Building Blocks for Peace
An Evaluation of the Training for Peace in Africa Programme

Evaluation Department
Note on layout and language
The layout of the document conforms to guidelines for accessibility and ease of reading, which require Arial font and left (not full) justification of the text.

Disclaimer:
This report is the product of its authors, and responsibility for the accuracy of data included in this report rests with the authors. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions presented in this report do not necessarily reflect the views of Norad’s Evaluation Department.
Preface

The goal of Training for peace in Africa is “to build sustainable capacity for peace operations in the United Nations (UN), African Union (AU) and the African Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms.” The main programmatic areas are training of police officers and other civilians, research and policy development. Both the police and other civilian components are crucial in order to create a stable and secure environment in situations of conflict. The focus of this evaluation is on the policing dimension since the vast majority of those trained by the programme are police.

We hope that this evaluation will provide important lessons for programme management of development assistance in fragile states, as well as evaluators in the same areas. The evaluation team highlights that in complex programmes involving several partners, a strong strategic framework is crucial to ensure that partners have a common understanding of how the activities can conduce to the desired outcomes.

Evaluations of development assistance in areas of conflict is challenging. The Evaluation Department had originally commissioned an impact evaluation of training using a quasi-experimental design, but the methods had to adapt to the realities on the ground. Using theories of change and contribution analysis, the evaluation team has nevertheless analyzed the effects of training in peacekeeping missions.

This evaluation was carried out by CMI in cooperation with Itad. The consultants are responsible for the content of the report, including the findings, conclusions and recommendations.

Oslo, November 2014

Tale Kvalvaag
Director, Evaluation Department
Acknowledgements

This evaluation report has been prepared by a team drawn from the Chr. Michelsen Institute in Norway working in association with Itad Ltd in the United Kingdom. The team consisted of Elling N. Tjønneland (team leader), Chris Albertyn and Torunn Wimpelmann from CMI and Anna Paterson, David Fleming and Alice Hills from Itad. Quality assurance was provided by Espen Villanger and Gunnar M. Sørbe from CMI.

The team leader was responsible for data collection from TfP partners and main stakeholders, mapping of training courses, support to rosters and policy development and was the lead author and editor of the report. He also attended the TfP International Advisory Board meeting in November 2013 and the TfP Annual General Meeting in March 2014. Anna Paterson led on the assessment of the impact of training, and in data collection from the AU Mission in Somalia and police officers in Rwanda. Chris Albertyn led on the data collection from the UN Mission in Liberia and police officers in Ghana, in mapping the strategic framework, and the cost effectiveness analysis. Torunn Wimpelmann led on assessing TfP’s research programme and participated in data collection in Liberia and Ghana. David Fleming conducted cost effectiveness analysis and assessment of the impact of training, and participated in data collection in Rwanda. Alice Hills was a main resource person on the police component and the UN. The quality assurance team provided advice on evaluation design, data collection instruments, and followed the process of study and provided comments to the emerging draft report.

Two members of the team – Elling N. Tjønneland and Chris Albertyn – have previous engagement with TfP through review and assessment studies commissioned by Norad and the Norwegian Embassy in Pretoria. They were both members of a team, and with Tjønneland as team leader, conducting a review of Training for Peace commissioned by Norad in 2009. The terms of reference and the nature of that review are not considered to constitute a potential conflict of interest. Chris Albertyn was in 2010 and 2012 commissioned by the Norwegian Embassy in Pretoria to make an independent assessment of the management and organisational capacity of AFDEM, one of the TfP partners, and subsequently to provide limited technical assistance to the organisation. He has not been involved in operational or strategic planning. Still, to avoid any potential conflict of interest Albertyn has not been involved in the team assessment involving AFDEM and its activities and interventions.
The team has benefited from the support and assistance of a number of people. Programme managers and officials at TIP partner institutions, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and at several Norwegian embassies have provided much assistance to the team during the evaluation. We are also grateful to the numerous officials taking time to meet with the team at the African Union's Peace Support Operations Division, in the planning elements in several regional economic communities and regional mechanisms, at the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Integrated Training Service, and in many other institutions.

The team is also extremely grateful to those who enabled our field visits and interviews in Liberia, Ghana and Somalia and provided invaluable logistical assistance and general support. Many thanks to Police Commissioner Greg Hinds (UN Mission in Liberia), Police Superintendent Per Evensen (Training Induction Unit, Liberia), and Superintendent Henry Otoo (Head International Relations Division, Ghana Police Services). The team is also extremely grateful to Commissioner Jimmy Hodari of Rwanda National Police and his staff for their kind and generous support in facilitating our mission in Rwanda, organising interviews and field visits and providing logistical support. We are also extremely grateful to staff at the National Police Academy, Gishari District, and National Police College, Musanze for warmly receiving us at short notice. The team benefitted greatly from its visit to AU Mission in Somalia hosted generously by the police component, which also offered access to senior managers at Headquarters and to groups of police officers at short notice. We owe particular thanks to Acting Police Commissioner Benson Oyo Nyeko and his staff. Thanks are also due to Cedric de Coning and Ingvild Magnæs Gjelsvik of NUPI who allowed our team member to accompany the TIP visit to the AU mission, offered assistance and advice on logistics and adopted a very cooperative and collegiate approach to the evaluation.

The team would like to take this opportunity to gratefully acknowledge and thank the numerous individuals interviewed. They graciously gave their valuable time to facilitate the team's country and mission visits and to provide information, analysis, interpretations and explanations. The views of all of these stakeholders were crucial in helping the team to formulate its assessments and recommendations.

The team has attempted to address all the evaluation questions in the Terms of Reference. Needless to say, any flaws and omissions are entirely ours. The team is also responsible for the views and recommendations expressed in this report.
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### Acronyms and Abbreviations

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<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>ACCORD</td>
<td>African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes</td>
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<td>ACIRC</td>
<td>African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crisis</td>
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<td>AFDEM</td>
<td>The African Civilian Response Capacity for Peace Support Operations</td>
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<td>AGM</td>
<td>Annual General Meeting</td>
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<td>AMISOM</td>
<td>AU Mission in Somalia</td>
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<td>APSA</td>
<td>AU Peace and Security Architecture</td>
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<td>APSTA</td>
<td>African Peace Support Trainers Association</td>
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<td>ASF</td>
<td>African Standby Force</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAO</td>
<td>Civil Affairs Officer</td>
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<td>CMI</td>
<td>Chr. Michelsen Institute</td>
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<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>DAC</td>
<td>OECD Development Assistance Committee</td>
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<td>DFS</td>
<td>UN Department of Field Services</td>
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<td>DPKO</td>
<td>UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations</td>
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<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>EAPCCO</td>
<td>Eastern Africa Police Chiefs Coordinating Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>EASF</td>
<td>Eastern African Standby Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>EASFCOM</td>
<td>EASF Coordinating Mechanism</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECCAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of Central African States</td>
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<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>FBU</td>
<td>Formed Police Unit</td>
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<td>FGD</td>
<td>Focus group discussion</td>
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<tr>
<td>GIZ</td>
<td>Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit GmbH</td>
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<tr>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>Head Quarter</td>
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<tr>
<td>IAB</td>
<td>International Advisory Board of TIP</td>
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<td>IAPTC</td>
<td>International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centres</td>
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<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Authority on Development in Eastern Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>IPO</td>
<td>Individual Police Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISS</td>
<td>Institute for Security Studies</td>
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<td>IPSTC</td>
<td>International Peace Support Training Centre (Kenya)</td>
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<tr>
<td>KAIPTC</td>
<td>Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre</td>
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<td>MFA</td>
<td>Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>MONUSCO</td>
<td>UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC</td>
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<tr>
<td>MoU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
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<tr>
<td>n. a.</td>
<td>not available</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organisation</td>
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<td>NOK</td>
<td>Norwegian Kroner</td>
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<td>Norad</td>
<td>Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NORCAP</td>
<td>Norwegian Capacity (standby roster)</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
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<td>PCC</td>
<td>Police contributing country</td>
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<td>PD</td>
<td>Pre-deployment</td>
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<td>PDT</td>
<td>Pre-deployment training</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSO</td>
<td>Peace Support Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSOD</td>
<td>AU Peace Support Operations Division</td>
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<tr>
<td>REC</td>
<td>Regional Economic Community</td>
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<td>RM</td>
<td>Regional Mechanism</td>
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<tr>
<td>RPTC</td>
<td>SADC Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>SADSEM</td>
<td>Southern African Defence &amp; Security Management Network</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAFDEM</td>
<td>Southern African Civilian Standby Roster for International Humanitarian Missions</td>
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<tr>
<td>SARPCCO</td>
<td>Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Cooperation Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAT</td>
<td>Selection assessment test</td>
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<tr>
<td>TCC</td>
<td>Troop Contributing Countries</td>
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<tr>
<td>TIP</td>
<td>Training for Peace in Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>ToT</td>
<td>Training of trainers</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNAMID</td>
<td>African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>UN Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMIL</td>
<td>UN Mission in Liberia</td>
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<td>UNMISS</td>
<td>UN Mission in the Republic of South Sudan</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNPOL</td>
<td>UN Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>USD</td>
<td>US Dollar</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZAR</td>
<td>South African Rand</td>
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Executive Summary
Executive summary

Introduction
This report presents the findings, conclusions and recommendations of an evaluation of the Training for Peace (TfP) in Africa programme. The purpose of the evaluation as specified by Norad's Evaluation Department is to assess relevance and effects of the programme with a view to informing decisions on the future of the programme, and also to inform the international community involved in peace operations. The evaluation had six main objectives and 22 evaluation questions covering the contextual environment; the strategic framework; the impact of training; the cost effectiveness of training; contributions to research, support to roster systems and policy developments; and the relevance of the programme. The evaluation shall focus on the 2010 – 2015 period.

TfP was initiated in 1995 and about NOK 290 million (about USD 50 million) will have been disbursed when the programme period expires at the end of 2015. The goal of the programme is to build sustainable African civilian and police peacekeeping capacities that are needed in order to implement multidimensional UN and AU peacekeeping mandates. TfP’s engagement takes place through a combination of training assistance, recruitment assistance, applied research and policy support.

The programme is implemented through five main partners: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Conflicts (ACCORD) in South Africa; the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) in South Africa; the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) in Ghana; the African Civilian Response Capacity for Peace Support Operations (AFDEM) in Zimbabwe; and the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) in Norway. TfP has two supporting partners: the Norwegian Police Directorate (POD) and the Secretariat of the Eastern African Standby Force (EASFCOM) in Kenya. The TfP support to AFDEM came to an end in 2014.
Findings

Context

There are still major needs for support to further development of African capacities to manage violent conflicts and to build peace. African countries are major contributors of personnel to peace operations on the continent, and the African Union has made much progress in developing polices and approaches to peace operations. However, the capacities to plan, manage and implement are still constrained and the understanding of the role of the police and civilian components is limited in most African personnel contributing countries.

TfP’s strategic framework

TfP is a complex programme without a clearly defined and articulated programme theory. Various internal programme factors (resources, diverse membership, structuring and management) and non-programme factors (complex and unpredictable external context) have contributed to TfP not effectively implementing a results-based management regime in which programme-wide outcomes are clearly defined, and then pursued by TfP partners.

Overall ownership and motivation for use and coordination of a contextually relevant TfP programme strategy is located within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The evaluation period has seen the development of a TfP strategic framework with TfP-partners sharing the broad objectives outlined there. However, there has been far less progress in translating shared objectives into a programmatic approach of shared and mutually reinforcing strategic action.

While relevant, the strategy as currently described is found not plausible as the basis for a programmatic theory of change for three main reasons: (1) Limited ownership, integration and engagement by partners to develop and implement a shared strategy as a management and learning tool; (2) Insufficient definition of key attributes of success with respect to the stated purpose (outcomes). There is a “missing middle” in the TfP strategy. It does not have clearly defined intermediate outcomes through which TfP outputs are clearly linked and assessed. The current management approach enables each TfP partner to annually choose multiple outcomes statements to justify an activities-based means of planning and budgeting; and (3) Insufficient authority/buy-in for TfP to operate as a coordinated programme using programme theory and theory of change as strategic management tools for planning, reporting, learning and adjusting its strategic approach.

Training and deployment

The volume of training in the 2010 – 2013 period is impressive with 80 training courses partially or wholly supported by TfP in producing a total of 3700 trainees. More than 250 police officers have participated in Train-the-
trainer courses, over 2700 police officers have attended TfP-supported police pre-deployment courses, nearly 350 female police officers have benefitted from special training courses, and about 300 civilian peacekeepers have been enrolled in training courses implemented by TfP-partners. Compared to quantitative TfP-targets, this is far more than envisaged, although the gender composition is lagging behind an ambitious target of 40 percent.

This TfP supported training is sizeable in quantitative terms. The TfP-partners are major providers of training in many important police contributing countries in Africa. However, the team also concludes that the effectiveness of the training as measured through deployment and the use of trainees is less than expected. This is partly due to insufficient attention paid to pre-training (selection) and post-training (use of trainees and sustainability of training interventions).

Furthermore, the TfP partners also appear to have different priorities and views on whether the focus should be on assisting the African Union in meeting the training needs of the African Standby Forces, or responding to the needs of on-going missions. Better targeting of training such as providing pre-deployment training to police officers selected for deployment and as close to deployment as possible will greatly enhance the effectiveness of training. The pool of trainers trained also needs to be maintained to ensure effectiveness.

Rosters are intended to be the key link between training and deployment. The development of rosters by the African Union and regional organisations is largely outside the control of TfP, but we also note that most TfP partners are neglecting this dimension and fail to keep track of their trainees or make them available to rosters.

The impact of training

Pre-deployment training does have a positive impact on police officers in missions compared to those who do not have such training, but we do not know how many of those trained with TfP support that were deployed.

The team assessed the impact of the pre-deployment training of 2700 police officers through interview data from samples of police officers in two peace operations in Liberia and Somalia and in two police contributing countries – Rwanda and Ghana. The evidence assembled shows that such training saves the time of police officers on arrival by equipping them with the learning to put the mission into a wider context and certain skills that they need to perform in the mission, both in terms of every-day tasks such as driving and report writing, and in terms of appropriate conduct, such as respect for diversity, and also on knowledge of the UN and international peacekeeping. This effect will be larger for less experienced police officers. The training also increases the psychological preparation of officers, their management of stress and ability to cope with challenging situations.

TfP is a major player in supporting the provision of pre-deployment training and has contributed to improved preparedness of a substantial number of police officers. However, we do not know how many trainees were deployed and it is in deployment that the main impacts of training are experienced. The data
suggests that pre-deployment training provided to officers already selected for deployment to an on-going mission and with training taking place as close to deployment as possible are more effective. The impacts of training are weaker in regional training courses focusing on training for the standby force.

The cost-effectiveness of training

There are major differences in pre-deployment training costs between TfP partners and between different models of training. The TfP programme has supported the delivery of several types of training courses with great variations in the costs of delivery. The team examined the police pre-deployment courses. Due to difficulties in assessing the effectiveness and impact of TfP-training, it has not been possible to measure cost-effectiveness. The team was however able to assess cost drivers and identify the cost per trained police officer of different models. Generally, TfP partners have been conscious of costs and have tried to minimise expenses. However, the team found dramatic differences in training costs between TfP partners and between different models of training. National or in-country courses targeting officers selected for deployment are cheaper than training officers from several countries in a regional course. The use of Norwegian instructors is a major cost driver, and training for the pool of police for the standby roster is very expensive. The costs of TfP supported training per trainee have varied between NOK 3 000 and NOK 23 000.

Research and policy support

TfP’s research is largely derived from the priorities of individual partners and not from the needs of the programme. Policy support has been dedicated and responding to needs of the beneficiaries but uneven in implementation. Research and policy support are highly significant and are intended to be reinforcing elements of the overall strategic design of the TfP intervention. The team finds that research is a highly relevant under-taking, and in some cases it has had a noticeable effect on other programme areas and on policy development by beneficiaries. However, the team finds that the research output is highly uneven both between and within partners and with discrepancy between planned research and implemented research activities.

The team found that TfP’s research, while producing many relevant outputs, is largely derived from the interests of individual researchers and the priorities of individual TfP-partners with insufficient attention to programme needs and priorities. The limited attention to the programme needs is particularly evident in the work related to the police. Research on the civilian component has been more relevant to training and policy work.

Policy support from TfP’s African partners has historically mainly been in relation to the evolving polices of the African Union and other African institutions while NUPI has mainly engaged with the UN and the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Support related to the civilian component has been systematic and long-term with some clear effects while policy support in relation to the police
component have been far more ad hoc and limited. Policy support in relation to African sub-regional organisations and member states are almost absent in TfP work in the evaluation period. Partners sometimes pursue different approaches and policies in relation to target groups. This has weakened the effectiveness of the programme. On the other hand, the efforts by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to provide additional and direct support to the African Union have increased the effectiveness in certain areas, primarily in strengthening the institutional capacity of the AU to deal with the civilian dimensions of peace support operations.

Relevance

*TfP is a relevant initiative in relation to the needs of peace support operations in African and Norwegian foreign policy objectives, but has to address weaknesses to remain a valid instrument.* TfP has made important contributions to the African peace and security agenda. Stakeholders and beneficiaries in Africa generally report confidence and trust in TfP partners. The TfP objectives are still relevant. African peace and security will continue to be important in Norwegian foreign policies and development aid.

TfP may still be a valid instrument to pursue these objectives beyond 2015, but this implies that TfP has to address a number of weaknesses identified in this evaluation. This includes being clear on its own purpose and structure as a programme, and its ability to strategically select priority outcomes and design interventions to achieve them.

Conclusions

The team presents its conclusions around three overarching and crosscutting themes

*Strategic framework and management: Shared objectives, but insufficient programme coherence and strategy.* TfP’s strategic framework was intended to enable the programme to focus better on achieving results, and to provide a basis for TfP to critically reflect on the chosen interventions in realizing outcomes. Some progress has been recorded with the introduction of the new framework and stronger efforts by the MFA and Norwegian embassies to assist TfP-partners. TfP partners do share a broad overlapping area of interest and common focus – and more so today than earlier. However, there is limited engagement by TfP partners to develop and implement a shared strategy with individual partners responding more to the needs of their individual organisations than to the needs of the programme. This is in particular evident in an insufficient translation of shared objectives into a programmatic approach of shared and mutually reinforcing strategic action. This has reduced the efficiency of TfP. The shift of the management responsibility from the Embassy in Pretoria to the Embassy in Addis Ababa has facilitated a better link between TfP policy engagement with the AU and Norwegian support to the AU and implementation of AU policies.
Programmes: High activity and dedication. TfP’s activities are implemented with much dedication and with capacity to respond to changing needs and evolving contexts. These are important assets for any programme operating in a complex and often unpredictable environment. The implementation of the TfP programmes has been activity focused with limited attention to outcomes and reflections on the effectiveness of different interventions.

Results and impact: Moving from activities to outcomes. TfP’s impressive training activities also capture TfP’s main weaknesses: insufficient attention to what works. Which interventions are leading to more outcomes and increases impact? Which type of pre-deployment training is more likely to increase deployment rate and lead to more competent peacekeepers? How can Training-of-trainers courses be used to build the training capacity of police contributing countries?

The broad scope of the current TfP strategic framework has enabled the justification of multiple training and other initiatives by individual partners, sometimes with co-contributions from other partners. The broad strategy focus, combined with an incapacity for asserting a programmatic management focus, results in medium to long-term strategic outcomes not being consistently pursued, expanded upon, or picked up by other TfP partners. The work-plans and focus of TfP partners can change on an annual basis. These annually chosen activities may still cohere with the overall strategic framework, but they are not necessarily enhancing or reinforcing programatically strategic efforts from the year before.

Recommendations

The team presents its main recommendations under two main headings.

Strategic direction. In deciding upon a future role for a Training for Peace programme the Ministry of Foreign Affairs must decide whether TfP should continue as a programme, or whether the programme approach should be abandoned and let support for all or some of the current TfP partners continue on a case-by-case base alongside other Norwegian support in this area. One of the added values of having a programme as opposed to case by case support is the ‘brand identity’ that TfP as a whole might generate, and the possibilities for collaboration between partners. If the programme is to continue, the team advises that this would be justifiable only if efforts are made to harness strategic direction.

Programme interventions. TfP supported interventions are now covering too many issues with too little focus on what it wants to achieve. TfP supports a range of different training course delivered through different models. The team recommends that selection of courses and delivery models must be based on identification of what works well in achieving outcomes. TfP’s research agenda must be based on programme needs and as a main rule projects should involve two or more partners. A similar approach is recommended in relation to policy
support where TfP must select its interventions based on what they want to achieve.

The TfP emphasis on training and support to the implementation of the African Peace and Security Architecture requires more attention than previously on how TfP interventions can be harmonized with support from other donor programmes to make it more sustainable and increase effectiveness. This applies in particular to support provided to regional organisations and member states.
1. Introduction and Background

Purpose and implementation of the evaluation

The purpose of this evaluation commissioned by Norad’s Evaluation Department is to provide information about the relevance and effects of the Training for Peace in Africa programme (TFP). Norad commissioned the study “with a view to informing decisions about the future of the programme and to inform the international community involved in peace operations.” The six evaluation objectives are reproduced in Box 1.1.

Box 1.1 Evaluation objectives

1. Provide an updated contextual and institutional analysis of the peace and security architecture in Africa;
2. Identify and map the programme logic and its underlying assumptions;
3. Assess the impact of the programme’s training component;
4. Assess the cost effectiveness of the programme’s training component;
5. Assess the contributions of the programme’s research, policy advice, and roster components to planned outcomes stated in the strategic framework; and
6. Analyse the programme’s relevance.

TFP has evolved over several phases since its conceptualisation in the early 1990s and its launch in 1995. It will have received more than about NOK 290 million – about USD 50 million - when the current phase expires in 2015. It has become a significant and major component in Norwegian support for peace and security in Africa. Below we have provided an analytical summary of the historical evolution and the main features of TFP, with further details presented in Annex Two. This chapter also includes a discussion and update of TFP’s context and operating environment.

The evaluation team’s data collection progressed through several distinct phases. The first inception phase was conducted in June/July 2013 and included initial discussions with Norad’s Evaluation Department and the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs. The team also met with the two Norwegian-based TfP-partners – the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) and the Police Directorate (POD) - and had a first reading of key TfP documents. The inception report (60 pages) outlined the team’s interpretation of ToR and approach to the evaluation, the methodology to be used and provided a detailed work plan. The Evaluation Department forwarded the inception report to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, relevant Norwegian embassies and TfP partners and invited them to provide comments.

The next phase from mid-August to November culminated with the submission of a mid-way report (34 pages) in November. It followed a period of data collection based on visits to all TfP-partners in Oslo, Durban, Pretoria, Bulawayo, Accra and Nairobi as well as with key stakeholders in these cities and in Addis Ababa, Harare, Gaborone and New York. The mid-way report summarised emerging and provisional findings; identified challenges and revisions to the approach and work plan; and outlined the plans for data collection through field visits to assess the impact of training.

Following the mid-way report, Norad’s Evaluation Department provided additional funds to enable the team to undertake scoping missions to two peacekeeping/peace support missions to plan and facilitate subsequent field visits to assess impact of training. Originally the team had selected the UN/AU Hybrid Operation in Darfur and the AU Mission in Somalia as case studies, but the logistical challenges involved in securing timely permission to visit Darfur led the team to shift from Darfur to the UN Mission in South Sudan. The scoping mission to South Sudan was planned for January 2014 but with the eruption of civil war in the country from mid-December it was judged to be impossible to carry out the required interviews with former trainees. It was therefore decided to shift the data collection to the UN Mission in Liberia. The scoping mission was carried out in early March and the field visit itself took place in late March.

The scoping mission to Somalia took place as scheduled in late January, but the subsequent deterioration of the security situation in Mogadishu led the team to abort the main field visit to the country. A report from the scoping missions (8 pages) was submitted to the Evaluation Department in March.

In addition to data collection visits to the missions in Somalia and Liberia the team also in this phase visited two main police contributing countries – Rwanda and Ghana. The purpose was to interview police officers who had returned from missions as well as interviews with senior officials involved in police training and deployment.

The final writing phase commenced in April with submission of the draft report in early June.

The evaluation team has met three times during the evaluation: in Bergen and Oslo during the inception phase, in Nairobi in preparing for the mid-way report and in London at the start of the writing phase. Throughout the process the team
had much communication with the Evaluation Department in Norad, with current and former TfP managers at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Norwegian embassies as well as with TfP partners. The team leader also attended the meeting of the TfP International Advisory Board in Addis Ababa in November 2013 and the TfP Annual General Meeting in Abuja in March 2014.

A first draft report was submitted to Norad’s Evaluation Department on 6 June 2014. In an email from 26 June the Evaluation Department requested clarification on a few specific issues. This final draft report was submitted on 2 July. The Evaluation Department forwarded the final draft report to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, relevant embassies, TfP partners, members of the TfP advisory board and others. The deadline for comments was 29 August. The evaluation team received comments from Norad’s Evaluation Department, from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Norwegian Embassy in Addis Ababa, from all TfP-partners and from one member of the advisory board. The team has summarized the main comments and its responses in a separate table submitted to the Evaluation Department.

The comments have been very helpful in preparing this final report. It has helped the team clarifying some of its arguments and findings, and to highlight certain findings both in the main text and in the executive summary. The comments have not pointed to any significant factual errors or led to revisions of major interpretations. However, some of the comments require a more principal response. One is that the evaluation has not sufficiently evaluated important dimensions of TfP’s work and has focused too much on the training component. To this the team responds that it is guided by the Terms of Reference which require a more specific focus on training and with a focus on the current period (from 2010). The Terms of Reference was developed by the Evaluation Department following consultations with TfP. The team’s interpretation and approach was outlined in the inception report which was submitted to TfP for comments. The Evaluation Department also forwarded the mid-way report to TfP.

Furthermore, the emphasis on “results” and “evidence” influenced the focus towards where the most robust evidence might be obtainable. The provision of baselines, listing of outputs and the documentation of outcomes by TfP partners outside of training has been limited – thereby also constraining the extent to which meaningful evaluative conclusions can be drawn in these additional result areas. However, the report has attempted to identify all the main activity areas of TfP and provides a summary of important contributions.

The team decided to focus on the police component because the bulk of the training is in this area. Out of the 3700 persons who have participated in TfP-supported training courses in the 2010-2013 period nearly all - 3300 - are police officers. The team decided to focus on TfP contributions in relation to the African Union, regional and national organisations and on-going peace support operations in Africa with much less emphasis on TfP contributions to policy development at the UN in New York or in relation to Norwegian foreign policy development in Oslo.
Several comments also relate to the discussion of TfP’s strategic framework and the state of a programme theory or theory of change in relation to the TfP programme. The team has made further clarification of this in a revised version of Chapter Three.

Measuring the impact of TfP and other peace support or peacebuilding interventions is challenging and demanding. Evaluations and assessments of results and impacts in the sphere of foreign and security policies are often viewed with scepticism by many practitioners. Much evaluative work in this area is also conducted using less sophisticated designs than what is common in evaluations of development aid. The Terms of Reference developed for this evaluation are ambitious and placed much emphasis on the methodology for measuring impact. They call for an evaluation design which includes mapping the context, assessing and/or developing a programme theory, and assessing the effects of the main training component through tracer studies of personnel who have received training. The design should also allow for attribution of impacts. And finally, the team is asked to provide a cost-effectiveness analysis of training, and to assess the research component in the programme and TfP’s contribution to rosters and to policy development, as well as the overall relevance of the programme.

There are special challenges involved in assessing impacts of a programme of this nature. First and foremost, establishing a credible counterfactual is often impossible since the nature of the conflicts can be unique. If so, rigorous measurements of outcomes and impacts have to yield for approaches that substantiate likely impacts through various methods. Moreover, an operating environment characterised by crisis and conflict and processes evolving in a chaotic rather than a linear fashion makes causal attribution between the intervention and intended impact difficult. Comparability of activities in different conflict settings is also limited. Furthermore, these types of interventions are often characterised by conflicting goals between their individual components and actors and/or between their short- and long-term impacts. The more comprehensive the objectives and activities of an intervention, the greater the necessity to respond to unexpected events and adapt activities accordingly.

Operating in highly escalated conflict situations also involves a high risk of failure. External donor interventions must therefore be prepared to accept greater risks yet maintain long-term engagement.

These challenges are not calls for a reduced focus on evaluations of interventions in peace and security. That would imply abandoning the aspiration to learn by subjecting actions to critical review and to underestimate the benefits that evaluations can offer to intervention planners and implementers. Instead, these challenges call for enhanced focus in programme design, monitoring and evaluation, taking into account the constraints of measuring causal attribution and conflicting goals, and mitigating the dilemmas associated with risks. Efforts

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to deal with these challenges have most systematically been dealt with within
the sphere of development aid and are reflected in the 2012 guidelines from the
OECD’s Development Assistance Committee.²

The team’s methodological approach is outlined and further discussed in
Chapter Two and Annex Three.

Structure of the evaluation report
Chapter Two and the associated Annex Three provide a presentation of the
team’s methodological approach and outline the different phases of the
evaluation process. The chapter and its associated annex also present how the
team responded to the evaluation questions related to the impact of training.
This chapter and the annex further provides a presentation of the data capturing
instruments, a profile of the sample of police officers interviewed in the UN
Mission in Liberia, in the AU Mission in Somalia and in two police contributing
countries – Ghana and Rwanda. Annex Six provides an overview of police
officers interviewed as well as the list of key informants among TIP partners,
beneficiaries, current and former TIP managers at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
and Norwegian Embassies, and others.

Chapter Three maps the TIP’s strategic framework and assesses the state of the
programme theory.

Chapter Four provides a presentation and analysis of TIP’s training courses and
the use of the trainees, including the state of the rosters for deployment. Annex
Four provides details on course statistics and the use of trainees. Chapter Five
analyses the impact of the training. Annex Five provides more details on the
findings from the interview data from missions and police contributing countries.
Chapter Six analyses the cost effectiveness of the TIP training.

Chapter Seven analyses TIP’s research programme and contribution to policy
support. Chapter Eight presents the team’s assessment of the relevance of TIP.
The final Chapter Nine presents the team’s overall conclusions and
recommendations.

Chapters Three to Eight begin with a summary presentation of findings and a list
of the specific evaluation questions addressed in the chapter.

The Terms of Reference for the evaluation are provided in Annex One at the end
of this report. Annex 2-6 are available for download at www.norad.no/evaluation.

Training for Peace – 1995-2014: An overview

The focus for this evaluation of TfP is the current 2010-2015 period. This section and accompanying Annex Two provide an overview of the evolution of TfP and its main contributions over time.

TfP was launched in 1995 as Training for Peace in Southern Africa. The goal of the programme is to build sustainable African civilian and police peacekeeping capacities that are needed in order to implement multidimensional UN and AU peacekeeping mandates. TfP’s engagement takes place through a combination of training assistance, recruitment and deployment assistance, applied research and policy support.

The programme is implemented through five main partners: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Conflicts (ACCORD) in South Africa; the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) in South Africa; the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) in Ghana; the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) in Norway; and – until March 2014 - the African Civilian Response Capacity for Peace Support Operations (AFDEM) in Zimbabwe. TfP has two supporting partners: the Norwegian Police Directorate (POD) and the Secretariat of the Eastern African Standby Force (EASFCOM) in Kenya.

TfP has gone through four funding cycles and is now (2011-2015) in its fourth phase. It has evolved in several directions since its inception; both thematically and geographically with more organisations becoming partners, and with an increasing effort to provide technical assistance support to ongoing peacekeeping missions and to engage more directly with the developing African peace and security architecture. This has been a response to changing needs and demands as well as different Norwegian priorities. The management of the programme has also changed considerably over the years, but throughout the management has been highly decentralized with much flexibility provided to the individual partners. A division of labour between the TfP-partners has been facilitated and developed, but the level of interaction and cooperation between partners has for the most part remained limited. From the start NUPI was managing and coordinating the programme on behalf of Norad and the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). This ended in 2006 with the MFA assuming direct responsibility, first managed from Oslo and from 2008 mainly through the Embassy in Pretoria. In 2013 the main responsibility was moved from the Embassy in Pretoria to the Embassy in Addis Ababa.

The team has observed a high turn-over rate of middle management responsible for translating broad strategic direction into action. In the evaluation period there has been three TfP managers in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, two or three in the Embassies and multiple shifts in many of the partner organisations.

Annex Two provides a profile of the TfP and its evolution since inception and to 2010. In the current 2011-2015 phase more emphasis has been placed on providing TfP with a strategic framework coupled with more importance given to results-based management.
Phase 4: 2011-2015

NOK 170 million – about USD 29 million - has been allocated to TFP since the start in 1995, including NOK 70 million for the 2007-2010 period. In 2010 it was decided to provide funding for another phase from 2011 to 2015 with an indicative budget of nearly NOK 120 million, or close to USD 21 million. The Table below summarises disbursements to the different partners and to the International Advisory Board (IAB) since 2010 – the start of the evaluation period.

**Table 1.1 Summary of TFP disbursements: 2010 – mid-2013 (NOK million)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>ACCORD</th>
<th>AFDEM</th>
<th>ISS</th>
<th>KAIPTC</th>
<th>NUPI</th>
<th>EASFCOM</th>
<th>POD</th>
<th>IAB*</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td></td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>29.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>28.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>27.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>15.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>17.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>6.5</strong></td>
<td><strong>14.9</strong></td>
<td><strong>29.6</strong></td>
<td><strong>15.6</strong></td>
<td><strong>8.5</strong></td>
<td><strong>9.4</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.6</strong></td>
<td><strong>101.9</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>16.7%</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
<td>14.6%</td>
<td>29.1%</td>
<td>15.3%</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
<td>9.2%</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The figures in the Table are based on data supplied by MFA’s regional department. Note: Funding to the Norwegian Police Directorate (POD) includes a separate grant of NOK 2.5 million for driving courses in Ghana for female police officers.

IAB is the TFP International Advisory Board

In providing funding for a new phase MFA made several steps to act on the recommendations from the 2010 review.³ This review had called for a more clearly defined focus and strategic framework for the programme and stronger strategic and administrative management of the programme (cf. Annex Two). MFA’s response included the development of a TFP strategic framework which listed 13 TFP objectives.⁴ They are reproduced in Box 1.2 on the next pages.

This strategy document was slightly revised and consolidated in 2012. The strategy document was followed by a list of targets to be achieved in the period, including – from 2011 – annual reports listing TFP activities, outputs and achievements. See more on this in Chapter Three.

The changes also included changes in management and reporting with a shift towards a more result-based approach. Reporting and planning formats were improved to facilitate this. Considerable efforts were made by TFP managers at

³ See especially the 2010 and 2011 internal memos from MFA. Fredsoperasjoner i Afrika. Sivil kapasitetsbygging gjennom Training for Peace. Status og veien videre mot neste fase (5 July 2010) and Notat om innretningen av TFP programmets (24 August 2011). The final changes and new directions adopted following consultations with the Advisory Board and TFP-partners were communicated to the TFP-partners in an email from MTA, TFP Update September 2011 (15 September). It contains several annexes, including “Mapping of recommendations from “Navigating complexity. A Review of Training for Peace 2010” which includes a list of decisions in relation to each of the 17 recommendations from the review.

the MFA and embassies to help facilitate this change. The strategic document did however suffer from several weaknesses, including insufficient description of outcomes (see more on this Chapter Three). The management of TfP was with effect from mid-2013 also shifted from the Embassy in Pretoria to the Embassy in Addis Ababa in order to facilitate improved relations between the programme and the AU. Management of the programme grant to KAIPTC was moved to the Embassy in Accra in 2011 which was already managing TfP’s core funding to KAIPTC. The Embassy in Accra also managed the POD support to the Ghana Police Service and their driving courses for female officers. Management of the support to EASFCOM was moved to the Embassy in Nairobi in mid-2013. Management of the Norwegian support to POD’s engagement in TfP – which until 2014 was mainly with KAIPTC and EASFCOM in addition to direct POD support to training courses in Gambia in 2012 - was managed from the Embassy in Addis Ababa.

**Box 1.2 TfP’s objectives**

1. Build self-sustaining African civilian and police peace operations capacity in the AU and RECs/REMs, according to their stated needs and plans. TfP’s main focus should lie on Southern, Western and Eastern African regions and countries, with options for some engagement in North and Central Africa, and well coordinated with other development partners;

2. Support the development of policies targeted at implementing SR 1325, 1820 and other normative developments relevant to cross cutting women, peace and security issues in peace operations;

3. Strengthen recruitment and training of female peace keeping personnel (and trainers) for peace operations, in line with SR 1325 and its emphasis on female participation in the prevention and resolution of conflict;

4. Continue efforts to improve relevant aspects of the selection, recruitment, training and deployment procedures for peace operations, as well as identifying and addressing bottlenecks to deployment;

5. Provide roster advice and support to the UN, AU and RECs for peace operations in Africa and, when appropriate, elsewhere. Stronger cooperation between TfP and Norwegian resources to strengthen the African roster and recruitment capacity;

6. Further conceptual development for the civilian and police dimensions of the African Peace and Security Architecture, including the African Standby Force;

7. Contribute research that is relevant to and effectively utilised as a support for TfP training and policy advice;

8. Contribute added value to the totality of international capacity building initiatives assisting UN and AU led peace operations in Africa, including active support to coordination efforts;

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5 The team found many documents in the embassy archives in Pretoria indicating strong follow-up with several partners in 2011 and 2012. This included feedback on draft reports and plans with requests for new versions with a stronger focus on results. We found no trace of any written communication on these matters in 2013. The 2014 archives have not been consulted.
Certain changes were also introduced in partner composition and partner relations. AFDEM – The African Civilian Response Capacity for Peace Support Operations - became a TfP member from 2011. It was also formally established as an NGO in 2011 and the Embassy in Pretoria provided significant technical support through consultants in 2011 and 2012 in assisting AFDEM in this transition. However, the MFA concluded in February 2014 that AFDEM did not live up to expectations and opted not to renew the contract when the current funding agreement expired on 1 March 2014. This marked the end of TfP support to AFDEM.

The placement of a Norwegian police commissioner to EASFCOM came to an abrupt end in mid-2013 when the incumbent resigned and recommended that Norway and TfP should terminate support for this placement. MFA decided in February 2014 to renew funding and a police officer from POD took up the position in mid-2014. Insufficient financial reporting and unspent funds have delayed a decision regarding continued direct funding to EASFCOM, but it is expected that funding for a new period will be entered into in the latter half of 2014. Both EASFCOM and POD are defined as “supporting partners” in TfP.

From 2013 MFA renewed efforts to improve co-operation and interaction between TfP partners. A first effort was linked to improvements in external communication and marketing through the TfP website and an electronic TfP newsletter. Additional funds were provided to ACCORD - the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Conflicts - enabling them to be in charge of this.6 Funds were also provided by the MFA in 2013 to launch a TfP research network with an initial focus on police in peace missions. NUPI was coordinating this network during the first year with KAIPTC assuming that responsibility from 2014. At the annual general meeting of TfP in March 2014 MFA announced

(9) Continue to develop the two way mutual partnership that is emerging between African and Norwegian TfP partners;

(10) Strengthen brand recognition and visibility of the TfP, with a view to strengthen TfP identity and TfP impact in normative and training efforts;

(11) Better utilise the TfP experience and resources in active policy cooperation with the AU and UN including at diplomatic and political level, with more active Norwegian Foreign service support to such efforts vis-à-vis relevant regional, sub-regional and national authorities;

(12) Adhere to results based management principles in the planning, implementation and monitoring and evaluation of the TfP Programme; and

(13) Phase out of TfP activities that are either being taken over by APSA institutions as APSA's capacity grows, or as TfP activities are otherwise rendered redundant.

Oslo: MFA [20 December 2010].

6 See also the TfP’s Information Strategy for Training for Peace in Africa: 2012-2015, a memo prepared by ACCORD for the November 2013 International Advisory Board meeting.
changes in the annual planning cycle in order to facilitate improved co-operation between TfP partners in developing working plans for the coming year.

In 2012 TfP undertook a major internal review of the police component of the programme. It was carried out by staff from POD, NUPI and the Institute for Security Studies (ISS). They presented a series of recommendations to improve and strengthen its work in this area. They included calls for

- a qualitative shift in the TfP police component’s support for policy development.
- Priority should be given to supporting the development of mid- and senior-level police officers for deployment to [peace support operations]. Many mid- and senior-level African police lack the managerial, mentoring and leadership skills to lead their subordinates in the new skills required of police in PSOs. Shifting focus to these two groups is expected to have an important impact on effective police deployment to PSOs. A further shift should be supported in future from direct provision of training to facilitation of training by the AU, RECs and RMs through training of trainers and other capacity building measures that facilitate efficient deployment of trained personnel. Training assistance should be adjusted to incorporate ongoing monitoring, needs assessment and impact assessment.

This led to a number of changes both in training and other areas. This included efforts to establish a TfP research network focusing on policing, and preparations for new TfP courses targeting mid-level management in peace operations.

**TfP’s operational environment**

Africa has seen much progress in recent years. Many countries have witnessed significant economic growth with political stability being consolidated. At the same time inter- and intra-state conflicts are still common, widespread and destructive, and pose significant challenges to the security and prosperity of millions of people on the African continent. Drivers of conflict are evident both at the international and systematic level, at the level of African states, and at the level of local leaders in communities and regions. The complex and integrated linkages between security and development have become more visible and the distinctions between traditional categories of conflict have been blurred. The violence and civil wars in the DR Congo, Somalia and in the two Sudans capture much of these with the current crisis in Mali and the Central African Republic illustrating violent intra-state conflicts, rise of militias and terrorism erupting being reinforced by the fall-out from the Arab Spring. But even in more stable parts of the continent, such as in Southern Africa, there are electoral violence and intra-state threats to peace and stability in several countries.

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There have been significant developments in international and global responses to African conflicts. Conflict and security in Africa continues to dominate the agenda of the Security Council in the UN. There has also been continuous strengthening of multidimensional approaches to peacekeeping especially related to the role of the UN police. This has also included a number of decisions indicating a further expansion of mandated use of force. This includes e.g., the establishment of a "force intervention brigade" within the UN mission in DR Congo to fight militias in the eastern part of the country. The Security Council after having avoided launching new large-scale missions for six years, in 2013 decided to approve the authorisation of 12 000 troops for Mali.

These examples also indicate a significant expansion of UN commitment to peacekeeping in Africa. Already more than 80 percent of UN peacekeepers worldwide are deployed to African peace operations. Outside the UN the European Union and several of the main European powers (in particular France) have continued to be active players both through deployment by their own troops and support to efforts by African countries and regional organisations. NATO embarked upon a major military intervention in Libya based on a UN mandate to protect civilians. The rise of the new economic powers, most dramatically illustrated by China and others such as India and Brazil, has added another dimension to the international response to Africa's conflicts.

Most importantly, the last decade has seen important developments in Africa's response to violent conflict and crisis. The powerful non-interference clause was abolished with the establishment of the African Union replacing the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 2002. While the OAU had a firm focus on defending

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10 The annual review of peace operations is a good source of factual information. See the most recent edition Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2013, Boulder, Col.: Lynne Rienner Publishers 2013 (A Project of the Center on International Cooperation).

national sovereignty and objected to interference in domestic affairs the AU adopted an official policy that permitted intervention in member states in “grave circumstances”. During its first ten years the AU suspended nine countries from its membership for unconstitutional changes of governments. It has also launched ten peace support operations on the continent, of which the AU Mission in Somalia is the biggest.

The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) provides the framework for the AU’s engagement in peace and security. Its components are to consist of a political decision-making body – the Peace and Security Council; an analysis centre – the Continental Early Warning Centre; an external mediation and advisory body – the Panel of the Wise; a multidimensional standby force comprising military, police and civilian components – the African Standby Force; and a special fund to cover costs – the African Peace Fund. Notably, each of these structures is envisaged replicated at the sub-regional level in each of AU’s official regions – West Africa, Southern Africa, North Africa, Central Africa and East Africa. The role of the AU within APSA is also to drive the process, to provide guidance and policy directions, to act as a legitimising institution, and to provide coordination.12

The AU’s achievements since 2002 have in many respects been remarkable. The problems and challenges inherent in moving from policies to implementation are, however, significant and have caused severe delays. There are major difficulties in operationalising APSA.13 This is illustrated by the fate of the instrument for peacekeeping or peace support operations, the African Standby Force, which is supposed to comprise regional standby forces from each of the AU’s five regions. The deadline for achieving operational readiness has been repeatedly extended. According to the most recent and third “road map”, it is now set for 2016. This deadline is once again unlikely to be met. The 2012 and 2013 efforts by the AU to respond to the crisis in Mali through the AU Mission in Mali are illustrative. The AU was, despite its political commitment to Mali, unable to properly confront the emergency situation and respond adequately to the Malian government’s request for assistance. The only recourse was the French intervention. There was also considerable delay in the operational readiness, logistical preparation and build-up of the units placed at the disposal of the mission. It was only after the French intervention that the deployment of inadequately prepared African troops began in earnest. Finally, the geographical position of Mali in the Sahel-Sahara region, at the crossroads of three of Africa’s five official regions and the deployment of units belonging to two different regional economic communities presented a series of political and technical challenges. This paved the way for a decision by the AU in May 2013 to strengthen the rapid deployment capability of the African Standby Force through the establishment of a special African Capacity for Immediate Response to

There are several reasons for the delays in operationalising and implementing the African Standby Forces. They are partly linked to technical deficiencies, weak institutions and poor funding. More importantly, there are also political obstacles, with member states being reluctant and sometimes unwilling to commit themselves to implement policies and norms being developed at the regional or continental level. In particular, there is reluctance to curtail their own national sovereignty. Internal political dynamics in the regions, rivalries between members and different geopolitical interests also constrain the implementation of APSA.

The two major sub-regional groupings – SADC in Southern Africa and ECOWAS in West Africa – have made some progress towards reaching “operational readiness” by 2015, but they still have a long way to go. ECOWAS has a strong track record in deploying personnel in peace operations – in part explained by the de facto adherence to the principle of a lead nation, enabling Nigeria to play a pivotal role. Within SADC there is no similar support enabling one country (South Africa) to play a similar leading role, although SADC has made a number of political interventions in regional crisis. The Eastern African Standby Force (EASF) is a regional mechanism specifically established for the purpose of securing a standby force from Eastern Africa. Political conflicts in this region made it impossible to use the existing and overlapping regional economic communities (IGAD, EAC and COMESA).

The Secretariat of the EASF (EASFCOM in Nairobi) receives much donor funding and has, in contrast to SADC and ECOWAS, a large number of donor-funded expatriates and seconded personnel from military and police in donor countries. This may explain much progress at the technical level in providing training courses and preparatory work for deployment. At the same time there is less buy-in from EASF member states themselves and EASF struggles to become an effective instrument for peace support interventions in the region. The activities of EASFCOM are largely focused on technical dimensions, such as training, related to the establishment of a future standby force.

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The AU has conducted its own assessment of the state of the African Standby Force and concluded at the time that ECOWAS, SADC and EASF – with dedicated efforts – may be able to reach operational readiness by 2015 while the two others in Central and North Africa are unlikely to do so.\textsuperscript{16}

There are many shortcomings in planning, designing and implementing the African Standby Forces in the regions. This does however not imply that African countries are unable to deploy. At the end of 2012 African countries deployed 32 000 military, 5000 police officers and 2700 international civilians to UN missions in Africa. In addition nearly 19 000 troops were deployed through the African Union and regional organisations the same year.\textsuperscript{17} African countries are also deploying to the new (2013) force intervention brigade in the UN Mission in DR Congo; all members of this brigade – a force originally conceived by SADC as a possible deployment through the African Standby Force – are from South Africa, Malawi and Tanzania.

The roles, requirements and indeed formal mandates of peacekeeping and peace support operations have evolved over the years responding to changing needs. The expanding role and numbers of police and civilians in peace operations are a major manifestation of this trend.\textsuperscript{18} This is most evident with the UN, but has also become evident in AU operations. However, most missions are military dominated with varying degrees of commitment to multidimensional approaches. This commitment is evidently much weaker in the AU compared to the UN. Multidimensionality has been built into the policy frameworks of the African Standby Force and in the structure of the planning elements of the force both at the AU Peace Support Operations Division in Addis and at the equivalents at the sub-regional level. However, the ASF structures all report to the Chiefs of Defence, with the police and especially the civilian components being weak. At the level of the member states the understanding of and commitment to multidimensional approaches to peacekeeping appears far more limited. The 2013 decision to establish the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crisis (see above) can also be interpreted as another manifestation of the failure of the African Standby Force.

The relations between the AU and the UN in relation to peace support operations have been further developed in the period, including with the expansion of liaison offices. However, there are tensions and rivalries between the two related to actual missions. This is perhaps most evident in the case of


\textsuperscript{17} These figures are derived from Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2013, Boulder, Col.: Lynne Rienner Publishers 2013 (A Project of the Center on International Cooperation). In total, more than 95 000 police and military troops were deployed in UN missions around the world at the end of 2012. About 72 000 were deployed in Africa. An additional 4500 international civilian staff were also deployed to Africa.

Somalia where the team also observed how UN officials on the ground held very sceptical views on the AU efforts to engage with policing, civil affairs and peacebuilding and felt that this would be much better dealt with if left to the UN.

Funding for peace operations through the AU is largely provided by external donor agencies. This includes direct financial support for ongoing missions such as from the European Union and the UN as well support to individual personnel contributing countries in Africa. They receive support for training and various technical assistance related to deployment.\(^9\)

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2. How to Evaluate Training for Peace?

Methodology

Methods for assessing the impact of training

The Terms of Reference (ToR) identify six main objectives and list 22 evaluation questions. These include questions related to the context and stakeholder positions, impact of training courses, contribution to policy development and the relevance of the programme. The ToR contain a specific emphasis on evaluating the impact of the training component. The team decided to focus on pre-deployment training of individual police officers. This is by far the dominant training component in the evaluation period with a total of 44 courses and 2700 trainees in the period from January 2010 to the end of 2013. This is nearly 75 percent of all those who have participated in a TfP-supported training course in this period. In addition the team also examined the other courses delivered for police officers in the period – the Train-the-trainers courses and the driving courses for female officers – to get additional data on the use of trainees. Taken together, the trainees of these three training components make up nearly 90 percent of those who have participated in TfP-supported training in the 2010 – 2013 period.

Methodological limits

As elaborated in Annex Three, the original aim of this evaluation was to measure the impact of training robustly by using a comparison group of police officers who had not participated in this training. For a number of reasons we were not able to construct a group of ‘trained’ and ‘untrained’ police. The reasons for this included lack of monitoring data from TfP partners who do not trace personnel they have trained, lack of information from missions about who has and who has not received special pre-deployment training before arrival in mission, possible pre-existing differences in the baseline skills levels of trained and untrained officers and different implementation of pre-deployment training.

As a result we have not been able to give the numerically precise estimate of impact that experimental and quasi experimental evaluations can offer where they are feasible.20 But we have provided a qualitative assessment of the contribution that TfP is making in its training interventions, which is a more appropriate approach to evaluating a very complicated programme that is operating in a complex environment.

Further, our original intention to interview police before and after TfP pre-deployment training was not possible because there was no such training course planned for or taking place in the period between the submission of mid-way report in November 2013 and the planned date for the submission of the draft report in February 2014. More importantly: The TfP partners were not in any substantive way involved in selecting participants for training.

Because we were unable to use “gold standard” methods, we needed to find other ways of dealing with bias. Our approach was:

- **To use mixed methods and triangulate:** Many of our methods of data collection are subject to bias when used in isolation. For example our findings from interviews with police officers are based on self-reporting by these police officers and both those who had received training and those who had not would have reasons to overestimate the value of training. This is why we also collected large amounts of data from key informant interviews with managers, donors and other officials and other stakeholders. We triangulated responses on learning and behaviour change with the opinions of managers in mission and in police contributing countries. We also conducted an extensive review of the other literature that has touched on training needs and outcomes.

- **To use data collection and analysis methods that explicitly considers alternative explanations:** Awareness and acknowledgement of the risk of bias during data collection and analysis was one of our main mitigating defences. We were aware of this risk during our interviews and we feel that the face-to-face interview (as opposed to a written questionnaire) was more able to deal with this risk allowing interviewers to delve into issues in more depth where stock responses were suspected. Many police officers were excessively positive about pre-deployment training, but when asked to explain what other factors contributed to their learning, skills and attitudes, gave a fuller picture of the other factors that played a part. Where police officers with and without pre-deployment training was in agreement on the impact (or its absence) we paid particular attention in our analysis. We also used a method of data analysis, drawn from contribution analysis, that explicitly considers alternative explanations for observed outcomes, and other factors that are influencing the effects of programmes.

**Contribution analysis to address causality**

Contribution analysis was developed for situations where an experimental evaluation design is impractical; in other words, where the most scientifically robust attribution cannot be established. It is one of the more respected analytical methods for dealing with attribution.\(^{21}\) Contribution analysis aims to demonstrate whether or not the evaluated intervention is one of the causes of observed change. It may also rank the evaluated intervention among the various causes explaining the observed change. This analytical tool contains simple methodical steps for organising data collection and analysis focussing on

systematic steps for building evidence to draw an analytically credible conclusion about the extent to which observed and recorded effects are attributable to the programme.\textsuperscript{22}

Once an initial theory of change has been developed, it is populated with available data and evidence, and an overall ‘performance story’ can be formulated and critically assessed. Any data and evidence gaps should be addressed, after which the theory of change and performance story can be reviewed and revised, and alternative, non-programme, explanations for observed change explicitly considered. The stages used in contribution analysis are summarized in Box 2.1 below.

\textbf{Box 2.1 Steps in Contribution Analysis} \textsuperscript{23}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textbf{Step 1:} Set out the cause-effect issue to be addressed
  \item \textbf{Step 2:} Develop the postulated theory of change and risks to it, including rival explanations
  \item \textbf{Step 3:} Gather the existing evidence on the theory of change
  \item \textbf{Step 4:} Assemble and assess the contribution claim, and challenges to it
  \item \textbf{Step 5:} Seek out additional evidence
  \item \textbf{Step 6:} Revise and strengthen the contribution story
\end{itemize}

As explained in Chapter Five in the main body of the report, pre-deployment training contains many learning outcomes and we focussed on those that were deemed most important and relevant by key informants, beneficiaries, and in other reports. We developed theories of change based on midway interviews with partners and key informants and assembled evidence around these. These were refined during the final phase of the evaluation and are presented below in Annex Five. The overarching results chain in which TIP training fits is shown below.

Drawing from the contribution analysis approach we tailored the steps in our data collection and analysis to follow specific steps that were reflected in the questions we asked and in our analysis of the resulting data. These questions form the basis of our Chapter Five on training impact:

1. Is there evidence that pre-deployment training effectively prepares police officers with knowledge, skills, attitudes and expectations that they need in deployment?
2. What is the contribution of pre-deployment training to these outcomes relative to other variables that affect them, for example professional background, other training before deployment, and induction training in deployment?
3. If there is evidence that pre-deployment training is contributing to these outcomes, what is the contribution TfP is making?
4. Does the contribution TfP is making maximise the effectiveness of TfP resources by using them in an economical and efficient way?

At each step we explicitly considered alternative explanations for the impacts observed or not observed. This was a good method for dealing with biases which we could anticipate, such as differences in the levels of prior education and seniority of police officers, which may play a large role in determining their performance in mission regardless of pre-deployment training.
Mixed methods and triangulation

There is a growing body of literature on methodological options for assessing impact where the most robust experimental and quasi-experimental designs are not feasible or appropriate.\(^24\) Much of this literature emphasizes the power of combining methods and sources to improve impact evaluation, taking an approach that is ‘systematic, draws on a range of evidence, and critically reviews and synthesises the evidence’\(^{25}\). The team used a mix of methods to support triangulation and validity in the data collection. We conducted structured beneficiary interviews, focus groups and key informant interviews. Significant amounts of data were collected. To elaborate on these data sources:

- **Document review**: We reviewed a large body of existing literature as well as programme documents from course reports and assessments to research outputs. We mined references in initially available reports to identify other relevant literature and documentation from the UN and a range of training providers and donors as well as to identify relevant project documents and material available from the TfP partners. The monitoring data from TfP and TfP partners on training is however very limited and patchy.

- **A large sample of key informant interviews**: We conducted nearly 150 key informant interviews including programme partners, trainers, police managers, senior officials involved in preparing, managing and implementing training programmes at different levels in missions and in police contributing countries, Norwegian and other diplomats and donors and AU and UN officials. The key informant interviews took place in Abuja, Accra, Addis Ababa, Gaborone, Mogadishu, Monrovia, New York, Nairobi, Oslo, Pretoria and Durban, Bulawayo and Harare. As with our structured interviews we felt that conducting a large number of interviews was an appropriate approach to mitigating bias, since we were unable to use “gold standard” methodologies.

- **Focus groups**: We conducted two focus groups with a total of 12 individual police officers in Somalia. This allowed us to have a more discursive and open ended conversation about the impact of pre-deployment training.

- **A large sample of structured interviews**: Structured interviews lasting 40 minutes each were conducted with 107 current and former individual police officers: 36 were with the UN Mission in Liberia, 36 with formerly deployed police in Ghana and 35 with formerly deployed police in Rwanda. This was in addition to our above mentioned focus group discussions in Somalia. We believe that the fact we have three different datasets of police responses, from Ghana, Rwanda and from the UN Mission in Liberia, alongside focus group discussions from the AU mission in Somalia meant that patterns and differences in interview responses can yield more reliable findings than would be the case with data from only one location.

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Annex Three provides more details on the selection of those interviewed in the
selected missions and police contributing countries. It also reproduces the
interview guide and gives a profile of the sample of officers interviewed in each
mission and country.

An overview of police officers and a list of key informants interviewed are given
in Annex Six. To preserve the anonymity of responses, where we cite individual
responses we refer to these individual police officers by number and not by
name. The numbers do not correspond to the list in Annex Six.

Analysing the value for money of training was challenging in the sense that we
do not have sufficient data on the use of trainees, and we were unable to
produce a quantitative estimate of the impact of the training. However, the team
was able to collect data on costs of individual courser and types of pre-
deployment courses which enable us to draw conclusion related to cost drivers
and costs of different types of courses.

Methods used for the other evaluation questions

The efforts to measure the impact of training were as expected the most
challenging and time consuming part of the evaluation. For the other evaluation
questions data was more easily available. In conducting the contextual analysis
(evaluation question one) the team relied on the substantial body of literature
available and interviews with a range of stakeholders, including senior officials at
the level of the African Union and several regional economic communities and
regional mechanisms, in police contributing countries, in several donor agencies
and with the UN in New York.

In responding to the evaluation questions on TfP’s strategic framework and
programme theory we relied on project documentation and interviews with TfP
partners, and with past and current TfP managers at the Norwegian embassies
and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This information was used to assess and
comment upon the strategic framework developed by TfP.

The evaluation questions on research were addressed through a mapping of the
research output from TfP, a content analysis of main outputs, an analysis of the
planning and management of research projects, and interviews with partners on
the relevance and use of research outputs and findings in other programme
areas.

The response to the questions on roster systems is based on mapping of what
TfP partners do in this area, and an assessment of the state of rosters for
deployment of police and civilians in Africa.

TfP’s contribution to policy development is assessed based on a mapping of
what TfP partners do, with a geographic focus on examples from Africa and with
a focus on multidimensional approaches to peacekeeping. We have examined
the nature of the policy support, interviewed stakeholders and potential beneficiaries and the extant literature on policy development on peace and security in Africa.

The findings from all these evaluation questions have been used to respond to the final evaluation question on relevance, which presents an overall assessment of the relevance of the current TIP programme, its objectives and effectiveness in relation to the African peace and security context, the needs of beneficiaries and the priorities in Norwegian foreign and development aid policies.
3. Mapping the Strategic Framework

Overall ownership and motivation for use and coordination of a contextually relevant TfP programme strategy is located within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Individual partners and supporting partners have different functions and perform different tasks within this framework. In the current phase there have been more efforts by the MFA to facilitate the development of a coherent programme with a stronger emphasis on achieving results. The plausibility of the current strategy relies upon ensuring a “coordination and synergy that underpins the TfP Programme as a whole” (Strategy Document, p.7).

While relevant, the strategy as currently described is found not plausible as the basis for a programmatic theory of change for three main reasons:

1. **Limited ownership, integration and engagement by partners to develop and implement a shared strategy as a management and learning tool;**
2. **Insufficient definition of key attributes of success with respect to the stated purpose (outcomes).** A “missing middle” without clearly defined intermediate outcomes through which TfP outputs are clearly linked and assessed. The current management approach enables each TfP partners to annually choose multiple outcomes’ statements to justify an activities-based means of planning and budgeting.
3. **Insufficient authority/buy-in for TfP to operate as a coordinated programme using programme theory and theory of change as strategic management tools for planning, reporting, learning and adjusting its strategic approach.**

**Box 3.1 Evaluation questions on the strategic framework**

1. What is the programme theory and its underlying assumptions?
2. How are the different programme components intended to contribute to developing sustainable African security architecture and how are they interlinked?
3. What are the main programmatic developments and shifts since the programme’s inception, and what factors have driven them?
Programmatic shifts and developments

The main programmatic shifts and developments since inception of TfP are described in Chapter One and in Annex Two. This section focuses upon the emergence of TfP’s strategic framework as a document which is an important step in the direction of elaborating a programme theory.

The TfP strategic framework responds to recognised key challenges and demands relating to TfP’s interest in promoting peace and security within Africa. Table 3.1 below summarises the key dimensions of a “theory of change” approach and identifies how the TfP Strategic Framework relates to each.

Table 3.1 Key differences between Theory of Change and TfP Strategy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Analysis of context</th>
<th>Theory of Change</th>
<th>TfP Strategy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Context analysed with view to informing intervention responses. Critical thinking around context and proposed pathways to achieving desired impact. “A specific theory or model of how the programme causes the intended or observed outcomes”26</td>
<td>No captured analysis of context or justification for the priority given to broadly defined objectives. Document describes goals, objectives, principles, roles, responsibilities, monitoring.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hypothesis of Change</td>
<td>Draws multiple possible links and causal pathways that could lead to desired change (outcomes): presents evidence to justify why chosen action X should lead to change Y – via a flow chart - flexible</td>
<td>Describes four high-level objectives and establishes 15 broadly framed outcomes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reasons for envisaged change</td>
<td>Describes how and why the desired change is likely to happen – clear on assumptions versus decisions based on evidence.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Format</td>
<td>Diagram illustrating multiple linkages and levels, supported by a narrative – feed-back loops and cycles are shown</td>
<td>Structured text document.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assumptions</td>
<td>Assumptions are made explicit when there is uncertainty on the strength of an argument which links a chain of proposed actions in achieving an outcome. Presents evidence where it exists to prioritise one course of possible action over another</td>
<td>No presentation of assumptions or risks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary function</td>
<td>A tool for programme design and cyclical review/validation/adjustment/evaluation of chosen strategy and prioritised actions.</td>
<td>A guiding framework for cohering partner planning and behaviours with respect to a shared set of broad objectives.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Motivating these approaches is the description of an intervention in which chosen actions under control of the programme (activities and outputs) lead to the achievement of results and impact, which can be shown to have been achieved fully or partially because of the actions of the programme. Depending upon the level at which it is directed, and its purpose, theories of change can be variable in detail:

There is no ‘perfect’ example, as all theories of change should vary depending on the views of those involved in its development, the context and nature of the intervention, and the purpose for which the theory of change has been developed. However, there are some core criteria which a theory of change should meet in order to optimise the usefulness of the product in communicating an overview of the intervention and the thinking behind it to an external audience.27

TfP’s implicit pre-2011 strategic approach was informed by the recognition of significant deficits in African institutional systems and numbers of personnel required for effective peace support operations on the continent. The primary rationale of the programme was to train as many personnel as possible in order to contribute numbers (quantity) needed. A key assumption was that an increase in numbers of trained personnel would build African capacity for more effectively supporting peace operations.

In July 2010 the MFA approved a new 2011-2015 phase for TfP, but emphasised inter alia the need for a more focused approach and results-based management. In November 2010 TfP’s International Advisory Board with support of TfP partners also endorsed a strategy change, shifting TfP from prioritising the provision of a ‘quantity’ of trained personnel, towards enhancing the quality of strategically relevant interventions.

It was recognised that a relatively small programme such as TfP should not be seeking to address such a broad range of challenges in a vast and complex Africa-wide context, hence the call for “focus”. TfP could potentially have greater impact if the programme coordinated its resources and actions towards creating or influencing outcomes it could be confident of changing. For example, while TfP wanted to improve the quality of recruits sent to pre-deployment training, it had little hope of influencing country-specific dynamics and selection practises – these were out of the control of TfP partners.

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Among the recommendations of the advisory board:

*Results-based planning, management and reporting, is necessary in order to identify, analyse and communicate TfP results and to stay relevant. TfP should further develop its understanding of indicators and benchmarks. The focus should be on impact and the relevant end-user/beneficiary of each activity.*

Since then, TfP’s management and its partners have grappled with the modality of how TfP as a programme plans, manages, reports and critically reflects upon the effectiveness of its chosen interventions. New reporting and planning formats were introduced, a workshop between staff from Norad and TfP partners took place, new consolidated work plans for TfP as a whole were prepared from 2011 and an annual TfP report was published beginning with 2011. TfP managers at MFA and the embassies also made additional efforts in having a dialogue with partners on planning and reporting. While the TfP partners formally approved the new strategic framework through the international advisory board meeting in November 2010 and at the Annual General Meeting in March 2011, the team has not been able to trace any written inputs from TfP-partners into the process of drawing up the strategic framework, although they were invited to do so.

The minutes of the March 2012 TfP Annual General Meeting reflect an agreement that the strategic framework would be updated and consolidated. In October 2012, the new TfP manager in the MFA circulated a revised and improved strategy document in line with the earlier recommendations received from the outgoing TfP manager. The TfP Manager indicated the updated document was to be tabled at the November 2012 International Advisory Board’s meeting in Oslo.

Minutes indicate that the November 2012 board’s meeting focussed more on analysis of the external context, and do not reflect any discussion of a revised TfP strategic framework. It appears that the revised framework has an ambiguous status and is not necessarily central for all TfP partners and supporting organisations such as POD.

The minutes of the March 2013 TfP annual general meeting reflect ongoing challenges of partners in adapting to a results-based approach in planning and reporting:

> Although substantial progress has been made, it is still necessary to emphasise impact and results rather than activities, both in planning and reporting, based on the Goal Hierarchy developed for the fourth phase of the TfP Programme (2011–15).

A review of TfP partners’ approved 2014 work-plans confirms ongoing challenges. Of five approved annual work-plans one partner does not provide any description of envisaged outcomes, while the other four organisations outline a combined total of 41 different “outcomes” they will pursue in the year
ahead - with many of them being different from the year before. Looked at from a results-based programmatic perspective, the strategic framework document - which does not describe programme outcomes - has become relegated in subordination to the individual ambitions of TfP partners.

Only one partner mentions the TfP Strategy Framework in their 2014 work-plans, and that is simply to state in one sentence that the plans submitted do align with the overall impact statement of the strategic framework. While most plans do list - with significantly uneven quality - activities, outputs and outcomes, none of these are framed with any reference to the 2011 – 2015 strategy framework.

There is an understandable ambivalence among TfP partners in furthering a planning and reporting process that might limit the current flexibilities they enjoy with TfP funds. A further underlying and less openly stated concern is the opportunity costs related to enhanced coordination and collaboration among TfP partners, as implied by the Strategic Framework.

There remains a strongly held view among some actors within TfP (and outside of it) that theories of change, results chains and logical frameworks have limited utility in complex, changing and variously understood contexts in which TfP operates. From another perspective, some partners express a futility in spending resources to try and quantify relative impact of one contributory set of interventions in a much bigger process whose ultimate outcomes they have no control over. This view reflects the high-level scope of TfP’s objectives, and an absence of more clearly defined and achievable intermediate outcomes.

TfP is understood by its partners as a useful vehicle that can incentivize and enable a broad common strategic focus towards enhancing African peace operation capacities. All of TfP’s partners (except AFDEM) have multiple sources of income and influence that shape their own particular strategic priorities and operations. For all of them, TfP funds are relatively small compared to their core funding and overall organizational budgets.

What is TfP’s Programme Theory and its underlying assumptions?

TfP does not have a theory of change. It has a story or narrative in which the complimentary positions and competencies of its partners have the potential to combine, or work at the same issue from different positions, to create a programmatic whole that is bigger than the sum of the individual parts.
Fig. 3.1 Summary Overview of the TFIP Results Chain Logic

**Results Chain**

**Inputs**
- Norwegian funding core funding via MFA plus funds via TFIP

**Activities**
- According to their competencies and agreed division of labour, TFIP organisations develop and run training courses, conduct research, provide policy support and advocate agreed policy priorities, provide recruitment and rostering support

**Outputs**
- 1. Standard and specialised training courses are developed, updated and conducted for African police and civilian personnel ahead of deployment, or during peacesupport missions in Africa;
- 2. Research documents that provide critical insight into African peace and security priorities, as well as strategically informs the training and policy support work of TFIP;
- 3. Policy support research, writing and engagements aimed at discussing and developing protocols, procedures, guidelines, doctrines and other documents which further clarify and enable the function of peace-support institutions in Africa;
- 4. Support towards the realisation of functional roster systems which enable the indentification of already trained civilian and police personnel for development.

**Outcomes**
- 1. Competent and effectively prepared civilian and police personnel are deployment in peace-support roles;
- 2. Institutional systems of UN, AU, RECs/RMs’s are strengthened

**Impact**
- Sustainable African capacity for peace operations by the United Nations, African Union and RECs/RMs is developed

**Key Assumptions**
- Predictable funding. Partners see value of TFIP collaboration beyond just being another source of funding income.
- TFIP organizations effectively and efficiently use resources in prioritising activities which produce planned outputs
- TFIP partners can provide training that is relevant, effective and cost-efficient to appropriately selected trainees;
- Research by TFIP partners is respected and reaches and influences targeted people who read it;
- Policy support work of TFIP partners adresses priorities and contributes to sustained outcomes;
- TFIP has competence and value to add to the process of developing and maintaining rosters in Africa.
- Member states are able to deploy trained personnel, trained civilians are recruited;
- Competent and sufficient human resource capacity.
- UN, AU, RECs/RMs’s continue to recive resources needed to perform their functions

Note: The figure is prepared by the evaluation team drawing upon the TFIP Strategic Framework
Building Blocks for Peace: An Evaluation of the Training for Peace in Africa Programme

United by a common purpose and a list of broadly defined objectives, TfP partner organisations engage in training, research, policy support (influence) and rostering activities which are believed (assumed) to synergise and contribute to the achievement of overall goal(s). TfP’s website labels TfP “an international capacity building programme .. based on a unique North-South-South cooperation”. The 2011 strategy framework has one stated common goal, a purpose statement, and thirteen wide-ranging objectives. The document then outlines principles (values) that should inform the “activities” chosen by TfP partners in relation to target beneficiaries and delivery of services.

While TfP’s Strategy Framework does not provide an analysis of the target context and the reasons and assumptions underlying their chosen areas and preferred means of intervention, there is evidence that TfP’s funding and convening power does enable discussions among various important actors in developing an ongoing analytical discourse of challenges and priorities. The International Advisory Board and leadership of TfP organisations do share views and arrive at common understandings of the priority challenges and ways in which TfP could be cohered to contribute towards their resolution.

The strategy document outlines that capacity will be developed “through a combination of training assistance, recruitment assistance, applied research and policy advice/normative work”. Drawing on the Strategic Framework, Figure 3.1 sketches out a visual representation of TfP’s programme theory.

TfP partners report that the terms and logic used in the TfP Strategy Framework are difficult to practically apply to their work. The document does not contain clear definitions or a description of how the broadly described goals, purpose, objectives and principles translate into corresponding activities, outputs, outcomes and impacts that partners are required to plan with and report upon – except to say that “outcomes” defined by TfP partners “should clearly contribute to achieving the objectives of the programme” and that: “The intended goals and results should steer the design, planning and reporting of the activities”.

As referenced earlier in this chapter, TfP partners are not developing their work-plans in response to a unitary set of clearly defined TfP impact and outcomes targets. Each partner decides its own activities and focus, and constructs a work-plan which is negotiated with MFA on a bilateral basis.

From a programme theory perspective, the basic building blocks in the TfP results chain can be outlined: inputs, activities, outputs, outcomes and impact. The two outcomes statements in Figure 3.1 (expressed in the strategy document as a single purpose statement) are very broadly and insufficiently defined in terms of attributes, quantity, quality and time.

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28 The TfP website describes its overall goal as: to build sustainable capacity for peace operations in the United Nations (UN), African Union (AU) and the African Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms (REC/RMs). http://trainingforpeace.org/frequently-asked-questions/

The TfP Strategy document differs in emphasis: to build sustainable African civilian and police peacekeeping capacities that are needed in order to implement multidimensional UN and AU peacekeeping mandates.
While the leadership engaged at the strategic level in TfP can identify and articulate broad outcomes necessary for strengthening peace support operations in Africa, there is a “missing middle” which would logically inform and link the chosen activities of TfP partners towards intermediate outcomes.

Referring to the four outputs areas that TfP partners focus upon, there is generally a “short line of attribution” in the outcomes chain before non-programme factors outweigh programme factors in influence. For example, this evaluation has found that TfP partners can provide pre-deployment training that is relevant and effective. The intended outcome is that competent and effectively prepared personnel are deployed in peace-support roles. As it is beyond the control of TfP to determine a) who is selected for training, b) if, c) when, and d) where, deployment of trainees takes place, TfP must assume that the training investment will contribute to outcomes in which non-programme factors have a stronger influence – with an estimated 30 to 70 percent of those trained not being deployed. Furthermore, TfP partners are not formally able to track or determine the deployment status of the police personnel that they have trained. In this scenario where non-programme factors so outweigh the programme factors it becomes challenging to assess the contribution of TfP to an outcome which targets deployment of trained personnel in peace support roles (more so when there are other donors and service providers offering similar training).

By way of example of various inter-connections in TfP: In recognising selection and deployment challenges in 2009 TfP supported exploratory research to further understand bottlenecks and challenges in the selection and deployment of peace-support personnel. A key finding of the study indicated that: “The case of TfP indicates that training programmes should focus more on post-training support mechanisms to facilitate trainees’ recruitment. The usage of rosters stands out in this context”. The report also indicated that more research was needed to “look into how training programs may contribute to bridging this gap.”

At a practical level, TfP did subsequently increase levels of support to AFDEM to assist in getting trained African civilians rostered and recruited to peace support missions. TfP resources have also been directed towards supporting the AU Peace Support Operations Division in developing further rostering capacity.

There has been some further research and a policy brief in 2013 by ISS proposing possible forms and functions of an “African Standby Force police roster system” (see Chapter Seven). There has however not been any research or support evident within TfP to address the ongoing incapacity of partners to track those they train for deployment, and to monitor and report on training and deployment data.

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The 2011 Strategic Framework document outlines that TfP partners should be assisted “to record and keep track of the those individuals they have trained, and to support the overall reporting of the TfP Programme by monitoring training and deployment data of the TfP Programme.”

In Chapter Seven, this evaluation reflects upon the challenges of coordinating applied research agendas of relevance to the operations and focus of TfP. Much of the research has not been strategically directed. There are few limited cases which inform TfP strategically on its training, rostering support and policy influence. While there are important documents produced, there is limited articulation of an influencing strategy, with an underlying assumption that publication and presentation of the reports at seminars will lead to influence and change at the outcome level.

TfP is a complex programme without a clearly defined and articulated strategy and theory of change. Various internal programme factors (resources, diverse membership, structuring and management) and non-programme factors (complex and unpredictable external context) have contributed to TfP not effectively implementing a results-based management regime in which programme-wide outcomes are clearly defined, and then pursued by TfP partners. An outcomes-focused results-based approach would enable clearer description and understanding of the relative contributions different tactics and interventions may make in promoting the desired programme outcomes.

The broad scope of the current TfP strategic framework has enabled the justification of multiple initiatives by individual partners, sometimes with co-contributions from other partners. The broad strategy focus, combined with an incapacity\footnote{The ‘incapacity’ is as much structural as it is relational. MFA has chosen not to assert a programme-centred strategy and planning regime, but rather a decentralized ‘responsive’ approval process focused upon bi-lateral discussions of the work-plans submitted by each partner. As such, neither MFA nor any of TfP’s partners are in a position to ‘require’ that more specifically defined strategic outcomes should command a coordinated programme-wide medium-term focus.} for asserting a programmatic management focus, results in medium to long-term strategic outcomes not being consistently pursued, expanded upon, or picked up by other TfP partners. The work-plans and focus of TfP partners can change on an annual basis. These annually chosen activities may still cohere with the overall strategic framework, but they are not necessarily enhancing or reinforcing programmatically strategic efforts from the year before.

TfP partners do however share a broad overlapping area of interest and common focus. Facilitated by TfP funding, regular networked interaction is able to promote leadership conversations that result in the development of strategically important knowledge which partners can and do act upon in seeking to contribute to the strengthening of capacity for peace.
4. Training Courses and Deployment

The volume of training in the 2010 – 2013 period is impressive with 80 training courses partially or wholly supported by TIP in producing a total of 3700 trainees. More than 250 police officers have participated in Training-of-trainers courses, over 2700 police officers have attended TIP-supported police pre-deployment courses, nearly 350 female police officers have benefitted from special training courses, and about 300 civilian peacekeepers have been enrolled in training courses implemented by TIP partners. Compared to quantitative TIP targets, this is far more than envisaged, although the gender composition is lagging behind the ambitious target.

This training is sizeable in quantitative terms. The TIP-partners are major providers of training in many important police contributing countries in Africa. However, the team also concludes that the effectiveness of the training as measured through deployment and other use of trainees as trainers or elsewhere is less than expected. This is partly due to insufficient attention paid to pre-training (selection) and post-training (deployment and use of trainees, sustainability of training interventions). Furthermore, the TIP partners also appear to have different priorities and views on whether the focus should be on assisting the African Union in meeting the training needs of the African Standby Forces, or responding to the needs of on-going missions. Better targeting of training such as providing pre-deployment training to police officers selected for deployment and as close to deployment as possible will greatly enhance the effectiveness of training. The pool of trainers trained also needs to be maintained to ensure effectiveness.

The team often had to rely on our own estimates to arrive at conclusions about the use of trainees. TIP partners have paid insufficient attention to monitoring and reporting of training activities and outputs. This is also reflected in the poor state of the rosters which are intended to be the key link between training and deployment. The development of rosters by the African Union and regional organisations is largely outside the control of TIP, but we also note that most partners are neglecting this dimension and fail to keep track of their trainees or make them available to rosters.
Training is a main activity and focus area of TfP. It is undertaken by all partners except AFDEM and NUPI. Pre-deployment training of individual police officers has always been a dominant training activity, including in the present period.

Training also encompasses a number of other courses targeting both police officers, civilians and even to lesser extent military officers. This chapter seeks to provide an overview and analysis of TfP’s training activities. How many receive what type of training? What do we know about who has received training – have they been able to put their training to any use in deployment or elsewhere? The final part of the chapter analyses TfP’s contribution to rosters – the intended link between training and deployment. Chapters Six and Seven provide an analysis of the impact and cost effectiveness of training. The evaluation questions addressed in this chapter are listed in Box 4.1.

**Training-of-trainers for the police**

Support to Training-of-trainers courses has been an important dimension in TfP’s training programme. The main TfP-activity in this area has been a series of Training-of-trainers courses intended to provide a pool of trainers for police pre-deployment courses based on the United Nations/African Union curriculum. This has mainly been implemented by the Institute of Security Studies (ISS) in Eastern and Southern Africa. ISS has conducted six such regular courses in the evaluation period. In addition ISS organized three training-of-trainers clinics (one in 2010 and two in 2012) intended to bring the best of the students from the regular training-of-trainers courses to a more in-depth training course to become certified by ISS as regional trainers.

All Training-of-trainers courses planned by ISS for 2013 were cancelled or postponed until 2014 due to insufficient implementation capacity or because too few officers signed up for the courses. All courses are conducted in

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1 The 2010 TfP annual report from ISS reports an additional course in Sudan in November 2010, but the team has not been able to find any trace of this course in the documents available to us and has therefore omitted this course from the list.
co-operation with the regional police organisations in the two regions – the Eastern African Regional Police Chiefs Coordinating Organisation (EAPCCO) and the Southern Africa Regional Police Chiefs Coordinating Organisation (SARPCCO). The courses typically run for 10-12 days.

A total of 138 police officers, of which 42 are women, have participated in these Training-of-trainers courses. Of these, 46, of which 18 are women, have also participated in the three clinic courses. We do not have access to data on the number of certified trainers graduating from the clinic courses, but one course report from 2012 mentions that seven out of eleven were recommended or highly recommended as trainers with four not being recommended. Some of those participating in the clinic courses from the country hosting the course have not participated in the regular Training-of-trainers courses. The team also noted a few cases of trainees who have participated in more than one regular training-of-trainers course.

In addition to the ISS courses, one training-of-trainers course was provided by the Norwegian Police Directorate (POD) through the Gambia police in 2012. This was outside and not linked to the support to KAIPTC. It provided training over two weeks for 16 police officers – eleven men and five women - from Gambia and Sierra Leone.

In early 2014 ISS with support from POD began developing a new Training-of-trainers course to provide trainers to the new in-mission mid-level police management courses. They also began revision of the curriculum and teaching methodology of the regular training-of-trainers courses.

In addition to these courses the ISS also mentions in its 2011 report that they held one training-of-trainers course with SARPCCO focusing on HIV/AIDS. The course had 22 participants, of which 21 were women. This course was a residual from pre-2010 projects which had stronger focus on HIV/AIDS and on violence against women and children.

In 2013 KAIPTC provided technical support to a pilot Training-of-trainers course on Conflict Related Sexual Violence in Cote d’Ivoire from 9-20 September. This course was a result of a joint initiative by KAIPTC and the UN Office of the Secretary General on Conflict-related Sexual Violence. It targeted police, including formed police units (gendarmerie), military and civil society.

In addition to the Training-of-trainers courses TfP also funded a number of related activities. This includes an annual retreat/seminar in Norway for all POD instructors, and a similar seminar by EASFCOM bringing all the Nordic instructors and the African instructors in EASF courses together.

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32 Data on the number of courses are partly derived from course reports where available, internal communication between the instructor and organiser, from annual reports to TfP, and from the ISS data base of personnel who attended courses and seminars. The figures we have arrived at are in some cases lower than those reported in official annual reports of TfP. In some cases instructors have been listed as participants in these reports.
Table 4.1 shows that TIP has supported 12 Training-of-trainers courses in the evaluation period. Ten are Training-of-trainers police pre-deployment courses with a total of 146 participants, of which just over 30 percent are women. The HIV/AIDS Training-of-trainers course was phased out in the early part of the period and the team has not made any further examination of this course. The pilot course on sexual violence from 2013 has also not been examined further.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>ISS/ predeployment</th>
<th>POD/ predeployment</th>
<th>ISS/ HIV-AIDS</th>
<th>KAIPTC/ Sexual Violence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>3 courses: 53(18)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1 course: 22(21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>2 courses: 31(7)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1 course: 16(5)</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>4 courses: 54(17)</td>
<td>1 course: 16(5)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1 course: 80(8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1 course: 22(21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>9 courses: 138(42)*</td>
<td>1 course: 16(5)</td>
<td>1 course: 22(21)</td>
<td>1 course: 80(8)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Number of courses with total number of participants, and number of female participants provided in brackets.

* This includes three clinic courses where (most) participants are drawn from the regular Training-of-trainers courses

The team examined the nine Training-of-trainers courses run by ISS in cooperation with SARPCCO and EAPCCO. This has involved 138 police officers of which 46 have received additional in-depth training and graduated as regional trainers. The TIP documents contain no assessments of the use of trainers trained. Through the steps outlined in Annex Four we managed to arrive at an estimate. Very few of those trained appear to have been used and involved in delivering training courses. Probably not more than 5-10 percent of those who have participated in these Training-of-trainers courses have been used as instructors.

This low figure may partly be linked to the selection of candidates for training. We note from the list of participants that many of them do not occupy any training position in their home country, nor do they have experience from any peacekeeping operation. Many are also coming from countries that are not deploying police to peace support operations. The selection process is partly outside the control of ISS. It is based on invitation from SARPCCO and EAPCCO to the police agency in each member country. They are, the team was informed, requested to send participants with a background as trainer and experience from peacekeeping. The member countries do not always adhere to this recommendation. However, ISS claims to be more successful now than before in getting the right people to attend the training courses. Senior staff at the Ghana Police Services Training College interviewed by the team emphasised that relevance and effectiveness of police training could be further enhanced by systematising the recruitment of experienced returning police officers into national training colleges – and then training them on how to train.
This brings us to the final remark on these courses: Ownership and sustainability. Is this training becoming part of national and/or regional efforts to increase the capacity to deliver pre-deployment courses? And is the Training-of-trainers - coordinated or coherent with other initiatives to strengthen training capacities in this area? The team does note that this issue has been raised also between the Norwegian Embassy in Pretoria and the ISS in connection with annual reports and work plans. The subsequent work plans from ISS then state that the training-of-trainers courses will assist member states to roll out national Training for peace support operations and the clinic courses will help provide trainers for standby forces. However, these references have been omitted in the 2014 work plan.

The team has not found any evidence of efforts by TfP to ensure that member states make use of the trainers. The Training-of-trainers efforts appear to begin and end with the training course itself. There is – as mentioned above – no effort to develop a consolidated list of available trainers, a pool, which is shared with training institutions or others. Nor does it appear to be any dialogue or communication between ISS and the police components responsible for the standby force in SADC or EASFCOM on training needs and supply of trainers.

In our discussion with senior training and deployment officials in two of the main police contributing countries in Africa – Ghana and Rwanda – the issue of self-sufficiency in trainer capacity was raised. Ghana is already self-sufficient while in Rwanda we were informed they aspired to be self-sustaining in 2-3 years’ time.

**Pre-deployment training of police officers**

The dominant training activity during the evaluation period has been pre-deployment training of individual police officers. Such courses are implemented by three partners: KAIPTC, EASFCOM and ISS. POD delivers instructors to KAIPTC and EASFCOM courses and from 2014 also courses run by ISS. POD has also delivered TfP-funded training outside these channels through bilateral arrangements with the police in Ghana and Gambia. Courses run by all the TfP-partners are identical in the sense that they are based on the curriculum developed by the UN, they often use the standard power point presentations as developed by the UN, and they tend to run for two weeks. The ISS has reduced the length of its courses to one week, but by working longer days and also delivering modules over the weekend they claim to cover the same terrain as the full two-week courses.

However, there are differences in teaching methodology and time allocated for practical exercises and role play. There may also be important differences across the course providers in how much time they allocate to individual

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33 See, e.g., the comments provided by the Embassy in Pretoria to the ISS in an email dated 20 February 2012. This appeared to be an important issue in 2011 and 2012. We have not found any trace of written communication between the Embassy and the ISS in 2013 in relation to reports and work plans. We have not consulted communication on this in 2014.
modules. A 2012 report from an EASFCOM trainers’ seminar reports that they have allocated too little time for the module on “protection of civilians” and that an average of 15 minutes of practical 4x4 driving for each course participant is not sufficient.\textsuperscript{34}

Importantly, courses delivered by TIP partners also differ in the extent to which they are mission-specific, national or regional. Some courses are mission-specific in the sense that they are delivered to police officers selected for deployment in a specific mission and may, but not always, contain mission-specific modules. These courses tend to be national and are delivered both by ISS and KAIPTC. EASFCOM and to a lesser extent KAIPTC also run regional courses where participants are coming from different countries and may have much less focus on specific missions. In the case of EASFCOM their current training has a focus on training police officers from EASF member countries for placement on the roster for the African Standby Force.

Table 4.2 provides a list of all police officers who have participated in a TIP-supported training course. These figures are informed estimates by the team. Annex Four provides information on how we arrived at them.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>ISS</th>
<th>KAIPTC</th>
<th>POD/bilateral</th>
<th>EASFCOM</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>1 course: 33 (6)</td>
<td>2 courses: 194 (n. a.)*</td>
<td>1 course (Ghana): 77 (2)</td>
<td>9 courses: 502 (190)*</td>
<td>13 courses: 806 (198 +)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>2 courses: 103 (31)</td>
<td>7 courses: 471 (177)</td>
<td></td>
<td>5 courses: 248 (68)</td>
<td>14 courses: 822 (296)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>1 course: 60 (31)</td>
<td>3 courses: 171 (68)</td>
<td>1 course (Gambia): 20 (6)</td>
<td>4 courses: 241 (87)</td>
<td>9 courses: 492 (192)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>2 courses: 120 (48)</td>
<td>3 courses: 288 (33)</td>
<td></td>
<td>3 courses: 178 (34)</td>
<td>8 courses: 586 (115)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>6 courses: 316 (116)</td>
<td>15 courses: 1124 (298 +)</td>
<td>2 courses: 97 (8)</td>
<td>21 courses: 1169 (379)</td>
<td>44 courses: 2706 (801 +)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Number of courses with total number of participants, and number of female participants provided in brackets.
* The number of 2010 courses at KAIPTC may be higher and the number of 2010 courses at EASFCOM be lower. There is no gender breakdown for the participants at the 2010 courses at KAIPTC.

\textsuperscript{34} The informal and internal reports from POD trainers often contain much information on such issues. See e.g., the report (in Norwegian) from Dag Hjulstad from the EASF Police UNPOC Trainers Seminar Nairobi, Kenya, April 2 – 3, 2012 (unpublished, 8 pages). The official report from this seminar (facilitated by ISS) does not contain such detailed observations, see Report of the EASF UNPOC Trainers Seminar, 2nd-3rd April, 2012, Nairobi, Kenya, Nairobi: EASFCOM 2012 (unpublished, 6 pages).
TfP has provided support to 44 courses in the four-year evaluation period with a total number of about 2700 participants. Of these more than 30 percent are female police officers. Compared to the target of 500 police trainees listed in the 2011-2015 strategic plan this is a very high number. However, the evaluation team notes that TfP is lagging behind its goal of ensuring that 40 percent of those trained are women. It is highly unlikely that TfP will be able to meet that target for the whole period, even with a substantial increase in the proportion of female trainees in 2014 and 2015. It should however, be added that EASFCOM has a lower target (30 percent) for their training than TfP and the Table suggests that EASFCOM is on track.

We also note from Table 4.2 that there is general reduction in the number of officers trained from the early to the latter part of the period. 2014 work plans from the TfP partners seems to suggest that this trend may accelerate. This is largely explained by the reduction of such courses through EASFCOM (they are shifting more of their police training to training of formed police units) and with POD deploying instructors to fewer courses. But at the same time there is a shift in police training within TfP following the 2013 internal police review with more emphasis being put on in-mission training (see more on this in “other training” below).

According to TfP’s objectives all those trained shall be deployed or placed on a roster. The first important observation on the deployment record is that the TfP partners do not have any hard data on this at all. This makes it impossible to arrive at accurate estimates. See more on this in Annex Four. Based on the assessments there we may assume that 30 percent of EASFCOM trainees, 55 percent of KAIPTC trainees, 60 percent of ISS trainees and 60 percent of the trainees from the two POD-supported courses have been or are in deployment. This implies that we would arrive at a total figure of about 1200. But these assessments and the total figure are guestimates. They can be lower and also much higher.

The number of individual police officers from African police contributing countries in deployment in early 2014 in Africa through the UN, AU and ECOWAS missions is about 2500. We do not know how many of these have received training through TfP partners, but we do know that the partners are delivering training to most of the major police contributing countries south of the Sahara (Rwanda, Uganda, Namibia, Kenya, Ethiopia, Ghana, Nigeria, Gambia, Sierra Leone, Senegal, Burkina Faso and others) and that TfP partners in earlier phases have delivered training to major police contributing countries who now do their own training (Nigeria, South Africa).

TfP may in quantitative terms be an important provider of pre-deployment training, but it is not the only external donor to provide support to such training. In the case of EASFCOM we note that in the evaluation period a range of donors have been supporting EASFCOM’s police component and pre-deployment training. This includes Denmark, Sweden, Germany, Canada, the UK, the
Netherlands, Japan, UNDP and the EU – many of them have co-funded courses supported by the TfP.

The general finding emerging from the team's assessments is that the deployment rate of those receiving training will increase if training is focused on those who have been selected for deployment and have passed the Selection Admission Tests (conducted by the UN or the AU), and if the training takes place as close to deployment as possible. This also suggests that regional training courses bringing trainees from different countries together may not be an efficient way of securing a high deployment rate. Former trainees interviewed by the team however, emphasized the participation in such regional training courses as important in exposing them to a multi-national and international police environment.

A final observation from this training is also the limited cooperation between the TfP partners delivering these courses. This applies to lessons learnt, efforts to improve training or even in preparing courses. As an illustration the team noted from the 2014 work plans that KAIPTC, POD and ISS were all considering delivering pre-deployment training to the Malawi police, but said nothing about cooperation or assessments of needs and efficiency. This also illustrates another observation made by the team, also from the training-of-trainers courses discussed above: The training course itself has become a main focus for the TfP-partners with insufficient attention to what takes place before (selection, needs) or after (deployment, sustainability).

**Special training of female police officers**

TfP's strategic objectives place special emphasis on UN Security Council resolutions calling for an increased number of females in peacekeeping missions. The main manifestation of this priority in the training area has been TfP-funding for a number of courses intended to ensure that female officers are (better) qualified for participation in missions. This has been implemented by POD through three courses with Ghana police in 2010, 2011 and 2012, one with Malawi police in 2013 and one with EASFCOM in Kenya in 2011. The EASFCOM project document for 2012-2015 indicates that they would like to organize one such course every year. The course statistics are summarized in Table 4.3. It shows that TfP supported seven courses with a total of 336 participants. In addition to covering the costs of organizing and delivering the course, POD also provided one facilitator from Norway for each course.

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35 The team has since been informed that POD has held bilateral discussions with the Malawi police and has invited KAIPTC and ISS to join POD in providing pre-deployment training courses.
These courses are focused on improving primarily the driving skills, but also – depending on the individual course – the computer skills and language proficiency of the participant. Ability to drive a 4x4 with manual gears, basic computer skills and command of English or French are formal requirements for police officers seeking deployment. This will be tested by the UN or AU before deployment through a formal selection assessment test. Those arriving in a UN mission will also have to do a second driving test which will help determine posting within mission – and potentially they may be sent home if they do not pass. The courses were first implemented in Ghana, where they were intended to enhance the driving skills of female police already selected for mission deployment.\(^36\) It was believed that that this additional training would enable trainees to pass a second driving test upon arrival in-mission and expand the kind of roles they could perform in the mission. In reality, some female police officers received training ahead of their assessment test and before any knowledge of deployment, while others received their training after having passed the test. By cross checking deployment data from the Ghana Police with lists of course beneficiaries, the team has been able to determine that out of 249 course participants, 132 had been deployed by October 2013.

The course in Malawi, on the other hand, was targeted towards female officers who had not yet passed the assessment test. In Malawi there was an assessment test in November 2013 where 48 female police officers passed. According to the 2013 annual report from POD to TFP the “majority” of those that passed had participated in the course. We have no information on deployment, but from UN records we found that Malawi had 19 female officers deployed in 2013. In mid-2014 – after the driving course in February 2013 and the assessment test in November 2013 – there were three police officers from Malawi in deployment – all female and all in Darfur.

There is no information available to the team on the outcome of the training in Kenya, but we know from UN deployment statistics that few female Kenyan police officers have been deployed since 2011 – three in April 2012, ten in April

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\(^{36}\) See the Norwegian Embassy in Abuja, *Decision document, Training for Peace, female driving training*, Abuja 25.10.10 RAF/10-0113.
2013 and 16 in April 2014. The figure for April 2010 was five. See more on the Nairobi course in Annex Four.

Rwanda has a particular large number of female officers on mission. In April 2014 56 of the 170 deployed individual police officers from Rwanda to UN missions were female. In March 2013 nearly fifty percent were female. Senior officers in Rwanda explained to the team that this was due to special efforts such as driving and language classes for female officers.

Training of civilian peacekeepers

TFP has a strong focus also on training of civilians with a target of providing “high-quality training to 500 civilian peacekeepers” in the 2011-2015 period. This training is largely implemented by ACCORD and to a lesser extent KAIPTC. ACCORD’s main focus has been on providing training to civil affairs officials in UN and AU missions. This in-mission training initially consisted of short ad hoc courses on conflict management and civil affairs skills training for the UN missions in Liberia, Darfur and Sudan/South Sudan. Realising that the impact of such short-term training to a range of missions may be limited ACCORD shifted its focus to more in-depth training of civil affairs officers in one mission: the UN Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS). It has since then provided short-term training – typically over 2-3 days – to virtually all civil affairs officials in UNMISS – from local programme staff to international experts. This also includes more in-depth training over five days for select experienced civil affairs officials in the mission. ACCORD intends to continue providing such training to UNMISS and is preparing to train a new batch of staff arriving in 2014.

Similar training has been planned for the mission in Somalia, but it has not been possible to implement this yet.

ACCORD’s training-of-trainers for civil affairs officers are listed in the “other training” section below.

KAIPTC was running four conflict prevention courses with TFP funding in the 2010-2012 period. They were longer (two weeks), targeted different stakeholders and had a wider focus. The total numbers of participants was 105 and of these 12 were based in missions during the time of the course.
This gives a total number of course participants just below 290 of which about one third or more are women. Note that some of the participants here have participated in more than one course so the actual figures may be a bit lower. This is far less than the planned target for the whole period although some of the training courses listed in the next section could also belong here.

The team has not examined these courses or achievements and results emanating from them. Some of the issues dealt with here will also be addressed in Chapter Seven. ACCORD is carrying out its own review/evaluation of its training to civil affairs officials in South Sudan. This is not completed at the time of writing. The Norwegian Embassy in Pretoria commissioned a review of ACCORD in 2013 which concluded that its training was of high quality, adaptable and contextualised. On the UNMISS training it noted that initial training was not sufficiently contextualized, but that this had improved and that the training package developed for UNMISS could easily be replicated to other missions.\(^37\)

The team also notes that there appears to be limited or no cooperation or interaction between ACCORD and KAIPTC in planning and learning from training interventions in this area.

### Other training

The TfP partners also list a number of other training activities and courses in their reports and plans. These have not been reviewed by the team. This includes courses from the previous TfP-phase which ended in the early part of the evaluation period. ISS had two such courses in 2010 and 2011. The course in 2010 was a one-week course on HIV/AIDS in Harare for police officers from Southern Africa (no further information available in the ISS reports) and the 2011 course was a one-week course on violence against women and children. It was held in Pretoria for police officers in child and family protection units from police

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agencies in Southern Africa (21 participants of which 19 were females). These courses appear to have had no special focus on international missions.

KAIPTC piloted one in-mission course in Mali in 2013 on sexual exploitation and abuse in fragile, conflict and post-conflict situations. It lasted two weeks and had 50 participants from the police (individual and formed police units).

ACCORD has several additional courses beyond those listed in the previous section. This includes in 2010 a Training-of-trainers course for civil affairs/training officers from six UN missions in Africa. It had 20 participants (eight women). In 2011 it carried out a similar in-mission Training-of-trainers course for UN Mission in Liberia with 17 participants (five women). No data is available in ACCORD reports on the use of personnel from these courses. In addition to the Training-of-trainers courses ACCORD contributed with modules and individual lectures to a range of training courses organised by *inter alia* the South African National War College, the SADC Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre, the Malawi Armed Forces and the Kenyan International Peace Support Training Centre.

In addition to the above new piloted TfP courses for the police were also introduced in 2013-2014 following the recommendation from TfP’s internal review of its police training support. KAIPTC piloted a mid-level mission management course in 2013 with German funding, but with two TfP-funded instructors from POD, and one TfP-sponsored facilitator from KAIPTC. ISS piloted an in-mission mid-management training course with the police component in the UNMISS in January, also with Norwegian instructors.

**Rosters – a disappearing link between TfP-training and deployment?**

TfP seeks to contribute to a roster system that will facilitate smooth recruitment of trained personnel. Specifically the programme shall, according to the 2011-2015 strategic objectives:

- provide technical support to the development of rosters by the African Union, the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and the Regional Mechanisms (RMs);
- place all personnel trained with TfP support on rosters or in deployment;
- track all deployments and relevant employment of TfP-trainees; and
- improve gender balance of TfP trained personnel in deployment or on rosters.

The evaluation found that TfP engagement with these issues was highly uneven. Achievements and results were also patchy. The team found important contributions from several TfP-partners, but also noted that partners have different approaches to the roster issue.

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The evolving policies on rosters being developed in relation to the African Standby Force are important points of departures in TfP’s strategic framework. Each of the five regional standby forces shall, according to the AU roadmap, have its own rosters for deployable military, police and civilian personnel. The AU’s planning element (Peace Support Operations Division or PSOD) in Addis provides the required policies, technical guidelines and support in implementation. The civilian rosters appear to be most advanced as measured by policy documents, guidelines available and the number of staff workshops.39

On the civilian roster ACCORD and to a lesser extent AFDEM have been particularly active and have made major contributions. In this sense TfP engagement with the civilian roster appears to have been highly relevant. It also has very clear impacts. TfP is however, not the only external actor providing support in this area. Germany, in particular, has been a major contributor - especially in supporting implementation in the regions.

TfP has been less engaged with the implementation of the civilian component in the regions. The most important contribution – beyond providing funding and hosting an annual workshop between the AU and the regional organisations - is the support to EASFCOM. The TfP grant to EASFCOM also includes funding to the staff in charge of the civilian component (while Germany and others are funding the training and the development of the roster). EASFCOM’s civilian roster is more advanced than any of the others. It contains – the team was told during its visit – nearly 400 civilians from the member states. They have received short-term foundation training as well as specialized training intended to prepare them for deployment in an African peace support mission.

The other main roster in place is in the SADC region. Training has mainly taken place under the auspices of SADC’s own Harare-based Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre (RPTC). AFDEM has, on behalf of RPTC, maintained a database of civilians trained. This had added up to about one hundred persons when the team visited in September 2013. The intention is that this eventually will become a roster maintained by the SADC planning element. With German support the SADC planning element is putting in place staff to run with this.

In ECOWAS there has been no direct engagement by TfP related to the civilian roster. From late 2013 a former TfP-ACCORD and AU-official took up a new position as civilian planning officer with ECOWAS with funding from Norway through the Norwegian NORCAP roster.

It is important to emphasise that emerging civilian rosters do not automatically translate into a pool of deployable persons. In 2013 the AU planning element requested all the regional organisations to nominate civilian candidates to the AU missions in first Mali and then the Central African Republic. None of them

In the case of the police there appears to be less progression, and also less engagement by TfP-partners. A 2013 study by ISS also revealed that the regional rosters are little more than a list of personnel who have participated in a training course.\textsuperscript{41} TfP-support for the regional rosters is \textit{de facto} only confined to EASFCOM. EASF shall, according to the roadmap of the African Standby Force, maintain a roster of 720 individual police officers available for deployment. They have with the support of TfP maintained a roster of all police officers who have participated in their own pre-deployment courses. It now numbers more than 2000 officers, but it appears to be little more than a list with contact details of officers who have participated in a course. Little is known about their actual availability for a standby force or deployment. It appears to be primarily a database used as a checklist to ensure that personnel signing up for a course have not attended a similar course in the past. In mid-2013 new software – with German support - was being phased in which seeks to capture more data on officers attending a course.

On the police roster side there are no systematic engagements by the TfP partners in relation to the AU, SADC or ECOWAS. The names and contact details of trainees from the courses delivered or supported by ISS, KAIPTC or by POD outside EASFCOM are not forwarded to the regional rosters. It is not known to what extent national police agencies benefitting from these TfP-supported courses are forwarding these details to the regional rosters, but it is believed to be less likely. This was confirmed in our discussion in Ghana and Rwanda.

The TfP partners – apart from EASFCOM – do not appear to have a proper system in place to maintain a data base of personnel they have trained. ISS has an incomplete database of personnel that have participated in ISS training courses and workshops since 2005-2006. There are major gaps, including from the current evaluation period. Contact details are not always collected and the database is not maintained. There is no tracking of persons trained. The Norwegian POD does not collect data of personnel trained, and claim that this is the responsibility of its cooperating partners, also in the cases where POD is the contracting partner for TfP grants. KAIPTC has a database with contact details of everybody trained, but contact details are not updated or maintained. KAIPTC’s Evaluation Department sends out course feedback questionnaires to former trainees 3-6 months after completion of training.\textsuperscript{42}

\textsuperscript{40} Personal communication by former AU official, March 2013 and interviews in EASFCOM in October 2013.
\textsuperscript{42} The response rate used to be about 10 percent, but has recently increased to 40 percent. Information provided to the team in April 2014.
ACCOUNT does not track personnel trained, but seeks to work closely with AFDEM which maintains a separate roster of civilians from Africa available for deployment. AFDEM’s roster is unique in the sense that it is an African-managed roster of civilians available for deployment. The AFDEM roster is not just a pool for deployment in peacekeeping operations, but also in areas like election observation, humanitarian relief operations and more. It maintains a pool of 500-600 persons available for deployment and facilitates deployment of a limited number of persons every year (16 in 2013). It has good relations with the AU human resource department, UN Department of Field Operations and others but has had less capacity to engage in any systematic way with technical assistance to the roster sections in planning elements in the AU and the regional organisations. In 2013 AFDEM began efforts to host mini-databases of all personnel trained through TfP – both police and civilians. TfP partners would either have to invite AFDEM to the training course and let them collect data for entry into the database, or collect the data themselves and enter it into the AFDEM database. Limited data had been collected as a result of this – and mainly from ACCORD. In the 2014 work plan ISS indicated that they would also like to make use of this facility. The termination of TfP support to AFDEM from 1 March 2014 effectively put an end to this.
5. What Difference Does It Make?  
The Impact of Training

Our findings suggest that pre-deployment training does have a positive impact on police officers in missions compared to those who do not have training. It saves the time of police officers on arrival by equipping them with the learning to put the mission into a wider context and certain skills that they need to perform in the mission, both in terms of every-day tasks such as driving and report writing, and in terms of appropriate conduct, such as respect for diversity, and also on knowledge of the UN and international peacekeeping. This effect will be larger for less experienced police officers. The training also increases the psychological preparation of officers, their management of stress and ability to cope with challenging situations. Other studies have also indicated the limitations of pre-deployment training in turning police officers into competent peace supporter. They may sometimes have insufficient capabilities from their home country, and the basic pre-deployment training is not sufficient to teach them skills in mentoring host police officers in the mission area, or in applying knowledge from modules on civilian protection and human rights. The role of induction training and targeted on-the-job training are crucial to achieve this.

TfP is a major player in supporting the provision of pre-deployment training and has contributed to improved preparedness of a substantial number of police officers. However we do not know how many trainees were deployed and it is in deployment that the main impacts of training are experienced. But we do know that different types of training are more effective than others.

The TfP-supported training courses and deployment of trainees were presented and discussed in Chapter Four. In this chapter we examine the impacts of training. The evaluation questions addressed are listed in Box 5.1.
Box 5.1 Evaluation questions on impacts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
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<tr>
<td>(1) How have training courses affected the trainees’ performance, attitudes and expectations in peace operations?</td>
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<td>(2) What are the views of organizations and missions that receive the TfP trainees of their qualifications, skills, attitudes, behaviour and performance?</td>
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<tr>
<td>(3) What is the relative effectiveness of different types of training?</td>
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<td>(4) How have the chosen training courses affected the trainees’ performance, attitudes and expectations in performing their civilian or police duties when returning home?</td>
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<td>(5) To what extent does deployment experiences influence on attitudes and activities of the trainees?</td>
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Pre-deployment training of the police

We decided to select TfP support to pre-deployment training of individual police officers to examine impact of training. TfP supported 44 courses in this area with some 2700 police officers participating. This is 75 percent of those trained with support from TfP in the evaluation period.

The TfP-supported training courses are in the main identical to other pre-deployment courses available for African police officers. The team has therefore not attempted to identify specific TfP-supported pre-deployment courses from other and similar courses delivered by TfP partners and other training providers. These pre-deployment courses are, with variations, based on the standard curriculum developed by the training division within the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations. The UN has developed training material consisting of the Core Pre-deployment Training Materials and the Specialized Training Materials for the UN police. The UN recommends that a minimum of two weeks should be allocated to such training and that the teaching methodology should be decided by training staff based on the best principles of adult learning. Each member state/police contributing country has the responsibility to ensure that the police officers they deploy will have received such training. The aim of the training is to ensure that a capable police officer is turned into a competent peacekeeper. The AU is relying on the same curriculum. The African Peace Support Trainers Association (APSTA) which brings together the main training institutions on the continent was (first half of 2014) finalising a training needs assessment with a view to improve guidelines and curriculum for the pre-deployment and in mission training.

The UN curriculum was last amended in 2009 in an effort to reflect the new demands for peacekeeping and policing in peace operations. Very little is known about the actual impact of this training. The UN itself carried out a

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43 The UN training standards and curriculum for police are available from the UN peacekeeping resource hub (http://peacekeepingresourcehub.unlb.org/PBPS/Pages/Public/Home.aspx).

training needs assessment in 2008 and again in 2012-2013 which provides a wealth of data, but it does not really provide any hard data on the impact. Interviews by the team with TfP partners and policy and training officials in New York and in Africa do however reveal a fairly consistent view.

This pre-deployment training is considered important to ensure that police officers arriving in a mission have the basic minimum understanding of an international operation. It is widely stated that this will help make induction into the mission easier. Training upon arrival in mission (induction training) and on-the-job training will then build upon pre-deployment training. This training becomes very important in providing a common foundation for police officers coming from a very large number of countries, sometimes also from different police forces within the same country.\(^45\)

**Box 5.2 Pre-deployment, induction and in-mission training**

**Pre-deployment training:** this is received by police officers before deployment. This training is typically based on the UN/AU curriculum, and is delivered by TfP partners, and other providers.

**Induction training:** this is received by police officers on arrival in mission. It is intended to build on pre-deployment training, but will be more mission-specific. The size and content of such training varies greatly. It is usually delivered by trainers within the mission.

**In-mission training** is various types of specialised “on-the-job” training provided to staff of the mission. Some TfP-partners were in 2013 and 2014 piloting mid-level police management courses to be delivered both before and after arrival in missions.

Furthermore, basic training becomes even more important considering low skills and limited international experience of police officers from many countries, including developing countries in Africa and Asia which provide the bulk of the police officers. The low skills level is also evident from TfP course reports where pre-course assessment tests have been made of the officers arriving for training.\(^46\) Senior police and training officials interviewed in New York and in missions also claim that they can easily notice if an arriving officer has not participated in any pre-deployment training. This is also a reflection of the generally low professional standards of policing in most of these police contributing countries.\(^47\) However, this training is also considered highly relevant...

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\(^{45}\) This is also emphasised in the new 2014 strategic guidance policy paper from the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Operations, *United Nations Police in Peace Operations* (New York: UN).

\(^{46}\) ISS has been doing such tests for all training courses where course reports are available to us. These tests reveal very limited and poor knowledge among police officers of the basic features of the UN, AU and international operations.

and often crucial for police officers coming from other parts of the world, including northern countries. It was frequently mentioned in interviews with both TIP partners and senior officials in missions that police officers from Western countries also often have limited knowledge of international operations and insufficient understanding and tolerance for cultural diversity. Training addressing these issues has become even more important with the shift of emphasis in policing mandates from traditional monitoring towards mentoring and supporting the development of police in the mission area.

Our interviews also revealed shortcomings of the courses. The curriculum, it was often claimed by African TIP trainers interviewed, takes insufficient account of African realities and it assumes that training staff have the skills and competence required to deliver good training. The reality is that most police contributing countries are struggling to effectively deliver proper training. At the UN in New York and in missions the team was often told that the curriculum is not first rate, but it is the best that can be achieved under the present circumstances and in the context of operations. Such considerations have also contributed to new efforts to focus more on training in missions – both through induction training upon arrival and in specialised and targeted on-the-job training. This is also evident in shifting TIP priorities following the 2013 internal review of TIP-support to policing (see Chapter One).

A recent (2013) review of human rights training in UN policing also confirms this picture. Based on data from nine missions it found that pre-deployment is unevenly delivered by police contributing countries depending upon the priority attached to human rights and the human rights module, the capacity and the availability of resources. Anecdotal evidence collected by the reviewers suggested that many police officers arrive without receiving any training on human rights responsibilities as UN peacekeepers, while many others arrived in the mission with vague notions of what “human rights” are and little understanding of the intersection of human rights activities with their work. The in-mission induction training also, the review found, relied on the mistaken assumption that all UN police had received standard pre-deployment training in accordance with the UN guidelines.\footnote{This was a review undertaken by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (2013), UN Peace Operations. Integrating Human Rights in United Nations Police Components. Good practices and Lessons Learned, New and Geneva, United Nations.}

The team’s interviews with key informants also revealed a widespread perception that corruption in deployment may be significant and impacts upon the selection of trainees and deployment and upon the quality of deployed personnel. The daily allowances for a police officer deployed in a mission are often equivalent to a month’s salary at home. In some police contributing countries officers wanting to secure a deployment may have to pay a bribe or a commission. This may also happen while in mission. One officer interviewed by the team was told he had to pay a commission to pass the driving test after arriving in mission.

To assess the impact of pre-deployment training the team carried out structured interviews and focus group discussions with nearly 120 police officers in two
missions and two police contributing countries (see Chapter Two and Annex
Three for more details, including a presentation of the sample from its case).
The detailed findings from this data set are presented in Annex Five. Below we
summarise and analyse the main findings. This is structured against four
overarching questions:49

1. Is there evidence that pre-deployment training effectively prepares police
   officers with knowledge, skills, attitudes and expectations that they need in
   deployment?
2. What is the contribution of pre-deployment training to these outcomes
   relative to other variables that affect them, for example professional
   background, other training before deployment, and induction training in
   deployment?
3. If there is evidence that pre-deployment training is contributing to these
   outcomes, what is the contribution TIP is making?
4. Does the contribution TIP is making maximise the effectiveness of TIP
   resources by using them in an economical and efficient way?

These questions encompass the OECD DAC recommended questions to
evaluate the impact of a development programme:

What has happened as a result of the programme or project?
What real difference has the activity made to the beneficiaries?
How many people have been affected?

Does pre-deployment prepare police officers for missions?
What kind of outcomes are we focusing on? We are essentially seeking to test
outcomes that relate to how prepared police officers are in early deployment and
whether they have learned skills for deployment that they would otherwise have
to catch up on and might not learn so thoroughly. The UN curriculum contains a
long list of 114 expected learning outcomes. Following findings from key
informant interviews in the early phases of the evaluation the team selected four
outcome areas:

A. Knowledge: The UN and the different mandates of missions; Mission
   specific background and mandate;
B. Skills: Driving and report writing;
C. Conduct: Respect for diversity; and
D. Expectations: Stress management/psychological preparation

49 This approach also reflects the logical steps we have taken to ground our analysis in a contribution analysis
approach, which attempts to look at the contribution of a single intervention where a) there are “other external
and macro-level factors” affecting the desired outcomes and these outcomes are “beyond the direct control
and influence” of the intervention and b) “there are multiple other organisations, public and private, potentially
contributing to these outcomes. See Erica Wimbush et al. (2012) ‘Applications of contribution analysis to
outcome planning and impact evaluation’ Evaluation 2012 18: 310
These outcome areas are covered in the UN curriculum for pre-deployment. However, there are much variation in how the training courses are delivered, including in how much emphasis is placed on individual topics and modules. This is evident both from the UN’s own training needs assessments and from the team’s interviews. Major variations are found in the time allocated to training modules addressing practical skills training such as driving, and in the extent to which a specific course has a specific mission focus and includes modules on the mission area. There are also differences in the pedagogical approaches favoured by trainers emanating from various countries, ranging from lengthy one-way lectures during which the authoritative trainer reads from texts and takes questions at the end of the lecture, through to participatory group work with sharing of experiences, joint problem-solving and feedback on role-plays performed by participants.

The chosen outcome areas correspond well with the training modules reported by police officers as being most useful at the beginning. Officers interviewed reported the following top five training modules as most useful in mission, in an open question that allowed multiple responses:

![Fig 5.1 Top five most useful training topics](image)

Note: Based on the responses of 78 pre-deployment trained individual police officers

The dominance of key themes and key words related to these aspects of training was confirmed by content analysis provided in Annex Five that we conducted on the overall responses of police officers to our structured interviews.

These findings also overlap with those of other studies. The main UN Strategic Needs Assessments in 2013 identified the following amongst a list of priority training needs for UN police: ‘the mandate of UN Peacekeeping in general as well as mission mandate and roles of its components’, ‘cultural awareness to
best interact with local populations and work with national police, ‘communication and writing skills’ and driving. A Rwandan study found that the five most useful themes were stress management, hostage survival skills, cultural awareness and respect for diversity, mediation and negotiation skills, message handling and radio communication skills.

Our interview data confirms that the selected outcomes also covered areas that are considered important for police officers in their careers when they return from deployment. Of 53 respondents among police officers who had returned to Ghana and Rwanda, 18 said report writing had remained useful, 16 said respect for diversity, 15 said driving skills and seven said general professionalism they had learned in pre-deployment had remained useful on return.

Below we have summarised the main findings emerging from Annex Five.

**Reaction: views on quality and relevance**

When they were asked whether anything in their pre-deployment training course had not been relevant, 60 of the 78 police officers (77 percent) who had received such training said there was nothing in the courses that was not relevant. Of the rest, seven mentioned mission relevance – the training was not mission specific enough, or contained modules that turned out not to be relevant in the mission, or in two cases the course focussed on another mission. Three officers said the material was ‘too theoretical’ or not directly relevant to UN police. Two felt the hostage survival session was too harsh.

We received a different message from senior police officers and key informants in the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), who were less convinced of the relevance of training of realities in Somalia. A senior manager at AMISOM Police reported that the training’s relatively greater focus on protection of civilians was geared towards missions where police were more engaged with civilians than in AMISOM where they are mentoring Somali police. The mentoring modules in the UN curriculum were insufficient to prepare police officers to be good mentors. Many training courses also lacked sessions on the AU.

We asked police officers to rate the quality of delivery of pre-deployment training and they were overwhelmingly complimentary about the delivery of courses. However, some officers did say the training courses had involved ‘too much lecturing’ and not enough of an ‘adult learning approach’.

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50 See the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Services (2013) Training: A Strategic Investment in UN Peacekeeping, Global Peacekeeping Training Needs Assessment, Final Report - 2012-2013 (New York, Integrated Training Services, UN DPKO and DFS) which surveyed peacekeeping personnel across a number of categories, including individual police officers.

51 See Khalid Kabasha (2013) ‘Pre-deployment Training and the Performance of Police Mandate in Peace Support Operations: the Case of the Rwandan National Police’ Peace Studies MA Dissertation, National University of Rwanda, Center for Conflict Management. This report surveyed Rwandan police who received pre-deployment training through the East African Standby Force in 2011 and early 2012 and asked them to rank the most important topics from a list that did not include driving.

52 AMISOM Police Senior Manager, AMISOM, January 2014.

53 One example is Ghana IPO no 4 – we have numbered our interviews with police officers in each sample (Liberia, Ghana and Rwanda) in order to maintain the anonymity of responses.
When asked how they would change the course, a significant number of officers said they thought the course should be longer in duration and contain more practical exercises and be more mission specific.

**Fig 5.2 Suggestions for improvement of training by individual police officers**

![Bar chart showing the suggestions for improvement in training](chart.png)

Note: Based on the most common responses of 78 pre-deployment trained officers

Of the training courses attended by the officers in our sample, the vast majority (70) were two weeks in duration, five were one week long, four were three weeks long and four courses reportedly lasted one month. The 44 TfP-supported courses mostly lasted about two weeks, with a few being six days. Insufficiency of time is frequently mentioned in course reports from all three TfP-providers. This was also picked up by the abovementioned study from Rwanda.

The UN 2013 Training Needs Assessment found similarly high approval ratings for the quality of pre-deployment training, with 88 percent of police saying it was good or excellent. Length of the training course was also highlighted in this assessment; the length was considered about right by 68 percent of the police, too short by 28 percent and too long by 4 percent. Across the board, staff with more peacekeeping experience was more likely to say the course was too long, whereas staff with less peacekeeping experience were more likely to say it was too short. The same applies to the rating of the courses. The more training courses officers have experience of, the more likely they are to give these training courses a lower rating.
In sum, police officers are very positive about the relevance and quality of the training. Although there is a clear risk of bias in these subjective questions, the positive reaction was seen across our sample indicating that police officers are generally happy with the way courses are delivered. The main recommendations from the officers interviewed were to make the course more mission specific and to extend its duration.

**Learning**

We were unable to test knowledge directly, but relied on responses from police officers triangulated with key informant interviews and other reports and studies of policing in Africa. Provision of a common minimum knowledge of the UN and international operations is a key purpose of the pre-deployment training. Pre-course assessments tests also confirm the generally limited knowledge of these issues among most police arriving for training (see above). Training after arrival in mission also generally gives limited or no attention to this.

We find that 82 percent of the respondents with pre-deployment training and who have returned from missions rated pre-deployment training as the most important contribution to their understanding of the UN core values and peacekeeping principles. Officers who had not received such training were asked how they learned about the UN, and only 14 percent had picked it up from other previous training. The rest had gained their knowledge while deployed in-mission.

Other reports such as the abovementioned UN 2013 Training Needs Assessment also highlight the role of such training as a main source of information on the UN and peacekeeping. 87 percent of the respondents here say that the training was effective.

**Behaviour: putting skills and attitudes into use**

Do trainees apply the learning and change their behaviour as a result of the pre-deployment training? The 2013 review mentioned above on the human rights component of the training was quite dismissive.

The team focused on the use of two basic skills, report writing and driving and of one conduct and attitude-related learning outcome – respect for diversity. What do the interview data tell us? Over 60 percent of pre-deployment trained respondents who have returned from missions rate this training as the most important contribution to building their skills both in report writing and driving. This is still a high percentage, but in-mission experience in particular played a larger role after the pre-deployment training. Police officers with no pre-deployment training reported that they relied on other training from their professional background followed by in-mission learning for driving and report writing. In our structured interview design we did not have questions asking police officers to rank the importance of this training, so we have relied on analysing the qualitative responses from the respondents.
**Report writing** is part of the professional training of most police, but the UN and the AU have specific reporting requirements, including daily reporting, and also require specific standards and templates. Pre-deployment training does appear to play an important role in teaching officers to meet UN reporting standards, along with induction training and in-mission learning. Over 60 percent of pre-deployment trained respondents who had returned from missions rated the pre-deployment training as the most important contribution to building their skills in report writing. Police officers lacking such training appeared to rely on previous professional training. Some officers in our Rwandan sample said they had not managed to write good reports in early deployment as a result of not being trained.

When asked what they did differently in mission and on return from mission, officers frequently mentioned the ability to write better reports. In early deployment, pre-deployment training may play a larger role in making reporting formats more familiar, especially since induction training often does not contain practical exercises. However, as regards report writing as a skill to be used after return from deployment, respondents emphasize the importance of practice while in the mission, and also in learning how to use a computer. As one officer without pre-deployment training put it: *I really learned a lot from the mission about report writing – the UN has a nice reporting system.*

**Poor driving skills** among police officers are a major challenge for many missions. Ability to drive a 4x4 is a formal requirement to pass the mandatory assessment test by the UN and the AU (see more on this in Chapter Four). The UN curriculum provides for training on this through class-based as well as practical driving lessons. However, time allocated to practical driving in most standard two-week courses is pretty limited and is often confined to a few minutes of driving for each course participant.

Our interviews revealed some evidence that police officers without pre-deployment training were less able to drive well in early deployment. One officer reported he had had to re-sit the driving test twice in early deployment and had passed thanks to the help of a fellow officer.

Driving was mentioned more than once in response to a question asking officers for examples where they acted differently in mission because of the pre-deployment training. These included examples of retrieving a vehicle stuck in sand and of defensive driving away from a potentially hostile crowd.

A senior country coordinator with extensive deployment experience in missions held a strong view that further investment in practical training of 4x4 vehicle driving and maintenance would result in a significant overall saving in that vehicles would need fewer repairs and would last longer.

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54 Rwanda IPO no 13.  
55 Rwanda IPO no.17.
Respect for diversity is a substantial component of the training curriculum related to standards, values and safety of UN peacekeeping personnel. We did not focus on this component in particular in our questionnaire design, but it emerged strongly in the interviews nonetheless, as one of the top five most important topics in training, and repeatedly discussed in our more open ended questions.

It may be particularly important for more junior officer’s on their first missions, who may never have left home or been greatly exposed to other cultures. This was noted by officers in our sample from Liberia, and particularly by young female officers from Rwanda. One officer also noted that attending a regional training course with officers from other countries was a ‘first step to understanding diversity.’

Across our sample, police officers reported that the pre-deployment training provides them with important information on the ‘do’s and don’ts’ and overall international standards. Respect for diversity is a key area in which this training prepares police on the importance of appropriate conduct. As one Rwandan police officer said, pre-deployment training is important in guarding yourself professionally against doing the wrong thing. A Ghanaian officer confirmed that information on behaving appropriately in different cultural contexts was important so as not to ‘put yourself in danger’. Police officers failing to respect diversity can and has led officers to conduct themselves badly in missions, and our interviews with senior police in Liberia suggested that misconduct involving ‘negative’ relations with locals, or public drunkenness, were common reasons for early repatriation.

One former head of section in Darfur reported that respect for diversity ‘remains very important right up to senior level. ‘In our sector I was in command of 800 people and during Ramadan, for example, you had to respect limited working hours and you had to work with language assistants who would ask for permission to go and pray.’

A number of officers said they did use the respect for diversity issues to which they had been introduced in pre-deployment training and which they encountered in mission in their careers after deployment. As one officer stated, I understand other people’s behaviour better. In mission it was about respecting diversity, but afterwards it helped me to deal with other people’s behaviour.

56 Rwanda IPO no 1.
57 Ghana IPO no 13.
58 Senior Police Official, Rwanda, May 2014.
59 Rwanda IPO no 16.
Stress management and general 'psychological preparation' were areas where officers interviewed reported major impacts. It appears from the interviews that it is a cumulative effect of a number of training sessions that helps police officers with stress management. It also appears from our data that this aspect of the training has the capacity to contribute to behaviour further into deployment as well as in early deployment, making police officers feel less stressed in early deployment and also helping them to deal with stressful and dangerous situations if and when they arise.

A number or interviewees suggested that pre-deployment training helps reduce the stress of early deployment. A Ghanaian officer reported I nearly gave up and wanted to go home. Pre-deployment training would have prepared me for that.60 Even officers who had managed to make up other knowledge and skills were blunt about the stress they felt on being deployed without training, as with other factors they also speculated that this would be particularly difficult for junior police: If I had been a more junior officer, I am not sure I would have had the courage to just go to the mission with no pre-deployment training.61

As one key informant with mission and training experience reported those who were less prepared were more likely to experience distress in mission.62 This ‘duty of care’ dimension of the training was echoed by another key informant with considerable mission and training experience. The critical aspects of pre-deployment courses for managing expectations and reducing stress were the mission specific elements to reduce ‘culture shock’, stress management aspects and the safety and security exercises such as hostage situations and mine awareness. Even information as basic as preparing police that there will be a time difference between the mission area and the home country could be crucial in preventing what he called the risk of ‘paranoia’ in early deployment.63 Respondents reported that induction training was often insufficient to deal with these issues because of its limited duration and because there were a number of other logistical things that were being addressed during this period such as organizing bank accounts and deployment of officers to their sections in the mission.

The capacity of pre-deployment training to prepare police psychologically for challenges in the field has also been highlighted in studies of training. One study of Rwandan pre-deployment training found that all trainees reported they had encountered challenges in mission such as ‘culture difference, extreme weather conditions, homesickness and depression, communication barriers, unfamiliar food…’64 47 percent (21) of respondents said pre-deployment training had prepared them for these challenges and 51 percent (23) said pre-deployment training had prepared them ‘to some extent’.

60 Ghana IPO no 4.
61 Rwanda IPO no. 17.
63 Experienced Trainer, Nairobi, October 2013.
64 Kabasha, Khalid (2013) op.cit.
Some criticisms of stress management sections in pre-deployment training were encountered in the AU mission in Somalia, where one focus group suggested the sessions were useful but not sufficiently tailored to the Somalia context, where there are specific stresses associated with having limited access to the world outside bases and police stations.65

It also appears that if dangerous situations occur in mission, whatever preparation police have received may help them to deal with these situations. Some of the most striking responses from police officers asked how they behaved differently in mission as a result of pre-deployment training were related to stress management and psychological preparation for stressful situations. When very stressful situations occur, officers reported that the training background kicked in, both in its specific and general elements. We had an example of an officer stopped by child soldiers with cutlasses in Darfur, who reported that he remembered his training in resolving the situation and coping with it.66 A Rwandan police officer taken hostage by teenagers armed with guns in Haiti for 8 hours reported: ‘[w]hen it happens you remember every bit of hostage situation training you’ve had.’67 Pre-deployment training will not be the only factor in preparing police officers to handle difficult situations, since the induction training may also contain sessions on the dynamics of the conflict and likely associated threats.

What is the contribution of the training relative to the other variables?

As shown above, our answer to this question is different for different outcome areas. For a general introduction to the UN, AU and peace-keeping we find that pre-deployment training is playing a relatively more important role compared to other professional training or professional background, whereas for mission specific knowledge, induction training plays a relatively more important role. The pre-deployment training is relatively important for introducing police officers to report writing, but officers without this training fall back on their professional background and learn this on the job. Pre-deployment training may be an important part of teaching police officers about driving in difficult conditions although much depends on how much time is allocated to this in the course. We have anecdotes from interviews in Rwanda and Liberia that some struggled to pass the driving test on arrival in mission. Driving experience and additional training in the home country is obviously important.

The pre-deployment training plays a key role in introducing police officers to respect for diversity, especially for officers who have never left home or been exposed to different cultures. This is an important part of ‘guarding against doing the wrong thing’ for police officers. Induction training may be insufficient to make up for this, but more senior officers with experience from international missions may not suffer the lack of pre-deployment training so much on this front.

65 Mogadishu IPO FGD no 2.
66 Ghana IPO no 34.
67 Rwanda IPO no 15.
Stress management and general psychological preparation is an outcome area in which pre-deployment training adds unique value. Police officers of all ranks reported that such training did or would have reduced their stress on arrival in mission.

Results: Pre-deployment training contributes most to results in early deployment

What does this add up to in terms of results across the four levels of training evaluation? Here we present our assessment of the effect on missions resulting from the improved knowledge and skills of the police with such training, and their application of these. It is more difficult to capture these effects than behaviour, particularly when it is not possible objectively to test changes in behaviour. The team did not have access to the conduct and performance records for police officers. However we do have broad responses about police performance from managers in mission and from other key informants. Coupled with this we have the self-reported comments on the overall impacts of this training made by officers who received training, as well as the observations of the officers that did not participate in such training on the difference that lack of this training makes.

Overall we have found that pre-deployment training makes a difference as perceived by officers and this is confirmed by staff who encounter officers in deployment, many of whom reported some recognisable difference between officers who had and had not received this training, even if this was often expressed in fairly modest terms such as observed differences in ‘reactions and the kind of questions they ask.’68 Experienced induction trainers reported that they could tell the difference just by looking at how new recruits carried themselves. Some skills learned in training may help in emergency situations at any point in the mission. But the very strong message of our police officers and key informant interviews was that the effects of pre-deployment training are mostly time-bound and concentrated in the important early days of the mission. One summary by an officer is typical: Pre-deployment training helps you to cope with induction and adjust in the mission better.69 This theme of psychological preparation and helping police officers to cope was a repeated refrain in our interviews as shown in our content analysis of data in Annex Five.

Respondents, both police officers and key informants, frequently expressed the value of the pre-deployment training in relation to early deployment. Thus the absence of training was expressed in terms of time needed to catch up, with the following comment by a police officer on his peers without such training: You notice the difference in non-PD trained people. They have to catch up but that takes time and time is very important in missions.70

When asked how long it took them to catch up, officer who did not receive such training gave estimates of up to two or three months. This is of course a

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68 UN key informant interview, Mogadishu, January 2014.
69 UNMIL IPO no 4.
70 Rwanda IPO no 2.
subjective measure and the amount of time is likely to vary according to professional background, and personal networks. A number of police officers reported that years of experience and seniority might reduce the time it takes to catch up. One officer reported *It took me two months to catch up [due to lack of pre-deployment training]. It might be more difficult for police officers who are more junior to catch up since I relied a lot on my background.* Another typical comment was: *It really depends on the education and capacity of the officer: if you can read documents and follow guidelines, you can cope, and if you have social skills and respect, you can adjust to cultural diversity.* A number of other factors which we have not been able to capture in our research are also likely to affect the amount of time police officers save in early deployment if they receive pre-deployment training, for example the degree of cultural difference between home countries of the officers and the countries to which they are deployed.

In summary, the results in the mission will be to save the time of police officers on arrival by equipping them with the learning to put the mission into a wider context and skills that they need to perform in the mission, both in terms of every-day tasks such as driving and report writing, and in terms of appropriate conduct, such as respect for diversity. This effect will be larger for less experienced officers. Pre-deployment training also increases the psychological preparation of police officers, their management of stress and ability to cope with challenging situations. Importantly, officers with pre-deployment training are also able to absorb more from induction training and leave the induction training better equipped.

### Results on returning home – contribution of pre-deployment training is very faint, but deployment may have a big impact

We asked Rwandan and Ghanaian police during the field visits how the experiences of deployment, including pre-deployment training, had affected their careers on return and the way they performed their duties.

In particular areas, police officers clearly feel more skilled and confident as a result of deployment and some of these are in the outcome areas we discuss above, and we have incorporated impacts on return from mission in the above sections. Across the board, the effect of this training is predominantly preparatory. For the training outcome areas which police officers reported were still relevant to them on return home, the effect of pre-deployment training is likely to have been eclipsed and far outweighed by practice and learning during the mission.

As well as building specific skills, our research suggested deployment has an overarching effect in making police feel more capable and professional. As a senior Rwandan police officer and former police officer in missions said: *I don’t know whether it helped me get promoted. But it helped me feel more capable and confident and I thank your project that…Also I gained a better network.* This was echoed by another senior Rwandan former officer in a mission: *I am*

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71 Rwanda, IPO no 13.
72 UNMIL IPO no. 13.
73 Rwanda IPO no 16.
now borrowing from the best practices from the UN in my conduct and I’m more professional and polished. I think like an international policeman now.\textsuperscript{74}

The extent to which deployment has an impact on police when they return is also likely to be affected by the extent to which home police services recognise skills learned in deployment and make an effort to feed these back into their home police services. We encountered some good examples from Rwanda and from Ghana, where police officers who had built skills in training, or IT or in dealing with sexual-based violence investigations, were purposively placed in roles which would allow them to use these skills on return from missions.

Experience gained in mission is also recognised as part of career progression and promotion to different degrees in different police services. More than half the sample of officers interviewed in Rwanda, a major police contributing country, was promoted shortly after return from mission. However, findings from Ghana contradict this with many expressing that Ghana Police leadership did not recognise mission experience for promotion. Some Ghana officers who did return and were deployed to posts in which they could use their new skills did receive promotion shortly after. However, this was because of their developed skills and not recognition of deployment. There is a belief expressed among some officers in Ghana interviewed that going on deployment actually holds your promotion prospects back, because during deployment you cannot sit the exams that are required to make your eligible for promotion.

**Pre-deployment training does not have an impact on the selection of capable officers**

The original evaluation questions included ‘what are the views of organizations and missions that receive the TfP trainees of their qualifications, skills, attitudes, behaviour and performance?’ We have included some of these views in the preceding sections. However it is important to note that much of what these organisations think about trainees is not within the capacity of pre-deployment training to affect. A repeated refrain was that trainees needed to be ‘trainable’ and that regardless of this training, police contributing countries were not always sending the right people. The result was that ‘some officers were very skilled and others needed mentoring themselves’ according to senior police staff at the AU Mission in Somalia. This variation in skills was echoed by a former head of a mission section in Darfur, who commented: *We shouldn’t waste our resources on people who will not deliver…The biggest problem is not with the training we offer but with whether we are training the right people.*\textsuperscript{75}

TfP partners have limited influence over the selection of capable police for deployment, or the police that are selected to be trained, beyond being able to prevent the same police from receiving multiple training courses. Therefore, as we have said, the impact of TfP may be to save the time of and to psychologically prepare the police officers who they receive, whatever their capabilities. But to maximize performance in mission, more consistently capable officers would need to be selected.

\textsuperscript{74} Rwanda IPO no 9.

\textsuperscript{75} Senior Rwandan police official, Rwanda, May 2014.
What contribution is TfP making?

Our findings are very clear on the positive contribution that pre-deployment training is making in preparing police officers for deployment. The benefits are mainly linked to the time required to be properly inducted into the missions, including ability to absorb benefits from induction training and early on-the-job training. These benefits are evident in psychological preparation, in technical skills such as driving and report writing, and in understanding the purpose of the mission and its mandate. This training is delivered by a range of different training providers. This training will vary both in teaching methodology and in the emphasis that is put on different modules. One training course may make two 4x4 cars available for driving for one day, another course one car for half a day, and a third may limit the driving modules to a power point presentation and video.

However, despite these variations of in the provision of pre-deployment training our assessment is firm on its role. It is better than the counterfactual of no pre-deployment training.

The TfP-partners are in quantitative terms large providers of training in many major police contributing countries. In theory, TfP support to pre-deployment training can deliver the outcomes identified above with every police officer that it trains so the number of trained police tells us something about TfP’s contribution. In Chapter Four we were unable to conclude with any firm estimate the deployment rate of the 2700 police officers who have received TfP-supported training. It may be 1200, but it could also be much less and much more (see the discussion in Chapter Four). It is also important to emphasise that a significant portion of those trained with TfP-support have been trained through EASFCOM and their primary purpose is not to train for deployment to on-going missions, but for future operational readiness of a regional standby force.

In sum, we have been unable to make anywhere near an accurate estimate of TfP’s contribution to the outcomes of pre-deployment training for the reasons stated above. If TfP partners were able to report quantitatively on the numbers trained and deployment rates it would also become possible to determine their relative contribution in relation to the contributions of other providers of training. Our conclusion is that TfP has contributed to improved preparedness of a substantial number of police officers in the evaluation period, but this number is considerably less than the number of trained police because not all have been deployed and the partners have not monitored their outcomes.
6. Value for Money? The Cost Effectiveness of Training

The TfP programme has supported the delivery of several types of training. The team are not able to draw conclusions about the relative cost effectiveness of different types of training. This requires data on the effectiveness and added value of different modes of delivery which we do not have. However, we can identify cost drivers and cost-efficiencies of delivering training. Departing from the evaluation finding that “pre-deployment training does have a positive impact on police officers in missions compared to those who do not have such training”, the team examined the police pre-deployment courses. In spite of incomplete financial data we have been able to assess cost drivers and identify the cost per trained police officer of different models. Generally, TfP partners have been conscious of costs and have tried to minimise expenses. However, we found dramatic differences between partners and between different models in the cost per trainee. In-country courses targeting officers selected for deployment are cheaper than training officers from several countries in a regional course. The use of Norwegian instructors is a major cost driver, and the training for the pool of police officers for the standby roster is very expensive. The costs of TfP supported training per trainee has varied between NOK 3 000 and NOK 23 000.

The TfP programme has supported the delivery of several types of training course. A total of 80 courses with TfP-support were delivered in the evaluation period with around 3700 participants. The team has budgets and financial reports from some of these courses, but often these reports do not take into account contributions by others – financial or in-kind. Nor do we have hard data on the outcomes of the training – the use of the trainees. This makes it difficult to arrive at firm conclusions and judgements on the relative cost effectiveness of different types of training models.

Box 6.1 Evaluation questions on cost effectiveness

(1) What is the relative effectiveness of different types of training?

(2) Are there other ways of conducting training where evidence of more significant results have been documented? and

(3) Can resources spent on training be justified in terms of results achieved (are they in line with what can be expected)?
This evaluation has established that pre-deployment training is achieving the desired result of trained officers performing more effectively when deployed to a mission. It is on the basis of this effectiveness finding that cost comparisons are made. Insufficient data on the use of trainers makes it difficult to draw firm conclusions on the effectiveness of different types of training (national, regional, mission-specific, training for on-going missions vs training for a future standby force). Furthermore, the "effectiveness" assumption is qualified in that it is beyond the scope of this evaluation to determine the relative and comparative impacts of training length, training methods, country of origin, and service providers upon the performance of trainees in mission.

Financial data coupled with an analysis of cost drivers, interviews and data from previous chapters, have enabled the team to derive some important findings on whether TfP is using its resources in an economical and efficient manner, and to inform future choices on balancing cost and effectiveness to achieve desired training outcomes.

Cost drivers and cost-efficiency
The team examined the delivery of pre-deployment training for individual police officers. There were 44 such courses with 2700 participants in the evaluation period. They are delivered through different models and by different TfP-partners/training providers. One provider is an NGO (ISS) which delivers training through national police agencies targeting officers selected for pre-deployment. Another is a national and public training institution (KAIPTC) which provides training both at the regional level where trainees are coming from a range of countries for training, as well as training targeting national police agencies and police officers in individual countries (mobile courses where staff and instructors from the training centre travel to the selected country). The third type is the regional intergovernmental organisation (EASF) which organises regional courses with invited participants from all member countries. These courses have mostly been held at training facilities in Nairobi, but are now also taking place at training facilities in Kigali and Addis Ababa. Participants are still flying in from the invited member states.

Table 6.1 overleaf summarises the most significant cost drivers which impact on the cost effectiveness of police pre-deployment training courses.
Table 6.1 Cost drivers in the delivery of training courses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cost driver</th>
<th>Example</th>
<th>Effect</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National training course held at a</td>
<td>ISS, KAIPTC mobile</td>
<td>Reduced training costs such as transport expenses, food and accommodation may be cheaper (the latter sometimes free)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>police training centre</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional training courses</td>
<td>EASFCOM, KAIPTC</td>
<td>Participants are coming from different countries. This increases dramatically transport costs, and sometimes also costs related to accommodation and food</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length of course</td>
<td>ISS vs KAIPTC and EASFCOM</td>
<td>Shorter courses involving weekend work saves costs, though often with lost value through reduced time for practical exercises</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norwegian trainers</td>
<td>POD trainers at KAIPTC and EASF (and from 2014 also ISS)</td>
<td>Use of Norwegian (and other non-African) instructors increases dramatically the cost of a course.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fees for instructors</td>
<td>Great variation between partners</td>
<td>Instructor fees/allowances per day (USD, 2012 courses): ISS - 150, EASF - 250, KAIPTC - 400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional variation in costs</td>
<td>Variation between countries</td>
<td>Training courses in “expensive” police contributing countries increases costs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Due to the absence of detailed financial data on training courses delivered during the evaluation period, it has not been possible to benchmark unit costs of training to help identify cost-efficiency improvements in training delivery. Moreover, the overall in-house systemic differences in the manner in which budgets and expenditures are allocated and reported by TfP partners makes the task of carrying out reliable cost-effectiveness comparisons difficult.

One particular challenge surrounds the costs of the use of instructors from the Norwegian Police Directorate (POD). Funding for their use is directed to POD from the TfP grant and does not appear as an expense in the financial reports from the TfP-supported training providers. In fact, the use of trainers from POD is also considered as a cost-saving measure for them – they can reduce spending on (much cheaper) African trainers. The bulk of the TfP grant to POD is spent on deploying instructors and facilitators to TfP-supported training providers. However, POD does not provide financial reports to TfP to enable us to see the costs of deploying personnel to individual courses. Their budget is about NOK 170 000 for two persons attending a course for two weeks. This will dramatically increase the costs of a course. In some cases – and especially in the courses run by EASFCOM – there are several trainers from the Nordic countries and they are in most cases funded by the donor agency outside the allocation to EASF.
In Table 6.2 below the team has illustrated the costs of different training courses and providers by identifying the cost per person trained taking into account the most significant cost drivers. This enables us to assess the overall efficiency of some of the different training models – the relationship between the outputs and the resources spent on producing them – and thereby understand whether TfP partners are spending well.

### Table 6.2 The costs of different types of training courses (in NOK)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provider</th>
<th>Course Details</th>
<th>Cost</th>
<th>Cost per person trained</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>ISS</strong></td>
<td>2012, Rwanda, National training, 60 Rwandese officers trained, regional trainers, 6 day course</td>
<td>283,852</td>
<td>4,731</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EASF</strong></td>
<td>2011, Course No 30, Regional course in Rwanda, 57 trainees from 6 member states and from Norway; regional trainers, 1 instructor from Norway and 3 from other Nordic countries; two weeks</td>
<td>987,315 (+ costs of POD and other Nordic instructors, est.: 85000 x 4 = 340 000)</td>
<td>17,321 (+ an additional 6000 if costs of POD and other non-African instructors are included)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>KAIPTC</strong></td>
<td>2012, Accra, 12 day mission-specific course for Ghana police, 60 participants, 1 trainer from POD and 3 from Denmark/Germany</td>
<td>701,627 (+ costs of POD and other non-African instructors)</td>
<td>11,694 (+ costs of all some non-African instructors)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EASF</strong></td>
<td>2011, Course No 31, Regional 12-day course in Kenya, 60 participants from eight countries (incl. 2 from Norway), regional instructors, 1 trainer from POD and 3 from Denmark and Sweden</td>
<td>714,847 (+ costs for POD and other Nordic instructors)</td>
<td>11,914 (+ an additional 6000 for non-African instructors)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>KAIPTC</strong></td>
<td>2012, Burkina Faso, Mission specific course for UNAMID, 46 trainees from Burkina Faso, 1 POD instructor + 1 from Germany (but based at KAIPTC)</td>
<td>410,884 (+ 85 000 for POD instructor)</td>
<td>8,932 (+ an additional 1850 for the POD instructor)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ISS</strong></td>
<td>2013, Burkina Faso, National training, 126 participants from Burkina Faso, 2 week course (no instructors from POD)</td>
<td>410,884</td>
<td>3,261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ISS</strong></td>
<td>2011 Namibia, National training, 41 officers trained, 6-day course</td>
<td>ZAR 308,675</td>
<td>Approx NOK 4,857</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ISS</strong></td>
<td>2011 Malawi, National training, 62 officers trained, 6-day course</td>
<td>ZAR 243,592</td>
<td>Approx NOK 2,619</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: This table is based on an analysis of TfP partner budgets, accounts and financial reports for 2010-13, as well as financial summaries put together by TfP partners specifically to assist the evaluation team.
The table on the previous side shows that the cost per person trained varies enormously across different training courses delivered during the evaluation period. Although this only represents a partial picture of the cost-efficiency of different training models, due to the incomplete financial data we have received, it presents some interesting findings.

The analysis below focuses on cost comparisons on three levels:

1. Between regional and national courses;
2. The use of international trainers; and

**National courses offer greater cost-efficiencies**

Analysis of the two courses conducted at the Gishari Police Training School in Rwanda, by ISS in 2012 and EASF in 2011, highlights the enormous variation in cost efficiency of two very different training models. The ISS course, run in collaboration with the Rwanda National Police for Rwandese officers with African trainers, can be shown to deliver a cost per output that is nearly four times lower than a course run at the same venue the year before with trainees from six member states (and excluding the cost of Norwegian and international trainers). These perspectives must be qualified and balanced with effectiveness considerations relating to time and numbers of course participants. Given the extensive curriculum, and the high value placed by trainees upon time-consuming practical exercises, it is questionable whether a six-day course is more effective than a 12-day course. While the size of venues is usually the constraining factor, a class of 126 may be more cost efficient than a class of 60. However, the bigger the class, the less likely there will be practical training exercises, and the individual attention that accompanies these.

Another regional training course run by EASF, this time in Nairobi, also yields a cost of nearly NOK 12,000 per person trained; whereas other national courses run by ISS in collaboration with the Malawi and Namibia national police in the same year yield a cost per trainee of more than three times less. Even taking into account the fact that the ISS courses are 50 percent shorter in duration than the regional EASF courses, the national pre-deployment training courses still offer significant cost-efficiency gains.

The table also shows great variations in the cost of national training. ISS training in Southern and Eastern Africa is cheaper than similar training in West Africa with KAIPTC’s training being far more expensive even excluding the costs of Norwegian and international trainers. The difference in costs between the two mission-specific in-country courses run by KAIPTC in Ghana and in Burkina Faso is largely explained by accommodation costs. In Burkina Faso it was provided free of charge by the host while KAIPTC charges USD 61 per night for police officers making use of their accommodation facilities.
International trainers are major cost drivers

The costs of use of Norwegian and other international trainers are not included in the financial reports from the TIP-supported training providers. Our estimates show that if this was included the unit costs will increase quite dramatically. In the case of EASF courses in Rwanda the costs will typically be around 23 000 compared to the ISS unit cost of 4800 for training in the same country at the same venue. This is high even accounting for the shorter length of the ISS course.

The role of the POD has changed somewhat in the period. In KAIPTC POD instructors are mainly used in a traditional role; in EASFCOM there has been an attempted shift away from an instructor function towards playing the role of facilitators and mentors of African trainers. POD has not been engaged in ISS training in the period, but from 2014 the work plan both from ISS and POD indicates that there will be much use of POD instructors in ISS courses, including in the development of new and in-mission courses. This will also increase ISS’ unit costs of training.

The use of POD instructors appears to be highly valued, especially by EASFCOM and now also by ISS. Part of the attraction may be that they do not have to pay for the services from their own budgets, but they are also considered to bring expertise and international experience to the training. For similar reasons POD also brings trainers from Africa to the pre-deployment courses in Norway and send Norwegian police officers as students to pre-deployment courses run by KAIPTC and EASFCOM. For POD itself TIP is considered a small, but important instrument also in further strengthening the international work of the Norwegian police. At KAIPTC a main motivation for the use of POD instructors appears to be financial savings for KAIPTC. POD’s involvement in course preparation at KAIPTC is limited and instructors often do not know which modules in the curriculum they are expected to deliver before arrival to the course.

Training for the standby force is expensive

The TIP support for the training for the EASF is very expensive also without the use of Norwegian instructors. KAIPTC and ISS focus much more on police contributing countries and training for on-going missions. This is mainly explained by the EASF’s decision to rely on regional courses for pre-deployment or foundation training for the future standby force. EASF has concluded that it is important to bring police officers from different countries together also at the level of pre-deployment training. SADC and ECOWAS on the other hand have largely left police foundation training to member states and have focused on leadership and specialised training at the regional level. The use of the African Standby Force’ AMANI training and exercise cycle is intended to take care of the need to bring personnel from different countries together. The AMANI exercises bring military, police and civilian components from member states together in regular exercises leading up to operational capability by 2015. These exercises are taking place under the auspices of the EASF in Eastern Africa.

Research and policy support are highly significant and reinforcing elements of the overall strategic design of the TIP intervention. The team finds that research is a highly relevant undertaking, and in some cases it has had a noticeable effect on other programme areas and on policy development. However, the team notes that the research output is highly uneven both between and within partners and with discrepancy between planned research and implemented research activities.

The team concludes based on its findings that TIP’s research activities, while producing many relevant outputs, are largely derived from the interests of researchers and the priorities of individual TIP-partners with insufficient attention to programme needs and priorities. The limited attention to the programme needs is particularly evident in the work related to the police. Research on the civilian component has been more relevant to training and policy work.

The policy support from TIP’s African partners has historically mainly been in relation to Africa and the African Union with additional inputs related to the UN has been delivered primarily by NUPI. Support related to the civilian component has been systematic and long-term with some clear effects while policy support in relation to the police component have been far more ad hoc and limited. Policy support in relation to African regional organisations and member states are almost absent in TIP work. Partners sometimes pursue different approaches and policies in relation to target groups. This has weakened the effectiveness of the programme. On the other, the efforts by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to provide additional and direct support to the African Union and its Peace Support Operations Division in the evaluation period have increased the effectiveness in certain areas, primarily in strengthening the institutional capacity of the AU to deal with the civilian dimensions of peace support operations.

Box 7.1 Evaluation questions on research and policy support

1. How are research findings utilized?

2. To what extent are research findings used to improve the TIP training curricula, develop roster systems or change policies?

3. Is there a gender focus in the research?

4. What effect, if any, do the TIP programme activities have on the policy development of peace operations in the AU, UN and member states?
Research and policy support are important components in TfP. It is undertaken by most partners but with different priorities and emphasis. The bulk of the TfP-funded research is mainly provided by NUPI, KAIPTC and ISS, and to a lesser extent ACCORD. Policy support is an important component for all partners, although in the case of the Secretariat of the Eastern African Standby Force (EASFCOM) it is more a potential beneficiary and facilitator. The evaluation questions addressed in this chapter are reproduced in Box 7.1.

Research

The goals of the research as outlined in the TfP strategic framework are both ambitious and general. It shall

1. Be applicable to the TfP context and feed into the TfP policy development, doctrine teaching and training, internally and with UN, AU and others;
2. Cooperate with teaching expertise to develop methods to make TfP research applicable to TfP training, UN and African training efforts, and in policy advice; and
3. Strengthen critical thinking on TfP relevant peacekeeping and post conflict issues in Africa, to further the global and African peace keeping discourse.

The partners’ research activities are outlined in annual work plans and reported in annual reports. These documents, as well as interviews with partners indicate high levels of activity but also highly uneven outputs across the partners. Furthermore, as the reports illustrate only to some extent do partners develop cohesive TfP research agendas distinguishable from their other research. Its symptomatic of this that a large number of projects listed in TfP work plans fail to materialise in any reported written output, whereas annual reports often list outputs that had not been envisaged earlier. In a few cases, the team could locate ‘missing’ outputs even if they had not been reported. Finally, the team also notes that the extent of research cooperation between partners has been very limited.

The bulk of the TfP-funded research in the evaluation period is conducted by NUPI which spends most of its TfP-grant on this. Other partners, especially ISS, but also to some extent ACCORD and to a lesser degree KAIPTC, have significant research on TfP-related topics funded from other sources. Thematically, NUPI’s research has – as reported in work plans - broadly fallen into three areas: protection of civilians; civilian capacity and peacekeeping; and the nexus between peacebuilding and peacekeeping. Gender issues, or women, peace and security, was from 2013 developed as a separate stream or focus area. In 2013 monitoring and evaluation of peacekeeping and peacebuilding was identified as a new important area of work. Big data, social media and peacekeeping was listed as new areas of research in the annual plan and reports from 2013. It was renamed “new issues in peacekeeping” in the 2014 work plan.
In 2010 NUPI listed 10 reports and 14 briefs as expected outputs. Some did materialise that year, but most did not. However, at the end of the period – in 2013 – the list of publications is impressive indeed with one edited book, eight book chapters, eleven articles in peer reviewed journals and nine policy briefs being listed as outputs from eight NUPI staff members. However, many of these outputs were not the planned outputs according to the 2013 work plan, which mainly did not materialise that year.

ISS has seen a decreasing trend in publications during the period under review. Several outputs were listed in 2010, but since then only one of the research projects listed and funded by TfP have led to a publication. The one project with an output was the project assessing the emerging police rosters within the African Standby Forces which produced a report and a policy brief in 2013. The other research projects funded in 2011 and 2012 were not completed. Nor did they lead to any publication. Workshops and field visits have been undertaken but the persons in charge have since left ISS and any draft reports or data collected could not be traced when the team visited. ISS’ poor record on research for TfP is somewhat surprising considering the considerable research output from ISS on African peace and security issues, including the publication of a peer reviewed journal (*African Security Review*), a magazine for dissemination of research (*The African*.org with a distribution of 22 000 at its peak before it ceased publication in mid-2012), and a range of monographs, anthologies, and research reports published every year.

KAIPTC has maintained a small research output throughout the period, but also here there is a weak correlation between planned research and actual implementation and publications. 2010 saw the publication of a compendium on ECOWAS and several research papers in KAIPTC’s occasional papers series. For subsequent years, the reported publications whose existence the team was able to verify include four book chapters, three policy briefs and three peer reviewed articles, as well as one other article and one report. For most years the annual reports list a number of forthcoming publications which are not mentioned again in subsequent reports and which appear not to have been published after all. Thematically, the publications cover several topics broadly related to peacekeeping and peacebuilding issues in Africa.

ACCORD has less emphasis on research in its TfP-program with TfP-funding mostly being used for workshops linked to curriculum development and policy support. ACCORD’s contribution is therefore primarily discussed in the policy section below. TfP-funding in certain years has also been used to cover costs related to the publishing of special issues of the ACCORD magazine *Conflict Trends*. These special issues focus on TfP-relevant topics. Outside TfP ACCORD has a larger research programme. It also publishes the peer reviewed African Journal of Conflict Resolution and an Occasional Paper series in addition to *Conflict Trends*.
Table 7.1 lists the main TfP publications emerging from TfP-funded research from NUPI, ISS and KAIPTC in the evaluation period. Unpublished documents, internet blogs, seminar reports and articles appearing in non-peer reviewed journals are not included.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>NUPI</th>
<th>ISS</th>
<th>KAIPTC</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<tr>
<td>Peer reviewed articles</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>2</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Published reports and compendiums</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Policy briefs</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>91</td>
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</table>

Table 7.1 TfP research publications from NUPI, ISS and KAIPTC, 2010 – 2013

The discrepancies between plans and reports, the non-completion of many research projects and also the differences in how partners classify a TfP-publication indicate to the team that management of research within TfP is less satisfactory. Still, a number of important, high quality and relevant publications have emerged over the past few years. This includes work on the civilian component of peacekeeping from NUPI, on ECOWAS and peacekeeping from KAIPTC and on the police rosters from ISS.

However, the more important question for the team is to what extent the research has been able to respond to programme needs and priorities as outlined in the strategic framework. The TfP itself has partly responded negatively to this. The 2013 internal review of TfP-support to the police component concluded that the research on policing in peacekeeping is very limited within TfP. It concluded that

*There has been little research conducted by partners on the police dimension … The scope of the TfP police dimension in research is underdeveloped, although there are very recent indications that more studies relevant to the police role in [peace support operations] are underway by TfP partners. Within TfP there is also little visible or documented evidence of a link between research outputs and training or policy development on the police component of [peace support operations].*

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There are better linkages in the civilian component with clear evidence of research having underpinned both training and policy engagement by ACCORD.

On rosters there is some important work such as the ISS report on the state of the police rosters (this work was completed after the completion of the TIP police review.) Several studies have also been published in relation to civilian rosters and challenges in securing deployment of civilians.

Only NUPI has conducted and published research findings on gender with TIP-funding. The 2013 annual report lists three policy briefs on gender in peace operations: one for the UN Mission in the DR Congo and one for the AU Mission in Somalia and one on gender mainstreaming; a book chapter on gender-sensitive protection and the Responsibility to Prevent with lessons from Chad; and one journal article on gendered military operations in Afghanistan and DR Congo. KAIPTC launched a project on female police peacekeepers but so far this has not resulted in any reported outputs. ISS’ work on gender included research on the impact of police pre-deployment training in Namibia, but the project never led to any written output.

Research at KAIPTC has an added dimension. KAIPTC is a public training institution and not a research or policy advocacy institution. The TIP support to the research department, or the Faculty of Academic Affairs and Research, has been considered to be an important initiative in strengthening the department. The growth and expansion of the Faculty is often highlighted as important and crucial for the further development of KAIPTC’s training. KAIPTC’s strategic plan and the TIP-supported Joint Financing Agreement also emphasises the important role of research-led training. In addition to the TIP-funded research the Faculty also has research projects funded through three other programmes. The Faculty has, since 2010, been running a master’s programme, and is introducing a Ph.D. programme in 2014. The team notes that the link between research and training within KAIPTC is still underdeveloped, in particular in terms of assessing the impact of training, including police training, and using such assessments to improve it. The material and findings from the KAIPTC’s training evaluation and development cell (part of the training department) have not been used in the research. However, we do note from the KAIPTC TIP’s 2014 work plan that the research department now plans to do a tracer study of former trainees deployed in missions. This may also help stimulate research inputs to the police pre-deployment training.

Finally, the team looked at the extent of co-operation in research between the TIP partners. This appears to be very limited with hardly any co-authored publication (with authors from two or more TIP-partners) having appeared in the evaluation period. The exceptions are in mainly in some co-authored publications from staff of NUPI and ACCORD. Two major efforts have been

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made to stimulate co-operation in this area. The first dates back to 2008 when
the TfP partners with additional TfP-funding from the Embassy in Pretoria, and
following recommendations from the Advisory Board, decided to embark upon a
project to produce annually a joint research publication. The led to a 76-page
booklet on Peacekeeping in Africa. The Evolving Roles of the African Union and
Regional Mechanisms (sic) which after several delays was published in late
2010, although none of the TfP partners reported it as a research output in their
annual reports.78 No other publication appeared as a result of this initiative.

The booklet contains five main chapters, four of them authored by TfP partners.
The chapters address the structural relations between the UN, AU and the EU,
the implications of AU’s funding dependence, and some of the operational and
political challenges facing the African Standby Force. Overall, there is little in the
booklet to suggest original research, some of the chapters overlap and the
academic quality is highly uneven.

A new initiative came from the MFA in early 2013 following the recommendations
from the TfP police review. The MFA wanted to stimulate joint research and to
address the recommendations in the report calling for more relevant research. It
provided additional funds for the establishment of a TfP research network,
initially coordinated by NUPI. This led, following a decision at the 2013 TfP
annual meeting, to a workshop with all TfP-partners in Oslo in June 2013.79
Following subsequent communication between the TfP-partners and decisions
at a TfP meeting in Addis Ababa in November it was agreed that the partners
should embark on joint visits to three missions in Africa with a view to collect
data on the police component and training needs. The first visit coordinated by
NUPI went to Somalia in January 2014. KAIPTC will lead on the second visit to
Mali planned for May, and with ISS leading on Darfur in the second half of the
year. Coordination of the research network was shifted from NUPI to KAIPTC in
March 2014.

The establishment of a formal research network is important, but the lessons
from the previous effort from 2008 to 2011 suggest that it requires strong
leadership as well as commitment from the TfP-partners and TfP management.
Publication of a joint high-quality book or report in 2014, as originally envisaged,
is a very ambitious target.

78 Cf. the project completion letter from NUPI to the Embassy in Pretoria from 28 April 2011. The booklet was
edited by Benjamin de Carvalho (NUPI), Thomas Jaye (KAIPTC), Yvonne Kasumba (ACCORD) and Wafula
Okumu (ISS). However, the booklet itself is not reported in any of the TfP annual reports from 2010. Nor is it
(2013/2014) available from the TfP website or mentioned in the current TfP publication list. It is listed in the
NUPI publications list available on the NUPI website, but appears no longer (2014) to be available for
download.
79 See the report from the first meeting in Outline of Future Research Agenda Identified at Training for Peace
Research Network Meeting Oslo, 5 June 2013 (unpublished, 6 pages). The meeting was planned for two
days but the business was completed in one day.
Policy support
According to the strategic framework TfP policy support shall

1. Focus on supporting key beneficiaries and partners, including the UN, AU and RECs, through relevant entry points;
2. Be relevant, i.e. address policy gaps, be enabling, support current operations, future operations and African Standby Force capacity, and be informed, amongst others through close linkages with the training and research aspects of the Programme;
3. Strengthen coordination between TfP partners and external Norwegian resources to maximize the support to the UN, AU, RECs and countries; and
4. Draw on the TfP brand name and recognition, where possible and appropriate, with a view to strengthen TfP impact in publications and outreach.

The different TfP-partners play different roles in supporting these objectives. ACCORD and ISS are also advocacy organisations and have a profile of engaging, lobbying for and assisting policy developments. They also have much TfP-funded activities in this area. KAIPTC is a government-owned training institution and is more constrained in what it can do and not do in this area. KAIPTC’s core objectives revolve around providing operational relevant training and building capacity in the region for participation in peace support operations. AFDEM, until its role as TfP-partner came to an end in March 2014, was primarily seeking to provide technical assistance to the AU and select regional communities/mechanisms in development of rosters and implementation. EASFCOM, a supporting partner to TfP, is an administrative secretariat to a regional intergovernmental organisation and as such only provides technical assistance to policy development and implementation of decisions. It does not actively promote policy development within EASF – nor is it allowed to do so. EASFCOM is better understood as a potential beneficiary of TfP policy support.

The Norwegian partners of TfP also have distinct roles. NUPI is active in policy support indirectly through its research, but also through a number of activities in relation to especially the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the UN. The Police Directorate is defined as a supporting partner responding to requests for assistance, but is nonetheless playing an important role in lobbying for and providing support to policy development related to the role of police in peacekeeping operations. This is most clearly illustrated in its relation to the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but also in relation to EASFCOM where it has been quite active in promoting policy development, training priorities and more.

The annual work plans and reports reveal a range of activities and outputs both in relation to the AU and African organisations with ACCORD and ISS being the most active, and - primarily through NUPI - in relation to the UN and Norwegian foreign policy. Historically, there appears to be general consensus that TfP and TfP partners have made important and sometime crucial contributions in advancing policy debates in Africa and policy development of African institutions
in relation to peace support operations. In this assessment the team has only examined the policy support in relation to African institutions.

However, it is often difficult to trace the impact of policy support. A main reason for this is an absence of dedication by the TfP-funded researchers and policy advocates to more closely monitoring on the outcomes of their contributions to these processes. The team is confident that there have been some important and significant policy support interventions that have been facilitated through TfP. There is also a lot of fire-fighting work for busy civil servants in the hope that “helping” them with their work will build relations of trust and influence. There have also been many interventions - probably many more than the successful interventions - and avenues of support for which it is impossible to attribute any outcomes to the work of TfP partners. Failures of trial and error approaches, and inexperienced policy advocates/researchers have also most probably been features of the policy support.

Through its review of TfP documents and interviews with stakeholder and beneficiaries the team arrived at a number of findings.

First, and perhaps most importantly, TfP partners are well known among major beneficiaries such as the African Union’s Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD) – the technical body in charge of the African Standby Force as well ongoing AU-missions – and in several missions, police contributing countries and in regional organisations. TfP partners are often called upon to assist by providing professional and administrative assistance on a range of issues. This is a reflection of trust and confidence between TfP partners and beneficiaries which have been established over many years - both through and outside the TfP programme.

Secondly, we do note that much of the “policy support” activities funded through TfP revolve around organising and hosting workshops and seminars bringing stakeholders together, or participating in such events organised by others. In some cases, particularly in the case of ACCORD and its support to the civilian component in the AU PSOD, the team was informed that there are now annual meetings between them to identify areas where PSOD would like external support in the coming year. This often revolves around organising, hosting and in some cases paying for workshops of various kinds.

Thirdly, the team observes that policy support is mainly confined to the continental level and in particular to the AU PSOD. This is mainly through ACCORD in relation to African Standby Force as well as in relation to ongoing missions. ISS has been less systematic and then mainly in relation to ongoing missions and efforts to strengthen the role of police commissioners within the AU. TfP efforts to engage with regional organisations have almost disappeared. To the extent it takes place it is on a small and ad hoc basis. This applies both to

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ECOWAS and SADC. In the special case of EASF – where the Secretariat itself is a formal TfP “supporting partner” - there has been a TfP focus, especially through POD, but with limited progress due to political constraints imposed by EASF member states.

Fourthly, there are no real efforts to engage with national authorities in personnel contributing countries to the African Standby Force or on-going missions. ISS, ACCORD and KAIPTC are however established institutions in their home countries and are contributing to the debates there.

Fifthly, the team observes that there is limited co-operation between TfP partners. Cooperation between ACCORD and NUPI related to the civilian component are a main exception to this while cooperation related to the police component has been very minimal. The 2014 work plans from the ISS and POD indicate a wish for stronger commitment to cooperation in the police area. The absence of cooperation also has other manifestations. The team found that in relation to Southern Africa the two main TfP partners engaged – ISS and ACCORD – seem to have opted for different approaches. ACCORD is engaging – although on a more modest scale – with the civilian component in the SADC planning element. In addition it contributes with lectures and modules at a range of training courses delivered by SADC’s Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre. This would be in line with official SADC policies and approaches for regional preparations for the preparations for the operational capability of a standby force. ISS on the other hand is mainly engaging with the regional police organisation (SARPCCO) - despite the efforts and formal decision by SADC that SARPCCO shall deal with “traditional” police issues while the police component in the SADC planning element shall deal with policing in relation to peace support issues.81 The same divisions, but to a lesser extent, is evident in East Africa with ISS focusing on the Eastern African Regional Police Chiefs Coordinating Organisation (EAPCCO) and other TfP partners focusing on EASFCOM. These different approaches call for reflections and exchange of lessons learnt with a view to develop harmonised positions guiding the selection of appropriate interventions to reach defined outcomes. The team found no evidence of this.

A final important observation made by the team is the strong efforts by the Embassy in Addis Ababa and the MFA to follow-up on initiatives emerging from TfP activities. This began in the previous TfP phase and is evident (from 2009) with MFA funding for two positions in the civilian component in the AU Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD). This made it possible for the PSOD to act on the many inputs and recommendations put forward by TfP partners. Today, these two Norwegian-funded ad hoc positions have been replaced by a staff of six, funded by the AU’s regular budget (although with funding from the donor-funded pool – The Joint Financing Agreement for Salaries in the Peace and

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81 Germany is a major donor to regional cooperation in policing in Southern Africa and work both with SARPCCO (and relies also on technical assistance from ISS in this work) and with the SADC police component and RPTC. It seeks to facilitate better division of labour between SADC and SARPCCO in this area and find the work of TfP/ISS potentially disruptive.
Security Department – where Norway is a contributor with funding earmarked for civilian positions in PSOD). The two original positions and the persons occupying them were then moved with Norwegian funding to the ECOWAS civilian component in Abuja and the AU Special Representative for Somalia in Nairobi. This is part of a Rapid Secondment Mechanism making African civilian experts available to PSOD and regional organisations. It is fully funded by Norway and administered by NORCAP/the Norwegian Refugee Council. Norway is also funding a part-time advisor on the civilian component to the Head of the AU PSOD. In addition, MFA is also providing funding for short-term technical assistance to PSOD and provides financial support to the funding of the police and civilian components in on-going missions - such as the USD 1 million announced in January 2014 to the AU Mission in the Central African Republic.

Norway is also prepared to offer similar type of funding assistance for staffing in the police component.

What effect does the TIP policy support have? It is not possible to provide a clear answer to that. There is no doubt that TIP has had made a significant contribution to the policies and frameworks for the civilian component. Through ACCORD, TIP has been participating and contributing to evolving policies over a long time. A recent review of ACCORD also concluded that ACCORD’s policy support has been sustained over time, to the point and practical – with support ranging from staff secondment to facilitation to skills brokering – which is highly appreciated by stakeholders. On the other hand there are also some clear limitations. TIP may have contributed to the AU policies, and in particular to PSOD documents, but the ownership and commitment to the civilian component in the regional organisations, and especially in member states, may still be very limited. ACCORD’s engagement with the UN Mission in South Sudan and the provision of the in-mission and mission-specific training to its civil affairs officials should also be highlighted. This is also an example of making use of research findings to advance training. This partly builds on ACCORD’s work with the UN in the previous TIP-phase. This cooperation led to the publication of a training manual (UN Civil Affairs Handbook) which has become a main platform for delivering training to UN civil affairs officials.

The effectiveness of TIP’s policy contribution in the policing area is more uncertain. There have been far less systematic efforts to engage over time and in any systematic way. TIP partners and the ISS in particular, are clearly considered by stakeholders to be important players with technical skills and resources. Following the recommendations from the 2012-2013 TIP police review 2013 there has been efforts by ISS, and also by POD, to assist in the process of establishing an African Police Commissioners Forum as a way to strengthen the police component in PSOD. This approach may not yield any

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82 This funding is channeled through NUPI. The special advisor is Cedric de Coning, a key mover and shaker within TIP almost since the beginning. He is a special advisor to TIP in ACCORD and is head of peacebuilding department at NUPI.


84 The manual was officially approved as a UN guidance document in March 2012. See the UN DPKO/DFS Civil Affairs Handbook, New York: The United Nations 2012.
immediate result since the issue of establishing continental bodies in this area involves a range of other policing issues which may have to be dealt before the role of the police in peace support operations will be addressed.

Policy support in this sensitive area of policing can easily also lead to setbacks. One example is the case of the EASFCOM and efforts to strengthen the police component there. The EASFCOM has, in contrast to the other regional organisations, a large number of expatriate donor-funded staff members. The EASF Council of Minister’s appointed an Expert Group to look at internal management at the EASFCOM and its relations to the international partners/ donors seconding experts. This 2012 report expressed some criticism of the international experts and their efforts to pursue certain policies which they argued ran counter to the position of the EASF. This included the activities in relation to the police component.\(^ {85}\)

Much of the policy support in the current period also seems to revolve around administrative and technical assistance in implementation. This also raises a number of new issues and challenges for TIP to which the team shall return in the next chapter: impact and sustainability requires commitment over time; harmonisation of donor efforts is often crucial; and ownership by the beneficiaries is essential. Support to positions and activities of the Secretariat of regional organisations may be necessary, but it is not sufficient to ensure progress.

\(^{85}\) The team has not consulted the report from this EASF committee and rely on information provided in the July 2012 report from the Norwegian police commissioner/senior police advisor to EASFCOM to the TIP managers in Pretoria and Oslo (unpublished, 25 July 2012, ”TIP Rapport 2/2012. Oppfølging av foreløpig sluttrapport dateret 7 juni 2012”, REG 0101 RAF 08/032).
8. The Present and the Future: The Relevance of the Programme

*TfP* has made important contributions to the African peace and security agenda. Stakeholders and beneficiaries in Africa generally report confidence and trust in TfP partners. The TfP objectives are still relevant. African peace and security will still be important in Norwegian foreign policies and development aid. The evaluation team finds that TfP may still be a valid instrument to pursue these objectives beyond 2015, but this implies that TfP has to address a number of weaknesses identified in this evaluation. This includes being clear on its own purpose and structure as a programme, and its ability to strategically select priority outcomes and designing interventions to achieve them.

**Box 8.1 Evaluation question on relevance**

(1) What is the relevance of the programme’s current design, components and partners, in terms of achieving its main objectives?

Throughout its 18 years of existence TfP partners have made important contributions to the peace and security agenda in Africa, and it has informed Norwegian foreign policies in relation to peace interventions on the African continent. Is its current form and structure still suited to the priorities and policies of the evolving African peace and security architecture, the African Union, the sub-regional organisations and member states? Is TfP still a useful mechanism to pursue Norwegian foreign policy and development aid objectives?

The TfP objectives as outlined in the strategic framework are still valid, even if broadly defined. The TfP objectives are medium to long-term in scope. The challenges of securing peace, post-conflict reconstruction and development and building African capacities to do so remain important. The establishment of an operational capability of the African Standby Forces is not achieved anytime soon despite a rapid expansion of the capacity of individual troop contributing African countries to deploy in on-going missions. In particular, there is still a long way to go before the role of police and civilian components in peacekeeping (UN) or peace support operations (AU) is sufficiently understood in member states.

These issues are also likely to remain important priorities in Norwegian foreign policy and development aid. Under most scenarios the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs will continue to be engaged with peace and security issues in
Africa both through the UN and through African organisations and African countries.

Does this also imply that the TfP programme will remain a valid instrument to pursue these objectives beyond 2015? The findings in the previous chapters tell us that TfP has made important contributions in the evaluation period, but findings are also that TIP is less effective in pursuing its objectives. The fundamental challenge for TIP is the nature of the programme: is it a coherent programme where different partners are working together to achieve common objectives, or is it a facility to enable flexible funding to diverse partners to engage individually in a broadly defined common arena?

Historically, TfP has primarily and de facto been a vehicle to fund a range of activities implemented by the TfP-partners, but with the current fourth phase (2011-2015) more emphasis was placed on developing a strategic framework, on facilitating integration between partners and programme areas, promoting joint work plans and to shift towards reporting against results. TfP has recorded progress and achievements in building this programme, but the team finds that this has been less than expected. While there has been progress in developing shared strategic objectives, there has been less progress in translating these shared objectives into a programmatic approach of shared and mutually reinforcing strategic action.

There is limited cooperation between the partners in providing support for training of police officers, partners pursue different approaches and strategies in providing policy support, and there is no common or coherent approach on how to engage with the African Peace and Security Architecture and the African Standby Forces. In 2014 support to one TfP-partner was terminated because of poor performance and delivery.

These shortcomings of the TfP approach – the need to move away from an activity focus and look at purposes and outcomes before selecting interventions - is also well captured by TfP’s training for deployment of police officers. TfP has supported the training of nearly 1200 police officers through EASFCOM to facilitate the operational readiness of a regional standby force. In total nearly 2000 police have been trained to ensure that this force has a deployable pool of up to 720 officers. How many does TfP want to train before the goal is reached? And is it lack of training that is the bottleneck preventing the Eastern African Standby Force from becoming operational? And what implications does this have for selection of interventions?

Furthermore, in pre-deployment training for on-going missions we expect that there are great variations in the deployment rate between different training models delivered by TfP. The dangers of an activity-focused approach are also well captured by the 2014 work plans from the TfP providers of police training (ISS, KAIPTC and POD). They all want to do pre-deployment training in Malawi in 2014, but none of the plans raised the question of how many trainees Malawi
needs. Malawi have on average deployed 30-40 officers per year in the evaluation period (although only three so far in 2014). And what does it take to ensure that Malawi at some stage can be able to train its own officers without having to rely on TfP support?

The challenges facing TfP may also be bigger today than at the start of the period under evaluation. This is due to an evolving and changing African context. In the past one major strength of the TfP and its partners was its ability to provide innovative ideas and pilot new approaches in the African debate on peace support interventions. Today, the focus and priorities have to respond to a more complex environment with more emphasis on implementation. At the same time there are many donor agencies and externally-funded programmes pursuing objectives similar to TfP. This implies that much more emphasis has to be spent on building capacity for implementation, on promoting sustainability of its interventions and to ensure that its activities are broadly harmonized with support for similar objectives pursued by others. Furthermore, like other donor-supported programmes, TfP becomes challenged to remain relevant in demonstrating capacity to monitor and report upon outcomes of focussed interventions and support.

Throughout its existence the TfP and its partners have developed strengths which provide a strong platform for the future. One is close ties with a number of African stakeholders in regional organisations. TfP is a trusted partner by many policy makers and senior officials. The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs also provides additional funding to the African Union to ensure that TfP-interventions can be implemented and sustained. The shift of management responsibilities from the Embassy in Pretoria to the Embassy in Addis Ababa has also enabled better harmonisation between TfP policy engagement and direct Norwegian engagement with the AU.

TfP partners have also displayed the ability to adapt to changing environments and needs. Some partners have developed capacity to provide swift and flexible responses to new developments and opportunities for engagement. TfP has been willing to take risks. These are important and crucial assets for any programme engaging in a volatile and fluid environment such as peace operations in Africa.

TfP must be able to build on its strengths in order to develop a strategy to increase its future relevance. We will return to options and recommendations in the next chapter.
9. Conclusions and Recommendations

This chapter draws conclusions building on findings in preceding chapters. The structure is built around three overarching and crosscutting themes: strategic framework and management; programmes and implementation; and results and impact. This is followed by specific recommendations in the second part of the chapter.

Conclusions

Strategic framework and management: Shared objectives but insufficient programme coherence and strategy

TfP is a complex programme implemented in a volatile and often rapidly changing context. TfP is considered by many stakeholders as a highly relevant and important initiative, but implementation of activities and projects has suffered from insufficient coherence and scattered activities. TfP is an initiative without a clearly defined and articulated programme theory or theory of change. Efforts were made by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 2010 to help ensure that TfP in the current 2011-2015 programme phase had a strategic framework with objectives, work plans and reporting mechanisms. This was intended to enable the programme to focus better on achieving results, and to provide a basis for TfP to critically reflect on the chosen interventions in realizing outcomes.

Some progress has been recorded with the introduction of the new strategic framework. TfP partners do share a broad overlapping area of interest and common focus – and more so today than earlier. Interaction between leadership and programme staff of TfP partners has also helped develop knowledge which partners can and do act upon. However, there is limited engagement by TfP partners to develop and implement a shared strategy with individual partners responding more to the needs of their individual organisations than to the needs of the programme. This is in particular evident in an insufficient translation of shared objectives into a programmatic approach of shared and mutually reinforcing strategic action. This has reduced the efficiency of TfP.

The shift of the management responsibility from the Embassy in Pretoria to the Embassy in Addis Ababa has facilitated a better link between TfP policy engagement with the AU and Norwegian support to the AU and implementation of AU policies in this area.
Programmes: High activity and dedication

TfP partners maintain a high level of activities to pursue the common focus of strengthening African capacities to manage and implement peace support operations. The activities are implemented with much dedication and with capacity to respond to changing needs and evolving contexts. Stakeholders and beneficiaries generally report confidence and trust in TfP partners. These are important assets for any programme operating in a complex and often unpredictable environment.

The implementation of the TfP programmes has been activity focused with limited attention to outcomes and reflections on the effectiveness of different interventions. This is evident both in training, research and policy engagement. This has led to inefficiencies and reduced the effectiveness of several interventions. TfP support to one of the partners was terminated in 2014 because of its weak performance.

Results and impact: Moving from activities to outcomes

This evaluation has assessed achievements and results of different TfP funded interventions, and we measured the impact of the main TfP programme – support for training of African peacekeepers. The team found that such training has important and positive impacts on police officers in missions compared to those who do not have such training. However, we do not know how many of the TfP supported trainees were deployed and it is in deployment that the main impacts of training are experienced. The team also noted that although TfP partners are conscious of costs there are great variations in costs between the different types of courses funded, and between different TfP partners.

The impressive training activities also capture TfP’s main weaknesses: insufficient attention to what works. Which interventions are leading to more outcomes and increases impact? Which type of pre-deployment training is more likely to increase deployment rate and lead to more competent peacekeepers? How can training-of-trainers courses be used to build the capacity of police contributing countries?

The broad scope of the current TfP strategic framework has enabled the justification of multiple training and other initiatives by individual partners, sometimes with co-contributions from other partners. The broad strategy focus, combined with an incapacity for asserting a programmatic management focus, results in medium to long-term strategic outcomes not being consistently pursued, expanded upon, or picked up by other TfP partners. The work-plans and focus of TfP partners can change on an annual basis. These annually chosen activities may still cohere with the overall strategic framework, but they are not necessarily enhancing or reinforcing programmatically strategic efforts from the year before.
Recommendations

This evaluation has come up with numerous findings. This could potentially lead to a plethora of recommendations that respond to each of the detailed elements in the analysis in the preceding chapters. However, we have opted to present only our main recommendations. They are listed under two main headings: Strategic direction, and programme interventions.

1. Strategic direction:

The objectives of TIP are still valid and Norwegian foreign policy is expected to continue to engage with the UN, AU and African institutions on peace and security. In deciding upon a future role for a Training for Peace programme the Ministry of Foreign Affairs must decide whether TIP should continue as a programme, or whether the programme approach should be abandoned and let support for all or some of the current TIP partners continue on a case-by-case base alongside other Norwegian support in this area. One of the added values of having a programme as opposed to case by case support is the ‘brand identity’ that TIP as a whole might generate, and the possibilities for collaboration between partners. If the programme is to continue, the team advises that this would be justifiable only if efforts are made to harness strategic direction.

1.1 A future TIP programme must be based on a strategy with defined outcomes. Any future TIP programme should define much more sharply the effects it wants to achieve and not just identify its current activities. This should involve considering using a Theory of Change approach. Such an approach will enable TIP to much more clearly differentiate between those factors under TIP’s direct control and for which they can be held accountable (the inputs and outputs) and identifiable links and rationales with which to achieve the wider effects they are pursuing (outcomes and impact). If adopted, this approach should inform the choice and design of performance indicators too. This in turn will help make monitoring and reporting on interventions possible and will enable TIP to get a better understanding of the relative contributions different tactics and interventions may make in promoting the desired outcomes.

1.2 Strong management is required. A future programme also needs to be managed to ensure work plans are implemented, interventions pursued and reported upon and that there are mechanisms in place to monitor and learn from the implementation of programmes. There are different pathways to achieve this. This may involve the MFA spending more resources on this through additional programme staff or use of external consultants to assist managers. It can also involve some or all TIP-partners establishing a strong consortium to implement a future programme. This will have to follow strategic discussions and processes.
1.3 Redefine the role of supporting partners. The Norwegian Police Directorate (POD) and the Secretariat of the Eastern African Standby Force (EASFCOM) are defined as supporting partners in TfP. POD is legally – as contract partner for funds to be spent in Africa - and through its role in shaping the direction of TfP-activities de facto a full member and should be defined as such. EASFCOM is not for any practical purpose a supporting partner; it is a beneficiary of support and recipient of funds – much like the AU and other public agencies – and it has never participated in TfP partner meetings other than through the Norwegian police officer seconded through TfP.

2. Programme interventions:
TfP supported interventions are now covering too many issues with too little focus on what it wants to achieve. The main recommended changes emerging from the report are:

2.1 Training must have clearly defined outcomes. TfP supports a range of different training course delivered through different types. TfP needs to decide as a programme and based on identification of what works well in achieving outcomes where it wants to concentrate its resources. This may be on pre-deployment training through types of courses that will lead to a high deployment rate or it may be on in-mission training based on ability to achieve outcomes. TfP also needs to reflect on whether provision of pre-deployment training courses for a future standby force is the best way of assisting efforts to establish regional standby forces. It is also crucial that TfP where relevant builds sustainability into its training programmes and help ensure – where relevant - that African training institutions will be able to deliver this training themselves. It if decides to focus on in-mission training, such as with the planned focus on training of mid-managers, is also needs to carefully assess needs and what it takes to ensure that sustainability can be achieved.

2.2 Research must respond to programme needs. TfP partners are producing many relevant and important publications, but the research is based on priorities and interests of individual researchers and institutions and too little on the needs of TfP. Research projects needs to be implemented by more than one partner – and not primarily by the Norwegian partner.

2.3 Policy support: identify interventions in relations to member states, on-going missions and the stand by force. The policy interventions need to have a much sharper focus, and decide on what to do in relation to what they want to achieve. Support for on-going missions may focus on select member countries or in-mission support with training being a central component. Support to the standby force may have to focus more on regional organisations and/or select member states and put less emphasis on the training dimension.
2.4 Harmonise with other external support. The TfP emphasis on training and support to the implementation of the African Peace and Security Architecture requires more attention to how TfP interventions can be harmonized with support from other donor programmes to make it more sustainable and increase effectiveness. This applies in particular to support provided to regional organisations and member states.
Annexes
Annex 1 Terms of Reference (ToR)

1. **Introduction**

The United Nations has a unique mandate to maintain international peace and security, and peacekeeping has become a central tool for the UN since the end of the cold war to address conflict situations. In 2011 it was reported that about 125,000 military, police, and civilian staff were deployed in 15 peacekeeping operations and 12 special political missions around the globe.¹ The missions have evolved at a rapid pace over the last decade, and the civilian capacity for these missions has become increasingly specialized. This has posed challenges in terms of the existing human resources system available within the UN.²

About three-quarters of UN peacekeeping personnel and budgets are deployed on the African continent and African states are increasingly expected to contribute to peace and security in Africa, both through substantive contributions to UN missions, and through the establishment of the African Union and its engagement in peace and security issues.³ This includes training and the preparation of rosters of civilian and military capacities.

The Training for Peace (TfP) programme was initiated in 1995 by the Norwegian government with funding from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). The overall goal of the programme, having evolved over the years, is to support the building of sustainable African capacity for peace operations in the UN, the African Union and the African Regional Economic Communities and regional mechanisms.⁴ With its focus on training, rosters, policy development and applied research, the TfP programme has aimed at placing the civilian and multidimensional aspects of peacekeeping on the agenda, including issues related to the protection of civilians and women, peace and security.

It is estimated that over 9000 civilians and police have been exposed in some manner to the programme since its inception to date.⁵ In addition, military officers and other civil servants have participated in TfP activities. Training activities, curricula, and target groups have developed during the course of the programme to reflect changes in the political and security landscape.

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² Ibid.
³ The African Union consist of 54 African states. The AU was established in 2001 in Addis Ababa and launched in 2002 in South Africa to replace the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). The AU’s first military intervention in a member state was the May 2003 deployment of a peacekeeping force of soldiers from South Africa, Ethiopia, and Mozambique to Burundi. AU troops were also deployed in Sudan for peacekeeping in the Darfur conflict, before the United Nations took over in 2008.
⁵ http://www.trainingforpeace.org/Training/Training-Courses.
2. The TfP programme\textsuperscript{6}: 2011 - 2015

In the current phase of the programme (Phase 4, 2011-2015), the programme aims to achieve the following outcomes according to its strategic framework\textsuperscript{7}:

- African peacekeeping and peace building personnel receive relevant and high quality training,
- well-functioning recruitment and roster systems are established for peace operations in Africa,\textsuperscript{8}
- relevant policy frameworks are utilized by UN, AU and the African Regional Economic Communities and regional mechanisms, and
- relevant and high quality research is carried out.

TfP support includes training and recruitment assistance, applied research, policy advice and normative work. TfP is also referred to as a platform for dialogue on important peace and security issues pertaining to the AU.

2.1 Previous reviews and evaluations

TfP was subject to an evaluation in 2000\textsuperscript{9} and reviews in 2004\textsuperscript{10} and 2010\textsuperscript{11}. Most recently, a review of the police component was completed.\textsuperscript{12} Findings presented in the above mentioned reviews of the programme have drawn attention to the limited systematic measuring and reporting of training outcomes, effects, impacts and indicators of progress. Recent efforts to address this have been made with assistance from Norad’s Section for results management,\textsuperscript{13} the result of which is reflected in the current TfP strategic framework.

2.2 The rationale for the evaluation

The TfP programme is complex and evolving and will have received approximately 280 Million Norwegian kroner over twenty years by the end of the current phase (2015), justifying an assessment of its impact.

3. Purpose, objectives and intended use of the evaluation

3.1 Purpose and intended use

The purpose of the evaluation is to provide information about the relevance and effects of the Training for Peace programme, with a view to inform decisions about the future of the programme and inform the international community involved in peace operations.
3.2 Objectives of the evaluation:

To achieve the purpose, the evaluation has six objectives:

1. Provide an updated contextual and institutional analysis of the peace and security architecture in Africa.
2. Identify and map the programme logic and its underlying assumptions.
3. Assess the impact of the programme’s training component.
4. Assess the cost effectiveness of the programme’s training component.
5. Assess the contributions of the programme’s research, policy advice, and roster components to planned outcomes stated in the strategic framework.
6. Analyse the programme’s relevance.

Based on the findings, the evaluation shall give recommendations.

4. Scope of work

The evaluation will focus on the time period 2010-2015. Older data can be collected when relevant.

The evaluation will assess both process aspects and effects of the TfP programme. The study shall include training of civilians and police for peace operations. Training of military personnel is not included.

5. Evaluation questions

The evaluation questions are grouped according to the order of the objectives.

5.1 Contextual analysis for the TfP programme

– How does the political and security context in Africa look like? Have there been important shifts in the discourse? What are the current and evolving peace and security challenges in Africa, and how will this impact on the work by different stakeholders?

– What is the current status of multidimensional peacekeeping, including developments in police, military and civilian capacities?

– How does the security architecture including the AU, UN and regional organizations (SADC and ECOWAS) look like? What are the mandates, roles, interests, incentives and capacities of different actors in developing the African security architecture for peace operations in Africa?
5.2 Mapping of TfP’s strategic framework

- What is the programme theory and its underlying assumptions?
- How are the different programme components intended to contribute to developing sustainable African security architecture and how are they interlinked?
- What are the main programmatic developments and shifts since the programme’s inception, and what factors have driven them?

5.3 Assessment of the impacts of TfP training

- How have training courses affected the trainees’ performance, attitudes and expectations in peace operations (analysed with a comparison group)?
- What are the views of organizations and missions that receive the TfP trainees of their qualifications, skills, attitudes, behaviour and performance (analysed with a comparison group)?
- How do former trainees perceive the quality and relevance of the TfP training?
- To what extent does deployment experiences influence on attitudes and activities of the trainees?
- What is the relative effectiveness of different types of training?
- To what extent is the programme on track to achieve the target number and gender balance of trainees?¹⁵

5.4 Assessment of the cost effectiveness of the TfP training

- How have the chosen training courses affected the trainees’ performance, attitudes and expectations in performing their civilian or police duties when returning home?
- Are there other ways of conducting training where evidence of more significant results have been documented?
- Can resources spent on training be justified in terms of results achieved (are they in line with what can be expected)?

¹⁴ Information about the content of the training can be found on http://www.nupi.no/Virksomheter/Forskning-sprogram/Training-for-Peace-in-Africa
¹⁵ According to the TfP Strategic framework 2011-2015 (fourth phase) this includes (500 civilians and 500 police by 2015, 40 % female, UN SCR mainstreamed in all training activities).
5.5 Assessment of contributions of research, support to rostersystems and policy development to stated TfP outcomes

Research activities

1. How are research findings utilized?
2. To what extent are research findings used to improve the TfP training curricula, develop roster systems or change policies?
3. Is there a gender focus in the research?

Roster systems

4. How relevant are the existing roster systems supported by TfP to the current deployment needs in African peace operations?
5. What mechanisms are in place to follow up trainees on the rosters?
6. To what extent has the programme contributed to the development of rosters in terms of gender balance, deployment, employment, and trained and qualified personnel?

Policy development

– What effect, if any, do the TfP programme activities have on the policy development of peace operations in the AU, UN and member states?

5.6 Assessing relevance of the TfP programme

– What is the relevance of the programme’s current design, components and partners, in terms of achieving its main objectives?

6. Methods and Data collection

Methods

The mapping of context could review extant literature.

The programme theory which serves as the basis for TfP should be explained or developed if not evident in programme documents.

To evaluate the effects of the TfP training, a tracer study and a reverse tracer study is envisaged, including an evaluation design that allow for attribution of impacts.
Tracing trainees
A tracer study should follow a group of individuals trained by TFP. The group should be followed from training course admission to deployment and post-deployment. The study shall include a baseline survey which will sample both non-TFP trainees and trainees who are scheduled to take part in select TFP courses in 2013. A reverse study is here defined as a study of trainees that have already been through training (it aims at identifying results earlier). Trainees can be traced when they are in the midst of or after having completed peace operation deployment, seeking to establish attribution of the effect of training on their attitudes, skills, and performance, taking context into account. The two types of tracer studies are intended to supplement each other.

Attributing impact of training
A plan for assessing attribution of impacts could include a comparison group as a counterfactual. The team should consider whether the method for selecting candidates for TFP courses can be used to construct a control group, or be utilized in other ways to assess impact using quasi-experimental methods. The evaluation should identify ways to compare between groups. The duration of training shall be taken into account when selecting indicators to be measured and when making comparisons across groups. Sample size calculations must take into account the challenges associated with tracing eligible participants and attrition at follow-up. The sample shall if possible be representative of the chosen training type.

Cost-effectiveness analysis
The cost-effectiveness analysis should measure the primary outcomes of the training intervention (attitudes, skills, improved performance of assigned duties) and relate these to intervention costs and the costs of alternative measures. Training inputs (including costs) and outputs should be collected from the partner institutions.

Assessment of contributions to policy development
Assessment of contributions to policy development can be done by conducting 2-3 case studies where intended inputs to policy developments can be identified, and their influence on policy decisions be traced. These findings could subsequently be compared with the results of tracing backwards from chosen

16 The ultimate objective of a tracer study is similar to that of other impact assessments: “to systematically analyse the lasting or significant changes – positive or negative, intended or not – in people’s lives brought about by a given action or series of actions.” A tracer study is concerned primarily with the changes at the level of the former beneficiaries’ lives. It seeks to document changes but also to determine the extent to which the intervention contributed to the changes. The actual task of tracing the former beneficiaries may be complicated since information on their whereabouts may be dated or incomplete. With tracer studies, a large part of the effort is spent tracing the interviewee. For more see http://www.ioc.org/specinfo/product/viewProduct.do?productId=19155, pp. 1-6 (for how to assess impact with counterfactual, additional literature sources should be consulted).
17 Key indicators to be measured in the survey may include year and duration of TFP training, perceptions of quality, relevance and impact of TFP training, knowledge on key aspects of peace operations addressed in training, post-training support, nature and history of deployments, attitudes, perceived reasons for non-deployment (if relevant), and additional specialized training undertaken since TFP.
18 The sample may be drawn from lists of trainees and graduates obtained from TFP partners or via other sources, and the AFDEM database.
19 Non-trainees and non-graduates may be identified and sampled from key peace support operations in Africa.
policy decisions to the evidence behind the decisions. The team could relate this component to the extant literature on factors affecting policy development.

**Relevance**

The assessment of relevance should be based on i. a. 1) findings from contextual analysis for the programme, 2) mapping and analysis of the TFP’s program theory; inter linkages and underlying assumptions, and 3) the contributions and effects of the various programme components.

**Data collection**

The evaluation may include but not necessarily be limited to data collection through:

- visits to partners, implementing institutions and countries of the trainees
- field visits to two peace building operations in Africa with TIP trained personnel
- visits to AU and UN headquarters in Addis Ababa and New York
- visits to other regional bodies
- collection of data on participants in training before and after deployment
- observation and participation in training courses
- interviews
- policy and discourse analysis
- focus group discussions with groups internal and external to the programme
- key documents (meeting records, programme documents, reports)
- statistical information from the UN, AU or relevant countries.
- collection of data from the monitoring and evaluation systems and performance measuring systems of the AU and UN missions, and
- other activities deemed necessary to answer the evaluation questions

The consultants are responsible for data collection and for obtaining the necessary permits. Data collected shall be made available to the Evaluation Department upon request.

The rights, dignity and welfare of participants in the evaluation shall be protected. Anonymity and confidentiality of individual informants shall be protected.

The evaluation shall be undertaken with integrity and honesty and ensure inclusiveness of views.

Where the team does not find sufficient information to make meaningful assessments, the team shall list the sources sought and not found or describe the type of information sources they would have required to carry out such an assessment.

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21 The selection of the peacekeeping operations will be determined in consultation with TFP partners during the inception phase.

22 To maximize the efficiency of data collection, the team can consider consulting with TFP partners and relevant stakeholders to develop a detailed time plan to be presented in the inception report.
7. **Organization and Evaluation team**

The evaluation will be managed by the Evaluation Department, Norad (EVAL). The team leader shall report to EVAL on the team’s progress, including any problems that may jeopardize the assignment.

The MFA and the TfP programme partners are main stakeholders in the evaluation and will be asked to comment on the draft inception report, intermediate report, draft final report and final report.

The team should consult widely with stakeholders pertinent to the assignment.

The evaluation team shall take note of comments received from stakeholders. Where there are significantly diverging views between the evaluation team and stakeholders, this should be reflected in the report.

8. **Budget and deliverables**

The tenderer will provide a total budget in Norwegian Kroner, specifying fees, all field visit and other travel costs – including costs for attending a contract meeting in Oslo and a presentation of the final evaluation report in Oslo - and other expenses. A maximum budget of 2.76 million NOK is anticipated.

The evaluation includes the following outputs:

1. A draft and final inception report
2. A mid-way report describing work progress, challenges, and any revisions to the work plan
3. A draft final evaluation report with main findings, conclusions and recommendations. An executive summary shall be included
4. A final evaluation report
5. A separate summary of two pages prepared for a wider audience
6. Presentation of the evaluation in a seminar in Oslo.

A dissemination seminar in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, may be organised. Travel costs and fees for this will be covered separately and shall not be included in the tender budget.

All presentations and reports shall be prepared in accordance with EVAL’s guidelines given in Annex A-3 Guidelines for Reports of this documented and submitted in electronic form in accordance with the time-schedule specified under Section 2 Administrative Conditions in Part 1 Tender specification of this document. EVAL retains the sole rights with respect to distribution, dissemination and publication of deliverables.
Annex I: Background information on the Training for Peace Programme

Management and funding

The TfP Programme is based on a North-South-South network of institutions in South Africa, Ghana, Zimbabwe and Norway.

TfP's primary focus is on Southern, Western and Eastern African regions and countries, although some engagement will take place in North and Central Africa in the current phase of the programme.

The programme is funded and managed by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Oslo), with support provided by relevant foreign missions. During the programme period 1995-2010, approximately 140 million Norwegian kroner were allocated to the TfP programme.

For this current phase (2011-2015), 28 million Norwegian kroner are scheduled to be allocated annually, amounting to 140 million Norwegian kroner for the entire period.

The programme's activities are overseen by an International Advisory Board, which meets annually. There are also annual meetings with the implementing and partner institutions who report to the MFA.

Partners in the TfP programme

The TfP partners have the following roles in the programme:

Institute for Security Studies (ISS) is an applied policy based research institute, based in South Africa, focusing in the TfP on the police dimension of peace operations through capacity building and pre-deployment training.

The African Center for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) is a South African based civil society organization specializing in the field of conflict prevention, resolution and management on the African continent. The TfP programme at ACCORD works in the field of peacekeeping capacity-building, with a focus on the civilian dimension of peace operations through the provision of training, research and policy support to the REC, UN and the AU.

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23 The responsibility is located in the Section for Security Policy and North America, in the Department for Security Policy and Northern Areas in the MFA. The day to day management is currently at the Norwegian Embassy in Pretoria, but will be transferred to the Norwegian Embassy in Addis Ababa in 2013.

24 Over a twenty year period 280 million Norwegian kroner has been allocated to the programme. (Funding data is extracted from the Norad Statistical Database and the Annual progress report 2011 cited in footnote 5).

25 The board provides advice to the MFA and partners on strategic developments and key issues related to the programme. The Board is comprised by representatives from academia and individuals with experience from international organizations such as the UN, and the AU. Partners in the TfP participate in the annual board meetings (Consolidated Annual Progress Report 2011 for the Training for Peace Programme (TfP), p. 28).
The African Civilian Response Capacity for Peace Support Operations (AFDEM) based in Zimbabwe, is a roster service with the overall goal of providing effective civilian response capacity in support of peace operations in Africa. It became a partner in the TfP programme in 2010 to provide a link between training, roster and deployment. It is the intention that all trainees qualified through TfP training are included in the AFDEM roster together with trainees from other training institution courses.

The Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) is based in Ghana. Within the TfP programme, the KAIPTC focuses on delivering capacity building support, this includes, amongst other things, training to African civilian and police personnel, applied research on critical African peace and security issues, and policy support to the AU, ECOWAS and national governments.

The Norwegian institute of International Affairs (NUPI) is a research institute focusing on international political and economic issues of relevance to Norwegian foreign policy. In the TfP programme it focuses on the needs of the UN and the African peacekeeping community, assessing trends and directions affecting peacekeeping in the African context. Current research focuses, amongst other, on the peacekeeping – peace building nexus, civilian capacity, local peace building and protection of civilians (but also social media data 27, and evaluation and monitoring of peace operations).28

The Norwegian National Police Directorate – International Section (POD) is responsible for training and deployment of Norwegian police officers in international peace operations. In TfP, POD supports the programme’s police activities, through specialist advice and specially educated training capacity to the TfP partners.

Supporting Partners
The TfP programme collaborates with the Eastern Africa Standby Force Coordination Mechanism (EASFCOM), part of the African Standby Force (ASF), which is under the command of the African Union. Under the TfP programme, EASFCOM receives advice and support through a seconded senior police advisor from the Norwegian National Police Directorate.

The UN Civilian Capacity Team at the Executive Office of the Secretary-General, and the Peacekeeping Best Practices Services at the Department of Peacekeeping Operations in the UN are important dialogue partners in the programme.

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26 Considered one of the pillars of the African Economic Community, the organization was founded in 1975 with a mission to promote economic integration in all fields of economic activity for its member states by creating a single large trading bloc through an economic and trading union. It also serves as a peacekeeping force in the region (http://www.ecowas.int/).

27 These data can be cross-correlated with the frequency of registered violent incidents as well as more traditional statistical indicators such as coverage of mobile phone users, mortality rates, and GDP per capita (The Economist 2010).

28 In the first years after its establishment, the TfP programme was run by the “UN Programme” at NUPI (Source: The project “training for Peace in South Africa”. Evaluation Report 3/2000, The Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, September 2000).
At the African Union, a core dialogue partner has been the Peace Operations
Support Division.

These supporting partners are not recipients of TfP funding, nor are they official
TfP programme partners, however they play a substantial role in the TfP
programme as dialogue partners and as recipients of policy advice.

Example of activities under the TfP programme

An example of activities of the TfP programme, are included below:

- Policy development activities includes support to the AU in adapting the
  protection of civilians concept - developed by the UN - to the African context,
  and in accelerating the development of the police component in the AU.

- Research findings are used to update training curricula and inform policy
development. The research conducted as part of the programme focuses on
themes such as the deficit of civilian capacity, protection of civilians,
strengthening the police component in the African security architecture and
the peacekeeping-peace building nexus, among other current issues.²⁹

- Example of training courses are: UNAMID Police Pre-deployment Course,
Conflict Prevention Course for Civilians, introductory course to peacekeeping
and peace building, courses for police in HIV and AIDS, gender awareness
and policing violence against women and children, training of trainers. The
training component included in 2011 a validation of UN training modules of
civilian protection. ³⁰

²⁹ Training for Peace in Africa. Consolidated Annual Progress Report 2011 for the Training for Peace
Programme (TfP).
³⁰ For example training for police ranged from being courses in sexual and gender based violence, to driving
lessons for female police officers (FOD has supported the latter in Ghana, Kenya and in 2013 also in Malawi).
EVALUATION REPORTS

1.00 Evaluation: Mid-Term Evaluation of the Joint Donor Team in Juba, Sudan
2.09 Study Report: A synthesis of Evaluations of Environment Assistance by Multilateral Organisations
3.09 Study Report: Evaluation of Norwegian Business-related Assistance Sri Lanka Case Study
3.09 Study Report: Evaluation of Norwegian Business-related Assistance South Asia Case Study
4.09 Study Report: Norwegian Environmental Action Plan
6.09 Evaluation: Evaluation of the Humanitarian Mine Action Activities of Norwegian People’s Aid
7.09 Evaluation: Evaluation of the Norwegian Programme for Development, Research and Education (NUFU) and of Norad’s Programme for Master Studies (NOMA)
8.09 Study: Evaluation of Norwegian Development Cooperation with the Western Balkans
9.09 Evaluation: Evaluation of Transparency International
10.09 Study: Evaluability Study of Partnership Civil Society Organisations
10.10 Evaluation: Democracy Support through the United Nations
11.10 Evaluation: Evaluation of the International Organization for Migration and its Efforts to Combat Human Trafficking
12.10 Study: Real-Time Evaluation of Norway’s International Climate and Forest Initiative (NICFI)
18.10 Evaluation: Real-Time Evaluation of Norway’s International Climate and Forest Initiative
19.11 Evaluation: Results of Development Cooperation through Norwegian NGO’s in East Africa
21.11 Evaluation: Evaluation of Research on Norwegian Development Assistance
3.11 Evaluation: Evaluation of the Strategy for Norway’s Culture and Arts Cooperation with Countries in the South
4.11 Study: Contextual Choices in Fighting Corruption: Lessons Learned
6.11 Joint Evaluation of Support to Anti-Corruption Efforts, 2002-2009
7.11 Evaluation: Evaluation of Norwegian Development Cooperation to Promote Human Rights
8.11 Norway’s Trade Related Assistance through Multilateral Organisations: A Synthesis Study
9.11 Activity-Based Financial Flows in UN System: A study of Select UN Organisations Volume 1 Synthesis Volume 2 Case Studies
10.11 Evaluation of Norwegian Business-related Assistance
12.11 Mainstreaming disability in the new development paradigm.
13.11 Evaluation of Norwegian support to promote the rights of persons with disabilities
21.12 Hunting for Per Diem. The uses and Abuses of Travel Compensation in Three Developing Countries
3.12 Evaluation of Norwegian Development Cooperation with Afghanist an 2001-2011
4.12 Evaluation of the Health Results Innovation Trust Fund
5.12 Real-Time Evaluation of Norway’s International Climate and Forest Initiative. Lessons Learned from Support to Civil Society
6.12 Facing the Resource Curse: Norway’s Oil for Development Program
7.12 A Study of Monitoring and Evaluation in Six Norwegian Civil Society Organisations
8.12 Use of Evaluations in the Norwegian Development Cooperation System
9.12 Evaluation of Norwegian Development Cooperation through the Human Rights
10.12 Local Perceptions, Participation and Accountability in Malawi’s Health Sector
11.13 Evaluation of the Norwegian India Partnership Initiative
12.13 Evaluation of Five Humanitarian Programmes of the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) and of the Standby Roster NORCAP
13.13 Study: Analysis of Norwegian’s International Climate and Forest Initiative Contribution to Measurement, Reporting and Verification
14.13 Can We Demonstrate the Difference that Norwegian Aid Makes? Evaluation of results measurement and how this can be improved
15.13 Unintended Effects in Evaluations of Norwegian Aid
16.13 Real-Time Evaluation of Norway’s International Climate and Forest Initiative

1.00 Evaluation: Taken for Granted? An Evaluation of Norway’s Special Grant for the Environment
1.01 Evaluation of the Norwegian Human Rights Fund
2.01 Economic Impacts on the Least Developed Countries of the Elimination of Import Tariffs on their Products
3.01 Evaluation of the Public Support to the Norwegian NGOs Working in Nicaragua 1994–1999
3A.01 Evaluation del Apoyo Publico a las ONGs Noruegues que Trabajan en Nicaragua 1994–1999
4.01 The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank Cooperation on Poverty Reduction
5.01 Evaluation of Development Co-operation between Bangladesh and Norway, 1995–2000
6.01 Can democratisation prevent conflicts? Lessons from sub-Saharan Africa
7.01 Reconciliation Among Young People in the Balkans An Evaluation of the Post Pessimist Network
1.02 Evaluation of the Norwegian Resource Bank for Democracy and Human Rights (NORDEM)
2.02 Evaluation of the International Humanitarian Assistance of the Norwegian Red Cross
3.02 Evaluation of ACOAPAM-ILO programme for “Cooperative and Organizational Support to Grassroots Initiatives” in Western Africa 1978 – 1999
3A.02 Evaluation of programme ACOAPAMUn programme du BIT sur l’exapppui associatif et coopératif aux initiatives de développement à la Base en Afrique de l’Ouest de 1978 à 1999
4.02 Legal Aid Against the Odds Evaluation of the Civil Rights Project (CRP) of the Norwegian Refugee Council in former Yugoslavia
1.03 Evaluation of the Norwegian Investment Fund for Developing Countries (Norfund)
2.03 Evaluation of the Norwegian Education Trust Fund for Arafican the World Bank
3.03 Evaluering av Bistandstorgårds Evalueringensnetværk
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4A.04 Study of the impact of the work of FORUT in Sri Lanka: Building Civil Society
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7.06 Evaluation of the “Strategy for Women and Gender Equality in Development Cooperation (1997–2000)”
1.06 Inter-Ministerial Cooperation. An Effective Model for Capacity Development?
2.06 Evaluation of Fredkorpset
1.06 – Synthesis Report: Lessons from Evaluations of Women and Gender Equality in Development Cooperation
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1.07 – Study: The Norwegian oil and gas sector’s contribution to human development. En syntese av evalueringensfølge
1.07 – Study: The Norwegian International Effort against Female Genital Mutilation
2.07 Evaluation of Norwegian Power-related Assistance
2.07 – Study Development Cooperation through Norwegian NGOs in South America
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5.07 Evaluation of the Development Cooperation to Norwegian NGOs in Guatemala
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3.08 Evaluation: Mid-term Evaluation the EEA Grants
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5.08 Evaluation: Evaluation of the Norwegian Raasch and Development Activities in Conflict Prevention and Peace-building
6.08 Evaluation: Evaluation of Norwegian Development Cooperation in the Fisheries Sector
1.09 Evaluation: Joint Evaluation of Nepal’s Education for All 2004-2009 Sector Programme