Civilian and Military Relations in Turkey: A Historical Survey

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Table of Contents

Executive summary 4

Introduction 5

1. A historical overview 7
   
   Phase I:
   The Republican period 1923–1960 8

   Phase II:
   The era of regular military interventions (1960–1980) 10

   Phase III:
   Civilian- military relations under the shadow of an authoritarian constitution (1980–2002) 11

   1982 constitution and legal safeguards 12

   Phase IV: End of the military tutelage (2002–present) 13

   Crime and punishment: Sledgehammer and Ergenekon 16

Concluding Remarks 19

Annex:
The military’s internal structure and its self-perception 23

   The military’s involvement and interest in the economy 26

   The Armed Forces Trust and Pension Fund (OYAK) 26

References 30

Endnotes 31
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This CMI Working Paper presents an analysis of civilian-military relations in Turkey, casting light on institutional, legal and economic aspects that have shaped the military’s role in society. An assessment of contemporary civilian-military relations in Turkey needs to be informed by a historical background. To that end, this paper chronicles how the military has evolved since the Ottoman Empire up till today, emphasising key historical processes that influence the dynamics between military and civilian powers. The paper concludes by observing that in recent decades the Turkish military has, by and large, withdrawn from the political scene, yet that recent political developments in the region and a corresponding intensification of security concerns leave open how this may evolve. Civilian-military relations have been considered in the context of the failed coup attempt of July 2015 in which the government aimed at absolute control over the armed forces and the military lost all of its major privileges.

Key words
Turkey
military
civil-military relations
INTRODUCTION

Turkish armed forces differ in many ways from those of South American, Middle Eastern, and Southeast Asian states, where it has not been unusual for soldiers to attain an executive or a bureaucratic post (Sakallioglu 1997: 153). On the contrary, the Turkish military has not endeavoured to take control of the executive and legislative domains. That is, soldiers have remained soldiers, and when they have intervened into politics they have done so while maintaining their organizational identity. In so doing, the military has not violated the divide between political and military domains.

What separates the Turkish military from its counterparts is its recognition of democratic politics and civilian rule; however, this recognition might have been shaped in the military’s own terms (Sakallioglu 1997: 153). The military has not aimed to dismantle democratic politics (that is, the electoral system), even though it has intervened in politics on several occasions with an objective of “fine tuning” (the military’s own wording). The failed coup attempt in July 2015 differs from other military interventions as it was organised by a clandestine group, Gulenists, which has infiltrated the state and the army over the last four decades.

To Harris, the popularity and the power of the Turkish military can be found in the way it is perceived by society, which is “impartial, nonpartisan, trustworthy, element of the state, and one dedicated to protect citizens” (Harris 2011: 203). Although in the past large sections of Turkish society tolerated military intervention in politics, such intervention does not now garner popular support. The ways in which society conceives of the politics and of the military as an institution influences the activities and political presence of the military. This is particularly true in the Turkish case: the military is the still the most trusted institution in spite of the recent prestige-damaging verdicts that have led to the imprisonment of large numbers of military personnel (see also Sarigil 2009). Furthermore, one of the major standpoints that reinforces the embodiment of the military in society may be that militarization has been one of the constituent aspects of the Turkish identity. For example, completion of military service for males (now 12 months for 20-year-old males) is a symbolic event for becoming a “true male”. School history books are based simply on military achievements and narratives of how all of the world powers have engaged and still engage in dividing and ruling Turkey (Altinay 2004, 2009, and 2003; Altinay and Bora 2001).

The military influence on politics has been above-politics, beyond attachment to any political party or political ideology, or economic and cultural cleavages (Sakallioglu 1997: 154). Rather, the military has legitimized its position in politics as a guardian of the state and its unity, as well of the regime that is grounded on Kemalist ideology and secularism.

This guardian role can be defined as the long-term capacity of the military to define and redefine the ideology of the regime; identify its corporate existence with it; submerge itself beneath the surface and yet be able to support long-term political order; and to define and redefine threats to the regime and formulate responses more substantially than in liberal democracies. This role-belief does not just pervade the military’s mind but creates and sustains a particular culture where the military is not just a professional organisation dealing with defense issues but a core element of the political system. The regime is in civilian hands but the custodial role of the military allows it a free entry into policy-making.

(Cizre 2007: 5).

Geopolitics is a key factor that affects the guardian role of the military (Cizre 2007: 8). Turkey’s geography reinforces this role and facilitates a security discourse to dominate politics. For example, it has been often said that the country is situated “directly in the middle of a region full of risks and challenges such as ultra-nationalism, religious fundamentalism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism and ethnic conflicts which emerged following the Cold War period and intensified in the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Middle East” (Cizre 2007: 8). Despite these challenges, as is claimed by some politicians and experts from Turkey and the world alike, the country has an important “geo-strategic position”; it is “a bridge” and a “gate opening to Eurasia.” The military,
therefore, has perceived for itself a responsibility to respond both to the new security challenges that have emerged post-Cold War and to the alleged strategic requirements of Turkey’s geopolitical position. Furthermore, during this period, the military has been working to respond to major domestic security issues deriving from the Kurdish insurgency and the rise of political Islam.

This report benefits primarily from secondary literature, but also draws upon the information that is being made publicly available in the policy reports prepared by independent research institutions based in Turkey and elsewhere. The media in particular provides an overview about the latest developments in Turkey regarding the imprisonment of several high-ranking officers and many others following their attempts to topple the government.

Section 1 provides an overview of the role of the military in Turkish society and politics with a particular focus on the relations between military and civilian actors in Turkey. The Annex in this CMI Working Paper explains the military’s internal structure and its self-perception, and summarizes the military’s involvement and interest in the economy. The final section offers some concluding remarks.
1. A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

A historical overview of civilian-military relations in Turkey should start with the Ottoman period. Extending the historical background to the pre-republican period reveals the origins of the central role that the military has played in contemporary Turkish politics and society from the structure of the Ottoman state/society relationship. Ottoman society was divided into two components: the rulers (askeri) and the ruled (reaya). The rulers constituted the central administration of the Ottoman Empire, and, in the period of the Empire, consisted of the military, the court officials, and the religious clergy (Heper 2011: 175). The ruled, on the other hand, consisted of the tax-paying class (including the non-Muslim population) and slaves. In the Turkish language the connotation of askeri is of the military, or of any given entity or issue that is in one way or another related to the armed forces. Modernization in Ottoman society began initially in the army, and the members of the armed forces were the first and only that engaged in Western education until the end of the late nineteenth century. The military played a crucial role in the political reforms conducted during the nineteenth century that were intended to westernize the Ottoman political structure, and in the constitution of the Republic in the aftermath of an independent war (Eisenstadt 1987: 135–153; Zurcher 2004).

In the 19th century the military was “not only the object of change but also the subject of change” (Heper 2011: 175; see for a detailed analysis and overview Berkes 1964; Lewis 2002; Ahmad 2002). Sultan Mahmud II (1808–1839) forcibly disbanded the Janissary corps. Instead, he created a “European-style army”, Asakir-i Mansure’i Muhammediye (the victorious troops of Muhammad). After the formation of a Military Council (Dar-i Sura-yi Askeri), “the Ottoman state came into possession of a single military organization under unified command” (Hanioglu 2011: 177). Abolishment of Janissaries in 1826 had an impact on the Ottoman reforms. Although some perceived of it as an “auspicious event”, “constitutional opposition between 1868 and 1908 regarded the event as an incremental step on the path towards bureaucratic dictatorship” (Hanioglu 2001: 178).

The influence of the army was expanded under the Hamidian regime, although there remained a clear separation between the civilian and military spheres (Hanioglu 2011: 180; see also Zurcher 2004 and Ahmad 2002). For example, commanders of the armed forces and the navy could become cabinet members, thereby involved in the decision-making process regarding non-military matters (Hanioglu 2011: 180). It had also become common practice to appoint generals to distant provinces with a dual role of both governor and commander. Whereas some members of the military had important duties in government, Hanioglu (2011: 180) notes that the opinions of the military had been considered as of equal importance relative to the opinions of the civilian institutions. However, civilians remained in charge of making final decisions.

The military’s self-image of its role in society was transformed by the military reform launched by German military theorist Colmar von der Goltz (Hanioglu 2011: 180). Although his mission was to structure the Military Academy, Goltz also “attempted to instil a new ethics of service and discipline”, and “enhanced role for the military in society” (Hanioglu 2011: 181). His ideas, inscribed in his treatise Das Volk in Waffen (The Nation in Arms), prescribed the military a superior class position—noblesse oblige—thus stating that it should not simply be subordinate to the state. Goltz was convinced that his ideas were pertinent to Ottoman society, as the society was calling for the guidance of a new elite class, that of the military. Hanioglu (2011: 181) notes that the Turkish translation of Goltz’s book was widely read in the military academy from 1886 onwards, and “the entire senior Ottoman officer corps had come around to the opinion that it was their duty to transform the empire into a nation in arms”. To achieve this under the Hamidian regime was not plausible though, since the military’s role was confined to providing advice. The military, however, was keen to extend its power.

The military gained strength after the 1908 revolution, with its role defined as a power broker together with the parliament and the press (Hanioglu 2011: 178). The 1908 Young Turk revolution had implications for civilian-military relations. Hanioglu (2011) suggests that the para-military Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) controlled the army after the revolution, even though the military had initially aimed to play a power-broker role. Formed
initially as an intellectual organization, CUP was later transformed into a para-military organization after 1907. It did not, however, aim to dismantle the state, but to save it. Therefore, its ideology was state-centered (Hanioglu 2011: 178). The CUP’s political agenda was to exert pressure on the sultan to execute the Ottoman constitution of 1876. The CUP controlled the lower ranks and the para-military groups at the time of the 1908 revolution; however, higher ranking officers were willing to take the revolution in a different direction. Unschooled officers preserved their loyalty to the sultan. The CUP aimed to take control over the higher officers as well, while transforming into a legal-political organization (Hanioglu 2011: 182). In the beginning of the 20th century the military defended the constitutional monarchy; during the CUP period (1912–1918), it was engaged in daily politics. However, the military could not become a professional body (Heper 2011: 175). The National Union Committee conducted the 1960 coup, yet lost power afterwards at the expense of their chain of command. The CUP leaders created their own army in which they were the high command (Hanioglu 2011: 193).

Phase I: The Republican period 1923–1960

The Republican period took the role of the military in a different direction by prescribing a “guardianship” task to the military in order to guard the secular and modernist reforms of the republic. During this period military officers were strictly banned from engaging in politics. The civilian-military relationship has become more intricate from 1950s onwards, since Turkey began its parliamentary democracy experience and regular multi-party elections.

Following Hale (2011), the military’s role in Turkish politics from the 1920s to the end of 1950s can be categorized in three periods. During the first period (1923–1926), Ataturk managed to isolate the possible challenges to his personal power that could be posed by the military officers, thereby constructing his personal power in the emerging regime. This was followed by a period (1926–1950) of securing the allegiance of the army to the new regime and its essential ideological premises for the inaugurated nation-building project with the Republic. The multiparty period, starting with the electoral victory of the Democrat Party (DP) and lasting until end of 1950s with the three successive electoral achievements of that party, constitutes the third period.

In the first period, the Republican establishment aimed to prevent the military’s involvement in politics, which might be realized by, for instance, military officers’ direct intervention in day-to-day politics, their ability to become parliamentary members, or their assignment to political roles. Rather, the Republican establishment assigned the military the role of guardian of the Republican reforms, the most vital being secularism and civic nationalism. After 1923 two senior commanders remained in the parliament (Ismet Inonu and Fevzi Cakmak); the former served as the prime minister and the latter as general-in-chief during Ataturk’s rule. (Hale 2011: 193). Fevzi Cakmak was the chief of the General Staff from 1921 to 1944. He was unique in the history of the Turkish army not only for his long-lasting posting, but as the only person given the title of Marshal. According to Hale (2011: 195), the presence of Cakmak was one of the key factors in keeping the military loyal to Ataturk. Some senior commanders formed the opposition group: Kazim Karabekir, Ali Fuat Cebesoy, Cafer Tayyar Egilmez and Refet Bele. Given that these generals were recognized in the country, according to Hale (2011), they could have been a threat to Ataturk’s newly emerged power.

During the second period, one of the main tools used to curb military influence and thereby keep the armed forces outside of parliamentary politics was the legal amendment. Law No. 385, enacted in December 1923, suggested that “in future elections officers and
soldiers would be obliged to resign from the forces before their election as deputies could be validated” (Hale 2011: 193). As established in the 1924 constitution as Article 23: “a person is not permitted to be Deputy and hold another Government post at the same time” (Hale 2011: 193). Article 40 of the 1924 constitution prescribed the role of supreme commander of the army, to be “represented by the President of the Republic” (Hale 2011: 193). Moreover, the chief of general staff lost his seat in the cabinet when the institution of caliphate was abolished in March 1924. As a consequence, the chief became responsible directly to the president instead of the ministry of defense. (Hale 2011: 193).

The Military Penalty Code was enacted in 1930. Article 148 of that code stipulated that military staff who “assemble together for political objectives, join political parties, participate in political demonstrations, meetings, or elections, or in any manner whatsoever make oral suggestions with these objectives, or write political articles or make speeches to this effect, shall be imprisoned for up to five years” (Hale 2011: 195, italics added by Hale).

The Armed Forces Internal Service Law was accepted in 1935. Article 35 of that law indicates that “the duty of the armed forces is to protect and defend the Turkish homeland and the Republic of Turkey, as determined in the Constitution” (Hale 2011: 195). This article provided legal grounds for the military to intervene in Turkish politics in order to protect Kemalist secularism. It was abolished in 2013.

With these legal provisions, the military played a significant role in the early years of the new regime in “education, social mobilization, and nation-building” (Hale 2011: 195). The military played a vital role in the modernization reform. Military schools enabled social mobility by providing state-sponsored education, which would guarantee a permanent job with high status. Military academy provided a modernist and a secular curriculum. The notes of a traveller from the 1930s, quoted in Hale, describe the influence of the military service on a Turkish citizen:

There was no need for him to learn to use a rifle because he had grown up with one. But the army had taught him other things—discipline, cleanliness, a sense of time, improved methods for cultivating the land, reading and writing and—perhaps the most important of all—a feeling of responsibility for his fellow-men. He had been in his village for the past seven months and obviously not forgotten what he had learnt. (Linke 1938:122–3 in Hale 2011: 195)

For a number of reasons, some groups took opposing positions within the army. One position was to modernize and professionalize the army. Between 1923 and 1945, the military could not become a professional institution. NATO made a vital impact on the modernization and professionalization of the Turkish army. Under the terms of the Marshall Aid program in 1948, the US government transferred modern military materials and sent specialists to train the Turkish armed forces to use them. Although young officers were more open to the new technological innovation, they thought that the conservative hierarchical structure in the armed forces precluded reform. Another reason for the spread of dissatisfaction among some in the army was economic. During the 1950s, the salaries of the military personnel were not sufficient. This was combined with then Prime Minister Adnan Menderes’s unfriendly attitude towards the armed forces and the growing perception in the military that the DP government was violating Kemalist secular principles. Menderes did not make improvements in the salaries of the armed forces. The DP government became authoritarian. One of the justifications of the 1960 coup was that the DP would seek to abolish the elections and establish a single-party regime (Harris 2011: 203).

During the third period, which commenced with the establishment of a multi-party period, the military’s political roles changed. When the Democrat Party was founded in 1946, young officers supported that party instead of the Republic People’s Party. The 1960 coup was organized by the middle ranks of the officer corps. Hale (2011) claims that to argue that the army unconditionally supported the Republican Peoples Party, CHP, during the single-party period is misleading. Although the formula “CHP + army = power” (CHP + army = iktidar) was very popular, some members of the armed forces was keen to end the mono-party regime, thereby aligning with the Democrat Party when it was founded in 1945 (Hale 2011: 197).
Professionalism of the military continued, and, during the 1950s, the military started to disengage from its politically neutral position and to involve itself in Turkey’s political life by claiming to guard secularism and civic nationalism (Heper 2011: 175). Military officers were educated in terms of Western norms and values and were sincere supporters of westernization.

Huntington (1957) argued that professionalism (military education and modernization of the armed forces) would keep the generals away from politics and that they would focus on defense policies. However, as Stepan (1973) contended, this was not always the case. In contrast, the influence of the military in politics grew during the Cold War in some Latin American and Middle Eastern countries as well as in Turkey despite professionalization of the army (Sakallioglu 1997: 152). Professionalism could increase the political influence of the military because it brought about a corporate independence for the military; as a result the armed forces could maintain discretion to decide those issues relating to its organisational activities including promotions, appointments, discipline, education, reform and modernization.

Nevertheless, professionalism falls short in explaining the power of the Turkish military. In order to grasp the peculiarities of the Turkish case, one still needs to consider the “historical-cultural context”, as only this context can explain how the Turkish military could possess a kind of political autonomy allowing intervention and control in Turkish politics.

Phase II: The era of regular military interventions (1960–1980)

The 1960 coup resulted in the execution of Prime Minister Adnan Menderes and two of his cabinet members, but, as is often pointed out by intellectuals, it brought about a liberal constitution. However, the constitution of 1961 also established the National Security Council (NSC, a forum where the military and civilians regularly discussed security issues) and paved the way for the institutionalization of the military’s political influence in Turkish political history. Hale argues that when the armed forces took power they contradicted the Ataturk’s legacy of not intervening in politics, even for the sake of protecting the Kemalist principles (Hale 2011).

In addition to the NSC, the 1960 constitution brought the following: a senate in addition to the parliament and an electoral system of proportional representation. In the NSC, the politicians had to comply with the views of the military on security-related issues. Security, however, entailed both domestic and external security, thereby leaving a great deal of room for intervention: “The generals, however, had made constitutional changes not only to dilute the power of the civilian government, but also to allow the commanders to maintain an influential role in political life” (Harris 2011: 205). One of the practices that became a tradition after the 1960s was to agree on a president from among the retired top brass of the army. (This was however changed after the 2000s. Ahmet Necdet Sezer was a jurist and a member of the constitutional court, and Abdullah Gül, the previous president, as well as Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the current president, both have careers in politics).

In the 1960s, some scholars, such as David Lerner and Richard D. Robinson, celebrated the military’s intervention in 1960, as they believed this act to be a positive move that secured Turkey’s modernization and enlightenment project (Hale 2011: 199). Such a view is now marginalized. There were other coup attempts after 1960, which were launched by Talat Aydemir and Fethi Gurcan. Aydemir and Gurcan were executed in 1964, after two failed coup attempts in 1962 and 1963. 1400 cadets were also expelled from the military academies on suspicion of their engagement in the failed 1963 coup (Jenkins 2005: 35).

During the 1960s, Turkey became a polarized country along ideological lines between right and left wing groups; clashes even led to casualties. During the late 1960s and early 1970s, a group of leftist intellectuals inspired by Doğan Avcıoğlu’s thoughts (mostly published in the journal Yön) tried to invoke the army to initiate a socialist revolution in order to establish a Baathist-like regime based on the principles of Kemalism, which they called the National Democratic Revolution (Milli Demokratik Devrim).

The senior generals delivered an ultimatum to the government in March 1971. The 1971 ultimatum was intended to become a constitutional amendment that would take measures
against the threats to national unity, public order, and national security; and consolidate the autonomy of the army (Harris 2011: 206). The memorandum of the army forced formation of a technocrat government to deal with the escalating tension, otherwise the military threatened to take power. The government (Justice Party) was dissolved, but the parliament was not abandoned. The parliament gave confidence to the technocratic government that ran the country from 1971 until 1973. During this period the military did not rule the country, but influenced politics by demanding that the government introduce martial law in some provinces where violence was intense. However, civilians had the discretion to take measures. In 1973 elections were held again (Harris 2011: 206).

The notion of national security focused on securing national unity, which could be challenged along the lines of “class, sect, religion, race or language” (Harris 2011: 206). The left was also considered a threat. Some restrictions on unions were imposed. The autonomy of the universities was abolished. However, political polarization increased in the 1970s; stability and order were not achieved. Political Islam emerged with the establishment of the National Salvation Party led by Necmettin Erbakan in the early 1970s. The Justice and Development Party (AKP) emerged from these roots, with Recep Tayyip Erdogan and several politicians distancing themselves from the ‘national outlook’ view that dominated political Islam from 1970 to the late 1990s.

The political situation during the 1970s grew increasingly unstable: unsuccessful coalition governments followed each other; society was divided along the ideological lines; and the parliament could not manage to choose its president after 102 successive attempts. Violence was widespread. Given the political stalemate, the un-governability of the state and society, and the rising violence, the military takeover of September 12, 1980, was justified by the Turkish society.

Phase III. Civilian-military relations under the shadow of an authoritarian constitution (1980–2002)

This section provides a closer look at the history of Turkish politics as well as the external dynamics that have influenced civilian-military relations post-1980s. In addition to a focus on the “drivers”, there are other mechanisms that have shaped civilian-military relations, such as legal and constitutional provisions, as well as institutional safeguards that enable civilian control or vice-versa. For example, an important dimension of the military’s political role was its predominant role in shaping the “national security” concept. The content of that concept has been conceived so widely and vaguely that it could involve any issue, namely the perceived threat of political Islam, of Kurdish separatism, Turkey’s accession to the European Union, administration of the curriculum in the education system, administration of higher education, and the activities of the media. Other factors that facilitated military autonomy after the 1980s include: the National Security Council, the presidency, organization of defense, military budgets, military spending, security and intelligence, and senior promotion (Sakallioglu 1997). It is difficult to assess whether the hierarchy was functioning perfectly in the Turkish Armed Forces’s (TAF) internal structure before 1980. The 1960 coup was initiated by junior officers, and after the 1971 memorandum three generals and eight colonels were dismissed on charges of hierarchy and command mechanism (Jenkins 2005: 37). The 1980 military takeover, however, followed the chain of command; it was carefully planned, thus differed from previous experience. Before the takeover, the then chief general of the staff Kenan Evren sent a letter to the president Fahri Korutruk to end the ongoing violence in the country. It has been claimed that from that time until the military takeover over 1900 people died in clashes (Jenkins 2005: 38). After the 1980 military takeover, the military seized control of executive power. The chief of the general staff, Kenan Evren, was given the title of chief of state and head of the National Security Council, while the chief of navy, Bulent Ulusu, was appointed prime minister (Harris 2010: 209). One of the actions that the military junta took was to prohibit all kinds of political activity during the post-coup period, and the leaders of the political parties of the day were detained (Harris 2010: 209). They were considered responsible for the violence and clashes. In order to consolidate stability and peace the military junta initiated martial law. The military regime carried out executions mostly
of those coming from leftist circles. Political parties were abolished in the end, as the leader of the left (Ecevit) and right (Demirel) refused to cooperate with the objectives of the military. According to Harris, the generals did not plan to abolish political parties in the post-coup period, but to eradicate antagonism that stemmed from partisan politics (Harris 2011: 2010).

Above all, the key legacy of the junta that re-shaped the political and social life from 1980s onwards is the authoritarian constitution written under the military’s control. It was ratified by the citizens (91.7 percent) on 7 November 1982. The new constitution restricted political liberties and freedom of expression considerably. As in the pre-1980 period civilians could not manage to end the clashes and render the country governable by finding solutions to hyper-polarization under coalition governments. The new constitution, the so-called September 12 (the date it was ratified by the public in 1982), therefore, aimed to construct an effective political system that would not be obstructed by fragmentation in the parliament. The bicameral system was brought to end with the eradication of the Senate that had been created following the 1960 coup (Harris 2010: 209). Furthermore, a new election law brought a threshold of ten percent of national votes in order to prevent fragmentation in the political system and coalition governments by restricting the entry of minor parties to the parliament. The constitution also confirmed the presidency of Evren for the succeeding seven years.

At the end of the junta period, the military tried to manipulate the elections by publicly declaring its choice, the Nationalist Democracy Party (NDP) run by a retired general. However, Turgut Ozal’s Motherland Party (MP), positioned in the center-right, had a significant victory, receiving 45.2 percent of the vote while the NDP managed to receive only 23.3 percent placing it third after Erdal Inonu’s Social Democratic Party (SODEP). Although the junta had banned the active participation of the pre-1980 politicians who were accused of being responsible for the political stalemate and the bloodshed in the country, the return of those politicians to active political life was enabled in 1987 as the result of a referendum, in which a tiny number of majority “yes” votes declared their willingness to open the political space to the old names.

1982 CONSTITUTION AND LEGAL SAFEGUARDS

With the new constitution, as was the case in the 1960 constitution and the 1971 memorandum, the military achieved new powers before returning the political scene to civilians. The powers of the NSC were expanded in 1983; the responsibilities of the military were “not just for the defense of Turkey’s territory and its political and economic interests, but also for the preservation of its ‘Kemalist’ legacy” (Cizre 2007: 4). The military endeavoured to exert its political power and influence the politics of the NSC. The NSC justified intervention in the civilian sphere not only by defining the security issues, but also by having the authority to take precautions in the case of a perceived threat (Bayramoğlu, 2002: 40). Bayramoğlu highlights the prominent role of the armed forces in Turkish political life by indicating that the other political institutions exist to serve to legitimize the military dominance in the decision-making process, whereas the role of civilians is to approve military policies. To him, when the armed forces are interested in an issue, that issue loses its political aspect and is redefined according to the national security concern (Bayramoğlu 2002: 40). The membership of the National Security Council was re-arranged as a regular institution, and the position of general secretary, responsible for coordinating and monitoring the decisions of the NSC, was established. The National Security Council Secretariat determines, formulates and implements policies related to national security (Cizre 2007: 4; see also Karaosmaoğlu 2000). Until 2003, the council of ministers were legally required to give priority consideration to NSC decisions. The wording determining the way in which the decisions of the NSC were to be formulated by the cabinet was reformulated. Whereas in 1971 the law stipulated that the NSC “recommend its views to the Council of Ministers”, according to the amended version in 1982 “decisions of the Council [NSC]...are to be given priority consideration by the Council of Ministers” (Harris 2011: 201). The military perceived the Kurdish insurgency and the growing political Islam as twin threats to national security (Jenkins 2005: 39). Another avenue by which the military
supported its power was the presidency. Six of the presidents in the Republican period were chosen from among the generals. With the new law, the president was entitled to represent “the office of the commander in chief”, to appoint the chief of general staff, and to declare martial law (Harris 2011: 210).

The position of Chief of the General Staff in defense policies is another standpoint through which the military establishes its power in politics. Each Chief has been responsible directly to the Prime Minister since 1961, though in advanced democracies the norms presuppose the Chief to be responsible rather to the Minister of Defense. As result, the Chief, in practice, replaces the role of Minister of Defense (Cizre 2007: 4), even though the latter is accountable to the Parliament in terms of defense policies. Therefore, the Chief is entitled to equal status with the Minister of National Defense. The Chief is also appointed by the President instead of the Council of Ministers. The Organization Law of the Ministry of National Defense (Law no. 1325) stipulates “the principles, priorities and programs to be determined by the Chief of General Staff: Recruitment of soldiers in times of peace and war; provision of weapons, tools and logistical requirements; war industry services; health services; construction, real estate, settlements and infrastructure services; and financial services including account enquiries” (Berksoy 2013: 112). Given these roles, the authority of the Minister of National Defense is restricted.

The presence of the military judiciary on the other hand causes a judicial duality, military courts in effect working in parallel to the judicial system. Military courts and military disciplinary courts were established by 1961. Given that no other institution is eligible for the privilege of having its own judicial mechanism, the military stands out as a peculiar case inasmuch as it enjoys that privilege (Berksoy 2013: 14). As a result, as Cizre suggests: “While extensively restricting individual rights and freedoms, the latest constitution of 1982 entrenched the military’s veto power in the political system to such an extent that it has made crude military intervention into politics redundant” (Sakallioglu 1997: 153–4).

However, the power of the military was challenged occasionally by the governments of the day. For example, the military and the government had different views on a possible military intervention in Iraq in the early 1990s; it was the military that supported non-intervention. The military had refuted Ozal’s reluctance to participate in the US-led Operation Desert Storm against Saddam Hussain in late 1980s. Ozal was willing to penetrate Northern Iraq, thereby assisting the US military operations coordinated from Saudi Arabia (1990–1991). However, the not-so-secret internal motivation of Ozal was, in fact, to regain the two oil-rich provinces of Kirkuk and Mosul. Such a claim could engender enthusiasm in Turkish public discourse because these provinces were part of the National Oath of 1918 (Misak-i Milli). Torumtay resigned from his office on 6 December 1990 after his challenge to Ozal’s ambitions, even though he had been recommended for that post by Ozal against the military’s own candidate.

The 1982 constitution also paved the way for the reinvigoration of political Islam blended with a flavour of Turkishness by introducing the compulsory teaching of Islam in schools. It is widely accepted that this attempt has facilitated the growth of political Islam and the Turkish-Islam synthesis from 1980 onwards. The Welfare Party (WP) formed a coalition government in 1996 with Tansu Ciller’s True Path Party (established and run by Suleyman Demirel, the leader of the Justice Party that was a crucial actor in Turkish political life). The military showed clear dissatisfaction with the idea of a political Islam-oriented government. The military forced the government to resign. It is known in Turkish politics as a post-modern coup, because not only was the government warned to follow the principles of Kemalism and secular values, but also civil society was mobilized in organizing a campaign against the government by aligning several NGOs (such as the Support for Modern Life Association and the Contemporary Education Foundation (Cagdas Yasami Destekleme Dernegi), and the Atatürkist Thought Association (Atatürkcu Düşunce Derneği)).

In sum, the military was at the centre of politics in order to guard the unity and secular character of the state during the 1990s. Escalating clashes with the Kurdish group, PKK, and the challenge of the Islamic discourse in political and social life, led the military to try to influence politics and at times mobilized secular-minded segments of the society. I provide this historical sketch because in the early 2000s the nature of the civilian-military relations was radically transformed in favour of the civilians.
Phase IV: End of the military tutelage (2002–present)

At least two significant developments fostered such a radical transformation: the Turkish accession process to the European Union and the emergence of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) as a dominant political force. The EU and the AKP can be considered the key drivers that dramatically changed the nature of civilian-military relations.

Clearly, a major external factor that influenced civilian-military relations, particularly after the 2000s, was the European Union. Turkey’s relationship with the EU dates back to the 1960s, when Turkey signed the Ankara agreement in 1963 establishing partnership with the then European Economic Community in order to integrate the country into the customs union, or trade partnership, and towards EU membership. The turning point that gave the EU-Turkey and civilian-military relations a different impetus, through the granting of candidate status to Turkey, took place at the EU Helsinki Summit in 1999. As such, Turkey started negotiations with the EU, which necessitated the adaptation of Turkey’s legal and political system to EU policies. Accordingly, civilian-military relations and the security sector writ large have been under the scope of reform because the EU has required the democratic oversight of the former (Cizre 2007: 4). The EU *acquis communautaire* has obliged Turkey to amend the 1982 constitution and the structure of the National Security Council, while further requiring changes to the judiciary duality between the civic and military courts. Interestingly, it is through these changes in the Turkish judicial system that military staff could be tried in civic court instead of by the military court in the Ergenekon and Sledgehammer (Balyoz) cases, which will be discussed below.

The armed forces’ dominant and autonomous position in Turkish politics has been under attack during the membership process of the EU. Accordingly, the power of the armed forces must be reduced in order to meet the so-called Copenhagen criteria for accession, which includes the “Democratic control of the armed forces (Decaf)”. Decaf was developed for the Central and East European (C&EE) countries which have been in the enlargement zone of NATO and the EU since 1993–1994. As the enlargement has turned into a security interest in Europe, Decaf has become a key factor in promoting stability and peace in former communist states (Cizre 2004:111). Umit Cizre strongly criticizes the policy of presenting Decaf to Turkey as a membership criterion, suggesting that it misses the target when applied as a model for Turkey. Cizre compares the militaries of C&EE states and Turkey to prove her thesis. To her, the militaries in the C&EE states are “smaller in size, weaker in terms of force levels, underdeveloped in corporate identity, low in political profile and non-interventionist with regard to domestic politics” (Cizre 2004: 112). However, as we have elaborated in this paper, TAF acts as a legally legitimate actor in political decision making, and develops its own corporate views about democracy, public life and national security autonomously vis-a-vis elected representatives.

It is also obvious to Cizre that the armed forces seem reluctant to give up the traditional role of guardianship in the membership process. In the Helsinki Summit in 1999, when Turkey’s candidacy to the EU was formally accepted, Turkey automatically adopted the provisions of Decaf, which enables the arraignment of military institutions in civil court and withdrawal of TAF from the political scene. After 1999 the Turkish government took initiative to change constitutional codes that justified the political involvement of the army and removed the administrative organ of the NSC (the NSC General Secretary).

In the context of Turkey-EU relations, the EU regards Turkey as geopolitically significant in the promotion of stability and peace in Southeastern Europe, the Middle East and Caucasus given the transformation of security concerns that have entailed with transitions from communism to terrorism, Islamic fundamentalism, and secessionist movements after the Cold War. Turkey has not had any problem in adapting to the new security concerns and alignments inside NATO. However, Turkey has given priority in the integration process to its capabilities and assets to EU’s defense bloc, despite the fact that the EU would have preferred a democratic and wealthy Turkey in the region to serve as a catalyst for liberal democracies in the region (Cizre 2004: 116). The armed forces seemed reluctant to reconcile with the EU’s stated mission of a “democratic Turkey” because it justified its intervention in politics and violations of democratic norms, as “exceptional” and “corrective” for internal enemies. For instance, after the NSC meeting on 28 February 28 1997, the army legitimizing
its intervention by declaring that the fight with Islamic activism was “a guarantee not only for the regime but at the same time of democracy, societal peace and the modern life style” (Cizre and Çınar, 2003: 314). On the other hand, TAF evaluated the Copenhagen criteria as democratic compromises that were too high a price for Turkey to pay while combating regressive movements, irtica, and separatist terror (Cizre and Çınar 2003: 315).

The EU documents related to Turkey addressed four fundamental issues for reform: the position of the Chief of General Staff; the role of the NSC; the composition and jurisdiction of the State Security Courts; and emergency rule in the Southeast. The General Staff is now responsible directly to the president, even though he should be responsible to the minister of defense under the EU democratization criteria. Moreover, the EU questioned the involvement of the armed forces in northern Iraq in 1997, which were undertaken without governmental approval.

The role of the NSC has broadened throughout the 1990s, and the domain of its policies has expanded to areas that were formally considered the responsibility of civilian authority. It is paradoxical that the NSC enlarged its role in politics and social life, in spite of the supranational pressure of institutional reform, and even though some reforms had already taken place (Cizre 2004: 124). The military judge in the State Security Court council was replaced with a civilian one just before the Öcalan’s trial in 1999, and the composition of the NSC was modified in October 2001 so that the civilian members would outnumber the high-command soldiers. The role of the NSC was limited to advisory as part of the constitutional amendments.

Against this backdrop, Decaf has been understood and applied in a purely institutional way by the EU (Cizre 2004:119). Cizre thus interpreted Decaf as an inefficient policy tool of the EU, in that it has regarded the militaries as ideology-free and purely defensive institutions with no corporate spirit, no history, and no ideological or alliance capabilities to assist them in providing public support and political prerogatives. In doing so, Cizre suggests, Decaf does not capture the “real politics” in which militaries are embedded. Therefore, to her, the EU proposal to “align the constitutional role of the NSC as an advisory body to the government in accordance with the practice of EU member states” is borne out from the insufficient understanding of the cultural, political and ideological weight of the military in Turkish life (Cizre 2004:121).

A major step was taken in 2003 with the Democracy package launched in August 2003 within the scope of the harmonization with EU legislation (Cizre 2007: 11). The package bridled the influence of the military considerably by reshaping the influence and the composition of the NSC, the institution through which the military has been acting as a “shadow cabinet”. The NSC has been redefined as an advisory body, stripped of its executive powers. The package also contained the following changes:

- Rearranged the composition of the NSC breaking the quantitative and qualitative dominance of the military and increasing the committee’s non-military members.

- Amended wording of the related article directing the Council of Ministers to “evaluate” instead of “give priority consideration to the decisions of the MGK”.

- Abridged the manoeuvring space of the Secretary in terms of executive; according to the annulled practice the Secretary could request confidential or non-confidential information from the non-military institutions, including ministries, public institutions, private organisations and private legal persons, obliging each to submit such information when requested (Cizre 2007: 12).

- Decreased the budget of the NSC by 60 percent.

- Established bi-monthly, rather than monthly, NSC meetings.

- Changed appointment procedures so that civilians could serve as Secretary General. According to the old procedures the Secretary General could only be appointed from within the military. Furthermore, the “chief advisor to the NSC and heads of some
departments and the contracts of 20 of the 53 retired military members of the Secretariat were not renewed” (Berksoy 2013: 8).

• Closed four of eleven departments of the Secretary and relocated their staff to other public institutions.

• Endorsed parliamentary inspection of the military budget.

• Made public activities of the NSC and ended the secret regulation of the General Secretariat of the MGK (Berksoy 2013: 8).

• Transferred the NSC Secretariat’s duties concerning to “co-ordinate and monitor” the decisions of the MGK to the deputy prime minister.

Furthermore, the presence of the military in some of the state institutions was ended. New laws cancelled military representation in some state institutions, namely those of the Council on Higher Education and Higher Board of Radio and Television. State Security Courts were also abolished (Cizre 2007: 12). Meanwhile, there were other substantive changes within the judiciary, primarily affecting the Supreme Council of Judges and Prosecutors (Hakimler ve Savcılar Yüksek Kurulu, HSYK) and the Constitutional Court. Changes to the law have led to the prosecution of those who took part in the military interventions. As a consequence, the power of the military over civilians and in the political system has been widely diminished—if not utterly exhausted—thanks to the legal changes (Berksoy 2013: 7). Consequently, the end of the military tutelage regime has been widely accepted among the public. Some argue that the civilian supremacy has not yet been consolidated, for a number of reasons: First, autonomy of the military continues because the military judiciary operates in parallel with the civilian judiciary. Second, the military is not transparent and in some ways not accountable; it is exempt from monitoring by the parliament and other non-military institutions, particularly as regards control of the military budget, including spending on weapons and militaristic equipment. Third, the duties of the General Command of the Gendarmerie and the Coast Guard Command create some issues in terms of civilian control. The Gendarmerie is responsible for the security of domestic areas outside of the urban areas; however, it is tied to TAF (Berksoy 2013: 11). Fourth, the village guard system, which has been used as means of security over the last years, also causes problems in terms of violence and human rights violations (Berksoy 2013: 11).

Nonetheless, the legal changes have had considerable influence of the nature of civilian-military relations; the major turning point in this regard was undoubtedly due to the persecution of the major military personnel—including former top brass—in large numbers by charging them either of attempting to topple the government by coup or with involvement in criminal networks in order to foment chaos that would lead to a coup. The process of the trials was one of the key political events (if not the most pressing) experienced after 2008. During this period, military personnel were detained in successive operations. The seriousness of the allegations and the extent of the detainments soon made obvious that the nature of the civilian-military relations was transforming.

**Crime and Punishment: Sledgehammer and Ergenekon**

AKP was able to secure broad public support from the beginning, so they could smoothly operationalize its challenge against military control. Many argue that civilian control was made possible with the imprisonment of several high ranking officers and the ex-General-in-Chief because of their “terrorist” crimes of toppling the democratic government through coup attempts (Sledgehammer, Moonlight, Blondegirl) and their participation in a criminal network, the so-called Ergenekon. The verdicts of the courts and the conduct of the cases have not satisfied many, even those who had high hopes. As we will see, even PM Erdogan and the supporters of the government later changed their positions and came to criticize the ways in which these cases had been conducted.
Certainly, the trials against the military have changed the nature of civilian-military relations drastically. Of those, Operation Sledgehammer (in Turkish, *Balyoz Harekâtı*) found 237 members of the Turkish armed forces, mostly from the higher ranks, guilty of planning a military coup against the AKP. The judiciary, including the Higher Court of Justice, found a group of soldiers, who were not satisfied with the AKP hold on political power, guilty of planning a detailed political intervention in 2003. Those plans only came to light in 2010 when a Turkish newspaper, *Taraf*, wrote of the attempt and then delivered documents of evidence in a suitcase to the state authorities. According to those documents, the designers of the coup aimed to create a chaotic atmosphere in the country by bombing two mosques in Istanbul and shooting down a Turkish aircraft over the Aegean Sea in order to accuse Greece of being responsible. The defendants, however, claimed that this was merely a regular scenario being discussed in a military seminar.

Operations against the suspected soldiers were conducted in 2010 and 2011; in total 365 people were accused of committing crimes, including the then Chiefs of the land forces, of the navy, and of the air forces. Following the court’s indictment of a great majority of the defendants, an extraordinary event in the history of Turkish politics took place on 29 July 2011: the top echelons of the armed forces—including the chief of the armed forces (Isik Kosaner), and the heads of the land forces, the navy, and the air forces—submitted their resignations to the prime minister before the Supreme Military Council where promotions in the army were decided. Kosaner said: “It has become impossible for me to continue in this high office, because I am unable to fulfil my responsibility to protect the rights of my personnel as the chief of general staff.” In 2012 the court sentenced most of those indicted to up to 20 years of imprisonment; the higher court by and large ratified the decisions, deciding to release several of those imprisoned on lack of adequate evidence.

Another major trial that concerns the military was the so-called Ergenekon case. The Turkish judiciary has determined that Ergenekon—named for a Turkish myth about a location in the Altay Mountains—is a secret organization formed by Turkish secularists and ultra-nationalists along with individuals from the military and security forces. It is, according to the courts, a network of terrorists, possibly the manifestation of the “deep state”, and responsible for most of the political terror over the last 30 years in Turkey. Their crimes, including provoking chaos by murdering elites, politicians, judges, military staff, and religious leaders, have been intended to dismantle the present government. The case has been a major political event with more than 500 people prosecuted since 2008. In terms of its relevance for this report, the Ergenekon case has significant implications for the nature of civilian-military relations. First, the court came to a conclusion that the military (both serving and retired officers) was engaged in clandestine activities as part of a larger network that used or plotted violence in order to achieve political ambitions. Furthermore, one of the objectives, as the court has determined, was to prepare for a military coup. Second, the General-in-chief who served between 2008 between 2010, Ilker Basbug, was found guilty of being a member of the terrorist organization and sentenced to 20 years. Oddly, by referring to the statements of Ilker Basbug, Professor Metin Heper of Bilken University, a prominent scholar in Turkish politics, argued that, after 2000, the military had come to the conclusion that the era of political interventions was over by recognizing that civilians have the right to make mistakes (Heper 2011). Heper (2011: 175) argues that “from 2002 onwards [the military officers] questioned the very wisdom of making interventions in politics.” He supports his argument by drawing on the statements of the high ranking officers. However, the judicial charges against and verdicts of several higher ranking officers diametrically contradict Heper’s claim. That is, the courts were convinced that the military had planned to topple the AKP government either through military coups or by attempting to create a chaotic situation in the country by aligning with terrorists under the umbrella terrorist network of Ergenekon. After the decisions on the Ergenekon case had been declared, many were convinced that the ultimate civilian dominance over the military was now established and the military would stay in their barracks.

The ways in which these cases were carried out and the decisions of the courts have not been satisfactory or convincing to all. Some intellectuals and the supporters of the incumbent government initially celebrated the case as a watershed event that ended the
military tutelage and thus opened a new era of normal democratic politics. The Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan claimed to have been the prosecutor of that case when the interrogations were launched. However, others claimed that the cases drew on forged documents (especially in the case of Sledgehammer) and inadequate means (or legally problematic) of evidence collection (such as using anonymous informants and gathering information by phone tapping) (see Jenkins 2009). For example, in the case of Sledgehammer, the defendants argued that the digital evidence, a CD driver, which constituted the cornerstone of accusations, was created years after the supposed crimes had been committed. Although the defendants claimed that the Calibri font used in the digital documents had not yet been launched in 2003, the high court was convinced that the documents could well have been revised afterwards. There have been numerous examples in the Turkish media about similar cases; those interested in the respective trials can visit Dani Rodrik and Pinar Dogan’s blog (http://balyozdavasivegercekler.com/category/in-english) for Sledgehammer and Jenkin’s piece on Ergenekon (Jenkins 2009).

As of September 2013 through January 2014, the judicial processes surrounding the Balyoz and Ergenekon cases were starting to be questioned by the government and its supporters as well when interrogations began into a corruption scandal involving the sons of two ministers of the day on 17 December 2013. The government responded strongly to these interrogations considering them to have been organized by a secret ‘civil junta’ or ‘parallel state’ (namely the Gulen movement) positioned within the state but acting outside state bureaucracy. In arguing that the corruption scandal had been brought to the agenda to topple the government, the government declared a war against the Gulen movement. These developments accelerated the political tension from the last days of 2013 onwards without signs of abatement. The developments had an unexpected consequence, when a political consultant (Yalcin Akdogan) implied that Gulen movement had organized a similar plot against the military, thereby manipulating the Balyoz and Ergenekon cases. After this statement, both the military and the government took action to appeal to the judiciary to retry the cases. The Constitutional Court’s verdict on the violation of constitutional rights in these cases led to the release of all of the detainees.

As a consequence, the Balyoz and Ergenekon cases, which had once drawn massive public attention, were closed. The question now is how recent events have influenced the military’s self-perception of its role in society and the regime (and the state), and how the security paradigm should be defined and executed in the post-tutelage period. Harris makes the point for both pessimism and optimism:

And to this day, Turkish politicians still appear to believe (witness the Ergenekon case) that the military could step in again, not only to deal with widespread disorder, but even for nebulous causes such as violations of Ataturk’s secular policies. This perception continues to influence political attitudes and behavior. Indeed, it may have played a role in the drive of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) to join the European Union as a way to increase the guarantees against a military move. And this certainly was instrumental in delaying Abdullah Gul’s election as president until this course seemed ratified by hastily called elections...the military left the political scene to civilians by their own initiatives after each intervention; military interventions were by and large due to escalating disorder and violence in the country, but not due to the ambitions of the generals. (Harris 2011: 212)
CONCLUDING REMARKS

From the 1950s onwards the military has not aspired to hold power and institute a military regime similar to those of the Latin American countries or of Greece during the 1970s. Rather, the Turkish military supported democracy and, in principle, accepted the supremacy of civilians. Because it perceived its self-image as the guardian of secularism and of the security of the country, the military kept an eye on the political process, which led to several military interventions and institutionalized military presence in the political life. The military directly intervened in politics in 1960, 1971, and 1980, and mobilized civil society in 1997 vis-à-vis the government of the day. One of the main means by which the military has influenced civilians since 1960 has been to issue official statements. Turkey’s honeymoon with democracy ended with military intervention in 1960, which resulted in a new constitution within which the political roles of the military were safeguarded legally. The seeds of the politicization of the military were found in the political events that caused the military intervention and in the 1960 constitution that legitimized further interventions. The military intervened in the political process in 1971, 1980, and 1997, and in each case managed to enhance its political role by leading civilians to amend laws regarding the military’s role in politics.

Some commentators have attempted to make a connection between the military and the interests of the social classes that would putatively support military intervention by arguing that military interventions had indeed reinforced the social and economic interests of some groups (Savran 1986). However, Sakallioglu (1997: 154) convincingly demonstrates that those alignments were contextual and temporary, and over time the support given to military has declined. In the light of this trend, in the Turkish case, according to Narlı (2000) there is a fragile alliance, or as she calls it, an “imperfect concordance” among the military, political elites, and the citizenry. To her, civil/military relations in Turkey are a specific outcome of the cultural, social and institutional context that has originated from a stratified society and political culture (Narlı 2000: 119).

Similar to the views of Sakallioglu (1997), which we have considered in the introduction, Narlı suggests a significant aspect in understanding civilian/military relations is the concordance between the military and citizenry in that common values and goals of the society were better served by the army after the establishment of professionalism from the 1950s onwards (Narlı 2000: 120). As a case in point, Narlı argues that the activities of the military after 1997, such as the seventy-fifth anniversary of the Republic during which the military shared the public space in specific ceremonies with civilians, helped erode civil/military boundaries (Narlı 2000: 212). In addition, the army engaged in social works in Southeastern Anatolia, such as constructing bridges and providing materials for the area school, in an attempt to remove barriers between the society and the army. TAF’s success in the UN and NATO peacekeeping forces in Somalia and Bosnia further improved its prestige.

Nevertheless, Narlı’s examples might be considered little more than symbolic because, especially after 1980, the armed forces isolated itself from the rest of society by constructing residents, social activity centers, restaurants and summer camps intended only for the officers of the army. Given also the case of the OYAK, which we elaborate below, the army has become an exclusionary social class, which has created its own habitat.

The composition of the officer corps is not elitist, as we will see below in the discussion of Jenkins’s research (2005). The military’s recruitment methods thus illustrate a form of consensus. This also explains TAF’s unchallenged and perpetuating domination in Turkish politics, which until recently was not merely derived from its role in guarding the Republic, but also from its promotion and reproduction of the military ideology and militaristic culture among the public (Cizre 2004:11; Altinay 2004, 2009, and 2003; Altinay and Bora 2001). Not only has a militaristic culture been predominant in the perception of masculinity, it has been diffused throughout civilian society through the education system, not least through the now-abandoned classes on national security.

Decision-making in Turkey has always to some extent been under the influence of the armed forces’ participation in Turkish politics (Narlı, 2000; 118). Yet, during the 2000s this situation changed. After the 1980 coup, the impact of the military on civilian life shifted between partnership and influence. Some scholars define the post-coup era as the...
September 12 regime, referring to a situation in which state constituted the center and society the periphery. Here, the state aimed to impose on society an authoritarian and conservative statist concept of politics (İnsel 2003: 293). The Turgut Özal government, which came to power in the post-coup era and served until 1989, tried to initiate dominance over TAF. Yet, success of export-led growth and neo-liberal economic strategies of the Motherland Party (MP) strengthened the civilian sphere; this in turn challenged military supremacy in the state. For instance, Özal had the courage to recommend changes to the 1982 constitution and, as we have seen, refused to appoint TAF’s nominee for the chief of the Turkish general staff; instead, he took the initiative by appointing his own candidate in 1991. Necip Torumtay, though supported by Özal, later criticized Özal’s Gulf War policies and subsequently resigned from office.

The True Path Party (TPP)/Social Democratic People’s Party (SPP) coalition government, which was the successor to the MP, changed the nature of civilian-military relations and allied with the military. In the mid-1990s two significant factors, growth of political Islam and of Kurdish separatism, enhanced the dominant role and further justified the positioning of TAF in politics. An accelerated influence of the military in politics was a reaction to those issues. In the Welfare Party and TPP coalition government civil-military relations became tense because of the policies and attitudes of the Welfare Party. The majority of the population, including trade unions and NGOs, backed the campaign organized by the military and actively protested the anti-secular activities of the Welfare Party and of Islamist groups. Hence, in 1997, on February 28th, with great support from different segments of society—excluding some leftist, liberals and of course Islamists—NSC declared their decision to restore secularism in the state, education, and social life. This declaration was the end of the Welfare Party and TPP government. The measures taken by NSC, in the historic meeting, framed the mentality of TAF that would be imposed on politics. The “February 28th process” sought to efface any Islamic influence in politics, and to clear the public sphere from any Islamic image (Cizre and Çınar 2003: 310). In fact, TAF emphasized that the February 28th process was an ongoing one—army members who signed the NSC document were tried recently, but the court did not find criminal activity.

The translation of national security concerns into public policy has changed the meaning of democracy in that rights and liberties have been subordinated to the demands of security (Cizre and Çınar 2003: 321). With the success of the Welfare Party in 1994 local elections, TAF engaged in making and breaking governments, issued public demands and warnings to civilians, structured new bills through its own research units and departments, organized campaigns to mobilize the society for the danger of political Islam, gave the final decisions to hold elections in 1999, and influenced foreign policy (Cizre and Çınar 2003: 321). The traditional image of above-party politics (Jacoby, 2003; 673), nevertheless, was damaged with the active participation of TAF in politics when it behaved as a political party.

The direct involvement of the military in civilian life on February 28th was criticized by Mesut Yılmaz, the prime minister of the day. He claimed that irtica was not the number one question for Turkey. Yılmaz implied that intervention was justified only in the case of a “clear and present” danger (Cizre and Çınar 2003: 313). The coalition government, established in 1999 and led by Bülent Ecevit, worked in harmony with the army; the imprisonment of Abdullah Ocalan, the leader of PKK, surely played a role in this regard.

Thanks to the EU reforms, the influence of civilians was strengthened during the 2000s. However, the major rupture in civilian-military relations that changed the situation in favour of the civilians has been brought on by the Sledgehammer (Balyoz) and Ergenekon cases. Only a few now support the idea of an active role for the military in politics, thus the armed forces would have hardly any legitimacy were it to decide to intervene in politics. The political struggle has been made within the civilian sphere, among the elected government and the Gulen movement, which had previously aligned with the AKP to weaken the old power structures. The failed coup attempt that took place on July 15thhas prompted the government to clean the Gulenists from the armed forces and introduce new laws in order to maintain absolute control over the military. The new role of the military in this development has yet to be seen. But, it is evident that the recent chaos in the Middle East as well as the direct threat of terrorism now affecting Turkey are bringing security concerns to the fore.

Not only has the image of the military been damaged after the coup attempt, but its
socially isolated structure has been challenged. Immediately after the coup, the government relocated and took over the military barracks located in city centers. Military hospitals have been transferred to civilians and military high schools, about which we will provide further information in the Annex, are closed. The General-in-chief is now directly responsible to the president, and the high commanders of the land, navy and air forces to the prime minister.

All of these developments signal the beginning of a new era, the path of which has not been clearly determined yet, although early signs suggest that civilians intend to establish absolute control over the military and put an end to its autonomous structure. This new direction can be seen as the end of the trend towards professionalization in civilian-military relations in Turkey.

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ANNEX:
THE MILITARY’S INTERNAL STRUCTURE AND ITS SELF-PERCEPTION

This section of the paper covers the internal structure of the military by focusing on recruitment, career structure, payment conditions, discipline and officer ethos. The purpose of this enquiry is to cast light on the following issues: the roots of the military’s prestige in Turkish culture; the position of minorities in the armed forces (i.e., whether they have been able to gain promotion to higher ranks); the daily practices of the military through which we can observe its ideological and religious orientations; the formal and informal means used by the military to consolidate its discipline; and the financial situation of military officers. This section has a more sociological orientation and provides concrete examples from the military’s daily practices. The intention is to add some sociological soul to the paper, thereby freeing it from a mere formal-institutionalist frame of analysis.

The Turkish military is the second largest force, after the army of United States, in NATO. There are approximately a total of 400,000 personnel in the land forces, 63,000 in the navy, and 53,000 in the air force (Cizre 2007: 4). The history of the Turkish army is said to date back to 209 BC when a systematized army was founded by the Hun leader Mete Han. As mentioned, the Turkish military differs from the world’s other militaries because it has been motivated by the Kemalist doctrine. This has resulted in the military perceiving itself as the representative of the will of the Turkish nation, as elected civilians could not take on the responsibility of such a duty because they tended to be corrupt and deviated from the secular and nationalist principles of Kemalism. Civilians are, therefore, to be kept under tutelage. To reiterate, the armed forces have never attempted to be involved in the daily practices of political life. While the military has intervened in politics, it has never aimed to establish a military rule. The military has declared itself committed to democracy and describes its acts as fine-tuning, implying that it does not aim to change the system utterly.

As mentioned, TAF is under the command of the Turkish General Staff (TGS), led by a chief of staff. The practice so far has been to appoint a member of the military as the chief, although there is no hierarchy among the different departments of the army. The chief is not merely a coordinator of the army, but is also entitled to represent each of the navy, air forces, and the army (Jenkins 2005: 22). The Gendarmerie is in charge of the security of the non-urban areas, which covers the villages, or other small-scale residential areas or non-residential areas. It is under the control of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, but its personnel, training and equipment are provided by TAF (Jenkins 2005: 22).

The TGS is subordinate to the Prime Minister, instead of the Ministry of Defense as is normal practice in Western democracies. The Ministry of Defense is responsible for conscription and military spending. In protocol the chief of staff outranks the minister of defense. TAF has adapted an organizational scheme similar to the American system of J-chiefs, involving seven departments, each with its respective responsibility:

- J-1 for personnel;
- J-2 for the arrangement and evaluation of internal and foreign intelligence from both the Turkish National Intelligence Organization (MIT), police and gendarmerie;
- J-3 for operations planning and training;
- J-4 for logistics;
- J-5 for strategic policies, threat assessment, budgets and military agreements;
- J-6 for communications;
- J-7 for studies of military history and strategy (Jenkins 2005:22).
The army, the navy, and the air forces have their own military academies, which cadets can enter around the age of 19. Military high-schools, which were closed following the failed coup attempt of July 15, and academies provide a modern education with the most contemporary equipment. The majority of students in the academies come from the five military high schools, which provide education for students aged 14 to 19. The academies of the army, navy and air force now admit female students. There are several female pilots; however, high-profile positions are still filled by men (Jenkins 2005: 23). Selection processes to both the academies and the high-schools are competitive, involving physical endurance along with required academic achievements. Candidates are screened as if they had committed a crime or engaged in political activities. Interrogations include the candidate’s family. Special groups of concern in such interrogations are the leftist, Kurdish and religiously-oriented students (Jenkins 2005: 23).

The personnel of the TGS are drawn from lower middle-class families; whereas the upper-class prefers to engage in other occupations, the lower-classes do not have access to essential background education (Jenkins 2005: 23). Jenkins (2005) claims that a military caste has not emerged in the Turkish caste system, because officers often discourage their children from a career like theirs (Jenkins 2005: 23).

When it comes to the career opportunities of ethnic-groups, we see the following practice. Ethnically Kurdish candidates have passed through a detailed interrogation since the mid-1980s when the PKK started an insurgency. There are no official or unofficial texts that document discrimination against the admittance of ethnically Kurdish, Alewite and non-Muslim citizens to the academies or opportunities for promotion. A career in the military for Kurdish and Alewite groups is possible provided that they submit to the principles of Kemalism like their ethnically Turkish colleagues. The same does not hold true for the non-Muslim minorities, namely Christians (Greek and Armenian) and Jewish citizens (Jenkins 2005: 24).

The career structure in TAF is strictly meritocratic, thereby favouritism and nepotism is not allowed. Officers of TAF are often moved every two-three years from one place to another, usually between developed and less developed places. The high degree of relocation aims to preclude “cliques loyal to a specific commander or a strong identification with a specific unit or region” (Jenkins 2005: 24).

There are two types of officers: staff and non-staff. The former posting is highly limited and competitive. Among the average 450–500 officers who graduate from the army academy each year, only 75 will become staff officers. These are then registered in the army staff academy, and after graduation gain senior positions with higher salaries (Jenkins 2005: 25). From these 75 graduates only 24 colonels can rise to the rank of general. Promotions are considered each year in August at the annual meeting of the Supreme Military Council (SMC), which consists of the prime minister, defense minister, and all 15 four-star generals and admirals (Jenkins 2005: 25). On paper, the SMC is chaired by the prime minister, with the chief of the General Staff acting as secretary. Until very recently, the military has had the final say on appointments and promotions. However, since 2011, discretion has been transferred to civilians. The main criteria for promotion from colonel to general are personal competence and disciplinary record. The competition becomes even stricter for promotion from a one-star general to a four-star general; therefore discussions on promotion often take more than a day. Until recently, the SMC could filter out pious or religiously oriented officers with the charge of involvement in non-disciplinary acts. This practice has now changed as religious orientation is no longer defined as a non-disciplinary act. The officers who were so charged previously can apply to receive their titles back.

After the failed coup attempt of 15 July a large number of Gulenists were expelled from the military.

According to the rules, the prime minister, the chief of TAF, and the minister of defense jointly submit a list of nominees for service commanders to the president. However, in practice, until recently, appointments were decided by the chief of the TGS, based on the seniority of the candidates. The chief will have informed the prime minister before the meeting about the list. A similar procedure has also been used for the selection of the chief of the TGS; on paper, the candidate for chief was selected by the Council of Ministers and ratified by the president. The practice, however, has been the selection of the succeeding
Until recently the military has been firmly against civilian intervention into their organization and operations, including recruitment and promotion practices. One of the causes of the 1960 coup was the willingness of the government to influence promotions. Generals were strictly forbidden to establish close relationships with politicians (Jenkins 2005: 27). Politicians attempted to appoint their own candidates to the chief post twice: once in 1977 and again in 1987. Whereas the former attempt was unsuccessful, in the latter case then president Turgut Ozal managed to have his own nominee, Necip Torumtay, chosen as chief. However, Torumtay resigned within three years, as he did not support Ozal’s willingness to be involved in the American invasion of Iraq.

The salaries of military officers are adequate; they are slightly higher than salaries of governmental officials but not competitive with the private sector. Officers also have access to several benefits, including subsidized housing, free medical care, and leisure activities that often take place within the premises of the armed forces. Like government officials, military officers are entitled to a lump sum when they retire, which is sufficient to purchase a decent apartment. Officers and their families enjoy free health benefits during their retirement (Jenkins 2005: 27). Generals might have the chance to be employed in the private sector when they retire from the military. Otherwise, other members of the personnel including the colonels might experience “social isolation” and difficulties in finding alternative jobs when they retire in their late 40s or early 50s (Jenkins 2005: 27).

Criminal acts involving the military are handled in the military courts. These crimes may include acts committed by individuals who do not fulfil mandatory military service requirements, acts committed against military personnel, or infractions that take place on the military sites. Discipline in the armed forces is firmly implemented. Even a breach of traffic regulations can preclude promotion. Offences of an ideological nature are the responsibility of the SMC. Jenkins (2005: 28) notes that, during the period of 1995 and August 2000, “a total of 745 serving officers were expelled from the military for ideological reasons, almost all of them for suspected Islamist sympathies.” The suspicion towards religion, however, does not mean that religion (Islam) is utterly absent in the Turkish military. Quite the opposite, regular praying and fasting during the Ramadan is not an uncommon practice in the military; all warships of the navy possess a Koran; and military corps cry ‘Bismillah’ before firing (Jenkins 2005: 28). The military is called the prophet’s heart (Peygamber Ocagi) (Narli 2000). Otherwise, the military has been sensitive to religious orientations that have been considered anti-secular or propagandistic (Jenkins 2005: 28).

Under the constitutional guarantee of Article 125, the decisions of the SMC were not subject to appeal until recently. Expulsion from the military for religious leanings stigmatizes officers, because they have been accused of being engaged in “ill-disciplined” activities. (Jenkins 2005: 29). The military and observers of Turkish politics have mentioned in particular the Gulen movement’s aim to gain access to the armed forces. As the criteria of defining anti-secular activities were somewhat subjective, many officers complained about the decisions of the SMC (Jenkins 2005: 29). However, the failed coup attempt in 2015, which was led by Gulenists, justified the scepticism against the Gulen movement.

The roots of the officer ethos can be found in the military schools and academies, where the cadets are trained to protect the principles of Kemalism. Another aspect of military ethos is hierarchy, which also has its roots in the military schools. As a practice, cadets should show respect even to senior students. One can argue that the prevailing strict discipline and hierarchy existing in the armed forces reflect social values and norms (Jenkins 2005: 30). In the beginning of their education, cadets swear to dedicate their lives to their country and to the principles of Kemalism. The weight of Kemalist teaching has been intensified, particularly following the 1980 military-coup. Jenkins (2005: 31) explains the reason for this as being the polarization of the society in the 1970s along the lines of Marxism and ultra-nationalism. Kemalism continued to be the ideological core of the military after the 1980s through the threats of Kurdish separatism and of political Islam. Political attachment to the principles of Kemalism is often accompanied by a mystical perception of Ataturk. Each March 13th, military schools commemorate Ataturk’s enrollment as a cadet. In this ceremony, cadets shout “Present!” in unison when the name of Ataturk is announced in a symbolic rollcall. The sentimental reactions of the cadets (as well as other sections of
the society) reach a peak with commemoration of the anniversary of Ataturk’s death on November 10th. One might find photographs of clouds or mountains hung on the walls in the training academies because of the resemblance of the clouds or the mountains to the facial structure of Ataturk (Jenkins 2005: 32). Another aspect of the military ethos is to isolate the conflicting views and chaos within the institutional structure of the armed forces (Jenkins 2005: 31). One reason for this might be the case to sustain hierarchical relationships and the efficiency of the institution.

The military’s involvement and interest in the economy

This section examines the sectors in which the military has been active in the economy. One dimension of this enquiry is to show the sectors in which the military has invested and had direct control. With this remark, I mean to examine the military enterprise known as the Armed Forces Trust and Pension Fund (OYAK), which was founded in 1961 and has since become one of the largest ten and among the most profitable business enterprises in Turkey. The armed forces has invested in diverse sectors, including industry, finance, and services, amongst others. OYAK is an interesting case, for it enjoys both the legal status of any other public enterprise and is thus immune from heavy taxation, and the legal status of a private enterprise and is thus free from government control.

This section is not limited to the OYAK case; the relationship between the military and economy is not limited to the non-militaristic economic activities of the military. Military spending, which involves public procurement within the defense and security sector, should also be examined; control of the defense budget is a contested issue in civilian-military relations.

The military involves and shows interest in the economy in three aspects. First, the military is an economic actor with its military holding company, the Armed Forces Trust and Pension Fund (OYAK). The second aspect is military spending; what is peculiar in the Turkish case is that high and ascending levels of military spending are not under the control of the political institutions, but the military. The third aspect is the military industry as well as the tendency towards militarization of the Turkish industrial sector (Akça 2010:5).

One of the explanations provided by Akça (2010: 6) for the weak or absent civilian control over the military is Turkey’s involvement in capitalist modernization processes at a comparatively later stage than Western states. As a consequence, to Akça (2010: 6), the military emerges as “an economic actor in all fields of the economy (production, trade, finance) and “[t]his implies, in the Turkish context, the conversion of the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) into a capitalist collective: The military officer becomes an industrialist, a merchant, a financial investor, and a rentier.”

The Turkish case is relatively more developed in this sense when compared to other countries that show similar characteristics in the ways in which the military is involved in the economy. For example, such an idea emerged in Pakistan in 1953, though it could only become effective in the 1970s. Moreover, Pakistan executed a different model than comparable cases, with the military officers being given a separate trust fund managed by a different holding company. China, too, followed a strategy of establishing military-led holding companies in the 1970s. It was common practice in the Central American countries (such as Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua), where a military junta was in power after the Second World War, to introduce trust funds. However, there too trust funds only become effective after the 1990s (Akça 2010: 6). Security has not been thought of solely as a public good since the 1980s, as privatization started in this sector.

The Armed Forces Trust and Pension Fund (OYAK)

The military acts as a powerful economic actor through OYAK, which has a peculiar organizational form that blurs the distinction between the civilian and military domains with regards to “its legal status, its administrative structure, and its activities” (Akça 2010: 8). OYAK was established on January 3, 1961, after the military coup of 1960, by the transitional executive organ (National Unity Committee) that was formed by the military. Therefore, the process by which OYAK came into existence was not by way of normal
political channels, though it has since been accepted by the political system and society. It is ironic that the groups (bureaucracy, intellectuals, and industrialists) that supported the military takeover, and the military officers, established and then participated in the administration of OYAK. Given that military officers had complained about the economic difficulties that they had experienced during the Democrat Party governments of the 1950s, the military officers justified the trust funds managed by the military as necessary to provide an adequate pension to military personnel (Akça 2010).

OYAK has a hybrid identity that combines the characteristics of both a public and a private organization. It enjoys “the jurisdiction of either private or public law depending on the context” (Akça 2010: 8). Although autonomous in terms of its management and finances, OYAK is integrated in the Ministry of Defense. Legal provisions assign OYAK a public character by regarding all of its assets and revenues as state property; as such, a person or an institution that comes into a situation of being in conflict with OYAK is treated as if they were in conflict with the state. In other words, OYAK enjoys the “rights, authorities, and privileges” afforded any other public institution (Akça 2010: 8).

Recently, the management team of OYAK has stressed that the OYAK holding company that invests in industrial production and is involved in the financial sector is detached from military control; however, the military continues its control with military officers dominating the higher management and board positions (Akça 2010: 9). In addition, “[t]he permanent members of the organization are active officers, non-commissioned officers (NCOs), and civil servants in the Turkish Armed Forces. Their membership in the fund is compulsory and they constitute the majority of the 250,000 plus members” (Akça 2010: 9).

Primarily, OYAK is an enforced savings institution; a compulsory membership fee is deducted monthly from the wages of the both permanent staff (10 percent) and non-commissioned officers (5 percent). Needless to say, these contributions constitute major resources of the holding, providing a regular and secure income (Akça 2010: 9). OYAK is also a complementary social security organization, which supplements the regular national pensions fund for its members by offering them social welfare (pension and death and disability benefits) and social services (credits and loan financing) (Akça 2010: 9). As a result, “OYAK operates as a compulsory savings institution, a supplementary social security and welfare organization, and a holding company” (Akça 2010: 9).

The OYAK holding currently consists of 60 companies that are either joint ventures (31) or completely owned by OYAK (29) operating under the holding (Akça 2010: 10). Its engagement in economic activities with numerous companies and capital makes OYAK one of the five holdings in Turkey along with the private holdings such as Koc, Sabanci and Cukurova that has played a considerable role in Turkey’s economy (Akça 2010: 10). It has largely concentrated investments in automotive manufacture, cement, iron-steel, and agricultural products (Akça 2010: 12).

However, in a competitive economy, OYAK enjoys some privileges, which its counterparts do not. First and foremost, it has exemptions from several taxes, including “income, corporate, inheritance, estate transfer taxes, and revenue stamp duties” (Akça 2010: 11). However, its partner companies pay those taxes. Furthermore, obligatory salary deductions from military personnel creates a consistent cash source for OYAK, which has been particularly helpful for the holding in surviving the great economic crises that Turkey endured during the late 1990s and early 2000s. Moreover, OYAK possessions are considered public property, and the relationship between OYAK and its members fall under military jurisdiction, which limits the principal (represented) and agency (institutions that represent) relationship. All in all, these privileges provide OYAK considerable economic advantages (Akça 2010: 11).

Economy policies of the state from the 1960s onwards also contributed to the growth of OYAK into one of the largest holdings because of the oligopolistic tendencies of industrial production that privileges large portions of production to the hands of a number of large holdings. These holdings enjoyed the import-substitute growth strategy between the 1960s and 1980s that aimed to protect the domestic market through high tariff barriers. Neoliberal policies of the 1980s also helped the large holdings create high profits with state assistance through credits, subsidies and exemptions from taxes. As has been mentioned, OYAK had already been benefiting from tax exemptions because of its hybrid identity. In this period
OYAK also took economic advantage of the massive privatization process and the tendency of capital to flow in the direction of finance. While it purchased state-led enterprises either on its own or in partnerships, especially during the 1990s, OYAK also lent money to the state. As a consequence, it has become a major economic player in the mid-1990s (Akça 2010: 12).

The OYAK experience suggests a peculiar case wherein the military acts not as a minor economic actor, but as a major player in the process of Turkey’s industrialization and integration to capitalism (Akça 2010: 13). Thanks to the parallel social security system created by OYAK—however compulsory this might be—military officers can enjoy the living conditions of upper-middle class (Akça 2010: 13). Combined with other subsidies offered by the military to its personnel, such as housing and recreational activities, benefits provided by OYAK have shielded the military (Akça 2010: 13) from the damaging effects of neoliberal policies and economic crises after the 1980s. Surely, OYAK also reinforced the privileged position of the military vis-à-vis society, segregating the army from the rest of the society (Akça 2010: 13). Akça observes that OYAK has not been subjected to scrutiny by the EU. The implication seems to be that OYAK’s partnership with the AXA group and Renault as well as the fact that 15 percent of Turkey’s defense industry imports are from Germany has spared OYAK from EU (Akça 2010: 14).

The military has control over military spending in terms of defense budget allocations and justifications for spending. There are a number of reasons that preclude the political institutions (i.e., the parliament and cabinet) from challenging the power of the military in this domain. The central constraint is the asymmetry of power, given that the non-military groups lack or have insufficient expertise in the field (Akça 2010: 23). This situation is surely not peculiar to the Turkish case; advanced democracies also encounter the same problem (Cizre 2007).

Unlike advanced capitalist countries, the historical evolution of Turkey’s military-financial and/or military-industrial structure followed a trajectory that began with investments from military holdings and expanded after 1980 into a classical model of the military-industrial complex. This period was also marked by high rates of military spending combined with the fast-paced development of military industry. Yet, similar to the case of military spending, TAF enjoyed absolute control over military tenders, procurement, and projects. The presence of the military as a capitalist collective also affected the military-industrial environment, and consequently a military foundation (TAFF) emerged as the leading actor in the sector, alongside other smaller, private companies. (Akça 2010: 24)

What is peculiar to the role that the military has played in the economy is that, unlike its western counterparts, the Turkish military has proactively engaged in investment in the industrial and financial sector through numerous corporations attached to the OYAK holdings. In the meantime, particularly after the 1980s, the Turkish industrial sector and Turkish universities have shown interest in the defense sector in order to develop a national defense industry that would respond to the modernization demands of the Turkish army while working to become a major exporter of defense systems. In fact, an earlier attempt in this regard was taken after the US embargo as a result of the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974. Yet, major steps towards modernization of the armed forces took place in the mid-1980s, followed by significant increases in the budget allocated with this endeavour in the mid-1990s (while in 1985 the budget was 12 billion dollars, in 1996, 150 billion dollars were allocated to be used over the next 30 years) (Akça 2010: 24). The objectives of the modernization projection were to supply the Turkish army the weaponry that was the product of the latest technological innovations and to increase the share of the national defense industry (Akça 2010: 24). As a result, the rate of self-sufficiency increased to 44.2 percent in 2008 from 25 percent in 2003 (Akça 2010: 25). However, the military industry could only create employment for 17,841 people (Akça 2010: 27). As a consequence of the systematic investment in the military industry, exports increased from 138 million dollars in 2003 to 576 million dollars in 2008. However, it remains an ambitious aim for Turkey to become a major exporter in a market by and large dominated by the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Israel and Germany (Akça 2010: 27).
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ENDNOTES

1 The institutional actors taking part in the security sector include: the armed forces, National Security Council, military judiciary, police, gendarmerie, police, coast guard, special operations unit, private security, temporary village guards, police intelligence, national intelligence organization, and gendarmerie intelligence.

2 To quote from Berksoy (2013:8) these changes include the following: “In 2006, the legal amendment specified that in times of peace, civilians who commit crimes referred to in the Military Criminal Law will be tried in a civilian court. In the 2010 referendum, the military judiciary was limited to crimes committed by military personnel with respect to military duties and crimes against the constitutional order are likewise to be tried in civilian courts. The structures of the institutions acting as the military’s prop within the judiciary, such as the Supreme Council of Judges and Prosecutors (HSYK) and the Constitutional Court were transformed and the necessary legal amendments were made to allow individuals to seek justice for dismissal decisions taken by the Supreme Military Council (YAŞ).” Again in 2010, the EMASYA protocols regulating the intervention of military forces in cases of public disorder were abolished. In the same year, the task of preparing the National Security Policy Document was transferred mainly to the political power.

This CMI Working Paper presents an analysis of civilian-military relations in Turkey, casting light on institutional, legal and economic aspects that have shaped the military's role in society. An assessment of contemporary civilian-military relations in Turkey needs to be informed by a historical background. To that end, this paper chronicles how the military has evolved since the Ottoman Empire up till today, emphasising key historical processes that influence the dynamics between military and civilian powers. The paper concludes by observing that in recent decades the Turkish military has, by and large, withdrawn from the political scene, yet that recent political developments in the region and a corresponding intensification of security concerns leave open how this may evolve. Civilian-military relations have been considered in the context of the failed coup attempt of July 2015 in which the government aimed at absolute control over the armed forces and the military lost all of its major privileges.