The Women, Peace and Security Agenda: A Normative Framework in Contestation
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Declaration

I, Johanne Rokke Elvebakken, declare that this thesis is a result of my research investigations and findings. Sources of information other than my own have been acknowledged and a reference list has been appended. This work has not been previously submitted to any other university for award of any type of academic degree.

Signature......................................Date................................................
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Any errors are mine alone.
Abstract

The Women, Peace and Security agenda has been heavily discussed by feminist International Relations scholars since the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 in October 2000. This thesis seeks to broaden the understanding of the WPS agenda and suggests understanding it as a contested normative framework in the making in international politics. The aim of this thesis is to identify the main contestations of the women, peace and security norm within the Norwegian expert community. Furthermore, this thesis also aims to answer how these contestations strengthen or weaken the agenda. The thesis is a case study of the Norwegian expert community working professionally with the WPS agenda. Eight expert actors from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation, the Ministry of Defence, the Peace Research Institute, the BI Norwegian Business School, Forum for Women and Development, and the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom have been interviewed.

Keywords: International Relations, feminist theory, Women Peace and Security, Norms, Norway, The United Nations.
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List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

BI – BI Norwegian Business School
CRSV – Conflict related sexual violence
DPKO – United Nations Department for Peacekeeping Operations
DRC- The Democratic Republic of Congo
FOKUS - Forum for Women and Development
IKFF – WILPF Norway / ‘Internasjonal Kvinneliga for Fred og Frihet’
IR –International Relations (The academic discipline)
KS – Norwegian Association of Local and Regional Authorities
LNU – The Norwegian Children and Youth Council
MFA – The Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MoD – The Ministry of Defence
NAP – National action plan for women, peace and security
NATO – The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGOWG- The NGO Working Group for Women, Peace and Security
NOK – Norwegian Kroners
Norad – The Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation
PBC – The UN Peacebuilding Commission
PBC – United Nations Peace Building Commission
PRIO – The Peace Research Institute Oslo
RAP – Regional Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security
Resolution 1325 - United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325
SGBV – Sexual and gender based violence
UN CSW - United Nations Commission on the Status of Women
UN SCR – United Nations Security Council Resolution
UN SCR 1325 – United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security
UN SDG – UN Sustainable Development Goals
UNSC – The United Nations Security Council
WILPF – Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom
WPS - Women, Peace and Security
WPS agenda – The Women, Peace and Security Agenda
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Figure 1. The approach of institutions and organisations towards the Women, Peace and Security Agenda
Chapter 1: A kaleidoscope introduction: New York, Bukavu and Oslo

In October 2015, the Security Council were gathered around a big round table in the UN headquarters in New York to review the implementation of Resolution 1325. The resolution was adopted fifteen years earlier on the topic of Women, Peace and Security and is considered ‘ground-breaking’ as it put the experiences of women in conflict on the agenda of the ‘armed conflict and security side of the UN’ (Cohn, 2008, p. 185). Traditionally, women’s issues have been viewed as soft power issues and not as a relevant thematic area for the Security Council, the organ with primary responsibility ‘for the maintenance of international peace and security’ (UN Charter, Article 24). Before the adoption of Resolution 1325 national leaders and diplomats have not broadly acknowledged ‘the need for and contributions of half the world’s population to international peace and security’, but in October 2015 this is exactly what happens (Anderlini, 2010, p. 13). The open debate in the Security Council lasts for two whole days and has 113 participating speakers, the largest number in any debate in the council’s history (United Nations Security Council, 2016, p. 2, point 2.4). Furthermore, 75 countries support the adoption of the eight resolutions on the topic of Women, Peace and Security. ‘Never before have so many countries co-sponsored a Security Council resolution’ (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015, p. 2).

The record-breaking support for the Women, Peace and Security agenda in the Security Council might leave the impression that the agenda is a well-established normative framework. The lack of women at negotiation tables in conflict solving and the continued use of sexual violence as a weapon in war tell another story. These contrasting realities were reflected in the statements made by representatives from women’s civil society groups in conflict zones and the homogeneous statements of state representatives at the two-day long meeting. State representatives assured their continued support for the agenda, despite the currently limited change to the lives of women and girls in conflict zones. In contrast, Ms. Lusenge, a women’s NGO representative from the Democratic Republic of Congo, said ‘I thought long and hard before deciding to come back here, and wondered whether or not it was worth the effort’ (Security Council, 2015, p. 6). Women’s efforts to build peace ‘must be supported, not only with words and applause but with concrete actions and means’ (p.
7). Ms. Mohammed, also a women’s NGO representative, from Iraq continued by arguing that the political will from the Security Council and governments is lacking, ‘We cannot wait another 15 years for the women peace and security agenda to be implemented’ (p.9).

Far away from the Security Council, gynaecologist Dr. Mukwege performs surgery on survivors of sexual violence in the Panzi Hospital in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The doctor has seen little change after the adoption of Resolution 1325, which calls for the protection of women and girls from ‘gender-based violence, particularly rape and other forms of sexual abuse’ (Operational paragraph 10, p. 3). Since 1999, the doctor’s team has treated more than 40,000 women for crimes committed by rebel groups and the Congolese military (Panzi Foundation, 2017). ‘In conflict zones battles take place on women’s bodies’ Dr. Mukwege states (Thierry M., 2015). Targeting women and girls in conflict is ‘a very cheap weapon’, the doctor argues ‘and you can get the same result with rape as if you were using weapons’ (Iaccino, 2016). ‘There is no medical solution’ to the conflict in the DRC the doctor states. Furthermore, ‘The paramount need, is not for more humanitarian aid for Congo, but for a much more vigorous international effort to end the war itself’ (Kristof, 2010).

The Security Council is not the only political arena where people disagree over the themes covered in Resolution 1325, as Dr. Mukwege and his team are receiving support, but also criticism and threats for speaking up against sexual violence as a tool of war in conflict zones. The doctor and his family were the subject of an attempted assassination when held at gunpoint in 2012; only weeks after Dr. Mukwege publicly condemned the 16-year long war and impunity for conflict related sexual violence crimes. To this day the doctor is still under threat for speaking up against the mistreatment of women in conflict, as the Congolese state has tried to censor the doctor’s public criticism (Dr. Mukwege at ‘The Hidden Weapon of War’, 4 May 2017).

It is the spring of 2017; eager listeners are gathered in the Eldorado Bookstore in Oslo, the capital of Norway. They are attending a debate with the topic of women’s participation in conflict solutions and peace work. At first glance, the subject might seem distant from the realities of Norway, a country in peace, recently proclaimed the third most gender equal country in the world (World Economic Forum, 2016). Nevertheless, Norway is a country involved in several conflicts worldwide and a
foreign policy actor with more influence than its geographical size might imply. As a NATO member state, personnel from the Norwegian Armed Forces currently have boots on the ground in international missions in countries such as Afghanistan, Iraq and Mali (Norwegian Ministry of Defence, 2017). Additionally Norwegian has officially been engaged in more than 19 peace processes since 1993, most recently in Columbia (Sending, Pouliot, & Neumann, 2015; Coordination meeting in the MFA, 1 March 2017).

On this spring day the experts and the audience are disagreeing. First, a lieutenant colonel from the Norwegian Defence University College is speaking on behalf of his employer, about the developments in the Norwegian Armed Forces since the end of the Cold War. The colonel worries that the Norwegian army is not even able to defend a small district in the capital of Oslo against a foreign enemy. He also argues that Norway’s primary focus has changed since the annexation of Crimea in 2014, ‘we are back to training for war with Russia, not humanitarian protection’. Then, Torunn Tryggestad, senior researcher and director of the PRIO Centre on Gender, Peace and Security speaks about the implications of Resolution 1325 in Norway and internationally. Tryggestad describes the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) as an adoptable agenda under pressure. With the new realpolitik developments at home and abroad ‘women’s issues are on an outward-bound again’ she states. In the end, the coordinator on 1325 between the Norwegian Ministries has her presentation. The coordinator has been asked to speak about Norway’s work for women’s participation in conflict solution and peace work; and describes it as ‘a work in progress’. ‘Norway cannot decide that women have a seat at the table’, the coordinator claims, ‘but we can facilitate’. Norway facilitates for women to be part of peace negotiations in Syria, Columbia and as experts in the African Union. In the end of the seminar there is time for questions and comments. ‘You are describing completely different worlds’ one audience member states to the three main speakers.

What these different episodes from New York, Bukavu and Oslo tell us is that the WPS agenda, despite its nominal success, is a highly contested normative framework under pressure both from the inside and the outside. The agenda is under tremendous pressure from the outside from those plainly disagreeing with its objectives or doubting its relevance in real political spheres. The example of this being Dr. Mukwege who was almost assassinated for his efforts to speak up against conflict related to sexual violence. The normative framework is also contested among
those within the agenda, who are supporting and actively working to strengthen it. In these discussions there is no common consensus. There is disagreement between states, state and non-state actors, and between the non-state actors themselves. This thesis aims to investigate these ‘different worlds’ pinpointed by an audience member in Oslo. Through studying the disagreements within the communities working with the WPS agenda in Norway.

1.1 Objective

This thesis seeks to examine the case of the WPS agenda as a contested norm in international politics. The WPS agenda is recognized and referred to as a ‘normative framework’- or standard of behaviour- by a steadily growing number of UN member states, actors within the UN system and NGOs alike (Tryggestad, 2014a, p. 467). By focusing on contestations this thesis digs into a normative framework ‘in the making’ in international politics (Tryggestad, 2009, p. 539).

The starting point of this study is the statement made by a member of the audience at the Eldorado Bookstore in Oslo who stated that the expert actors discussing the WPS agenda ‘are in completely different worlds’. This thesis aims to understand why this might be the case, as well as how we can make sense of these different worlds. Do these different worlds have any purpose? In order to answer these questions, this thesis focuses on the Norwegian expert community working professionally with the agenda. This thesis will argue that the Norwegian expert actors identify themselves as actors working to strengthen the WPS Agenda. Yet, they ‘encompass different meanings’ to the WPS agenda and what it entails (Zähringer, 2013, p. 187). These expert actors identify that there are competing discourses of what the WPS agenda really is about, and the key issues they disagree on. Such disagreements will be referred to as contestations throughout this work. Norms in international politics, such as the WPS agenda, can be described like boomerangs that are thrown back and forth between actors and current events taking place (Krook & True, 2012, p. 123). The WPS agenda is not static a static ‘thing’, but adoptable processes (p. 123).
1.2 Research questions

This thesis seeks to answer the two following research questions:

1. What are the contestations of the Women, Peace and Security norm within the Norwegian expert community?
2. How do these contestations of the Women, Peace and Security normative framework strengthen or weaken the agenda?

1.3 Operationalization

This thesis claims that the UN WPS agenda should be viewed as norm in negotiation within International Relations. There is a difference of opinion among those working to strengthen the WPS agenda, which can be conceptualised as contestations. This thesis uses critical feminist perspective on norms in IR as a starting point to understand the contestations to the WPS agenda. Thereafter, in the process of writing this thesis, I investigated the contestations that the literature suggested in practice, by interviewing Norwegian expert actors working with the WPS agenda.

In the first research question I will draw on the experiences of the informants and conceptualise based on norm and feminist international relations literature. I have conducted in-depth interviews with eight Norwegian representatives from government institutions, research institutions and civil society organisations. Additionally, I have attended talks and meetings on the WPS agenda and themes related to it. The objective is to investigate the contestations the informants see to the WPS agenda and how they make sense of these contestations. The second research question aims to emphasise how the contestations established strengthen and weaken the WPS agenda.

1.4 Outline

This thesis is organised into six chapters. Chapter two introduces the reader to the theoretical framework of this thesis. The theory chapter has a critical constructivist and feminist approach to norms in International Relations and the WPS agenda. Chapter three introduces the methods and methodological choices made in this study. The chapter aims to present my methodological considerations and justify my qualitative method. Chapter four is the first of two main findings chapters. The chapter gives a short introduction to the WPS agenda, the Norwegian key actors working with WPS, before discussing the WPS agenda as a contested normative
framework before, during and after the adoption of UNSCR 1325. Chapter five argues that we can understand the WPS agenda as a contested norm in IR by focusing on three main contestations of the agenda found among Norwegian expert actors. Chapter five also adds a brief discussion of how the contestations strengthen or weaken the WPS agenda. The end of chapter five offers a summary of the main findings. Chapter six concludes this thesis.
Chapter 2: Norms and Feminist Contributions to International Relations

This chapter will establish the theoretical framework of this thesis by giving an insight into previous research on the topics of international norms and feminist perspectives on norm contestation in the academic discipline of IR. The aim of this chapter is to anchor the research questions of this thesis in the established IR literature. First, this chapter will conduct a literature review of norms, as the WPS agenda is an example of what has come to be understood as an emerging normative framework in IR. What is a norm in IR? And what are normative scholars interested in? Then, I will move on to critical feminist theory, which differ as it put women at the core of research, often without accepting paradigms of traditional IR. These perspectives question the WPS agenda and the understandings of the world reproduced in the making of the agenda. For these reasons I used critical feminist perspectives when developing my interview guide.

2.1 Norms in International Relations

Norm literature is ‘concerned with international or regional norms that set standards for the appropriate behaviour of states’ (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 893). Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) define norms in international politics as ‘a standard of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity’ (p. 891). Additionally, norms are non-static and shared. Norms serve the ‘purpose of guiding behaviour by providing motivations for actions’ (Björkdahl, 2002). The term ‘Norm diffusion’ in IR refers to the process of how norms spread, ‘from the local to the global level and vice versa’ (Fuchs & Glaab, 2011, p. 729). The explanations of norm diffusion differ, but one explanation is that new norms develop to ‘fill a normative gap in the current practices of international politics’ (Tryggestad, 2014a, p. 26). This subsection will emphasise norm contestation, because the Norwegian expert actors interviewed for this thesis agree that the WPS agenda is a normative framework, without agreeing what this normative framework entails.

2.1.1 One, two, three and norm

Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) definition of norms is commonly referred to in IR. As already established, they define a norm as ‘a standard of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity’ (p. 891). The quality of ‘oughtness’, which is the
element of an action making it moral or dutiful, is what set norms apart from other sets of rules. Yet, the difference between international law and norms is not as stark as many scholars expect it to be, as making successful law and policy requires understanding of the influences of norms and behaviour (p. 891-3). Also, those behaving in accordance with a norm believe the norm inherits ‘appropriateness’ and ‘goodness’ (p. 891). Therefore ‘we recognize norm-breaking behaviour’ as it ‘generates disapproval or stigma’ (p. 891). Furthermore, Finnemore and Sikkink refer to a three-stage process where norms first ‘emerge’, and ‘cascade’, and lastly are internalised. The first two stages are ‘divided by a ‘tipping point’ in which a critical mass of relevant state actors adopt the norm’ (p. 895). The first stage is characterised by ‘norm entrepreneurs’, which try to convince enough other states to ‘embrace the norm’ (p. 895). Two elements are crucial for the success of this stage: ‘norm entrepreneurs and organization platforms from which entrepreneurs act’ (p. 896). In the second stage a norm ‘cascades’ to the rest of the ‘population’. Other states begin to adopt the norm more rapidly, even without domestic pressure to do so (p. 902). Norms do not always reach this tipping point (p. 895). The primary mechanism for promoting norm cascades is to persuade ‘norm breakers to become norm followers’ (p. 902). At the end of the ‘norm cascade’, the norm might reach the third stage where it is so widely accepted and internalised, that the norm ‘acquire a taken-for-granted quality and is no longer a matter of broad public debate (p. 904-5).

However, Finnemore and Sikkink argue that few people today discuss ‘whether women should be allowed to vote’ or ‘whether slavery is useful’ as these are examples of norms that have reached internalization and subsequently are taken for granted and not discussed (1998, p. 895). That element of conflict vanishes as soon as a norm reaches a tipping point (Deitelhoff & Zimmermann, 2013). They argue that these issues cannot be viewed as negligible in IR, as they impact state behaviour. Yet, women that are not able to vote or instances of slavery, are still prominent international challenges today. The authors use the example of what ‘people’ ‘discuss’, and as such allows their analysis to be accessible by both the state and the individual. Yet, they do not discuss whether or not a norm that has reached internalization should make a change at the local or individual level. For instance, should the implementation of the WPS agenda improve the status of women in conflict zones (Zwingel, 2012)?
2.1.2 Do norms take us to a better place?

Acharya (2004) claims ‘agency-oriented explanations of norm diffusion tended to be static and failed to explore how excising norms helped to redefine a transnational norm in the local context’ (p. 269). Furthermore, ‘first-wave scholarships’ such as Finnemore and Sikkink are concerned with ‘conversion rather than contestation’ (p. 242).

Lastly, Tryggestad argues that norms do not have to develop with the backing of global institutions like the UN, but can also be generated in various cites and multidirectional processes Tryggestad (2014a)

Acharya (2004) offers a more conflicted understanding of international norms in terms of translation and adoption, yet still accepts that successful norm diffusion is somehow a process with steps. Acharya emphasise a dynamic process of norm diffusion referred to as ‘localization’, which explains how local actors reconstruct foreign norms to ensure the norms fit with the actors’ cognitive priors and identities. The actor also adjusts the norm to fit local pre-existing norms, beliefs and institutions (p. 239). In this process, the local actors ‘perform acts of selection’ to build compatibility between the local context and ‘emerging global norms’ (p. 269). As such ‘localization’ suggests there are no ‘objective definition of individual norms, rather, they may be filled or localized in a variety of ways at both the international and domestic levels’ (Krook & True, 2012, p. 110)

Acharya (2004), like Finnemore and Sikkink, argues that there are paths or steps towards norm diffusion, as contestation is the first step in a path towards localization. The contestation of a norm is when local actors resist new external norms. However, contestation can contribute to internalization of a norm if some local actors begin to view the norm as having potential to contribute to the legitimacy of local institutions (p. 251).

2.1.3 Rethinking the Life Cycles and Contestation as Approach

Krook and True (2012) argue that we need to challenge the perception of norms themselves as the concept of norm circles offer unsatisfactory explanations of norms development. Norms are constantly shaped and reshaped, and not a ‘one-way process in which norms emerge and are then communicated and internalized’ (p. 108). Norms should be conceptualized as ‘processes’ and ‘works-in-progress’, rather than as ‘things’ and ‘finished products’ (p. 104). The reformulation of norms as
processes emphasise that ‘norms are subject to on-going attempts to reconstitute their meanings’ (p. 109). These on-going attempts can be understood as contestations and can weaken or strengthening normative frameworks according to critical IR approaches (Deitelhoff & Zimmermann, 2013).

2.2 A Feminist Perspective on Norm Contestation

Enloe (2008) argues:

A feminist enquiry into anything entails, first, being curious about the creations of meanings for masculinities and femininities; second, taking seriously the conditions, ideas and actions of diverse women, but also; third, always tracking down what sorts of power are at work, in whose hands, and with what consequences. True, being a feminist investigator takes stamina (p. 258).

At the end of the Cold War Enloe asked the seemingly simple question of ‘where are the women?’ in international politics (1989). Enloe argues that the question is a productive one to ask, as it requires scholars to look at power structures in IR. Furthermore, Enloe claims that ideas of femininity and masculinity linked with nationalism have a very specific function in international relations. Also, the work of women in international politics is highly overlooked because it is mistakenly viewed as insignificant. Yet, women have undiscovered roles in international politics such as diplomat wives’, banana plantation workers and sex workers she says. These women, as well as the role gender plays in international relations, ‘make the world go round’ as they uphold male power structures such as army bases and traditional diplomacy. As a result female banana pickers and our way of viewing them plays a role in upholding the status quo. Lastly, Enloe argued what many feminist international relations scholars have argued after her, ‘the personal is international: the international is personal’ (p. 344).

The questions Enloe asked in 1989 are highly relevant for the academic key discussions on the WPS agenda today. It might seem obvious that the women are there, as they are the key subjects of the agenda. Yet, does the agenda have room for gender or only women? Besides, does the WPS agenda challenge local and international power structures or cope without them? Can we change the position of women in conflict without changing the structures surrounding them? Shall only the women change? Furthermore, the UNSCR1325 argues that the violence women
experience and the lack of representation of women in conflict prevention threaten international peace and security. Therefore the WPS agenda might be an example of how local or private experiences and behaviour have international consequences and need international reactions. Again, the personal is international and the international is personal.

2.2.1 Why critical feminist theory?

The core questions that have been asked in IR ‘have typically been about the behaviour of states, particularly powerful states and their security-seeking behaviour, given an anarchical international environment’, and ‘the lack of international institutions’ and international cooperation’ (Tickner, 2006, p. 23). Feminist scholars operate with different lenses, as they are mainly concerned with the experiences of women. Women and femininity, or men and masculinity are the main subjects of analysis, as feminist scholars are not only restricted to women’s experiences but also the concept of gender. Women in particular are the main subjects of analysis, rather than objects with secondary importance or interest. As a result of this, concepts dealt with in traditional IR theories might not be the focus of analysis (Cox, 1981, p. 127). However, these traditional IR concepts do come up, but through different lenses. An example is how feminist scholars have studied the gendered dimensions of war. Moreover, state behaviour is an additional example, in which feminist scholars have sought to explain why women remain disempowered in matters of foreign and military policy (Tickner, 2006, p. 23). Yet, Dahl (2012) emphasises that even though femininity or masculinity are central concepts of analysis, there is still no consensus surrounding its meaning. Dahl contends that ‘we often forget that we never agreed on what we mean by femininity’ (p. 58). Furthermore, power is a core concept both in traditional IR theories and feminist theory. Who has power, who does not have power and how does power work are all key questions in feminist IR theory. J. Tickner (1999) argues that feminist perspectives on international relations are considerably ontological and epistemologically different to mainstream IR approaches. As a result, ‘feminist and IR scholars frequently talk about different worlds and use different methodologies to understand them (p. 3).

2.2.2 Contestations in critical feminist literature
Feminist perspectives should be included in understandings of norms in IR as they argue that norms do not stand above power, but result from global power relations and this can reproduce them. Often not in the favour of women.

Furthermore, feminist perspectives are critical of viewing norms as set rules (Sjoberg & Tickner, 2013). This thesis uses feminist literature to emphasise the fragility of the WPS agenda. Feminist literature also forms the basis for the questions discussed in interviews with the expert actors. The WPS agenda is limited as a norm by the perception of women as peaceful, as well as the formal and informal practices of the UN.

Cohn (2008) describes UNSCR 1325 as a ‘late intervention’, which suggests WPS is a limited normative agenda. Furthermore, Cohn claims that Resolution 1325 should have tried to end war by contesting the legitimacy of the system that legitimises war internationally. Instead the resolution is ‘late’ as the UN Security Council leaves war itself in place, and defends the dominant paradigm of a world made up of states, which defends state security through military means. The intervention is also ‘late’, as it urges actors in war to protect women from violence and involve women in decision-making to end wars, after a war has already started. Furthermore, Cohn concludes ‘letting (some) women into decision-making positions…seems a small price to pay for leaving the war system essentially undisturbed’ (p. 203). An illustration of the ‘late intervention’ are women’s activists in conflict zones bringing printed out copies of Resolution 1325 when they are going to talk to military leaders (p. 191).

The concept of ‘late intervention’ leaves the impression that the WPS agenda might seem like a robust normative framework, yet it is a limited agenda that offers little change to perceived power structures. The UN Security Council maintains the international order expressed in the UN Charter, but includes the concept of human security into this work, by recognising women as actors in international relations. Gibbings (2011) argues that the actors promoting the women, peace and security agenda do not want ‘angry women’ as they breach the norm of the women, peace and security agenda. Gibbings illustrates her point by discussing the informal visit of Amal Al-Khedairy and Nermin Al-Mufti, two Iraqi activists on a ‘Women of Iraq Tour’ to the UN Security Council in the spring of 2003. The NGO Working Group arranged for the two women to participate in an informal meeting with UN Security Council members. There were about 30 people at the event, among them members
from the NGO Working Group, ambassadors, state officials and UN officials. In the talk the two women called the Iraqi invasion an ‘unjust war’, ‘illegal occupation’ and ‘imperialism’ (p. 522-4). According to Gibbings participants labelled the talk as ‘angry’ and the organizers the NGO Working Group worried about their impact on their own credibility within the UN (p.524). Gibbings claims Al-Khedairy and Al-Mufti broke UN practices because of the following factors. First, they ‘had little knowledge or experience with UN practices and norms’ (p. 527). They were not briefed by the NGO Working Group as the working groups assumed they would share their views as they were women’s activists. Secondly, after the speech UN gender advocates explained to Gibbings that the two women were not sure they wanted to draw upon Resolution 1325 to achieve their rights, even though it defended their right to speak (p. 525). Thirdly, Gibbings concludes that ‘angry women’ are not wanted at the United Nations and that ‘In the corridors of the UN discourses that are uplifting, positive and present women as peacemakers are the most valued’ (p. 526). Narratives used in the UN are supposed to he ‘positive, hopeful and future oriented’ (p. 527). This episode exposes the contentedness of the boundaries of the norm. There are consequences of the boundaries to the agenda Gibbings describes. Certain performances are anticipated and expected, while others are discouraged (p. 525). Furthermore, it gives the impression that certain women are preferable, as well as guidelines for how women should behave. They should not be political or angry, but universally peaceful. Furthermore, the boundaries put forward by Gibbings raises questions of how many of their principles NGOs are willing to put to the side in order to be included in the WPS agenda.

B. v. d. Lippe and Stuvøy (2013) question the use of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 in practice on the ground in Afghanistan, as Western powers used Resolution 1325 rhetorically to legitimise the military intervention in Afghanistan in 2001. They argue that notions of gender equality, such as the idea of freeing Afghan women from the Taliban, together with direct references to UN Security Council Resolution 1325 were used to justify the West’s military intervention. Furthermore, one should consider how the use of the agenda militarily affects women’s rights. In this instance the WPS agenda is viewed as weak as it is co-opted. Western powers use the agenda to legitimise their own use of force, rather than to understand local power structures that affect women’s lives (p. 2).
2.3 Conclusion: The Women, Peace and Security Agenda: A contested norm in the making?

The WPS agenda is a contested norm in the making. Critical feminist perspectives offer an introduction to these contestations and background knowledge of the main discussions within feminist research. The theoretical perspective of this thesis suggests that the WPS agenda should be viewed as a norm in contestation. By focusing on these contestations, the fragility and discussions of norms become visible.

One could argue that the WPS agenda has gone through both of the two first stages and the ‘norm cascade’ according to Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) analysis. The WPS agenda ‘cascaded’ when the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1325. Tryggestad (2014a) argues that the WPS agenda has not yet reached the final stage of Finnemore and Sikkink’s norm life cycle, ‘where it has been fully accepted and internalized’, as it still depends on norm entrepreneurs to be integrated into ‘strategic analysis, policy planning and operational activities’ (p. 467). The perspectives of Acharya support the notion that the WPS agenda is operationalized by every actor that engages with it. Therefore, there is no overall consensus to what the WPS agenda is in practice.

The WPS agenda has developed into an international norm, as it can no longer be ignored by actors in international relations (Tryggestad, 2009). Yet, feminist scholars disagree concerning the strength of the WPS normative agenda and what the new norm entails. Norms are not only about trying to make the world better, but also about reproducing international power relations.
Chapter 3: Methodology and Research Design

This chapter will justify the methodology used in this study, outline the research design, as well as discuss challenges approached when working on this thesis. Conducting research demands transparency in methodological choices and openness of how findings were arrived at (Bryman, Ramos, & Teevan, 2012, p. 410). This chapter will start by discussing what a feminist methodological perspective and qualitative interpretative method entails. As a qualitative interpretative research design is the most fitted to answer the research questions of this thesis. Furthermore, as this project is about norm contestation I will start the next section by addressing how one can identify or see a norm. Then, this chapter will justify the methodological choices made in this thesis, with emphasis on the case selection and data collection (interviewing Norwegian expert actors). Lastly, this chapter will discuss the validity and ethics of this study. This chapter does not deal with the findings or analysis of this thesis, as it will be discussed in the main findings.

There is no single standard or feminist methodological perspective as IR feminist scholars draw upon a variety of methods, both qualitative and quantitative. Yet, there are ‘distinct feminist perspectives on methodology which have emerged out of a deep scepticism of traditional knowledge’ and what is claimed to be knowledge (Tickner, 2006, p. 40). Having a feminist lens means that I should be open about my own biases, and acknowledge that my research will never truly be neutral, but always value-based. Critical feminist theories have explicit normative agendas, and are open about having normative agendas as they argue that women have been underrepresented, as well as disregarded in the discipline of IR and they want to change it. Critical feminist theories disagree with those who believe that social science can follow the same rules as natural science. For a critical feminist A + B will not equal a certain outcome (Shepherd, 2010). Literature by critical feminist scholars is the basis of the project, as my research project, as well as the questions in my interview guide was constructed utilising their research.

The aim of this study makes the case for the adoption of qualitative research design. The research questions are concerned with how we can understand the WPS agenda as a contested norm in IR, and how these contestations are also part of strengthening the agenda.
The research does not aim to examine surface features, but ‘deeper understandings’ dealing with the political and social features of the WPS agenda (Johnson, 1995). These questions can best be understood through text analysis of in-depth interviews as it allows me to gain insight into the experiences of the interviewees, and create a ‘dialectic between the researcher and the researched’ (Tickner, 2006, p. 27). Furthermore, as already established, feminist scholars argue that no research is value free, and this project is no exception. The research of this project adopts an interpretative qualitative research design, which entails that the researcher does not start with concepts that are developed ‘a priori’ (knowledge that is independent of all particular experiences) but rather seeks to allow them to emerge from encounters and interpretations (Kitcher, 1980, p. 4). Also, interpretative methodologies positions ‘meaning-focus and person cantered concerns’ at the centre of scientific explanations (Yanow & Schwartz Shea, 2006, p. xii). Qualitative interpretative research is based upon a ‘constructivist ontology and an interpretative epistemology’ (Yanow & Schwartz Shea, 2006, p. xviii; Holden, 2016, p. 13). Epistemology and ontology are key terms associated with knowledge. Epistemology refers to ‘an understanding of knowledge - of how we can know- and therefore what constitutes a research question’ (Ackerly, Stern, & True, 2006, p. 6). Ontology is how we understand the world, such as what ‘constitute relevant units of analysis’ and whether the world and these units are constant or dynamic and able to change’ (p. 6).

The experts I interviewed for this thesis are the main units of my analysis, and their answers are the primary data of this study. The interviewees were asked about their practical responsibilities and roles working with the WPS agenda. Then, the interviewees and I discussed what the main contestations of the WPS agenda within the expert community is, both in a Norwegian and international context. In these discussions I also told the interviewees what previous interviewees and myself thought the main contestations are. I did this to make sure that the units received the opportunity to give counter arguments to other units that had different views of the agenda.

3.1. Norm contestation and Norwegian expert actors

This thesis argues that the WPS agenda is a normative framework, which is constantly contested, as there is no overall consensus on what the agenda stands for, but several competing interpretations and understandings. As established in chapter
two of this thesis, Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) define a norm as ‘a standard of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity’ (p. 891). Furthermore, norms are ‘shared moral assessments’ and ‘not merely individual idiosyncrasies’ (Björkdahl, 2002, p. 13). In other words, members of a given society share norms. This thesis understands that the Norwegian expert actors interviewed for this project are examples of actors sharing the norm, as well as ‘norm entrepreneurs’ shaping and pushing the agenda domestically and internationally (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 893).

This thesis has decided to study norm contestation by focusing on the norm executants; which are the expert actors working on the WPS agenda. Critical feminist scholars argue that focusing on experts is valuable for several reasons, even though one should question knowledge reproduction and those viewed as experts (Enloe, 2008). For this project I was interested in studying experts as they are the ones that have the most awareness of the discussions within the community working professionally with the WPS agenda. Also, they are part of defining and shaping the WPS Agenda in their work. Several of the expert actors interviewed for this thesis are part of shaping Norwegian foreign policy. I define experts broadly, as belonging to three main sections; the state (MFA, Norad, MoD), researchers and civil society representatives. However, as these three sections consist of hundreds of people, I aimed to target actors with key roles and that interlinked with other actors. Furthermore, I set out to approach interviewees that would disagree with each other in some way. An example of this is the two researchers that I interviewed which openly said that their views of the agenda differ. The interviewees could be situated or work abroad, but needed to have a link to Norway in some way, by either being employed or a Norwegian national.

In the research of this thesis I have interviewed eight actors, which I have chosen to refer to as expert actors. These actors are described as experts in this thesis because they are involved with the WPS agenda as part of their job, which gives special skills, knowledge and power.

3.2 Case and data selection

The research for this thesis was conducted from January to June 2017. The primary research method of this thesis are interviews with eight Norwegian expert
actors having the WPS agenda as one of their main responsibilities in their job. In order to collect data I also attended meetings and talks on the topic of WPS.

3.2.1 Interviews

The primary data of this thesis is eight interviews conducted with Norwegian expert actors working on the women, peace and security agenda (Appendix 3). The eight people interviewed work for the state, research institutions and non-governmental organisations.

The interview guide was developed based on my literature review and guidance of my supervisors. Furthermore, I adjusted the interview guide after my first interview as I found quite a few of the questions were too general. The interview guide was divided into three main sections. The first section was about the role the expert had in the agenda and so this differed from person to person. The second section focused on the term contestations, and what the main discussions of the agenda are according to the interviewee. The third section had examples from critical feminist literature, which all argue that there is no common consensus over what the WPS agenda entails. The last section was the same for each interviewee, in order for each person to have some of the same discussion points.

The sampling was purposeful as I was aiming to interview experts on the WPS agenda in a Norwegian context. Eight in-depth interviews were conducted in different locations in Oslo. I made a point of interviewing the experts where they work. Before I started conducting interviews I had a test interview with a diplomat and a soldier from the Norwegian Military Academy in order to better understand the Norwegian Armed Forces and what the training soldiers go through.

The eight interviews lasted from 40 to 120 minutes. The interviews were semi-structured as it allowed me to tailor each interview to the interviewee, their role in the agenda and perspective. This approach also allowed me to have an open mind as a researcher and let the interviewee focus on their view of the contestations of the WPS agenda. Because of the semi-structured interview approach I was able to develop the concepts and theories ‘out of the data’ (Bryman et al., 2012, p. 12). However, semi-structured interviews complicated the research process as it made the findings harder to compare. Yet, I believe this strengthened this thesis as it shows that the opinions of the agenda differ among the expert actors. To me these disagreements are the most interesting aspects of my findings, and therefore I emphasise them.
3.1.2 Talks and discussions

In addition to the interviews conducted, talks and meetings are also referred to throughout the findings of this thesis (Appendix 4). These meetings have been crucial for the research in this project. They provided opportunities to see the experts interviewed for this thesis in discussions with other actors. It also allowed me to hear the opinions of expert actors I was not able to interview. As the WPS agenda is interlinked with other topic specific agendas and issues, the seminars referred to in this thesis do not necessarily mention the WPS agenda specifically, but the topic is somehow linked to it. For instance, this might include a discussion of women’s role in decision-making in conflict. I was also able to have informal talks with several of the interviewees at conferences and public events.

3.2 Data analysis

The interviews were conducted with the informed consent of the participants, and recorded on a phone and my computer. After the interviews were conducted I saved them in a password-protected folder. The interviews were conducted in Norwegian, as both the interviewees and myself have Norwegian as our first language. Just after I finished an interview I wrote a summary of the interview and my impressions based solely on memory. Then I transcribed the interviews in Norwegian with an online program called transcribe.wrelly.com. After the interviews were transcribed I colour coded them by going through the text and identifying themes, particularly main contestations identified by the expert actors. I also identified what I found to be the most important quotes of the interviews. During this process I discussed my findings with my supervisors. Then I translated the quotes I had identified as key quotes from the interviews into English. Afterwards I contacted my interviewees and asked them to read the translations to see if they agreed with the translation and wording. I also asked if the interviewees wanted to be made anonymous after reading their own quotes, as all of them had previously expressed that they wanted to be identified with name and work title when the thesis is made public. Furthermore, I gave them the opportunity to change wordings, and almost all of them did that. The reason why I allowed that was because the interviews were translated and I did not want the quotes to lose meaning for the interviewees. Furthermore, I did not want the interviewees to feel misrepresented.
Additionally, I took notes at the talks I attended, so the quotes from talks in this thesis are based on note taking and are not transcribed. In some instances, the talks were made public afterwards, for instance the MFA uploaded video recordings of speeches and discussions to their website. In these instances the quotes are direct quotes. I was invited to the coordination meeting between the ministries, NGOs and research groups. This is the one event that is not public and therefore I only took notes, which I use as background information.

When reading this thesis you can identify quotes or arguments from talks and interviews. These sources have the name or title of the person or event in them, followed by the date. An example of an interview being: ‘Contact in the MFA, 23.3.2017’. And an example of a talk being: ‘The Hidden Weapon of War, 4.5.2017’. You can find details about the interviewees and events in appendix 3 and 4.

3.3 Validity and Research Ethics

There are different scientifically valid ways to produce knowledge in IR. The ways in which findings are arrived at should make sense to those who do not agree with the proposed argument. I aim for it to have ‘internal validity’, where based on the assumptions of this research, the conclusions follow rigorously from evidence and logical argumentation (Jackson, 2010, p. 22). This thesis does not aim to have external validity as the conclusions arrived at are based on the opinions and perspectives of the interviewees and my objective interpretations of these statements (Gerring, 2006).

Finally, this chapter will discuss the ethical considerations taken, as well as the ethical difficulties encountered in this research project. Research ethics is not simply about telling researchers what they should or should not do, but about being reflective and aware of the ethical dilemmas one encounters when conducting research in ‘a messy reality’ (Bruter & Lodge, 2013). To do no harm to the participants is the overarching principle in qualitative studies using interview data, and therefore also in this study (Berg & Lune, 2012).

The interviewees in this study are government officials in senior positions, researchers with doctoral degrees, and representatives of NGOs. As the interviewees are in key professional positions most of them are used to participating in debates, discussing their work in public and being interviewed. The interviewees are not
‘marginalized’ or in ‘a relatively lower power position’ than myself as a researcher (Arsel, 2017, p. 944).

All the interviewees were contacted by e-mail when being asked to participate in the research of this thesis. In those e-mails the interviewees were given a short description of the theme and objective of this project. These e-mails stated that I was interested in interviewing Norwegian expert actors working with the WPS agenda to discuss the agenda as a contested normative framework. In the beginning of each interview I also stated that the thesis project is interested in looking at the Norwegian expert actors, and that the person was asked to be interviewed because I consider them an expert actor. The interviewee was then asked for consent.

Again, the interviewees were asked if they wanted to be anonymised in the final text. At this stage two interviewees asked to be anonymised based on the quotes they received, in those two cases we agreed on the description and title I should use in the finished text. The confirmation of the quotes from the interviews turned out to be the biggest ethical challenge of this thesis.

One of these two interviewees felt that they had been misinformed of the aim and objects of this research project. The interviewee stated that they did not know that Norwegian expert actors were the key subjects of analysis. In that case I went back to our correspondence and listened to the recording of that specific interview. Furthermore, the interviewee and I had a phone conversation in which they stated their concerns and I told the interviewee more about my research. I also told the interviewee that I did not want anyone to feel wrongly represented and that they could withdraw their interview if they wanted to. This phone conversation was very important for my future experience as a researcher as it gave me more insight into the perspectives of one of my interviewees. Before working on my thesis I had only interviewed fellow students for a mock research methods project, and this phone conversation deepened my knowledge. Firstly, the interviewee emphasised that they were representing their work place and that they should not speak freely about their perspectives and opinions to the public. Several of the interviewees had expressed that they had shared perspectives with me which should not be open to the public, because it could damage the work with the WPS agenda and the cooperation with other institutions and actors. In some cases we spoke freely about the WPS agenda in

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1 I use the term *they* in order to not identify the interviewees.
2 This thesis is published at Brage.bibsys.no and is therefore open to the public.
interviews, but I was not able to use these quotes or opinions in this thesis. In those cases I have tried to find similar views expressed in public documents. Secondly, the interviewee expressed that they did not understand that they were the focus of the analysis, as they did not identify themselves as an expert. On this point the interviewee and I disagree. Firstly, I did express to all my interviewees that I view them as experts as they work professionally with the WPS agenda and some of the interviewees are able to shape policy on the issue matter. However, this is my individual opinion. ‘Even attempting to understand or represent another person’s experiences is an act of power’, and the interviewee has the right to disagree with me on this point (Spirak, 1988, as cited in Arsel, 2017, p. 944). Also, one of the interviewees did not reply to my e-mails. In the end I decided to anonymize all the interviewees except from these two researchers in order to make sure that this thesis could not harm the interviewees.

It is a limitation to this thesis that the discussions the interviewees and I had are not fully represented in the findings of this work. However, I believe that the difficulty of getting the quotes from the interviews confirmed with the interviewees is a finding in itself, as the WPS agenda turned out to be a much more controversial and fragile topic than I anticipated when first deciding to study it.
Chapter 4: The Women, Peace and Security Agenda: A Normative Framework in Contestation

The aim of the next two chapters is to answer the research questions of this thesis and analyse the findings. The analysis will primarily be based on interviews conducted with Norwegian actors working professionally with the WPS agenda. The literature review of this thesis outlined the main discussions of the WPS agenda among feminist IR scholars and showed that it is little consensus on what a gender sensitive approach to IR should entail. The following chapters will build on these perspectives while also taking into consideration the opinions of Norwegian expert actors working professionally with the WPS agenda.

This chapter will first give a short introduction to UNSCR 1325 and the WPS agenda. Then, the WPS agenda will be discussed as a contested normative framework since the making of Resolution 1325. In other words, the contestations discussed in this thesis are not new or unique to the Norwegian expert community. Lastly, the chapter will explore the Norwegian expert community working with the WPS agenda and their work places.

The following chapter will argue that the WPS agenda can be understood as a contested normative framework based on three main dualisms within the Norwegian expert community. These dualisms are described as security versus development (1), the international as universal and the local as particular (2), and structural change and empowerment (3). These chapters will bundle actors under themes. However, these chapters will not argue that any of the expert actors interviewed for this thesis relate fully with one of these concepts over the other, but rather they are constantly dragged between them as part of the contestation process. The end of chapter five will reflect upon the overall findings of this project and answer the second research question.

4.1 An Introduction to the Women, Peace and Security Agenda

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 (see appendix 5) starts with pre-ambular paragraphs. These paragraphs refer to previously established normative standards among UN member states through legal principles, human rights and humanitarian law. Examples being previously adopted Security Council resolutions, the UN Charter and the Beijing Platform for Action. The resolution then goes on to address three main themes. First, the resolution addresses the gendered aspects of
war and armed conflict. The resolution recognises that conflict targets women and girls differently and demands protection of women, particularly from sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV). Secondly, the resolution reaffirms the important role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts and in peace building and calls for increased participation of women in all decision-making levels in national, regional and international conflict prevention. Thirdly, the resolution calls upon local actors, member states, but also the UN system itself to adopt a gender perspective in peace operations, negotiations and agreements. The resolution recognizes the urgent need to progress on gender mainstreaming on all aspects relating to women and girls. These three topics are covered in 18 operational paragraphs (Pratt & Richter-Devroe, 2011). The topics in Resolution 1325 range across the spheres of economics, justice, security and formal politics (Kirby & Shepherd, 2016).

To date the UN Security Council has adopted eight resolutions on the topic of WPS. These resolutions are called UNSCR 1325 (2000), 1820 (2008), 1888 (2009), 1889 (2009), 1960 (2010), 2106 (2013), 2122 (2013) and 2242 (2015). The resolutions add to Resolution 1325 and further address issues of conflict related sexual violence and the impunity of such crimes, underrepresentation of women in decision making, the inclusion of civil society, as well as the accountability of actors in conflict. Examples include Resolution 1820, which recognises sexual violence as a tactic of war and argues that sexual violence ‘can be defined as a war crime’ (Jansson & Eduards, 2016). Resolution 2242 links WPS to countering terrorism and extremism (Shepherd, 2017).

The WPS agenda does not stand alone, but is one fraction of several institutional frameworks dealing with concepts such as women’s issues, protection of civilians in conflict, human rights and development. Therefore it is not a goal or possible for this thesis to discuss the WPS agenda isolated or without the influence of these other international frameworks.

4.2 A normative framework in contestation

In order to understand the contestations of the WPS agenda today, this thesis wants to go back to before and during the adoption of Resolution 1325. The aim is to show that the WPS agenda is not only a contested normative framework today, but it has been contested both before, during and after the adoption of Resolution 1325. Until the adoption of Resolution 1325, civil society organisations and especially
women’s organisations, were the main actors strategically pushing for women’s experiences in armed conflict to be acknowledged not only as a human rights issue, but also as an international security issue. After the adoption of Resolution 1325, the beginning of the WPS agenda as we know it today, countries and international organisations have to a large extent taken over the agenda and adopted a state-centric approach to the subject. This section will discuss women’s civil society organisations strategic approaches to the UN, with focus on the Forth Conference on Women in 1995. The conference is referred to as ‘the conceptual roots of 1325’ and the beginning of close cooperation between UN member states and civil society organisations on the topic of women and armed conflict (Cohn, 2008, p. 187). Then this section will move on to the adoption of Resolution 1325 and the WPS agenda, as we know it today.

NGO-led international women’s movements strategically developed methods to influence a variety of international agendas and policy debates within the UN in the decades leading up to adoption of Resolution 1325 (Chen, 1995). There was an increase in the ‘complex of alliances, networks and coalitions’ set up to unite women’s NGOs globally in the 1980s, which lead to a rapid growth to the women’s movement lobbying at the UN (p. 479). This diversification expanded the knowledge base of the women’s NGOs seeking to influence the UN. The NGOs developed their substantive, political and technical skills, and strengthened their research, documentation and communication abilities (p. 488). As a result, these NGOs and civil-society networks became a valuable asset to the UN and its member states, as they could provide policy makers with expert advice from the diverse NGO community (p. 481). As a result the women from civil society organisations taking places at policy-makers tables nationally and internationally increased (p. 488).

After the Cairo conference in 1994, the women’s movement lobbying the UN learned from the Women’s Health Coalition that there are three main ways in which to influence official UN documents. First, by influencing the composition of official delegations. Secondly, by lobbying at all preparatory meetings and at conferences and thirdly by working with the media (Chen, 1995, p. 486).

Furthermore, the women’s organisations successfully lobbying the UN adopted strategies that fitted within the UN framework and did not aim to fundamentally change the international organisation, but rather add to it, ‘forward
looking strategies’ being an example (Pietilä & Vickers, 1990, p. 45-70). ‘Forward looking strategies’ emphasise not focusing on accomplishments as well as ‘what had not been achieved, and why not’, but overcoming obstacles to the achievements ahead and focus on priority areas (p. 6). This approach has been criticised as being lead by those closely associated with the UN and for being ‘top-heavy bureaucratic’ (Lloyd, 1990).

The women’s movement challenged the UN and its member states on several policy issues before pushing women’s experiences in war as a policy area that should be on the Security Council’s agenda. The NGOs focused on making the UN and its member states realise that there are ‘important women’s dimensions’ to topics that are not obviously linked to gender such as poverty and climate change. They also focused on gender-based violence as it demonstrated ‘most clearly and urgently what it meant to expand human rights to incorporate women’ (Chen, 1995, p. 483). When the women’s movement strategically started framing women and armed conflict as a security issue, the issue was not new to women’s organisations. WILPF International is an example of an organisation which fought for women’s rights to participate in decision-making on all aspects of peace and security as early as 1915 (WILPF, 2017a).

The Forth World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995, which resulted in the Beijing Platform of Action, is regarded as one of the precursors to Resolution 1325. It was the first UN convened conference to recognise women’s experiences in armed conflict as a security issue, and too involve civil society actors in such large numbers. The platform was the first to identify the ‘effects of armed or other kinds of conflict on women, including those living under foreign occupation’ as one of twelve ‘critical areas of concern’. The Platform urged governments, international organisations and civil society to take actions (Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, 1995; Pratt & Richter-Devroe, 2011). A whole chapter in the Platform for Action was devoted to the subject of ‘women under armed conflict’ and acknowledged that equal access and participation of women in prevention and resolution of conflicts are ‘essential for the maintenance and promotion of peace and

3 The term originated in the report from the World Conference on Women in Nairobi in 1985. The report was called ‘Forward Looking Strategies for the Advancement of Women: World Conference to review and appraise the achievements of the United Nations Decade for Women: Equality, Development and Peace’.
security’ (p. 57). The platform additionally states that women and girls suffer particular consequences of armed conflict and terrorism because of ‘their status in society and their sex’, naming ‘systematic rape’ as an example (p. 57). Furthermore, the Beijing Conference gathered the largest number of NGOs at any such UN conference at that time, and several UN member states included NGO representatives in their official delegations (Tryggestad, 2009, p. 545). Furthermore, like the previous UN World Conferences on Women the Beijing Conference was accompanied by a parallel conference non-official Women’s NGO Forum. The Beijing Forum was the largest yet by about 30,000 participants (Roberts, 1996).

The Women and Armed Conflict Caucus started thinking about taking the issue of ‘women and armed conflict’ to the UN SC, discussing the obstacles to implementing the Beijing platform as early as in 1998 (Cohn, 2008). At Beijing+5\(^4\) it was highlighted that the ‘women and armed conflict’ part of the platform had not been addressed or implemented, and for that reason a NGO Working Group on Women and Armed Conflict (NGOWG) was founded to further lobby the UN for the passage of a UNSC resolution ‘that would help ensure that the issue of women, peace and security would be properly addressed’ (Pratt & Richter-Devroe, 2011, p. 492)\(^5\).

Civil society organisations that were not only concerned with women’s issues such as Amnesty International were also part of the NGOWG. Following, the President of the UN SC issued a statement at the International Women’s Day which declared that ‘peace is inextricably linked with equality between women and men’ (United Nations Security Council, 2000).

Gender-based and conflict related sexual violence (CRSV) received considerable attention through out the 1990s, mainly due to the war crimes in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda (Solhjell, 2010). Furthermore, as human security developed into a UN priority, gender security followed as a relevant topic for the Security Council (Jansson & Eduards, 2016, p. 592). Instead of being viewed as an unfortunate by-product of violent conflict, sexual violence was discussed as a weapon and tactic of war. Furthermore, civil society actor’s concern for the impacts of conflict on women and women’s marginalised role in conflict resolution ‘was mirrored in the

\(^4\) Beijing+5 is the name of the five-year review of the Beijing Platform for action in the UN General Assembly.

\(^5\) After the adoption of Resolution 1325 the NGO WG changed name to NGOWG on Women, Peace and Security rather than ’women and armed conflict’.
theoretical shift in IR theory away from the (neo-)realist state-centred to a more holistic, agent-centred conceptualization of security’. Which was ‘proposed particularly in the field of critical security studies… and feminist IR…’ (Pratt & Richter-Devroe, 2011, p. 492).

In October 2000, the NGOWG were invited to sponsor a session on ‘Women, Peace and Security’ in the UN SC and to draft a resolution on the topic. A week later Resolution 1325 was unanimously adopted by the UN SC (p. 492). The adoption was a testimony to the women’s NGO lobbying the UN, illustrating that they were not the only ones that had changed, the UN had also gone through a transformation since its founding. ‘After years of knocking on doors at the offices of member states’ delegations in New York, a strong lobby of women advocates from nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and from within the UN system had finally succeeded in placing issues relating to women, peace and security on the agenda of the Security Council’ (Tryggestad, 2009, p. 539).

Three main groupings have been given credit for Resolution 1325, as it was the outcome of intense lobbying by international women’s organisations ‘from below’, diplomacy ‘from above’ by individuals within the UN system, and a small group of UN member states, including Norway (Tryggestad, 2014b, p. 466). When discussing the adoption of Resolution 1325 today, the Norwegian MFA gives credit to women’s civil society organisations (Contact in the MFA, Interview 23 March 2017).

Since 2000, the WPS agenda has been taken to national and transnational levels within the UN and beyond it. Due to the adoption of Resolution 1325, WPS became a formal item on the Security Council’s agenda, which means the council is required to address the topic regularly and all UN agencies are mandated to do gender mainstreaming (Tryggestad, 2014b, p. 467). UNSCR 1889 encourages member states to develop NAPs (2009), and 72 out of 193 UN member states have adopted NAPs as of August 2017 (Peace Women, 2017). Several regional and multilateral organisations have also implemented their own forms of the WPS agenda. NATO, EU and AU are examples of regional organisations that have adopted their own Regional Action Plans (RAPs). Additionally, NATO’s Secretary General appointed a Special Representative for WPS in 2014 (Schuurman, 2015).

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6 74 countries have adopted NAPs on WPS when Kosovo and Palestine are included.
The WPS agenda has been called out for being ‘state-centric’ (Shepherd, 2008). The UN Security Council is a decision-making body within the framework of an international organisation, whose members are nation states. Without the member states supporting and wanting new UN agendas to emerge, new agendas will not be successful. As such, ‘the consolidations and implementation of WPS principles at national and international levels have become increasingly focused on state responsibility and action’ (Kirby & Shepherd, 2016, p. 383). The state-centrism of the agenda ‘is at odds with the driving impetus from civil society that brought the WPS agenda into being in the late 1990s’ (Kirby & Shepherd, 2016, p. 379). The Contact in FOKUS elaborates:

Resolution 1325 and the two resolutions following on the topic of Women, Peace and Security were made in consultation with civil society organisations. Civil society wrote the resolutions in cooperation with a few UN member states, but since then the international Women, Peace and Security Agenda has become more state driven. The United States drafted a new resolution on WPS, which they made civil society organisations aware of the day before it was ratified in the Security Council (Interview 2 March 2017).

The statement argues that women’s civil society organisations, which lobbied for WPS to become a topic on the Security Council agenda, has little control over the ways in which the UN and its member states have developed the agenda. As states are in many ways steering the WPS agenda, it has been used for purposes these civil society organisations did not intend it to be used for. Women’s movements were traditionally peace activists critical of military solutions and traditional power structures. While ‘the UN’s collective system for securing the peace has remained tenaciously state-centred, militaristic and male dominated’ (Otto, 2004, p. 1). Therefore after the adoption of Resolution 1325, the NGOWG ‘decided to take an advocacy and watchdog role in relation to the actual implementation of UNSCR 1325’ (Tryggestad, 2018, p. 252).

4.3 Norwegian Key Actors for Women, Peace and Security

There are global, regional, national and local actors working with the WPS agenda. Examples of such actors are international and regional organisations, UN member states, civil society organisations, and research and media institutions (Coomaraswamy et al., 2015). The term actor can refer both to institutions and
individuals. There is a diverse range of Norwegian institutions, organisations and individuals working with the WPS agenda. This section aims to present the Norwegian community working professionally with the WPS agenda with emphasis on the actors interviewed for this thesis. Chapter 3 gave the criteria for selection of expert actors, and Appendix 3 has an overview of the interviewees. The individuals interviewed for this thesis represents three main sections depending on their work place: 1) government and state actors, 2) non-governmental organisations and civil society organisations, 3) research institutions. The interviewees from the first section work in the MFA, Norad and the MoD. The interviewees from the second section work in FOKUS and IKFF (Wilpf Norway). The interviewees from the third section work at PRIO and BI Norwegian Business School in addition to having other positions and roles. There is fluidity between these sections as there is overlap between, within and across these three sections of the Norwegian expert community working with the WPS agenda. For instance is Torunn Tryggestad, who is a deputy director and researcher at PRIO, also a Core Group member of the NATO Civil Society Advisory Panel, and a previous advisor to the UN section in the MFA. There are regular meeting between state actors and civil society coordinated by the MFA. The Norwegian, institutions and individuals working to strengthen the WPS agenda in Norway, is a small community where almost everyone knows or is aware of each other.

No parliament members or representatives from any political parties have been interviewed for this thesis. Neither have any individuals that are currently and primarily stationed outside of Norway been interviewed, such as representatives from diplomatic missions, researcher, local field workers or NGOs. However, several of the interviewees have previously held positions abroad.

4.3.1 State and government

The Norwegian government has developed a National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security (NAP). The NAPs main objective ‘is to ensure that women are able to take part in peace processes and that the rights, needs and priorities of both women and men are addressed in all peace and security efforts’ through focusing on four priority areas. These priority areas are peace processes and peace negotiations (1), women and men’s security, rights and needs in international operations (2),
peacebuilding processes (3), and safeguarding both women and men in humanitarian crisis (4). Additionally, preventing and combating sexual violence in conflict is a key element in all of these four priority areas (The Norwegian Ministries, 2015). The NAP identifies five focus countries for Norwegian WPS efforts. These countries are Afghanistan, Columbia, Myanmar, Palestine and South Sudan (The Norwegian Ministries, 2015). These countries are regarded as in conflict or post-conflict by the Norwegian government and are identified as areas where the WPS agenda is ‘central in order to secure just and including peace’ (The Norwegian Agency of Development Cooperation, 2017b). The action plan also includes measures to strengthen female recruitment in the Norwegian Armed Forces. The priority areas and goals of the Norwegian National Action Plan are divided between four ministries. These ministries are the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Justice and Public Security and the Ministry of Children, Equality and Social Inclusion. The MoD and the MoJ have primary responsibility for following up the WPS agenda in international operations, while MFA are responsible for translating the UN Security Council resolution policy ‘into practice’ (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015, p. 8). Additionally, there is a coordinator for WPS with an office in the MFA, who is responsible for keeping in touch with focal points\(^7\) in the four ministries, and have an overview of Norwegian efforts, and strengthen the agenda nationally.

The MFA has four primary responsibilities in implementing the NAP, according to guidelines for the Foreign Service. First, they have ‘a normative focus’ in multilateral forums such as UN and NATO. Secondly, they pursue ‘political dialogue with the authorities of individual countries’. Thirdly, they provide founding earmarked for WPS efforts in fragile states and post-conflict countries. Lastly, the MFA support research to ensure a knowledge-based-approach to the implementation of the resolutions (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015, p. 12).

Norad is the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation, and does the quality assurance of Norwegian Development Cooperation, and is a directorate under the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (The Norwegian Agency of Development Cooperation, 2017a). Norad has five main tasks: aid advisory services, quality assurance and monitoring, grant programmes, communication and evaluation. Norad

\(^7\) Focal points are the same as key actors.
approaches the topic area of WPS as a human rights, women and gender equality issue. Norad gives advice on WPS to the MFA the embassies, as well as to other sections of Norad. Most of the advice is comments on global processes and actors. Examples of such actors are UN Women and the World Bank. The interviewee’s department gives advice to Norwegian government actors both on headquarter level, country level and the local level. ‘A lot of the time it is important to connect the experiences made at local level up to the global processes’ (Contact in NORAD, Interview 23 March 2017).

The Ministry of Defence has primary responsibility for several of the intermediate objectives in the NAP such as integrating gender perspectives into military and police contributions to UN and NATO-led missions. Furthermore, the UN has called for all UN member states to boost recruitment of women to all international missions (The Norwegian Ministries, 2015). The Norwegian parliament passed a law in October 2014 making military service mandatory for both men and women, which in the long-term will boost female Norwegian military personnel in international operations (Regjeringen, 2014).

4.3.2 NGOs and civil society

FORUM Norway 1325 is the main umbrella network for Norwegian civil society advocacy and engagement on Norway’s WPS agenda. FORUM 1325 has 21 member organisations, which include the major Norwegian humanitarian NGOs, political advocacy groups and women’s organisations. The forum meets twice a year to coordinate advocacy points before formal meetings with the MFA (Holtfodt & Wilde, 2016).

Representatives from two NGOs have been interviewed for this thesis. First, WILPF was founded in 1915 as a protest to WW1, and is the oldest operating women’s anti-war organisation in Norway. ‘At that time, as well as now, the purpose in founding WILPF was to have an organisation through which women could work for peace and freedom by claiming women’s right and responsibility to participate in decision-making on all aspects of peace and security’ (WILPF, 2017a). WILPF has an international secretariat based in Geneva, and a New York office focusing on the work of the UN. WILPF was one of the first NGOs to gain consultative status (Category B) with the UN (WILPF, 2017b). Furthermore, WILPF is one of 14
international organisations in the NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security. The consensus-based coalition gives recommendations to UN member states and leadership and was initiated before the adoption of Resolution 1325. The mission of the NGOWG is to collaborate with the UN, its member states and civil society towards full implementation of UN SC3 1325, and all other resolutions that address WPS. The NGO WG is formally cooperating with the UN and regularly invited to the UNSC to give their recommendations (NGO Working Group on Women Peace and Security, 2017)

FOKUS is a knowledge and resource centre for international women’s issues with an emphasis on the spreading of information and women-centred development cooperation. FOKUS’ primary goal is to contribute to the improvement of women’s social, economic, and political situation internationally. FOKUS is an umbrella organisation, which consists of 66 women’s organisations. It has also been the Norwegian National Committee for UN Women since 2010. FOKUS receives financial support from NORAD and the Norwegian MFA through framework agreements (FOKUS, 2017). FOKUS was the biggest receiver of the Norwegian 1325 Fund in 2016 with 30 million NOK (Contact in FOKUS, 2 March 2017).

4.3.3 Researchers and research institutions

There are several researchers studying and discussing the WPS agenda in Norway. The PRIO Centre on Gender, Peace and Security. The main activities at the centre are publishing, teaching and training. Additionally, the centre also provides policy advise, for instance to the MFA in regards to the NAP. Additionally the WPS agenda is studied at universities. An example being the University of Oslo: Centre for Gender Research.

Two researchers have been interviewed for this thesis, and these are the only once that are not made anonymous. Frist, Torunn Tryggestad is the director of the PRIO Centre on Gender, Peace and Security. She is also the Norwegian representative to the civil society group working on gender in NATO. Secondly, Berit von der Lippe is a professor in rethoric at the BI Norwegian Business School.
Chapter 5: Contestations

There are ‘a number of conceptual, policy and practical issues that are crucial in the debates around UNSCR 1325 specifically, and women, peace and security more broadly’ (Pratt & Richter-Devroe, 2011, p. 489). Furthermore, the implementation of the WPS agenda is the ‘duty’ of many stakeholders, who have different interpretations, requirements and approaches to the agenda (Coomaraswamy et al., 2015). These debates are also present in the Norwegian community working professionally with the WPS agenda. The contact in the MFA states ‘there are some fundamental discussions (of the WPS agenda) which are constantly on-going’ (Interview 23 March 2017). Berit von der Lippe adds ‘I realise that there are at least two perspectives on this (agenda), some/others only sees one’ (Interview 5 April 2017). This chapter aims to investigate and explore three of these crucial debates as contestations from a Norwegian expert point of view. The contestations are security versus development (1), the international as universal and the local as particular (2), and lastly structural change and empowerment (3). These three contestations have interrelated elements and certain overlaps.

5.1. Security Versus Development

At first glance, the adoption of Resolution 1325 seems like a unification of the visions of the women’s movement, the UN Security Council and UN member states. Even though one can argue that the WPS agenda, in many ways, has brought these actors closer together they are still divided in their views of the WPS agenda. One of the strongest divides, both between and within these groups of actors, is their view on military means in order to obtain peace. WILPF and the broader women’s movement pushing for the adoption of Resolution 1325 argue that ‘militarism and armed conflict are completely at odds with the goals of gender equality and international peace and freedom’ (Ruby, 2014). On the other hand, UN member states, which are represented by Norway in this thesis, recognise that the WPS agenda demands for the prevention of armed conflict. Nonetheless, for Norway and other UN member states the WPS normative framework is fitted within security policies, where military means is one of the methods used when responding to armed conflict. Military and police personnel are the ones mainly employed in international peacebuilding efforts. This approach emphasises dealing with the WPS agenda ‘in the world as it is’ by making sure that
the military has a gender perspective. For instance by including women in international operations. Rather than preventing armed conflict, the approach advocates for the prevention of violence and discrimination of women in armed conflict once it has already started. Therefore it is referred to as ‘a late intervention’ by IR feminist scholars (Cohn, 2008). First, this sub-section will assess the differing alignments of the actors in regards to a militarised view of the WPS agenda. The sub-section is called ‘security versus development’ as the institutions are torn between these two approaches in regards to ‘creating’ peace and security. Then, this sub-section will discuss what it entails taking a military-means approach to the WPS agenda with emphasis on women in the military. Lastly, this sub-section will present the perspectives of actors who view the Norwegian approach to the WPS agenda as a late intervention, due to the state-heavy focus of this sub-section.

5.1.1 The Approach of Institutions and Organisations Towards Peace and Security

Figure 1. The approach of institutions and organisations towards the Women, Peace and Security Agenda

Figure 1 shows that the institutions and organisations are roughly divided between a development approach on the one side and a military-means approach to WPS on the
other side. The state actors and civil society actors are roughly divided between the two; nonetheless the figure shows that there are contrasts between the actors within these two approaches.

Firstly, IKFF is the organisation that is the furthest away from the military means approach, as their methodology is ‘always non-violent’, and they ‘strive to end all use of violence and military solutions’ (WILPF, 2017b). FOKUS differ from IKFF as it is a knowledge and resource centre for women’s issues, which consists of 59 women’s organisations and committees in political parties, trade unions, solidarity and aid organisations (FOKUS, 2017). As FOKUS consists of many organisations it does not have one approach, but competing views within its organisation. However, the organisation does not promote military means as a way to solve conflict and it accentuates development policy measures, as it is a ‘forum for women and development’ (Contact in FOKUS, Interview 2 March 2017).

The MFA, Norad and the MoD are cooperating on WPS related issues, as they are all government agencies responsible for implementing policies set out by the Norwegian parliament. As Norway is a state with armed forces, none of the ministries or agencies are fundamentally against using military means, yet their roles in the agenda differ. The MFA has a coordination and advisory role in relation to other ministries and works to secure and promote Norway’s interests internationally, including its military needs. The MFA also deals with issues of peace and reconciliation and is therefore placed in the middle of figure 1. (Sending et al., 2015). As Norad does the quality assurance of Norwegian Development Cooperation it approaches the WPS agenda mainly as a development issue, but it cooperates with all types of Norwegian state actors abroad including international military missions. The MoD is the government office with responsibility for the formation and implementation of Norwegian security and defence policy and is therefore placed the furthest towards the military means approach in figure 1. However, individuals within these agencies differ in their approaches, which mean that the interviewees might represent a certain view found within their organisation.

5.1.2 A Military-Means Approach to Women, Peace and Security

The former Norwegian Minister of Defence Ine Marie Eriksen Søreide declared it is vital that Norwegian politicians and decision makers ‘see the world as it
Søreide pushes the logic further:

Over the last few years Børge Brende and I have come to realise that our choices are not between what is good and what is bad, but between what is bad and what is worse. As a result many of the choices we have made, especially those relating to international military operations and whether or not we are going to participate in them, have not been choices between ideal solutions, as I do not have the luxury to view the world as an ideal place where my choices are between good solutions. In the fight against ISIL Norway has taken a choice, a choice we have openly discussed as a complicated one and full of dilemmas. Not doing anything also has consequences. These types of scenarios says something about the complexity in the debates and the crossroads we have taken, why we have taken these choices, and why we will continue making them (Talk, ‘Veivalg I Norsk utenrikspolitikk’, 20 April 2017).

Note that Søreide emphasises that not using military means also has significance and that Norway will continue to make similar choices as it has made in the past. Søreide spoke to defend a newly published White Paper, which accentuates that democracy, human rights and respect for international law are the values that forms Norwegian foreign policy. However, today’s ‘unpredictable’ security situation has consequences and the White Paper therefore concluded that Norway should strengthen its defence capabilities and intensify security cooperation with other nations and organisations such as the EU and NATO (The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2017). In short, the White Paper highlights military solutions, even though it also handles conflict prevention, mediation and strengthening of international law.

There is not a sustainable debate in the Norwegian parliament over whether or not Norway is going to continue having armed forces, remain a NATO member state or solve armed conflicts with military means. Rather, ‘the consensus on foreign policy issues in regards to peace and security is extremely strong in Norway’ (Berit von der Lippe, Interview 5 April 2017). Furthermore, Norway has a ‘peace through war’ approach where Norwegian attachments to peace remain strong while still allowing for support to military actions (Leira, 2013, p. 338). This approach allows Norway to

8 Søreide is now the Minister of Foreign Affairs.
9 Brende was the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs between 2013 and 2017. This quote is translated for this thesis and not approved by Søreide.
contribute with ‘significant offensive military force’ in countries such as Afghanistan and Libya, while also emphasising dialogue as a peace mediator and working to strengthening the UN (p. 352).

The Norwegian state approaches the WPS agenda from the military-means perspective outlined above. The Advisor in the MoD states:

There is tension internally in the 1325 community… I am never quite sure what is meant when critics voice a ‘not to militarisation’ of the agenda… I know it has to do with their attitudes towards armed forces, but to me it seems simplified. As if a military professional can be stereotyped. We must remember that different armed forces have different approaches and are guided by different policies.’ (Interview 16 May 2017).

The MoD interviewees stress that the Norwegian armed forces are acknowledged internationally. For example has there been no allegations of war crimes or breaches of international law committed by Norwegian troops in Afghanistan even though they have been there, often many hundreds at a time, for over 12 years.

The two interviewees working in the MoD accentuate that the WPS agenda did not come from within the MoD or the Norwegian Armed Forces, but is an order and legally binding obligation from the Norwegian parliament and the UN Security Council, which the MoD and the Norwegian Armed Forces are obligated to implement.

Furthermore, the Senior Defence Staff Officer can understand the fear of militarisation in general, but says that as long as Norway has a defence, that defence needs to have a gender perspective, as that is something all organisations should have (Interview 18 May 2017). Additionally, since the WPS agenda comes from the UN Security Council, there is an acknowledgement at least among the government agencies that the topic will be dealt with first and foremost as a security issue. The Senior Advisor in the MoD explains:

For the Ministry of Defence the fundamental element of 1325 is that it is a Security Council Resolution, and therefore it belongs to the security policy area, that is the reason the Resolution is ground-breaking…I would not be doing my job if I said the Resolution has nothing to do with the military (Interview, 16 May 2017).
Moreover, the Senior Defence Staff officer adds that the WPS agenda is contested from within the MoD and the armed forces. There are discussions as to whether or not the MoD should continue to emphasise the WPS normative framework:

Some are still asking themselves if Norway needs 1325 if we going forward are mainly focused on national defence and security, rather than international operations or missions. ‘But we do not know what our next operations or missions will be, so we have to be prepared, with gender perspectives both nationally and internationally’ (Interview 18 May 2017).

The quote above refers to the current defence report in the MoD and the Norwegian Armed Forces. The quote also shows that there are certain individuals in the military that are advocating for WPS, and others that are not. Furthermore, the Senior Defence Staff Officer discusses how the military has a fictional element to it, as it is training for a potentially unknown future:

It is required that military training has a gender element to it…when you design military exercises you create a fictional world and a fictional situation. Exercises in the military are everything from exercises in the field to exercises via computer screens… and we are still not good enough at practicing gender perspectives by incorporating it to all these different scenarios (Interview 18 May 2017)

5.1.2.1 Afghanistan

Norway, among other NATO member states, used UNSCR 1325 in order to justify a military invasion in Afghanistan in 2001. The invasion Afghanistan is a good example of the contestation of the WPS agenda as there are discussions both inside and across the institutions with a strong sense of ownership to the agenda. The actors disagree over whether or not the use of Resolution 1325 was just used rhetorically in order to justify the invasion, and if military means can help enhance women’s participation and create sustainable peace.

One of the main discussions of the use of Resolution 1325 in Afghanistan is between rhetoric and policy change (B. v. d Lippe & Stuvøy, 2013). The Senior Defence Staff Officer states that ‘today, it is questioned if women’s situation in Afghanistan was used as an argument for intervention back then, or misused in the
line of argumentation’ (Interview 18 May 2017). Tryggestad adds that ‘many believe the WPS agenda was misused in Afghanistan, at least on a rhetoric level’. As in the USA and the UK ‘the wives were brought out’. Laura Bush and Cherie Blair held ‘emotional speeches’ about how important it was to invade Afghanistan to rebuild women’s human rights and equality. ‘Several years past and neither of the two countries made much efforts to do so’ (Interview 14 March 2017). Tryggestad summarises:

‘In my opinion it was a way to legitimise the invasion and mobilise political support in among the people. Everyone agreed that it was terrible how women in Afghanistan were treated… So it was a successful rhetorical strategy to mobilise the people, the way I remember it the invasion had strong popular support.’ (Interview 14 March 2017)

The interviewees claim that the line of argumentation used in the USA and the UK was also used in a Norwegian context. A Norwegian state representative referred to the fictional novel ‘A Thousand Splendid Suns’ by Khaled Hosseini when discussing the quality of life of women in Afghanistan. Politicians told the Norwegian people that their presence in Afghanistan was motivated by a duty to help women and children in Afghanistan.

Another discussion raised by the invasion in Afghanistan is if women’s lack of basic human rights should be used to justify military interventions (B. v. d Lippe & Stuvøy, 2013). The contact and Norad emphasise that aid and development strategies were used to legitimise the military intervention, without little practical results on the ground (Interview 23 March 2017). Furthermore, as the WPS agenda is a ‘transversal topic’ it is hard to measure the effects of it (Godal et al., 2016). The contact in IKFF adds:

Every person who thinks for more than two minutes will understand that it is impossible to promote gender equality and women’s empowerment through military interventions. It is not possible to bomb a country to gender equality or women’s empowerment. Everyone knows that war creates catastrophe, damaged infrastructure, destroyed homes, poverty and illness. We have every reason to believe that
women and children will have extremely different lives because of it. So I experience it as false argumentation (Interview 14 March 2017).

The Senior Defence Staff Officer underlines that the MoD focus their work with 1325 on three main pillars: first, the obligations they have to the WPS agenda; secondly, a gender specific analysis of the area of operation at home or abroad; and thirdly, the mandate for the specific operation. ‘Based on these three pillars you can decide what your ambitions for a gender perspective in that operation should be’. However, ‘…If you do not carry out the analysis, it is very hard to measure your success’. The Officer highlights that the Norwegian MoD still have ‘a long way to go make it a natural and integral part’ of what they do, also in Afghanistan (Interview 18 May 2017).

Berit von der Lippe questions the lack of empirics in the NAP on WPS, and in policies dealing with WPS overall:

Where are the empirics? What types of success have they had with their wars so far? After they started with the war against terror. There is none. It is just hell. There are more schools that have been built in Afghanistan, but many do not dare to attend them… We have been doing these wars for almost 20 years, and they do not have a single example they can lift up (Interview 5 April 2017)

GIWPS and PRIO recently launched a WPS Index funded by the Norwegian MFA. The index incorporates three basic dimensions of well-being: inclusion (economic, social, political); justice (formal laws and informal discrimination); and security (at the family, community, and societal levels) (Peace Research Institute Oslo & Georgetown Institute for Women, 2017, p. viii). After the 16 year long NATO presence in Afghanistan, the index gives the country the ranking 152/153, which is the bottom ranked country in a tie with Syria. In comparison, Norway is ranked 2/153 (p. 22). Furthermore, Lippe also adds that in addition to lack of empirics, the Norwegian NAP and WPS policies say nothing about misuse or abuse of the agenda. Despite, the experiences made in Afghanistan Norwegian policies are an implicit legitimisation ‘of the same procedure as last year’ (5 April 2017)
Lippe states that the WPS agenda is an example of ‘the current hegemonic power discourse’ mainly because of the ‘little resistance defence and foreign policy is receiving within academia’. Lippe explains the small critique the agenda received by utilising the metaphor of ‘inoculation’ originally coined by Roland Barthes. The term is medical and is a synonym of vaccination. The term refers to the process of taking a small portion of poison to make the body immune to diseases. Barthes explained the term as ‘immunizing… a small inoculation of acknowledged evil one thus protects it against the risk of generalized subversion’ (Barthes, 1972, p. 150), or to ‘admit a little bit of evil in an institution, such as foreign policy, as to ward off awareness of its’ fundamental problems (Robinson, 2011). Lippe says that an example of inoculation is when those supporting the WPS agenda say ‘that one war did not turn out as well as we wanted it to’, or it did not solve the issues we wanted it to solve. Furthermore, ‘a suitable dose of antidote makes you immune to everything else you should criticise because you got some critique off your chest, but just the right dose’ (Interview 5 April 2017).

5.1.3 Women in the Military

The UN and NATO’s goal in their respective WPS agendas is to increase the share of female troops deployed in international missions and operations. In order to do so, the UN and NATO depend on the member nations contributing troops (Schuurman, 2015). In the beginning of the 2000s Norway viewed Resolution 1325 as an advocate to get more women into the armed forces in order to employ more female troops to the UN and NATO (Danielsen, Larsen, & Owesen, 2015). Furthermore, the Norwegian government also claimed that the armed forces, like any government organisation needs to become more equal in terms of gender, ethnicity and religion. Civil society actors and government agencies have different approaches as to whether or not including women in a military means approach to security is sufficient. The contact in the MFA explains that the WPS agenda ‘is not about securitising women’ or ‘mainly about opening military positions to women’. However, as the UN Secretary General’s report from 2015 states:

…Recruiting women to peacekeeping and ensuring that peace and security efforts are gender-responsive is part of what Norway wants to achieve, as it is also stated in our National Action Plan. It is a continuous discussion, it might seem like a profound disagreement, but
at the same time we all agree that women must be involved to make sustainable peace. It is about having all the information we need and gaining access to all the resources that women and men possess together. We agree that it is important to work to achieve political solutions to conflicts, and to do much more to prevent them in the first place. This is at the core of Resolution 1325, and in the Security Council resolutions following (Interview 23 March 2017).

In the quote above the contact in the MFA recognises the perspectives of those actors challenging the notion that the WPS agenda should be about involving Norwegian women in military operations. The Senior Advisor in the MoD adds that the WPS agenda ‘has an enormous transformative force embodied within itself’, as it challenges the status quo (Interview 16 May 2017). The Senior Defence Staff Officer adds that one of the things the WPS agenda helps to transform is the gender composition in the army:

Historically the Norwegian Armed Forces were only men; you could compare us to the Norwegian Church. There you only had male priests as well. We are one of the last male bastions. It is time for change, and we are changing, but at the same time we cannot lose sight of our main tasks and other major changes in our organization. Achieving gender equality is very important, and as a large actor in society we have to contribute. We represent our society, and we have to solve our tasks within that society’ (Interview 18 May 2017)

In October 2014 military service became mandatory for both men and women born in 1997 and later. Norway is the first NATO member state to do so. The integration and implementation of WPS in Norwegian peace and security policy were not the only factor as the push to make the Armed Forces inclusive in terms of gender came from within Norwegian society, and not only from the Security Council. The contact in the MFA adds:

‘In the face of conflict and war, we must do the best job possible. We believe that we are at our best when our peacekeepers represent the population more broadly. We need different ethnicities represented, different religions, socioeconomic backgrounds and last but not least both women and men represented in our peacekeepers. This is about trust and about getting the job done well. We need to use the whole spectrum of our competence in all important spheres, also in peacekeeping.’ (Interview 23 March 2017)
Furthermore, the WPS ‘community’ comprises a relatively small number of individuals in around the UN, in regional organisations and within UN member states. These individuals often consider themselves to be ‘guardians’ of the WPS narrative’ (Tryggestad, 2018). An interviewee says working with the WPS agenda within the MoD and the Armed Forces can be difficult as the agenda is challenged from within the institution. Additionally, as a woman in uniform women’s civil society organisations might be intolerant:

You could say that I was somewhat naïve, because I expected everyone to include gender perspectives in their work, because it is so obvious that the Norwegian Armed Forces should also have a gender perspective. But that was not the case…In addition, some of the people working in peace or pacifist non-governmental organisations were telling us it was their agenda, and that armed interventions did not get better by having women carrying the guns…I know it is about ideology.

The interviewee adds that she has been to public conferences where representatives from pacifist civil society organisations have said that women in uniform look ‘terrible’ or that it is ‘awful to see women in their green combat uniforms’\(^{10}\). Some Norwegian actors, especially those within civil society, argue that including women in the armed forces might offer a great career path for Norwegian women, a challenge for the individual. Yet, it is contradictory to the initial arguments of the civil society organisations pushing for the adoption of Resolution 1325. Rather than preventing conflict itself, Norway is concerned with including women in peace and security policies as they are.

5. 1.4 A Late Intervention?

The women’s movements pushing for the adoption of Resolution 1325 demanded that the prevention of conflict should become a key aspect in the WPS agenda. Even though one could say that the fundamental causes of conflict are not addressed in the Security Council resolutions, as ‘state actors are part of the landscape of conflict, even if admittance of culpability is rare’ (Porter, 2007, p. 11).

\(^{10}\) I have not added the date of the interview here as I do not want the identity of the interviewee to be revealed.
The measures discussed taken by the Norwegian government, can be seen both as gendering security and securitising gender. Gendering security involves introducing ideas regarding gender-sensitive policies and equal representation. While securitising gender proceeds by locating rape and sexual violence in the context of war regulations. Even though these measures are encouraged with reference to women’s vulnerability, they serve to legitimise war and the male soldier, and both approaches depoliticise gender relations. Even though ‘the introduction of ideas of women’s vulnerabilities and gender equality has affected the discourse of security…they occur in a context of previously established ideas of what security is and who women are’ (Jansson & Eduards, 2016, p. 591).

Lippe is one of the Norwegian expert actors interviewed for this thesis that argues for Cohn’s concept of ‘late intervention’. Lippe says that the inclusion of women in the military and the police, as part of the WPS agenda, is an example of how WPS ‘is a debate of already set boundaries’ and an inclusion of gender equality ‘within already set premises’. Furthermore, it shows that WPS is ‘a debate that render harmless the whole thinking about war’ and a simple ‘inclusion of men in the concept of gender’ (Interview 5 April 2017).

The contact in FOKUS argues that if someone had actually watched the record-breaking debate in the UN Security Council in 2015 they would see that ‘most of the debaters said exactly the same thing’ as before. The only difference from before the adoption of Resolution 1325 is that state representatives add that ‘it is very important to include women’. Other than that, the debate and the application of military solutions are the same. Therefore, the WPS agenda is a sort of late intervention (Contact in FOKUS, Interview 2 March 2017).

5.2 The international as universal and the local as particular

Politicians have stressed that Norway has ‘a duty or an obligation’ to spread gender equality policies internationally, as we can help ‘create peace and improve the world’ (Leira, 2013, p. 346). It became evident that Norway should take up the WPS agenda during the 2000s. The WPS agenda was considered a logical continuation of Norway’s emphasis on women internationally, and it could provide Norway with newfound influence in international security policy arenas (Danielsen et al., 2015).
Furthermore, Norwegian foreign policy on WPS, such as the National Action Plan (NAP), is very much about what Norway is doing to strengthen WPS abroad, rather than emphasising what can be done at home.

5.2.1 Fish, oil and gender equality

Norway is successfully exporting fish, oil and gender equality abroad. The spreading of gender equality is a good foreign policy tool according to the Norwegian government. The WPS agenda makes the world, while Norwegian normative power and alliances are strengthened internationally (Danielsen et al., 2015). The expert actors disagree over whether or not there are any downsides to Norway ‘killing two birds with one stone’, and what these potential downsides might be.

The WPS agenda has became ‘a door opener to powerful countries and actors in order to discuss other issues’ according to Tryggestad. When Hillary Clinton was the American Secretary of State, Norwegian diplomats in Washington said that the WPS agenda was the best ‘tool’ they could use when reaching out to the American State Department and administration, with the intent to also discuss more strategically important issues. An example of these dualisms in Norwegian foreign policy is Hillary Clinton’s visit to Norway in 2012. First, Clinton went to a women’s conference in Oslo, and then she visited Tromsø in Northern Norway (Torunn Tryggestad Interview, 14 March 2017). The High-North and Antarctica has been considered ‘Norway’s most important foreign policy area’ since 2005 (Norwegian Government, 2017).

Additionally, Norway is ‘pushing’ the WPS agenda in international spheres where it helps gain influence. Tryggestad adds that Norway is in a sort of competition with other countries, which aims to be the best at WPS. Canada and Norway have already started competing to be one of the next countries elected for the non-permanent seats in the Security Council. Norway has also been competing with Bangladesh to lead the work on WPS in the UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), but lost. ‘For the future of the agenda I think it is good that a country from the South is going to promote the agenda within the UN PBC, and not always these Nordic and ‘like-minded’ countries’ Tryggestad states (Interview 14 March 2017).

The contact in FOKUS emphasise that their impression is that Norway is ‘good at bringing up’ the WPS agenda in spheres where it is already being discussed,
but that ‘it is not very often that they bring it up in situations where it is controversial’. The contact adds:

‘Normatively the Women, Peace and Security Agenda are among the strongest. However, whenever Norway is contributing in an international military operation that is not headed, by let’s say, UN Peacekeeping, they just count heads. In these hard power situations 1325 is not on top of the agenda.’ (Interview 2 March 2017).

Additionally, the contact in IKFF argues that Norwegian foreign policy is, as all other states, striving for power and influence. Moreover, the contact concludes that ‘Norway is a small country that wants a stronger position globally and involvement in peace negotiations is one of the strategies Norway has chosen’. The contact in IKFF, which has also worked in Angola, further, highlights the dualisms in Norwegian foreign policy:

When I was in Angola, Norway made more money on oil in Africa than we gave in development. Everyone would agree that Angola is a corrupt state, as they have the second longest sitting Head of State in Africa: José Eduardo dos Santos. They have massive inequality and poverty… It is obvious that Norway should not invest in Angolan oil when the country is in war, but we did so (Interview 14 March 2017).

Berit von der Lippe argues that the contradictions in Norwegian foreign policy are incorporated into the mind-sets of politicians. Lippe uses the example of Secretary General of NATO Jens Stoltenberg and foreign ministers gathered at a summit in Antalya in 2015 singing ‘We are the world’ together at a stage while being filmed by international media. Lippe argues that the state representatives must believe they are representing the world, and that they are representing the children, because ‘otherwise they would not do it, at least not while being filmed’. Furthermore, ‘they sang it right after the NATO bombing in Libya. How is it possible?’ (Interview 5 April 2017). Lippe emphasises that it is an example of hegemonic discourse, which should be viewed through the lens of power analysis. The quote below highlights that Norway can openly have juxtapositions in its foreign policy as there is always someone out there worse than we are:

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11 ‘We are the World’ is a song and charity single originally recorded by the United Support for Artists (USA) for Africa in 1985.
Who owns the right to the power to define what the hegemonic discourse is? It is a consensus that in NATO we, Norway and NATO, represent the common good… It is someone there that is worse than we are. There are few that envied Soviet communism in its time or that applauds IS and violent extremism in our time. So with that as a latent backdrop, implicit and explicit, makes it easy to go on believing ‘we are the world, we are the children’… In a global context and at least in the West where implicit the comparisons are a lot worse’ (Berit von der Lippe, Interview 5 April 2017)
5.2.2 Home and abroad: Norway’s outward looking approach

Norwegian foreign policy efforts aiming to strengthen the WPS agenda are heavily focused on what Norway can do and is doing to strengthen the normative framework abroad, rather than emphasising what can be done at home. The UN Security Council resolutions on WPS ‘underpins the bulk of actions taken on transnational and national level’ such as member states developing NAPs (Jansson & Eduards, 2016, p. 591). Out of the 74 countries that have developed NAPs, numerous are considered to currently be in conflict by the UN Security Council, examples being the DRC, Sierra Leone and Afghanistan (2017). Yet, the first and most eager UN member states to develop NAPs were Denmark, the UK, Sweden and Norway, which are not considered to be armed conflict-areas by the Security Council. Especially the NAPs developed in Europe and Northern America have an outward looking approach. Tryggestad emphasise that:

The American Action Plan been accused for being very much about white men going out in the world to save brown women. These attitudes have been criticised for having a top-down approach, and being about how ‘we know best’. It has been described as new imperialism (Interview 14 March 2017)

Furthermore, European and Northern European governments have argued that in the case of their own countries, which are not in armed conflict, the WPS agenda is about foreign policy, what they do to help other countries solve conflict and peacebuilding. Especially for a country like Norway, which is also a ‘huge donor’, it is ‘natural’ that the action plans are more outward looking (Torunn Tryggestad, Interview 14 March 2017). The contact at FOKUS argues that the Norwegian NAP, just like the American NAP, is under fire from civil society organisations in Norway. The NAP ‘is not about making a peaceful society at home, the only point which covers domestic affairs is the compulsory conscription for women in the military’ (Interview 2 March 2017).

State Secretary Laila Bokhari argued at the Coordination Meeting in the MFA that the WPS agenda in many ways is ‘moving home’, due to smaller gaps between domestic and international policies and current events such as mass migration to
Europe (Meeting 1 March 2017)\textsuperscript{12}. Referring to the coordination meeting, the contact at FOKUS argues that when talking about bringing the agenda home Bokhari ‘talks about female migrants’, and does not look at ‘our domestic procedures’. The WPS agenda ‘will only be used in relations to female immigrants, refugees and so on… and will not be about looking at Norwegian society in any way’. The contact at FOKUS further argues that even though Norway is not a country in armed conflict at home, politicians could use the agenda at home as well. ‘We could have used the agenda to look at violence against women or for instance weapon storage, but we do not include that. We are also thinking that the agenda is about what happens abroad’ (Interview 2 March 2017).

\textbf{5.2.2.1 Local and global}

There is awareness among the expert actors that the Norwegian NAP mixes different levels of analysis, as it treats the local experiences of women as a global security issues. The contact at Norad emphasises:

\begin{quote}
What I believe is that by making this into a global norm, which is what happens in the making of these Security Council resolutions, the issue is pulled away from the local context and into an overall general problem the world has to solve (Interview 23 March 2017).
\end{quote}

The contact at Norad worries about what the NAP can actually achieve as it is ‘extremely challenging to achieve anything in war’, and ‘often you do not achieve anything when it comes to aid and development’. Furthermore, ‘In a conflict situation we are often not present with any of our actors such as embassy personnel’. The actor further emphasises that the lack of diplomatic missions on the ground in conflict situations affects the spheres Norway is aiming to influence, as it is hard to find ‘an area in which we can influence’. As a result, the contact at Norad argues that Norway mostly works with the WPS agenda in ‘negotiation delegations’ during armed conflict (Interview 23 March 2017).

\textsuperscript{12} Bokhari said ‘WPS agendaen flytter på mange måter hjem’ in Norwegian. The translation of the quote is not confirmed with Bokhari.
Several of the expert actors underline that the WPS agenda is lacking ownership locally in conflict-zones and that the agenda is being pushed from the outside, often by Western states. The contact at FOKUS says that to its member organisations and partners, issues of CRSV and lack of women in decision making is usually not being discussed as WPS issues locally. ‘The discussion of global norms is not a very important discussion when making programs with grass roots women’ the contact concludes (Interview 2 March 2017). Additionally, the contact in Norad says that there is little local ownership to the WPS agenda in Afghanistan among locals, except from within civil society organisations. In Afghanistan the WPS is viewed as an international type of commitment rather than a local commitment (Interview 23 March 2017).

Berit von der Lippe argues that the NAP is shaped by who it is about; the foreign rather than the national sphere. It is about ‘the other and not us’ she says, as ‘we would never talk about ourselves in this way’ (Interview 5 April 2017). The NAP is an example of ‘the white women’s burden’ as the Norwegian government does not manage to see who they are representing (Interview 5 April). The government uses a specific gender-equality rhetoric, or a specific feminist rhetoric…in order to mobilize support for war’ (B. v. d. Lippe, 2012, p. 19). However, ‘They are in a post-colonial hegemonic thinking which is wrapped into a gender equality blanket’ Lippe concludes (Interview 5 April 2017). The Senior Advisor in the MoD disputes Lippe and stresses that the NAP ‘is part of an international project’, and that ‘Yes it contains words… Words are a tool used in politics to achieve action’ (Interview 16 May 2017).

5.3 Empowerment and Structural Change

The WPS agenda ‘constructs a link between social (gender) change and political (conflict) transformation in mainstream international policy’ (Pratt & Richter-Devrooe, 2011, p. 490). Moreover, state officials and representatives of international organisations have argued that the adoption of Resolution 1325 was ‘not only about women’ but ‘an agenda for change’, based on the historic lesson ‘that we cannot be at peace as long as everyone is not included’ (Schultz, 2017). The WPS agenda is fixated on women and girls in ‘formulations as well as implementation’

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13 These quotes are from Ambassador Marriët Schuurman the NATO Secretary General’s Special Representative for Women, Peace and Security since 2014.
(Pratt & Richter-Devroe, 2011). The Norwegian National Action Plan is also heavily women focused, even though it mentions the need to support both ‘women and men’ in conflict situations (The Norwegian Ministries, 2015). Is the profound focus on women and girls eliminating a more critical discussion of power relations and should other marginalised actors be included in the agenda?

5.3.1 Women and Girls

As previously mentioned, Resolution 1325 is considered a landmark document as it promises to protect women’s rights and guarantees their equal participation in peace processes (Cohn, 2008). The actors’ interviewed for this thesis acknowledge the focus on women and girls in Resolution 1325 and in the WPS agenda overall, but disagree over whether or not it is necessary to prioritise women over other marginalised groups in conflict prevention and peace-building. Furthermore, the Norwegian expert actors focus on different aspects in their discussions of the role of women.

The contact at FOKUS acknowledges that the organisation does not work much with men in their work, as they are a women’s umbrella organisation, yet they consider it ‘very important to include men, and to get them on the team’. A project FOKUS had in South Sudan ‘ended up including men who already agree with the agenda’. Also, the contact at FOKUS says that it is often difficult to include women in male occupied spheres such as decision making, and that is where FOKUS aims to make a change. ‘In South Sudan when they are going to include women, they bring someone’s wife. It is an example of blindly counting heads’ (Contact in FOKUS, 2 March 2017). FOKUS’ Executive Director underscores that woman’s lives in conflict are still not taken seriously in conflict-affected areas almost 20 years after the atrocities in Bosnia Herzegovina. The focus on women might seem overwhelming in theory. However, the mass rapes and sexual violence women in Bosnia experienced during the war in the 1990s sparked the adoption of Resolution 1325. These women have still not gotten reparation nor help from the international community (Lindstad, 2015). The Senior Advisor in the MoD supports the arguments of FOKUS, ‘I think we are not there yet internationally. Women are still targeted in war in a very special way, which I think justifies the special focus on women’ (Interview 16 May 2017).
The contact in Norad emphasise that ‘Discussions of power are almost non-existent’ in the WPS agenda (Interview 23 March 2017). The contact in IKFF argues that governments focus on women as victims by mainly dealing with CRSV, rather than the representation-side to the agenda, which is about changing power relations:

It is harder to get a focus on the active representation element of 1325, because this is the part which is most relevant to changing power relations and structures. Of course, violence against women is a symbol of powerlessness… But one of the things that can increase women’s power on a long-term basis is women’s active participation in society. This implies that women’s participation cannot be seen as a short-term issue only related to the actual peace negotiations – but as a long term one. An example being participation in political processes (Interview 14 March 2017).

Tryggestad highlights the focus on women and girls in Resolution 1325, and the use of the term gender in an UN context:

Past the term gender mainstreaming, women are the ones referred to in Resolution 1325. Women, women, women! Women and girls! In the beginning it was necessary to make women visible. Women had been overlooked and marginalised. So back then it was about lifting women up on the agenda, and showing that they are much more than victims in war. Now, we are more interested in understanding gender, the term gender. Now the term gender is equal to the term women in an UN context (Interview 14 March 2017).

PRIO decided to call their research centre a Centre for Gender, Peace and Security rather than a centre for Women, Peace and Security. They choose the name to broaden the scope of their research and their co-operators. ‘We want to work with gender, in the true meaning of the word, as something relational that involves both men and women’. ‘We cannot achieve our goals in regards to empowerment and gender equality without working with both men and women’ (Torunn Tryggestad, Interview 14 March 2017). ‘Gender equality is a problematic term’ says Berit von der Lippe, ‘Equal with whom? With the interest of whom? What interest?’ (Interview 5 April 2017). The contact at Norad is also concerned with the lack of discussions of
The contact in the MFA says that ‘applying a gender perspective also means taking a closer look at the gender roles of men’ (Interview 23 March 2017).

5.3.2 Women, Peace and Security for All?

As the interviewees have pointed out the use of ‘gender’ in the WPS agenda means ‘women’. This becomes even clearer in the Norwegian governments policies on transgender people. Lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender, as well as other (LGBT+) communities face extreme human rights abuses including violence, lack of access to basic health care throughout the world (Ayoub, 2015). Comprehensive data on hate crimes and state-sponsored violence against LGBT+ people is non-existent in a lot of countries, yet LGBT+ people are targeted both in countries that are considered to be in armed conflict and countries that are considered to be in peace by the Security Council (Banning-Lover, 2017).

In addition to the Norwegian NAP on WPS, the MFA also has an Action Plan for Women’s Rights and Gender Equality in Foreign and Development Policy for 2016-2020. This Action Plan is not concerned with the topic of Peace and Security per-se, but does mention issues such as ‘sustainable peace’, ‘terrorism’ and ‘women’s political and economic empowerment’ (2016). Furthermore, as this Action Plan deals with Gender Equality it is a valid source of information when it comes to dealing with how MFA and Norad deals with the concepts of gender and women.

The Action Plan mentions ‘transgender women’ twice. First, in a section dealing with the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDG):

This means that we need to focus more on inclusion and non-discrimination of women in fragile situations, as well as marginalised groups of women such as women with disabilities, indigenous women, and lesbian, bisexual and transgender women (p. 6).

The action plan also mentions transgender women in the subsection ‘Outcome 5.2 International acceptance for sexual rights and right to abortion’. Norway needs to:

Take a cross-regional approach to protecting the human rights of lesbian, bisexual and transgender women, and ensuring equal treatment in legislation and in practice (p. 28).
These two examples illustrate how Norwegian foreign policy is actually talking about women, when using the term gender. Furthermore, they raise the question of what a ‘transgender women’ is. Is a transgender women targeted because she is a women, or because she challenges notions of male and female? The interviewees where asked what they think of the example, as it raises questions of what dealing with gender means to them.

Tryggestad believe the people who wrote the action plan have a ‘traditional background in terms of working with women and gender equality issues within Norad’ (Interview 14 March 2017). Most likely they just wrote about transgender women, and not transgender men or those that are transgender in general, because it is an action plan about women. Berit von der Lippe says ‘every time they talk about gender it has to be about women; Women, women, women. So this transgender example you are asking me about, it is an extreme example of how gender is always about women’ (Interview 5 April 2017).

Furthermore, the question of transgender women brings up another debate. How inclusive should the WPS agenda be? At the International Women’s Day in March 2017 the weekly Norwegian newspaper Morgenbladet ran the question ‘Feminism for all? New minorities wants to be part of the women’s rights movement.’ all over its front page (Appendix 6). In the article following the newspaper asked, if feminism should also include and take responsibility for the struggles of Muslims, transsexual communities and the disabled? Even though the expert actors claim the WPS agenda is not a feminist agenda, but rather an agenda for making more peaceful societies, it is clear that debates of intersectionality and third-wave feminism have been discussed within the WPS community as well. Tryggestad says the debate is especially prominent in feminist oriented academic communities, where they have strong awareness of LGBT+ rights, but that these types of issues are not broadly discussed within mainstream IR ‘at all’. Also, ‘this is very much a hornet’s nest’ Tryggestad adds. The WPS agenda is about lifting up 50 per cent of the world’s population, which also involves lesbian women etc. To start dividing women into subcategories might be the next step for the agenda once it becomes stronger, ‘or

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14 *Morgenbladet* means ‘the morning paper’.

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maybe someone else has to fight for that cause’ (Interview 14 March 2017).

Furthermore, Tryggestad adds:

In many countries it is very hard to work with the Women, Peace and Security Agenda in the first place. So if we are going to add the rights of gay, lesbian and transgender people we could just forget about it all, because it is so extremely controversial in many settings.

Additionally:

The most important part about 1325 is to get a foothold, with these types of perspectives in hard power security forums like the UN and NATO, where the actors are involved in international peace and security. It is about gender mainstreaming and understanding gender roles in the societies you are entering. How war and conflicts affects women and men differently. LGBT rights are subcategories somewhere underneath these perspectives. And we still have an incredibly long way to go to make women visible, and to make women visible as political actors’ (Tryggestad, Interview 14 March 2017).

The contact in the MFA also claims that the WPS agenda is too vulnerable to include other marginalised and often controversial communities. The contact says:

It might at times be an advantage for the strongest group out of the weak to move ahead alone. Often it will be an advantage for the weakest of the weak groups to be together with the strongest group (Contact at the MFA, Interview 23 March 2017).

However, the contact at the MFA says that the women’s movement needs to show solidarity with other marginalised communities. Furthermore, many women peacemakers are often quick to include the gay community in the WPS community. ‘These are Muslim women, Christian women, women from the Middle East, North Africa, Asia. It appears to be less controversial than many might anticipate. They talk about women’s rights and LGBT rights in the same breath’ (Interview 23 March 2017). However:

We should be careful when putting agendas, which are meeting a lot of resistance together. The Women, Peace and Security Agenda has large support at this stage. It might be able to bear some resistance, but we must be smart and strategic (Interview 23 March 2017).

Several of the Norwegian Expert Actors point to the tensions in the WPS Agenda ‘between highlighting the significance of women’s agency in peace and
security and failing to address structural factors that may constrain women’s agency’ (Pratt & Richter-Devroe, 2011, p. 494). The Norwegian NAP is limited to the context of peace and conflict, rather than the divisions of power. The contact at Norad argues that women’s issues should not necessarily be treated in a vacuum:

The women’s movement will most likely disagree with me, but I am not convinced that we should work on women’s issues in a separate vacuum, instead of working with broader issues of rights where we bring in a larger discussion of power. No matter which suppressed groups we are talking about, I think we need a larger discussion of the fundamental structures.’ (Contact at Norad, Interview 23 March 2017)

Also;

It is a lot about those with power and those without power. You can end up getting more and more women into decision making without actually changing the structures. That is why it is so important to get past this male-female representation, and ask what we can do about the fundamental power structures. So many have been excluded, not only women.’ (Contact at Norad, Interview 23 March 2017)

5.4 Discussion of Main Findings: Are Contestations strengthening?

Discussing the contestations of the WPS normative framework could potentially strengthen the agenda. Some argue that discussion of the contestations draws attention to the limitations of the agenda, which are considered weakening. Such as the lack of implementation, and pressure from those not agreeing with the aims of the agenda. When studying contestations the analysis is also drawn towards the adaptability of the WPS agenda and how it has been contested since the drafting and adoption of Resolution 1325. Furthermore, a norm being contested is not a synonym to being weak or fragile. The WPS agenda is contested as the actors feeling ownership to the agenda are diverse and belong to different organisations and agencies. Focusing on contestations of the agenda involves all these different actors in the analysis, rather than a limited analysis, which only includes a few narratives portraying the WPS agenda as a broadly accepted and uncontested norm among actors in IR. An analysis of contestations stresses the making of a norm, which means tracking down what sorts of power at work, rather than viewing norms as static (Enloe, 2008) Lastly, the actors working with the WPS agenda are not a ‘giant sisterhood’, but engaged in a highly contested normative framework (Nancy Fraser at
the talk ‘Feminism after Hillary’, 31 May 2017). Debates among those working to strengthen the agenda should be welcomed as it could push the WPS agenda forward. Therefore, the WPS agenda is not fragile, even though it is still in the making.

The Global Study states (2015):

The world has changed since the Security Council adopted resolution 1325 in October 2000. The nature of conflict in certain regions is qualitatively different, the content of what we mean by ‘peace’ and ‘security’ is evolving, and the understanding of what we mean by ‘justice’ has also transformed. This ever-changing and ever evolving reality poses major dilemmas for the four pillars of Security Council resolution 1325 and its subsequent resolutions: the pillars of prevention, protection, participation, and peacebuilding and recovery (p. 15).

The quote above argues that the world in which we live and the UN operates in is not the same as it was in October 2000. Conflicts have changed and understandings of fundamental concepts have evolved. Unsurprisingly, the WPS normative framework has also transformed. The findings of this project demonstrate that the agenda was never static, but has been evolving since the beginning.

Government officials speeches addressing the WPS agenda has been criticised for oversimplifying and for being ‘impossible to believe’, also in Norway (Cohn, 2008, p. 200). This chapter has shown that the expert actors working with the WPS agenda are aware of and discusses the dilemmas and contestations embedded within the agenda. A bigger emphasise on the contestations of the WPS agenda, could make the agenda more inclusive to other actors as it welcomes different opinions and views. Berit von der Lippe says:

I am tired of being in opposition and not being invited to closed rooms… My perspective is treated as it does not exist, and it is just looked upon as rhetoric’s (Interview, 5 April 2017).

The WPS agenda is contested partly because of the diverse range of actors working on it. In Norway four ministries, including the MFA, MoD, non-state actors and researchers has ownership to the agenda and want to advance it. These actors have disagreements among, and within themselves, as the agenda is ‘being constantly negotiated’ (Baumgart-Ochse, Glaab, Smith, & Smythe, 2017). I would like to finish
this discussion with a quote from the contact in Norad. The interviewee encourages all actors to discuss the dilemmas of the WPS agenda:

It is important to discuss the dilemmas… We are all living in a world full of dilemmas with few set answers. Therefore, the biggest hazard is if we lack discussions of the dilemmas... I have accepted these dilemmas by working in this industry, and I accept that these issues are important even though there are dilemmas. The dilemmas are the reason why I wanted to work with this to begin with, so I wish we could discuss them even more’ (Interview 23 March 2017).

5.5 Summary of the main findings

The objective of this thesis has been to identity the main contestations of the WPS agenda among Norwegian expert actors. Additionally, this thesis has aimed to argue that the contestations of the WPS normative framework is part of strengthening the agenda as it shines light on the adoptability of the agenda and the diverse group of state and non-state actors with ownership to the agenda.

First, chapter four gave a short introduction to the WPS agenda, which mainly focused in UNSCR 1325 and the seven Security Council Resolutions following. Then, the chapter argued that the WPS normative framework has been contested since the adoption of UNSCR 1325. Civil society organisations pushed for the Security Council to involve the experiences of women in peace and security, and a broad range of state and non-state actors feels ownership to the agenda and has applied to their own work. The WPS agenda is distinct in international relations as the actors with ownership to the agenda ranks from the women’s pacifist peace organisations WILPF to the NATO military alliance. Therefore, the WPS agenda might be more disposed to contestation that other normative frameworks. Furthermore, chapter four gave an overview of the key organisations and institutions working with the WPS agenda in Norway. The section was also an introduction to the work places of the interviewees in this study.

The WPS agenda area is not only challenged by those not supporting that the experiences of women in armed conflict should be considered a security issue, but also from within the communities working to enhance the issue. Chapter five argued that the WPS agenda could be understood as a contested normative framework based on three main dualisms within the Norwegian expert community. These dualisms are described as ‘security versus development’ (1), ‘the international as universal and the
The chapter argued that the Norwegian actors have different views of each of these issue areas. However, this thesis does not believe that any of the expert actors can be categorised as only having one perspectives on each of these issues, but that they show awareness of the different debates within the agenda. The actors are often dragged between the different arguments as part of the contestation process.

First, the section security versus development (1) claims that the work places of the actors interviewed differ in their view on military means in order to obtain peace. Roughly, the non-state actors interviewed have a development approach to security and the state actors also have a military approach to security. The Norwegian ministries puts the WPS agenda within an already established understanding of security, while the civil society actors wants the WPS agenda to transform the ways in which security is approached which involves moving away from the heavily focus on state security, towards human security. Furthermore, the invasion in Afghanistan is one of the most discussed applications of Resolution 1325 within the ‘status quo’ understanding of security, as NATO member states partly legitimised the invasion by claiming they wanted to enhance the lives of women. Again, the experts underline different aspects of the invasion. Additionally, Norwegian WPS policies involves including women in the Armed Forces and to increase the share of female troops in international missions and operations. The Armed Forces has been, and is still one of the most male dominated government institutions in Norway. Furthermore, one of the actors interviewed argues that it can be challenging working with gender policies in the Armed Forces as there is resistance from within the work place, and from outside by some of the women’s organisations. Some actors view the adoption of WPS within the Norwegian ministries as ‘a late intervention’, because it leaves the system of war intact, in exchange for involving women in the system as it is (Cohn, 2008).

The second contestation of the WPS agenda discussed in this thesis is the international as universal and the local as particular (2). The section stresses the dualism between Norway’s expression of WPS as a duty to help women in other countries, and the self-interest Norway has in doing so. Norway is getting international recognition for its work with gender equality nationally and internationally. The expert actors question whether or not Norway can claim to represent the common good internationally. Additionally, Norway has an outward-looking approach when dealing with WPS. The agenda is not considered to be about
making a peaceful society at home, but about working with WPS internationally. The expert actors challenge the notions of local and global in the WPS normative framework.

The third contestation of the WPS agenda is empowerment and structural change (3). The section looks into the Norwegian expert actors understandings of the terms gender and women. The section also discusses if the heavy focus on women and girls in the WPS agenda eliminates a more critical discussion of power relations. The expert actors differ when discussing whether or not other marginalised groups in conflict should be included in the WPS agenda.

The third section of this chapter offers a brief discussion of how the contestations of the WPS normative framework strengthens or weakens the agenda with focus on strengthening factors.

The fifth section of chapter five reflected upon the overall findings of this project. The section aimed to highlight how the contestations of the WPS normative framework strengthens or weakens the agenda.
Chapter 6: Conclusion

This thesis has studied the WPS agenda as a contested norm in international politics. With the aim to make sense of the ‘different worlds’ Norwegian expert actors working to strengthening the WPS normative framework views the agenda through. By studying contestations and dualisms in the WPS agenda, this thesis digs into the making and power relations embedded within a norm.

The thesis has argued that the WPS agenda is a contested normative framework in international politics, not only among those working to weaken the agenda, but also among those working to strengthen it. The Norwegian expert actors interviewed are addressing the contestation of the WPS agenda from vastly different standpoints and knowledge bases, as there are competing discourses of what the WPS agenda is really trying to achieve and the ways in which to get there.

First, in order to identity the points of contestation within the Norwegian expert community this thesis investigated norm literature and critical feminist perspectives in IR. The theory chapter concludes that all norms are contested, as norms are not static, but adoptable works-in-progress that are constantly reshaped. As such, the WPS agenda is in the making, and will stay in the making as new events and discussions take place and actors add to the agenda. Furthermore, critical feminist scholar’s discussions of IR and norm contestation were also brought into the second chapter as they question notions of knowledge, and bring women into international politics. Additionally, critical feminist perspectives underline the making of any policy, as it aims to track down the sorts of power at work. The WPS agenda is not suddenly there, but the result of certain reproduced power relations.

The methodological chapter outlined the research design and ethics of this study. A feminist researcher should aim to be open of biases and recognise that no knowledge is value-free. The main challenge of this study was agreeing on the quotes with the interviewees. However, this difficulty added to the findings and gave me a deeper understanding of research ethics.

The WPS normative framework differs from other UN Security Council agendas as a broad range of actors feels ownership to it. Civil society organisations pushed for the Security Council to acknowledge that women’s experiences in war challenged international peace and security. After the adoption of Security Council Resolution 1325 they took a watchdog role with in regards to the implementation of
the WPS normative framework. Despite the involvement of civil society organisations in the making and adaption of the WPS agenda, the agenda is focused on the actions of UN member states, for instance through National Action Plans. In Norway, the work with the WPS agenda is confined within four ministries, and civil society actors are trying to influence the government, while also protesting it and trying to add different perspectives into the agenda.

This thesis argues that the WPS Agenda can be understood as a norm in contestation based on three main debates. The contestations are security versus development (1), the international as universal and the local as particular (2), and lastly structural change and empowerment (3). The first contestation discussed is the negotiation between securitisation and development. Civil society organisations in particular argue that state actors have wrongly securitised women’s issues, for instance in Afghanistan. While the state actors says a topic will be dealt with as a security issue once it is on the agenda of the Security Council.

Secondly, critical feminist perspectives are interested in what they consider artificial boundaries between private and public spheres. The WPS agenda advances this discussion by making the local experiences of women in armed conflict into a global security issue. This section emphasises the Norwegian National Action Plan on WPS (NAP), and argues that Norway has an outward looking approach, which involves working to enhance the lives of women in armed conflict areas, while also strengthening Norway’s alliances with powerful partners.

The discussion of empowerment and structural change is the last contestation of the WPS agenda discussed in this thesis. The expert actors have different views of the strain on women and girls in the WPS agenda, and whether it eliminates a more critical discussion of power relations when working for peace.

It was unexpected that the Norwegian actors would have such different approaches to the WPS agenda, whilst simultaneously working alongside each other to strengthen WPS nationally and internationally. However, the expert actors portray the agenda as fragile in many aspects, and several actors were apprehensive towards openly discussing the WPS agenda as contested.

This thesis was limited by my biases as a researcher and weight on certain perspectives over others. For instance has this thesis not focused on the lack of implementation, funding and report mechanisms of the WPS agenda on a national and international level, which many of the actors stressed when discussing the WPS
agenda. I wanted to focus on ideological debates rather than lack of funding and so on. Additionally, the interview guides were based on discussions within critical feminist IR theory, which most likely also affected the type of discussions the interviewees and I ended up having.

The resources available, as well as my experiences as a researcher also limited the work of this thesis. As the thesis is focused on Norwegian expert actors, future research could bring in the perspectives of other actors, such as those working abroad at embassies and in peacekeeping operations. It would also be useful to bring in the perspectives of several individuals from the same work place (for instance the MFA or FOKUS) in order to see how contested the WPS agenda is within one organisation.

In order to conclude the discussions in this thesis I would like to suggest that the Norwegian expert community working to strengthen the WPS agenda, should keep the agenda in the making by involving different perspectives. Rather than viewing contestations of the agenda as a weakness, the actors could more openly discuss and display their awareness of the dualisms of the WPS agenda, as I believe it leads to a more nuanced debate and awareness of the issues facing the agenda.
Sources


Deitelhoff, N., & Zimmermann, L. (2013). Things we lost in the fire: How different types of contestation affect the validity of international norms. *Retrieved from*


Holtfodt, M., & Wilde, A. (2016). *Norway*. Retrieved from https://www.google.no/search?q=Magnus+Holtfodt+(FOKUS+%E2%80%93+Forum+for+Women+and+Development)+on+behalf+of+FORUM+Norway+13251+and+Alexandra+Wilde+(CARE+Norway)&oq=Magnus+Holtfodt+(FOR OKUS+%E2%80%93+Forum+for+Women+and+Development)+on+behalf+of+FORUM+Norway+13251+and+Alexandra+Wilde+(CARE+Norway)&aqs=chrome.69i57.364j0j7&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8


Lindstad, G. (2015). I survived the war, but how can I survive peace?. *Women United*


Appendix

1. Interview guide
2. Example of interview guide (Norwegian)
3. Overview of informants
4. Talks and events attended
5. Resolution 1325
Appendix 1: Interview guide

NAME/ WORKPLACE/ POSITION/ ROLE IN REGARDS TO WPS
(TIME AND PLACE OF THE INTERVIEW)

Short summary of the person

Short introduction of my thesis in order to find out if the person has some questions about the project before we start.

PART 1: INTRODUCTION:
1. Ask for permission to conduct the interview.
2. Ask to record the interview.
3. Emphasise that I am looking for opinions and thoughts on the topics discussed.

PART 2: THE PERSONS WORK WITH THE WPS AGENDA
1. Asking questions about the persons work.
2. Asking questions about the organisation the person works in with regards to WPS.
3. Follow-up questions in regards to what the person is telling me.

PART 3: Themes
1. Is the WPS agenda a norm?
2. Do you think there are any boundaries to the WPS agenda? If so, what are these boundaries?

PART 4: CASE STUDIES THAT CHALLENGE THE BOUNDARIES OF THE WPS AGENDA.
1. The Norwegian action plan. Anything you would like to add to it? Should the action plan be more concerned with what is happening inside Norway?
2. Columbia (Peace process, Nobel Peace Price speech)
3. The war in Afghanistan and the use of 1325 (Berit Von Der Lippe)
4. Carol Cohn 1325 is a ‘late intervention’.
5. Gibbings ‘No angry women at the UN’.
6. Feminism for all?
   Morgenbladet ‘Should Norwegian women take responsibility for the struggle of muslims, the transsexual community and the disabled?'

PART 5: ENDING
1. Is there anything you would like to add?
2. Is there anyone you think I should talk to?
3. Ask the person again if they want anonymity now that the interview is conducted. Ask if they want me to send the text to them before the thesis is submitted.
Appendix 2: Example of interview guide in Norwegian

Senior Advisor in Norad
(Norad, 23 Mars 2017)

Norad: Direktoratet for utviklingssamarbeid og norsk bistand.

Om oppgaven min:
1) FNs kvinner, fred og sikkerhetsagenda som en norm med rammer og grenser. En norm 'in the making'. Jeg er interessert i hva som er innenfor og utenfor normen. Som språk, tematikk og kanskje for politisk? Er det temaer som blir tatt opp i normen?
2) Norske eksperter og deres rolle.

Introduksjon
1. Be om samtykke og si at personen kan anonymiseres i oppgaven hvis du ønsker det.
2. Spørre om å ta opp intervjuet.
3. Forklare hva oppgaven min ser på.
4. Vektlegg at jeg ønsker tanker og meninger rundt temaene.

Del 1
1. Hvordan arbeider du med kvinner, fred og sikkerhetsagendaen?
2. Hva er Norad sin rolle i agendaen?
   - Finansiering: nyttet det?
3. Oppfølgingsspørsmål og eventuelt spørsommål om eventuelt andre aktører som har blitt nevnt i samtale (UD, NGOer, forskere).

Del 2: Begreper og temaer
4. Hvor enige opplever du at norske aktører er om kvinner, fred og sikkerhetsagendaen?
5. Er kvinner, fred og sikkerhetsagendaen en norm?
6. Har normen rammer? I så fall, hvilke rammer ser du til agendaen?

Del 3: Eksempler og diskusjon
1. Norges handlingsplan
   - Er det noe du eller Norad ønsker å legge til?
2. Krigen i Afghanistan og bruken av 1325.
4. Carol Cohn hevder at 1325 er en 'sen intervensjon’. Er du enig, eller uenig?
5. Morgenbladets diskusjonen om den fjerde bølgen av feminisme. Må kvinnebevegelsen (1325) plutselig ta ansvar for kampen til muslimer, transseksuelle og funksjonshemmede?

Avslutning
1. Er det noe du ønsker å legge til?
2. Er det noen du tror jeg kan ha nytte av å snakke med?
Appendix 3: Overview of informants

All the interviews were conducted in Norwegian. I recorded all the interviews, transcribed them and translated key sections to English. Except from the two researchers, all the interviewees are anonymous. The discussions brought up by the interviewees, and the insight into the workplace of the interviewees is more important than their identity.

In addition to the eight main interviewees I had informal discussions with four informants. These four informants provided me with background knowledge and ideas for discussions to bring up in the thesis. Therefore they deserve to be mentioned. The first informant is employed as a diplomat in the MFA, and works with women’s issues and corruption. The second informant is a program manager at Wilpf International stationed in Geneva. The third informant works in an international human rights organisation in Oslo and is specialises in women’s issues. The forth informant is a student at the Norwegian Military Academy, and deepened me understanding of the Norwegian army and Norway’s international operations.

We also discussed his experiences with gender training in the military.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Name or title in text</th>
<th>Org.</th>
<th>Title and responsibilities</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2 March</td>
<td>Contact in FOKUS</td>
<td>FOKUS</td>
<td>The title of this contact is executive officer. Coordinator for the national civil society forum on WPS in Norway, and country coordinator in FOKUS. The interviewee is a programme coordinator in Forum for Women and Development (FOKUS) and Coordinator of FORUM Norway 1325 which is the national civil society forum for WPS in Norway.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 March</td>
<td>Torunn Tryggestad</td>
<td>PRIO</td>
<td>Torunn Tryggestad is the director of the PRIO Centre on Gender, Peace and Security, as well as senior researcher at PRIO. Tryggestad is also the Norwegian representative to the civil society group working on gender in NATO. Tryggestad is currently working on an Oxford Handbook on Women, Peace and Security.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 March</td>
<td>Contact in IKFF</td>
<td>WILPF Norway</td>
<td>This interviewee is the leader in IKFF, the Norwegian Section of the NGO Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF). The interviewee also works as a consultant and has previously worked for the UN in Angola.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 March</td>
<td>Contact in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>The Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>The ‘Women, Peace and Security Agenda’ is among the tasks this contact deals with in the MFA.</td>
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<tr>
<td>23 March</td>
<td>Contact in Norad</td>
<td>NORAD</td>
<td>Senior Advisor in Norad. This interviewee is anonymous. This</td>
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</table>
The interviewee spends most of their time working on the WPS Agenda. Their role is to give advice to MFA and the embassies, as well as custom-made advice on WPS to other sections of Norad. Most of the advice is comments on global processes and actors. Examples of such actors are UN Women and the World Bank. The interviewee’s department gives advice both on headquarter level, country level and the local level.

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<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Company</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5 April</td>
<td>Berit Von Der Lippe</td>
<td>BI</td>
<td>Berit Von der Lippe is a professor in rhetoric at BI Norwegian Business School, a researcher and author. Her main publications are articles and books about language and power, political rhetoric’s, foreign policy and gender.</td>
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<tr>
<td>16 May</td>
<td>Senior Advisor in the Ministry of Defence</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence</td>
<td>The interviewee is a Senior Advisor in the Norwegian Ministry of Defence, and defines their job as being about the ‘female recruitment side’ of the Ministry and ‘translating policies, such as the National Action Plan on WPS, into practical tasks’ in the Norwegian Armed Forces. In addition to implementing the law on conscription in the armed forces, this interviewee has been part of drafting two of the Norwegian National Action Plans on WPS. This interviewee also attends the yearly meeting of NATO’s Committee on Gender Perspectives.</td>
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<tr>
<td>18 May</td>
<td>Senior Defence Staff Officer</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence</td>
<td>This interviewee is anonymous and is a Senior Staff Officer at the Norwegian Defence Staff. This interviewee works with implementing UN SCR 1325 in the Ministry of Defence and the Norwegian Armed Forces as one of their main tasks. This interviewee is also doing research at the Norwegian Defence University College.</td>
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</table>
## Appendix 4: Talks and events attended

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title:</th>
<th>Organiser:</th>
<th>Date:</th>
<th>Where:</th>
<th>Talkers and roles if needed:</th>
<th>Open to the public:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Violence against women in war and conflict</td>
<td>JURK</td>
<td>5 December 2016</td>
<td>The House of Literature, Oslo</td>
<td>Joanna Nicholson, Ragnhild Dybdahl, Andrea Gustafsson Grønningsæter,</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>The conflict in Syria:</td>
<td>NUPI</td>
<td>9 January 2017</td>
<td>Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Oslo</td>
<td>Robert Mood</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Coordination meeting in the MFA between the ministries, NGOs and research groups.</td>
<td>MFA</td>
<td>1 March 2017</td>
<td>MFA, Oslo</td>
<td>Government actors and NGOs working with the WPS agenda in Norway. About 60 participants. Dag Nylander (Head Norwegian diplomatic team to Columbia)</td>
<td>No. You need an invitatio n.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s rights in crisis and conflict</td>
<td>MFA</td>
<td>8 March</td>
<td>The Nobel Peace Centre, Oslo</td>
<td>The Minister of Foreign Affairs Børge Brende. Representatives’ from Save the Children, Norwegian Church Aid, CARE Norway, The Norwegian Refugee Council. Discussant: Laila Bokhari</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s participation in conflict solutions and peace work.</td>
<td>OKF (Oslo Kvinnesaksforening), Wilpf Oslo</td>
<td>16 March</td>
<td>Eldorado bookstore, Oslo</td>
<td>Main speakers: Tormod Heier (MoD) Torunn Tryggestad (PRIO) Marita Sørheim-Rensvik (MFA) Discussants: Liss Schanke (WILPF) Bjørg Ofstad (OKF)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Event Title</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Additional Details</td>
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<tr>
<td>Youth, Peace and Security</td>
<td>LNU</td>
<td>4 april</td>
<td>The House of Volunteering, Oslo</td>
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<tr>
<td>Veivalg i Norsk utenriks og sikkerhetspolitikk (Cross roads I Norwegian foreign and security policy)</td>
<td>MFA and the Norwegian Parliament</td>
<td>20 April</td>
<td>The House of Culture, Oslo</td>
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<td>Yes.</td>
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<td>Introductory speakers: The Minister of Foreign Affairs Børge Brende</td>
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<td>The Minister of Defence Ine Eriksen Søreide.</td>
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<td>Discussants: Kate Hansen Bundt, Den norske Atlanterhavskomité</td>
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<td>John-Mikal Størdal, (Forsvarets forskningsinstitutt)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Ulf Sverdrup (Norsk utenrikspolitisk institutt)</td>
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<td>Moderator: Christian Borch</td>
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<tr>
<td>A gender perspective on demography and conflicts</td>
<td>Norad and the Research Council of Norway</td>
<td>27 April</td>
<td>Norad, Oslo</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Researchers from Norway and abroad.</td>
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<td>Yes.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Do Muslim women need saving?</td>
<td>KIFO, SAI, TF (UiO), SKOK and UIB. Funded by the Fritt Ord Foundation.</td>
<td>2 May</td>
<td>The House of Literature, Oslo</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Introduction: Nefissa Naguib</td>
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<td>Main speaker: Lila Abu-Lughod</td>
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<td>Yes.</td>
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<tr>
<td>The Hidden Weapon of war</td>
<td>Norwegian Church Aid</td>
<td>4 May</td>
<td>Nobel Peace Centre, Oslo.</td>
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<td>Main speakers: Dr. Denis Mukwege (Gynaecologist from DRC)</td>
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<td>Ilwad Elaman (activist from Mogadishu)</td>
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<td>Mustafa Qasim (Norwegian Church Aid)</td>
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<td>Saja Michael (Activist from</td>
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<td>Feminism after Hillary</td>
<td>The House of Literature</td>
<td>31 May</td>
<td>The House of Literature, Oslo</td>
<td>Main speaker: Nancy Fraser</td>
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<td>Interviewer: Hanna Helseth</td>
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Resolution 1325 (2000)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 4213th meeting, on 31 October 2000

The Security Council,


Recalling also the commitments of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (A/52/231) as well as those contained in the outcome document of the twenty-third Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly entitled “Women 2000: Gender Equality, Development and Peace for the Twenty-First Century” (A/S-23/10/Rev.1), in particular those concerning women and armed conflict,

Bearing in mind the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the primary responsibility of the Security Council under the Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security,

Expressing concern that civilians, particularly women and children, account for the vast majority of those adversely affected by armed conflict, including as refugees and internally displaced persons, and increasingly are targeted by combatants and armed elements, and recognizing the consequent impact this has on durable peace and reconciliation,

Reaffirming the important role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts and in peace-building, and stressing the importance of their equal participation and full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security, and the need to increase their role in decision-making with regard to conflict prevention and resolution,

Reaffirming also the need to implement fully international humanitarian and human rights law that protects the rights of women and girls during and after conflicts,
Emphasizing the need for all parties to ensure that mine clearance and mine awareness programmes take into account the special needs of women and girls,

Recognizing the urgent need to mainstream a gender perspective into peacekeeping operations, and in this regard noting the Windhoek Declaration and the Namibia Plan of Action on Mainstreaming a Gender Perspective in Multidimensional Peace Support Operations (S/2000/693),

Recognizing also the importance of the recommendation contained in the statement of its President to the press of 8 March 2000 for specialized training for all peacekeeping personnel on the protection, special needs and human rights of women and children in conflict situations,

Recognizing that an understanding of the impact of armed conflict on women and girls, effective institutional arrangements to guarantee their protection and full participation in the peace process can significantly contribute to the maintenance and promotion of international peace and security,

Noting the need to consolidate data on the impact of armed conflict on women and girls,

1. **Urges** Member States to ensure increased representation of women at all decision-making levels in national, regional and international institutions and mechanisms for the prevention, management, and resolution of conflict;

2. **Encourages** the Secretary-General to implement his strategic plan of action (A/49/587) calling for an increase in the participation of women at decision-making levels in conflict resolution and peace processes;

3. **Urges** the Secretary-General to appoint more women as special representatives and envoys to pursue good offices on his behalf, and in this regard calls on Member States to provide candidates to the Secretary-General, for inclusion in a regularly updated centralized roster;

4. **Further urges** the Secretary-General to seek to expand the role and contribution of women in United Nations field-based operations, and especially among military observers, civilian police, human rights and humanitarian personnel;

5. **Expresses** its willingness to incorporate a gender perspective into peacekeeping operations, and **urges** the Secretary-General to ensure that, where appropriate, field operations include a gender component;

6. **Requests** the Secretary-General to provide to Member States training guidelines and materials on the protection, rights and the particular needs of women, as well as on the importance of involving women in all peacekeeping and peacebuilding measures, **invites** Member States to incorporate these elements as well as HIV/AIDS awareness training into their national training programmes for military and civilian police personnel in preparation for deployment, and **further requests** the Secretary-General to ensure that civilian personnel of peacekeeping operations receive similar training;

7. **Urges** Member States to increase their voluntary financial, technical and logistical support for gender-sensitive training efforts, including those undertaken by relevant funds and programmes, inter alia, the United Nations Fund for Women and United Nations Children’s Fund, and by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and other relevant bodies;
8. **Calls on** all actors involved, when negotiating and implementing peace agreements, to adopt a gender perspective, including, *inter alia*:

   (a) The special needs of women and girls during repatriation and resettlement and for rehabilitation, reintegration and post-conflict reconstruction;

   (b) Measures that support local women’s peace initiatives and indigenous processes for conflict resolution, and that involve women in all of the implementation mechanisms of the peace agreements;

   (c) Measures that ensure the protection of and respect for human rights of women and girls, particularly as they relate to the constitution, the electoral system, the police and the judiciary;


10. **Calls on** all parties to armed conflict to take special measures to protect women and girls from gender-based violence, particularly rape and other forms of sexual abuse, and all other forms of violence in situations of armed conflict;

11. **Emphasizes** the responsibility of all States to put an end to impunity and to prosecute those responsible for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes including those relating to sexual and other violence against women and girls, and in this regard **strengthens** the need to exclude these crimes, where feasible from amnesty provisions;

12. **Calls upon** all parties to armed conflict to respect the civilian and humanitarian character of refugee camps and settlements, and to take into account the particular needs of women and girls, including in their design, and recalls its resolutions 1208 (1998) of 19 November 1998 and 1296 (2000) of 19 April 2000;

13. **Encourages** all those involved in the planning for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration to consider the different needs of female and male ex-combatants and to take into account the needs of their dependants;

14. **Reaffirms** its readiness, whenever measures are adopted under Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations, to give consideration to their potential impact on the civilian population, bearing in mind the special needs of women and girls, in order to consider appropriate humanitarian exemptions;

15. **Expresses** its willingness to ensure that Security Council missions take into account gender considerations and the rights of women, including through consultation with local and international women’s groups;

16. **Invites** the Secretary-General to carry out a study on the impact of armed conflict on women and girls, the role of women in peace-building and the gender dimensions of peace processes and conflict resolution, and **further invites** him to
submit a report to the Security Council on the results of this study and to make this available to all Member States of the United Nations;

17. *Requests* the Secretary-General, where appropriate, to include in his reporting to the Security Council progress on gender mainstreaming throughout peacekeeping missions and all other aspects relating to women and girls;

18. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

‘A feminism for all? New minorities want to be included in the struggle for women’s liberation. Nora Mehsen represents several of them.’