The Hooligan Problem

British state responses to football-related violence, 1968-75

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Abstract

This thesis is an analysis of state responses to football hooliganism in the period 1968-1975. The locus of this study relates to why and how the British Government involved themselves in sporting problems. Furthermore, the developments are considered within a historical and sociological framework, which is essential to describe the developments within the football scene. Attention is less devoted to what was thought about football hooligans, but instead what was thought should be done to prevent and punish hooligan activities. More specifically, this period saw an evolution of policy based on public concerns and ‘law and order rhetoric’, which subsequently led to step-changes in regulation practices. In summary, this thesis will evaluate the first state-mediated attempt of ‘policing the hooligan crisis’.
Acknowledgements

Writing this thesis has been a long-lasting and absorbing process, and an appropriate end for my five years at NTNU. Although difficult at times, I am proud to complete such a comprehensive academic study, in which I hope will contribute to existing scholarly work on the subject.

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1 Introduction

1.1 Historical context

Football hooliganism became a well-known social problem during the early 1960s. The 3pm kick-off on Saturdays highlighted the ‘working class weekend’, and although football crowds were perceived as ‘good-natured for the most part’, there was a steady increase of misconduct in football stadiums.¹ ‘Hooligan’ behaviour in general was soaring; in dance halls, social clubs and seaside resorts. As some of the characteristics of football hooliganism were shared by other youth cultures from the same period, the totality of this disorder was often attributed to the ‘sixties revolution’. Critics have claimed that this perceived ‘revolution’ was founded on the dichotomy between what has been labelled as the ‘respectable’ sections of society and the ‘transgressive others’.² This relationship was signified by continuous negotiations of morality, usually through subtle manifestations of ‘good’ and ‘evil’. According to some critics, increased levels of disorder were a result of increased ‘permissiveness’ and ‘post-war affluence’ among teenagers.³ These teenagers formed subcultures, and were labelled as ‘mods’, ‘rockers’, ‘teddy boys’ or ‘football hooligans’, and the themes of protest, conflict, permissiveness and crime appeared to form ‘one great, undifferentiated threat’.⁴ However, a distinctive hallmark of football hooligans was hostility not only directed at the ‘establishment’, but also towards others of their own kind. In addition, football hooliganism can be regarded as idiosyncratic because of its long-lasting position as a threat to British society.

The 1960s transformed football spectating as a form of leisurely family recreation to what appeared to be stylised and fiercely loyal partisanship, rooted in interpretations of working class ideals. As class-identity and ethnic identity seemed to wither in this period, arguably, attending football matches could provide a strong

sense of community and self-identification.\textsuperscript{5} Hence, the football scene served to give young working class males the appearance of having dominant positions within a division of popular culture.\textsuperscript{6} This position interacts with a parallel development. Television companies and newspapers of all sorts began to specialise in football coverage in the 1960s, and due to the assertiveness of supporter behaviour, and the increased publicity it produced, the apparent deteriation of the football scene had wider ripple effects across society. As football’s tug-of-war deepened, the exposure of the football scene in the media contributed further towards an amplification of public anxiety.\textsuperscript{7} The culmination of this gradual escalation of concern may be represented through the emergence of government initiatives. As the government began to involve them with football hooliganism in the late 1960s, the following period may epitomise the ‘end of the start’ of football hooliganism. As hooligans apparently threatened law and order, subsequent governments were gradually forced to respond to this development. In doing so, authorities involved with football attempted to reform the experience of attending football matches. This thesis will evaluate the state-mediated responses to the increase in football hooliganism. Specifically, this relates to the government’s responsibilities in dealing with football hooliganism, the policies and practices promoted by various authorities, as well as some implications of the strategies implemented in the time period 1968-1975. ‘Policing the hooligan crisis’ established itself as a complex matter, and the reactions from authorities were arguably significant in shaping the development of football hooliganism in the 1970s.

1.2 Historiography

Britain’s transformation into an ‘affluent’ society during the late 1950s, and the broader cultural and social changes in the 1960s have frequently been subject to analysis by academics. However, it was not until the brink of the 1970s that the social and political significance of football received more extensive attention. Within the disciplines of sociology, psychology, cultural studies, anthropology and history, scholars have engaged with the fundamentals of supporter behaviour, and its interconnection to various structures within society. The primary topic of study has

\textsuperscript{5} Kerr, J., \textit{Understanding Soccer Hooliganism} (London: Open University Press, 1994) p. 116
\textsuperscript{7} Cohen, S. (1987), see also, Young, J. (2011)
been attempts to ‘set sport in its full cultural context’, a sub-discipline involved with ‘sequence, tendencies, outcomes and change’.\(^8\) According to some scholars associated with sports studies, the neglecting of sports and leisure has been a common feature within the historical and sociological disciplines.\(^9\) John Hargreaves explicitly states that only a minority of academics are prepared to take sports seriously as an interpretive and analytical problem and that ‘the blindness of the academic community to the social significance of sport exhibits […] [that] the culture of the mass of the population is considered beyond the academic pale’.\(^10\) Hargreaves further suggests that sports studies are usually accorded low academic status, certainly a generator for inadequate academic coverage of sport in previous times.\(^11\) However, if football’s role in society has been underestimated in the early post-war decades, the point of enquiry on football hooliganism in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s has been extensive.

This interest in football as a topic of study is largely a product of the rising popularity of ‘the people’s game’, but also the cultural development of spectators. Certain sociological theories addressing ‘deviant youth’ in general, are adaptable for researching football hooliganism. Academics such as Stanley Cohen, Jock Young, Ian Taylor and Stuart Hall, have worked on youth cultures in the 1960s and 1970s. Their work has shaped ‘hooligan literature’ by trying to explain the ‘social totality’ of football hooliganism.\(^12\) In the collaborative project *Images of Deviance* and *Folk Devils & Moral Panics: The Creation of the Mods and Rockers*; the concepts of ‘moral panic’ and ‘social deviance’ have been applied.\(^13\) Cohen uses ‘action’ and ‘reaction’ to describe the relationship between hooligan behaviour and responses from authorities.\(^14\) Decoding ‘action’ in the framework of ‘culture, symbolism and style’,

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\(^11\) Ibid

\(^12\) Football hooliganism has been represented as forming a ‘social totality’ based on its general pervasiveness in society, see Dunning, E. (1988) p. 8


has been a favoured research topic when exploring subcultures.\textsuperscript{15} The first research conducted by sociologists in the early 1970s tended to regard hooliganism within a similar framework as well. However, though this framework is highly applicable to the structural characteristics of football hooligans, the ‘hooligan experience’ may prove to be relatively unique as a social and political phenomenon. This is partly due to the political concern associated with the hooligan issue, but also its social roots.

The explicit motivation for performing hooligan ‘deeds’ is in fact the most extensive area of ‘hooligan research’. Within the cross-discipline of sociology and environmental psychology, the rationalisation of ‘hooligan activities’ has been heavily discussed among academics. Analysts have engaged in core psychological aspects, and in particular, actions associated with habitual ‘male’ attributes.\textsuperscript{16} In particular, Eric Dunning and Peter Marsh emphasise the attribute of ‘ritualised aggression’ and class affiliations. These assumptions are largely based on studies concerned with class and gender, and particularly, the pioneering work of Eugene Trivizas.\textsuperscript{17} Although the characteristics of ‘male psychology’ demonstrates an interesting subject when engaged with theoretical explanations of violent behaviour, class distinctions are more helpful because its focus on the social and political structures contributing to violence. Most ‘hooligan literature’ considers class perspectives in some way or another; however, the most significant works have been written by Eric Dunning, John Hargreaves, John Clarke and Ian Taylor.\textsuperscript{18} Conflicts within British society are mainly a product of the social structures, and in particular, they way the produce and maintain class distinctions.


\textsuperscript{17} Trivizas, E. ‘Offences and Offenders in Football Crowd Disorders’ in \textit{British Journal of Criminology}, 20:3 (1980), pp. 276-88

[the] social crises of Western society force recognition of the fundamental and worsening inequalities of class in its general and specific effects. We have to develop analysis that begins and ends with the fundamentals of class in its simple and complex divisiveness.\textsuperscript{19}

John Hargreaves’ rather bold statement on the significance of class is recognised as an accepted truth within some academic camps. Hargreaves and Taylor was amongst the first scholars to consider football violence as a notable area of study, and this approach is largely adopted from traditional Marxist ideas on class-relations as the primary cause for conflict.\textsuperscript{20} There might be a tendency, particularly by ‘left-realists’, to extrapolate the importance of class in isolation. This is a methodology Dunning claims might forge ‘ouvertist’ approaches and ‘a romanticisation of the working class as the ‘prime agent in history’’.\textsuperscript{21} This perspective is also supported by a faction of scholars, which argue that there is more to the ‘hooligan case’ then what can be ‘gleaned from ethnographies’.\textsuperscript{22} Though a controversial issue, most academics finds common ground in the sense that issues external to the football scene are indispensible when researching the causation of ‘hooligan activities’. The triggers and causes for certain phenomenons are never in isolation, but rather a part of a ‘collective’ of social relations.

A significant aspect of this collective is represented through the effect of public concern. This is not overlooked in ‘hooligan literature’, and as mentioned in the previous section, the representation of hooligan incidents by journalists and people of authority in the media may escalate the crisis further. Cohen argues that ‘in society, the media functions as unofficial ‘control agents’, both as enforcers of norms and rules, as well as moral crusaders.\textsuperscript{23} The presentation of these news reports is vital in the way football hooliganism is perceived within the general public and the potential level of ‘moral panic’ it can produce. The importance of constructing public concern within a framework of ‘moral panic’ retains a powerful position within hooligan academe. ‘Moral panic’ or and ‘moral anxieties’ signify the same social

\textsuperscript{19} Hargreaves, J. (1987) pp. 180-81
\textsuperscript{21} Dunning, E. (1988) p. 199
phenomenon, indicating persistent campaigning by several interested parties, where a ‘condition, episode, person or group of persons emerges to become defined as a threat to societal values and interests’. During the 1960s, the emergence and persistence of hooligan activities at football grounds definitely generated a level of public concern. In regard to Hall’s definition of the word, hooligans signified a threat to British society as they deviated from the assumed moral values of the establishment and the respectable sections of society. Jock Young’s research points to the processes that generate ‘moral panic’. He views moral panics as a ‘dramatic form of othering’. If we are to take this into consideration, it was not the hooligan activities that generated ‘moral panic’, but rather how these were represented. This function seems evident when analysing some of the rhetoric used by people in the media at the time.

Furthermore, the relevance of ‘moral panic’ in this context may be the most significant factor when analysing whether social reactions to the problem were treated fairly. Cohen and Young strongly argue that the ‘punishment’, in all its forms, does not necessarily fit the ‘crime’. As this poses an interesting subject, it is essential to break down the notion of punishment, within the scholarly umbrella of social and political reaction.

As football violence became recognised as a national problem in the late 1960s, the first commissions of informed inquiry were launched. The political responses to such a complex situation are essential in comprehending its alterations and continuities. The mainstream of scholarly literature on hooliganism has highlighted the relationship between football spectators and public authorities, emphasising that during the 1960s, but particularly in the 1970s, the connection between sport and state tightened. The involvement of the state altered the social and physical context of football, in a way that has generally been found to be inadequate by academics. In sociologist Brett Bebber’s *Violence and Racism in*

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24 Ibid, p. 9
26 Young, J. (2011) p. 250
Football, he addresses the policies implemented by authorities in the 1970s and 1980s. This relates to Hall’s ideas of ‘law and order politics’, police strategies and legal measures applied to eliminate football hooliganism. Although a significant section of ‘hooligan literature’ considers the overall response to hooligan activity at various times and places, Hall’s, Cohen’s, and Bebber’s research might be the most dedicated contributions in explaining the supposedly interventionist politics that shaped Britain in the 1970s. While Bebber’s research is based primarily on source material from government correspondence, crime statistics and reports. Hall and Cohen complement this research, with providing essential perspectives of the political and sociological developments within a similar timeframe.

Football hooliganism has developed to be a substantial locus of study during the last forty or fifty years, and could be mentioned within the majority of scholarly disciplines. The developments within the football scene relates persistently to issues of crime, culture, politics and class; wide genres that are continuously a significant part of society. Some scholars have neglected particular areas, and others have attempted to reflect the wider context, without presenting significant finds. The majority of ‘hooligan literature’ however, is distinctively focussed on the 1980s; a period considered as the apex of football violence, with disasters at Heysel, Bradford and Hillsborough in the limelight. This notion leaves scholarly works on the emergence of football hooliganism, much to be desired for. This historiography has valued the perspectives of scholarly works published in the 1970s and early 1980s. In particular, Ian Taylor, Stanley Cohen and Stuart Hall provided current perspectives on the relationship between hooligans and the authorities, which relates to the issue

Cohen, S. ‘The punitive city: notes on the dispersal of social control’ in Contemporary Crises, 3(4) (1979) pp. 341-363
discussed in this thesis. In addition, these perspectives pose a significant value of interest. The ‘social crisis’ in 1960s was of course a historical and sociological phenomenon by itself; however, it may also be considered as a product of academia. As journalists and academics commented on the happenings within British society as the sequence of events continued to unfold, it makes the definitive separation of primary and secondary sources questionable. On a more recent note, in the 1980s the Football Trust used the work of Dunning and Williams as a focal point in the make-up of their policies. This example illustrates that discourse created by academics certainly had the potential of influencing the direction of social policy, or at least public discussions. In the period explored in this thesis, academic debates in relation to state responses are imperative aspects of exploring the evolution in policy and practice.

Although Hall and Cohen are closely investigating the motivation behind ‘hooligan activity’, the perspectives of public and political reactions to this activity are essential to understand this changing relationship. Incidentally, this response comprises the centre of my analysis. The response comes from a complex set of authorities, which leads to a consideration of both formal and informal influences to the control culture of the early 1970s. The relevant scholars on authorities in a footballing context is under communicated by scholars in the 1970s, however, both the research made by Brett Bebber and Eric Dunning proves vital contributions that symbolises both historical change and continuity of state-mediated responses. In particular, using this secondary literature in combination with primary sources from the late 1960s and early part of the 1970s, should describe the possible shift in relations between sport and state as football hooliganism emerged with force.

1.3 Sources and chapter structure

This is both a work of synthesis and a work of primary research. By synthesis, I refer to various concepts involved in illustrating specific development, in which I will discuss and contend some of the conclusions made from other scholars, as well as using theories or models that may relate to specific features of football hooliganism. Though the primary sources are of an assorted manner, they are mainly gathered from

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the National Archives in Kew, the British Library in London, and parliamentary debates digitised through the Hansard Millibank Systems website. The majority of newspaper articles will refer to have been researched at the British Library, whereas specific police reports will most likely be collected from the National Archive in Kew. Collectively, the primary sources and secondary literature is the foundation of my discussion.

The main part of my thesis will discuss how football’s governing bodies handled the emergence and rise of football hooliganism. This refers to an exploration of the discussions regarding football hooligans in parliament and potentially, specific government initiatives generated in order to limit hooligan activities. In relation to the developing policies, it is necessary to reflect on how these were carried out by authorities such as the police and the courts, which were directly engaged with football disorder. A relevant feature in this discussion, relates to the political environment in this period, in which I will attempt to rationalise whether the term ‘law and order society’ is fitting in the context. The rhetoric in policy making is important in order to convey the intentions in parliament as well as those within the various branches of government. However, I have to consider which actors take part in designing the policies, and which actors are involved in the implementation of these policies. Important points of discussion will be made throughout the text, however, some of the most essential consequences of this development will be considered near the end. The culmination of my discussion leads to my thesis question: ‘Why did British state responses to football hooliganism change in the period 1968-1975?’ More explicitly, my thesis will describe the responses from governing authorities, focussing particularly on 1) what they thought should be done about football hooliganism 2) what they actually did about football hooliganism 3) how this contrasted with previous approaches, and, 4) what were some significant consequences of the change in policy and practice.

More specifically, to answer these questions, I will structure the thesis both chronologically and thematically. The maturation of football hooliganism as a problem for clubs and police arguably started previously, however the period 1968-1970 can be regarded as maturation of football hooliganism from irregular disturbance to a definite social policy area for the government. This perceived shift will be epitomised through official government inquires, however, although these
provides some popular indications of what was though should be done with football hooligans, they will be supplemented with discussions in parliament to give an hint of the concern and approach taken by politicians. In order to successfully review possible changes in tactics and procedures, this section will also contemplate some of the existing procedures already in place to combat football hooliganism. The approach going into the 1970s has at times been labelled as a product of the ‘law and order lobby’. The last section of chapter one will be devoted to breaking down the term ‘law and order’ as a signifier for a period of intervention, following the general election in 1970. In conclusion, chapter one will consider a shift in approach by the government, leading up to the measures introduced in the 1970s.

The second chapter is thematic, indicating the legislative and practical measures that were suggested or implemented in the time period 1970 to 1975. On separate occasions I will address the preventive measures, as well as the punitive measures, in relation to potential shifts in policy, practice and legislation. These sections will provide an important perspective in regard to pressures or demands from authorities or the public, as well as explaining the general approach of authorities involved with football hooligans. This chapter will indicate why the developments in this period happened this way, as well as looking at some of the difficulties and successes of the governing authorities. Collectively, the thesis will definitely supply the reader with a better understanding of the early ventures of combating football hooliganism. Optimistically, the material will be of assistance in nuancing general ideas of football hooliganism, perhaps even altering some of the conceptions and ‘truisms’ in ‘hooligan literature’. Arguably, the contested arguments will be a result of the symbiotic relationship between primary research and secondary research. Although the source material provided is imperative for the originality of the thesis, neglecting valuable discourse on the subject would be a step in the wrong direction if this piece were to contribute to the academic genre.
2 Government initiatives and ‘law and order politics’

2.1 The materialisation of concern

The origins of political interest in football hooliganism were associated with a growing national concern regarding the intensity and publicity of spectator behaviour during the 1960s. In this period, parliamentary discourse questioned political engagements in relation to football hooliganism and prospects of improving the overall environment at football grounds. These initiatives sought to find national solutions to what appeared to be a national problem, and the ripening of this problem led to state-funded inquiries on football hooliganism. According the Richard Giulionotti, the period 1968-1970 marked a maturation of parliamentary engagements to football hooliganism as a social policy area.\(^{34}\) The discussions related to a perceived escalation of spectator violence, formal solutions to vandalism and punishment, and hooligan activities as a cause for public concerns. Previous declarations emphasised that the problem rested with the football clubs themselves. In 1967 Dick Taverne of the Home Office declared:

> Responsibility for public order and safety at a football ground rests with the management of the football club concerned and that it is open to the management to seek the services of the police […] I do not think that this matter calls for direct action by the Government.\(^{35}\)

As late as 1968, current Minister of Sport, Denis Howell confirmed the Home Office’s stance on government responsibility, emphasising that ‘[…] responsibility lies with the football authorities and clubs concerned’ in a debate.\(^{36}\) The financial situation of the Home Office during the Wilson administration in the 1960s was troublesome. According to Brett Bebber, significant engagements to social problems such as football violence were not prioritised as a matter of expenditure in this period.\(^{37}\) However, the response in parliament with reference to public concern, legislation and action from government bodies, were acknowledged through two

\(^{35}\) Hansard, HC Deb 27 April 1967 vol 745 cc1802-3
\(^{36}\) Hansard, HC Deb 29 February 1968 vol 759 c398W
\(^{37}\) Bebber, B. (2012) p. 51
critical government initiatives. Soccer Hooliganism – A Preliminary Report, a research project conducted by J. A. Harrington, was presented as a study of the causes behind hooligan behaviour, as well as solutions to control these activities. John Lang’s Report of the Working Party on Crowd Behaviour at Football Matches supplemented Harrington’s work as a guide for football clubs on how to handle misbehaviour among football supporters. This chapter will refer to these reports as the ‘Harrington Report’ and the ‘Lang Report’. These inquiries, along with parliamentary debates in a similar time frame, represented a tangible maturation of governmental initiative. Furthermore, the content of these reports disclosed some essential political perspectives and approaches to wider social and political crises of football hooliganism.

2.1.1 The agenda for government inquiries

The development of the ‘Lang Report’ started in May 1968, and included a scheme directed at football clubs, which if implemented, would assist the prevention of hooligan behaviour. This measure underpinned that responsibility still rested with the football clubs. The solutions presented in this scheme were prospects of changing the infrastructure and logistics of football grounds, but also ways to encouraging positive conduct. The construction of what Bebber refers to as ‘restrictive environments’ is a common feature in the policies suggested in the ‘Lang Report’. The specifics of physical and architectural adjustments ranged from ideas of close-circuit television to seating arrangements, features of the football ground that were not to be fully implemented until the late 1980s. Although safety measures and regulations regarding the physical state of the grounds were discussed at length, and recommendations were made, the implementation of these proposals was largely neglected by football clubs, judging from the disasters at the Ibrox Stadium in Glasgow in 1971 and, stadiums at Bradford and Sheffield in the 1980s. The

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38 Bebber, B., (2012) p. 6
‘Harrington Report’ also devoted a section to discussion of problem areas within football grounds. A police chief stated in an interview that ‘no football ground has ideal conditions for crowd control’.41 However, most of the interviewed officials regarded facilities and control to be of adequate standard.42 Arguably, a concern regarding the level of implementation of these standards seems to be present in both reports, particularly in terms of co-operation between government and clubs.43 The suggestions mad in these reports required a significant amount of practical measures by the clubs, and the application would demand the full support of the various authorities involved with crowd control.

In terms of the content of the various reports, The ‘Lang Report’ was based on physical and logistical recommendations in order to restrict hooligan behaviour. Vice Chairman of the Sports Council John Lang managed its development, and the committee had no representatives from the academic milieu. In comparison, the ‘Harrington Report’ was led by psychologist Dr. J. A. Harrington, and was regarded as more of an academic project centred on why some spectators behaved the way they did. Most of the findings were related to primary sources, and data were gathered from various members of society.44 Although small-scale, Harrington’s research team provided different perspectives on the hooligan problem. A noteworthy explanation of hooligan activities is related to ‘overexcitement’ and ‘immaturity’, emphasising the effect of ‘crowd psychology’.45 This notion, of course, is in contrast to the research made by Dunning and Taylor, who argue that socio-economic differences is key in understanding violence among spectators.46 Both official government inquiries has been criticised by academics engaged with football hooliganism.47 In regard to the Lang Report, a relevant concern for Peter Marsh was the lack of evidence presented in some statements, for example regarding alcohol: ‘there can be no doubt that the consumption of alcohol is an important factor in crowd misbehaviour’.48 Arguably, academics and journalists discussed the motivations behind spectator violence at the

41 Harrington, J. A. Soccer Hooliganism: A Preliminary Report (Bristol: John Wright and Sons, Ltd, 1968) p. 32
42 Ibid, p. 33
43 Harrington, J. A. (1968) p. 34, see also Lang, J. (1969) pp. 11, 14
44 The respondents included among others, managers, players, football fans, referees, police officers, railway conductors, readers of The Sun, F. A. Management, Harrington, J. A. (1968) p. iv
45 Ibid, pp. 16-21
time. However, it appears fundamental to see beyond single factors, like alcohol, in producing a qualified argument in this discussion. The fact that Harrington himself was a psychologist rather than a sociologist might also have excluded some valuable sociological perspectives, particularly those that are considered prominent within later ‘hooligan literature’. 49

2.1.2 Public opinion and the media

A significant find in the ‘Harrington Report’ was the difference in opinion regarding the seriousness of hooliganism by various members of society. In particular, the data collected on people involved in football clubs, or as part of the police organisation, seems to undervalue the seriousness of football hooliganism, at least in comparison to ‘the general public’. When asked whether they considered football hooliganism to be a serious problem, between fifty and sixty per cent of police authorities, players, directors and supporters clubs, perceived the problem as serious. On a related note, one third of the objects perceived the problem as much exaggerated. 50 In contrast, a significant ‘89 % of the interested public regarded the problem as serious’. 51 The find correlated with the general unease in parliament about ‘a growing public concern’ associated with the emergence of football violence, already in the early months of 1968. 52 The discrepancy between the public’s and football officials’ attitude supports the general consensus within ‘hooligan literature’, that the presentation of hooligan behaviour in the media distorted the perspectives of the general public. More explicitly, Dunning specifies that:

The dominant message of most media reports, especially those of the tabloid press, helps reinforce the public perception of football hooliganism as always and invariably an extremely dangerous affair. In this way, they contribute to the generation of a moral panic. 53

However, the Harrington study implied a different perspective. Tabloid newspapers were, of course, becoming more pervasive in society, but the ‘Harrington Report’ leaves the impression that this ‘pervasiveness’ might have positive implications,

\[49\] Taylor, I. ‘Hooligans: Soccer’s resistance movement’ in New Society, 358 (1968), pp. 204-06
\[50\] Harrington, J. A. (1968), p. 7
\[51\] Ibid
\[52\] Hansard, HC Deb 29 February 1968 vol 759 c398W
emphasising instances where good behaviour has been praised.\textsuperscript{54} Although academics might have the benefit of hindsight, the opinions of various members of society regarding ‘Publicity and the Mass Media’ in 1968, are in slight contrast to the perspectives of several of the most valuable researchers on the subject. A statement from The Police Federation is particularly in divergent with the general view in academia, emphasising that ‘we do not think that the press has exaggerated the seriousness of the matter, in fact the press has highlighted the need for more positive action to be taken to deal with the problem.’\textsuperscript{55} Although there are no definite answers regarding the likelihood of exaggeration in news reports, the report explicitly states that sportswriters have difficulty in reporting ‘unexceptional games’ and may welcome the opportunity to report crowd incidents when there is little to report on the field of play.\textsuperscript{56} In general, the role of the media’s reliability, television and news reports was occasionally on the agenda in parliament. Conservative politician Lord Arnold Gridley stated that ‘the Press of this country has sunk to about the lowest levels that it is possible for newspaper reporting to sink’, emphasising on lack of factual recording and factual objectivity.\textsuperscript{57} On a general level, the pervasiveness and increased ‘tabloid’ or even ‘sensationalist’ journalism in the late 1960s and 1970s was a facet of its time. Naturally, this development also affected how football was covered in the media, and contributed to how incidents were perceived by the general public. As politicians and other figures of authority pressed for ‘more law and order’ in the 1970s, the press function as an important medium, indirectly constructing public opinion.

\subsection*{2.1.3 Regulating vandalism}

One of the main controversies related to football hooligans in the 1960s involved the behaviour of travelling away fans. Incidents of vandalism on railways were properly reported and indeed measurable. Although the number of incidents did not increase between 1960 and 1966, there were more than twenty-five thousand cases of misconduct or damage of trains in this period.\textsuperscript{58} Although this sort of mischief was a

\textsuperscript{54} Harrington, J. A. (1968). P. 30
\textsuperscript{55} Ibid
\textsuperscript{56} Ibid. p. 31
\textsuperscript{57} \textit{Hansard}, HL Deb 07 February 1968 vol 288 cc1138-263
\textsuperscript{58} Harrington, J. A. (1968), p. 44
national problem, the density seemed to be thicker in the northern regions of England, where football hooliganism were particularly frequent in the 1960s.\textsuperscript{59} Although the reports indicated that sanctions and solutions was issued primarily from railway officials, the concern eventually emerged at the highest political level.

In a government memorandum dated November 1969, the itinerary was transport arrangements before and after football matches. Mainly, the policy had information from The British Transport Police concerned with Saturday matches, including both railway ‘specials’ as well as ordinary runs where football supporters could be expected.\textsuperscript{60} The most important evidence from this inquiry is the application of ‘train specials’, as well as level and detail of communication between railway and various police departments.\textsuperscript{61} The information flow between clubs and police departments would tentatively make it possible to have police arrangements suitable for various types and numbers of travelling supporters. The systems of operation developed to be comprehensive and specified to each football fixture. Furthermore, the new procedures was characterised by a close relationship between the clubs and the railway institution:

The club know the names and addresses of the ticket holders and should damage be caused in any carriage or compartment the occupants can be required to produce a ticket and are there by identifiable. […] The club provides about 14 stewards from their membership to liaise with Railway Police Officers on the train.\textsuperscript{62}

As with vandalism at football grounds, the sensitivity of the subject was tied to which authorities were to be held responsible. The authorities directly involved included railway officials, football clubs and local police. While railway authorities provided a certain level of control on a normal scheduled run, the apparent lack of manpower when a substantial amount of travelling away fans caused ruckus on trains demanded both stricter controls and ‘power in numbers’. Railway authorities explicitly stated that football authorities and clubs should apply stricter measures.\textsuperscript{63} In a correspondence dated October 2\textsuperscript{nd} 1968, the dilemma of responsibility was thoroughly considered in parliament:

\textsuperscript{60} HO MEPO 2/11286, 20 November 1969
\textsuperscript{61} Ibid
\textsuperscript{62} Ibid
\textsuperscript{63} Harrington, J. A. (1968) p. 46
At present Clubs pay for this service, but it is illogical. We do not charge for policing queues outside theatres, the Albert Hall, railway stations or etc., by accept these as coming within our normal police responsibility […] I recommend that in future we deal with all matters relating to policing outside football grounds, i.e., beyond the curtilage, in the same way and ask no charges of the Clubs concerned.64

In general, these ideas delegated more responsibility to police authorities, confirming the tendency where the hooligan problem became a matter of public responsibility, rather than club authorities themselves. Following a review of the arrangements proposed, ‘it [was] decided that the cost of police outside sports grounds should be borne wholly by the Police Fund.’65 In October, arrangement had been formalised, nicely recounted by MP Merlyn Rees:

The standing arrangements for the exchange of information between police forces about football hooligans on trains have been strengthened; a code of practice designed to encourage good behaviour by supporters is to be circulated by the Football Association to all League clubs; and there is under consideration a scheme to enable stewards, nominated by the League clubs concerned, to travel on football trains as part of the plan to prevent disorder. Details are being worked out.66

Continuing amount of damage caused to private property was formalised as a threat in parliament.67 It demanded a reaction from higher authority, and correspondence between various officials evidently proved that strategies were being worked out to combat hooliganism. The issue of vandalism on trains represented how football hooliganism extended to the public sphere, rather than in the confinement of the football ground. This development forced public authorities to respond and assist in forming specific strategies in the handling of away fans.

2.1.4 Early forms of law enforcement

The enforcers of misconduct in and outside football grounds were in the 1960s, generally club stewards and policemen. However, in this period, the clubs themselves, through fines or temporarily closing down of grounds, were punished if supporters stepped out of line repetitively.68 Penalising individual spectators were a complex

64 HO MEPO 2/11286, 12 September 1968
65 Ibid
66 Hansard, HC Deb 16 October 1969 vol 788 cc594-5
67 Hansard, HC Deb 29 January 1969 vol 776 c343W, see also, Hansard, HC Deb 01 May 1969 vol 782 cc1596-7
68 Harrington, J. A. (1968), p. 43
matter, particularly since these measures demanded that club authorities, police
departments and the magistrates co-operated effectively. The problems faced by
police both in identifying and arresting offenders at football grounds, the surrounding
local area, and on trains were substantial. The ‘Harrington Report’ specifically
addressed this problem, stating that ‘the knowledge that they will more than likely get
away with their misdeeds encourages hooligans’. The massive resources and the
technical and communicative aids that were requirements to properly control sizeable
crowds were somewhat lacking in the late 1960s. The ‘Harrington Report’
specifically emphasised that the number of cases prosecuted compared to cases
reported, was less than 20 per cent.  

First and foremost, the approach taken by authorities when exercising
punishment was influenced by two direct factors. It entailed strategies developed by
politicians and researchers on one hand, and the resources available by clubs and the
local police on the other. Moreover, an indirect factor was the public demand for
stricter penalties, which proves essential in reviewing the level of punishment and the
role of the magistrates in this period. Member of Parliament Edward Taylor asked this
in parliament in 1968: ‘Is he aware that the Government would have the general
support of the public if they provided for more effective penalties to deal with […]
vandalism?’ Lord Willis had too requested a ‘tougher line’ and ‘stiffer punishments’
towards hooligan activities. Although the topic of punishment was a ‘hot potato’ in
parliament, this proved an early sign from of pressure from the government, in where
they attempted to involve themselves in policing and punitive matters. This period
saw general pressure come from various authorities, however, this pressure did not
materialise towards the courts and the magistrates. ‘The question of penalties is […] a
matter for the courts’ said Minister of Transport Richard Marsh in 1968, a view that
was uphold when later Prime Minister and at the time Home Secretary James
Callahan, stated:

As for magistrates, there is a lot to be said for a general expression of opinion
from the House if that is desired, but it is not for me to instruct them – indeed

69 Ibid, p. 55  
70 Ibid, p. 44  
71 Hansard, HC Deb 09 December 1968 vol 775 cc31-2  
72 Hansard, HL Deb 07 February 1968 vol 288 cc1138-263
it would be resented if I were to try to do so – in the kind of sentences they should impose.73

Mr. Alan Hardaker, secretary of the Football League for more than twenty years, implied that decisions regarding punitive measures were the responsibility of Parliament, and expressed; ‘If the powers of the courts are defined by Parliament, then Parliament should change the law’.74 The practical enforcers of law were indeed the courts, and whether they would be lenient to alter their practice was a dilemma for the so-called ‘law and order lobby’, as the pressure mounted towards the institutions of punishment in the 1970s.

However, magistrates did not have sole responsibility for punishing or prohibiting rowdy behaviour at football matches. In this sense, the aforementioned ‘Lang Report’ attempted to develop alternative measures in the handling of such behaviour, most significantly the use of detention centres and getting supporters to ‘report in’ on match days. In a discussion regarding ‘facilities for police and police control’, one of the structural requirements at football matches recommended was an ‘official detention room, where persons can be temporarily detained prior to removal to a police station’.75 This punitive measure demanded ‘(h) that an official detention room be provided at all grounds’.76 This would then prevent the offender to commit further misconduct, as well as improve the chances of systematically prosecuting hooligan activities. Several punitive and preventive measures were discussed in parliament, where as some were presented in Lang Report as an effective strategy of dealing with transgressors. An example involved that previous offenders should ‘report at some other place of time, as a most suitable method of keeping the mischief under control’, and more specifically, ‘on subsequent match days at a place and time away from the ground’.77 This view was followed up, and further developed by the new liaisons arrangements undertaken by the police, in which Callahan stated that ‘under certain appropriate circumstances […] young people report at police stations and at other places for work and other beneficial duties on a Saturday afternoon’.78

Although the logistics, physical resources and manpower these procedures required

73 Hansard, HC Deb 09 December 1968 vol 775 cc31-2, see also, Hansard, HC Deb 20 November 1969 vol 791 cc1485-7
74 Hansard, HC Deb 09 June 1969 vol 784 cc1020-57
75 Lang, J. (1969) p. 9
76 Ibid, p. 15
77 Ibid, p. 10, 15
78 Hansard, HC Deb 20 November 1969 vol 791 cc1485-7
were difficult for the police authorities and the clubs themselves to facilitate, a variant of this measure came to implemented at times during the early 1970s.\textsuperscript{79} Early recommendations from the government and the research projects, regarding both spatial and physical policies and punitive measures, were generally resisted at first, due to the considerable amount of financial and administrative burden the policies implicated. However, they generated a framework in which later enthusiasts for legislation could thrive upon.

\textbf{2.2 The ‘Law and Order Theme’}

As football hooliganism spread and intensified during the late years of the 1960s, the branches of government sought to reconstitute their function as authorities within the public sphere. As we have seen in the previous chapter, among various problems in society, football hooliganism became, partly due to the production of the Harrington and Lang Report, considered as a definite policy area. Barrie Houlihan argues that the history of football disorder as a British political issue corresponds to an ‘issue attention cycle’.\textsuperscript{80} This cycle is signifies first through a latent and continued prevalence of a prospective policy area, followed by an alarming discovery and excited investigation of the social phenomenon.\textsuperscript{81} Although these step-changes overlapped, its prevalence was evidently represented through public outcry and subsequent research in the late 1960s, where as politics in the early 1970s materialised this development through a comprehensive evaluation of the current systems and procedures at place to combat football hooliganism. If football hooligans provided ‘action’ in relation to i.e. Stanley Cohen’s definition, this section is primarily concerned with the ‘reaction’ from local and national authorities.\textsuperscript{82} Mainly, the reaction refers for the most part not what was thought about football hooligans, but what was done about them or what was thought should be done about them. Regarding the intensity of this reaction, ‘the ultimate formalisation being achieved when new laws are actually created’.\textsuperscript{83} As this is a continuous development, this chapter will explain and analyse the relationship between the sport and the state, in

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{79} Bebber, B. (2012) p. 130
\textsuperscript{80} Houlihan, B. \textit{The Government and Politics of Sport} (London, Routledge, 1991) pp. 174-200
\textsuperscript{81} Ibid
\textsuperscript{82} Cohen, S. (1987) p. ii-xxii
\textsuperscript{83} Ibid, p. 111
\end{flushleft}
light of the policies and practices applied by what have been referred to as ‘social control agencies’. Conservative politicians has referred to the ‘breakdown of certain spontaneous agencies of social control’ when addressing the negative impact of ‘youth permissiveness’. On a related note, the use of the term ‘social control’ is prominent in the works of Edwin Lemert, Cohen, Hall Guilionotti, and includes all forms of formal or informal authorities, such as executives in government, the police authorities, the courts, the football officials, but also unofficial social controllers, such as the press and the public. This chapter will occasionally refer to this collective of authorities as ‘agencies of social control’, particularly when referencing some of the most prominent scholars on football hooliganism. Its use generally refers to the long-term fielding of demands concerning legal and environmental measures by various authorities in society. The approaches from various ‘agencies’ must be considered from a perspective of its implications, a decisive factor in the developments that took place in Britain in the first half of the 1970s.

2.2.1 ‘The tip of the pendulum’

The state has won the right, and indeed inherited the duty, to move swiftly, to stamp fast and hard, to listen in, discreetly survey, saturate and swamp, charge or hold without charge, act on suspicion, hustle and shoulder, to keep society on the straight and narrow. Liberalism, that last back-stop against arbitrary power, is in retreat. It is suspended. The times are exceptional. The crisis is real. We are inside a ‘law-and-order’ state.

Stuart Hall’s take on the situation in Britain, epitomised the system of belief associated with some political divisions in the early 1970s. Hall argues further, that the fundamental quality of interventionist politics is associated with the ‘institution’, which possess ‘the sole, legitimate monopoly of the means of violence, and the right to limit and discipline any conflict over rights which might arise’. These beliefs were influenced by a rejection of liberal and progressive ideas, and based on moralistic conservative values. Conservative politicians like Lord Hailsham and Lord Maude in particular, addressed the connection between moral order and law and

84 Crime Knows No Boundaries (Conservative Political Centre, 1966) p. 11
order, in discussing the role of the state in society. Although the Football Association and the courts had already proclaimed that they were going to ‘war’ with football hooligans in 1967, Stuart Hall considers the general election in June 1970 as the ‘official tip of the pendulum’, marking the shift between ‘consent’ and ‘coercion’. In relation, Stanley Cohen reflects upon this shift with associations to a successful ‘hegemony’, which denotes the moment ‘when the ruling class is able not merely to coerce its subordinates to conform, but to exercise the sort of power which wins and shapes consent.’ Although Geoffrey Pearson argues that ‘consent’ has never been won in a popular sense, the 1960s may be characterised as a period of ‘managed dissensus’, where consent is won at the expensive of ‘infrequent estrangements’. The ‘repertoire’ of this hegemony was exhausted by the end of the century, and following the developing level of pressure in the late 1960s, the ‘law and order lobby were in the ascendant’. Arguably, the shift in public relations was nuanced and involved several political and social factors, and although football hooliganism was an important subject for attention, it is essential to recognise the scope of social tensions in Britain at the time.

From the end of the decade, the state had, according to Stuart Hall, been on a collision path with emerging youth cultures and the general working class. As the Labour party struggled to control the social uprisings, the Conservatives desperately wanted to restore authority to the government. In this period, Tory politicians used public declarations to generate political capital, and in the forefront stood Edward Heath, Enoch Powell and Lord Hailsham. Not only did they potentially magnify public concerns, but come election time, they benefitted from them. Outspoken politicians had the capacity to use the increasing means of communication to shape public opinion, and to potentially construct the causes and characteristics of ‘the crisis’. According to Hall, prominent public figures had the power of definition, a definition which if supported by the general public, culminated in a ‘popular demand

88 Hall, S. (1978) p. 286
89 Ibid, p. 277, see also Daily Mirror, ‘War on soccer hooligans’, 16 August 1967, see also Daily Mirror, ‘Courts go to war on soccer louts’ 22 August 1967
92 For the term ‘managed dissensus’, see Hall, S. (1978) p. 320
94 Hall, S. (1978) p. 277
for more law and order. While prominently disparaging a perceived complacency of the Labour party, Edward Heath stated immaculately: ‘we are not going to become a nation of pushovers’. Reading between the lines of some of the proclamations at that time, it is vital to understand that football hooliganism was not the only social crisis. Furthermore, at a time of increased ‘deviancy’, the politicians would attempt to tip the scales at any cost, generally opting for rhetoric that suited the electorate. According to Cohen, the state may respond in four different ways; though a welcoming response, through indifference, with a retributive response, or with a progressive response. Judging from the perceived motifs of some members of the Conservative Party, the new Government could tend towards a combination of ‘retributive responses’, characterised by a hard, moralistic line and increased punishment, and ‘progressive’ measures, which were more viable in the long term, being concerned with the social and financial position of the offenders whilst advocating innovative ways of preventing further deviant behaviour. On a general level, the clear statements from the government emphasised that they would not be pushed over and be labelled as ‘indifferent’ to the current developments. The ideological path of the government related to all forms of social patterns that generated concern, and thoroughly had the potential to alter future change in public relations.

Government affairs with workers at the docks or in the mines, student revolts, and immigration also contributed to what Hall refers to as a ‘crisis of consensus’. The general protest from these groups represented anarchic violence; ‘mob violence, violence for which no rationale, […] violence for kicks – pointless and incomprehensible’, and most importantly; the violators appeared to belong to the same subversive family, signifying a threat from ‘below’. The instant reaction to this perceived ‘stream of violence’ was according to Conservative Politician Angus Maude not peace, it was the law, and only the law could, ‘fairly and legally administered […] in the end guarantee [peace and justice]’. An interesting aspect of the political shift in 1970 was the perception of the possible legitimacy of what Brett Bebber refers to as the ‘exceptional state’. The politicians was seemingly able to

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94 Hall, S. (1979) p. 3
95 Sunday Express, 8 March 1970
96 Cohen, (1971) p. 11
97 Hall, S. (1978) p. 319
98 Ibid p. 300
99 Sunday Express, ‘Now Anarchy Has Shown Its Face’, 30 July 1972
100 Bebber, B. (2012) P. 273
reassure the silent majority that their concern was shared, and as we have seen in the ‘Harrington Report’, the Conservatives’ ‘law and order crusade’ actually articulated what many members of the public felt and called for in this period. The social anxiety was precipitated in a political form, and as Hall proclaims, in exceptional times, the ‘interest of ‘all’ finds its fitting armature only by submitting itself to the guardianship of those who lead’.  

The connection between this ‘guardianship’ and the idea of ‘moral panic’ may construct what Neil Smelser describes as ‘sensitisation’. Indeed, Hall refers to sensitisation as a specific condition for the state of ‘moral panic’. The process of ‘sensitisation’ involves a belief system that assigns ‘blame’ to various groups in society, and subsequently directs specific measures of control towards these groups. Although football hooligans may be emblematic for groups of this kind, certain forms of proceedings and methods were generated in order to specifically deal with this group. These interventionist policies were a general tactic for politicians in the early 1970s, and its legitimacy was arguably built partially on the rise of public concern, which according to Smelser and Hall was generated by the hard rhetoric utilised by the Conservative Party.

2.3 Summary

1960s Britain experienced a period of instability, especially in terms of a developing ‘social crisis’ with the younger generation. Although this materialised in several venues of society, football hooligans slowly became a real concern for politicians and public authorities. The last few years of the 1960s saw institutions and parliament take more responsibility in this matter, and inquiries and policy recommendations were produced through the Harrington and Lang Reports. Not only were they government initiatives, their proposals and general perspectives on football hooliganism were discussed in parliament more frequently than in previous years. This was indeed a product of the upsetting development of the football scene, but a significant aspect concerning state-mediated initiatives also related to political pressure and public concerns. On these grounds, this chapter has implicated some of the structural ways in which police authorities and football clubs attempted to alter

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103 Hall, S. (1978) p. 312
their procedures in order to control their crowd, both inside and outside football grounds. Arguably, the years preceding the 1970s were yet to accumulate major practical altercations based on the policy recommendations. However, as the first discussions of football hooliganism in parliament emerged in 1967 until the conclusion of the reports in 1969, this period proves to be an important period in the maturation of political concern. The 1970s brought a degree of materialisation to these initiatives, proving that the general development of state intervention was gradually escalating.

The spectre of social problems in this period is broad, however, the state-mediated reactions to these developments have on occasion been rationalize through a description of 1970s politics as a product of the ‘law and order lobby’. Stuart Hall argues that for ‘governments in trouble […] the only remedy for a society which is declared to be ‘ungovernable’ is the imposition of order’. This relates to the assertive policies issued by the government branches, in order to recuperate control of a spiralling social scene. The institutions involved were mostly the same as in the late 1960s; however, their methods of inquiry may be described as more pervasive come the 1970s. These methods poise some interesting subjects for analysis. It is essential to reflect on whether the responses were planned and within policy lines, as opposed to unorganised and spontaneous. Another interesting subject for attention relates to how various agencies operates in regard to each other, and arguably, whether their original perspectives and practices were altered by those of other groups and institutions in British society. Although some of the reactions from specific institutions will be presented as a segment of development by itself, the societal control culture must be seen as intertwined and dependent on each other. However dependent, this chapter is divided into different sections of exploration, first and foremost presenting the possible culmination and concept of a ‘law and order society’.

The concept of a campaign, crusade, panic, state or society based on the prominence of ‘law and order’ is discussed at length by Stuart Hall, and in terms of policing the ‘hooligan crisis’, the motifs and actions of ‘the law and order lobby’ has arguably been prominent in describing a increase in state intervention taking place the 1970s.

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104 Hall, S. (1979) p. 3
3 Policy and practice

A perceived ‘shift’ in policy brought an immediate escalation of conflict through preventive or institutive action, and altered the position and role of the state. The amplification of these issues was most visible when evaluating the solutions and practices of state apparatuses, such as the courts or the police administration. Stuart Hall defines this shift in practice through three phases. Firstly, there is a tendency to move in the direction of the law, for example through tightening legal sanctions. Secondly, there is a notion of mobilising the various law-enforcement agencies to exercise ‘informal’ control. The third and last phase is converging all institutions on the same law and order ‘ideology’. A successful shift may provide the mechanism of anticipating transgression or violence, raising the threshold of repression. The implementation of a ‘social control culture’ is subsequently able to safeguard and protect their interest, rather than to recapture or recover control or power. The aim of the upcoming section will consider these stages in relation to various authorities, in light of pressures from the public and the media. More explicitly, in response to what pressures did the law and order state operate? Furthermore, how did established agents of control adapt to the offenses and offenders, and what kind of preventions and punishments were utilised? This approach may point towards whether or not we can adopt Hall’s stage-wise theory in the case of football hooliganism.

3.1 Preventive measures

The agenda for the ‘law and order lobby’ was to evaluate and systematise existing practices and potentially, generate new methods of policing. This was a period of ‘recovery’, during which the state attempted to achieve a stable adaptation to the changes in society, which focussed on how to prevent further misbehaviour. Evaluating whether the measures suggested and implemented proved successful, form a suitable subject for analysis. The tactics that prevailed may have had unintended, even unfavourable consequences. Likewise, they may have proved to effective methods of deterrence. From an analytical perspective, the distinctive methods of enforcement should not be considered in isolation when determining trends of
violence. However, considering a perceived ‘shift’ in interventionist politics, it is viable to look separately at preventive measures and punitive measures. Distinctive forms of action generally imply how various branches of government were approaching the issue of football hooliganism. In this regard, considering punitive measures, the courts are granted specific attention. Respectively, through preventing hooligan activity directly at times and places of disorder, the police organisation should be considered as a primary medium of power. This subchapter will consider the preventive feature in regulation, examining how hooligan behaviour was contained through anticipation and safeguarding rather than acted upon through remedy or reappropriation. More explicitly, the government, the police and the football clubs facilitated an environment of ‘prevention’ through certain reinforcements. In particular, the most relevant factors were those of physical restrictions, police organisation and means of communication.

3.1.1 Physical restrictions

Architectural and environmental policies were suggested at football grounds in the late 1960s through the Lang and Harrington Report, and its implementations or lack there-of were evaluated throughout the whole of the 1970s as well. The application of these policies was an important aspect of preventing violence on match days. More explicitly, controlling ‘behaviour inside the stadia, transport to and from matches, and control of crowds between bus and coach stations and football grounds’ was the area of responsibility, primarily allocated to, and organised by, the police organisation.\textsuperscript{108} This commitment included bringing supporters to the football ground, often by train or bus ‘specials’, as well as supervising supporter behaviour outside stadiums. However, the most substantial arrangements were those in conjunction with controlling crowds at football grounds, safely and effectively. A significant contribution to this topic is the work of historian Brett Bebber. Bebber has constructed a collective term for the strategies pursued in the early part of 1970s as a ‘Total Policy of Containment’, an approach focussed on constructing an environment able to restrict violence through methods of physical modifications.\textsuperscript{109} This is not to say physical restriction and organisation at football grounds was a new facet under the

\textsuperscript{108} AT 60/39, 30 July 1975
\textsuperscript{109} Bebber, B. (2012) pp. 69-146
Conservatives, but as mentioned previously, rather than a continuation of the ideas from research groups in the late 1960s. Lang in particular, introduced a considerable proportion of the physical restructuring represented in the policy of containment.\textsuperscript{110} Up to this point, the clubs had been designated most of the burden of controlling the crowds.\textsuperscript{111} Traditionally, the state may be able to ‘regulate some aspects of sporting practice, but sport was ‘not generally recognised to be part of the state apparatus’.\textsuperscript{112} However, as the 1960s came to an end, football hooliganism was clearly regarded as a ‘Home Office matter, one of law and order, rather than a sporting matter.’\textsuperscript{113}

In terms of developing the ‘policy of containment’, Denis Howell emerged as a prominent figure. As a Labour politician, he continuously pressured the government to impose drastic punitive measures and new, restrictive legislation. At the end of a troubling season in 1970/1971, Howell established a working party addressing crowd safety and football violence from a legislative and political perspective, consistently attempting to find a balance between acceptable and unacceptable forms of discipline.\textsuperscript{114} The unacceptable forms envisioned the grounds as a war zone, evident in is notes, where he at one point drew a football pitch surrounded by land mines and machine guns, covering the spectator terraces.\textsuperscript{115} In support of this perspective, a police constable stated that the pitch and the supporters should be separated through ditches filled with water and nettings made of wire, leaving the crowds ‘to its own furies’.\textsuperscript{116} Although his perspectives emerged ten years after, they were already suggested by the Harrington’s working party.\textsuperscript{117} However, these examples do not necessarily represent the general attitude of British constables or members of Howell’s working party. However, it may contribute in understanding the interventionist approach taken by the Working Party, representing a ‘direct threat of violent, militaristic intervention should transgressions occur’.\textsuperscript{118} Judging from some of the statements made by various authorities, the argument of a ‘militaristic approach’ is convincing in relevant ‘hooligan literature’. In Bebber’s words, ‘the new schemes

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{lang} Lang, J. (1969) pp. 9, 11
\bibitem{bebber} Bebber, B. (2012) p. 51
\bibitem{haynes} Haynes, R. \textit{The Football Imagination} (London, Arena, 1995) p. 19
\bibitem{hansard} \textit{Hansard}, HC Deb 15 October 1969 vol 788 cc559-70
\bibitem{bebber2} Bebber, B. (2012) p. 51
\bibitem{figure} Figure 3.3: Drawing of pitch defence in Home Office files, undated, National Archives, gathered from, Bebber, B. (2012) p. 88
\bibitem{hlg} HLG 120/1465, 1 November 1978
\bibitem{harrington} Harrington, J. A. (1968) p. 49
\bibitem{bebber3} Bebber, B. (2012) p. 87
\end{thebibliography}
for spatial organisation […] resulted in methods that paradoxically endangered everyone while providing security for none’.119 Although the rhetoric used by Bebber may be perceived as a stretched conclusion, there was an existent ambiguity between safety and repression in the measures that were proposed by men of authority.

Richard Lane from the Home Office established that ‘the line between measures for crowd safety and those for combating hooliganism can be very thin’. 120 This statement supports Bebber’s arguments, but it is essential to regard the formal guidelines introduced when evaluating the level of implementation. Of the architectural policies generated, the most relevant are the protocols of the Wheatley licensing scheme, and the following ‘Safety at Sports Grounds Act’. The ‘Wheatley Report’ was developed by Judge Wheatley, and had contributions from the unpublished study by former footballer Walter Winterbottom.121 This study considered ‘the effectiveness of existing arrangements for crowd safety at sports grounds in Great Britain […] and the nature of any alterations in the law, which appear to be needed’.122 Although previous recommendations had not manifested itself in legislation, Wheatley’s proposals, though significantly adopted from those in the Lang Report, lead to what in 1975 became law through the ‘Safety at Sports Grounds Bill’.123 Although published in 1972, it did not become law until Labour had reclaimed power. The legislation of this bill demanded the arrangement of perimeter fences, crush barriers, gangways and fan segregation, in accordance with Howell’s policy of containment.124 During the legislative implementation of the ‘Safety at Sports Grounds Bill’ in 1975, Howell himself stated that:

‘It is not just a question of how we can control large numbers of people gathered together in a sport ground. Considerations of safety for the public have become much wider than that. They involve questions of discipline – perhaps ‘indiscipline’ is the right word – of the followers of the sport’.125

Evidently, Howell confirmed the rhetoric of Richard Lane, and while updating stadiums into ‘safe spaces’, they were additionally preventing disorderly behaviour, by creating tightly controlled and divided terrace areas. This development, at last

119 Ibid, p. 71
120 HO 300/113, 4 September 1974
121 Bebber, B. (2012) p. 249
123 Bebber, B. (2012) p. 79
124 Ibid p. 72
125 Hansard, HC Deb 18 January 1974 vol 867 cc1076-161
culminating in legislation, proved a tendency to raise the threshold of the means of containment.

### 3.1.2 Police organisation

As the number of violent episodes increased at football grounds, the police authorities were forced to readjust their tactics in order to retain a sensible amount of control. The policies were generated from the government, but the police conducted the everyday procedures at football ground. The adaptation of government policies led to what can be described as a state-mediated police response. In fact, the Home Office, as well as Denis Howell’s working party, consistently met with the Association of Police Officers, chief constables of different boroughs, local police officers and club officials in order to discuss and establish fixed routines and strategies applied when faced with hooligan activity. These routines were developed as the police co-operated with agents of higher rank, but additionally, everyone involved with football hooligans, including railway employees, club stewards and local shop-owners, attempted to generate integrated strategies to limit misdemeanours. The correspondence between chief constables and Home Office conveys a collection of information, both regarding the incentives of the government, as well as the strategies and procedures utilised by the police authorities.

From 1970 and onwards, the Home Office, first Mr D. J. Trevelyan, thereafter by Mr D. Howell himself, requested copies of police rapports from matches anticipating or experiencing football violence. Although similar documents regarding crowd safety at football matches can be traced in the 1960s as well, the agenda for the majority of the reports from the 1960s discusses possible ways of controlling crowds more effective, for example by requesting a set framework for the operational system of turnstiles, ticket allocations, supporter segregation and police communication. These reports indicate a variation of practices at football grounds, and therefore a lack of fixed preventive measures. Notably, in the span of the seasons 1965-1966 and 1966-1967, where the documentation is significant, around thirty matches are reported, and the majority contains insignificant or limited knowledge about current

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127 ‘Safety of crowds at football matches and other popular sports events’ from now on referred to as HO 446941/105 MEPO 2/9483
strategies for crowd control. Early correspondence emphasises a range of procedures, particularly on the issue of transport, setting guidelines for the operation of i.e. train ‘specials’. These guidelines were frequently general, with statements such as ‘if the British Transport Police have reason to think that hooliganism is likely to occur on a train, they will inform the local police’. However, as mentioned in the previous chapter, there seems to be several specific preventive measures in comparison particularly related to the co-operation between police, railway employees and the respective football clubs, such as: ‘clubs will be asked to provide on the trains Stewards, wearing armbands, up to three a coach, to whom free travel will be granted.’ More explicitly, in the fall of 1969, Luton FC was to provide ‘about 14 stewards from their [the clubs’] membership to liaise Railway Police Officers on the train’. The police reports in the late 1960s illustrates that organisational changes to transporting football supporters was extensive, however the specifics of employment and procedures at football grounds was less fixed going in to the 1970s. The culmination of political concerns in the early 1970s led Home Office to request information from police representatives, in order to ‘obtain some idea of its prevalence’ and enabling them to construct viable and fixed alternatives to solve the issue of hooliganism.

In light of the magnitude of police reports in this time frame, planning and provision at football grounds appeared more systematic. As the police became more experienced and the co-operation between the policy makers and policy enforcers increased, the procedures became more standardised throughout the early 1970s. Gary Armstrong argues that potentially ‘tough’ methods of control were justified, due to the government’s public image as ‘an institution of law and order’. Interpreting the political rhetoric of the Conservative Party as a crusade underlining authority and power, branches of government may gradually have adopted this notion. As the main influence of crowd control, the police organisation served as the primary image of authority for football spectators. The representation of authority was arguably manifested through the intimidating manoeuvre of having ‘power in numbers’. At

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128 ‘Request from Home Office for nomination for Metropolitan Police representatives to serve on Working Party dealing with Hooliganism at Soccer Matches’, from now on referred to as HO MEPO 2/11286, 20 November, 1969
129 Ibid
130 Ibid
131 HO 287/208051, 10 August 1972
several football stadiums in the late 1960s, police constables were invited to voluntarily supervise the crowd as support to the club stewards.\textsuperscript{133} The Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis clearly stated that ‘no hard rules are laid down’ in regard to police employment, but that the normal employment were one police constable per one thousand spectators.\textsuperscript{134} At a relative stalemate in police deployment in the first half of the 1960s, authorities eventually promoted a significant increase in police employment. Although the ratios between police and spectators were different depending on the respective club and the expected trouble, however, employment in the 1970s were drastically increasing, ranging at most to one police officer per eighty-nine spectators.\textsuperscript{135} Although this development was gradual, it has to be considered as the culmination of the significant pressures towards government, police authorities and football clubs to actively detect and act on hooligan behaviour.\textsuperscript{136}

However, significant police presence was not only the only factor associated to the perceived increase in authority. The 1970s also brought innovatory police aids, such as appropriating police dogs and police horses as assistive tools in crowd control.\textsuperscript{137} The function of police horses allowed for an effective way of segregating and controlling larger crowds and traffic, serving to prevent clashes between fan groups, and as means of intimidation. It was recognised that approximately twenty-seven out of the forty grounds in top-tier football utilised mounted police in order to retain order.\textsuperscript{138} Metropolitan Police had dismissed utilising dogs for crowd control altogether in the mid-1960s, due to its unpredictability.\textsuperscript{139} The shift in policing measures in the 1970s however, although contested in parliament, introduced the application of dogs at some matches, extending the authority of the police organisation.\textsuperscript{140} The overall approach was seemingly to prevent crime through intimidation. As the police authorities imposed themselves significantly within the football scene during the 1970s, both in terms of massive deployment and new instruments of control, they became the most prominent signifiers of authority at football grounds.

\textsuperscript{133} HO 446941/105 MEPO 2/9483, 20 January, 1966
\textsuperscript{134} Ibid, 27 January 1966
\textsuperscript{135} Bebber, B. (2012) p. 100
\textsuperscript{136} HO MEPO 2/11286 i.e. 12 September 1968, see also, HO MEPO 2/11286, 27 November 1969
\textsuperscript{137} HLG 120/1618, ’Winterbottom Report’, June 1975
\textsuperscript{138} Ibid
\textsuperscript{139} HO 446941/105 MEPO 2/9483, 3 June 1965
\textsuperscript{140} Hansard, HC Deb 04 December 1974 vol 882 cc1533-5
3.1.3 Intelligence

As the government addressed the issue of football hooliganism in a more serious manner, they opted to find solutions together with the commands directly responsible for safety and crowd control. As suggested previously, Denis Howell and other members of government were in direct contact with the police organisation, and police reports were directed to the Home Office, informing them of specific incidents, strategies and patterns of deployment. It is valuable to point out the distribution of roles within stadium policing. Collectively, the interaction between superintendents, inspectors, sergeants, club stewards, dog handlers and regular police constables, just to name a few, were essential in the strategic attempt of policing the crowd. Moreover, intelligence about hooligan tactics or specific violent persons was transmitted between clubs and police departments throughout England. However, the most prominent technical form of communication in and adjacent to the grounds was the radio. This had been an important feature in crowd control in the 1960s, nevertheless, as the police network became more comprehensive, 92% of football clubs used radio correspondence to facilitate effective crowd control in 1971. In some cities, even members of the contributed to support the authorities with information through radio and telephone. The preservation of radio technology was a continuation of the suggestions brought forward by Harrington and Lang, and proved to be the most significant method of communication within the policing network.

Although the majority of methods were traditional, alternative measures of identification were considered, particularly within Howell’s working party. Identifying individuals in big crowds were undoubtedly demanding for the authorities, and even though police had better preconditions due to the increase in deployment and more effective networks of communications, they gratified useful innovations enabling them to identify and apprehend the culprits. Although a regular procedure in other criminal matters, various departments attempted to create a common database of known hooligan gangs or individuals, by creating and sharing profiles of identification. Denis Howell even considered the possibility of supporters carrying identity cards through stadium admission, in order to ‘sort the chaff from the wheat’.

141 HLG 120/1618, 27 May 1971
142 Bebber, B. (2012) p. 115
143 HO 287/1630, 13 August, 1970
enabling the police to reject entrance for supporters that had a history of hooligan activity.\textsuperscript{144} These ideas exemplified a much-expanded practice of co-ordinating, surveillance and record-keeping section set up partly by the Home Office. Home Office minister of State called this expansion ‘part of the operational activities of the police […] not normally subject to Parliamentary Control’.\textsuperscript{145} Evidently, the developments of intelligence and co-ordination were not only improvements from the police organisation, but in a state of crisis, directed by a broad spectre of politicians of authority. However, the majority of various innovative measures were either not completed, or simply deemed unacceptable. However, some of the propositions, such as visual surveillance techniques, though regarded as inefficient and temporarily dismissed at the time, were to reappear as a significant factor in crowd control measures a decade later.\textsuperscript{146}

3.1.4 Summary

The exploration of preventive measures was predominantly a continuation of the ideas prospected by Lang and Harrington in the late 1960s. Although physical regulations were far more systemised and organised in the 1970s, the ‘Safety at Sports Grounds Act’ was not formally completed until 1975, and not immediately implemented by the majority of clubs. The general procedures developed by pressure groups and authorities improved crowd control, in terms of segregating the fans, but also through fixed distribution of roles between club and police. Arguably, the interventionist policies developed primarily by government officials, led to a representation of police as the principal body of authority within the football scene. However, strategies of policing brought the branches of government closer than before, and the network of intelligence were better equipped to prevent major indiscretions at football matches. Although the innovative proposals of crowd control were not as significant as expected, the existing measures going into the 1970s were arguably represented formally, through documentation and evaluation. It seems clear that particularly during the Conservative reign, the practices of crowd control endured a process of

\textsuperscript{144} AT 25/247, 6 August 1974
\textsuperscript{145} Bunyan, T. The History and Practice of the Political Police in Britain (London, Quartet Books, 1977) p. 85
\textsuperscript{146} Hansard, HC Deb 19 June 1975 vol 893 cc1743-803
evaluation, which involved the perspectives from what has been referred to as ‘social control agents’. In relation to this, Hall argues that it is a problematic issue connected to this construction in policy, and that the intimate relationship between police and government officials is a dangerous affair. As the police department sent ‘an open letter to all General Election candidates from the Police Federation’, arguing for a harder stance on hooliganism, the police engaged actively in the overarching policy solutions made by the government.\(^{147}\) Arguably, the ‘making’ of law and its enforcement should be a separated affair, and a blurring of distinctions where, as we have seen, police officials served as instigators of pressure towards magistrates, complicates the development of the ‘control culture’. In essence, ‘the police cannot both constitute a powerful crusading part of the ‘law and order lobby’ and maintain for long the semblance of social and political impartiality’.\(^{148}\) As the 1970s brought the police organisation into the public limelight, and evidently involved themselves actively in the discussion of punishment and legislation, the police participated in constructing public opinion, either through subscribing openly to the rhetoric of politicians, or reshaping the policies themselves in their practice.

3.2 Punitive measures

The early 1970s were emblematic in the way the police and the magistrates were encouraged to implement tougher politics. This notion supports John Kerr’s argument, that ‘popular wisdom about soccer hooliganism is that the government and judiciary should ‘get tough’ with soccer hooligans’.\(^{149}\) With this statement, he referred to the measures applied with the intention that hooligans should receive larger fines and longer prison sentences. The incremental changes in policy was broadly motivated by this ‘popular wisdom’, and complemented by the research conducted in reports from Lang and Harrington, in which they opted for more effective preventive measures, and in particular, adequate forms of punishment. A tougher position in regard to punitive measures was considered to be the most effective disincentive for future hooligan activities. Subsequently, the more or less unanimous request for strict

\(^{147}\) Hall, S. (1979) p. 16
\(^{148}\) Ibid, pp. 16-17
\(^{149}\) Kerr, J. (1994) p. 111
measures in parliament and in the media led to an evaluation of the current methods of discipline and the formation of new punitive practices.

3.2.1 Pressures

Previously in this thesis, punitive measures have been considered in relation to the recommendations of Lang and Harrington. In Harrington’s report, we established that a mere twenty per cent of culprits were apprehended, a statistic which concerned the general authorities. Although most frequent in 1950s and 1960s, certain social commentators still considered ‘the grounds as the source of trouble’, requesting that shutting down grounds was the most viable alternative of punishment. However, of the various solutions explored, several prominent figures called for steeper penalties for individuals. The main recipient of pressure had been the football clubs themselves, and their inability to structurally control their supporters. However, in the run up to the general election in 1970, the pressure gradually shifted towards individual sentences, issued by the courts and the magistrates.

The rationale in favour of harsher punishments was based on proclamations such as: ‘new situations need new remedies’ or ‘irrational processes will produce irrational reactions’. This development was a product of the crisis in football, currently so serious that the limit of punishment was considered insufficient. Several politicians who admittedly were affiliated with the ‘law and order lobby’, such as Howell or Hardaker, were unwilling at times, to admit that punishment should be more severe. The explanations for this reluctance could be that the early forms of pressure were not from ‘moral entrepreneurs’, but indirect pressures generated by the media. Newspapers regularly called out the ‘inadequacies of the magistrate’, in support of Conservative’s general castigation of supporter behaviour. The magistrate was accused of ‘encouraging crime’, due to their failure in discouraging hooligan activities through punishment. The notion of indirect pressure is supported by a quote from Conservative politician Reginald Maulding, who suggested that ‘the

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150 Harrington, J. A. (1968) pp. 43-44
151 Evening Standard, 15 August 1970
152 The Guardian, 7 February, 1970
153 Bebber, B. (2012) p. 137, see also, Hardaker’s comments on the courts in HO 287/208051, 27 August 1970, see also, Howell’s comments on the courts in HC Deb 27 April 1967 vol 745 cc1802-3
154 Evening News, 28 August 1970
155 The Guardian, 26 November 1975
Home Office could build public favour to persuade magistrates to impose harsher penalties’.156 As pressure mounted from the public sphere, it legitimised critical remarks from various authorities towards judiciaries, demanding stiffer sentences. Len Shipman, the President of the Football League referred to hooligans as ‘wild animals’, in calling for hasher punishments, and as the face of law and order, Denis Howell was central to the process of punitive escalation, particularly after he regained formal power as Minister of Sport in 1974.157 As he publicly proposed seemingly harsh and inventive punitive measures, Howell and his followers slowly confronted the independence of the judiciary, aiming to reform the boundaries of legislation and punishment.

3.2.2 Exploring punishment

In parallel with the physical restructuring of football stadiums and tactical organisation of police deployment, the processes of punishment were changing during the early 1970s. The way in which police dealt with hooligans once apprehended can be regarded as the first stage of punishment. With an increased in police authority inside stadiums, actually arresting hooligan supporters were important in demonstrating the shift in relations. Director of Public Prosecutions argued that the most effective way of combating hooliganism ‘was quick, effective justice […] likely to deter further acts of hooliganism’.158 Deep into the 1960s, the work tasks for police officials mainly stated that police should support stewards with ejecting supporters, rather than arresting them.159 In reality, the normal proceedings in this period were ejection. For example, during a match in Liverpool in 1971, two hundred and thirty-two persons were ejected, and only nine people where charged with offences.160 Arguably, performing arrests were an expensive, complex and time-consuming endeavour, both for local police departments and courts, in contrast to verbal warnings or ejections. At a match in Luton, the Chief Constable estimated that:

156 HO 287/1630 13 August 1970
157 Daily Mirror, 6 May 1974
158 HO 287/1500, 20 October 1969
159 HO MEPO 2/11286, 12 September 1968
160 HO 287/208051, 24 August 1971
In this particular case, the cost alone would range up to £6000. The range of strategies used to apprehend the offenders were more advanced compared to previous times, and the police utilised both ‘snatch squads’ to single out culprits, and group arrests when collective violence occurred. They were recommended arresting as many subjects as possible, especially in serious cases of violence. Subsequently, if disturbances at stadiums were blown up in the media, police felt compelled to defend the low number of arrests. Arguably, registering incidents of misbehaviour was indicative of the gravity of football hooliganism, and while ejecting supporters proved to be an effective way of removing problematic individuals in the short term, it was a method that excluded specifying which types of offenses that were made, and the number of ejections were not always registered in police reports. Although the most convenient measures in terms of punishments also were the most common, there was a steady flow of new punitive proposals. The ‘Lang Report’ had early on argued for the implementation of detention rooms, and although an effective implementation did not materialise, the local magistrates found the more acceptable alternative of ‘holding’ offenders for a limited period in order to prevent future disruption. Another alternative punishment proposed by the courts was the facilitation of Attendance Centres. It was presented as a motion that would keep teenage criminals from going to matches. Although this practice was implemented in some areas of Britain, making adequate punishments for young hooligans was difficult. Generally, if the culprit were seventeen years old or younger, like the majority of hooligans were, they were handed soft penalties. On the other hand, Howell, being lenient to strict measures, considered the restoration of corporal punishment as an option. Even mandatory military service for offenders was envisaged. However, logistical and legislative obstructions meant that these suggestions were never implemented. For the

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161 HO 287/208051, 30 August 1975
162 Ibid
163 Bebber, B. (2012) p. 104
164 Ibid, pp. 109-110
165 Bebber, B. (2012) p. 130
166 AT 60/41, 30 July 1975
167 HO 287/208051 Undated, 1973
most part, whenever arrests were made, the courts and magistrate applied traditional punishments. Of the several classifications of offenses listed in police reports between 1970-1975, ‘threatening behaviour’, ‘possessing offensive weapons’, ‘drunk and disorderly’ and ‘criminal damage’ were the most common.\footnote{HO 287/208051} For these matters, the responsibility of prosecution rested first and foremost with the local magistrate. The distinction between magistrates and the courts is essential in this manner. Ordinarily, the magistrate prosecuted minor offences, and therefore the vast majority of hooligan cases. In the occasions where violence was more severe, the case was passed through to the courts. Judge Justice Ashworth, which incidentally carried out the last death sentence in the United Kingdom, stated that ‘a deterrent sentence is not meant to fit the offender, it is meant to fit the offence’.\footnote{Sunday Times, 18 October 1970} Arguably, this rhetoric deemed the social and financial position of the offender as irrelevant, or rather; associated poverty with punishment. The ‘Harrington Report’ had concluded that most hooligans were working class people or teenagers, a theory that most likely was supported in parliament as well.\footnote{Harrington, J. A. (1968) pp. 11-14} In relation to youth punishment, Pearson argues that the outcome of the ‘Children and Young Persons Act’ of 1969, was indicated by a ‘sudden quantum-leap’ of crime registered amongst young people.\footnote{Pearson, G. (1983) p. 217} Pearson argues that the figures are deceiving, and an investigation of patterns of record keeping and types of punishment must be considered.\footnote{Ibid} In particular, ‘differentiated punishment’ posed a conundrum in relation to judiciary practice. As pressure mounted towards magistrates, they defended their rights to determine the standards of punishment, opting for fines in most cases. The Powers of Criminal Courts Act from 1973 safeguarded this policy, as it required that magistrates consider the means of the offender when assigning a fine.\footnote{Ibid} Subsequently, teenagers or lower class citizens were realistically able to pay their fines back to the government. This notion contrasted the favoured policy amongst many politicians, where overwhelming ticket prices and disproportionate fines where suggested as the preferable strategy of eliminating working-class elements within the football scene.\footnote{Ibid, p. 132}

Although the majority of criminal prosecutions were issued by magistrates
during the early 1970s, politicians continuously advocated prosecution of criminals in courts rather than handing out fines. However, as late as in 1975, when one hundred people were arrested during a round of fixtures in the top division, only two of them were sentenced in court, where as the rest were handed fines. In August the same year, sixty-one supporters were arrested due to serious riots and threats. As deduced by police reports, approximately seventy-five per cent of the suspects were charged with ‘threatening behaviour’. This was a charge, which, according to Bebber, would maximum be treated with a fine of one hundred pounds, or three months imprisonment. The majority of the culprits were handed modest fines, with the opportunity to pay them down in instalments, in line with the aforementioned Criminal Courts Act. Firstly, these practices did not represent the rhetoric of many supporters of the law and order theme, however, it showcased the relative independence of the magistrates and the courts. Secondly, although the police deployment was substantial in this period, the amount of resources and effort that were required by local departments to follow the path of formal punishments, were seemingly unmanageable. This led the exercising authorities to apply practical and traditional alternatives of punishment.

3.2.3 Summary

In terms of punitive measures, there is an assumption that ‘the threat of seriously aversive consequences will moderate the violent and aggressive behaviours which are associated with many young football enthusiasts’. The punitive measures were designed through the idea that hooligan acts were calculated and goal-oriented, however, according to a study conducted by psychologist A. J. Bowers; ‘this is less likely to be the case for adolescent delinquents’. Without going into too much detail of the psychological aspects of crime, Eric Dunning makes the distinction between ‘instrumental’ and ‘expressive’ violence, and in support to other sociologists such as

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176 Ibid p. 132
177 The Guardian, 2 September 1975
178 HO 287/208051, 30 August 1975
179 Ibid
181 HO 287/208051, 30 August 1975
183 Kerr, J. (1994) p. 111
John Kerr, claims that football violence in the early 1970s were for the most part expressive violence.\textsuperscript{184} This notion may undermine hooligan behaviour as pointless, rather than regarded as ‘a form of resistance’.\textsuperscript{185} However, the perceived ‘cycles of violence’ relates to why some of the most prominent social commentators reject the government’s approach to punishment.\textsuperscript{186} In this context, it is essential to explain two distinctive approaches. These distinctions may be referred to as ‘soft’ solutions, or ‘hard’ solutions.\textsuperscript{187} Soft solutions may involve measures of rehabilitation or other creative outlets, based on a process that Pearson refers to as ‘consent through a constructive educational dialogue’.\textsuperscript{188} In contrast, ‘hard’ measures is emblematic for the perceived ‘law and order society’, and regardless of its success, was synonymous with the rhetoric by a division of politicians in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The demands for more discipline and stiff sentences, in parliament or in the media intensified the so-called ‘control culture’, which inevitably, at least according to sociologists such as Armstrong and Hobbs, represented a disproportionate response to the problem.\textsuperscript{189} Giulianotti, along with the majority of scholars who work on football hooliganism, argues that the government failed to address the underlying roots of the problem when calling for ‘hard’ solutions, such as corporal punishments and heavy fines.\textsuperscript{190} The perceived failure from the authorities to apply measures that were both effective and acceptable may further have increased hostility and crime at football grounds.

\textsuperscript{184} Dunning, E. \textit{et al} (1988) p. 236
\textsuperscript{185} Hall, S. (1976), see also, Taylor, I. (1968)
\textsuperscript{186} Bebber, B. (2012) p. 3
\textsuperscript{187} Cohen, S. (1987) p. 89
\textsuperscript{188} Pearson, G. (1983) p. 238
\textsuperscript{190} Giulianotti, R. (1994) p. 15
4 Conclusions

4.1 The shape of ‘law and order politics’

The unmistakable shift in rhetoric during the last few years of the 1960s, and particularly in the 1970s, implied a strong sense of change in policy. If we are to consider the election in 1970 as the ‘tip of the pendulum’ in this respect, it is imperative to look beyond the mere rhetoric, and towards a shift in formal action. This is not to say that rhetoric is irrelevant when analysing the political tensions in this period, because the rhetoric applied were essential for the development of the ‘law and order society’. If the implications of ‘aggressive rhetoric’ were set within a stage-development, similar to how Cohen analyses the social and political reactions to ‘Mods and Rockers’, it is relevant to include the process of ‘diffusion’. ‘Diffusion’ involves a level of ‘mass hysteria’, where the concerns about specific incidents, or a series of incidents, are felt beyond the immediate victims. This relates to a shift from local concern, to national concern regarding football hooliganism. Without going into too much depth in the theoretical discussion of ‘mass hysteria’, or ‘moral panic’, which are very loaded terms, we must not underestimate the role of politicians and other authorities, in tandem with the media as fabricating ‘public opinion. The rhetoric used, especially by Denis Howell and the ‘law and order lobby’, as well as officials from football authorities and police authorities, at least founded the perception of a ‘law and order society’.

The legitimisation of the hard stance on football hooliganism stemmed more or less on a perceived increase of misbehaviour and violence by football supporters. When the Conservative Party started their campaign, relating crime to ‘permissiveness’ in the mid-1960s, they frequently referred to increased crime levels as a result of ‘unprecedented change […] attributed in part to the breakdown of certain spontaneous agencies of social control which worked in the past’, such as family, local loyalties and the church. As crime levels kept rising, as seen for example in Eugene Trivizas’ research, the state of society were epitomised by the

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192 Crime Knows No Boundaries (Conservative Political Centre, 1966) p. 11
need for interventionist politics.\textsuperscript{193} Contrasting the perception that a breakdown of the family and local loyalties are to blame for the social crisis that emerged, is the perspective of sociologist Geoffrey Pearson. He argues that the continuous issue of class is to blame, and interestingly, claims that the ‘social crisis’ that emerged is based on a myth.\textsuperscript{194} The problem with establishing the need for law and order based on rising crime is associated with the ambiguity of criminal statistics in itself. As we have seen, the number of changing factors in ‘policing strategies’ introduced in the late 1960s and early 1970s complicates the trustworthiness of criminal statistics. In reference to changes in police deployment, the mere fact that police presence at football stadiums increased significantly was essential for the detection of criminal activity. Furthermore, the effectiveness of deterrence was helped by upgrading the means of communication and more effective co-operation between those responsible for crowd control. As the police was pressured to arresting hooligans, in contrast to the informal notion of an ejection or warning, the authorities demanded better procedures in registering offenses. Without subscribing to the perspective of those rejecting that a ‘shift’ in law and order happened, it is feasible to have in mind that statements about rising crime may be what Pearson refers to as ‘logically undecidable’.\textsuperscript{195} While crime statistics were occasionally presented in order to generate a sense of crisis or to gain political capital, it is on the other hand reasonable to recognise that football hooliganism persisted as a significant crime problem in England through the 1970s.

Whether or not 1970 proved to be a break in continuity is based on a number of assumptions about the mechanisms of a ‘law and order society’. Arguably, police reports and news articles spotlighted the growing incidents of football hooliganism in the early 1960s.\textsuperscript{196} However, it did not appear as a locus of inquiry in parliament until 1967.\textsuperscript{197} Richard Giulianotti makes the periodical distinction of political attention to football hooliganism, and refers to the period of 1968-1970 as phase of maturing concerns.\textsuperscript{198} Arguably, concerns from police officials, the media and the public were frequent in the preceding years, however, the construction of the Harrington and Lang

\textsuperscript{193} Trivizas, E. ‘Crowd Dynamics And the Prevention And Control Of Collective Disorders’ in \textit{The Police Journal} 56:2 (1982) p. 156
\textsuperscript{195} Ibid, p. 218
\textsuperscript{196} Dunning, E. \textit{et al} (1988) pp. 8-12
\textsuperscript{197} \textit{Hansard}, HC Deb 27 April 1967 vol 745 cc1802-3
\textsuperscript{198} Giulianotti, R. \textit{et al}. (1994) pp. 12-30
reports proved that concerns were escalating on a political level as well. Consequently, the 1960s proved to be a period of incremental changes in political attention, culminating in a period where responsibility gradually shifted from football clubs to the branches of government. According to Giulianotti, the transitional features of the 1970s may prove to be a policy of ‘reflexivity’, where authorities exert their power in a reactive or spontaneous way.\textsuperscript{199} It appears evident that the ‘hard rhetoric’ of politicians during a moment of crisis in 1970 may be overstated, as it did not materialise fully in ‘action’. However, although the measures appropriated by the ‘law and order government’ were not, in Stuart Hall’s words, ‘swift and sweeping’, increased pressure towards police and courts arguably led to a recognition of hooligan behaviour as criminal action.\textsuperscript{200} The mode of ‘reflexivity’ was still present in the 1970s, however, some preventive strategies led to a more organised approach to football hooliganism. Through formal punishment and better information about hooligan disorder communicated to the Home Office, the police and government were somewhat able to determine the current condition at football grounds; which proved to be an higher ratio of detected crime. However, as each official initiative on soccer hooliganism was portrayed more or less like a coherent response to the problem, clubs, politicians, magistrates and police authorities struggled, or were unwilling to implement recommendations presented, delaying the progress in creating a ‘law and order society’. Even though Howell and his devotees did not receive substantial public opposition, they were seemingly unable to successfully exert their power on the authorities involved with crowd control and punishment. However, the rhetoric of certain figures of authority demonstrated the readiness to advocate violence to prevent violence, which certainly shaped the relationship between the authorities and the football supporters in the early 1970s, as well as in the future.

\subsection*{4.2 Authorities in question}

Although football is not the only context in which hooligan behaviour transpires, it is unusually persistent. While stylistic subcultures has come and gone during most of the century, football hooliganism can be perceived as a constant threat to British society for at least two decades. Rohan Taylor argues that that ‘the immediate causes for

\textsuperscript{199} Ibid, p. 14
\textsuperscript{200} Hall, S. (1978) p. 278
football’s problems seem obvious: ‘chronic hooliganism and poor administration, in deadly combination’. The idea that poor administration might have triggered further violence, is a popular notion in ‘hooligan literature’, and agreed upon by aforementioned scholars such as Stanley Cohen, Brett Bebber and Eric Dunning. This relates to what in scholarly terms can be called ‘deviancy amplification’, and refers to the process of interaction between society and the ‘deviant’, in this case, represented by the football hooligan. In short terms, each event can be seen as creating potential for a reaction which might cause further acts of deviance. The introduction of more intensive policing and eventually, extensive physical restrictions, was implemented within the framework of more effective crowd control, hoping to decrease incidents of violent behaviour. Based on the perceived policy by the government, measures of fan segregation, intimidating police aids and formal punishment was important elements of responses to football hooliganism. In some cases, the preliminary approaches from the government and the police may have led to escalating forms of disorder.

There are two incidents, in Leeds, and in Manchester, which epitomises some of the issues that may have contributed to shaping the perceived impression of the police as ‘amplifiers of deviance’. Following a fixture between Manchester City and Middlesbrough in 1975, the number of arrests and ejections had been ‘unusually high’. The comprehensive police report displayed, that there had been a concern regarding police discipline, or rather, police negligence by the Manchester Police. After the match had finished, supporters of Middlesbrough had been fearful of the major disturbances around their coach, and had requested several times to be escorted by the police force. Assistance was rejected by this group of officials, and correspondingly, some police constables had supposedly said: ‘I don’t give a toss […] I’m fucking off home’ as well as: ‘if you are daft enough to come here, you take the consequences’. The incidents headlined local newspapers the following weeks, spotlighting police responsibilities in safety matters. In Leeds the same year, fans expressed similar resentment towards the police, complaining that they were treated in a similar manner as ‘second-rate citizens’ or ‘hooligans’. In a letter sent to Denis

201 Taylor, R. (1992) p. 3
203 HO 281/2053, 23 April 1975
204 Ibid
205 Northern Echo, 31 March 1975, see also, Manchester Evening News, 29 March 1975, see also, Middlesbrough Evening Gazette, 29 March 1975, 31 March 1975, 1 April 1975
Howell, they expressed that on a general note, ‘the attitudes of the police to the fans left much to be desired’. The foundation of this statement was what they had heard and seen by police officials. The aggressiveness of the police was symbolised through statements like: ‘I would like to see a lot of you get done’. Furthermore, the letter also described a situation where a supporter was supposedly being dragged out of the stadium by his hair and threw into a wired fence. In general, as the physical restructuring in stadiums took form, and police were handed more authority, cases like these were presented to the Home Office regularly. Evidently, scholars argue that the police systematically discriminated and acted excessively in the attempt of controlling the crowds, although the government would occasionally play this down in the media. On a related note, Dunning argues that the introduction of more sophisticated strategies by the police appears to have contributed to an increase in the sophistication of the tactics and organisation of the hooligans, in a ‘process of mutual reinforcement’. Undoubtedly, during the whole of the 1970s, many hooligans seemed to respond with strategies created to defy the controlling measures inside and outside stadiums. The existence of so-called hooligan ‘firms’, based on effective hierarchies, organisation and intelligence exemplified how hooligans re-adjusted to an ever-expanding control culture. In relation to the extension of authority, it was argued that ‘until a different attitude is taken to the man on the terrace, violence will increase’, indicating that the approach taken by the governing authorities, led to a general escalation of violence, rather than safety or control.

A relevant aspect when considering the perceived escalation in police brutality and negligence is the dichotomy between the approach taken by the control culture, and the observations made by sociologists in this period. The general consensus within ‘hooligan literature’ appears to reject the majority of the state-mediated responses developed within a political environment aspiring to be on the offensive in regard to football hooligans. In terms of criminology discourse, Jock Young and Ian Taylor contributed to the construction of the literary direction labelled ‘left realism’.

206 HO 287/208051 8 October 1975
207 Ibid
210 Watt, T. The End: 80 Years of Life on Arsenal’s North Bank (Edinburgh, Mainstream, 1993) pp. 130-1
This scholarly ideology was based on the rejection of right-wing politics, represented by the ‘law and order agenda’ of the Conservatives in the early 1970s.\textsuperscript{211} Supporters of this perspective have argued that if the ‘intervention strategies took more account of the condition and position of football hooligans’, they would be more likely to succeed in their endeavours.\textsuperscript{212} Roger Ingham, a scholar engaged with ‘hooligan psychology’, received a letter from a supporter wishing for the implementation of rehabilitative measures, rather than strict punishment.\textsuperscript{213} He further argues for ‘more self-determining projects and […] to be educated in social awareness’.\textsuperscript{214} The implementation of ‘reform’, as opposed to ‘reaction’ is a recommendation pursued by the likes of Geoffrey Pearson, Roger Ingham and Brett Bebber, and coincides with the rhetoric of trendsetters such as Stanley Cohen and Stuart Hall. Although these scholars have a strong position in ‘hooligan literature’, more recent research, contest these perspectives. Gary Armstrong argues that portraying hooliganism simply as ‘an overblown Trojan horse, which has made it possible for the British police to introduce and normalise covert tactics and strategies of surveillance’ fails to hand the spectators any accountability to the problem.\textsuperscript{215} The orientations of the majority of scholars involved with ‘hooligan literature’ have at times been criticised for being too policy-oriented, as sympathisers of a subculture that contributes to the mayhem seen consistently at football grounds.\textsuperscript{216} A potential problem with analysing football hooliganism in its widest social context, similar to some of the work of left-realists, is the application of theoretical models supposedly relevant for all instances of social deviance. In particular, although social context is essential for understanding deviant behaviour, there might be a slight tendency to disregard the reality of hooligan activities, particularly going into the 1980s.

The causation of football hooliganism is certainly affiliated with society’s class divisions; however, the numerous factors involved with the growth of hooligan behaviour are too broad to cover extensively in a single research project. This project

\textsuperscript{212} Kerr, J. (1994) 112
\textsuperscript{213} Ingham, R. et al (1978) p. 102
\textsuperscript{214} Ibid
\textsuperscript{216} For critiques on subcultural theories, see in particular, Williams, J., in Williams, J. et al (1991) pp. 176-180, see also, Dunning, E., in Dunning, E. et al (1988) pp. 218-221
has been concerned with the actual implementation of ‘law and order’. Although it has been argued the ‘war on hooliganism’ was less significant than what may have been expected in the first half of the 1970s, the tensions within the political and social environment affected the climate at football grounds and at newspaper stands. The discussions presented in this thesis culminate in the notion that the first attempt at controlling the crisis was a product of ‘law and order rhetoric’. In retrospect, this approach did not prove to be particularly effective in putting the hooligan problem to an end. However, it founded the legitimacy of interventionist politics within the football scene, which only increased throughout the 1970s and under the Thatcher government in the 1980s. Football hooliganism would continue to be a significant social problem for governments adopting a ‘law and order approach’, as predicted in 1971 by ‘leftists’ such as Ian Taylor:

As long as the controllers of soccer and the wider society proceed in this way, we can expect resistance to continue. We may even predict a change in its extent and expression. Aside from violence and aside from invasions, the soccer hooligan may indeed begin to organize. I cannot imagine that the soccer conscious will be beaten until the final whistle blows.217

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Appendix

The thesis relevance to my work in the Norwegian educational system

The topic of my thesis relates to various academic disciplines, where as sociology and history are the most influential elements. Arguably, social and cultural studies are an essential part of the curriculum, as the students should be able to 'discuss and elaborate culture and social conditions in several English-speaking countries'. Indeed, one of the main subject areas includes the skill to analyse 'cultural forms of expression from the media', also a significant part of this thesis. The media represents a significant subject for analysis, particularly in the social sciences.

This points directly to another important academic skill; to provide an adequate response to the source material you are investigating. As an example, the specific competence aims for English refers to 'independent and critical use of sources' as essential. This is of course a part of the 'Core Curriculum', as the students should have the ability to examine to 'test one's explanation by examination of sources'.

I feel confident that, through researching various source material, such as police reports from the national archives and large theory-heavy sociologic literature, I am able to distinctly evaluate source material and its worth for any given subject in the English curriculum. In relation to the topic of study, the social crisis of the 1960s was influential for the development of British culture, and the position of criminals in society are highly significant aspect of social structures. In my position as a teacher in both English and history, I may use this topic and similar topics to explain the relation between social and historical developments, and important facet of understanding culture.

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219 Ibid