I have considered the official reports to the CEDAW Committee, the alternative reports of ANNA and the reports of the CEDAW Committee. After reading these documents it becomes clear that Russia gives the data that is far away from reality. It seems like the reporting to the CEDAW Committee is seen by Russia just like obligatory routine. And since the comments of the CEDAW Committee are advisory in nature, Russia continues to pretend that the process of the elimination of discrimination against women proceeds.

One of the essential part of the Russian culture is religion. The Russian Orthodox Church in a collaboration with Russian authorities proliferate traditional values and the image of a traditional Russian family. Patriarch Kirill in his speeches and preaches use the historical analogies in order to oppose Russia and the West. Building up the discourse of the foreign intervention in Russian culture, families and social order he promotes the rejection of the western norms, values and modernization. The role of women in Christianity also doubt the opportunity for women to be equal to men. Considering a woman like just a part of a man, Christianity doubts the independence of women and see women more like supporters and servers to men. The collaboration of the Russian state and the Russian Orthodox Church set back the gender equality.

I have also provided an example of how strong this collaboration between the state and the Russian Orthodox Church really is. The Pussy Riot trial and the following amendment in the Criminal Code is the remarkable step that was made in order to make the collaboration of the State and the Church even stronger. The show trial and the real prison sentences to the women of this group depicts that the Church has a strong influence not only on Russian
people, but also on the political decisions. This is also a good illustration how the Church can be used to strengthen the position of the Kremlin.

Another problem for adoption norms on gender based violence is the Russian identity. After the collapse of the Soviet Union the state identity of Russia was redefined. Constructivists scholars claim that sovereignty is one of the most important institution because it affects the states behaviour. Under the Putin’s regime the importance of sovereignty as a reflection of masculinity increased. This led to the emergence of the term “sovereign democracy”. This term includes not only inviolability of the Russian border, but also independence in the decision-making process and adherence to Russia’s own special path. The strong propaganda of traditional values and traditional gender roles affect people’s attitude towards the western values. The western values are portrayed as something inappropriate and alien to the Russian culture. Connecting feminists, human rights and homosexuality, the Russian authorities provoke hostility of the people to these concepts.

As I have mentioned above Zwingel (2012) notes that the cultural match is essential in norm acceptance. In the case of Russia it is clear that there is a huge cultural gap or mismatch with the western order. This can be called another obstacle in norm localization. On the one side, Russian people want to live in liberal state with strong legislations and they want to have an opportunity to rely on the state, but on the other side, Russian people are not ready to accept the western norms that will give a chance to build such a state.

It is also important to mention that Putin’s regime make the adoption of the international norms even more difficult. The lack of freedoms and lack of independent norm proliferators in the Russian government together with propaganda of the Russian “special path” raise a threshold that the international norms have to overcome to be adopted to a very high level.
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