Dynamics of destabilisation indevelopment interventions in South Kordofan, 2005-2011

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About the author

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The programme Assisting Regional Universities in Sudan and South Sudan (ARUSS) aims to build academic bridges between Sudan and South Sudan. The overall objective is to enhance the quality and relevance of teaching and research in regional universities.

As part of the program, research is carried out on a number of topics which are deemed important for lasting peace and development within and between the two countries. Efforts are also made to influence policy debates and improve the basis for decision making in both countries as well as among international actors. ARUSS is supported by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Abstract

This paper outlines the landscape of development interventions in South Kordofan between the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005 and the start of a new war in June 2011. Given the constant political volatility during this period and the resurgence of violent political contest, the study traces the conditions under which such interventions took place. It analyses the impact of the political context, but also looks at how the interventions related to this context during planning, implementation and evaluation. As a case study, IFAD’s South Kordofan Rural Development Programme is followed into the area in and around Heiban, a rural centre in the central Nuba Mountains, where it was supposed to extend a system of community development committees linked to public administration. The study’s perspective on actors involved in the programme to a variable extent shows not only the complexity of social relations it was interwoven with, but also how this and similar interventions emerged on the ground as part of a plurality of social institutions and organisational structures, in spite of their design as singular contribution to a given situation. Reading context and case study together, the paper argues that any evaluation of development interventions and their consequences in a region like South Kordofan fails to be adequate, if political accountability and political legitimacy are left out or marginalized in the analysis. Instead of being approached as an isolated interaction with ‘local communities’, specific conditions of gaining influence have to be understood, if a substantial contribution is expected to be made.
List of abbreviations

ADF African Development Fund
BCPR Bureau of Crisis Prevention and Recovery
CBO Community-based organisation
CLARIS Community Livelihoods and Rural Industry Support
CPA Comprehensive Peace Agreement
DCA DanChurchAid
DDR Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
EU European Union
FAO Food and Agriculture Organisation
GIS Geographic Information System
GoNU Government of National Unity
GoS Government of Sudan
HAC Humanitarian Affairs Commission
ICC International Criminal Court
IFAD International Fund for Agricultural Development
IWRM Integrated Water Resource Management
JAM Joint Assessment Mission
JMC Joint Military Commission
JMM Joint Monitoring Mission
MDG Millennium Development Goal
MDTF Multi Donor Trust Fund
MIC Ministry of International Cooperation
NCA Norwegian Church Aid
NCP National Congress Party
NGO Non-governmental organisation
NISS National Intelligence and Security Service
NMAA National Mine Action Authority
NMPACT Nuba Mountains Programme Advancing Conflict Transformation
NRRDO Nuba Recovery, Rehabilitation and Development Organisation
OCHA Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid
PDF Popular Defence Forces
RCO  Resident Coordinator’s Office
SAID  Sudan Aid Information Database
SDG  Sustainable Development Goal
SKADP  South Kordofan Agricultural Development Programme
SKRDP  South Kordofan Rural Development Programme
SPCRP  Sudan Productive Capacity Recovery Programmes
SPLM/A  Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army
SRRC  Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission
TRMA  Threat and Risk Mapping Analysis
TRP  Threats and Risks Programme
UNDP  United Nations Development Programme
UNEP  United Nations Environment Programme
UNICEF  United Nations Children’s Fund
UNIDO  United Nations Industrial Development Organization
UNMAO  United Nations Mine Action Organisation
UNMIS  United Nations Mission in Sudan
USAID  United States Agency for International Development
USDA  United States Department of Agriculture
WES  Water, Environment and Sanitation
WFP  World Food Programme
WSARP  Western Sudan Agricultural Research Project
1. Introduction

For South Kordofan, the period 2005 to 2011 represented the closest approximation to peace since the 1980s. A Ceasefire Agreement between the Government of Sudan (GoS) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) had been in place since 2002, but was characterized by military zones dominated by both war parties and kept divided by an international force, the Joint Military Commission (JMC). The years following the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005, however, put to test how far peace had a chance to emerge in the area. Given that the war has again been raging since June 2011, this test, however, must be considered as failed.

There already exist numerous studies analysing how and why this failure occurred (e.g., Rottenburg et al. 2011, Gramizzi and Tubiana 2013). The study at hand rather focuses on the efforts of rehabilitation and construction that occurred during those years, albeit with a central perspective on dynamics of destabilisation. Considering the central concept of ‘sustainability’ in present development discourses, this perspective tries to capture the struggles in and around development interventions not just to achieve their goals, but even to keep them alive. While it has been often noted how disruptive these interventions themselves can be to previous social arrangements – especially large-scale development programmes – it is the vulnerability of the interventions that is in question here, based on the argument that it reflects the vulnerability of the targeted beneficiaries as well.

Given the hope that another period of ‘peace’ may come about, this is not a trivial wisdom of hindsight or second-guessing. It is also not about the formulation of ‘lessons learned’, which often neglects the historicity of development interventions. The aim is to show the importance of analytical tools that take into account both the structural, more lasting, and the situational elements of the sites in which such interventions emerge (for a detailed argument, see Ille 2013).

Some general observations on political developments have to be made beforehand; others will be added throughout the text. The ‘peace’ period in South Kordofan can be described best as an interplay of cursory demilitarization and peace-building programmes on the one hand, and more or less covert militarization and a continuing mindset of war on the other. The existence of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programmes, for instance, coincided with the renewal of membership lists for SPLA and the government-sponsored Popular Defence Forces (PDF). The latter were provided, in the midst of ‘peace-building’, with a new building in South Kordofan’s capital Kadugli and were readily merged into the Rapid Support Forces during the present war in an attempt to consolidate paramilitary forces under the umbrella of Sudan’s National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS). In the meantime, the proliferation of weapons throughout the state continued and gave strength to a security paradigm that pervaded many development interventions as well.

Certainly the struggles between and within the dominant political organisations have to be regarded as providing the largest momentum of destabilisation. The uneasy alliances forged on several levels were not in the position to provide a sense of certitude and trust towards the future that could have sustained constructive activities and is, in general, foundational for all kinds of development interventions. Although the ultimate breakdown of physical public security occurred mainly from June 2011 onwards, the lack of human security in the sense of predictability and continuity of social relations and livelihoods destabilised such interventions already in the years before.

What is intended with this study is to highlight how different development interventions were related to these conditions. As a textual strategy, the chosen structure ventures from a standard model of a project cycle to map the dynamics that ‘upset’ or destabilised such cycles. This is not done in the
sense of an audit, since an audit starts from the presumption that everything should go according to plan, scanning for deviations. The study rather starts from an understanding of models “as an analytical representation of particular aspects of reality created as an apparatus or protocol for interventions in order to shape this reality for certain purposes” (Behrends, Park and Rottenburg 2014: 1-2).

On this basis, the deviation from plans or destabilisation of interventions are regarded as inevitable dynamics during the translation of models into practice, a difference especially practitioners ‘in the field’ are very familiar with, constantly working to bring model and practice in touch with each other or, in the terminology used here, to stabilise the intervention. Retrospective analysis of destabilisation is also already integrated into internal and external evaluations of most development interventions, especially donor-driven ones. This is, however, often based on an input-output model that works with boundaries dividing the inside and outside of an intervention.

In this study, interventions are understood as constantly emerging and in-the-making, as much as at-work. In analytical practice, this shifts attention from boundaries to boundary-making, from social orders to social ordering, in short, from structure to processes of structuring. Unlike those in charge of evaluating interventions in the conventional sense, the internal and external, as well as inputs and outputs, are not treated here as pre-given categories. Instead of identifying achievements and failures, the emergence of development interventions is seen as part of anticipated and unanticipated consequences of overlapping social actions, purposive and non-purposive. It is the perspective of individually involved actors that gives a rather positive or rather negative value to these consequences, and it is this broader notion of evaluation that is of importance here.

Accordingly, the text is divided into three sections: planning, implementation and evaluation. The first section outlines some major development programmes and projects that were supposed to be implemented in South Kordofan after 2005. The second section follows a specific intervention into the field, namely the South Kordofan Rural Development Programme of the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), partly based on written representations such as reports, partly based on the author’s fieldwork between 2005 and 2010 (Ille 2013). The third section looks at consequences of interventions as described by involved actors, wherein political participation and political accountability emerged as crucial, albeit neglected aspects.

In conclusion, it is argued that the design, practice and assessment of development interventions in South Kordofan has to take stock of these aspects if a meaningful link between their organisational stabilisation and the region’s economic, social and political stabilisation is intended.

2. Planning

In development planning, the future is looked at through the disparities between ‘what is’ and ‘what should be’. The benchmarks for ‘should be’ result from complex processes of prioritisation, both globally circulating, such as in the discourse on Millennium/Sustainable Development Goals (MDGs/SDGs), and related to a specific intervention’s background. These processes carry numerous assumptions and political implications which are often not explicitly formulated, but may become apparent during attempts of implementation. In this sense, the following account of post-2005 development interventions in South Kordofan gives a general background to such attempts, one of which will be looked at more closely in part 3.
2.1 Governance

During the years after 2000, many plans were drawn up for a prospective period of peace and recovery in Sudan, supporting post-war rehabilitation (Koop 2001), voluntary return (IOM & UNDP 2003) and agricultural revival (Council of Ministers 2008). They also took the form of national and federal five-year and 25-year plans. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA, 2005) itself was actually a planning framework for the so-called transitional period (2005-2011) under a Government of National Unity (GoNU).

In South Kordofan, a central concern of such plans was the transformation of a war-based separation of areas, dominated by the GoS and the SPLM/A, respectively, into an integrated administrative system. Before 2005, the first steps to integrate development interventions and cooperation between the war parties had been taken by forming the Nuba Mountains Programme Advancing Conflict Transformation (NMPACT) in 2002 through an agreement between the governmental Humanitarian Affairs Commission (HAC), SPLM’s Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (SRRC) and the UN Resident Coordinator’s Office (RCO), still under the umbrella of UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid (OCHA); financial and technical support was given by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the World Bank, among others (Pantuliano 2005a, Pantuliano 2005b, Bradbury & Gamal Eldin 2006). During this period, peace-keeping in the region was supervised by the Joint Monitoring Mission / Joint Military Commission (JMM/JMC), a cooperation of national and international monitors created on the basis of a Ceasefire Agreement signed on 19 January 2002 in Bergenstock (Souverijn-Eisenberg 2005).

After the CPA had been signed, the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) was formed as general reference body for peace-keeping, and the Resident Coordinator’s Office received in May 2005 the mandate to guide the implementation of the peace agreement under a new umbrella, the Joint Assessment Mission (JAM) for Sudan. The replacement of NMPACT also showed the new status of the region in the UN system as needing ‘recovery and development’, not ‘relief’ (Hockley 2005).

The JAM formulated in 2005 a comprehensive plan for the transitional period, the Framework for Sustained Peace, Development and Poverty Eradication, in agreement with the former war parties and involving a group of organizations under the leadership of the World Bank and UN agencies. In its first report, the need to enhance participation and local demands in decision-making to address the conflictual relationship between centre and periphery was stressed, supporting the process of post-conflict reconstruction and development which JAM was intended to facilitate (JAM 2005: 11-12).

The Framework was also the basis of a donor conference in Oslo in April 2005, where the Multi Donor Trust Funds (MDTF) were formed with an initial pledge of US$ 500 million. The Technical Secretariat of the Khartoum office of these Funds wrote in March 2008 a growth diagnostic for South Kordofan, where efforts to generate a better future were set against a situation of “protracted effects of conflict and gross under-provision of basic services” (Klugman and Wee 2008: ii), but also “marginalization by the center” and governance failures to be tackled by planned action guided by clear prioritisation (Klugman and Wee 2008: 29).

Among interventions targeting such governance issues were ‘Local Governance Capacity Building in South Kordofan’ of the the UN Development Programme (UNDP), planned to run from 2006 to 2012, and the work of UNMIS Civil Affairs with South Kordofan’s parliament on legislation and implementation of power sharing, as stipulated in the CPA (Klugman and Wee 2008: 49). Interventions planned within the framework of the Participating Agency Service Agreement (PASA) of the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) with USAID were formulated to “lay the
foundation for democracy and good governance that will be required for successful implementation of the CPA’’ (US-AID-USDA 2006: 2).

Apart from ‘limited capacities’ or ‘political will’ as challenges for implementation, the discourse of evidence-based development also brought the lack of data into the spotlight of interventions, both for the sake of transparency of governmental performance and a sound need-supply balance. In the field of UN-related programmes, the annual United Nations & Partners Regional Working Plans for Southern Kordofan provided an overview, while UNDP put forward efforts to create databases on and for development interventions.

So the Sudan Aid Information Database (SAID) came into being as part of the Capacity Development for Aid Management and Coordination project, conducted together with the Ministry of International Cooperation (MIC) to document and analyse development aid data of the time after 2005 (<http://said.mic.gov.sd>, offline at the time of writing). Another database specific for South Kordofan was initiated by the RCO in Kadugli and prepared by UNDP’s Threats and Risks Programme (TRP) from 2008 onwards. It brought together data on non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and their activities from the RCO and a 2006 database of OCHA, which included assessments of South Kordofan’s situation during the running of NMPACT (NMPACT 2002, OUNRHS Sudan 2003, NMPACT 2005) and the UN Sudan Transition and Recovery Database (Starbase, http://reliefweb.int/node/129140). The database was then published on the UN Sudan Information Gateway (www.unsudanig.org, offline at the time of writing).

Working under UNDP’s Bureau of Crisis Prevention & Recovery (BCPR), the TRP created in agreement with several state governments Threat and Risk Mapping Analyses (TRMA), which showed on GIS-based maps existing facilities, projects and potential points of conflict, following the assumption that information about needs and conflicts will prompt state governments to do something about it.

### 2.2 Infrastructure

Among the priorities formulated by the MDTF-National’s growth diagnostic was “improved connectivity and access to markets” (Klugman and Wee 2008: v), which included access to transportation, communication and electricity (Klugman and Wee 2008: 96). Proposed interventions in this direction were formulated under the premise of trade-offs, favouring connections between major towns, resource-rich areas and supra-regional markets, in addition to “a need to look at options for rural roads to provide improved access to farmers, and to integrate local producers in the supply network” (Klugman and Wee 2008: 105). Already the report of JAM spoke of a lack of infrastructure as an obstacle to national unity, economic growth and social services (JAM 2005: 18) and the need for road construction and electrification (JAM 2005: 34).

In this direction, the MDTF-National formulated the South Kordofan Start-up Emergency Project, funded by the Government of National Unity with a budget of US$ 1.8 million. While the proposal anticipated road constructions by oil development companies for their own use, the project was intended to clear 50 km so-called secondary roads, grade additional 8 km and construct three bridges as well as eight culverts (MDTF-N 2005: 3) up to 2007. This was to be implemented by local private contractors under supervision of a consultant with equipment leased from major national hardware companies, combined with capacity building for the South Kordofan Ministry of Physical Planning and Public Utilities (MDTF-N 2005: 9-10). At the same time, the Community Livelihoods and Rural Industry Support (CLARIS) programme of UN’s Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), running since 2004, was supposed to be extended by turning it into the Kadugli Vocational Training Centre operating under the Ministry of Education. Opened in July 2009 (PWC 2010: 19), it was
intended to provide practical training for “young people, women and other vulnerable groups in rural areas” to “lead to sustainable self-employment or employment within the construction, manufacturing or service sectors” (MDTF-N 2005: 11).

The National Emergency Transport Rehabilitation Project, which was proposed in August 2006 (GoNU & WB 2006), was supposed to be directly funded by the MDTF and put forward two elements related to South Kordofan, the Road Improvement Program for the Nuba Mountains (US$ 21.2 million) and the Preparation of Rural Access Road Program for the ‘Three Areas’ (690 km, US$ 5 million). Diagnosing South Kordofan as an isolated state, better regional economic integration was to be fostered by building bridges and by demining, constructing and rehabilitating main roads (GoNU & WB 2006: 32). Prepared by local consultants and supervised by international consultants, these activities were to lead to a so-called orbit road leading from Kadugli to Talodi (150 km), from Abu Jibayha to Talodi (160 km) and from Kadugli to Kauda (135 km), the first of which was ultimately financed by the European Union through the Sudan Productive Capacity Recovery Programme (IFAD 2009c: A6). The second programme added roads between Kadugli, Heglig and Bentiu as link to the south, and between Muglad and Abyei as access for surrounding villages to the national road network (GoNU & WB 2006: 33).

To improve access to electricity, the 2006-2011 Five-Year Strategic Plan of the South Kordofan State Planning Council put electricity from the national grid up to extension for the sake of economic production and basic services in urban areas, identifying solar energy as a potential solution for rural areas (MDTF-N 2005: 30). This was addressed in MDTF-N’s Solar Electrification Programme in the frame of the Community Development Funds project, for which three localities in South Kordofan, Abu Jibayha, Rashad and Keilak, were chosen, added to in 2010 with a contract for solar panels in another 200 villages with the Solarman Company (PWC 2010: 10). In coordination with the State Ministry of Education, the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) also provided, up to 2010, 171 solar lamps as part of its supply of schools with basic equipment (PWC 2010: 19).

2.3 Water resource management

Another central concern of development planning was the availability of water, regarding both accessibility and distribution. In an assessment of Sudan’s environmental situation, a 2007 report by the UN Environment Programme (UNEP), Sudan’s “chronic shortage of freshwater” is noted, with extreme differences in water distribution and a “trend towards generally drier conditions” (UNEP 2007: 59). This assessment was based on studies in North and South Kordofan conducted in preparation of Sudan’s First National Communications under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (GoS 2003a, GoS 2003b), which had shown annual variations of precipitation of 65% and 15%, respectively (UNEP 2007: 59). The solution was seen in Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM), connecting improvement of information about resources and needs with the promotion of “equity, public participation and accountability” (UNEP 2007: 248).

One of the major planning efforts in this direction was part of the 2008 Strategic Map for South Kordofan, whose framework was a national 25 Year Strategy (2003-2027), pointing out provision of water to rural areas as “top priority” (HSC 2008: 83). Subsequent programmes should according be driven by a larger involvement of NGOs and private companies, more responsibility of communities for water management and supply maintenance, as well as the transformation of the governmental State Water Corporation into a monitoring rather than a providing institution (HSC 2008: 86). A supporting role was concretised for UNICEF’s Water, Environment and Sanitation programme (WES) and IFAD’s community development programme (see part 3). In terms of direct improvements in the first 10 years, the strategic map listed the “rehabilitation of 700 (non-operating) hand pumps, 25 water
yards, and construction of 2500 new hand pumps, 100 new water yards, and 20 high capacity dams” (HSC 2008: 87).

However, just large-scale dams were given specific attention regarding their potential output and sites. At this point, a profound contradiction appears in the relation between development planning, governance and public infrastructure. The planning focussed on storage of water for irrigation from major seasonal water courses, at odds with the initial statement that the focus of development interventions should be water supply in rural and war-affected areas, especially “war displaced population in their original villages or in the new resettlement areas” (HSC 2008: 85). This also corresponds with general public spending during that period, as the GoNU earmarked 60% of its budget on the five largest national projects, especially the Merowe Dam (WB 2007: vi), mostly benefitting urban populations in gentrified areas, not the populations announced to be the priority.

This contradiction indicates a gap between proclaimed intention and concrete efforts that became even wider during implementation, as will be shown in the following section.

3. Implementation

While development plans were built around the assumption that ‘peace’ in South Kordofan would remedy past shortcomings or even injustices, their practical implementation could not be expected to easily emancipate itself from the conditions that triggered their creation. If practices are understood as “organized nexuses of activity” (Schatzki 2001: 48), then practices of development interventions have to be seen in connection with existing activities of actors getting involved in them. In this sense, the subsequent look at implementation tries to illuminate through a case study, how involvement in and connection to a development intervention took place.

The case study goes deeper into a sector left out of the overview above, namely agricultural production. This sector represented a major focal point for development interventions in South Kordofan not just for the period discussed here, but throughout independence (e.g., the Western Sudan Agricultural Research Project of USAID, World Bank and the Agricultural Research Corporation, 1976-1986, followed by the Southern Kordofan Agricultural Development Project 1989-1998). One of the largest of these programmes, linking rural administration and production, was IFAD’s South Kordofan Rural Development Programme (SKRDP), which the author experienced throughout his fieldwork in South Kordofan between 2005 and 2010.

IFAD is based in Rome and addresses, according to its own description, food security issues in rural areas (<http://www.ifad.org/governance/index.htm>). Projects are funded jointly with national governments; the 10-year SKRDP, for instance, with a 70% share of IFAD and 30% plus man-power from the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry in South Kordofan. The staff was recruited from employees of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry under a Programme Management Unit and a Programme Executive Branch, while supervision and evaluation were done by IFAD personnel coming regularly from Rome.

When the stipulated duration of the programme came close to an end in 2009, a 4-year extension was applied for and the Dutch government granted supplementary funds “to expand the outreach of the programme until December 2013” (IFAD 2010a: 1). Another grant was provided by IFAD with money from Sweden as part of the so-called Eighth Replenishment in support of a microfinance component, one of the few components regarded as a success (IFAD 2010a: 1, IFAD 2010b). However, the Programme Management Unit was downscaled to the Programme Director and the
General Director to be phased out after two and four years, respectively; the other staff was re-integrated as regular state officials.

The programme was initiated after the government of the National Congress Party (NCP) initiated a ‘peace from within’ in 1997, which had only a limited impact on the war, though. Accordingly, the 2000 baseline survey for the programme covered only government-held areas, showing the implications of the intervention’s objective “to improve and sustain the living standards of the target group by assuring their food security and providing them with social services in a secure environment in which they can manage their own community affairs” (IFAD 2000a: 4). Sustainability was argued to be ensured by embedding the programme into existing administrative structures, both on state-level by using existing authorities and on village-level by using or creating development committees (IFAD 2000a: 5).

The categories ‘beneficiaries’, ‘target group’ and ‘communities’ obscured the fundamental discrimination against areas which were not under governmental control, based on a security paradigm that both acknowledged historical bases of instability in the region and prevented them from guiding the implementation. A 2000 security assessment identified resource management issues as a driving factor of violent conflicts since the 1960s, including the appropriation of agricultural lands of the rural population for mechanized farming, which also caused disturbances in pastoral migration and local water distribution arrangements. These were intensified in the 1970s by the abolition of the Native Administration system, the previous mainstay of communal conflict management. The effects of lacking maintenance and development of water sources promoted further instability in the 1980s (IFAD 2000b: 3).

While this completely ignored the role of political violence, including policies of coercive cultural change instigated by central governments since the 1960s (Sharkey 2008), the programme proposal defined criteria for the selection of target groups contradicting the argumentation of the security assessment. If the transfer of fertile agricultural lands into the hands of commercial investors was one of the major triggers of violent conflicts, then the support of stability in the region would have to address this issue and start with the areas most affected by it. But while the security assessment had already reduced its own historical account to a resource management problem, the proposal clearly prioritised “the successful achievement of targets and the safeguarding of assets”, meaning “that the programme will commence in secure areas” (IFAD 2000a: 5).

In any case, the argument of the project put building administrative structures in communities, specifically through so-called community development committees, at the beginning of the implementation. Similar to and derived from rationales for agricultural extensions, this was supposed to create a community-based link to state authorities and experts for several areas of communal needs. Similar efforts were made throughout South Kordofan, for instance by German Agro Action (Deutsche Welthungerhilfe) in Lagawa or in frame of the MDTF-N’s Community Development Funds.

The impact of multiple institutional structures caused by lack of coordination between these interventions, especially vis-à-vis smaller organizations working in SPLM/A-dominated areas, will be discussed in more detail in part 4. Since IFAD’s attempts to create sustainable community development communities show much of what destabilised development interventions in the region in general, they will be the focus in the following as well. In order to highlight the relation between models and practice, different perceptions of the process and the experience of a specific community will be discussed in more detail.
3.1 Perspectives from Kadugli

The creation of access points for the local administration was a basic part of the programme and, according to the logic of the planners, immediate accessibility was of crucial importance for the choice where the programme should be initially implemented. The proposal had defined selection criteria on different levels with respective authorities for selection, IFAD’s Programme Management Unit and state authorities to select localities, a Community Selection Committee in the localities to select communities and Community Development Committees to select beneficiaries.

Seven selection criteria for localities were put down in the proposal, referring to several statistical sources:

(a) locality population (from the estimates of the Bureau of Statistics in Kadugli); (b) staple grain production per head of locality population (from the Save the Children Fund (SCF) Crop Assessment Survey, 1997/98); (c) economic purchasing power as additional staple grain not produced per head of locality population (from the SCF Crop Assessment Survey, 1997/98); (d) percentage of locality population enrolled in schools (from state Ministry of Education records); (e) number of locality population per operating hand water pump (from state Ministry of Engineering Affairs and UNICEF records); (f) number of locality population per operating locality health facility, including clinics, dispensaries and dressing stations (from state Ministry of Health records); and (g) number of locality population per number of locality technical services staff (from state Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning) (IFAD 2001: A1).

In January 2010, the author conducted interviews with both the former (2001-2007) and the active director (since 2008) of Agricultural Extension at the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, with which the IFAD programme was coupled. They described the identification of needy villages in the pre-selected areas as based on ranking, which had been done on the basis of a 2001 survey conducted only in government-held areas, one year before the Ceasefire Agreement. It had identified 25,000 families as ‘poor / war victim’ by using the income of the family as main criteria. Up to the end of the regular period of the programme, this remained the only large-scale survey and selection process.

The strong link to governmental administration was marked from the beginning by a State Law for Development Organisations, which had been established specifically for the programme, modelled after a similar process for the North Kordofan Rural Development Programme (Abdalla 2013: 168). It obliged to have Community Development Committees as a link between rural communities and state administration and thus gave the IFAD programme the status of initiating a new structure of public administration, alongside the Native Administration. This structure was to serve as an umbrella to all other state-based rural development interventions, such as

• extensions (registration in the Ministry of Justice),
• charitable associations (registration in HAC) and zakāt (registration in the Ministry of Social Development), and
• cooperatives (registration in the Union of Cooperatives, Ministry of Finance and Economy).

The aim was to create committees that would cluster community initiatives and demands, divided into subcommittees for agriculture, education, animal resources, health and women with elected representatives. For projects related to farming, for instance, these sub-committees would mediate
between the programme and so-called contact farmers, who receive seeds and livestock to increase their productivity.

What may be seen in this description is an attempt by the state government to establish innovative links with the weakest citizens in order to ensure the best possible public services and, at the same time, communities’ participation and ownership of their own settlements’ development. This operates with categories such as ‘state officials’ and ‘beneficiaries’, whose distinction is taken for granted, in other words, excluding the possibility that other than state-citizen relations are interfering in the conduct of the programme.

However, a tendency to ethnic homogeneity among the SKRDP’s staff could be observed. The author’s first contact with the programme happened in 2005 when doing research among the Shawabna, a group whose complex history was at odds with the ethnic polarisations the war had nourished (Ille 2011). Many of the staff, among them the Director-General and the Deputy Programme Director, belonged to this group. This ethnic ‘line’ in the higher management went back to the 1980s and 1990s, when the Minister of Agriculture and Deputy Governor, himself Shawabna, was strongly connected to the agricultural development programmes of that time (see above); he returned as Minister of Agriculture in the years 2008 and 2009. The new IFAD-funded programme had not only its offices at the same spot as the earlier programmes, but another Shawabna became its Director-General as well.

According to a non-Shawabna employee interviewed in December 2005, this amounted to systematic favouritism. Before quitting the job in 2004, he experienced recruitment without interviews or other formal procedures in favour of family members and intimidation of non-Shawabna staff, Nuba such as himself, by national security agents. He once received a delegation from the JMC, being the highest-ranking staff member present at that time, and was afterwards interrogated. There were also several persons involved in decision-making who were not staff members, but ethnically linked to the management. Finally, he encountered several perpetrators of torture and other kinds of violence against Nuba during the war, including himself, who were now his colleagues.

These statements are by themselves weak evidence of such tendencies and were not followed up systematically in the author’s research. However, they show that the perception and conduct of the programme involved categories and complications, which did not exist in its formal documents.

The author’s research on the SKRDP started in April 2009 and culminated in intensive fieldwork in Kadugli, as well as in and around the rural centre Heiban from January to March 2010, main results of which are presented in the following sections (for more details, see Ille 2013: 179-190). The text follows the formation and work of Community Development Committees, in order to show the complex processes that influenced what consequences the programme had in this area. Considering the failure to establish any working committee, the case study also provides detailed observations of what destabilised the implementation.

3.2 Perspectives from Heiban

The planned programme came with prescribed tools for implementation, such as a start-up workshop and a Programme Implementation Manual. The explanation given by the local director of SKRDP’s office in Heiban, however, was based on oral information and a drawing on a whiteboard. He had just started in October 2009 after graduating in Rural Development from the Islamic University of Omdurman. The office had been established in 2006 as part of an attempt to extend the programme to the SPLA-held areas, now called the ‘Chosen Areas’. A first assessment was initiated in April 2007 with a group of 12 Native Administration leaders and five of SKRDP’s staff. Delegations were sent to
surrounding villages to assess needs and to prepare the formation of Community Development Committees.

The formation procedure was described as beginning with a village assembly, where groups for education, agriculture and livestock, health and women are elected. A chairperson is appointed in each group, as well as a general secretary and a financial secretary; these twelve form the development committee. In each village, there were also three men and three women as contact persons for projects in agriculture, animal husbandry and orchards, respectively. Based on a questionnaire to be filled out by the contact persons and the development committee, the local office prepares evaluation reports, which inform further planning in the capital through data on demography and poverty levels in the villages.

However, only the first report of 2007 arrived at the Agricultural Extension office in Kadugli and the evaluation report of 2008 could not be found when the new director took office in 2009; all other documents were procurement lists for development centres, a town hall and the health centre in Heiban. In 2007, so the report showed, only eight villages had committees at all, of a total target of 50 villages in Heiban Locality. But instead of supporting the acceleration of work until the final year, 2010, financial means for moving outside of Heiban were suspended by the PMU in 2009.

Even in the existing committees, there was almost no functionality. In Heiban, for instance, the originally elected members did not come to the start-up workshop in Kadugli, and a new assembly convened by the local SKRDP office was attended by few and thus not appropriate to establish a legitimate, representative committee. Accordingly, all activities had stopped. In 2009, the new director tried to mobilize another assembly by visiting Native Administration leaders and religious authorities, as well as going from house to house; the subsequent assembly counted about 300 persons in a rural centre of several thousand inhabitants. The meeting showed that the formation of a new committee had not only problems to establish legitimacy, but fostered open conflict between old and new members. Still, a new development committee was elected and identified the renovation of the secondary school in Heiban as top priority; the state of the women’s centre was lamented as well.

The local director explained previous problems with communicative difficulties with the former staff and expressed the intention to improve communication and implementation decisively. However, already the assembled meeting had shown some complications that went beyond matters of communication. Several demands were made to have in the committee an equal representation of the ethnic groups residing in Heiban. This, as the director pointed out, went against the principles of representation in the programme, which were to be independent from ethnicity and Native Administration. This formulation conceals that ethnicity was simply left out from the programme’s political analysis, in spite of widespread politicised ethnic relations, probably not fitting the models of rural development legitimate in the environment in which the planning took place.

In fact, further discussions with the local director showed that he actually inserted ethnic considerations in his decision-making. The criteria for so-called priority villages, which were to form development committees, excluded settlements with less than 150 households and with either a school, a clinic, artificial water sources or similar public services. Abol, a village close to Heiban, did, strictly speaking, not fit these criteria, but was selected for its proximity to Heiban and as the only settlement of the ‘Abol ethnic group’. What influenced this acceptance of a new principle was also the observation that without cooperation with Native Administration leaders implementation would be seriously hampered.

This tampering with formal criteria was thus an attempt to fit the planners’ model to pre-existing socio-political structures, arising as a necessity from the model’s approach to sites for intervention.
through an undifferentiated category, ‘communities’, and to social change as a matter of establishing new institutions, not carefully transforming the existing ones. It was also far from the seven selection criteria that the initial plan had formulated which had assumed that an annually appointed Community Selection Committee would apply these criteria to studies and ranking by Locality Extension Teams (IFAD 2001: A2-A3). Most of all, it speaks of the challenges for an attempt to simply extend an organisational principle closely connected to the governmental structures in Kadugli in an area insufficiently connected or even hostile to these structures.

The stabilisation of such an attempt had many more aspects to be considered. In general, not much happened to achieve a mutual understanding of the involved actors’ situation. Regular inspection tours from SKRDP’s local office, which could have mitigated this problem, were hampered by lack of funds, but also the fragmentary character of communicative links that the few tours actually taking place created.

Pressed to submit a report for 2009, the staff of the Heiban office went on a tour at the end of January 2010, in order to collect data from the contact farmers in nearby villages. The information demanded from the office in Kadugli required interviews with each contact farmer, and to note the amount of received seeds and livestock, the size of cultivated area, disaggregated by ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ method, and the yield. If the latter was below expectations, explanations such as lack of rain and livestock damage had to be given.

Many of the contacts took place during weekly market days, which brought people from adjacent villages to Heiban. In this case, gaps still needed to be filled from five villages with active contact farmers, and a tour started on 3rd February, in spite of 31st January being the deadline for the report. In the village of Mer two interactions took place that show very well the steering between formal rules and situational circumstances that characterised these contacts.

Mer was a village of a few hundred inhabitants; the market was almost empty on its weekly market day. SKRDP’s delegation was met by a member of the development committee, who described the committee as not functioning. The background was the resignation of the chairman elected in 2007, who gave the position to a younger man, obviously seeing this as a legitimate succession, as did the rest of the development committee. SKRDP’s local director, however, proclaimed this new chairman to be illegitimate, because he was neither trained by the SKRDP, nor was he elected by a general assembly of the village. The director clearly understood the categorical distinction between ‘trained’ and ‘untrained’ as the line between those the programme can work with and those who it cannot work with, and the lack of a general assembly was seen as a breach of a principle of equal representation the system was attempted to be built upon.

In fact, the fundamental importance of trust among those involved in the programme became clear with the case of one of the contact farmers, who had received help from others to cultivate the experimental field, where the delivered seeds were supposed to be planted according to the rules learned in the start-up workshop. However, he had refused to share the harvested crops and failed to get support in the following years, whereupon his field fell into decay.

To assess the contact farmers’ progress, one-to-one interviews and visits to the fields would have been warranted. It turned out that most of the contact farmers also were committee members, all of them travelling or far away. Working with what was at hand, the delegation therefore only interviewed the member that had greeted them in the beginning, asking about the harvest. The answers remained general and without numbers, simply stating the months of rainfall, a complaint that harvest had been so bad they had to sell livestock to buy grains, and that the experimental field had not been cultivated, since seeds arrived at the village only in August. Once again the director pointed out what he saw as a
misunderstanding, since the varieties of white sorghum distributed to the contact farmers are sown in August. This was part of a fragmentary development of new farming methods and crops that put subsistence farmers’ experiences against the short-lived outcomes of three-day workshops and mostly unguided experimental fields.

The local director’s conclusion that more monitoring would be necessary reflected both recognition of lack of communication and the implied presumption to be representative of a better, flawless method of agricultural production deserving adoption, not a process of mutual learning. However justified this presumption is, it led in numerous cases throughout the area to a silent return to previous varieties and cultivation methods, and the follow-up was close to non-existent, so that neither side ever communicated about it.

On this tour, as well, the one interview was all the effort done to collect and discuss information and was forwarded in this way through the report. This has to be emphasised considering the fundamental importance information from development committees was supposed to have for governmental planning: data forwarded by the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry’s Planning section via the Minister’s office to Khartoum were aggregated from such reports.

But the weak communicative links emerging from interaction between SKRDP’s staff and ‘beneficiaries’ did not only result from the inapt combination of insistence on form and fragmentary, casual conversations. The possibility of establishing and developing cooperation towards practical changes was prevented by a constant lack or delay of funds, especially during the transition to a new source of funding in 2009. In effect, the Heiban office of the SKRDP was on hold and became even indebted to local traders for their daily supplies and to the owner of the rented office space for electricity. A water tanker intended for beneficiaries was used to supply the office with water, the programme’s tractor remained with cable damage in a storehouse in Kadugli, fuel could not be bought and salaries were not paid.

This basic cash flow problem in a multi-million dollar programme had existed throughout its duration, mainly due to the government’s failure to pay its share, prompting IFAD to stop its payments as well (see part 4). In consequence, the Heiban office and its activities remained fragmentary and more concerned with the own survival than with implementation and stabilisation.

Apart from these elementary problems, the ‘communicative difficulties’ were actually about the complex process of introducing new practices into sectors essential for the lives of the ‘target groups’. The organisational provision of having short workshops and presuming not just the willing adoption, but successful implementation of these workshops’ contents speaks of an underestimation of the intricacies of this process, or its low priority. While the existence of concomitant experimental fields for previous and recommended crops and methods incorporated experiences of past agricultural development programmes among small-scale farmers, the continuing logic of agricultural extension as an occasional, but patronising contact between experts and farmers did not.

However, in spite of the absolute formulation of the programme, it was not the only and not the most consequential development intervention in the area, but part of a complex landscape of initiatives, both governmental and non-governmental, based on an organization or not. The following example indicates the multiplicity of financial sources and sources of knowledge involved in such initiatives.

One of the achievements recorded by SKRDP’s Heiban office was the construction of a women’s centre for the women’s group of the development committee. The building was actually a combination of cement and bricks provided by the organization Norwegian Church Aid (NCA), stones brought by hand by a group of women and sand sponsored by a Heiban-based trader, while
SKRDP funded part of the walls, a fence and roof sheeting, adding devices for jam and noodle production, as well as a television set with video player and power generator.

However, no initial capital was available to start jam and noodle production, no technical experience existed to put the television set to use, and no training was provided by the programme. After some time, the wife of a migrant returning to Heiban started to operate the television, and for some time it provided a club life, until the power generator stopped working. In early 2010, the new local director also initiated the installation of a new power generator and a short momentum of spaghetti production and television evenings reappeared. This time, it was the lack of caretakers for children and other alternatives for domestic duties that brought meetings and activities to a halt.

For most of this time, the chairperson of the women’s group had been Sara, who had spent four years in Nigeria as a teenager with her family, learning Hausa and visiting an evening school with lessons on sewing, small-scale horticulture, domestic animal husbandry, among others. She also graduated from a Teachers Training Centre in Kauda, close to Heiban, receiving a ten-day course in similar practical skills, which she then taught in Heiban to about eighty female students. Among these skills were the making of jam, edible oils, and embroidery, which led to some productions that were presented in two exhibitions to visitors and buyers from Kauda, mostly staff of international organizations.

With this background Sara opened one of the first restaurants in the market of Heiban, employing and training other women in the process. She took on a managerial role in the restaurant, benefitting from twenty years of professional experience as secretary and typist in Heiban’s city hall. For a year, she also headed the local section for women’s issues in a Heiban migrant association based in Khartoum, one of the more permanent bases of the women’s group in SKRDP’s development committee.

The training in Kauda, being the focal point for international organisations in SPLM/A-dominated areas, was the starting point for further contacts. Her restaurant was highly frequented, also by visitors regarding it as a ‘woman’s success story’. In conversations with her, NGOs’ staff would suggest to her to propose projects to their organisations, such as an orchard or a domestic chicken farm. The chairwoman of the organization Rū’ya, Zaynab Balandiyya (Noma & Freeman 2010), suggested to found a ‘mill fund’, bringing together the female customers of the electrical mills in the market that were highly frequented. This, so was the idea, could also lead to other activities, such as gathering charitable gifts for the needy in town, while the initiative would be similar to existing forms of pooling, such as commodity funds of traders and communal funds for events and larger purchases.

It was ultimately another war that endangered these activities. Since June 2011, indiscriminate aerial bombings that already destroyed buildings and livelihoods in the previous war were used again, at least once, 27th September 2012, falling on Heiban market during a weekly market day (<http://nubareports.org/bombing-in-heiban/>, accessed 5th October 2014). Under these circumstances, it is thus not enough to follow development interventions’ own categories of perception to assess the consequences they have; what is needed is a process evaluation that goes beyond their own objectives and indicators.
4. Evaluation

4.1 Performance

In its planning, the SKRDP aimed at an administrative system built on equal representation in community development committees, working out non-partisan goals and communicating achievements and needs to the higher authorities through regular reports. A first contradiction this met was the close association of this programme with a governmental system that openly supported ethnic categories in public administration amidst a recent history of ethnic polarisations during civil war. A second contradiction was the presumption of an existing, stable system of public administration that only needed extensions to the rural areas.

In a 2009 evaluation by the Country Programme, it was claimed that the SKRDP had “contributed to increased asset ownership, improved food security and higher farm and off-farm incomes” (IFAD 2009b: 7). In the 2009 report of IFAD’s central Office of Evaluation, this sounded decisively different, as it criticized:

- poor involvement by co-financiers (IFAD 2009a: 18);
- design weaknesses, such as overly optimistic targets combined with insufficient inputs (IFAD 2009a: 19);
- inefficient project components dispersed over large, poorly accessible geographic areas (IFAD 2009a: 20);
- limited improvement in household financial assets, associated with weak performance of rural financial services undertaken by the programme (IFAD 2009a: 23);
- no sustainable impact on agricultural productivity and food security, due to absence of a sustainable seed supply system (IFAD 2009a: 24);
- under-designed and underfunded components (IFAD 2009a: 32); and
- adverse effect on project performance by political instability, causing high turnover among senior government officials, together with lack of counterpart funding (IFAD 2009a: 34).

A 2011 PhD thesis, based on statistical analysis of a survey among 1600 respondents from eight villages served by the programme, also noted that the relationship between beneficiaries and the programme suffered from the formers’ limited opportunities to participate as stakeholders in the different phases of design and implementation. But improvements of livelihoods were most of all limited by financial insecurity due to lack of commitment to funding, especially by the government, which caused service delivery to be weak, late and sporadic (Hassan 2011).

This criticism is not an isolated assessment. Concerning development interventions for public infrastructure, the international consultants for the MDTF-National noted in their quarterly reviews the lack of progress on the Kadugli-Kauda road, delayed to such degree that after three years not more than 20 kilometres were at the stage of embankment and a complete re-planning was recommended (see Ille 2013: 127-129). In spite of almost 400 solar systems being provided in 10 villages, the MDTF’s Third Progress Report spoke of “[i]nadequate skills for effective operation and maintenance” of many installed facilities (MDTF 2008: 59). A 2010 annual report pointed out that successful
implementation needed partnership with community leaders and bottom-up accountability, “provided these community projects are integrated into the government’s master plans at the state level” (MDTF-N 2010: 24).

In the sector of water supply, already the 2007 UNEP report had pointed out that communities in Sudan are rather vulnerable to lack of water supply because of human activity, not natural phenomena (UNEP 2007: 67). So public administration was criticised for its failure to fulfil basic functions while governmental programmes were concentrating on large-scale projects. Not even fundamental data on water in rural areas were available, and the only data beyond two stations in South Kordofan, Kadugli and Rashad, were “anecdotal reports of declining groundwater levels that require scientific verification” (UNEP 2007: 243). However, the 2008 Strategic Map for South Kordofan, which was supposed to guide the way to improvements, failed to mention steps towards better data availability and management, beyond a general hint at the “[e]stablishment of a database as a planning and management tool” (HSC 2008: 86).

In fact, the gap between institutional efforts and available data remained large and spoke of biases in prioritisation. Nationally, a Sudan Agromet Dekadel Bulletin started to be published in 2003 by the Sudan Meteorological Authority (later Sudanese Standards and Meteorology Organization) with data from the Satellite-based Agro-Meteorological Information System established by the World Food Programme (WFP) and the TAMSAT group of the Department of Meteorology, University of Reading. The Department of Statistics in South Kordofan’s Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry was also able to establish monthly measurements of rainfall in up to 18 stations. But these stations were not only concentrated close to mechanized farming schemes, leaving out the most war-affected areas in central South Kordofan, but also failed to stabilize as huge gaps in the 2008 and 2009 data show (Ille 2013: 93-94).

In another direction, the Water, Environment and Sanitation programme (WES) was established through an agreement between UNICEF and the government of South Kordofan, in order to improve water supply throughout the state. In 2010, most of its activities had stopped, because the government failed to pay the 50% share of costs that the agreement entailed. This corresponded with MDTF-N’s caveat in 2005 that “experience with other MDTF projects suggests that transfer of counterpart funds from the GoNU may not occur in a timely manner” (MDTF-N 2005: 21-22).

The lack of distributive justice and the problematic prioritisation of large-scale projects were also noted for the national agricultural sector. The Agricultural Revival Programme (2008-2012) was intended to support the country’s economic diversification from dependency on oil, and its main inception report noted the priority of interventions “which benefit the majority of the people in the rural areas” (Council of Ministers 2008: 9). But a comprehensive assessment of food security in northern Sudan in 2011 noted a continuing contradiction between increased productivity, up to full coverage of the estimated national needs (Robinson 2011: 36), and insufficient access to food in a huge number of households (Robinson 2011: 37). This was interpreted as being mostly due to a skewed income and wealth distribution (Robinson 2011: 9) and widespread uncertainty and insecurity throughout the country (Robinson 2011: 37).

At the same time, the Agricultural Revival Programme did not concentrate its efforts on poor people in rural areas, but on the large-scale irrigated sector.

The Five-Year Agricultural Revival Plan will end next year with most of the US$ 5 billion funds allocated to the irrigated sector to enhance water control, rehabilitate irrigation schemes and complete a multipurpose dam project at Merowe. The provision of short-term agricultural credit through the Agricultural Bank of Sudan (ABS) is a regular operational procedure in
both the irrigated and rainfed sectors, particularly the entrepreneurial mechanized subsector. Loan uptake for cereal production is generally by entrepreneurs with strong business connections with the ABS and other banks; farmers in the traditional subsector are rarely able to raise the necessary collateral, and this year is no exception, despite a stated willingness to make loans available to smallholders, few if any examples have been noted by AM teams (Robinson 2011: 17).

In fact, lack of translating the initially stated aims “into appropriate policies and to provide the necessary funds and technical assistance adequately and timely” (Council of Ministers 2008: 71) was initially formulated as a possible obstacle to successful implementation. This shows once again the little consequence that such meticulously formulated development plans had, being disconnected from political accountability and thus without political consequences of their non-implementation.

At the same time, the claim of large-scale interventions to provide a full package for an area also led to the prevention of smaller initiatives that could have provided similar services. In Heiban area, it was repeatedly noted at communal conferences that SKRDP did not deliver services adequate to its scope, aggravated by the state administration’s blocking of other organisations in the same area.

As a consequence of the fundamental character of the programme, other structures with non-registered committees were discouraged and delegitimised in favour of the Kadugli-based state administration. Thus the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry actively intervened in the selection of sites by the EU-funded Sudan Productive Capacity Recovery Programme to prevent an overlap with SKRDP’s target areas (Ille 2013: 143-144). While this could be seen as an attempt to cover the whole state and avoid multiple interventions in one area, the SKRDP’s low output, especially in SPLM/A-dominated areas, made it a prohibitive step. The attempt to cover most of the problematic agricultural areas by externally funded programmes embedded in governmental structures may also be interpreted as an attempt to secure governmental control without financial responsibility.

There was also a lack of integration between public administration and development interventions. Often national NGOs and CBOs were not made integral parts of larger interventions, or were even categorised as ‘civil society’, as can be seen from the UN Working Plans. This may be due to the lack of economic output most of these organisations produced, but it is their socially integrative potential that could much more in the foreground, considering the overall stabilisation aimed at in most post-2005 programmes. Among these active organisations, the umbrella organisation NubaNet and the NGOs NAFIR, Mandi, Nisā’ al-Nūbah (Nuba Women), Al-Mara’ fi Manāṭiq Al-Nūbah (Women in Conflict Areas) and Rū’ya can be named. But there were also a great number of often Khartoum-based migrant and ethnic associations, which developed into focal points of community-based development interventions as well, such as the Heiban Association. In some cases initiatives came out of this invisibility, for instance the Tundiyya Association, which worked on a community development plan with the Friedrich Ebert Foundation and cooperated for water supply with the Community Development Funds (assessed in Ali 2010). Invisibilities were also supported by the UN-initiated database SAID (see above), mostly because of the way data was collected. The RCO’s major role strongly concentrated observations in and around Kadugli, and the lack of interaction with smaller organisations and communities left the majority of entries incomplete and unchecked. The data collection and training workshops conducted for the connected TRMA (see above) in different localities were supposed to lead to ownership by both state administration and communities, but up to 2011 major difficulties around it had not been solved.

One of the major constraints, the government’s constant definition of security-related red lines, will be discussed more in the next section. But the database itself also showed the contradictions and gaps
to be expected from the lack of integration in the region. Both ‘Nuba Mountains’ and ‘South Kordofan’ appear as regions, whereby the former was shown with only one activity until 2007, namely the Nuba Mountains Community Empowerment Project, initiated by the World Bank in 2003 and later transformed to the Community Development Fund. Agencies active in South Kordofan were the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), GoNU, UNDP, UNICEF, UNIDO, the UN Mine Action Organisation (UNMAO) and Vet-Care, but not IFAD. Another major organisation, NCA, appeared only once for 2006 (cp. Ngugi et al. 2010), while organisations only active in SPLM/A-dominated areas, such as Samaritan’s Purse and the Nuba Recovery, Rehabilitation and Development Organisation (NRRDO), had no entry at all, the same as Save the Children USA, Care USA, Merci Corps, Medair, etc.

In fact, this grossly under-represented the multitude of organisational structures and development interventions active after 2005, which may be shown by another short look at Abol. In a village of about 400 inhabitants, SKRDP’s community development committee existed aside a water committee established by the organisation Concern Worldwide in 2008, a self-organised women’s group, followers of Native Administration leaders, three church congregations, two territorially divided ethnic groups, SPLM’s rural representation structure and SPLM’s youth association, which formed in competition with the Khartoum-based Heiban Association, the latter active there as well. An annual prayer group had formed doing small projects for water supply in the village, and further social formations such as pooling groups, communal labour parties and family structures were to be found, too, all with different, albeit overlapping spheres of influence.

Rather than being used for joint efforts, the institutional plurality paved the way for individual solutions that could break up existing organisational structures from one day to another, as happened when the chairman of the development committee and the water committee left for Heiban to open an iron forgery based on skills learned in SKRDP-funded training.

Apart from not being tuned for the complexity of social activities in the fields they tried to change and improve, the large-scale development interventions were also part of a divisive organisation of the political landscape that hindered the integration and stabilisation of efforts, even when attempted. Most of the organisations central to service delivery in SPLM/A-dominated areas were not able or did not endeavour to register under the state administration system in Kadugli and rather continued to be organised via Juba and Nairobi, especially after the events of March 2009 and June 2011 (see below). This concerned most of all NRRDO, which had been founded by people from the Nuba Mountains and was a partner for service delivery throughout the war for Doctors without Borders and Cap Anamur, among others, but also Samaritan’s Purse, Concern Worldwide and Merci Corps during ‘peace’.

Instead of building bridges between the hostile areas, the way development interventions were organised supported the hostile tendencies in many cases. Komey (2010: 224) emphasised that “the war-imposed settlement pattern of boundary-making along ethnic lines in the same locale was being consolidated by certain key peace and development partners, including state institutions, UN agencies, international NGOs, and community-based organisations (CBOs).” A crucial aspect of this pattern survived through the security paradigm that development interventions were subjected to throughout the period discussed here.

### 4.2 Security

It is not surprising that post-war interventions are surrounding questions of security, both for staff and assets brought into a region. This last section will show, however, that the security paradigm...
nothing less than supporting the tendencies of hostile mobilisation that favoured a continuation of militant politics and subsequently military action.

As mentioned in section 4.1.1, IFAD’s Office of Evaluation regarded the political instability in South Kordofan as one of the major problems of the SKRDP (IFAD 2009a: 34). It is interesting to note that another study including IFAD-funded projects in an assessment of community capabilities in North and South Kordofan identified a positive impact of these projects on communities (Harizi and Klemick 2007:18-19). The statistical study discussed IFAD’s formal criteria of selection and their impact on an analysis based on random samples, without considering any of the circumstances discussed above, and ultimately without recognition of a bias built into the 2004 sample by disregarding political accessibility, and not just infrastructural accessibility. The only category of conflict the study works with is conflicts over land, using an outsider/insider model, while only two sentences are devoted to hints at political volatility (Harizi and Klemick 2007: 4). No part of the text questioned the assumption of black-boxed, clear-cut communities, treating them as one unit (see, for instance, Harizi and Klemick 2007: 6, figure 1).

This can also be found in assessments such as the South Kordofan growth diagnostic of 2008 through the category of ‘the local’. Thus “the recognition of local level solutions suitable to the diverse environmental and production condition, traditions and social capital within the state” (Klugman and Wee 2008: i) was regarded as essential, as “[l]ocally differentiated strategies are needed to initiate and sustain growth” (Klugman and Wee 2008: v), and “local traditions and social capital vary” (Klugman and Wee 2008: 88).

In fact, the political developments did not allow drawing a clear line between local, national and even international levels, since they constantly overlapped. In January 2010, a governmental engineer was stopped from preparing a road close to Buram, a small town in a SPLM/A-dominated area, because the residents, heavily affected both by the previous war, mistrusted the intentions of having a faster connection to Kadugli. In Kauda, a Turkish company was prevented from installing telecommunication masts, because SPLM/A’s administration perceived that its contract, designed and signed in Khartoum, continued not just the centralised decision-making over the residents’ heads, but also favouritism towards ‘Arab’ companies.

In general, all development interventions were strongly affected by political developments and tensions. This became most obvious in March 2009, when thirteen international organisations were expelled by presidential degree with the argument that they overstepped their mandate in Darfur, actually as a sign of political prowess in the face of President Omar Al-Bashir’s indictment by the International Criminal Court (ICC). Their leaving Sudan also had a great impact on South Kordofan (Pantuliano et al. 2009; Komey & Ille 2010 with focus on the health care sector in Heiban Locality), and the President’s claim that national organisations could compensate soon turned out to be wrong and even not seriously believed by the governmental authorities themselves. Shortly after the expulsion, several targeted organisations received letters by HAC, offering their return under a different name or with a different branch. In South Kordofan, one saw Save the Children Sweden replace Save the Children USA, Merci Corps Holland replace Merci Corps, Care Switzerland replace Care USA, mostly with the same national staff and lower budgets.

In a similar way, the refusal of the Sudanese government to sign new amendments to the Cotonou Agreement in mid-June 2009 shows the interlacing of local, national and international dynamics (www.sudaneseonline.com/en216/publish/Latest_News_1/Sudan_Withdraws_its_Signature_of_Amendments_in_Cotonou_Agreement.shtml>, accessed 20th April 2015). Officially explained with clauses about AIDS prevention and the requirement to join the Rome Statute, i.e., to accept the ICC, the refusal limited the future of most EU-funded projects, including the Sudan Productive Capacity
Recovery Programme (SPCRP), a cooperative effort of the FAO, Humanitarian Plus and the Sudanese Ministry of International Cooperation working with state ministries, local NGOs, CBOs and village communities in South Kordofan, Blue Nile and Red Sea states.

But it was also the ‘regular’ political economy in Sudan that heavily influenced the dynamics of development interventions, especially those with governmental participation. To decrease dependence of the northern Sudanese economy from oil as the only major source of revenue, more and more land and mineral concessions were given to foreign investors (Cotula et al. 2009, WB 2010) and public corporations were privatised. At the same time, development funds continued to benefit large-scale projects rather than broad-spectrum interventions and the government kept 75% of the annual budget reserved for military and public service, including the national security apparatus (UNICONS report quoted on www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article37518, accessed 20th April 2015).

This did nothing to improve the financial situation of the former war areas. A 2007 World Bank Public Expenditure Review had already pointed out that

\[\text{financial support to the Three Areas in 2005-2006 was around 35-40 percent below what had been programmed in the JAM. In the 2007 budget, the GNU plans an increase to$249 million, compared to$183 million in 2006 (which is still 32 percent below the amount envisioned under the JAM). (WB 2007: viii)}\]

South Kordofan received in the following years higher absolute amounts, corresponding with overall higher budgets for the federal states outside the capital, but “it [wa]s surprising, given the commitments in the CPA to the Three Areas, that the state’s share in total transfers has fallen” (Klugman and Wee 2008: 37). This continued previous shortcomings in the formulation and conduct of budgets, which were not structured by priorities and sequences, unclear about stakeholder and non-governmental participation, and overall presuming an unrealistic increase of federal transfers to South Kordofan. Low amounts marked for localities also contradicted the declared policy of decentralization, as did the fact that most budgetary planning was done by central organs in Khartoum (Klugman and Wee 2008: 45-46).

To varying degrees, such processes were recognized in assessments. The South Kordofan growth diagnostic of 2008 strongly referred to the civil war, but also to a process of “marginalization by the center”, which led to “political, legal, financial, administrative and logistical constraints to development” (Klugman and Wee 2008: 29). In a MDTF-N report of 2005, South Kordofan appeared as “a desperate but complex political and economic environment”, where “[o]nly […] addressing the need for basic services, especially among the most war-affected and marginalized populations, can […] help to mitigate some of the social and political instability in the state” (MDTF-N 2005: 23).

In accordance with this reasoning, a major function of post-war interventions was seen in providing a ‘peace dividend’. In this sense, the former areas of direct military confrontation between the war parties were depicted as testing ground for political cooperation, whose stabilisation was supposed to be supported by economic development and reduction of historical inequalities.

Up to 2008, most assessments were highly critical of the lack of progress in this direction, noting “delays in forming a government, lack of integration of the civil service, lack of physical infrastructure continuing to prevent access to many areas, and weak institutional and human resource capacity to manage the process” (Klugman and Wee 2008: 29), in spite of a UNDP-funded governance programme for the sake of administrative integration throughout the state (Klugman and Wee 2008: 49).
It may be added that the delays in integrating administrative units and providing basic functions in SPLM/A-dominated areas also led to exclusion from development programmes, as in case of Heiban, assessed to have not the necessary capacities for the Community Development Fund programme, since no locality had been established there until 2006 (COWI 2007: 11). It can also be pointed out that the slow improvements in living conditions furthered the perception of the area, even of the capital, as a remote, unattractive workplace, exemplified by the refusal of police doctors to follow orders to be transferred to a new police hospital in Kadugli, which remained dysfunctional long after its official opening.

What is missing from these analyses, however, is the socio-political processes that underlie these failures of governance or generalized categories like ‘political will’. Thus the delays in civil service integration cannot be understood without understanding the history of cultural oppression of peoples in the Nuba Mountains that goes back at least to coercive Arabicisation and Islamisation programmes in the 1960s, over the radical anti-‘fifth column’ policies and massacres in the 1990s, to the dismissal of Nuba civil servants and targeted killings at the beginning of another war in 2011 (OCHA 2011). Embedded in a long history of attempted domination of the region and its people, strong counter-currents of cooperation and emancipation would be required to change the dynamics that moved them towards violent hostility (Ylönen 2009).

The efforts of ‘administrative peace-building’, however, rather showed a perpetuation than a change of these dynamics. The slow progress in public projects up to 2008 was suddenly accelerated, when Ahmad Harun Kafi of the NCP became governor in 2008, still indicted for war crimes by the ICC. This followed a large political crisis after the SPLM Finance Minister Ahmad Sa’id Abd al-Rahman was dismissed by then governor Umar Suliman, NCP, after criticising the central government’s control over the federal state budgeting and cash flow (www.occasionalwitness.com/Articles/20080930.html, accessed 20th April 2015). Now the cash flow from the central Ministry of Finance increased immediately and major construction projects were finished quickly, such as tarmac roads, two major hospitals in Kadugli, telecommunication transmitter masts and major water storages. However, the basis of these contracts was not a careful negotiation with the political partners or even a process in the federal state South Kordofan, but the contracts were mostly decided on centrally in Khartoum.

Still, this may be seen as a turning point in the state’s politics, and the period under Ahmad Harun Kafi and his vice-governor Abd al-Aziz al-Hilu was perceived, for some time, as the long-awaited political partnership South Kordofan needed. However, both were on opposite sides of a war only three years later. This followed very tense elections with an outcome illegitimate enough that the central government's attempt to disarm the SPLA soldiers remaining in northern Sudan triggered full-scale war.

It is not intended to analyse these political conflicts in detail. They have been indicated, though, in order to show their inevitable impact on most development interventions, especially those deeply involved with basic functions of state administration. This obvious involvement in violent political contests was not ignored by most development interventions, but especially when governmental structures were involved, the consequence was a security paradigm that categorically excluded ‘insecure’ areas.

This can certainly be connected to the circular and ultimately frustrating process of construction and destruction in war areas, as demining programmes show. Sudan’s National Mine Action Authority (NMAA), DanChurchAid (DCA) and UNMAO led de-mining efforts in South Kordofan and quite successfully cleared a majority of roads and residential areas (see wartime assessment in Moszynski
2001). Already on 11 June 2011, the planting of new land mines around Kadugli was reported (OCHA 2011).

The strong security paradigm developing for the area had also to do with the devastating reviews of wartime programmes, which may be exemplified by the South Kordofan Agricultural Development Programme (SKADP). Intended as an implementation of the results of the Western Sudan Agricultural Research Project (WSARP), it was supposed to support agricultural development of the rain-fed sector in South Kordofan. Its implementation started in 1989, and reviews of the progress were throughout negative. After 5 years, one of the funding partners, the World Bank, concluded that performance was generally unsatisfactory, and with little impact in the three components it should have covered, namely water supply, roads and agricultural machinery (WB 1995). After 10 years, the other funding partner, the African Development Fund (ADF) gave the note ‘unsatisfactory’ as well, with most components not or only weakly implemented.

ADF’s review greatly criticized the project design, as well as both the lack of supervision and the government’s lack of commitment, while insecurity in mentioned as negative impact (ADF 2010: vii). The World Bank’s report strongly concentrated on the security situation, calling the project’s main lesson that “attempts to implement a project under difficult security conditions are likely to lead to a loss of resources for meager results” (WB 1995: 8). This may reverberate in the emphasis on ‘secure areas’ in IFAD’s proposal (IFAD 2000a: 5) and the criteria of successful implementation that underlay it.

But instead of making success in the sense of assets and production numbers the priority, the co-creation of stability could have been the focus and main category of accountability, fostering a cooperative implementation of development interventions, not a competitive one, countering instead of adding to the on-going harsh political struggles.

In this sense, it is worth following the argumentation of the World Bank’s final report on the South Kordofan Start Up Emergency Project concerning its impact on the stabilisation of the region’s population, which, according to the report, was “[t]he greatest Project gain” (WB 2012: 13). The argumentation is based on the fundamental distinction of an economic and social sphere from a political sphere, thereby allowing the statement that the present war is “politically motivated”, meaning no active interest and involvement of ‘communities’ (WB 2012: 11).

The stabilisation was, according to the report, achieved by better water supply, repaired social fibre, improved agricultural production and upgraded transport infrastructure. Gender mainstreaming was ensured by sizable participation of women in training and committees, between 30 and 43%. But the main argumentative effort went into the category ‘Social Development’, which was supposed to cement the claim of communities’ stabilisation to a point of disengagement from violent conflicts.

This claim is embedded into a historical narrative that tries to explain the nature of conflicts in the region. The main root cause of the protracted, complex conflicts throughout Sudan is related to the domination by Khartoum-based elites of the Northern Nile Valley, who extracted resources from the other regions without giving much in return. The subsequent development disparity nurtured a multitude of conflicts:

- center-periphery conflicts between Khartoum and its impoverished peripheries;
- communal conflicts between non-state, identity groups (such as farmers or nomadic pastoralists), often over access to livelihood-related resources;
- local-elite conflicts between people competing for influence in a region, or between leaders of different rebel factions, and finally, cross-border conflict involving neighboring countries working through proxies. (WB 2012: 14).
In South Kordofan, this destroyed peaceful coexistence, accelerated by the recruitment of pastoral nomads as governmental militias during the previous war, and kept many regions volatile beyond 2005. The CPA was not able to provide comprehensive safeguards against bad governance and distributive injustice, while many political hopes, for instance invested in the conduct of popular consultations, were not fulfilled.

This account corresponds in its broad lines with many studies of the region’s political history, which makes the subsequent lack of pushing for political accountability the more surprising. The conduct of training for conflict-sensitive development planning (WB 2012: 16) does not seem to level out the many dynamics of destabilisation that have been identified on the way between planning, attempted implementation and ensuing practices. In fact, the report recommended remediying problems of implementation by adjusting project designs to ‘fragile settings’, which basically means the adjustments to ‘local situations’. In detail, this entails close engagement with local authorities, realistic assessment of local capacities, government-based, comprehensive and integrative coordination, as well as “[r]esolving the tension and trade-offs between the need to act quickly to stabilize conflict-affected populations and longer-term capacity development objectives” (WB 2012: 20)

A major shortcoming of these recommendations is the treatment of ‘local authorities’ as an unproblematic group, even beyond the intricacies of the category ‘local’ (see above). Furthermore, the report’s differentiation of an emergency measure and long-term development is inappropriate for a region in which complex emergencies have been the status-quo for over two decades and counting. Apart from actually not adjusting to the fragile setting, it is the presumption of eventual stabilisation that prevents from defining a governmental responsibility to lead to such a stabilisation, including the accountability for failing to do so. This presumption, however, is fed by the initial differentiation of politics from community development as economic and social, i.e. non-political sphere, which, once again, contradicts the account’s own observation of “complex alliances”, “related militarization and arming of the population” (WB 2012: 14).

This becomes especially clear in the correlation of recent development efforts and a claimed disengagement of communities in the war (WB 2012: 14). While it is true that many inter-communal agreements have prevented the same kind of mobilisation that happened in the previous war (Gramizzi and Tubiana 2013), this crossly underrepresents a broad range of political dissatisfaction across the population, but also the armed forces’ lack of distinction between soldiers and civilians, for instance through indiscriminate bombing of civilian settlements and destruction of agricultural areas, leaving people far from leading ‘normal lives’ (WB 2012: 14).

It also ignores the activation of paramilitary Rapid Support Forces as one of the fundamental fighting forces, similar to the Popular Defence Forces of the previous war. The diagnosis that contested election results inflamed the war also excludes the aggressive election campaigns and the tense political manoeuvres that precluded the results (Rottenburg et al. 2011). Concerns with “the Government’s ability to provide peace dividends in war-affected areas such as South Kordofan” (WB 2012: 14) show an assumption of governmental legitimacy and undoubtedly intention of its citizens’ best interests that speaks of an – intentional or unintentional – failure to draw conclusions from the report’s own historical account.
5. Conclusion

This paper reviewed development interventions that have been initiated in South Kordofan between 2005 and 2011. With a focus on major programmes and projects with links to governmental institutions, it outlined the way post-war reconstruction after the signing of a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005 was designed in development planning during this period. Considering the failure of achieving political stability and the start of a new war in June 2011, the analysis stressed the aspect of political legitimacy as fundamentally contested in the region and thus essential for the question, how such interventions could be and were implemented.

Through a case study of the International Fund for Agricultural Development’s (IFAD) South Kordofan Rural Development Project and its impact in and around Heiban, the paper showed the political intricacies of implementation even in seemingly unpolitical fields, such as small-scale agricultural production. Furthermore, it is highlighted that also major programmes and projects are subject to complex local conditions for gaining influence, which cannot be sufficiently understood by presuming legitimacy of the governmental partners or even of what is summarized under the term ‘local leaders’.

Linking local efforts with developments on regional, national and international levels, the paper’s evaluation of the examined development interventions found a primacy of contested legitimacy when it comes to their stabilisation or destabilisation, an aspect mostly disregarded during the interventions’ own evaluation.

On this background, the study concludes that if political accountability and political legitimacy are not essential elements of the planning, implementation and evaluation of development interventions, their absence will prevent a meaningful contribution to political stabilisation and subsequently, considering the repercussions of political instability, to the overall stabilisation of the region. Given the position of governments as sovereign partners in present multilateral interventions, such elements are highly unlikely to be effectively implemented against those in power, especially under authoritarian rule. It is thus all the more important to consider this when the consequences of development interventions are to be assessed, especially concerning claims of stabilising effects as a result of such interventions.
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This paper outlines the landscape of development interventions in South Kordofan between the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005 and the start of a new war in June 2011. Given the constant political volatility during this period and the resurgence of violent political contest, the study traces the conditions under which such interventions took place. It analyses the impact of the political context, but also looks at how the interventions related to this context during planning, implementation and evaluation. As a case study, IFAD’s South Kordofan Rural Development Programme is followed into the area in and around Heiban, a rural centre in the central Nuba Mountains, where it was supposed to extend a system of community development committees linked to public administration. The study’s perspective on actors involved in the programme to a variable extent shows not only the complexity of social relations it was interwoven with, but also how this and similar interventions emerged on the ground as part of a plurality of social institutions and organisational structures, in spite of their design as singular contribution to a given situation. Reading context and case study together, the paper argues that any evaluation of development interventions and their consequences in a region like South Kordofan fails to be adequate, if political accountability and political legitimacy are left out or marginalized in the analysis. Instead of being approached as an isolated interaction with ‘local communities’, specific conditions of gaining influence have to be understood, if a substantial contribution is expected to be made.