Andreas Kagiavas Torp

Chios and the Ancient Greek Superpowers

An Examination of Chios' Role in the Peloponnesian War

Master’s thesis in History
Supervisor: Staffan Wahlgren
Trondheim, May 2017

Norwegian University of Science and Technology
Faculty of Humanities
Department of Historical Studies
# Table of Contents

**Table of Contents** .................................................................................................................. iii

**Acknowledgments** .................................................................................................................. v

1.0 **Introduction** ....................................................................................................................... 1
   1.1 **Historiography** ..................................................................................................................... 2
   1.2 **Research question and methodology** ..................................................................................... 5
   1.3 **Presentation of original work and findings** ........................................................................... 7
   1.4 **Battles in the Peloponnesian war** ......................................................................................... 8

2.0 **Chios’ way to power – trade, wealth and manpower** .......................................................... 25
   2.1 **Early beginnings – Chian trade in the Archaic period** ......................................................... 26
   2.2 **Chios’ trade connections** ..................................................................................................... 29
   2.3 **Grain trade and manpower – the backbone of the Chian navy** ........................................... 32
   2.4 **Goods Chios traded** ............................................................................................................ 35
      2.4.1 **Slaves** ........................................................................................................................... 37
   2.5 **Chian trade and Chios’ role in the Peloponnesian war** ....................................................... 38

3.0 **Chian naval contribution between 431 B.C. and 412 B.C.** ................................................ 41
   3.1 **Chios in the early stages of the war** ..................................................................................... 42
   3.2 **Where was Chios? A short discussion on Athens’ show of force between 430 and 425 B.C.** 44
   3.3 **Chios back in the game** ...................................................................................................... 47
   3.4 **Chios compared to other states** ............................................................................................ 54
   3.5 **Chios’ politics and choices** .................................................................................................. 56
   3.6 **End of Chian naval contribution – revolt in sight** .............................................................. 59

4.0 **Revolt against Athens – Chios at the forefront** .................................................................. 63
   4.1 **Talks of revolt** ..................................................................................................................... 63
   4.2 **Major crisis and Athenian response** .................................................................................... 67
   4.3 **Burning bridges – the Chians decline Astyochus’ proposal** ................................................. 70
   4.4 **Turning point – Chios is free from Athens’ grasp** .............................................................. 73
   4.5 **Chios and its dependency on individuals rather than states** ........................................... 76
   4.6 **End of revolt and end of the war** ....................................................................................... 78

5.0 **Conclusions** ....................................................................................................................... 81
   5.1 **Aftermath** .......................................................................................................................... 83
   5.2 **Further study** ..................................................................................................................... 84

6.0 **Bibliography** ....................................................................................................................... 87
   6.1 **Primary sources** ................................................................................................................ 87
   6.2 **Secondary literature** ......................................................................................................... 87
6.3 Web pages ........................................................................................................ 89
6.4 Maps .................................................................................................................. 90
Acknowledgments

I would like to thank my supervisor, Staffan Wahlgren, for excellent supervision and guidance. Even though we have not always been in the same city, or the same country even, you have never been more than an email away. Of this I am very grateful.

My mom, dad and sister deserve the biggest of thanks, as they have been there for me whenever I needed them. A special thanks to my late grandmother, Anne Marie Kagiavas, and my grandfather Michalis Kagiavas, who always supported me and had so high hopes for me. Without their support this thesis would never have been written. I would also like to thank the rest of my family for being so supportive, aiding me through what has been two wonderful, but sometimes difficult, years.

Trine and Sandra deserve a special thanks for their amazing friendship and for proof reading my thesis. Many thanks are also in place to all my friends, especially those at the reading room and DHS, for all your care and for the great times we have had over the past two years.

All mistakes are my own.
1.0 Introduction

From 460 to 445 B.C., Athens and Sparta had been at war, in what is called the First Peloponnesian war. In 445, the so-called the Thirty Year’s Truce was concluded. However, this truce was broken in 433, when Thebes, an ally of Sparta, attacked Plataea, an ally of Athens. With the truce broken, in 431 B.C., a 27 year long war began, called the Second Peloponnesian war, or, more commonly, as it will be referred to here, the Peloponnesian war.

The conflict soon developed into a war that concerned most of the Greek areas of the Mediterranean. After being rather evenly fought for the first 20 years, with the occasional truce, the war ended, in 404 B.C., with Spartan victory. Many factors contributed to the Spartan win, but one of the chief reasons seems to have been the Athenian defeat in Sicily in 413 B.C., which lead to a major uprising and revolt against Athens among their allies, thus giving the Spartan alliance a much stronger stance in the Aegean. However, the Spartan win came with major losses, and Sparta only held the city of Athens for about a year. In any case, the Peloponnesian war was a grand war between the two definite superpowers of Greece at that time.

Even though the Peloponnesian war was a great war between two superpowers, it is important not to forget the many smaller contributors and allies on each side. Many historians seem to overlook these, or at least choose not to put emphasis on them. One such ally, and perhaps the most important, was Chios, which was one of the three states in the Athenian alliance that contributed with ships to the war effort, the other two being Lesbos and Samos. Although Chios, of course, was not as powerful as Athens or Sparta themselves, it still was a powerful, moderately important and wealthy island state in ancient Greece: certainly more so than its neighbours Lesbos and Samos, and perhaps just as powerful as Corinth (that supported Sparta). Now, considering the trend in historical research which focuses on microhistory or the details of history, I believe it to be in its place to analyse the smaller city states’ place in this war. With this as starting-point, my master thesis intends to make an original contribution to the research on the Peloponnesian war by investigating the role of Chios.
1.1 Historiography

Before I discuss the secondary literature, I would like to comment briefly upon some of my primary sources and the persons behind these, namely Thucydides and Xenophon. In short, no research could be done on the Peloponnesian war without their accounts.

Thucydides was an Athenian general and historian who fought for the Athenians during the Peloponnesian war until he was exiled after failing to defend Amphipolis against the Spartan commander Brasidas in the winter of 424/23 B.C. Little is known about Thucydides, except from what he says about himself, namely that he was the son of Olorus, and that he himself caught the plague that ended many Athenian lives at the beginning of the war. Even though his family provided opponents of the democratic leader Pericles, Thucydides himself became an admirer of Pericles. Thucydides returned to Athens at the end of the war, but his narrative ends in the middle of 411 B.C.

Thucydides is often compared to Herodotus, his predecessor and the "father of history", but the two wrote very different kinds of history. Herodotus’ history was full of anecdotes and short stories about faraway lands and unknown peoples. Thucydides’ account on the other hand stays much more on topic, retelling the story of the Peloponnesian war much more to the point, and as an eyewitness to many events he narrates the story with great accuracy. The Peloponnesian War was the only work Thucydides wrote, as far as we know. Most of the time he stays, or so it seems, relatively unbiased, retelling events as they happened, but he sometimes forgets himself, and gives a seemingly subjective view. Modern historians believe that Thucydides’ judgement of several important figures in the war is hardly accurate and there is to this day a debate on his account of the Megarian Decree, a law in Athens forbidding Megarians entering into the Athenian trade markets and the ports of its allies. By some ancient people, such as Aristophanes, the Megarian Decree was considered the true reason for the war. Despite being criticised for some aspects of his work, Thucydides is for

---

2 Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War 4.104.
3 Thucydides, 2.48.
4 Rhodes, ‘Introduction’
most of the Peloponnesian war our only source, and should be considered as very valuable as such.

Xenophon was an Athenian soldier and historian, who wrote, among other works, the Hellenica which I use as a primary source in this thesis. He was born in Athens in the early 420s B.C., but his admiration for Sparta led to his banishment.\(^6\) He fought as a mercenary leader in the east, and he fought together with the Spartan king Agesilaus II in Anatolia, which led to the king giving him an estate near Olympia on Xenophon’s return to Greece.\(^7\) In 371 he was forced to move to Corinth, but was allowed to move back to Athens in 365, where he died in the late 350s.\(^8\)

As a historian, Xenophon may have helped publish Thucydides’ Peloponnesian War, and he definitely wrote his own Hellenica, or A History of My Times as it is also known.\(^9\) He also wrote other texts such as the Symposium, and a book on Cyrus the Great, and inspired great authors such as Arrian of Nicomedia, the author of the Anabasis.\(^10\) It is however the Hellenica that I am concerned with in this thesis, as it that of his works which deals specifically with the Peloponnesian war and also begins as a continuation of Thucydides’ account of the same. The style in which the beginning of the Hellenica is written is similar to that of Thucydides, but Xenophon lacks the depth of the analysis.\(^11\) This is probably due to the fact that Thucydides was much more interested in the politics around the war, whereas Xenophon seems much more interested in the mechanics of warfare. In any case, the Hellenica is our only remaining source written so close to the events, and dealing with the later part of the war, making it an essential source in order to sum up Chios’ role during this crucial period in Ancient Greek history.

As for secondary literature, there has been little to no research on the subject of my master thesis, i.e. the Peloponnesian war with special reference to the contribution made by Chios. It goes without saying that there are a great number of publications, large and small, on the subject of the Peloponnesian war as such, but these are mostly rather general works, or they examine the war from an Athenian or Spartan point of view. George Grote’s History of


\(^{7}\) Livius.org, ‘Xenophon’, http://www.livius.org/articles/person/xenophon/, last accessed 08.05.17

\(^{8}\) Cawkwell, ‘Introduction’

\(^{9}\) Cawkwell, ‘Introduction’

\(^{10}\) Livius.org, ‘Xenophon’, http://www.livius.org/articles/person/xenophon/, last accessed 08.05.17

\(^{11}\) Livius.org, ‘Xenophon’, http://www.livius.org/articles/person/xenophon/, last accessed 08.05.17
Greece was really the starting point of modern research on the Peloponnesian war. The first volume was published in 1846, and the twelfth and last volume was published in 1856, and it remains to this day one of the most influential works on the history of ancient Greece, volumes six to eight being of interest to the study of the Peloponnesian war, and, perhaps, volume seven in particular, in which Chios is mentioned quite a lot. However, much of what Grote says about Chios is the same as what can be found in Thucydides’ narrative, and the original work done by Grote on Chios is unfortunately not detailed enough. Understandably, even great works such as Grote’s cannot go into enough detail on every subject, and the History of Greece still stands as one of the most influential works on Greek history.

In more recent times, it is Donald Kagan, with The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War (1969), The Archidamian War (1974), The Peace of Nicias and the Sicilian Expedition (1981) and The Fall of the Athenian Empire (1987), who is probably the leading expert on the Peloponnesian war. In 2003, these four studies were cramped together into one book called The Peloponnesian War, which of course loses much detail, but gives a very useful overview over the war. However, all of these works are lacking in detail when it comes to smaller states like Chios. This is of course as expected, since these books are covering basically every aspect of the war and, therefore, details must be missed.

The same is true for G. E. M. de Ste. Croix’s The Origins of the Peloponnesian War, published in 1972. However, as he for the most part only covers the outbreak of the war, his contribution is of even smaller significance for my paper. Nevertheless, since he offers a different view from what earlier historians had said about who to blame for the war, his is an important work in the historiography of the Peloponnesian war.

Even though these works are all substantial and enlighten the Peloponnesian war very well, they, as indicated, do so broadly, thus putting the smaller states in the background, or leaving them out altogether. Therefore, they have not been used to a great extent in this thesis for anything more than gaining a good overview of the period. In sum, it seems to me that there is a lack of good book-length studies on the lesser states that took part in the war. In fact, various minor articles and journal papers are of greater importance to the historiography of Chios in the Peloponnesian war than the great works discussed above.

Among the few publications with Chios in the centre of attention, Chios in the Athenian Empire by J. P. Barron is among the most important. The article deals with Chios as part of the Athenian Empire from the two first decades of the Delian League until the Peloponnesian
war. What Barron is concerned with is whether we hear little of Chios in this period because there was no news, i.e. that nothing (of great consequence) happened to Chios in this period, or whether there was some other reason why we hear little of Chios. In any case, his paper gives us a good general overview of Chios over a fairly long period of time, but it never reaches for the depth of things.

*Athens and Samos, Lesbos and Chios: 478-404 B.C.* by T. J. Quinn has also been very useful to me, although it does not focus especially on Chios in this war. Instead, it analyses Samos, Lesbos and Chios in separate chapters through the entire 5th century and their connection with Athens. This leaves Chios with only 10 pages of this book, most of which focuses on Chios in the time of the Peloponnesian war. However, all we get is a rather broad overview of Chian affairs with the Athenians in this period. Nevertheless, both this book and that of Barron do conclude that little is known or can be said about Chios for most of the period they analyse. In my opinion this may be true in terms of politics, but from an economic standpoint the story is rather different.

For this reason, *The Financial History of Ancient Chios*, by P. Gardner, has been very helpful. Gardner’s paper focuses obviously more on the financial aspects of Chian history, and it has been very useful in the second chapter of my thesis, but again, it does not deal with the specific topic of my master thesis, even though it mentions Chios during the Peloponnesian war on some occasions. As we have just seen, the same goes for much of the secondary literature that is available. Although many of the books and articles that I have used in my paper have been very useful and all of them touch on the subject, none of them talks about Chios specifically as a major participant in the Peloponnesian war (as, of course, one cannot expect from articles about for example the financial history of Chios).

1.2 Research question and methodology

We have seen from the historiography that an independent study on Chios in the Peloponnesian war is missing, indeed a study on the minor city states’ impact on the war at all is missing. The research question for my thesis is therefore as follows: *What was Chios’ role in the Peloponnesian war?* There is one major technical difficulty with this research question, namely the definition of the word ‘role’. Role is a word that can have several different meanings, but in this thesis it will be understood as the importance of Chios’ involvement. In
that, I mean what did Chios do during the war that made an impact to the history of the war? What I try to keep in mind throughout this thesis is ‘how would this war have panned out if it had not been for Chios’ involvement?’ Was Chios merely a background actor or was Chios more of a centre stage actor, acting more closely to the bigger names such as Athens or Sparta?

In order to answer my research question properly I need to look at the economic and political background, establishing what kind of resources Chios had access to before the war and how powerful and influential Chios was at the time when the war broke out. Having provided this kind of background discussion, the role of Chios during the war can be examined. The way in which I will examine Chios’ role in the war is to analyse how many ships Chios contributed (as Chios was a naval power I believe that it is most valuable to look at her navy) when they went to war alongside Athens and compare that number to the Athenian contribution and the contribution of others wherever that is possible. It is by analysing Chios’ naval contribution that we can understand how important Chios was as an Athenian ally, and therefore also how important Chios was in the formative years of the war. Was Chios such an important ally to the Athenians as Thucydides will have us believe? Finally, I will discuss Chios’ role in the rebellion against Athens in 412 B.C., and in this section I will bear in mind the question ‘what if Chios had not rebelled?’ This question can obviously not be answered, but it is interesting to think about while working on the overbearing subject of Chios’ role in the Peloponnesian war. There are however a number of questions that will be answered throughout this thesis: Why was Chios such an important state in the rebellion? How important was in fact Chios for the balance of power between Athens and Sparta? By examining the questions above I hope to prove the importance of Chios to the Peloponnesian war.

This paper belongs to the field of political and economic history. In any historical text, it is always the author’s interpretation of events and how these events are portrayed that decide which history is being told. I have therefore spent much time and effort on choosing what history should be told and in what way. I have obviously not had the time or the opportunity to cover every aspect of the Peloponnesian war, nor every aspect of Chios’ rich historical background or involvement in the war. Nevertheless, this is the most detailed analysis of Chios’ involvement in the Peloponnesian war hitherto provided.

One cannot discuss the Peloponnesian war without relying heavily on Thucydides, of which I have used an English translation, but I have also relied on other ancient sources as my primary sources. Also archaeological evidence has informed many aspects of this paper. For
secondary literature a wide variety of literature has been used, however, as mentioned above, little has been written about Chios specifically.

Chapter 3 and 4 are both based on an analytic, qualitative approach, whereas chapter 2 is based on a mix of qualitative and quantitative approaches. The reason for this is that I wanted to create some statistics at the beginning of chapter 2 and end that chapter with an analysis that based itself on the statistics, as well as including an interpretation of Thucydides’ work. What I hope to show in chapter 2 is how the statistics that I present can help me create a stronger argument than what the analysis of Thucydides’ work can do on its own. I have chosen a chronological layout for this paper, since this, I hope, best will be able to demonstrate the changing role of Chios during the war. As historical events tend to affect each other, I hope that the chronological layout will show the causality of the events during the Peloponnesian war.

In 1.4 a timeline is presented of the battles that were fought between 431 and 404 B.C., including both naval and land battles and referring to the main states involved. Minor battles and skirmishes have been omitted, due to lack of space in my thesis and because they are of lesser importance to the war. In chapter 2, as I mentioned in the paragraph above, I present the historical-economic background for the island state of Chios as well as shortly discuss how this all ties up with Chios’ role in the Peloponnesian war. Chapters 3 and 4 constitute the main body of this paper. In chapter 3, I present Chios’ role in the Peloponnesian war as a steadfast and strong ally of Athens up until 412/411 B.C. In chapter 4, I discuss Chios’ role in the revolt against Athens and during the final stages of the war. The last chapter, chapter 5, offers a short summary of this thesis and concludes my arguments.

1.3 Presentation of original work and findings

This thesis is the first work in English, as far as I am aware, that focuses exclusively on Chios in the Peloponnesian war. The timeline of battles presented later in this chapter is also the first full list of the battles of the Peloponnesian war, presented in the following way: (1) location, (2) year, (3) source and, finally, (4) passage from source. The timeline presented in my master
thesis is heavily inspired by L. I. R. Petersen’s timeline, presented in his doctoral thesis. The statistics of ships that Chios contributed throughout the war, which will be presented in chapter 3 is also entirely original. However, that said, it should be admitted that our view of the power balance in the Ancient Greek world has not been revolutionized by this thesis; Athens and Sparta will forever stand out as the two superpowers in the Ancient Greek world. Nonetheless, I have, I hope, argued more convincingly than before that Chios was not only Athens’ strongest ally, but one of the richest and strongest Greek states in the 5th century B.C., Athens and Sparta excepted. Furthermore, this thesis argues that Chios was of moderate importance to the war, but was of great importance in the critical years after the Sicilian expedition.

With a sound economy and a large population as its basis, Chios became a strong ally for the Athenians between 431 and 412 B.C., and in 412, after the Sicilian expedition, the Chians took a leading role in the revolt against Athens, a revolt which no doubt had an effect on the outcome of the war. My examination demonstrates that the revolt, which Chios led together with Sparta, was to some extent instrumental in changing the balance of power in the Ancient Greek world. Athens’ naval empire collapsed shortly after, and Sparta picked up the pieces and created its own empire of satellite states. However, it is probably true to say that it was not only the revolt by itself that changed the balance of power, but rather the effect it had on the resources of the Athenians and the amount of pressure it put on Athenian forces who had to fight on several fronts.

1.4 Battles in the Peloponnesian war

Battle of Plataea 431 B.C.

Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War 2.2-2.5

“The Thirty Years Treaty agreed after the conquest of Euboea lasted for fourteen years. In the fifteenth year...at the beginning of spring, in the first watch of the night an armed force of slightly over three hundred Thebans entered Plataea, a city in Boeotia allied to Athens. (...) Plataea had always been hostile to Thebes, so the Thebans, recognizing the imminence of war,

---

12 L. I. R. Petersen, Siege Warfare in the Successor States: Byzantium, the West, and Islam, 400-800 A.D. (Trondheim, 2011)
wanted to make an pre-emptive strike and seize the place while the peace still held and there was not yet an open state of war. (...) When the Plataeans became aware of Thebans within their walls and the sudden occupation of their city, they were terrified and, unable to see them in the darkness, thought the invaders much more numerous than they were. (...) However, somehow…they came to realize that the number of Thebans was not large, and they reckoned that if they set on them they could easily overpower them: the majority of the Plataeans had no wish to defect from Athens. (...) the Thebans did withdraw from Plataean territory without doing any harm. The Plataeans quickly brought inside all that was out in the country, then immediately put the prisoners to death. The number of these captives was a hundred and eighty…”

---

**Attack on Peloponnesian towns** 430 B.C.  
*Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War 2.56*

“When this Athenian force set sail, they had left the Peloponnesians in the coastal region of Attica. Arriving at Epidaurus in the Peloponnese they ravaged most of the area, and in an attack on the city they came within hope of capturing it, but did not succeed. They then put out from Epidaurus and devastated the territory of Troezen, Halieis, and Hermione (all these are areas on the coast of the Peloponnesse). Moving on from there they came to Prasiae, a coastal town in Laconia: they ravaged some of the land and also took and sacked the town itself. After this they returned home, to find the Peloponnesians by now withdrawn and no longer in Attica.”

---

**Siege of Plataea** early summer, 429 B.C. until 427 B.C.  
*Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War 2.71; 2.75-78; 3.20-24; 3.52*

“In the following summer the Peloponnesians and their allies did not invade Attica, but campaigned instead against Plataea, under the command of Archidamus the son of Zeuxidamus, king of Sparta. (...) After making this appeal to the gods, Archidamus set his army to war. First they surrounded Plataea with a palisade built with the trees they had cut down…then they began to construct a ramp against the city wall. (...) As well as the earthworks the Peloponnesians brought up siege-engines against the city. (...) The Peloponnesians concluded that it was impossible to take the city at their present level of
assault, and they began to prepare for circumvallation. (…) After failing in this attempt too, the Peloponnesians sent home the bulk of their forces, but retained a part of the army for the construction of a wall around the city…The Plataeans had already evacuated to Athens their children and women, the oldest men and the rest of those who were unfit. (…) In the same winter (winter of 428/427, ed. note), the Plataeans, still besieged by the Peloponnesians and Boeotians, were beginning to suffer from shortage of food and had no hope of support from Athens or any other prospect of rescue. (…) At about the same time in this summer (summer of 427, ed. note) the Plataeans too ran out of food and, unable to withstand the siege any longer, capitulated to the Peloponnesians.”

Battle of Rhium 429 B.C.

Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War* 2.83-85

“The Corinthians and their allies were sailing in no expectation of battle. Their ships were fitted out more as transports to carry troops to Acarnania, and they did not think that the Athenians with their twenty ships would dare to make battle against their own forty-seven. (…) The Athenians pursued them and captured twelve ships, taking on board most of their crews. They then sailed off to Molycrium, set up a trophy at Rhium and dedicated a ship to Poseidon, and returned to Naupactus.”

Battle of Naupactus 429 B.C.

Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War* 2.86; 2.90-92

“Phormio too sailed round to Molyciran Rhium and anchored outside it with the twenty ships he had deployed in the battle. (…) So when they saw the Athenians at anchor, the Peloponnesians likewise anchored with seventy-seven ships at the Rhium in Achaean…For six or seven days the two fleets lay at anchor opposite each other, training and making preparations for the battle. (…) The eleven leading Athenian ships outran the Peloponnesian wing and its turn into the open water: but the Peloponnesians caught the other nine, drove them in flight to the shore and disabled them, and killed all the Athenians who did not manage to swim away. (…) Meanwhile their twenty ships from the right wing were pursuing the eleven Athenian ships which had escaped their turn into the open water. (…) Their previous mistakes and present disorder limited the Peloponnesian resistance, and after a short while
they turned and fled to Panormus, from where they had started. The Athenians gave pursuit, capturing the six nearest ships and recovering those of their own which had earlier been disabled on the shore and taken in tow by the enemy. (…) On their return the Athenians set up a trophy at the place from which they had sailed out to their victory.

Siege of Mytilene (Lesbos) 428-427 B.C.

Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War* 3.2-3; 3.6; 3.15; 3.26-27; 3.50

“Immediately after the Peloponnesian invasion, Lesbos (apart from Methymna) revolted from Athens. (…) The Athenians were exhausted both by the plague and by the escalation of the war in its early years, and they though it would be a major undertaking to open another front against Lesbos, a naval power with its resources intact…they became alarmed and determined on pre-emptive action. They instantly sent out to Lesbos forty ships…The Athenians were greatly encouraged by the inactivity of the Mytilenaens, and called in their allies, who were the quicker to come when they saw no sign of resistance from the Lesbians. (…) The Spartans and their allies accepted the arguments and took the Lesbians into alliance. (…) In the following summer the Peloponnesians dispatched the forty ships to Mytilene…Meanwhile the Mytilenaens were forced to come to terms with the Athenians. The ships from the Peloponnese were taking their time and still had not reached them, and their food had run out. (…) On Cleon’s motion the Athenians executed the men sent to Athens by Paches as the prime movers of the revolt…and they demolished the Mytilenaens’ walls and took over their ships. After that they did not impose tribute on the Lesbians, but instead divided the island…The Athenians also took over the towns on the mainland which had been under Mytilenaen control, and these then became subjects to Athens. Such were the events concerning Lesbos.”

Battle of Olpae winter 426/25 B.C.

Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War* 3.105-109

“In the same winter the Ambraciots fulfilled the promise to Eurylochus which had kept his army in the area, and launched a campaign against Amphilochoian Argos with three thousand hoplites. They invaded Argive territory and captured Olpae…When the Peloponnesians under Eurylochus learnt that the Ambraciots had reached Olpae and occupied it, they set out from
Proschium to bring support as quickly as they could. (…) and joined the Ambraciots at Olpae. At daybreak the now united forces established themselves at the place called Metropolis and pitched camp there. Not long afterwards the Athenians arrived in the Ambracian Gulf with their twenty ships to support the Argives; and Demosthenes too arrived…The ships moored off Olpae and maintained a blockade of the hill from the sea. (…) they choose Demosthenes as leader of the whole allied force…Demosthenes took them forward and camped near Olpae. (…) The Peloponnesian army proved larger than his and its line out-flanked him…Preparations were completed on both sides, and they engaged at close quarters. (…) The battle ended late in the day. Both Eurylocus and Macarius had been killed, and the command had passed to Menedaïus. (…) So the next day Menedaïus made overtures to Demosthenes and the Acarnanian generals, asking for a withdrawal under truce, and also the recovery of their dead. They granted the return of the bodies, while they themselves set up a trophy and recovered their own dead, which numbered about three hundred.”

Battle of Pylos 425 B.C.

Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War* 4.11-15

“The Spartans now moved to attack the fort simultaneously with their land army and their ships, which were forty-three in number, and the admiral sailing in command was the Spartiate Thrasymelidas…He made his attack where Demosthenes expected it, and the Athenians defended themselves on both sides, land and sea. (…) So throughout this day and part of the next the Spartans continued their attempts to attack, and then desisted. (…) Meanwhile the Athenians ships arrived from Zacynthus, a total of fifty now, as they had been joined by some of the garrison ships from Naupactus and four Chian ships. (…) Most of the Spartans’ ships were by now out from land and facing them. The Athenians fell on these and drove them into flight. They pursued as best they could over the short distance…Anguished by the sight of this disaster, which threatened the isolation of their men on the island, the Spartans came running in support, plunged fully armed into the sea and grabbed hold of their ships to pull them back…the Spartans were virtually fighting a sea-battle from land, and the Athenians, victors eager to take maximum advantage of their present fortune, were fighting an infantry battle from their ships. (…) The Athenians set up a trophy, returned the enemy dead, and took possession of the wrecks…”
Battle of Delium 424 B.C.

Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War* 4.76; 4.89-90, 4.93; 4.96-97; 4.100-101

“In the same summer also, and immediately after the withdrawal from the Megarid, the Athenian general Demosthenes arrive at Naupactus with forty ships. On the matter of Boeotia both he and Hippocrates were in communication with a number of men in the Boeotian cities who wanted to change the existing order and turn it to democracy on the Athenian pattern…The Athenian’s task was to take Delium, the sanctuary of Apollo in Tanagraean land facing Euboea. (…) At the very beginning of the following winter matters were ready for the betrayal of Boeotia to the Athenian general Hippocrates and Demosthenes…But mistakes were made about the dates for their respective mobilizations…As Hippocrates was not yet there to create diversionary trouble in the country, the Boeotians brought a full levy into action…When the conspirators in the Boeotian cities learnt of this failure, they made no revolutionary move. Hippocrates had raised a full-scale Athenian army…and arrived at Delium too late…He settled his army there and began to fortify Delium (…) Hippocrates was still at Delium, and when he received a report of the Boeotian advance he sent instructions to his army to take up position. (…) Hippocrates reached halfway along the line with this encouragement, but had no time to go further, as the Boeotians…immediately shouted a paean and advanced on them down the hill. (…) Pressed now on both sides by the combination of this development and the Theban drive which was breaking their ranks, the entire Athenian army turned to flight…On the next day those who had reached Oropus and Delium were transported home by sea, leaving a garrison behind (they were still in possession of Delium). The Boeotians set up a trophy, recovered their own dead and stripped the enemy dead, posted a guard on the field and returned to Tanagra, where they laid plans for an attack on Delium. (…) With this force they marched to Delium and attacked the fortification…Some of the garrison were killed and two hundred taken captive, but most of the others got on board their ships and were transported home. Delium was captured on the seventeenth day after the battle.”

1st battle of Amphipolis 424/23 B.C.

Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War* 4.102-106
“Hagnon named the settlement ‘Amphipolis’ (…) This then was Brasidas’ destination when he set out with his army from Arnae in Chalcidice. The crossing was at some distance from Amphipolis itself, and there were no walls running down to it from the city as there are now, but a small garrison had been posted there. (…) He crossed the bridge, and immediately annexed the property of all the Amphipolitans occupying the whole intervening area outside the walls. (…) they sent for help to the other general in the Thraceward region, Thucydides…the author if this history. He was at Thasos, an island colonized from Paros, about half a day’s sail from Amphipolis. (…) Brasidas meanwhile was doing his utmost to gain prior control of the city. He was apprehensive of the support from the ships at Thasos…He therefore offered moderate terms…On hearing this proclamation the people in general began to waver…And so the agreement was made, and they admitted Brasidas on the terms as proclaimed. Such was the surrender of Amphipolis…”

Battle of Torone 424/23 B.C.

Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War* 4.109-114

“After the taking of Amphipolis Brasidas and his allies campaigned against the peninsula called Acte…When this still did not achieve their compliance, he broke off for a campaign against Chalcidian Torone, where the Athenians maintained a garrison. (…) On sight of the agreed signal Brasidas set his army in motion and advanced at the run, the whole army giving a concerted shout which caused widespread panic in the city. Some of his troops pushed straight in through the gates, while others scaled the wall…As the capture of their city proceeded the majority of the Toronaeans were distraught…”

Battle of Mende 423 B.C.

Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War* 4.129-130

“…the Athenians had put their preparations into effect and sailed against Mende and Scione with fifty ships (including ten from Chios), a thousand of their own hoplites, six hundred archers, a thousand Thracian mercenaries and peltasts from their allies in the area…Setting out in their ships from Potidaea they put in by the temple of Poseidon and marched against the Mendaeans. (…) So on that day, with no submission by the Mendaeans and their allies, the Athenians withdrew and made camp…On the following day Nicias took half of the army and
proceeded to ravage the land as far as the border with Scione…the democrats immediately took up their weapons and turned in fury on the Peloponnesians and the opposite party in league with them. This onslaught routed them completely…By now Nicias was back at the city, and the whole Athenian army now poured into Mende…”

Siege of Scione 423-421 B.C.

Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War* 4.131-133; 5.32

“With the situation at Mende under control, they proceeded against Scione. The Scionaeans and Peloponnesians had come out to face them and established a strong position on a hill in front of the city, so placed that it was impossible for their opponents to complete a surrounding wall without taking the hill. The Athenians attacked in full force and in the ensuing battle drove off the troops occupying the hill: they then made camp, set up a trophy, and prepared for the circumvallation of the city. (…) Towards the end of the summer Scione had been completely ringed by a wall, and the Athenians withdrew the bulk of their army leaving a garrison there. (…) At about the same time in this summer (summer of 421, ed.note) the Athenians succeeded in taking Scione by siege: they killed the grown men, enslaves the children and women, and granted occupation of the land to the Plataeans.”

2nd battle of Amphipolis 422 B.C.

Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War* 5.3; 5.6-11

“Brasidas set out to relieve Torone, but heard of its capture on his way and turned back. (…) Meanwhile Cleon installed a garrison in Torone, then put out and sailed round Athos, making for Amphipolis. (…) Cleon had now sailed round from Torone against Amphipolis. (…) Brasidas heard of these plans and responded by taking up a counter-position on Cerdylium…so that he could not fail to notice if…Cleon made a move with his army…and advance inland against Amphipolis with his existing forces. (…) For a while Cleon made no move, but then he was forced to do what Brasidas expected. (…) As soon as Brasidas had seen the Athenians on the move he had come down from Cerdylium in response and entered Amphipolis. (…) At this point Brasidas, seeing the Athenian army on the move, saw his opportunity also…Brasidas harried the right wing, and was wounded in the course of the attach. The Athenians on the right wing were more inclined to stand and fight. Cleon
himself...fled immediately and was overtaken and killed...So now the whole Athenian army had been put to flight. (...) Brasidas was still alive when he was brought into the city by the men who had come to his rescue and carried him out of the battle. He...died shortly afterwards. (...) After recovering the dead the Athenians sailed for home, and Clearidas and his colleagues turned to the administration of Amphipolis.”

Battle of Mantinea 418 B.C.

Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War* 5.64-74

“Meanwhile a message reached them from their friends in Tegea indicating that, if they did not come at once, Tegea would secede from Sparta to join Argos and its allies, and was already in the brink of secession. The Spartans reacted with unprecedented speed, sending out a full levy of citizens and Helots. (...) They also sent to Corinth, Boeotia, Phocis, and Locris, asking for supporting troops to meet them at Mantinea as soon as possible. (...) When the Argives and their allies saw the enemy in action they took up a strong and virtually unassailable position and deployed for battle. (...) On the following day the Argives and their allies formed up in the battle-order they planned to use should they encounter the enemy. (...) The two armies were now ready to engage, and in the brief interval the various contingents were addressed by their own commanders along the following lines. (...) They now proceeded to the engagement, the Argives and their allies advancing with grim determination and in high feeling, the Spartans more slowly and to the tune of the many pipers included in their ranks...It was the largest battle that had been joined between major Greek cities for a very considerable time. The Spartans displayed the weapons taken from the enemy dead and immediately went on to set up a trophy…”

Battle of Melos 416 B.C.

Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War* 5.84; 5.114-116

“And the Athenians sent a force against the island of Melos, consisting of thirty of their own ships together with six from Chios and two from Lesbos...The commanding generals...established their force on the island, but before doing any harm to the country sent forward spokesmen to negotiate with the Melians. (...) The Athenian spokesmen returned to the army. As the Melians showed no sign of submission, the Athenian generals immediately
began hostilities and built a wall completely encircling the city of Melos…Later they left a garrison of their own and allied troops to keep guard on the place both by land and by sea, and went back with the bulk of their forces. (…) At about the same time (following winter, ed. note) the Melians once more took another part of the Athenian wall which was scantily guarded. In response a further force was sent out from Athens…Now under tight siege, and also betrayed by some internal treachery, the Melians volunteered surrender to the Athenians at their absolute discretion.”

Battle of Catana ___________________________ winter 415 B.C.

Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War* 6.63-70

“At the very start of the following winter the Athenians began preparations for the attack on Syracuse. The Syracusans too for their part prepared to go on the offensive against the Athenians…they insisted that their generals should lead them out to Catana, since the Athenians were not coming against them. (…) The Athenian generals were well aware of the situation. Their plan was to draw the entire Syracusan army as far as possible away from the city and then use this opportunity to sail their ships round under cover of night and establish a suitable base without interference…On the following day the Athenians and their allies prepared for battle. (…) The Athenians wanted to make the first attacking move…With this address Nicias led his army straight into battle. The Syracusans were not expecting to have to fight that soon, and some of them had actually gone off into the city…They came running back in hurried support…When the armies were engaged hand-to-hand, for a long time there was no advantage on either side…but then….the Syracusan line began to break up and the whole army was put to flight. (…) So the Athenians followed in a body as far as it was safe to do so, then withdrew and set up a trophy.”

Battle outside the harbour of Syracuse ___________________________ 413 B.C.

Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War* 7.22-24

“…the Syracusans were fired with enthusiasm for battle at sea, and began manned the ships. When the fleet was ready, Gylippus brought round his entire infantry force under cover of night in preparation for a land attack on the forts at Plemmyrium, while at a preconcerted signal the Syracusan triremes set out. (…) But the Athenians quickly manned sixty ships in
response…There followed a sustained struggle outside the mouth of the harbour, the Syracusans trying to force entry and the Athenians trying to keep them out. The Athenians in Plemmyrium had gone down to the waterside to watch the sea-battle, and Gylippus took this opportunity to make a sudden attack on the forts at first light. He took the largest fort first, then later the two smaller forts…But then the two smaller forts were taken the Syracusans were now losing the sea-battle…The Athenians disabled eleven Syracusan ships and killed most of the crews…They themselves lost three ships. They…set up a trophy on the islet in front of Plemmyrium, then returned to their own base. So although the Syracusans had come off badly in the naval engagement, they did now hold the forts on Plemmyrium, and they set up three trophies, one for each fort.”

Final battle of Syracuse summer 413 B.C.

Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War* 7.70-72

“The Syracusans and their allies had already put out and deployed with about the same number of ships as before, using some of them to guard the exit and ring the rest of the harbour, so that they could make a simultaneous attack on the Athenians from all sides: at the same time they had their land forces ready to give support wherever their ships might have put in to shore. (…) The ensuing battle was more fiercely fought and on a greater scale than any of the previous engagements. (…) With many ships meeting in a small space…there was little direct ramming because of the lack of room to pull back for a charge through the line…While the sea-battle hung in the balance the two land armies on the shore were gripped in an agony of conflicting emotions…For the Athenians everything depended on their ships, and their anxiety for the outcome was intense beyond word. (…) So, after a hard-fought battle in which both sides lost many ships and many men, the Syracusans and their allies, with victory now assured…set up a trophy.”

Siege of Chios 412/11 B.C.

Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War* 8.24; 8.34; 8.38; 8.55-56; 8.61-63

“Leon and Diomedon now used the Athenian fleet from Lesbos to prosecute war against the Chians from their ships…Landings were made at Cardamyle and Boliscus, where the Chian forces coming to resist them were defeated with many casualties and the general area
devastated: they were defeated again in another battle of Phanae, and in a third battle at Leuconium. After this the Chians no longer came out to fight, and the Athenians comprehensively ravaged their richly cultivated land…From there they (the Athenians, ed. note) sailed on later to put in at Lesbos, and began preparing for the fortification they intended to build in Chios. (…) The Athenians had now transferred their forces from Lesbos to Chios and, with superiority on both land and sea, began fortifying Delphinium, a place not far from the city of Chios which was in any case strong on the landward side and also offered harbours. The Chians took no action. (…) A Laconian…now arrived in Rhodes, sent from Chios by Pedaritus to report that the Athenian fortification was now complete…But meanwhile Pedaritus himself, with his own mercenary force and the whole Chian army, made an attack on the Athenian wall…the Athenians came out against them, routed the Chians first, and then defeated the force with Pedaritus. Pedaritus himself and a large number of Chians were killed…After this the Chians were yet more tightly blockaded both by land and sea…A fortunate circumstance was that…they had received…a new governor after the death of Pedaritus, a Spartiate called Leon…and he brought with him twelve ships…The entire Chian land forces broke out and seized a strong position, while their thirty-six ships were launched against the Athenians’ thirty-two, and came to battle. It was a hard fight, and…the Chians and their allies had not been worsted in the action. (…) Meanwhile the Chians gained greater control of the sea.”

Battle of Syme 411 B.C.

Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War 8.42-43

“So without any pause, and before his movements could be detected, Astyochus sailed towards Syme, hoping to catch the Athenian ships somewhere in the open sea. Heavy rain and cloudy conditions disorientated his ships in the darkness and created confusion. The fleet became split up, and when day broke the left wing could now be seen by the Athenians, while the rest of the ships were still straggling the other way round the island. Charminus and the Athenians hastily put out to sea against them with fewer than their total of twenty ships…They attacked immediately, disabled three and damaged others, and were having the better of the action until the unexpected appearance of the larger part of Astyochus’ fleet had them blocked on all sides. They then turned to run, losing six ships as they did so…After this the Peloponnesians…sailed across to erect a trophy on Syme…”
Battle of Euboea

Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War* 8.95

“In fact the Peloponnesian ships sailed on past...they then went on to Oropus. The Athenians had put out a fleet in haste and were obliged to use crews who had not trained together...With Thymochares as general in command they sent a number of ships to Eretria, which made a combined total of thirty-six when they arrived and were added to the ships already at Euboea. They had to fight as soon as they got there. (...) The Peloponnesians captured twenty-two of the Athenians ships, variously killed or made prisoners of the crews, and set up a trophy. Not long afterwards they secured the revolt of the whole of Euboea apart from Oropus...”

Battle of Cynossema

Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War* 8.104-106

“The engagement then began, and proceeded as follows. (...) With the battle now a certainty, the Athenians – seventy-six ships – extended their line along the Chersonese from Idacus to Arrhiani, and the Peloponnesians – eighty-six ships – extended theirs from Abydos to Dardanus. (...) The result of these moves to right and left was that the centre of the line (Athenian line, ed. note) became weak and over-extended...So the Peloponnesians fell on the centre and drove the Athenian ships off the water. (...) But then, over-confident after their victory, the Peloponnesians began chasing individual ships at random and part of their line fell into disarray. (...) They (the Athenians, ed. note) routed these and next took on the scattered ships of the victorious Peloponnesian centre, giving them such a mauling that most of them turned to flight without any resistance. (...) After this rout the Peloponnesians fled for the most part to the river Meidius at first, and then later to Abydos. (...) They (the Athenians, ed. note) set up a trophy on the headland of Cynossema...”

Battle of Abydos

Xenophon, *A History of My Times* 1.1.1-1.1.8

“But Mindarus...had observed the fighting. He hurried down to the sea, launched his triremes and set sail in order to pick up Dorieus and his ships. The Athenians sailed out to meet him and engaged him off the shore near Abydus. The battle went on from morning till late in the
afternoon, with successes and losses on both sides. Then Alcibiades with eighteen ships sailed into the Hellespont in support of the Athenians, and the Spartans turned and ran for shelter towards Abydus. (…) Finally, the Athenians sailed away to Sestus. They had captured thirty enemy ships without their crews, and had recovered all their own ships which had been previously lost.”

Battle of Cyzicus 410 B.C.

Xenophon, A History of My Times 1.1.11-1.1.18

“The Athenians at Sestus could see that Mindarus was planning to sail against them with sixty ships, so they…made for Cardia. Here they were joined by Alcibiades…Here the whole fleet, eighty-six ships in all, assembled and set sail on the following night. (…) After the assembly he (Alcibiades, ed. note) made ready for battle and, in a heavy rainstorm, set out for Cyzicus. By the time they were near, the sky had cleared and the sun came out. He could see Mindarus’ fleet, sixty ships altogether…The Peloponnesians, seeing that they were faced with many more Athenian triremes than before and that they were already close to the harbour, fled towards the shore, moored their ships close together and fought back against the Athenians as they sailed down on them. But Alcibiades with twenty ships sailed right round and landed on the shore. Seeing this, Mindarus also landed. He was killed while fighting on shore, and the men with him took to flight. The Athenians captured the entire Peloponnesian fleet except for the Syracusan ships which were burned by their crews.”

Siege of Calchedon and Byzantium 408 B.C.

Xenophon, A History of My Times 1.3.1-1.3.21

“After the winter was over and at the very beginning of spring the whole Athenian force sailed to Proconnesus, and from there set out against Calchedon and Byzantium. (…) He (Alcibiades, ed. note) then employed the whole army in blockading Calchedon. A wooden stockade was built from sea to sea…At this point Hippocrates, the Spartan governor, led his men out form the city to fight. The Athenians drew up in order of battle to meet him, and Pharnabazus, from his position outside the blockading lines, came up with a large force of infantry and cavalry to help him. Fighting went on for a long time…Hippocrates was killed and his men fled back into the city. At the same time Pharnabazus also withdrew. (…)
Alcibiades went away after this to the Hellespont...and the other generals came to an agreement with Pharnabazus that they would spare Calchedon if he paid them twenty talents...At the time when these oaths were exchanged Alcibiades was away at Selymbria. He captured this city and then moved on to Byzantium. (...) the Athenians went on with the siege of Byzantium. They had built siege works all round the place and launched attacks on the fortifications both at long range and at close quarters. (...) The Athenians, after finding that their efforts to take the city by force were getting them nowhere, persuaded some of the Byzantines to betray the place to them. (...) What happened was this. When the conspirators had made their plans, they opened the gates at night...and then let in the Athenian army with Alcibiades…”

Battle of Notium 406 B.C.

Xenophon, A History of My Times 1.5.10-1.5.14

“After Lysander had reorganized the fleet, he dragged ashore the ninety ships which were at Ephesus an remained inactive while they were being dried out and refitted. Alcibiades, meanwhile,….left his own pilot Antiochus in command of the fleet with order not to bring about an engagement with Lysander’s ships. But Antiochus with his own ship and one other put out from Notium into the harbour of Ephesus…At first Lysander launched a few ships and sent them in pursuit of Antiochus and then the Athenians came up with more ships to support him. Finally, Lysander launched all the ships he had, put them in line of battle and went into action. The Athenians then launched all the rest of their triremes at Notium and put out to sea one after another, just as they were launched. Thus in the battle that followed one side was fighting in good order while the Athenians were in no sort of order at all. In the end they turned and fled with the loss of fifteen triremes. (...) Lysander took over the captured ships and sailed across to Ephesus, after having put up a trophy at Notium.”

Battle of Arginusae 406 B.C.

Xenophon, A History of My Times 1.6.26-1.6.35

“As soon as Callicratidas heard that the relief force was at Samos, he…set out himself with the remaining 120. (...) When the weather cleared at dawn he set sail for the Arginusae islands. The Athenians sailed out to meet him. (...) So battle was joined and the fighting went
on for a long time. At first the ships were in close order, but later they became separated. Finally, Callicratidas, as his ship was ramming an enemy ship, fell overboard and disappeared in the water…and, at this point, there was a general flight of the Peloponnesians back to Chios, though many of them went in the direction of Phocaea. The Athenians on their side sailed back to the Arginusae islands. (...). They therefore set up a trophy and spent the night where they were.”

Battle of Aegospotami 405 B.C.

Xenophon, A History of My Times 2.1.20-2.1.29

“The Athenians had been sailing close behind and, with their fleet of 180 ships, came to anchor at Elaeus in the Chersonese. (...) They set out at once for Sestus where they took provisions aboard and then went straight on to Aegospotami, which is opposite Lampsacus. (...) As soon as the sun rose the Athenians came up with their fleet in line of battle to the mouth of the harbour. However, Lysander did not put to sea against them, so, when it was late in the day, they sailed back again to Aegospotami. (...) When Conon saw that the enemy were attacking, he signalled to the Athenians to hurry back as fast as they could come to their ships. But they were scattered in all directions; some of the ships had only two banks of oars manned, some only one, and some were not manned at all. Conom himself in his own ship with seven others and also the state trireme Paralus did get to sea fully manned and in close order. All the rest were captured by Lysander on land. (...) Conon, escaping with his nine ships, could see that for the Athenians all was over.”

Siege of Athens 405/04 B.C.

Xenophon, A History of My Times 2.2.7-2.2.23

“Lysander then sent word to Agis at Decelea and also to Sparta that he was sailing to Athens with 200 ships. At the same time Pausanias, the other king of Sparta, the whole army of the Spartans and all the rest of the Peloponnesians, except the Argives, took the field. When the whole force was concentrated, Pausanias led them to Athens and camped in the Academy. (...) Then, after devastating Salamis, he (Lysander, ed. note) anchored at Piraeus with 150 ships and closed the harbour to all merchant ships. The Athenians were now besieged by land and by sea. They had no ships, no allies and no food; and they did not know what to do. (...
Theramenes, with nine others, was then chosen to go as ambassador with full powers to Sparta. (...) They offered to make peace on the following terms: the Long Walls and the fortifications of Piraeus must be destroyed; all ships except twelve surrendered; the exiles to be recalled; Athens to have the same enemies and the same friends as Sparta had and to follow Spartan leadership in any expedition Sparta might make either by land or sea. (...) Theramenes and his fellow ambassadors brought these terms back to Athens. (...) Next day the ambassadors reported to the Assembly the terms on which Sparta was prepared to make peace. Theramenes made the report and spoke in favour of accepting the Spartan terms and tearing down the walls. Some people spoke in opposition, but many more were in favour and so it was decided to accept the peace. After this Lysander sailed into Piraeus, the exiles returned, and the walls were pulled down among scenes of great enthusiasm and to the music of flute girls. It was though that this day was the beginning of freedom for Greece.”
2.0 Chios’ way to power – trade, wealth and manpower

In order to truly understand Chios’ role in the Peloponnesian war it is essential to first understand what made Chios what it was in 431 B.C. This chapter will therefore go deeper into Chios in the pre-Peloponnesian war era, from approximately the Bronze Age, when Chios begins its interaction with others, until the outbreak of the war. There are however several periods within this long period from the Bronze Age until 431 B.C. that are lacking in sources, which makes especially the time until the 8th century B.C. rather problematic. Nevertheless, it is not impossible to draw some conclusions from this era. What I hope to be able to show is that Chios spent its pre-war years establishing itself as a trading power, not only in the Aegean, but also in the wider Mediterranean, and from there went on to also become a naval power to reckon with. K. Brodersen however suggests, that Chios never became an important power13, but as we shall see, trade quickly developed into wealth. Wealth in turn was transformed into manpower and naval strength, which was Chios’ main contribution to the Peloponnesian war.

Excavations done in the 1950s show that there were settlements at Chios in the Late Bronze Age,14 but apart from that not much more is known. For the period between the Late Bronze Age and the Middle Archaic Period (roughly 700 B.C.) very little is known about Chios’ history, much due to lack of excavations and much unpublished material. Our available literary sources offer little information about Chios in the pre-Archaic period as well, and it is not until the Classical period that Chios is mentioned in any great detail. When the Peloponnesian war began in 431 B.C., Chios entered as Athens’ wealthiest and perhaps most powerful ally. Since the end of the Persian Wars in 479 B.C. until 431 not much seems to have happened with regard to Chian history. The battle of Lade in 494 B.C. was, as far as we know, the last major military contribution Chios made before the Peloponnesian war. However, here Chios contributed with 100 ships according to Herodotus, counting for almost 1/3 of the Greek fleet and 30 ships more than their neighbours the Lesbians.15 It seems

15 Herodotus, The Histories 6.8-9
though that after this battle Chios was more or less in the background of Greek history until
the outbreak of the Peloponnesian war. Although the period from ca. 500 to 431 B.C. seems
to be a quiet one for Chios, the time from approximately 650 B.C. until 500, was not as quiet
as the years that followed, as we shall soon see. The combination of stable politics at home
and a growing and prosperous commerce, made it possible for Chios to grow into one of the
wealthiest and most powerful city-states of the Aegean.

In spite of being a relatively small island situated in the eastern part of the Aegean, Chios was
among the states that dominated the sea, especially in terms of commerce. However, as we
have seen in the previous chapter, Chios has not been mentioned much in the historiography
despite its efforts and its prominence in the Greek world at that time. In this chapter I will
look further into how Chios managed to reach such a prominent stature in the Greek world
and in fact become Athens’ wealthiest and strongest ally at the outbreak of the war. I will do
this by looking at two different sets of sources. I will look at the written sources and analyse
how Chios was depicted in the Greek world in the years before 431 B.C., starting as early as
Herodotus. I will also take a closer look into the archaeological evidence, especially pottery
and coins, in order to try and establish the extent of Chios’ trade from which it got its major
wealth. In this way I will show that the literary evidence is heavily supported by the
archaeological evidence, thus showing there was indeed a reason for Thucydides to say that
Chios was among Athens’ strongest allies and perhaps the richest of all the Greek states.

2.1 Early beginnings – Chian trade in the Archaic period

It is well known that the Greeks made early contact with its Mediterranean neighbours and
that trade and seafaring were a major part of the Greek way of living. Due to
Greece’s geographical position it was natural to look to the east, rather than
west, as well as the Black Sea in the north. This in turn led to major
influences on Greek culture from the
east, but the discussion on cultural
influence will not be examined in greater detail here. Looking at Chios more closely shows that Herodotus for example mentions Chios as a centre of trade as early as the end of the 6th century B.C. The Phocaeans wanted to buy Oenussae, an island close to Chios and under Chian control, but were refused.\(^\text{16}\) This is probably due to the Chians not wanting competition as a trading power in the canal between Chios and the west coast of Asia Minor. As the channel between Chios and the mainland was the main north-south route for shipping along the Asia Minor coast,\(^\text{17}\) it is understandable that Chios wanted the possible toll revenue for themselves. If we look at map 1, we can see that one of the main trade routes in the Mediterranean from an early time went between Chios and the mainland. What is clear, is that Chios at this time must have been a state depending on trade.

It seems that Chios must have been a trade centre for a while, as it takes quite some time to build up a good reputation and a trade network of the size that Chios had in the early Archaic period. Thus Chios as a trade centre, as Herodotus describes it, must have started earlier than the end of the 6th century B.C. C. Roebuck argues that Chios began as early as the 8th century to take advantage of its geographical position and began local trade with Old Smyrna, Erythrae and adjacent cities.\(^\text{18}\) This of course does not seem unlikely, as Chios probably was an established trade centre in the 6th century, and that they saw profit in their advantageous geographical position is only natural. The written sources are however unfortunately scarce on this point, as Herodotus is the only source actually mentioning Chian trade in the Archaic period. Many theories can of course be made, but little can be known for sure. Nevertheless, the literary evidence accessible does seem to indicate that Chian trade did begin before the 6th century, probably as early as the Bronze Age and definitely around the 8th century.

Nevertheless, some literary sources indicate that Chios was influenced by other parts of the Greek world much earlier than what Herodotus talks about. Pausanias (ca. 125-180 A.D.) tells us that “…Oenopion too sailed with a fleet from Crete to Chios…”\(^\text{19}\) Admittedly, this passage talks of a mythical era, which is probably dates back to the Classical Bronze Age era, making it difficult to trust as evidence in itself. However, from archaeological findings we can assume that the Chians either bought Mycenaean goods or learned to produce Mycenaean style

\(^\text{16}\) Herodotus, 1.165  
\(^\text{19}\) Pausanias, Description of Greece 7.4.8
pottery themselves, as such pottery has been found at Chios. Hood and Boardman assume, because of the above mentioned passage, that the pottery was of Cretan rather than mainland inspiration, even though we cannot be certain. We cannot know for sure whether there was some sort of trade between Chios and Crete, or Chios and mainland Greece, in the Middle or Late Bronze Age, when these findings are dated. However, what we can be certain about is that the Chians did use Mycenaean style pottery in the Middle or Late Bronze Age, either through trade or by meeting others and learning from them. Whether they adopted this type of pottery from Crete or mainland Greece is of less importance, as either way there must have been some form of interaction.

Because the written sources are lacking regarding Chian trade in the Archaic period, we should turn our attention to the archaeological evidence. This is important, as it can help to explain how trade in the Archaic period worked, not only for Chios, but for other states as well. However, for the remainder of this chapter I will keep my focus on Chios. Chian coins have been found in as widespread places as the west coast of modern-day Turkey, Tarentum in Italy and the Nile Delta. As amphoras go, many remains have been found in Athens and other places on the Greek mainland, but also in shipwrecks outside the coast of Chios. Amphorases have also been found in places like Chersonesos on the Crimean peninsula, where 5 vessels were found.

A quick glance at the places where Chian amphoras have been found shows that Chios traded, or at least Chian goods have been traded, with people in Greece, modern day Ukraine, Italy, modern Turkey, the Near East and Egypt. Of course, Chian goods could have been traded further onwards from these places, but this is difficult to prove. Nevertheless, the archaeological evidence also shows us at what time Chian trade must have been present at certain places, thus giving us a minimum starting date for Chian trade outside the realm of Greek influence. Although most of the evidence stems from approximately the same time period, around the 6-5th century B.C., it is interesting to see how the Chian trade network grew. The extent of Chian trade then was clearly far-reaching, and at the outbreak of the Peloponnesian war it had probably been extending from at least the 8th century, but perhaps since the Bronze Age.

---

20 Hood and Boardman, 1954, p. 20
21 Hood and Boardman, 1954, p. 20
22 Hood and Boardman, 1954, p. 20
23 A. Baldwin, The Electrum and Silver Coins of Chios (Chicago, 1979), p. 12-13; 15; 19
We have seen now that Chios’ trade network indeed was far-reaching, but it does leave some questions unanswered. Who did Chios trade with more specifically? We saw that they traded in many areas, but did they trade with other Greeks that had colonized there, or with indigenous people? Also, what did they trade? Did the Chians trade only in their own goods and goods they themselves wanted, or did they serve as middlemen too, transporting goods for others? It would also be possible to imagine that trade partners would have a tighter bond between them, thus strengthening their relationship during a war. It is therefore important to not only look at Chian trade as a means to gain power and wealth, but also to see whether or not it affected Chios’ relationship with other participants in the Peloponnesian war. I will come back to this in the following chapters, as I will not focus on the actual events of the Peloponnesian war in this chapter.

What goods Chios traded is also of great interest as it helps us understand how a small island with limited possibility to grow foodstuffs was able to feed and maintain a strong standing navy. It must also be remembered that Chios’ navy was not only strong at the outbreak of the Peloponnesian war, but had been strong for many years, at least from the Ionian revolt in 499 B.C., but I will come back to this in section 2.3. The nature of Chios’ trade was of course a mix of import and export, but what kind of goods Chios dealt in is an interesting question to answer, as it explains to what extent Chios was resource dependent, in terms of foodstuffs, or whether the island could provide for itself. Could Chios grow enough foodstuffs for its own inhabitants or were they dependent on import of grain for example? Also, was the famous Chian wine the only export, or did Chios have more to offer? These questions are very important when we look at how Chian resources, or Chian access to resources, affects its manpower and furthermore the strength of its navy.

2.2 Chios’ trade connections

Above I gave a brief overview of the areas of which Chian archaeological remains have been found. In this section I want to further expand on this and try to establish who Chios actually traded with. When I have shown who Chios traded with, I turn my attention to the goods they traded in. Hopefully this will give an indication of how Chios was able to feed its large number of inhabitants. We have already seen that Chios early began to trade with cities close
to themselves such as Old Smyrna and Erythrae, and that it did not take long before they traded in areas further away as well.

However, as Chios extended its trade network, other, more powerful cities wanted to trade with them too. Greek cities like Athens, Corinth and Olympia all began to trade with Chios, as well as non-Greek cities like Histria in Romania, Olbia, Salamis on Cyprus and Tell el-Mashkuta in Egypt. Unfortunately our written sources do not tell us who initiated contact with whom. Our literary sources do not actually provide much information at all on the subject of who traded with whom in this time period. Nevertheless, various archaeological surveys show that Chian goods, such as pottery, and Chian coins, have been found in all the above mentioned locations. It is therefore archaeological evidence I will depend on mostly when discussing this subject in further detail shortly. Although archaeological evidence is a valuable source of information, it does not tell us much other than where certain items were found, usually who made them and, perhaps, how they can be dated to a specific time period. Other than that we have to give the finds meaning ourselves.

I believe that of all of Chios’ trade partners, Athens is the one giving us the most valuable information in terms of what is relevant to further chapters. Not only was Athens the largest and perhaps most advanced Greek city, it was also one of two main protagonists in the Peloponnesian war, and for many years, Chios was a close military ally of Athens. It is therefore important to look at the relationship between these two states, not only in military terms, as will be done later, but also in terms of their trade relations. Studies show that well-deposits in Athens were filled with ca. 16% Chian amphoras up to 440 B.C., when the number rose to ca. 28% until approximately 412 B.C. Supposing that the dating of these amphoras is correct, then the last date of 412 coincides well with another well-known date, namely the year when many of Athens’ allies, including Chios, revolted after the Sicilian expedition. As is commonly known, Athens suffered a great defeat in Sicily, leaving many of her allies in doubt of whether they should still support Athens. I will come back to this in greater detail in chapter 4, but it is worth mentioning already now that it seems that the trade relationship between Athens and Chios collapses at this point. Of course, this seems natural given that they were no longer allies, but at any rate it shows how trade relations and political relations often went hand in hand.

26 M. Lawall, 1998, p. 84-85
Having seen that Chios traded with a number of very different peoples and that Athens and Chios had a strong trade relationship up until 412 B.C., I believe it is time to look at the goods Chios traded and whether or not Chios was self-sufficient.

Chios was a city that already in the late Archaic period was trading with cities all over the Eastern Mediterranean. Many smaller cities traded mostly in direct imports and exports, which of course is the most common mode of trade. In that, I mean that they exported their own goods, and imported whatever they needed from others. However, Sarikakis argues that as well as exporting agricultural products such as wine and its unique white mastic, Chios also supplied the west with luxury items from the east.\(^{27}\) Here Chian traders could acquire luxury items, which they could trade with others or keep for themselves, or in any case be transporters of such items as a third party for a fee. We know that this is very common in modern day trade and shipping, and it should not be thought of as unlikely to have happened also in ancient times.

However, this was not the only way the Chians made a profit of trade. Roebuck argues that Chios also took great advantage of its position on the coastal route along western Asia Minor, and levied tolls on shipping through the channels by the island.\(^ {28}\) Together with what we already know from Herodotus’ story about the Phocaeans we understand how important this canal was for the Chians. Based on Herodotus’ story and Roebuck’s argument, it seems that some of the first profits Chios made from trade was not its own export or transporting for others, but levying tolls on the existing trade routes through its own waters. Again, this too is a well-known phenomenon from the modern world where for example local authorities levy tolls for crossing the Panama canal or the Suez canal. However, in order to maintain the tolls and not let ships pass by without paying, Chios must have had a navy standing by in order to apprehend ships that did not pay. Unfortunately, our written sources tells us nothing about this, but as the Chians did make money on this project it is logical that there must have been a standing fleet at Chios.

Having seen how Chios made money from trade I believe it is now time to look closer at what Chios made money from. What goods did they trade in? Was some goods more important than others for the Chians? And finally, how does this all tie up to Chios and the

\(^{27}\) Th. Ch. Sarikakis, ‘Commercial Relations Between Chios and other Greek Cities in Antiquity’ in J. Boardman and C. E. Vaphopoulou-Richardson (eds.) Chios, A Conference at the Homereion in Chios 1984 (New York, 1986), p. 121

\(^{28}\) Roebuck, 1986, p. 82-83
Peloponnesian war? But firstly, what do I mean when I use the term ‘goods’? In this paper I use it for all wares sold and purchased, from wine to amphoras to gold to slaves. Even though slaves of course were people, they were bought and sold for a price in ancient Greece, as a commodity to the owner, and will therefore be discussed as ‘goods’ in this paper. However, before I can begin my discussion on the importance of slaves and slave trade to the Chian economy, I must firstly discuss Chios’ population, as that is important to have discussed before we take on the trade discussion, particularly the slave trade. Then, I will take a closer look at a variety of goods, more or less important, in which Chios traded. Lastly, I will discuss the Chian slave trade, which, as we will see, was very important not only for the production of Chian goods, but also as a factor contributing to the Peloponnesian war, in the sense that the slaves actively fought against their Chian masters during the revolt against Athens.

2.3 Grain trade and manpower – the backbone of the Chian navy

With most of the cultivable land being used for olive and wine production, it is reasonable to believe that Chios was dependent on grain import from others. However, Brodersen argues that Chios could clearly grow enough to feed its population. Unfortunately, Brodersen does not elaborate on this idea and does not refer to any ancient sources or modern surveys. On the other hand, Roebuck suggest that Chios in fact had to import grain for as much as a third of its population at that time, which probably totalled around 60 000 to 80 000 free men, women and children. This is excluding the slaves, of which we know there were many. Obviously, slaves had to eat too and must be included in the calculation. According to Jameson, a family of five need about 1000 kg of wheat a year to support itself, that is an average of 200 kg per person, per year. Jameson argues further that the daily ration of barley of a slave was a choinix, or 1.087 litres of barley, which is the same as 191.00 kg a year. Thucydides too states that each slave would get one choinix and perhaps some meat and wine. It seems then that the slaves were malnourished, in comparison to adults in regular families and especially

29 Brodersen, 2006, p. 102
31 Roebuck, 1953, p. 12
32 Roebuck, 1986, p. 81
34 Jameson, 1978, p. 131, footnote 51
35 Thucydides, 4.16
to soldiers. Nevertheless, slaves ate too, and if Chios had to import grain for its population, which seems likely that they did, also their slave population has to be included in the calculation of the quantities required.

An important question does spring to mind though, when discussing the Chian grain import, and that is how much grain did the Chians actually produce themselves? As we just saw in the paragraph above, Brodersen seems to believe that the Chians could grow enough to feed its own population. Unfortunately, we know little about the agricultural production on Chios, except for wine and mastic. It is therefore difficult to conclude on anything about Chian agricultural production at this time, and I do not have the opportunity to examine this topic further in this thesis. However, due to the topography of the island of Chios, and its priorities to produce wine, it is likely that Chios could not produce enough foodstuffs to feed its own population.

In any case, the population figure is noteworthy when compared to Athenian numbers, which Fisher estimates to approximately 45,000 male citizens at its height. It is a fair assumption that Chios’ population was perhaps as large as half that of Athens’. This could obviously be a large problem for the Chian population as foodstuffs were scarce and the land was cultivated for wine and olives. However, no ancient sources mention the problem of producing enough foodstuffs, perhaps because it was not seen as a problem at the time or perhaps there was no interest in the question. However, there was little to no colonizing from Chios, clearly indicating that overpopulation was not a problem. The only solution left then, was import of foodstuffs, especially grain.

The Chian traders found grain to feed its population from faraway places like Egypt, Thrace and the Black Sea region. Especially the Greek-founded Egyptian city of Naucratis was an important trade city for the Chian traders as they could obtain Egyptian grain there, as well as luxury commodities like papyrus, linen and other items, which they could trade to other Greeks or to the West. Even though Chios produced little to no grain themselves, they managed to feed its massive population in the time before the Peloponnesian war, and it continued like this until the Athenian blockade of Chios in 412/411, when famine really threatened the local population. This is of course natural, as what happened was that both the blockade and the slave uprising at Chios halted the possibility of feeding the Chian people.

---

37 Roebuck, 1986, p. 83
38 Roebuck, 1986, p. 84
with imported grain. As we can see, Chios did well in managing the food production/import for its population, and what we shall see next is how this all ties up with Chian naval strength.

At the battle of Lade in 494 B.C. Chios contributed 100 of the 353 ships that the combined Ionian fleet assembled, whereas Miletus for example ‘only’ contributed 80 and Lesbos 70. According to Roebuck’s calculation, this gives a total of 20,000 Chian sailors, not including slaves, or approximately 25% of the total Chian population. Unfortunately, the sources do not give exact information of the number of men on the ships, except that Herodotus does mention 40 men, specially picked from the citizen body, on each ship. As to this, Roebuck argues that those 40 must have been part of the standard 200 men which Herodotus usually uses as an estimate of how many men there were on each ship. Rodgers argues that there were 18 soldiers on board each ship and a further 20 needed for various other roles, leaving 162 men as rowers. This fits well into what Herodotus tells us about the 40 picked men, and how those 40 would have been a part of the standard 200 on each ship.

Hunt argues that slaves too must have been used as soldiers or sailors, but Roebuck argues against this, saying that, because of slave behaviour on Chios, it is to be doubted that slaves were used in the navy. To argue his case, Hunt refers to a short passage in Thucydides and a little-known inscription, which, in fact, do seem to indicate that Chios did indeed use slaves in their navy. However, the passage in question is from events in the summer of 412, possibly making the circumstances quite different from the years between 499 and 431 B.C., which is what we are discussing here. In sum, while I find it highly possible that slaves were in fact serving on Chian ships in 412, when the Chians needed as many men as they could find, and after many years of war, I do not believe that this was the case in the years between 499 and 431 B.C.

It is thus possible that between Herodotus’ writings, and the writings of Thucydides, the Chians began to use slaves in their navy. With all of this in mind we cannot say for certain how many free Chians there were, but Roebuck does make a compelling argument, and based

39 Herodotus, 6.8
40 Roebuck, 1953, p. 12
41 Herodotus, 6.15
42 Roebuck, 1986, p. 81
43 Rodgers, 1964, p. 45
44 P. Hunt, Slaves, Warfare and Ideology in the Greek Historians (Cambridge, 1998), p. 40
45 Roebuck, 1986, p. 81
46 Thucydides, 8.15
47 Hunt, 1998, p. 46
on the sources that are available to us, it is not entirely unlikely that there was a total of 60-80 000 free Chians, excluding slaves, in the early to mid-5th century B.C. It is of course possible that this changed over the next 50 or so years to the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, but it seems likely that the Chians at least began the war with only free men as sailors and soldiers on their ships. However, this is likely to have changed over the course of the war, as many free citizens either died or were taken prisoners. Therefore, in order to keep the number of ships high, the Chians could have begun to use slaves as crew, which is what Hunt is arguing for the passage he uses from 412/411 B.C. Nevertheless, before the outbreak of the war, based on the discussion above, it seems likely that the Chian population of free men, women and children was approximately 60-80 000.

It is also probable that, individually and combined, the Ionian cities had larger fleets than Athens and Syracuse until ca. 480 B.C. We can thus see the importance of slaves in the Chian community as all, or most, of the men in working age were recruited as sailors or soldiers. The slaves were not important as sailors or soldiers, if we are to believe Roebuck’s argument above, but they made it possible for the free Chians to be sailors and soldiers. We can further see that trade in general was very important for the Chian community, and its naval strength, as it most certainly would not have been able to obtain such a fleet without its wealth. Had Chios been a poor island, it could probably not have supported the import of such large amounts of grain as it did, to feed its massive population. And with a smaller population, Chios could not have mustered such a large fleet as it did at Lade without the use of slaves as its crew. In conclusion, what we see here is a chain of causality, and that the trade economy affected the population growth, and that the population growth further affected the Chian navy. The Chian population was neither poor, nor small, and in the following section I will discuss the goods with which the Chians traded to obtain their wealth and power.

2.4 Goods Chios traded

Chios, as many other trading states, traded in many different goods. The most famous Chian export was the Chian wine. Even though it was not produced in large quantities, it sold at a

---

48 Roebuck, 1953, p. 10
very high price\textsuperscript{49} and was reckoned as the best of all in the 5\textsuperscript{th} century B.C.\textsuperscript{50} Sarikakis tries to prove this by showing to an example from Alexandria where 90,000 amphoras were found, of which 80,000 were Rhodian and only 160 Chian.\textsuperscript{51} These statistics alone does not necessarily prove that Chian wine was better than for example Rhodian wine. However, the thought of Chian wine being produced and exported in lesser quantities, and therefore being more exclusive, can certainly indicate that Chian wine was superior and, although exclusivity does not always equal quality, it certainly is an indication of price and that Chian wine probably was priced much higher than other wines. However, it seems likely based on the literary evidence too, that Chian wine in fact was produced in small quantities because it was better than wine from other places. Athenaeus goes as far as saying that only Alban and Falernian wine (Italian wine) was better.\textsuperscript{52} Admittedly, Athenaeus was writing at a much later time (2\textsuperscript{nd}-3\textsuperscript{rd} century A.D.). It is however probable that he drew on sources which had knowledge of Chian wine several hundred years before his own time. The exclusivity and the quality of the Chian wine made it a highly wanted item and it thus became one of the most important Chian exports at the time.

Other trade commodities were pottery, metal goods, marble and slaves, and of these, slaves were the most profitable of all.\textsuperscript{53} Even though Chios was primarily an agricultural community, other goods were just as important for the increase in Chian wealth in this period. We know for example that the famous Horses of St. Mark might have been a work produced at Chios, and sent to Constantinople under Theodosius II.\textsuperscript{54} Even though this sculpture is of uncertain origin, it is most likely that Chian sculptors and marble workers created other magnificent pieces that were traded off. With so much wealth accumulated from trade, Chios could afford to import the grain it needed to feed its massive population, from which it drew its naval strength. I will come further back to slave trade in greater detail shortly. However, with most of its male population incapable of tending to the agriculture because they were sailors or soldiers most of the agricultural season, others had to tend to the farming, which is where the use of slaves comes into the picture.

\textsuperscript{49} Sarikakis, 1986, p. 122-123
\textsuperscript{50} J. P. Barron, ‘Chios in the Athenian Empire’ in J. Boardman and C. E. Vaphopoulou-Richardson (eds.) \textit{Chios, A Conference at the Homereion in Chios 1984} (New York, 1986), p. 95
\textsuperscript{51} Sarikakis, 1986, p. 123
\textsuperscript{52} Athenaeus, \textit{The Deipnosophists} 1.59
\textsuperscript{53} Sarikakis, 1986, p. 121
\textsuperscript{54} \textit{Parastaseis syntomoi chronikai}, 84
2.4.1 Slaves

Thucydides mentions the slave population at Chios in the late 5th century and observes that they had a large number of slaves and a denser slave population than any other state except Sparta. 55 Also Athenaeus mentions the slave population of Chios. He says that the Chians were the first to use slaves, after the Spartans and the Thessalians, however they acquired them differently, namely that the Chians bought barbarians at a price. 56 This indicates two things. Firstly, that the Chians must have been rather well off at an early time, as many of them were able to buy slaves from foreign lands, instead of, or as well as, taking slaves as war loot. Secondly, in order to be able to buy barbarian slaves, Chios must have either been in barbarian land buying slaves there, or had barbarians (or middlemen) at Chios. Either way, both sources seem to indicate some sort of trade, and it is likely that the trade did not stop at slaves, but that other goods were traded as well. The short passage from Athenaeus on the previous page also shows that the Chians began trade with non-Greeks very early.

Together with Corinth and Aegina, Chios was at an early time a great emporium of slaves 57 and sold not only barbarian slaves, but also young Greeks at Ephesus and Sardis for service in Persian harems 58. The trade with both Greeks and non-Greeks, mostly Persians, was nothing new as we have seen, since Chios had been trading with most of the Mediterranean also in earlier times. However, when Chios joined the Ionian League, where it was the League’s “heart and soul, and furnished the largest number of ships to the fleet” 59, it is likely that trade between Chios and the East declined. This is especially true after 499 B.C. and the Ionian Revolt and Chios’ entrance into the Delian League in 479 B.C. However, as Lawall’s study indicates, Chios did not stop trade with the East entirely at this time. Amphoras have been found in Gordion in Asia Minor and can be dated to as late as at least 425 B.C. when the number of amphorases decline dramatically. 60 What Lawall’s study shows is that Chios continued to trade with non-Greeks throughout the 5th century, despite a steady alliance with Athens until 412 B.C.

---

55 Thucydides, 8.40
56 Athenaeus, 6.88
58 Herodotus, 8.105
59 Gardner, 1920, p. 164
60 Lawall, 1998, p. 85-86
According to Oliver, only the poorest members of society could not afford slaves\textsuperscript{61}, thus indicating that everyone else had the finances to at least own one or more slaves. As Chios was a wealthy society, relying heavily on slaves, one can assume that there must have been somewhere between 60,000 and 120,000 slaves in Chios. This is based on the assumption that most of Chios’ 60-80,000 inhabitants were relatively well-off and that they on average owned 1-2 slaves each. Harris argues that wealthy Athenians could have between 12 and 36 slaves.\textsuperscript{62} He argues further that even poorer people would have had slaves, which he bases mostly on the stories of Homer.\textsuperscript{63} However, no standard number of slaves is given, I therefore use a conservative estimation, with 1-2 slaves per person. Of course, children would not own slaves themselves, thus the number is likely to lie closer to 60-80,000 slaves, than 120,000. Nevertheless, I believe that this is a fair assumption. If we compare the Chian numbers to the number of slaves in Athens at the same time, which according to Lewis might number as high as 150,000\textsuperscript{64}, the number at Chios seems staggeringly high, at 60-80,000 slaves. However, what we must keep in mind is that Chios was only second to Sparta in terms of keeping slaves, making this a very plausible number.

2.5 Chian trade and Chios’ role in the Peloponnesian war

What have we seen in this chapter? We have seen that the Chian trade economy is heavily connected to Chios’ political position at the outbreak of the Peloponnesian war. Had it not been for the wealth Chian traders accumulated over centuries of trading in the Mediterranean, the Chian people could not have contributed as many ships as they did, over as many years as they did. After all, Chian naval power did not start in 431 B.C., but was strong at least as early as 499 B.C., if not earlier. It is clear that this would not have been possible, had it not been for the extensive trade network Chios had or the valuable goods they traded in.

I believe further that all of what we have seen above would not have been possible had it not been for the slave trade, in which Chios excelled. From the early beginnings of slave trade in

\textsuperscript{62} E. M. Harris, ‘Homer, Hesiod and the Origins of Greek Slavery’ in \textit{REA} 114 (2012), p. 15
\textsuperscript{63} Harris, 2012, p. 17
Greece, Chios was involved, creating an opportunity to have a society at home where the men did not have to stay on their farms and tend the land, but could be sailors or soldiers, thus enabling Chios to be a great naval power. There was of course a backside to having such a large number of slaves to work your land, as was the case when they turned against their owners and joined the Athenians during the revolt of 412 B.C. However, the gains for Chios over time were substantial and truly necessary in order to make them as powerful as they were in 431 B.C., an aspect many scholars have neglected or ignored. It is likely that Chios reached its peak in terms of power in the early 5th century B.C., but I believe that it is clear from the evidence provided above that if they did lose any power in the years between the battle of Lade and the outbreak of the Peloponnesian war, it was little or nothing. I argue this because, as we will soon see, Chios continued to produce a steady stream of ships, and was throughout the war until the rebellion of 412/411, one of the strongest allies to Athens, if not the strongest.

It is evident that Chios was a strong and wealthy state in 431 B.C. when the Peloponnesian war broke out. For many centuries before the war, Chios had been a trading emporium, and had built up its economy based on trade. As we have seen, Chios began to trade with others at least as early as the 6th century B.C., and was probably in contact with other people and cultures as early as the Mycenaean era. Throughout the 6th and 5th centuries B.C., Chios expanded its influence of trade, and their trade network stretched out from Egypt to the Black Sea, as well as Italy and of course mainland Greece. Of the many goods Chios traded, the most important import was grain, which enabled the Chians to feed a massive population of about 60-80 000 free men, women and children, as well as at least as many slaves. Because the Chians could not produce enough grain themselves, the Chians had to import most of the grain they needed. In order to do so, the Chians had to export goods. The most important Chian export was wine, and the Chians did in fact produce a very good wine, perhaps flavoured with mastic. Slaves too were important for the Chian economy, not only as traded goods, but also as workers who would tend to the land. I find it doubtful that the Chians could have been such a strong naval state, had it not been for the fact that most of the work that had to be done to the cultivable land was done by slaves. The Chians then, were a powerful and wealthy people at the outbreak of the Peloponnesian war, and for many years to come ready to support Athens in the campaign against the Spartans and its allies.
In the last chapter we looked at Chios’ trade economy and how this was related to Chios as a naval power until 431 B.C. and the outbreak of the Peloponnesian war. We saw that Chios became more and more dependent upon trade and that trade made the Chians rich and mighty. We saw that Chios became a state that relied on its trade economy and that Chios’ power and navy was a consequence of this. In this chapter I will examine Chios’ contribution to the Athenian war effort before the rebellion against Athens in 412. This will primarily concern the Chian naval contribution, as it was its navy that really made an impact on the Greek world. In fact, it was, as far as we know, their only contribution to the Athenian war effort, and therefore the only discussion that can be made about Chios’ contribution is about naval contribution. However, before I begin my examination proper, some issues must be raised and discussed.

Firstly, Thucydides’ account, although essential, is rather problematic. Whenever Thucydides mentions Chios and how many ships they contributed to each battle, it is often mentioned together with Lesbian ships. For example, in book two of *The Peloponnesian War*, when the Athenians prepares for an expedition against the Peloponnes in 430 B.C., Thucydides tells us that “Chios and Lesbos contributed to the expedition with fifty ships”. The reason why this is so problematic is because it is very difficult, if not impossible, to single out Chios alone in these situations and give a precise and correct number for the Chian naval contribution as separate from that of Lesbos or others. However, I propose that this separation can be achieved, although admittedly in a rather imprecise way. If we compare the Chian and Lesbian contributions before they are mentioned separately, to the numbers they contribute when Thucydides mentions them separately, and then compare that to the number of Athenian ships, we can deduct a ratio number from this exercise. I give here an example. If the Chian/Lesbian contribution was ten ships and the Athenian 20 before Thucydides mentions Chios and Lesbos separately, and the Chian was seven and Lesbian three and Athenian still 20 at a later date, when they are mentioned separately, it is highly probable that the Chian contribution was seven also before separation and the Lesbian three. This example is highly simplified for the purpose of explanation, but other, more complicated examples will be discussed later in the chapter, with real numbers taken from Thucydides. Needless to say, it

---

65 Thucydides, 2.56
remains an estimated guess. However, I see this as the most correct and only possible solution to the problem at hand and, in any case, it can give an at least plausible image of the Chian contribution before Chios was mentioned alone by Thucydides.

Secondly, secondary literature is scarce and most of it does not focus on the subject of the Chian contribution to the Athenian war cause. As I have stated earlier, secondary literature on the Peloponnesian war focuses mostly on the two great powers of Athens and Sparta. I will therefore draw many conclusions of my own in this chapter, based on the available primary sources. The discussion in this chapter thus stands mostly on its own feet, and might therefore be open for criticism. However, because there has been done little to no research on this specific subject before, I believe that it is inevitable that the discussion in my paper has to be based solely on the primary evidence.

Thirdly, because of the above mentioned issues, the methodology in this chapter is different from the others, in the sense that it is much more quantitatively focused. However, the analysis of the Chian naval contribution presented here is the most detailed and thoroughly examined, as no other research has been done in the field. Finally, unless otherwise stated, all ships that are mentioned in this, and in the following chapter, are triremes with full crew. Thucydides varies in terms of the level of detail he gives in the description of the ships, thus we must assume that whenever Thucydides does not mention anything else, the ships are triremes with full crew, which was the most common type of ship at that time.

3.1 Chios in the early stages of the war

The first time Thucydides mentions Chios contributing a specific number of ships is already in 440 B.C. during the Samian Revolt. Here Chios is said to contribute first 25 ships together with Lesbos, and when these were lost in a surprise attack, they contributed another 30 together with Lesbos. 66 Athens on the other hand contributed 84 at first, but 60 sailed away, leaving only 24 at the time of the surprise attack, and then later contributed another 120. 67 Unfortunately, Thucydides says nothing about how many of the ships Chios and Lesbos contributed actually came from Chios and Lesbos respectively. This happens again a few

---

66 Thucydides, 1.116-117
67 Thucydides, 1.116-117
times, until Chios becomes the sole contributor of ships, but I will come back to that later in section 3.3. As there are no records of these numbers except from Thucydides, we cannot know for sure how many ships Chios actually contributed. All there is to say is that as a combined force, Chios and Lesbos contributed with roughly 22% in the first battle against the Samians, 51% in the surprise attack that they lost, and 20% in the final battle, when Athens had sent for reinforcements. These percentages are drawn from comparing the Chian/Lesbian numbers to the total of ships (Chian/Lesbian ships x 100 /Athenian + Chian/Lesbian ships = %). What is interesting is that when the Athenian presence is at its greatest, namely in the first and second battle, the Chian/Lesbian number is approximately 20% both times, and this number will continue to pop up.

Then, when the war started and Thucydides begins his account properly, Chios already in the early beginnings of the war, when the Athenians prepared for an expedition against the Peloponnesse, contributes with a massive 50 ships together with Lesbos.\textsuperscript{68} That number itself is staggering, but when compared to the Athenian fleet, it only accounts for 33,3%, as the Athenians mustered a total of 100 ships.\textsuperscript{69} Again, we cannot know for certain how many ships came from Chios, and how many came from Lesbos, but we can assume on the background that Chios was a more powerful state that they probably contributed more. This is of course speculation, but as the discussion further will show, it is not entirely unlikely. However, what we see is that there was an increase in the percentage of contribution from 440 to 430 B.C. What this actually indicates is uncertain. Of course, it could just be a coincidence, as is likely. Nevertheless, it could also indicate that the Athenians wanted to draw a lot of strength from its allies early, in order to get a solid start to the war. Even though Thucydides calls this the greatest war of all time, no one knew for sure how long the war was going to last at the beginning, thus it is reasonable to assume that the Athenians wanted to attack in great strength in the beginning. However, this remains speculation, as there is no evidence of any Athenian thoughts of a Blitzkrieg. In any case, many Chian ships were involved in the beginning of the war and one cannot disregard such a large number as 50 ships, or 33,3% of the total Athenian fleet. Only a strong and powerful state would be able to support such a large number of ships, and Chios was such a state.

\textsuperscript{68} Thucydides, 2.56
\textsuperscript{69} Thucydides, 2.56
3.2 Where was Chios? A short discussion on Athens’ show of force between 430 and 425 B.C.

However, in the years to follow, Chios contributed little to no ships at all. In the years between 430 and 425 B.C., Thucydides does not mention Chios. This is interesting in the sense that a state of Chios’ size and power was more or less unused in a five-year period in the beginning of the war. It is also interesting in terms of what I just discussed about that Athens perhaps wanted a good start to the war, as it would be natural for them to call in their allies to support. However, this was not what happened. Why was not Chios involved in the war in these years? Was there perhaps no use for Chios? To answer these questions I will look more closely at Athenian operations in the time 430 to 425 (and try to understand why Chios was not involved).

In the winter of 430, Athens sent 20 ships to Naupactus to prevent any ships sailing to or from Corinth and at first they were able to do their task on their own. After an initial battle in the summer of 429, where the Athenians won, Phormio, an Athenian admiral, sent for reinforcements, and the Athenians decided to send him another 20 ships. However, those ships being despatched from Athens had to go to Crete first, delaying their arrival at Naupactus.

Meanwhile, the Peloponnesians attacked Phormio and the Athenians at the mouth of the Gulf of Crisa, and the battle ended in a tie, where most of the Peloponnesians sailed back to Corinth and later on the Athenians sailed back to Naupactus. Later on the Athenian fleet led by Phormio sailed away from Naupactus, without Thucydides telling us why, which is odd as Naupactus seemed like a place of importance only a few months earlier. Nevertheless, in this scenario, I find it strange that

70 Thucydides, 2.69
71 Thucydides, 2.83-84
72 Thucydides, 2.85
73 Thucydides, 2.86, 2.90-92
74 Thucydides, 2.102
Chios or Lesbos are not called in to support, as they could have supported Phormio with ships when the Athenians had other business to deal with in Crete. However, neither Chios nor Lesbos are mentioned. Admittedly, the journey from either of those two islands is long, but still shorter than sailing from Athens to Crete and then to Naupactus.

Also, shortly after this battle, the Peloponnesians decided to attack Piraeus from Corinth, as they understood that the harbour of Athens was unguarded. In short, the Peloponnesians attacked Salamis instead because they were frightened of the risk following an attack on Piraeus, which gave the Athenians enough time to prepare a defence. Unfortunately, Thucydides does not elaborate on what kind of risk the Peloponnesians might have faced, but it is likely to be that of losing all their forces at the hands of the Athenian defence. However, the Peloponnesians had withdrawn from Salamis and dispersed to their respective homes, and Thucydides tells us that “from now on they (the Athenians) took greater care for the defence of the Peiraeus...”. Although no harm was done to Piraeus, I believe that the situation could have been avoided had Athens used her allies in this case. As I mentioned above, Athens did not send for Lesbos or Chios to support Phormio, which would have left 20 Athenian ships in Piraeus and thus guarded the harbour. Perhaps should Chios and/or Lesbos have contributed these 20 ships instead of Athens. Again, Thucydides does not give a reason why Athens’ allies are not called to action, nor does he say anything about whether her allies had other business to deal with elsewhere. What is clear however, is that Athens’ allies could have been of use in this case.

In the summer of 428, the Peloponnesians invaded Attica once again, but at the same time Lesbos revolted from Athens. Athens reacted with disbelief of the news at first, but sent envoys to check and after that they became alarmed and determined on pre-emptive action. However, Thucydides tells us that “the Athenians were exhausted both by the plague and by the escalation of the war in its early years, and they thought it would be a major undertaking to open another front against Lesbos, a naval power with its resources intact”. Even though the Athenians were exhausted and probably had already spent much of their resources on the

75 Thucydides, 2.93
76 Thucydides, 2.94
77 Thucydides, 2.94
78 Thucydides, 3.1-2
79 Thucydides, 3.3
80 Thucydides, 3.3
early part of the war, they decided to send as many as 40 of their own ships to stop the Lesbian revolt.

Although Athens did send a major fleet themselves, they also called in their allies, who responded quickly as they saw no sign of resistance from the Lesbians.81 This short passage is quite interesting as Thucydides talks about ‘Athens’ allies’, but does not mention who they were, as he usually does. Considering that Lesbos is geographically close to Chios, it is reasonable to suggest that the Chians were called in to aid the Athenians. Even though we cannot be certain about this, I find it highly unlikely that Athens’ strongest ally in Ionia was not called in to support them in the war against the Lesbians. However, because we cannot be sure that the Athenians actually did call in the Chians to support them, we have to think of reasons why not. One reason why Chios perhaps was not called in support might have been because of loyalty to Lesbos. Thucydides does not talk about this and Chios does not hesitate to join an attack on Lesbos in 412/411 (I will come back to this in greater detail in the next chapter). Because Chios joins the attack on Lesbos in 412/411, I find it unlikely that it was because of loyalty to the Lesbians that the Chians should not have been called in to support Athens in 428 B.C. It seems probable then, that Chios could have been among the allies that Athens did call in support, but that Chios was not mentioned specifically by name.

Later on, the Spartans took Lesbos into their alliance, and in an effort to help the Lesbians they prepared an invasion of Attica by sea.82 The reason for this was that the Athenians might move their fleet from Lesbos, in order to protect Attica. However, the Athenians solved this problem differently, namely by crewing 100 ships with metics and their own citizens, which in turn made the Spartans withdraw, and so then did the Athenians withdraw as well.83 Because the Spartans did not know who crewed the ships, they made their decision solely on the large number of Athenian ships, and withdrew on that basis. Then Thucydides tells us something which is really interesting, which is that the Athenians had a total of 250 ships in service in the course of the summer of 428 B.C.84 Because of the sheer number of Athenian ships, I would argue that the Athenians believed that their fleet was big enough and strong enough to fight the Peloponnesian alliance by themselves. Thus, they did not call in support to for example Naupactus or the defence of Piraeus as discussed above. It seems to me that the Athenians had too much belief in their navy at this point that they did not see the value of

81 Thucydides, 3.6
82 Thucydides, 3.15
83 Thucydides, 3.16
84 Thucydides, 3.17
calling in their allies for support. However, Thucydides then tells us that the maintenance of the fleet, the largest number of ships they manned throughout the war, as well as keeping the men at duty at Potidæa, on the Western peninsula of Chalcidice, were particular drains on the Athenian finances, which in turn might have led to relying more heavily on their allies in the later years of the war. It is at least striking that the Athenians from 426/425 asked their allies to join their campaigns more often.

Nevertheless, in the summer of 427 B.C. the action on Lesbos drew to a close as Peloponnesian assistance, which was on its way from the Peloponnese, took its time and the Lesbians ran out of food. In short, the Athenians recaptured Lesbos, agreed not to impose tribute on the Lesbians but divided the island, took over the towns on the mainland which had been under Lesbian control, and thus Lesbos and the mainland towns became, from now on, subjects of Athens. In the following winter Athens was again struck by plague, which killed many of their soldiers, and at the same time a series of earthquakes hit Athens. In the summer of 426 Athens sent ships on several expeditions; a total of 90 ships were in service at the same time, showing off Athenian naval strength and getting more people to join their alliance. In the course of the winter of 426/425 Athens was involved in some minor expeditions and battles, but nothing that to me seems as something they could have needed support for, or even had to call in aid from their Ionian allies.

3.3 Chios back in the game

In 425 B.C., at Pylos, on the south-western coast of the Peloponnese, the Athenians attacked a Spartan fleet, with the help of Chios. The Athenians prepared for a sea-battle, where they would either wait for the Spartans to sail out to sea and meet them, or they would sail into the bay where the Spartan fleet was anchored. It was the last of these two options that happened, and the Spartans were taken by surprise, as they did not believe that the Athenians would attack them in the bay. The Athenians crippled many Spartan ships and captured five.

85 Thucydides, 3.17
86 Thucydides, 3.27
87 Thucydides, 3.50
88 Thucydides, 3.87
89 Thucydides, 3.91
Thucydides tells us that in all the confusion “…the Spartans were virtually fighting a sea-battle from land, and the Athenians, victors eager to take maximum advantage of their present fortune, were fighting an infantry battle from their ships”.\(^9^0\)

The Athenians won this battle, set up a trophy, and it was seen as a major disaster for the Spartans.

Finally, Chios is again mentioned and is now contributing as little as 4 ships,\(^9^1\) but this time there is no mentioning of Lesbos, only Chios on its own. When compared to the ships contributed by Athens, 55 in total,\(^9^2\) it adds up to only 6.8\% of the entire fleet. The battle of Pylos was won decisively by Athens and at first glance it looks like they would have won it without the help of an ally. They outnumbered the Spartan fleet, which only numbered 43 (some ships might have been lost in a previous battle shortly before this one, but Thucydides does not say so),\(^9^3\) and the Athenians were known as better sailors than the Spartans. However, it is possible that the Athenians asked the Chians to contribute some ships, either because they wanted to be sure that they overpowered the Spartans, or that they were unsure of how many ships the Spartans actually had. Either way, the Chian contribution was small, but it was a contribution nonetheless.

After the battle of Pylos in 425 B.C. it took only two years until the Chians were called to aid by the Athenians again, and this time they contributed their regular 20 or so percent. The Athenians with 40 ships and the Chians with ten ships sailed for Mende and Scione, on the Western peninsula of Chalcidice, in the summer of 423 B.C. and won successive battles.\(^9^4\) The battle of Mende was a siege-battle, and the Athenians got unexpected aid from a political party within the city, as there was political discord in the city, and thus the battle was easily

\(^{90}\) Thucydides, 4.14
\(^{91}\) Thucydides, 4.13
\(^{92}\) Thucydides, 4.13
\(^{93}\) Thucydides, 4.11-12
\(^{94}\) Thucydides, 4.129-133
won. With Mende now under Athenian control, Athens turned to Scione and this too was a land battle. However, before the city was taken, a deal was struck between Athens and Sparta, leading to a temporary truce. However, Athens continued to build a wall around Scione and by the end of the summer of 423 the wall was finished. The city was later taken in the summer of 421 B.C., and the Athenians “killed all the grown men, enslaved the children and women, and granted occupation of the land to the Plataeans”. What is interesting is that Chios again contributed as much as 20% of the total fleet, which possibly indicates that they were not asked by Athens to summon their entire fleet two years earlier at Pylos, and again strengthening the idea that Athens only needed a few Chian ships in 425 to be sure they would win. However, what is also interesting is that this was the first time Chios contributed with as much as 20% of the entire allied fleet alone. Thucydides does not mention Lesbos at this point, showing that the Chians were more than capable to contribute with a strong navy all by themselves. Bearing in mind that Chios was among the richest of the Greeks, this should not come as a surprise.

After the battles of Mende and Scione in 423 B.C., it would take another seven years before Thucydides again mentions Chios. In 416 B.C., Athens attacked the island of Melos and sent 30 of their own ships, six from Chios and two from Lesbos. Thucydides tells us that:

“…the Athenians sent a force against the island of Melos, consisting of thirty of their own ships together with six from Chios and two from Lesbos, twelve hundred of their own hoplites, with three hundred archers and twenty mounted archers, and about fifteen hundred hoplites from their allies in the islands. The Melians are Spartan colonists who, unlike the other islanders, would not submit to Athenian domination…Later they (the Athenians) left a garrison of their own…and kept up the siege. (...) Now under tight siege, and also betrayed by some internal treachery, the Melians volunteered surrender to the Athenians at their absolute discretion.”

---

95 Thucydides, 4.130  
96 Thucydides, 5.32  
97 Thucydides, 5.84  
98 Thucydides, 5.84  
99 Thucydides, 5.84, 5.114-115
Again looking at the percentage, Chios roams around the 20% mark with roughly 16% of the total fleet, and also interesting is that they contributed three times as many ships as Lesbos did. Two things are noteworthy here. Firstly, Thucydides mentions Chios and Lesbos as two separate units for the first time, instead of as a combined force, as he has done earlier. Secondly, this passage further enhances the notion that Chios contributed more ships to the Athenian war effort than Lesbos earlier as well. If Chios contributed more than Lesbos in this period, it is also likely that Chios contributed more than Lesbos earlier on as well. One has to wonder if Chios also contributed as much as three times as many ships than Lesbos before they are mentioned separately. The theory of Chios contributing more than three times as many ships as Lesbos is of course impossible to say for certain, with the sources available. In any case, Chios remains to this point a steady and strong ally to the Athenians and we now approach the major turning point of the Peloponnesian war, namely the Sicilian expedition.

“And now the Athenians set sail from Corcyra with their entire armament and began the crossing on their way to Sicily. The extent of this armament was as follows. There were a hundred and thirty-four triremes in all, and two Rhodian penteconters: of these a hundred were Athenian (sixty being warships and the rest troop-transports), and the remainder of the fleet was provided by Chios and the other allies.”

This is how Thucydides begins his account of the Athenian crossing to Sicily in the summer of 415 B.C. The Chians were the only other state contributing ships, according to earlier passages of Thucydides, (except for two Rhodian penteconters), and contributed 34 ships, the most since the outbreak of the war. Thucydides has mentioned several times earlier, that

100 Thucydides, 6.43
101 Thucydides, 1.19; 5.84. In Thucydides 5.84 Lesbos is for the last time mentioned as a contributor of ships, and from the passage 1.19, Thucydides only mentions Chios and Lesbos as ship contributing allies of Athens.
102 Thucydides, 6.43
Chios was among the few who contributed ships to the Athenian alliance, and at this point they were the only ones. Admittedly, it seems odd to argue that Chios was the only contributor of ships, even though Thucydides explicitly states in the passage cited above that other allies provided some too. Nevertheless, in 415 B.C., Chios was the last of Athens’ strong naval allies, and even if other allies did contribute ships, it is highly unlikely that they contributed many. Thucydides does not give more detail about these numbers, making it difficult to determine how many ships were contributed by each of the Athenian allies. Nevertheless, at this point Chios was the only other ally Athens had that still contributed ships, thus the other allies cannot have contributed many on their own. It is far more likely that they contributed with soldiers and rowers. Chios did probably not provide all 34 ships themselves, although most of the ships were Chian. As there is no possible way to isolate which ships were Chian and which were from other Athenian allies, I will continue my argument supposing the 34 ships mentioned in the passage above were all Chian.

If we now look at the percentages, we see that out of the fleet that began the crossing in 415 B.C., 25.4% of the ships were Chian, and if we only look at the warships, the number increases to 36.2%. Firstly, this tells us that Chios again contributed roughly around the 20% mark, but secondly, and more importantly, if we look at the warships only, Chian ships stood for 1/3 of the total fleet. Unfortunately this has got little to no recognition in scholarship. However, what this shows us is that Chios was continuously throughout the war a steady contributor of ships, proving their greatness and wealth in their contribution. It might also indicate that Athens drew heavily from their allied forces at this point. When we look at the last time Chios contributed ships before the rebellion, in 413, Chios contributed as few as five
ships when Athens sent for reinforcements. At the same time, Demosthenes, an Athenian general, joined with an Athenian fleet of 60 ships,\textsuperscript{103} and thus Chios only stood for 7,7\% of the reinforcements, and the Athenian ships stood for 92,3\%. However, in the next chapter we will see that Chios was not out of ships just yet and could still muster a strong fleet. Nevertheless, Chios made a strong contribution to the Sicilian expedition, which, as is well known, went horribly wrong for the Athenians and their allies.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
Year & 
Athenian ships & Chian/Lesbian ships & Chian ships & Lesbian ships & TOTAL & \% of Chian ships of total fleet \\
\hline
440-439 (a) & 84 & 25 & & & 109 & 22.9\% \\
\hline
440-439 (b) & 24 & 25 & & & 49 & 51.0\% \\
\hline
440-439 (c) & 120 & 30 & & & 150 & 20.0\% \\
\hline
430 B.C. & 100 & 50 & & & 150 & 33.3\% \\
\hline
425 B.C. & 55 & & 4 & & 59 & 6.8\% \\
\hline
423 B.C. & 40 & & 10 & & 50 & 20.0\% \\
\hline
416 B.C. & 30 & & 6 & 2 & 38 & 15.8\% \\
\hline
415 B.C. & 100 (60) & & 34 & & 134 (94) & 25.4\% (36.2\%) \\
\hline
413 B.C. & 60 & & 5 & & 65 & 7.7\% \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Table representing how many ships Athens, Chios and Lesbos contributed between 440 and 413 B.C.}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{103} Thucydides, 7.20
Before I end this section, I will discuss the issue of how geography and time for preparation might have had an effect on the number of ships that Chios contributed. Of the five places that Chios joined Athens in naval combat, none of them are in close vicinity of Chios. In 430, Chian and Lesbian ships aided the Athenians on various minor campaigns in the Peloponnese, and in 425 Chios joined Athens in a battle at Pylos, also in the Peloponnese. Chios also supported the Athenians at the battle of Mende and Scione, in the far north of the Aegean sea, and at the battle of Melos, in the far south of the Aegean sea. Finally, Chios sent ships to Sicily for the Sicilian expedition. Of all these places mentioned above, none are especially further away from Chios than the others, with the exception of Sicily. It therefore seems that geography was not a factor to determine the Chian contribution of ships. However, it does pose another question, namely if the preparation time had anything to say about the number of ships that Chios contributed?

Before the minor campaigns in the Peloponnese in 430 B.C., Thucydides tells us that Pericles “was preparing an expedition”, meaning that the Athenians, the Chians and the Lesbians would have at least some time to prepare well before the expedition started. At this instance, Chios/Lesbos sent 50 ships, or 33,3% of the total allied fleet, which might indicate that given enough time to prepare, the minor states could send larger fleets. At the battle of Pylos in 425, Chios only sent 4 ships, or 6,8% of the total allied fleet and Thucydides tells us that: “Meanwhile the Athenian ships arrived from Zacynthus, a total of fifty now, as they had been joined by some of the garrison ships from Naupactus and four Chian ships”. Although Thucydides does not say so explicitly, one is left with the feeling after reading this passage that the Chians and the garrison ships from Naupactus did not have much time to prepare. We are not told why the Chian ships joined the Athenians before this battle, but it is possible to assume that they were nearby, and that they were not sent all the way from Chios to join the Athenians in a battle that the Athenians probably would have won anyway.

In 423, at the battle of Mende and Scione, Thucydides tells us that: “…the Athenians had put their preparations into effect and sailed against Mende and Scione with fifty ships (including ten from Chios)…”. We are again told that the Athenians prepared an expedition, much in the same way they prepared in 430 B.C., and at this point Chios aids the Athenians with 20% of the total allied fleet. At the battle of Melos in 416, we are not told of any preparations, and

---

104 Thucydides, 2.56  
105 Thucydides, 4.13  
106 Thucydides, 4.129
Chios only contributed with 15.8% of the total allied fleet. Then, in 415, the Athenians “planned for a long absence”,\(^{107}\) before they left for Sicily, clearly indicating a fair amount of time for preparations. At this instance, Chios contributed 34 ships, or 25.4%, to the total allied fleet.

Before the campaign against the Peloponnese, at the battle of Mende and Scione, and before the Sicilian expedition, we are told that the Athenians prepared themselves, arguably also their allies had time to prepare, and in each instance, Chios contributed 20% or more. Whenever they did not have time to prepare, that is at the battle of Pylos and at the battle of Melos, Chios contributed less than 20%, which we saw was the average percentage earlier in this chapter. Time for preparation was arguably important for the Chians in order to be able to contribute a large number of ships, whereas geography however proved not to be significant.

3.4 Chios compared to other states

When we look at the percentages of Chian ships to the total fleet and take an average of those numbers, we find that Chios contributed on average 22.5 or 23.7% to the Athenian cause, depending on whether one includes the Athenian transports in 415 B.C. The number of ships Chios contributed varies a lot, from four ships to 34 ships, but what we can see from table 1, is that on average, Chios contributed a steady 20-something percent, which also was indicated earlier by single incident percentages. It seems therefore that the Chian contribution of ships to the Athenian fleet was generally about one fifth of the total fleet, or in other words, one fifth of the naval strength of the Athenians.

A quick look in Thucydides’ account shows that Lesbos was never mentioned as a ship providing ally of Athens without the mentioning of Chios as well. This means that the times Lesbos contributed ships, they did so together with Chios. However, Thucydides does mention Lesbos together with Chios in one instance where Chios later is mentioned alone, namely when Chios and Lesbos contributed 50 triremes to the Sicilian expedition.\(^{108}\) However, as Thucydides later tells us, only 34 Chian ships actually made the journey from Corcyra across to Sicily,\(^{109}\) which (i.e. 34) is also the number I have operated with above.

\(^{107}\) Thucydides, 6.31
\(^{108}\) Thucydides, 6.31
\(^{109}\) Thucydides, 6.43
These numbers then are problematic as Thucydides nowhere in between the passages that I just referred to, mentions anything about ships being left behind or lost at sea. However, what might have happened, and we cannot be sure about this, is that 16 ships were left behind, of which some were Lesbian. Another possibility is that Thucydides put Lesbos into the phrase ‘other allies’ in the last passage, but this again seems strange as Lesbos has been mentioned alone several times earlier. However, as Thucydides perhaps put Chios into the phrase ‘other allies’ earlier in section 3.2 (actually ‘their allies’, talking about Athens’ allies), it is not entirely unlikely that Thucydides did the same thing with Lesbos in the passages discussed above. I therefore suggest that in this instance, Lesbos contributed ships as part of the ‘other allies’.

Furthermore, I would like to shortly compare Chios to Corinth, a Spartan ally, and discuss the findings. The reason for this is that it would demonstrate the naval power of Chios compared to other states as well as to the total Athenian fleet the few times Chios contributed, as I have already done above. However, why Corinth? Lesbos is easily explainable as it is the only other ally of Athens that contributes ships, but Corinth is more difficult to justify. However, Corinth was according to Thucydides the first among the Greeks to build triremes and they too were a powerful naval state. It also gives us a view of the “other” side of the war, namely to Athens’ and Chios’ enemy. Corinth was much more often mentioned by Thucydides, but what I will do to make the comparison between Chios and Corinth possible is to compare them whenever Corinth aided Sparta with ships, and not when they went to battle all on their own. By doing so, Chios and Corinth become comparable, as we can get a percentage for Corinthian ships within the entire Spartan fleet.

However, unfortunately for my discussion and for the interesting point this would make in terms of comparable states in the ancient Greek world, Thucydides only mentions Corinth as a ship-providing ally of Sparta once. He does mention them a few times earlier, in various land and sea battles, but he never mentions any specific numbers until the winter of 413/12, where Sparta imposed on their allies to build ships, assembling a fleet with a total of 100 ships, of which 25 were Spartan, 25 were from Boeotia, 15 from Phocis and Locris, 15 from Corinth and 20 from various minor allies. This adds up to only 15% Corinthian ships of the total fleet. Nevertheless, because Corinth is mentioned so little as a ship-providing ally, it is very difficult to use these numbers to make any sort of argument. Of course, one could begin to

---
110 Thucydides, 1.13
111 Thucydides, 8.3
analyse Corinthian contribution to the war effort on its own, but that would make a thesis on its own. It would also not be beneficial for an examination of Chios. I will therefore end my comparison of Chios to other states here.

Nevertheless, if we look beyond the numbers and apply significance to what Thucydides actually says in the passage I discussed in the paragraph above, we find that Chios in many ways was to Athens, what the UK was to USA during the Cold War. The comparison might seem far-fetched, but if we look at Thucydides’ passage above, Sparta relied heavily on a number of satellite states, and all the Spartan allies contributed roughly the same amount of ships as Sparta themselves did. Sparta would in this case be the Soviet Union. Athens on the other hand relied usually only on a few allies at once, Chios being the strongest of these. In the same comparison, Chios could therefore be compared to the UK, with Athens as USA. The comparison of Athens and Sparta being USA and the Soviet Union, or NATO and the Warsaw Pact, has been made several times earlier and is by no means original. However, the comparison of Chios to the UK has, as far as I am aware, not been made before. I will not go further into this comparison here. Suffice it to say that a comparison with the power balance in modern times might make us better understand some general mechanics of power balances and how, in their different ways, Athens and Sparta relied on their allies.

3.5 Chios’ politics and choices

However, what can, and should, be discussed further are Chios’ politics and the choices made during the years of the war that I have discussed above. What was the Chian attitude towards the war? Did Chios always send as many ships as they had available whenever Athens called them for support? In general, what was Chios’ policies regarding the contribution of ships? In this section I will analyse Thucydides’ account to see if these questions can be answered, as they will help to explain the history of Chios’ war effort. I will therefore go deeper into each of the cases presented above, and I have chosen to do this analysis separate from the accounts above, as the method is different and I believe that this makes my arguments more clear. As I have stated earlier, Chios joined Athens in battle on several occasions, the first one during the Peloponnesian war being in the summer of 430 B.C. Thucydides tells us that:
“Pericles was still general, and...he was preparing an expedition of a hundred ships against the Peloponnese, and when all was ready he took them out to sea. He had with him four thousand Athenian hoplites on board the ships, and three hundred cavalry in horse transports, constructed then for the first time out of old ships: and Chios and Lesbos contributed to the expedition with fifty ships. When this Athenian force set sail, they had left the Peloponnesians in the coastal region of Attica.”112

However, Thucydides mentions nothing about the circumstances under which Chios contributed these ships, neither does he discuss anything other than Pericles’ plans and what happened next. What this suggests is that Chios either had to provide these ships for Athens, and that there was some sort of force involved, or that Chios willingly provided these ships. Nevertheless, we cannot be certain of which of these alternatives it is, except that Chios did in fact contribute a large number of ships. Five years later, in 425 B.C. at Pylos, Chios aided Athens with four ships, bringing the Athenian total up to 50 ships. However, here, too, Thucydides fails to mention anything about the circumstances under which Chios contributed these ships, and we know nothing about the Chians’ attitude to sending ships, nor if they sent more or less than requested by the Athenians, if such a request was even made. For all what we know the Chians were free to send as few or as many as they saw fit, as there are no recorded complaint from the Athenians, or any mentioning of lack of Chian ships by Thucydides.

The same is true for the arrangements regarding the campaign against Mende and Scione in 423 B.C. Athens sailed against Mende and Scione, with ten Chian ships, but Thucydides again fails to mention anything about the willingness of the Chians to send these ships. As we have seen, the willingness of Chios it not mentioned again and again, and one can wonder why Thucydides does not mention anything about that. Were the Chians so called ‘yes-men’, agreeing to every Athenian command? Did the Chians have any say in how many ships they should send, or if they were to send any at all? It seems, according to Thucydides’ account, that the Chians complied to Athenian requests. I believe that this is due to the old agreement of the Delian League where Chios was under Athenian protection, as long as they provided ships. Quinn argues that the fear of Athens was great at Chios, which was demonstrated when the Chians obediently demolished their newly built wall when commanded to do so in the

112 Thucydides, 2.56
winter of 424.\textsuperscript{113} It is perhaps this same fear that drove the Chian war effort and made them comply to the Athenians in all of the above mentioned cases. Unfortunately, there is no other evidence for this than the passage where the Chians tear down their wall. However, the tearing down of the wall was an order from the Athenians, indicating that the Athenians did indeed have the authority to order the Chians to do things. Thus, it is reasonable that they also ordered the Chians to contribute as many ships as they did in each case, without Thucydides explicitly saying that it was in fact an order.

Seven years later, in 416, when the Athenians attacked the Melians, Chios aided Athens with six ships. Yet again, Thucydides mentions nothing more than how many ships Chios contributed and then proceeds to give the account of what happened. The story is the same in the following summer, when the Athenians set sail from Corcyra heading towards Sicily, as well as in the summer of 413, when five more Chians ships are sent to Sicily together with 60 Athenian ships. Nevertheless, Thucydides does present some sort of explanation to all this a little later on, when he gives the account of all the nationalities that are involved in the Sicilian expedition. Thucydides tells us that:

\begin{quote}
“Of the others who joined the expedition some were subjects, others were independent allies, and there were also some mercenaries. The tribute-paying subjects were the Eretrians, Chalcidians, Styrians, and Carystians from Euboea; the Ceans, Andrians, and Tenians from the islands; and the Milesians, Samians, and Chians from Ionia (of these last the Chians did not pay tribute, \textbf{but were independent as long as they provided ships instead, and took part in the expedition on that basis}).”\textsuperscript{114}
\end{quote}

Firstly, this list reminds us a great deal of the catalogue of ships in \textit{The Iliad} by Homer\textsuperscript{115}, only much shorter. Secondly, it is the last part of the passage that is of interest to us, as it tells us why Chios joined this expedition, and in large parts indicates why the Chians so willingly contributed ships throughout the war. What Thucydides says is that as long as Chios provided ships for the Athenians, whenever the Athenians asked for ships, the Chians would remain independent. This fits well into the theory that the Chians were afraid of the Athenians, as the

\textsuperscript{113} Quinn, 1964, p. 263
\textsuperscript{114} Thucydides, 7.57
\textsuperscript{115} Homer, \textit{The Iliad} 2.584-862
Chians saw that the Athenians would be able to take their freedom away from them if they did not do as the Athenians commanded. Further, Thucydides says that it was due to this agreement, that the Chians willingly joined the expedition to Sicily. This passage then is perhaps why Thucydides does not mention anything earlier, as he sums it all up nicely just before the Sicilian expedition, and therefore also just before the alliance between Athens and Chios falls apart. In any case, Chios was a steady contributor of ships to the Athenian war effort, because of fear of the Athenians and because they wanted to stay independent. Nevertheless, when Athens was weak after the Sicilian expedition, the Chians saw an opportunity to become free from their alliance, and be an independent state on their own, without Athens’ interference or fear for Athenian repercussions. However, I will discuss that in more detail in the next chapter.

3.6 End of Chian naval contribution – revolt in sight

What seems obvious, despite varying numbers, is that Chios was a steady contributor of ships to the Athenian cause before the revolt in 412 B.C. The percentage of ships contributed is at an average of about 20%, making every fifth ship in the Athenian fleet Chian, whenever the Chians were called in to support. However, that was not always the case, as Athens on several occasions did not call in Chios to support in the years between 430 and 425. Whether that was because the Athenians felt superior to its enemies at that time, or whether it was because they wanted to save the support of its allies, we do not know. However, after 425 B.C., Chios was an ally Athens trusted to support them whenever they needed, and Chios was the strongest contributor of ships when they sailed for Sicily in 415 B.C.

However, before 425 B.C., Athens fought several battles without Chios’ aid. Especially Naupactus became an important town for the Athenians, as control of the town meant that the seaway to Corinth was blocked. Several battles were fought for the control over this town, and the Athenians came out victorious, despite the fact that they did not send for aid, but fought the battles on their own. I have argued in section 3.2 that Athens perhaps could have sent for help to win the battles fought between 430 and 425, especially since the Athenians themselves sent reinforcements, which had to travel by Crete to deal with some things there first. In any case, Athens controlled the sea despite the plague taking many lives back home, and several
setbacks on the mainland. The Athenians therefore probably did not feel the need for aid from their allies at that point in time.

Later on, in the summer of 428, Athens had to deal with the rebellion at Lesbos, which geographically lies close to Chios. However, as we saw, Athens choose not to send for support from Chios, or at least Thucydides does not mention Chios specifically. ‘Athens’ allies’ were mentioned, and it is reasonable to believe that Chios would have been among these allies, but we cannot know for sure. I argued that it was highly unlikely that Athens’ strongest ally in Ionia were not called in to support them, and I therefore find it reasonable to believe that Chios in fact was among the allies that Athens called for aid. In short, even though the Lesbians had become allies of Sparta, Athens recaptured the island and took possession of it as well as Lesbos’ mainland towns. After this, in 426/425 B.C., Athens went on several minor expeditions, without the aid of its allies.

Then, in 425 B.C, at the battle of Pylos, Chios was finally called into action again. The battle ended in a major disaster for the Spartans. However, Chios contributed as little as four ships, whereas Athens came with 55 of their own. Thus, the Chian ships might not have actually been needed at this battle. Two years later, Athens attacked Mende and Scione, and Chios was again asked to support the Athenian navy. This time Chios sent 10 ships, and Athens 40, and they won two easy battles, even though the battle of Scione turned into a long drawn-out siege. Then, Chios is not mentioned again for another seven years, until the battle of Melos in 416 B.C. Here, Chios contributed three times as many ships as Lesbos, but only a fifth of the ships that the Athenians provided. That was the last battle the Chians fought together with the Athenians before the departure for Sicily. Thus, we can see that Chios did not support Athens many times throughout this phase of the war, but when they did, they contributed roughly 20% of the total fleet. One must ask oneself, could Chios have contributed more? I would argue that they most certainly could, on the basis of how many ships they sent to Sicily and how many ships they had at the beginning of their revolt in 412 B.C. However, the question why they did not contribute more is still an open one, and I believe that it cannot be answered until, and if, more primary evidence becomes available and enlightens the subject further.

Nevertheless, Chios supported Athens’ Sicilian expedition too, with 34 ships when they first sailed for Sicily in 415 B.C., with six more ships being sent in 413. Admittedly, the number 34 is up for discussion, as I discussed above. However, because Chios was the last real ship contributing ally of Athens, it is reasonable that the other allies did not provide many of the 34 ships. Of the total Athenian fleet, that too adds up to 25,4% of the first voyage, and 7,7%
of the second one. It is obvious that Chios’ contribution, not only to the Sicilian expedition, but throughout this stage of the war, was steady and strong. When I then compared Chios to other states, except Athens and Sparta, we saw that Chios was if not the strongest, then at least one of the strongest states in the Greek world, when it comes to its navy. Lesbos, which was one of Athens’ main allies before the revolt in 428 B.C. never contributed as many ships as Chios, and never contributed on its own. Neither can Corinth, Sparta’s main naval ally, measure up to the naval strength of Chios in the years between 430 and 413 B.C. Unfortunately for us, Corinth was only mentioned once by Thucydides as a contributor of ships, and I am sure that they contributed more often than that. Had Thucydides had more insight into Spartan affairs at that time, Corinth might have been mentioned more often as well. However, as far as we know, Chios was a stronger naval state than both Lesbos and Corinth in the years between 430 and 413 B.C.

When it comes to Chios’ decisions, I believe that Chios did not have many options. Chios was Athens’ ally in such a way that Chios would support Athens whenever Athens asked, and in return Athens would protect Chios from foreign invaders. At least this was the intention when the Delian League was formed shortly after the Persian war ended in 479 B.C. However, in reality, it seems that the alliance between Athens and Chios was based more on fear, as Chios clearly feared Athens’ power. In addition, Chios was an independent state within the Delian League, as long as they did what Athens told them to do. Therefore, I would argue that Chios did not have much free will, at least not in the years between 431 and 413, where they practically did exactly what Athens told them to do, and therefore stayed independent.

However, as we shall see in the next chapter, Chios took advantage of the situation after Athens’ horrible Sicilian expedition. Independence seemed possible to achieve for the Chians without Athens, and shortly after the news arrived of how the expedition went, Chios went out of their way to rebel against their Athenian allies.

116 I am fully aware that there are discussions on the actual date of the end of the Persian war and that, technically speaking, it may be said to have ended no earlier than 449. However, I have chosen to use the year 479 B.C. for both simplicity and because it is when the major hostilities ended.
4.0 Revolt against Athens – Chios at the forefront

In the last chapter we looked at Chios’ contribution to the Athenian fleet and the attitude and politics of the Chians regarding their contribution. However, as I have mentioned several times now, Chios revolted against Athens in 412 B.C., and this is what I will analyse in depth in this chapter. How important was this revolt for the outcome of the Peloponnesian war? How important was Chios’ role in the revolt? As we have seen, Chios had a strong navy and was a wealthy state. Up until 412, Chios was an ally of Athens and played more or less a rather small role in the war, and by small role I mean that they did not affect the war much and that Athens and Sparta were the main antagonists. This was about to change, as Chios took a leading role in the revolt, which ultimately led to Athens losing many of its most important allies, and thus aided Sparta on its way to victory.

4.1 Talks of revolt

As soon as news of the disastrous Sicilian expedition reached Athens and her allies, talks of revolt began. Thucydides tells us that Athens was quick to begin preparations after its failure, building new ships and improving their economy, but “most of all they kept a close watch on their allies to prevent revolt”. Meanwhile, as Athens were doing their preparations, Euboea and Lesbos sent envoys to the Spartan king Agis, asking him of aid as they wanted to revolt from Athens. However, while Agis was negotiating with the Lesbians, whom he had decided to aid first, the Chians and the Erythraeans sent envoys to Sparta, accompanied by a Persian governor named Tissaphernes also asking for aid to revolt. Whether it was Thucydides writing in hindsight or an actual fear from the Athenians of revolt, we cannot know for sure. However, what is evident is that if there was a fear from the Athenians of revolt, the fear was logical as so many of their allies chose to ask for help to revolt so soon after the Sicilian expedition. In addition, the allies that Thucydides mentions here are not

---

117 Thucydides, 8.4
118 Thucydides, 8.5
119 Thucydides, 8.5
some small, unimportant islands, but some of Athens’ most important allies, and their revolt would of course be a major problem for the already wounded Athenians.

After some more envoys had arrived at Sparta and more negotiating followed, the Spartans made an alliance with Chios and Erythraea, and decided to send 40 ships to aid the already 60 Chian ships at Chios. Now, before I move on I would like to briefly discuss these numbers, as they are quite interesting. Firstly, the Spartans are sending an inferior fleet to aid the Chians, thus the Chians are better represented in the new Spartan/Chian fleet, with 60% of the fleet being Chian ships. However, the Spartans did not manage to send a full 40 ships right away, and the Chians were forced by the Athenians to send them 7 ships to prove that they were still on the Athenian side, even though they were not. Secondly, the fact that Chios had 60 ships (a number we can be fairly certain about because Thucydides tells us that the Spartans did send inspectors to Chios to check this) tells us that Chios was still quite strong after the Sicilian expedition, even though they contributed a large number of ships at that time. What is evident is that Chios, even after so many years of war, was still a fairly strong state and managed to maintain a fleet of 60 ships.

Nevertheless, the Spartans set sail with 21 ships headed for Chios, but were intercepted by the Athenians, and the Spartans lost some ships and the rest were dragged up on land and thus halted there. When the news reached Sparta, the Spartan general Alcibiades (born in Athens, but defected to Sparta after the Sicilian expedition) had to persuade the ephors to still send more ships to Chios to aid the coming revolt. He succeeded; thus Sparta sent 5 ships to Chios with Alcibiades and Chalcideus, who

“arrested all they met in the course of their voyage, to prevent any reports of their coming. They put in first at Corycus on the mainland, where they released their prisoners and had a preliminary meeting with some of the Chians in the plot, who advised them to sail straight into the city unannounced. So they suddenly arrived at Chios to the surprise and alarm of the general public. The oligarchs had so arranged it that the council was sitting at the time, and Chalcideus and Alcibiades were

---

120 Thucydides, 8.6
121 Thucydides, 8.7-9
122 Thucydides, 8.6
123 Thucydides, 8.10
124 Thucydides, 8.12
given the floor. They announced that many more ships were on their way (keeping quiet about the blockade at Speiraeum), and the Chians formally declared secession from Athens, followed shortly by the Erythraeans.”

I would again like to pause for a minute here and discuss what Thucydides is actually saying. Up until now, it seems that all the Chians wanted to revolt from Athens, but Thucydides writes that when the Spartans arrived, the general public of Chios were surprised and alarmed. The outcome in any case was that the Chians formally declared secession from Athens. Even though the public was surprised by the Spartans, it seems that the promise of more ships to come, and strong support from the Spartans in aiding the revolt against Athens, made the thought of revolting against Athens much more palatable for the Chians. However, as we just saw, the oligarchs of Chios were very much aware of the arrival and I believe that some discussion on the political groups of Chios must be examined.

I would like to briefly discuss the type of government Chios had at this time, as well as what the Chian population thought of a revolt (as this is an interesting and important point when discussing Chios’ role in general). As we have just seen, Thucydides mentions both oligarchs and a council, both being active at the same time. Quinn seems to believe that this is evidence of a mixed constitution at Chios in 412 B.C., or at any rate an oligarchy with some democratic features. Bradeen however argues that Chios was under an oligarchy the entire 5th century, and that if there had been any support for a democracy, Athens would have taken advantage of that, perhaps as early as 424. Also de Ste. Croix discusses the government type of Chios briefly and suggests that Chios up until 412 was a moderate oligarchy rather than a democracy. Barron too mentions Chios as an oligarchy, but does not discuss it in any further detail. Nevertheless, Thucydides does mention both oligarchs and a council, as well as saying that the Chian people were forced under tight control in 412, which points to that

---

125 Thucydides, 8.14
126 Thucydides, 8.14
131 Thucydides, 8.38
the population did have some sort of say or that there were democratic elements up until that point. In other words, oligarchy and democracy seems to have been functioning together at Chios, at least to some extent. Thus the idea of a mixed constitution is supported by Thucydides in several passages, making Quinn’s argument favourable compared to de Ste. Croix’s and Barron’s arguments. At any rate, what we can confidently say about the Chian government at this time was that it definitely had some oligarchic attributes to it, and perhaps, but most likely, some democratic attributes as well.

Even though the oligarchs had much to say at Chios in 412, they obviously did not enjoy full power, as they hesitated to say anything to the council, and thus also the rest of the population, about the Spartan arrival. There are some theories about why the oligarchs kept the Chian council in the shadows, but the leading argument is that of fear of the Athenians. Quinn argues in several articles that it was fear of the Athenians that was the main obstacle to revolt for the masses, and that they only revolted after getting assurance from the Spartans that additional ships were on their way. He further argues that they (the oligarchs) foresaw that it was the fear of facing Athens unaided, not of constitutional change, that they would have to overcome and that this could be shown by the tactics they and the Spartans adopted. Unfortunately, Quinn does not go further into how we can see this from the tactics, but in a footnote he discusses the difference between this approach, where there is no mention of force and that of Brasidas at Acanthus, where there was mention of force. de Ste. Croix too argues that the oligarchs did not dare mention this plan to the council or the masses until the Spartans arrived, but fails to give a more detailed explanation. He goes on to saying that the pro-Athenian leaders at Chios were killed and an oligarchy was imposed by force, but this happened approximately 6 months later according to Thucydides. It seems that the Chian oligarchs hesitated to reveal their plans to the masses until they knew they had popular support and a sure alliance with the Spartans. It is also evident that the Chian population were keen to revolt, as they revolted shortly after the Spartans arrived and with no sign of force being used by the Spartans.

133 T. J. Quinn, Athens and Samos, Lesbos and Chios (Manchester, 1981), p. 44-45
134 de Ste. Croix, 1954, p. 6
135 de Ste. Croix, 1954, p. 6
136 Thucydides, 8.38
The reasons why both the Chian masses and the oligarchs wanted to revolt are different. Thucydides suggests that the masses wanted to revolt because they saw Athens as too weak to keep on fighting for another year, and Quinn suggests that “the oligarchs of Chios hoped to change their constitution with the help of Sparta.” Both groups got what they wanted and Chios revolted.

4.2 Major crisis and Athenian response

Having discussed the government of Chios and the Chian population’s thought of revolt, I will now continue analysing Thucydides’ narrative. Thucydides tells us that “the Athenians recognized that they now had a clearly major crisis on their hands: with the most important allied state gone over to the enemy”. It is also in this passage that we are told that the Chians have slaves on their ships, as I mentioned briefly in section 2.3. In any case, Athens was eager to recover Chios and nothing was spared in the operation. What this clearly indicates is the importance of Chios to the Athenians. First of all, Thucydides himself tells us that Chios was the most important ally to the Athenians. Furthermore, the state of urgency the Athenians were in when they heard the news of Chios rebelling clearly indicates the importance Chios had to them. Although Chios was an important naval ally, it was also important for the Athenians that the Chians did not get a strong influence over other allies in Ionia, as they would spread the revolt quickly. At least that seems to be the essence of what Thucydides tells us.

Nevertheless, what the Athenians feared was exactly what happened, as Chios began to promote revolt elsewhere. Teos was the first city after Chios to join the revolt, and, shortly after, Miletus too revolted, as Alcibiades and a Spartan, together with the Chians, managed to convince them to do so. However, two more things are noteworthy in this passage. Firstly, that Alcibiades managed to do what he promised the ephors before he left Sparta, which explains why he was so keen to achieve his mission of encouraging revolts without more

---

137 Thucydides, 8.2
138 Quinn, 1981, p. 44
139 Thucydides, 8.15
140 Thucydides, 8.15
141 Thucydides, 8.16
142 Thucydides, 8.17
assistance than that from the Chians and Chalcideus. Secondly, that the Athenians were on their heels and so when Miletus did revolt, Athens blockaded Lade, which was the island facing the city. This left the Athenians with 19 ships in close proximity of Miletus and Chios. This event also lead to the first Spartan alliance with the Persians, negotiated by Tissaphernes (for the Persians) and Chalcideus (for the Spartans),\textsuperscript{143} which was important as they joined forces against the Athenians. Soon after, Chios spread the revolt further to Lebedus and Aerae, at the same time as the Spartan ships that were blockaded by the Athenians earlier broke out and set sail for Chios and Ionia.\textsuperscript{144} Shortly afterwards there was a revolt in Samos, supported by the Athenians who granted them independence,\textsuperscript{145} which was important because Samos then became an significant base for the Athenians in Ionia.

Even though Chios had by now promoted revolt in a few places, their enthusiasm for promoting revolt elsewhere did not cease, and they sent 13 of their own ships towards Lesbos, following the Spartan plan.\textsuperscript{146} Thucydides tells us that this was in order to “involve as many cities as they could in sharing the risk of defection”.\textsuperscript{147} As we have already discussed, the Chians were clearly afraid of Athens’ power and it is possible that by sharing the risk of defection with others around them, they thought the retributions would not be as devastating, should the revolt fail. However, while Astyochus reached Chios on his way to Lesbos, an Athenian fleet under the command of the generals Leon and Diomedon captured Lesbos, so Astyochus secured the revolt of Eresus, then sailed back to Chios.\textsuperscript{148} What we begin to see now is a situation that very much goes back and forth, both sides struggling to maintain a solid position. Chios and Sparta are both heavily invested in creating more revolts, while Athens is demonstrating her naval power, forcing revolts back and hindering revolts wherever possible.

The next passage in Thucydides marks however a turning point, at least for now. Thucydides tells us that:

“Leon and Diomedon now used the Athenian fleet from Lesbos to prosecute war against the Chians from their ships, launching attacks from the Oenoussae islands

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{143} Thucydides, 8.17-18
\item \textsuperscript{144} Thucydides, 8.19-20
\item \textsuperscript{145} Thucydides, 8.21
\item \textsuperscript{146} Thucydides, 8.22
\item \textsuperscript{147} Thucydides, 8.22
\item \textsuperscript{148} Thucydides, 8.23
\end{itemize}
opposite Chios, from Sidoussa and Pteleum…and from Lesbos itself. Landings were
made at Cardamyle and Boliscus, where the Chian forces coming to resist them were
defeated with many casualties…they were defeated again in another battle at Phanae,
and in a third battle at Leuconium”.

Thucydides further tells us that the Chians now gave up and that the Athenians began
to ravage the richly cultivated land, which was only the beginning of starvation
for the Chians. With cultivated land, I mean here cultivable in terms of good for
growing wine vines and mastic, but rather poor for growing cereals. At this point, the
Athenians begin to control parts of Chios and the war is now taken to the Chians.
The next part of the passage is quite interesting, as Thucydides pauses for a
second and mentions two things: firstly, he explains why the Chians revolted, which was because they believed that Athens was in a dire
state; secondly, he says that the Chians wanted to wait with the revolt until they had a good
number of allies to share the risk with. What is interesting about this is that Thucydides has
mentioned all of this before, yet he mentions it again here. As it is mentioned in the same
breath as Chian prosperity and prudence, and well-ordered government, it could be some sort
of explanation as to why such a stable and rich state would press a revolt.

In any case, Thucydides mentions further that there was some sort of pro-Athenian group in
Chios, pressing to give the land back to the Athenians, but that this group was quickly put
down, not by the Chian authorities themselves, but with help of the Spartans how to best put
down such a conspiracy. Unfortunately, Thucydides leaves us with that and moves on, but
in a later passage he continues and we are told that the pro-Athenian group, led by Tydeus,
son of Ion, is executed and the rest of the population put under tight control.\textsuperscript{153} Nevertheless, at the end of this passage, the Athenians are gaining control over Chios and Chios is not mentioned again until early winter 412. Here we are told that the Athenians had two main operations on their hands, a naval blockade at Miletus as well as that they were dispatching a fleet and infantry to Chios.\textsuperscript{154} This indicates that gaining full control over Chios was still high on the priority list for the Athenians, as well as strangling the revolt elsewhere too. As the Athenians also wanted to keep infantry on Chios indicates that a blockade, such as the one on Miletus, was not enough and that only full control of the island was acceptable.

4.3 Burning bridges – the Chians decline Astyochus’ proposal

However, Chios was not yet taken by the Athenians and, when the Spartan admiral Astyochus was approached by envoys from Lesbos, he sailed for Chios and presented to the Chians and to Pedaritus, who was governor at Chios at that time, the possibility of a second attempt at revolt in Lesbos.\textsuperscript{155} Astyochus argued that by provoking a second revolt at Lesbos, they could either win more allies to their side, or in any case do some damage to the Athenians, but neither the Chians nor Pedaritus complied, and thus refused Astyochus the Chian ships.\textsuperscript{156} This is an important decision for the Chians as we shall soon see. Because of their refusal, Astyochus refused to aid Chios when the Athenians stroke them hard, thus losing an important ally in the revolt. Although Chios had enough to worry about at home, with the Athenians attacking them, it was obviously not so much that envoys could not arrive at Chios without problems, and ships seem to have been able to still sail freely in and out of the harbour. It remains a speculation, but perhaps Chios and Pedaritus should have agreed to aid Astyochus with ships, being more offensive in their quest of gaining more support for the revolt. In any case, Astyochus left Chios and set sail for Miletus, making it clear for the Chians that they could expect no help from him if they ever needed it.\textsuperscript{157} Shortly after Astyochus left, the Athenian naval and infantry force that set sail from Samos to Chios met three Chian ships, pursued them, and three Athenian ships were wrecked in a storm, whereas

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Thucydides, 8.38
\item Thucydides, 8.30
\item Thucydides, 8.32
\item Thucydides, 8.32
\item Thucydides, 8.33
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
the Chian ships got away.\textsuperscript{158} The rest of the Athenian fleet found refuge and set sail for Lesbos and began preparing for the fortification they intended to build in Chios.\textsuperscript{159} Whether Thucydides wrote the story the way he did for dramatic effect or not we cannot know, but shortly after Astyochus leaves, the Chians, according to Thucydides, face a massive threat, which will inevitably strike down on them.

While Astyochus, who might have been Chios’ saviour had they aided him only a few moments earlier, arrived at Miletus and took command over the Peloponnesian fleet,\textsuperscript{160} the Athenians arrived at Chios with superiority at both land and sea.\textsuperscript{161} Thucydides tells us that the Chians took no action, as they had been beaten in several battles earlier, and that the Athenians began fortifying Delphinium, a place north of the city of Chios, which was strong on the landward side and offered harbours.\textsuperscript{162}

Furthermore, Thucydides tells us that there was internal conflict amongst the Chians at this point and that “…no one could trust anyone else, and for that reason it was thought that they themselves would not be a match for the Athenians, nor would the mercenaries brought by Pedaritus”.\textsuperscript{163} However, the Chians did send envoys to Miletus asking Astyochus for help, but they were refused as Astyochus had promised them when he left.\textsuperscript{164} This is a crucial passage in terms of understanding Chios’ part in the revolt, at the time when Athens was about to gain full control of the island. No aid was in sight, Chios has no opportunity to provoke further revolts as their harbour is blockaded, and they had given up on fighting the Athenians on land. At this point

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{map_chios_delphinium.png}
\caption{Map of Chios, with Delphinium marked out and enlarged on the right.}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{158} Thucydides, 8.34  
\textsuperscript{159} Thucydides, 8.34  
\textsuperscript{160} Thucydides, 8.36  
\textsuperscript{161} Thucydides, 8.38  
\textsuperscript{162} Thucydides, 8.38  
\textsuperscript{163} Thucydides, 8.38  
\textsuperscript{164} Thucydides, 8.38
then, in the winter of 412/411 B.C. it looked like Chios’ role in the war, and certainly in the revolt, was done.

However, the Chians kept sending messages for Astyochus asking for help to lift the blockade, but got refused every time. In addition to the problem of having a large Athenian force on its lands, Chios also faced a problem of slave desertion. As soon as the Athenians gained a firm position at Delphinium, the majority of slaves deserted and helped the Athenians do great damage to the countryside, causing a more severe food shortage for the Chians. Now, after several attempts to get his help Astyochus finally agreed to aid the Chians, but, as chance had it, at the same time he got a message from Caunus, which is located on the western coast of Asia Minor. The message said that 27 Spartan ships were on its way, and Astyochus believed that it was more important to provide a convoy for these ships than to aid Chios, so he abandoned the Chios plan and sailed for Caunus. Again, had Chios aided Astyochus earlier they might have been aided themselves when needed. Unfortunately for the Chians, this is not what happened, and they were yet again left to their own. However, what is interesting at this point is that the Athenians too are using a lot of resources on keeping Chios. Thus Chios is indirectly damaging the Athenian cause.

After this, Chios is not mentioned again until towards the end of the winter of 411 when they did two things. Firstly, they sent yet another envoy to the Spartans who were now at Rhodes, asking for aid or else the entire Chian fleet would be lost. The Peloponnesians thought about giving help, but then Thucydides says nothing more of it and moves on. Secondly, Pedaritus took his mercenary force and the Chian army and attacked the now finished Athenian fortifications, but lost, resulting in an even tighter blockade. Thucydides tells us that at this point the famine was severe. The Athenians must have been rather confident at this point, as they had beaten the Chians a total of four times, as well as having them totally blockaded.

In fact, it is the blockade that seems to have been the Chians’ biggest problem. As I have emphasised a few times earlier, Chios was dependent on their trade economy and it was absolutely necessary for the Chians to be able to import grain to feed themselves. However,
with the Athenians tightening their blockade, and the slaves having joined the Athenian side, the future for the Chian population seemed grim. There was little to no cultivable land, on which the Chians could grow foodstuff, and because of the blockade, little to no import of grain or other food stuffs was possible. However, we must assume that some smuggling was done, on the basis of what follows shortly. Nevertheless, smuggling alone would not be enough to feed Chios’ massive population, and starvation was no longer just a possibility, but for many Chians a reality. Also, no evidence or indication of smuggling is present in our sources, thus, that such activity took place, remains only speculation. In any case, the situation for the Chians was at this point very severe, and it seems likely that the Chians would not be able to hold out much longer.

4.4 Turning point – Chios is free from Athens’ grasp

However, the major turning point came at the beginning of spring in 411 B.C. First, before spring came, the Peloponnesians had finally decided to relieve the distress of Chios and set sail for the island, but had to stop at Miletus in order to avoid engaging the Athenians at Samos.171 Meanwhile, the Chians got a new governor after the death of Pedaritus, named Leon, and he came with 12 ships that had guarded Miletus.172 Firstly, this indicates that the blockade around Chios could not have been as tight as Thucydides mentioned earlier. Secondly, this meant that the Chian ships already in the harbour of Chios got reinforcements and perhaps a new fighting spirit with the new governor. Thucydides tells us that:

“The entire Chian land force broke out and seized a strong position, while their thirty-six ships were launched against the Athenians’ thirty two, and came to battle. It was a hard fight, and when they turned back to the city as evening came on the Chians and their allies had not been worsted in the action.”173

---

171 Thucydides, 8.60
172 Thucydides, 8.61
173 Thucydides, 8.61
Firstly, it seems that the Chians only had 24 ships left on their own before this battle, as Leon had arrived with 12 ships, indicating what hardship they had suffered before this. That they only had 24 ships left could either mean that the rest were lost in Sicily, after Sicily during the first year of the revolt or that they could not man more than 24, which seems like the most likely scenario. However, neither Thucydides, nor any other sources, say anything about why the Chians only had, or could only man, 24 ships. Secondly, this passage states that the Chians definitely did not lose the battle against the Athenians, and as we will shortly see, the Chians came well out of the battle.

Shortly afterwards Thucydides says that “the Chians gained greater control of the sea” and that Strombichides, the Athenian general in charge of the Athenian forces at Chios, left;\(^\text{174}\) thus the siege of Chios and the final battle must have ended at least in a Chian win. The departure of Strombichides is however fairly surprising, as he takes with him 24 Athenians ships which could have been used to press the Chians back, but rather he moves on to several attacks on minor cities closer to the Hellespont.\(^\text{175}\) As I mentioned above, Thucydides tells us that Athens felt that the security of Chios was the most important and pressing case, thus I find it very strange that Strombichides decides to abandon Chios. It is also noteworthy that Thucydides does not mention the importance of Chios at this point, nor does he mention why it was so important for Strombichides to leave either. In any case, Chios was now free from the Athenian blockade, and during the rest of the war Chios was never taken by the Athenians again.

Although the Athenians must have maintained some presence at Chios after Strombichides left, the reasons for his departure is of interest. Was Chios no longer important to the Athenians? Or did perhaps the Athenians understand that they could not win Chios back, so they rescued what forces they had left on the island, and went somewhere else? Chios is only mentioned by Thucydides once more, when the Peloponnesians again are at Chios and the Chians are paying the wages for the Peloponnesians, possibly indicating that the Chians were still a wealthy people. However, it seems that Chios’ role in the war was weakened after the revolt, i.e. that it took so much resources and manpower to withstand the Athenians and finally beating them, that they were unable to aid the Spartans further. At least they are rarely mentioned in the last part of Thucydides. In addition, it seems that the Athenians saw that Chios now was a lost cause, so Strombichides left, and no further attempt was made in order

\(^{174}\) Thucydides, 8.63  
\(^{175}\) Thucydides, 8.62
to take back the island. Furthermore, Thucydides tells us that “the democracy at Athens had been overthrown”, indicating some sort of division in the political scene in Athens. This too could of course influence events, such as the departure of Strombichides. However, Thucydides says nothing more about Strombichides or the ships that he took with him, until a little later in the summer of 411, when Strombichides is about to return from the Hellespont to Samos.

Unfortunately for us, Thucydides’ account stops here, in the summer of 411 B.C., and Chios is not mentioned again in the short remainder of his account. However, Xenophon continues the story of the Peloponnesian war in the Hellenica, but Chios is not mentioned again before 406. It seems that five years after Thucydides’ account ends, Chios is back in some sort of position of power, as they are able to contribute crews to the Spartan fleet. Admittedly, contributing crew to some ships is not the same as actually contributing ships, but after all the fighting with the Athenians and the famine, it is possible that this was all that Chios was able to do in 406. However, Chios was back in the war, but not in the same role as before: in fact, they would never come back to the same level of power or importance later on either.

In the summer of 406 it seems that agricultural production was back and running again on Chios, as Spartan troops supported themselves on Chian agriculture. It was also the last time Chios would be mentioned in this war. The Spartan general Eteonicus, who was in charge of the Spartan troops at Chios, became aware that the troops were forming a plan to attack the people of Chios, in order for the soldiers to be better off during the winter months. So he came up with a plan of himself, and Xenophon tells us that what happened was as follows:

“Next Eteonicus called together the people of Chios and told them to raise money so that the sailors could be paid and so would not do anything violent. The people of Chios raised the money, and then Eteonicus gave the signal for the men to go aboard the ships…Afterwards the people of Chios and the other allies held a meeting at Ephesus at which they discussed the situation and decided to send ambassadors to

---

176 Thucydides, 8.63
177 Thucydides, 8.79
178 Xenophon, A History of My Times 1.6.3
179 Xenophon, 2.1.1
180 Xenophon, 2.1.1-2
Sparta…to ask that Lysander should be sent out to take over the command….The Spartans sent Lysander out with the office of vice-admiral, with Aracus as admiral. This was because they have a law forbidding the same man to be admiral twice. However, the ships were in fact under the command of Lysander”.\textsuperscript{181}

It seems then, that Chios’ role in the Peloponnesian war was coming to an end, but the last thing they did was also among the most important things, namely to bring Lysander back in command. As Thucydides tells us in the passage above, it was against the law in Sparta for a man to be admiral twice, but Lysander was in effect the commander of the Spartan fleet. However, the Spartans could have decided to bring back Lysander without outside pressure from the Chians. But as it happened, Chios was among the Spartan allies that convinced the Spartans to bring Lysander back as the commander of the fleet. In hindsight at least, it was important for the war, or at least the Spartans, that Lysander should be brought back to command, as he was the commander that ultimately defeated the Athenians at the Battle of Aegospotami in 405 B.C. This in turn led to Athens’ surrender in 404 B.C. However, it appears as if Chios’ role in the Peloponnesian war was coming to an end after the revolt in 411, and that Chios’ influence and power declined in the last years of the war.

4.5 Chios and its dependency on individuals rather than states

Before I end my discussion on Chios’ part in the revolt against Athens, and in the years after the revolt, I would like to discuss a theme that develops during Thucydides’ narrative of the revolt, namely that Chios becomes more and more dependent on the goodwill of individuals, rather than states. At the beginning of the revolt, we are told by Thucydides that Chios sent envoys to Sparta, asking for help to revolt, whereas the Lesbians had sent envoys to Agis, the Spartan king.\textsuperscript{182} In this case, Chios is asking the state of Sparta for help, not an individual. Throughout Thucydides’ narrative, Chios has been in contact with states whenever they wanted something, or was asked to do something.

\textsuperscript{181}Xenophon, 2.1.5-7
\textsuperscript{182}Thucydides, 8.5
However, when Astyochus presented his plans to Pedaritus and the Chians, in the winter of 412/11 B.C., he was refused. Soon after, Chios was under attack by Athens and needed help. Instead of asking Sparta the state for help, they sent envoys to Astyochus, who now turned the envoys down, time after time.\footnote{Thucydides, 8.40} Why Chios chose to send envoys to Astyochus instead of Sparta, or any other ally, we do not know, except that they perhaps did so because he was the admiral at that time. However, as I mentioned above, when they wanted to revolt, Chios sent envoys to Sparta, not Agis, which is the exact opposite of what they did this time. Whether the answer from Sparta would be the same, we cannot know for sure, but it does in any case indicate that Chios was either by will, or by force, becoming more dependent on individuals rather than states - at least for the time being. I therefore believe that this refusal, and the following turning down of the envoys by Astyochus, was the beginning of Chios’ dependency on individuals rather than other states.

We can see the Chians being dependent on individuals later on as well, when the Spartan forces stationed at Chios wanted to attack the Chians, but the Chians were saved by the Spartan commander Eteonicus. Xenophon tells us that:

\begin{quote} 
“The troops in Chios under Eteonicus could support themselves during the summer months from the seasonal produce and could get money by hiring out their labour in the island. But when winter came on they found themselves short of food, clothing and footwear. \textbf{So they got together and planned to make an attack on Chios.} (…) Next Eteonicus called together the people of Chios and told them to raise money so that the sailors could be paid and so would not do anything violent. The people of Chios raised the money, and then Eteonicus gave the signal for the men to go aboard the ships.”\footnote{Xenophon, 2.1.6} 
\end{quote}

The Chians did not come to Eteonicus asking for help, but was nevertheless dependent on his aid, otherwise they would have been attacked by the Spartan soldiers. What happened next was that the Chians sent envoys to Sparta, asking for Lysander to take over command.\footnote{Xenophon, 2.1.6} That the Chians sent envoys to Sparta suggests that they were not entirely dependent on individuals, as they were able to send requests to the Spartan state as well. Nevertheless, at the
end of the revolt against Athens, there seems to be a trend that the Chians were more dependent on individuals than on states.

4.6 End of revolt and end of the war

It is quite clear that the revolt of Chios and other Athenian allies in 412/411 B.C. was more than a bump in the road for the Athenians, but rather a major crisis. After a humiliating defeat in Sicily, the last thing the Athenians needed was to lose some of its most important allies, and having to fight not only Sparta and the Spartan allies, but the states that revolted too. That was however exactly the situation the Athenians faced in 412, and the pressure seems to have been too much for Athens to handle. In 405, at the battle of Aegospotami, the Athenians lost their last major battle and surrender shortly after in 404. It seems then, that the Athenians were unable to cope with fighting so many different enemies at once, and that the total amount of resources the Athenians had to use was just too much. After all, we were told that the Athenians spared no expense in the campaign of taking back Chios when they heard that the island had rebelled. And the cost of maintaining the Athenian fleet and troops in various places was certainly not low either.

We saw that in 412 B.C., when news of the disastrous Sicilian expedition arrived, Chios was quick to send envoys to Sparta to ask for assistance in their attempt to revolt from the alliance with Athens. Sparta opted to aid the Chians, because of the promise of a large Chian fleet that would aid the Spartan war effort, and thus the revolt against Athens began. Even though the Chian people were kept in the dark for some time by the oligarchs at Chios, they quickly embraced the idea of revolt as soon as they got promises that more ships were on its way from the Peloponnese and that the risk of revolt would be shared with others. When the Athenians got news of the events that unfolded at Chios, they hurried to gather enough resources and ships to crush the rebellion as fast as they could. Thucydides even stated that the Athenians “…now had a clearly major crisis on their hands: with the most important allied state gone over to the enemy”. Thus it is quite clear that the situation in which Chios put Athens was dire and needed the full attention of the Athenians.

---

186 Thucydides, 8.15
However, before the Athenians could put a stop to the rebellion, Chios and Sparta managed to convince more states to revolt, Miletus being one of them. The Persians too saw this as an opportunity, and supported the revolt and the Spartan war effort. Chios however continued to spread revolt, as they wanted to share the risk of defection with others, so that if they in the future were to be punished by Athens, many more would share that punishment. Even though Chios fought hard to encourage revolt elsewhere, Athens soon invaded Chios and beat the Chians in several battles. The Athenians then began to ravage the land, and were joined by the many slaves that lived on Chios. Furthermore, they did not stop there, and we were told by Thucydides that Athens had two main operations at this point: to have a naval blockade of Miletus, and dispatch a fleet and infantry to Chios, in order to gain full control of the island.

At this point, Chios was not yet under Athenian control, and the Spartan admiral Astyochus asked the Chians for aid to raise a second revolt at Lesbos. The Chians however declined, thus burning the bridge between themselves and a Spartan admiral that could have helped Chios in the future. The Athenians then began to fortify Delphinium and blockade the harbour of Chios. This was a catastrophe for the Chians, as they had to import food to feed its massive population. Chios then sent many envoys to Astyochus, asking for aid, but all the envoys were declined. I argue that if Chios had joined Astyochus in rising a second revolt at Lesbos, they might have been helped in this instance. However, the governor at Chios, Pedaritus, then took his mercenaries and some local troops and attacked the Athenians. The Chians lost, and the blockade of the harbour got even tighter, thus making the situation for the Chians even worse.

Nevertheless, the Chians’ luck turned, as they managed to get a new governor after the death of Pedaritus, named Leon. He brought with him 12 ships, which together with the ships in the harbour of Chios and the Chian land forces that remained managed to fight back the Athenians and regain control of the island. Soon after, the Chians gained more and more control of the sea, as the Athenian general Strombichides left for the Hellespont. Not much more is mentioned about Chios by Thucydides, and we have to rely on Xenophon’s account for the last few years of the war. Apparently, Chios was not much involved in the last few years, and it seems then that Chios’ role in the Peloponnesian war had come to an end.

At the end of section 4.5 I argued that Chios became more and more dependent on the goodwill of individuals, rather than states, as the revolt went on. The Chians were not fully dependent on individuals, as they did send envoys to Sparta after the departure of Eteonicus in 406. However, for the most part at the end of the revolt, the Chians were more dependent on the goodwill of individuals rather than that of allied states.
5.0 Conclusions

As presented in chapter 1, research question of this thesis is Chios’ role in the Peloponnesian war. Throughout the thesis I have offered arguments showing that Chios played an at least moderately important role in the war before 412 B.C. Its importance grew in the revolution against Athens in 412 B.C., as it was a leading state in the revolution and shifted its allegiance to Sparta. We have seen that Chios was not a major actor in the war, in that it was not drawn into battles on many occasions, and can thus not be compared to states like Athens or Sparta. It should however, as I have done in the chapters above, be compared to states like Lesbos and Corinth as a supporting actor. In fact, I would argue that Chios should be given even more importance for the war than for example Lesbos and Corinth, and that the role Chios played had greater significance to the outcome of the war. For the Athenians, Chios was a strong naval ally, and, after the revolt of 412, Chios was an important tool for the Spartans in order to obtain more naval power, culminating in a change in the balance of power at the end of the war.

In chapter 2, as a background to the examination of Chios’ role in the Peloponnesian war, an analysis of Chian economy before the war and Chian demographics was provided. I argued that Chios was heavily dependent on its trade economy, and that this was a prerequisite for the Chians’ ability to provide enough food for its own population, as well as its large slave population. Chios was heavily dependent on the import of grain, which became evident when the Athenians blockaded Chios in 412 B.C., resulting in a massive shortage of food for the Chians. What we also saw from chapter 2 was that, at the outbreak of the Peloponnesian war, in 431 B.C., Chios was at its economical height, being one of the wealthiest Greek states, and one of Athens’ strongest allies, if not the strongest. Finally, wealth was converted into power and power was developed into political influence and military strength. Chapter 2 was therefore important for the rest of the thesis, as it explained the prerequisites for Chian naval power and therefore also how Chian could be a strong ally for the Athenians.

Throughout the first 19 years of the war, Chios was among Athens’ most reliable allies, contributing ships on several occasions: whenever the Chians got enough time to prepare, they contributed more than 20% of the total allied fleet. In the introduction I asked the question if Chios was an important ally to Athens, and in chapter 3 I showed that it was evident that Chios in fact was so. In modern research of the Peloponnesian war, more
emphasis should be put on the importance of Chios to the Athenian alliance due to its contribution and because of the example Chios made to other, minor Athenian allies. In chapter 3 I argued that Chios in fact was a strong naval ally for the Athenians, contributing ships on several occasions and on a steady average of about 20% of the total allied fleet. Chios was clearly an important ally to the Athenians, and during the course of the war Chios also became an important ally to the Spartans.

When several Greek states wanted to revolt after the Sicilian expedition, Chios became the leading force in the revolt. We saw in chapter 4 that the Spartans saw Chios as the strongest state and choose to aid the Chians first. With the Chian and Spartan forces combined, the revolt then spread to several other states in the Aegean, creating a very difficult situation for the Athenians. There is no doubt that a revolt would have happened with or without the support of the Chians, but the revolt would arguably not have been so strong and drained so many resources from the Athenians, had Sparta not been able to get the Chians on their side. Chios was unquestionably a strong ally for the Spartans to gain after the Sicilian expedition, not only because of the large fleet that was still at Chios, but also because the Athenians saw this as a major crisis and spared no expense in taking back the control of the island. A consequence of the Athenian attempt at recapturing Chios was a major drain of resources, giving the Spartans the advantage they needed at the end of the war.

This in turn leads to the question, whether Chios did change the balance of power in the Greek world. Was Chios one of the forces that tipped the balance over from the Athenians to the Spartans? In chapter 4 I argued that Chios leading the revolt was hurting the Athenians, even though the Chians spent much time under a land and naval blockade by the Athenians. Nevertheless, the Athenians were already hurt after a lengthy war which had drained its resources. They were worn out after the Sicilian expedition that went wrong and had Chios not revolted, others would most certainly have. The Chians did however revolt, and gave the Athenians a real fight, but ultimately needed to be saved by the Spartans. The Athenian blockade of Chios almost killed the spirit of revolt in the Chians. However, the Chians and the Spartans managed to lift the blockade, and the Athenians would never recover the island of Chios. Nevertheless, it seems that Chios’ involvement in the revolt did in fact tip the balance of power in favour of the Spartans. We might say that Chios revolting and joining the Spartan alliance was the straw that broke the camel’s back. The Athenians never truly recovered after the Sicilian expedition and the revolt, and it did not take many years before they had to capitulate.
No historian would ever think to suggest that an island like Chios would be in the same league as Athens and Sparta, the two superpowers of the Ancient Greek world. Nevertheless, Chios was among the strongest, most influential and wealthiest Greek states, and it was of moderate importance in the Peloponnesian war. As long as it was allied to Athens, Chios was a steady contributor of ships and a strong ally. The importance of Chios for the Peloponnesian war grew in the revolt against Athens in 412 B.C., and the balance of power tipped in favour of the Spartans at the end of the revolt. The little island state of Chios never dominated the Greek world, but it was instrumental in changing the balance of power in the late 5th century B.C. Thus, Chios’ role in the Peloponnesian war was a seemingly small one, but it could be argued that the small role the Chians played had a major impact on the history of the Peloponnesian war and therefore on the course of the history of the Ancient Greek world.

5.1 Aftermath

As discussed in section 4.4, Chios was mentioned by Xenophon as a contributor to the war effort for the last time in 406 B.C., raising money for the Spartan soldiers and asking the Spartans to give Lysander the command of the fleet. Two years later, in 404 B.C., Athens surrendered and Sparta won the war. Nevertheless, Athens soon regained some sort of power and democracy was restored and, even though Sparta won the war, they never managed to sustain an empire in the same way as the Athenians did. However, this did not mean that Athens was restored to the great empire it once was. In fact, the Peloponnesian war ended any chance of Athens again becoming a dominant force in the Ancient Greek world. After the fall of Athens, several wars followed in the years after the end of the Peloponnesian war, and within 70 years, Athens (and the rest of the Greek city states) fell under the control of Philip II.

What is there to say about Chios in the aftermath of the Peloponnesian war? Not much is known about the immediate events that followed for Chios after the end of the war. Because Chios still was an ally of Sparta, it is reasonable to believe that the Chians became one of Sparta’s satellite states in the Aegean. Whether being a Spartan satellite state differed much for the Chians from being an Athenian ally we cannot know, as not much information is given about Chios in this period. What we do know is that the Chians joined the Second Athenian Empire, which was founded in 378 B.C., after the Spartan defeat at Leuctra in 371 B.C.
Because of the change in politics at Chios in 371, many Chians were exiled, the family of the historian Theopompus included.¹⁸⁷ However, the Chians revolted from Athens in the years between 357 and 355 B.C., and remained independent until the coming of the Macedonians. After the arrival of the Macedonians Chios was not independent again as a state of their own.

One can speculate as to why not much is known about Chios in the years after the Peloponnesian war. Theopompus, who, as we know, was a Chian, probably wrote something about Chios in his *Hellenica*, of which unfortunately only 19 short fragments exist today. However, of those 19 fragments, much is similar to Xenophon’s work. As we know, Xenophon does not mention Chios after 406 B.C., and thus we may assume that Theopompus did not either, due to the similarity in their works. On the other hand, as Theopompus was a Chian, it would have been natural for him to be interested in the history of his native island. In any case, because most of his work is lost, it is not possible at this time to know for sure what Theopompus actually wrote. It is due to the lack of surviving sources that our knowledge of Chios’ history after the Peloponnesian war is lacking detail.

5.2 Further study

There are many other topics regarding both Chios and the Peloponnesian war that could still be studied. Generally speaking, I believe that it would be fruitful to study the role of the minor states in the Peloponnesian war, in order to gain a fuller picture of the war. Furthermore, one could study the role of foreigners in the Peloponnesian war. After all, the Persians became of more importance as the war went on. Admittedly, the role of foreigners have nothing to do with Chios as such, but I believe that this very thesis raises the question of “what about everyone else?” I would suggest that the examination of Chios’ role is only the beginning of many other case studies of both other Greek states’ and foreigners’ role in the Peloponnesian war.

If we now move away from the studies of the Peloponnesian war, I would suggest that studies in Chian economy and Chian politics would be of great interest. There are still to this day several aspects of both topics that have not been examined to its fullest. The Chian production and trade in mastic is very interesting as the mastic of Chios is a unique product and still used

¹⁸⁷ Livius.org, ‘Theopompus’, http://www.livius.org/articles/person/theopompus/, accessed 05.06.17
to this day. In terms of politics, it would be of interest to understand better why the Chian
government was so stable, even though it probably was a mixed government with oligarchic
and democratic traits. In light of this thesis I would also suggest a further study in the political
and economic institutions after the war, as this area of Chian history has been poorly
explored.

Other topics too, such as naval warfare, and the effect of the slaves on warfare and the
economy are also of great interest. One could for example study the role of slaves in Greek
naval warfare, with states such as Chios, where slaves were only used to some extent, as case
studies. Even though this thesis enlightens much of Chios’ history within the timeframe of the
Peloponnesian war, many more questions should be asked and answered in the years to come.
6.0 Bibliography

6.1 Primary sources


6.2 Secondary literature


L. I. R. Petersen, Siege Warfare in the Successor States: Byzantium, the West, and Islam, 400-800 A.D. (Trondheim, 2011)


6.3 Web pages

Livius.org, ‘Theopompus’, http://www.livius.org/articles/person/theopompus/, last accessed 05.05.17
6.4 Maps

Map 1: https://s-media-cache-ak0.pinimg.com/originals/d0/0d/df/d00ddf38c89990ded134b9f1fd041ac4.gif, last accessed 24.04.17


