Introduction

Does Euroscepticism constitute a stand-alone set of positions and preferences, unrelated to positions that societal actors have on other issues besides European integration, or is it systematically related to other issues? In other words, can we reasonably predict a party or citizen’s position on issues like immigration, welfare policy, or international trade based on their position on European integration? That is the central question this chapter addresses.

On the one hand, broad societal phenomena such as globalization, political disaffection and populist ideology allegedly underpin both Euroscepticism and positions on issues such as immigration or economic liberalism (Kriesi et al. 2012). This fuels the hypothesis that Euroscepticism is not a stand-alone phenomenon, but is rather part of a broader emerging cleavage (Hooghe et al. 2004; Kriesi et al. 2008; Marks and Wilson 2000). Age and education are powerful predictors in this new cleavage, where the elderly and the lesser educated tend oppose globalization – including European integration, but also free trade and immigration – while the young and higher educated support it (Birch 2016). The effect of education on Euroscepticism has also grown over time (Hakhverdian et al. 2013). According to Hoeglinger (2016), European integration is merely the side kick of the real issue that divides European societies currently: immigration. If Euroscepticism is simply one among many tools in the strategic competition for power among
political parties (Sitter 2001) or otherwise caused by phenomena common to democratic societies, it is more likely to be folded into broader and more encompassing patterns of political conflict.

On the other hand, unlike most other issues, both the process of European integration itself and the complexity of the political issues related to it are often considered *sui generis*, featuring a unique mix of questions of polity contestation and policy contestation (Höglinger 2012). Some have argued that Euroscepticism is a direct negative reaction to the EU and European integration (De Wilde and Trenz 2012; De Wilde and Zürn 2012). That is, Eurosceptics oppose the EU for what it is: a unique experiment of polity formation beyond the nation-state unlike anything else tried before domestically or internationally. For example, Hobolt and De Vries (Forthcoming) show how citizens’ evaluations of how the EU (mis-) handled the Eurocrisis shaped their votes during the European Parliament elections of 2014. This fuels the hypothesis that Euroscepticism is a stand-alone phenomenon, where the positions of societal actors and citizens on European integration are not systematically related to their positions on other issues.

With rising Euroscepticism evident in public opinion, party politics and public sphere debates, the extent to which it forms part of a broader cleavage may have profound impact on its longevity, its predictability and, ultimately, its effects on democratic politics. As the attention span of mass publics in the age of mediated politics tends to be short and dominant issues forming the political agenda come and go (Bennett and Entman 2001), the extent to which Euroscepticism becomes embedded in a broader cleavage may make it a much more structural and stable feature of representative democratic politics. In the case of cleavages, conflict patterns are generally less flexible and more straightforward as the cleavage folds multiple issues into a single dimension of conflict. Absent a cleavage, however, each issue pits different opponents against different supporters and the conflict patterns become more obscure and more fluid. While this means that reaching compromise might be more difficult in the case of a cleavage, assigning responsibility and mobilizing citizens becomes easier. Concerning democracy, therefore, the degree to which Euroscepticism becomes embedded in a broader cleavage has important – albeit mixed– consequences (Bartolini and Mair 1990).

The extent to which Euroscepticism is linked to other positions may differ across arenas. In public opinion, exclusive national identity perceptions often fuel Euroscepticism (Hooghe and Marks 2005) as well as opposition to immigration. Hence, there is significant evidence that
Euroscepticism in the arena of public opinion is part of a set of issues that also includes anti-immigration sentiments and anti-neoliberalism (Kriesi et al. 2012; Kriesi et al. 2008). In party politics, we find single issue Eurosceptic parties, but they tend to be short-lived (Sydow 2013). The more structural party political representation of Euroscepticism is done by nationalist-populist parties on the one hand, and radical-left parties on the other hand. Finally, when it comes to public debates, studies rarely ask whether mass media explicitly link EU issues to other issues. However, Koopmans et al (2010: 79) find that news on policy fields where the EU has substantial powers – e.g. agriculture and monetary policy – is more Europeanized than news on domestic issues. Coverage of immigration in non-EU countries – where nation states remain largely in control of policy – is only weakly Europeanized.

In essence then, the question of whether Euroscepticism is embedded within a broader cleavage boils down first to the descriptive empirical question of issue linkage: do political parties and citizens link questions about European integration and EU membership to other issues – such as immigration – in systematic ways? To understand the extent of issue linkage, we need to investigate the causes of Euroscepticism. If causes are uniquely EU related, Euroscepticism is unlikely to be systemically linked to other issues. Conversely, if much broader social phenomena cause Euroscepticism – like globalization or party competition – than it is much more likely that Euroscepticism will be systematically linked to other issues. Hence, the extent to which we witness issue-linkage provides positive support for the hypothesis of cleavage formation and therefore carries broader implications for democratic politics across Europe. There are strong differences of opinion within the literature on how and in which forums Euroscepticism should be studied. Also, there is no common understanding of the important causes of Euroscepticism, which leads to different expectations about issue linkage. Even if there are causes fueling issue-linkage, different causes may link Euroscepticism to other issues in different ways. To further investigate the question of whether Euroscepticism is embedded in a broader cleavage, we therefore proceed to discuss five core theoretical debates about the causes of Euroscepticism that generate different expectations on issue linkage and then proceed to review the extent to which we find empirical evidence of issue linkage in party politics, public opinion and mass media coverage.
Transformation or reproduction of European society?

The first theoretical distinction can be made between studies that see fundamental changes in European society and those that only see patterns within the existing societal framework. In both cases, issue linkage is expected, but the kind of issues Euroscepticism is linked to differs strongly. On the one hand, there are studies that perceive European integration – and subsequently Euroscepticism – as part of a reproductive process in society that reinforces pre-existing patterns of politics. On the other hand, we find studies that argue European integration is part of a transformative process in society (Schmitter 2004: 43). The reproductive strand argues or assumes that contestation over the issue of European integration is structured by existing and stable cleavages of party systems (Marks et al. 2002) or demographics (Gabel 1998). Historically generated cleavage patterns in society have resulted in distinct national patterns of politics across Europe (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). These patterns of politics are structured by rather ‘frozen’ party systems that have not significantly changed since the 1920s (Mair 1987). European integration, in this line of reasoning, is just one of many issues in domestic politics that can be analysed using the same theoretical notions and mechanisms as other issues. For example, it is well known that parties in government tend to suffer in elections during times of economic hardship. The documented surge in Eurosceptic voting during the Euro crisis in a variety of elections (Nicoli Forthcoming), can thus be understood as a reproduction of this general pattern within the European context. Moreover, the prominence of the class cleavage in structuring European politics might be declining, but ‘left’ and ‘right’ simply co-opt slightly different meanings to accommodate the change. This co-opting of new issues into pre-existing patterns of conflict through a slight modification of what it means to be ‘left’ or ‘right’ has been done since the days of the French revolution (Laponce 1975). In this theory, the cognitive power of the left-right metaphor is so great, that it folds Euroscepticism within this meta dimension of politics. Whether the left or the right is more Eurosceptic changes over time (Hooghe et al. 2004) and even differs across geographical space (Marks et al. 2006); but the left-right dimension tends to align the issue of Euroscepticism within its overarching pattern of conflict. If the left is in favour of Euroscepticism, the right will automatically oppose it by proxy, since it opposes whatever the left supports, and vice versa. The expectation of this reproduction thesis in terms of issue linkage is that Euroscepticism will be systematically connected to the core questions of left-right politics as it
was conceptualized during the past decades: economic freedom vs economic equality, cultural liberalism vs cultural conservatism, and state intervention vs. state retraction from society.

Alternatively, Euroscepticism is seen as a response to a fundamentally transformative process in European societies. Advocates of this transformation thesis argue or assume that there is a long-term trend in the way Euroscepticism features in European societies and that old cleavages are ‘unfreezing’ and losing explanatory power (Mair 2001). For instance, Inglehart (1970) argues that the rising levels of living standards and education in Western Europe since the end of World War II foster cognitive mobilisation and postmaterialist values. As citizens become better educated and gain access to the world via television and internet, they become more capable of identifying with remote institutions like those of the European Union. Additionally, when their basic material needs are satisfied, citizens will start to care more about immaterial things like peace across Europe, the environment, democracy and human rights. Over time, European citizens will therefore become less and less Eurosceptic as technological progress continues to improve education and welfare. In other words, Euroscepticism is a remnant of the early-modern world that loses traction as Europe enters an era of postmodernity (Beck 2005; Inglehart and Welzel 2005). Yet, a growing body of literature documents how Euroscepticism has become de-aligned from left-right, as both the far left and far right oppose Europe. This has led to the thesis that the political space in Europe increasingly resembles an inverted u-curve (Van Elsas and Van der Brug 2015).

While subscribing to the modernizing transformative view of society, some scholars highlight that its effect is not the same on all citizens. While some citizens come to advocate modernization, others oppose it (Fligstein 2008). Among supporters of modernization, we find citizens who have cosmopolitan values and who consider the EU as part of a larger cosmopolitan political project that attributes moral values to individuals around the world in universal manner (Ecker-Ehrhardt 2011; Teney et al. 2014). Similarly, those who consider themselves the ‘losers of globalization’ become Eurosceptic, just as they oppose other aspects of this modernizing transformation. Thus, a transformation of the cognitive capacity and values of European citizens transforms European public opinion. In a modification of this transformative perspective, it may no longer be the educational gap alone that explains differences in public opinion, but rather a broader effect of globalization and denationalization (Kriesi et al. 2008). It is notable that both objective and subjective indicators of ‘losing’ significantly impact citizens’ Euroscepticism (Teney et al. 2014). This lends credence to the notion that it is not the ‘objective’ educational
divide that determines Euroscepticism, but rather a subjective perception of whether one belongs to the elite – reaping the benefits of European integration – or to the masses who suffer from increased economic competition and a loss of cultural distinctiveness (Manin 1997: 228ff; Teney and Helbling 2014). As the distance between elites and citizens in European societies grows, this may translate into an increased difference of opinion between elites and citizens over the oft-perceived ‘elite project’ of European integration (Hooghe and Marks 2006a: 249).

**Elite or Mass-driven?**

This leads us directly to the second important theoretical divide in the literature: whether Euroscepticism is understood as *elite-driven* or *mass-driven*. This divide is most clearly evident as a methodological choice for studying party politics (elite) or public opinion (mass). Such a stark methodological division carries with it the troubling implication that very few studies combine a focus on party politics with one on public opinion. Thus, the causal theories of party politics differ from the ones in public opinion studies and there are subsequently different expectations and findings on issue linkages.

Students of party politics build on the assumption that the structure of national party systems and strategic behaviour of political elites determine the degree and characteristics of Euroscepticism (Ladrech 2007; Meijers 2015; Pogunke et al. 2007). Such studies take a top-down perspective and view political elites as the drivers of citizen opinions toward European integration (Ray 2003). On the other hand, students of public opinion often assume that European, national and individual characteristics shape citizens’ opinions on European integration. These individual opinions aggregate to public opinion, which either enables or disables political elites to debate the issue and further determine the course of European integration (Eichenberg and Dalton 1993; Inglehart et al. 1987; Niedermayer and Sinnott 1995). This is a bottom-up perspective of Euroscepticism.

A third position in the debate between elite and mass-driven perceptions of Euroscepticism is taken up by media studies. This field studies the Europeanisation of national public spheres by studying coverage of Europe-related issues in national media (Koopmans and Statham 2010) and the creation of dominant narratives and discourses that ‘frame’ and shape the meaning of European
integration (Diez Medrano 2003; Larsen 1999). Some studies understand the media as a forum in which different actors can voice their opinion. Studies with this view study media coverage as a window through which to gain insight into the positions of political parties, interest groups and citizens and as a data source for studying how well these different positions are reflected in national public debates (Koopmans 2007; Kriesi et al. 2007). It allows the study of issue linkage, for example by relating the arguments parties make about Europe in the news to the arguments they make about other issues. Others highlight that media constitute an independent intermediary actor between elite and masses in the public debate over European integration as agenda setters (De Vreese 2001; Trenz 2004). Mass media may have limited effects on the opinions of citizens or parties, but they do determine to a large extent which issues people think about. Thus, to the extent that mass media cover EU issues in relation to other issues, they may stimulate issue linkage in opinion among political parties and citizens even if the direction of that linkage remains open.

While the study of Euroscepticism in political parties and public opinion remains largely separated, some efforts have been made to explicitly test the causal relationship between mass and elite levels of support for European integration. There is evidence that public opinion affects the position of political elites (Carrubba 2001; Williams and Spoon 2015), but other studies have reported a predominantly top-down causal relationship (Ray 1998; Vössing 2015; Wessels 1995). A growing consensus is forming that the relationship between public opinion and party politics is a two way street (Hooghe and Marks 2005; Steenbergen et al. 2007): “Europeans may not be complete *tabulae rasaes* when it comes to European integration, but neither are their views completely determined and unsusceptible to persuasion and information.” (Steenbergen et al. 2007: 18). The more mass driven Euroscepticism is, the more likely it is that Euroscepticism becomes embedded within a broader cleavage as structural demographics such as income, gender, race and age are more likely to be at the core of a citizens’ position on Europe and other issues. In contrast, when political entrepreneurs have a greater role in shaping Euroscepticism in the elite-driven perspective, it is more likely that Euroscepticism is less embedded in a structural cleavage as different elite agents – e.g. parties – in different contexts will chose to mobilize on the issue in different ways, and changing ways over time.
Europe-wide or nation-state specific?

Early neo-functionalist integration theory hypothesised a general effect of European integration on citizens’ opinions about the EU. As the importance of European integration and supranational institutions became more evident to individual citizens, they would shift their political expectations from the national level to the European level (Schmitter 1969). Thus, there would be no significant difference between member states in the attitude of citizens towards European integration, at least to the extent that states are all equal members in the integration scheme. Therefore, in this understanding, the main determinant of Euroscepticism is the level of European integration and the importance of supranational institutions (De Wilde and Zürn 2012). Such expectations are supported by the fact that Euroscepticism is increasingly prominent throughout the EU (De Wilde et al. 2013; Szczerbiak and Taggart 2008; Usherwood and Startin 2013). Thus, an individual’s opinion on European integration was influenced by the level and scope of integration and her capacity to identify with distant institutions as measured by level of education attainment and access to media, not by nationality (Inglehart 1970; Lindberg and Scheingold 1970). After the first enlargement in 1973, it became apparent that support for membership in the UK and Denmark was significantly lower than in the original six member-states. However, it was expected that this difference would eventually even out. Only after the end of the 1980s, when it became increasingly apparent that differences between member states were more resilient than expected, did analyses of Euroscepticism start including the nation state as an explanatory factor in their analysis.

Kritzinger analyses public support for European integration in relation to individuals’ assessment of national political and economic performance. She finds that “[c]itizens use domestic realities as proxies for their attitudes towards the EU.” (2003: 321). A negative assessment of national politics is associated with a positive attitude towards European integration if citizens see the EU as a lifebuoy protecting them from the incompetence of national politicians. In Germany and Italy, for example, citizens who dislike national politics because of corruption or historical militarism have a positive attitude towards European integration because they see Europe as the savior from national flaws. This is further reinforced if citizens have a negative opinion about the national economic performance. In contrast, French and British citizens become more positive towards European integration as their assessment of national economic performance increases. Thus, whereas Germans and Italians perceive of the EU as an alternative to the nation state, both
politically and economically, French citizens see European integration more as a reinforcement of their nation state, especially in economic terms (Kritzinger 2003). This implies a reverse logic of issue linkage. In all four of these countries, one expects to find a connection between citizens’ opinion about government performance and European integration, but the correlation will be negative in Germany and Italy and positive in France and the UK. A further refinement of the influence of national political and economic context can be made based on the national welfare system (Brinegar et al. 2004; Hix 2005: 172). In Scandinavian member states, the welfare state is more encompassing than the EU average. Leftist parties and citizens thus perceive European integration as a threat to national accomplishments. Right leaning citizens and parties, on the other hand, see the EU as an ally in their quest to liberalise their countries and reduce the role of the state in society. The reverse relationship can be found in the UK, where the left is generally more pro-integration than the right since Thatcher’s dismantling of the British welfare state and the launch of a European social policy in the 1980s, although the return of ‘old labour’ under Jeremy Corbyn ushers in a decidedly Eurosceptic turn within the UK left (Birch 2016; George and Haythorne 1996). Because the issue of European integration fits better in the traditionally dominant left-right dimension of politics in the Scandinavian member states and the UK, these member states are more prone to Euroscepticism than continental member states with Christian democratic welfare states (Brinegar et al. 2004: 86).

A major caveat in comparative studies on Euroscepticism in multiple countries is that these countries are almost always EU member states or states closely affiliated to the EU. We know much less about Euroscepticism or more general skepticism toward regional integration outside of Europe (but see Isani and Schliphak 2016). To the extent that data is available on regional integration, it is often not directly comparable since other regional organizations like ASEAN, NAFTA or MERCOSUR are nowhere near as elaborate or influential as the EU. It is very likely that the European focus leads scholars to underestimate commonalities within the EU, and thus underestimate EU-wide causes of Euroscepticism (Zürn 2016). Differences between EU member states are likely to come to the fore in within-EU comparisons while they might be dwarfed when compared to Euroscepticism in non-European countries.

In short, empirical studies differ to the extent that they explain Euroscepticism based on Europe wide phenomena versus nation-state specific phenomena. The first group expects to find similarities in causal logics across the EU – it is the EU itself that causes Euroscepticism – while
the latter focuses on national context factors. Neither one of these groups emphasizes issue linkage, although the latter group expects some issue linkage between economic liberalism and Euroscepticism in countries whose welfare state system deviates from the Christian democratic norm of the old six, albeit in different directions. Here then, the debate is not about whether Euroscepticism is embedded in a broader cleavage or not, but whether it is embedded in similar ways in different countries. Since the cleavage arguments tend to be general – i.e. expecting a globalization cleavage across Europe that looks more or less the same – the Europe-wide explanations of Euroscepticism are more inclined to support the notion that Euroscepticism is embedded, while nation state specific explanations are more likely to lead to the conclusion that Europe is a stand-alone issue.

Structure or agency?

While the nation-state versus EU-level explanations of Euroscepticism are common, another theoretical argument concerns the impact of actors versus institutional structures to explain different levels of Euroscepticism. Again, the difference of opinion is often implicit, captured in research design choice rather than explicit argument. Some studies focus on the behaviour of actors, mainly individual political parties and media/journalists to explain Euroscepticism. Particularly, following saliency theory, political parties have an interest to politicize issues when three conditions hold: their policy position is closer to the majority of voters than that of other parties, they are not internally divided on the issue and their policy position fits their general ideological profile (Hooghe and Marks 2006b: 13; Steenbergen and Scott 2004). This explains why Eurosceptic parties are often fringe parties on the far left or right. Not only are mainstream parties more often internally divided on this issue but, because government responsibility requires them to defend European integration frequently, they also tend to have positions that are further away from more Eurosceptic positions of citizens than do fringe parties, individual case studies of how political parties position themselves on the issue of European integration have also attributed considerable explanatory power to the actions of party leaders or factions and contingent contextual factors (Gaffney 1996; Johansson and Raunio 2001; Larsen 1999). Outside of party politics, journalists and public intellectuals can contribute to Euroscepticism as agenda setters (cf. Lacroix and Nicolaidis 2010), e.g., Thilo Sarrazin contributed strongly to the formation of Euroscepticism in Germany through the publication of his book Deutschland Schafft Sich Ab in
2010. Journalists may report on European integration because it has news value, or because they perceive it as their moral duty to scrutinize government activity, educate citizens and communicate public opinion to the political elite (Trenz et al. 2009). All of this means that if Euroscepticism is primarily the product of the agency of leading and charismatic politicians, intellectuals and journalists, than it is unlikely to be systematically linked to other issues. The unique personalities of the agents and the different timing and contexts of their agency likely makes Euroscepticism either a stand-alone phenomenon unlinked to other issues, or variably linked to other issues in unsystematic ways.

On the other hand, Euroscepticism may be largely inhibited or enabled by structural factors. Bartolini (2005) argues that European integration has largely been a boundary removing enterprise. The removal of boundaries in political, administrative and economic terms, increases exit options and thus reduces the pressure for people to organise themselves and manifest themselves politically within the system. The specific characteristics of the EU-polity thus inhibit the mobilization of citizens using Euroscepticism. For this reason, Bartolini joins the neo-functionalists in identifying structural EU wide phenomena as the causes of Euroscepticism, albeit with a clear caveat. This is the explicit expectation that the EU rigs the system against manifest Euroscepticism since there is no channeling of political opposition which, in turn, makes such mobilization inconsequential. This might explain the widespread indifference among EU citizens concerning European integration (Van Ingelgom 2014). Clearly, structural causes of Euroscepticism also underpin the argument of a rising globalization cleavage, embedding Euroscepticism in more encompassing conflict.

The effect of the choice for research design should not be underemphasized. Studies aimed at thick description of individual EU debates or single case-studies of political parties tend to overemphasize political leadership and contingent factors, leading to the risk of under-estimation of issue linkage. On the other hand, studies focusing on a large-n comparison, whether over time or between countries, tend to favour structural explanations over agency as anything popping up as significantly correlated with Euroscepticism is likely to be interpreted as an indicator of structural causes while the often large segment of unexplained variance is ignored as noise. This runs the risk of an over-estimation of issue linkage.
Explaining divergence in support for European integration has been a central research aim within the study of Euroscepticism, especially research studying public opinion. A rational choice explanation argues that citizens support European integration when they think it benefits them. Hence, white-collar workers with higher education, skilled proficiency, living in border areas support European integration more than do blue-collar workers (Hooghe and Marks 2005; Kuhn 2011). As the integration process has liberalised capital more so than labour, these citizens have profited the most from European integration (Gabel 1998).

Alternatively, Haesly (2001) argues that citizens base their opinion on European integration not only on perceived economic benefits, but on identity perception. In his comparative study on public opinion among Scots and Welshmen, Haesly finds that citizens can be categorised in three groups based on their own identity perception: Eurosceptics, Europhiles and instrumental Europeans. Only the last group makes a utilitarian assessment of European integration and this is not exclusively based on economic benefits. For example, European integration might be instrumentally seen as a way to achieve more regional autonomy or environmental protection (Haesly 2001: 97). Further evidence that some citizens make utilitarian considerations while others make identitarian considerations is shown to be linked to what kind of values people associate with the EU (Teney et al. 2014).

The linkage between European integration and economic policies that the Euro crisis has brought to the forefront and the increased salience of economic issues due to the severity of the crisis lead Paul Statham and Hans-Jörg Trenz to theorize that Euroscepticism is now more linked to economic concerns than to identity concerns (Statham and Trenz 2013). Whereas the Laeken process leading up to the Constitutional Treaty with all its state-like symbolism of a European flag, an anthem etc., and the discussion on possible Turkish membership stimulated identity based concerns and ideological linkage on the cultural dimension in the first decade of the 2000s, EU politics since the outbreak of the crisis in 2009 has brought controversy about national budgets and economic redistribution to the forefront, linking Euroscepticism more strongly to economic concerns. This is not to say that Euroscepticism is now a purely economic phenomenon. The rise of the new Eurosceptic party Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) in Germany shows this. While at first a purely single issue anti-Euro party, it now appears to increasingly embrace anti-immigration
rhetoric. However, evidence so far shows that the recent economic and financial crisis led to an increase in the importance of national and identity factors over economic interests in explaining Euroscepticism among European citizens (Serricchio et al. 2013). Finally, the extent to which identity and economic interests affect an individual’s appreciation of European integration may be framed by national political elites accounting for some observed differences across countries. If the national dominant discourse on European integration is instrumental like in the UK and Denmark – stressing costs and benefits of European integration – one can expect individual citizens to make a similar calculation (Larsen 1999). However, if integration is framed as a rehabilitation after WWII or the best strategy towards modernity and international prestige, like in Germany and Spain respectively, utilitarian considerations may be less predominant in citizens’ appreciation of European integration (Diez Medrano 2003). Those emphasizing agency in Euroscepticism tend to stress the role of far-right parties as they link European integration to immigration as a joint existential threat to national identity (Hooghe 2007; Taggart 1998; Werts et al. 2013).

Conclusion

Whether and to what extent Eurosceptic preferences are coherently linked to other preferences or dispositions is an empirical question. To understand how and when issue linkage exists and Europe is folded into an emerging cleavage, this Chapter has focused on various causes argued in the literature. If strategic opportunism in opposition is what leads political parties to Euroscepticism, then it is likely to be linked to other criticisms of government and elitism that such parties often represent. If a sense of losing out to global competition in economic and cultural terms leads citizens to become more Eurosceptic, then citizens’ preferences about Europe are likely linked to other preferences on border crossing issues, such as migration and economic integration. If, on the other hand, it is the EU itself that is the main driver, Euroscepticism more likely reflects the sui generis nature of its cause.

Clearly, the resonance of the issue of European integration with perceptions of identity and economic interests strongly affects issue linkage. In the alleged globalization cleavage, Kriesi and colleagues (2012; 2008) identify two main dimensions of contention. First, there is a cultural
dimension of globalization conflict that is mainly structured by the issue of immigration. Second, there is an economic dimension of globalization conflict that is mainly structured by issues related to economic liberalism, such as international trade. European integration in comparison to these two issues remains the junior partner, as citizens and political parties consider it less salient. In terms of dimensionality, it falls somewhere in between the economic and the cultural dimension of the globalization cleavage, although they report it to be more closely linked to the latter.

The Euro crisis affects the issue linkage of Euroscepticism in a variety of ways and the above discussion on causes allows us to identify both changes and continuities in the embedding of Euroscepticism. First, with the EU clearly enforcing its authority on domestic budgets through austerity measures and bailouts in the short run and through the further institutionalization of budgetary rules – notably the six-pack, two-pack and European Semester (REF) – in the long run, Euroscepticism as a direct response to increased EU authority has clearly become more prominent and forceful throughout Europe (Armingeon et al. 2016; Teney 2016). It is no longer a marginal phenomenon, if it ever was, nor restricted to a limited number of member states (Usherwood and Startin 2013). Much of the blame for the Euro crisis, however, has befallen the national governments rather than the EU institutions. Every member state government except the German and the Dutch ones have been voted out of office since the outbreak of the crisis. Whereas some people considered the EU as an alternative to national governments in the past (Kritzinger 2003), the pattern of evaluating the EU negatively if the national economy is doing bad and national government performance is ranked low has become widespread throughout the EU. In their study on the evolution of trust in the EU during the Euro crisis, Armingeon and Ceka (2014) highlight indeed the importance of domestic cues for citizens in forming their opinion on the EU: dissatisfaction with the national government and the negative evaluation of the national economy translate into Euroscepticism among citizens. Thus, Euroscepticism has been increasing the most in countries severely hit by the Euro crisis. If monetary policy was already one of the most Europeanized issues in the mass media before the outbreak of the crisis (Koopmans et al. 2010), it is likely to have become even more so since. Those who oppose monetarism and orthodox liberalism – especially citizens in bail-out countries – oppose the EU too as these policies are constitutionally enshrined within the Eurozone framework and enforced by creditor nations and the ‘Troika’ (IMF, ECB and European Commission). In creditor states such as Germany, blame is attributed mostly to proliferate southern member states and banks.
Clearly, the theoretical juxtapositions may be clear in theory, but less so in reality. In reality, European societies are both reproducing themselves and transforming. Euroscepticism is both mass and elite driven with elite cueing and party responsiveness both demonstrable. There are Europe-wide and nation state specific causes that generate both similarities and differences across countries. Parties and prominent individuals have the capacity to influence opinion and discourse, yet there are also structural factors generating patterns that hold across time and space. Finally, citizens make both utilitarian and identitarian considerations in evaluating the EU.

This Chapter has highlighted theoretical arguments in the literature that explain Euroscepticism, the findings that support these claims and has mapped major theoretical controversy in explaining Euroscepticism. Each of the perspectives discussed generates different expectations about whether Euroscepticism is a stand-alone phenomenon or embedded within a broader cleavage. Rather than providing a conclusive empirical answer to this question, our aim has been to map the theoretical debate about it. It has been shown that many of the theoretical propositions made by studies of Euroscepticism are implicit, rather than explicit. Through the choice of research design, most studies implicitly favor some explanation of Euroscepticism over another or assume causal connections. A choice to focus on public opinion tends to be based in a more structural understanding of roots of Euroscepticism, whereas a choice to study speeches of key politicians at critical junctures in European history are much more likely to support the conclusion that Euroscepticism is a stand-alone issue, if not an idiosyncratic and ephemeral phenomenon. Care should therefore be taken to assess the implications of different research designs on the likelihood of finding issue linkage.
References


