Challenges in deploying effective police to international peace operations

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Executive Summary

This paper examines the challenges of deploying and using adequately prepared and appropriate skilled police personnel in UN peace operations. It approaches this issue primarily, although not exclusively, through the prism of training. It briefly describes changes in the demand for and role of police in contemporary peace operations, and the existing system of recruitment, selection and training of police peacekeepers. It then considers four types of problems encountered in deploying effective police personnel in the areas of supply of personnel, skillsets, predeployment training, and performance. The paper holds that problems in these interconnected areas undermine the effectiveness and impact of police components in peace operations. While the UN has made some important efforts to improve recruitment and selection of police peacekeepers, and to standardize peacekeeping training of police prior to deployment, both selection and training standards continue to be inconsistently applied and inadequate.

Resolving the perpetual problem of getting police peacekeepers with the needed capabilities deployed to missions will require more than simple technical fixes; the human resources challenge for police (as well as military and civilian personnel) in UN operations goes beyond recruitment and training to include questions of effective guidance, management, resourcing, and the monitoring and evaluation of peacekeeper performance to support institutional learning and adjustment of recruitment and training processes. The problem is complex and multifaceted, not least because the UN is an international organization with management challenges that are distinct from those encountered by national public service organizations. The UN’s organizational structures and processes themselves require attention. Solutions call for commitment and corrective action by PCCs, UN HQ, and the leadership of UN field missions. The paper contributes to broader ongoing discussions about what is required to improve the impact and effectiveness of peacekeeping personnel, and of peace operations more broadly.
Introduction

This paper examines the challenges involved in getting appropriately qualified and trained police deployed to UN peacekeeping and special political missions (referred henceforth as peacekeeping or peace operations). Police have become critical actors in efforts to prevent, manage, and resolve conflict through peace operations. The degree of professionalism and preparation for deployment on mission of police peacekeepers are important factors in the effective performance of many of the capacity-building, development and reform tasks that police are now mandated to perform – not least their role in helping to develop or rebuild more effective, accountable and responsive host state law enforcement institutions in the aftermath of conflict. Yet despite their critical role in helping to re-establish and strengthen the rule of law and functioning systems of public order and security in conflict-affected states, and thus in building a sustainable peace, UN missions struggle to receive the numbers of police with the skills required to implement their complex mandated tasks.

While certain improvements have been introduced to the system of recruitment, selection and training, there are continuing problems in ensuring appropriately skilled police are deployed on mission. The problems span multiple areas and actors: where decisions on mission personnel needs are made; integrity and relevance of national recruitment and training processes; the ability of the UN to enforce its recruitment and training standards; and the need for systemic feedback systems to enhance police peacekeeper performance through specific adjustments in recruitment and training.

The paper begins by setting out the context of the police component, tracing the evolution of the role of police in peacekeeping operations, from their largely passive monitoring role, to their contemporary roles in helping to establish public order and (re) build legitimate and viable state law enforcement institutions in host states. The evolution in mandates, tasks and mission environments have been key drivers of efforts to better ensure the deployment of appropriately skilled and adequately prepared police personnel. The paper then reviews the core

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1 This study is part of the «Learning from Experience – International Policing»-project, which was financed by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and carried out by Dr. Marina L. Caparini and Dr. Kari M. Osland in 2014-17.
elements of the system by which police personnel are recruited, selected and trained to meet the needs of peacekeeping missions. While this paper focuses primarily on the training of police who are deployed to peace operations, recruitment and selection practices are closely linked to training as they directly influence who is considered eligible for deployment. The core elements of the system considered here include UN minimum recruitment standards, the requirement for pre-deployment training by member states contributing police to peace operations, and UN induction and in-mission training.

The paper will then turn to four key challenges that continue to affect recruitment, selection and training of police for peacekeeping operations. These include, first, problems with supply – i.e. difficulties achieving mandated numbers of police personnel and resulting recruitment gaps for field missions. Second, the UN is inconsistent in its ability to recruit adequately skilled police personnel for missions. This entails problems with quality, low numbers of policewomen, and, among some PCCs, persistent corruption in deployment practices that affect quality of personnel recruited. A third problem concerns pre-deployment training, which is not implemented by some PCCs, and is not yet optimal for preparing police for current roles and conditions on mission. The fourth challenge concerns performance of mandated tasks by police personnel, with specific focus on protection of civilians by FPU, and capacity building by IPOs.

The subsequent section discusses wider, more systemic problems that affect the police component, and its fulfilment of mandated tasks in peace operations. These broader problems have been identified in recent reviews and evaluations conducted of peacekeeping and the police component, and include the lack of dedicated programme budgets, risk-averse organizational culture, overambitious mandates, and continued weakness in the integration of efforts across components and UN agencies and programmes. Finally, possible solutions and ways forward are discussed to address these challenges in deploying qualified and capable police to peace operations.

Information and data for the study was conducted in 2014-17, using a variety of methods including: author participant observation of three police pre-deployment courses, two in northern Europe and one in East Africa; interviews with course developers, directors, instructors, and students; one focus group discussion with African police personnel with recent peacekeeping mission experience; and written questionnaires filled out by former and serving police commissioners of selected UN peacekeeping missions. In addition, the author conducted desk review of relevant materials on peacekeeping training, including peacekeeping
and training needs assessments, donor programme evaluations, UN documents including UNPOL Strategic Guidance Framework policy and guidance, academic books and articles, grey literature from think tanks, policy institutes and non-governmental organisations, peacekeeping conference presentations, and news media.
The evolution of police roles in peacekeeping and contemporary functions of UNPOL

The police component in peace operations has grown significantly in both quantitative and qualitative terms over the past 30 years. During the Cold War, peacekeeping missions were primarily military in character and fulfilled the function of an impartial international force that monitored and supervised ceasefires before the negotiation of a peace settlement. Civilian police were deployed to only three peacekeeping missions in the UN’s first four decades: the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) in 1960-64; the United Nations Security Force in West New Guinea (UNSF) in 1962-63; and in the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) from 1964, and which is ongoing.2 Police who were deployed in these earlier Cold War era peacekeeping missions were involved largely in monitoring (observing and reporting on) the conduct of the host state police, although in some cases they also assisted with the restoration of public order through support to day-to-day law enforcement activities (without judicial powers to arrest or detain), and supported the training and development of host state police.3

With the end of the Cold War and the bipolar balance of power, the demand for peacekeeping missions increased as internal armed conflicts erupted in various regions. The Security Council began to authorize a growing number of multidimensional missions – i.e. those that incorporate not only military peacekeepers, but also police and civilian elements. Mandates became more complex as peacekeeping moved away from its Cold War interpositional, ceasefire monitoring role and towards directly supporting the implementation of comprehensive peace agreements. Peacekeeping missions consequently became increasingly mandated to support statebuilding and peacebuilding activities such as institutional reform, monitoring human rights, the

3 Chappell and Evans, pp. 14-16.
development or extension of state authority, disarming, demobilizing,
and reintegrating former combatants, and reform of the security sector. A

Police in multidimensional peacekeeping missions of the post-Cold
War period were specifically assigned responsibility for a growing array
of tasks linked to the re-establishment of law and order, providing
operational support to host state police, and assisting with the reform
and reconstruction of police and other law enforcement institutions.
With the heightened demand for multidimensional peace operations
and the expansion in police roles in those operations, the numbers of
police authorized and deployed on peacekeeping missions rapidly
began to increase. By 1994, 1,677 police were deployed to UN
peacekeeping missions. 5 Demand for police peacekeepers steadily
increased, peaking in 2010 with 14,699 police peacekeepers deployed
(of over 17,616 authorized for that year) 6, levelling off to hover around
13,000 over the following six years. 7 According to the latest UN figures,
11,982 police were deployed in 16 UN peacekeeping operations at the
end of June 2017. 8 Some 88 ‘police-contributing countries’ (PCCs) have
supplied personnel in 2017. 9

In two exceptional UN transitional administrations (Kosovo from
police were authorized to take full responsibility for operational policing
under executive policing mandates. They were also mandated to help
build entirely new police and law enforcement institutions, returning
police power to the host state police once it had sufficient capacity to
enforce the law and was perceived as a reformed, legitimate institution
in the eyes of the public. In another development from 1999, most UN
peacekeeping operations have been mandated to provide protection of
civilians. 10 The responsibility to provide protection of civilians is shared

4 United Nations, ‘Post-Cold War Surge’,
7 For specific yearly totals of police in peacekeeping missions, see United Nations,
‘Monthly summary of military and police contribution to United Nations operations’,
9 United Nations, ‘Contributors to UN peacekeeping operations’, as of 31 January 2017,
DPKO/DFS Policy, Ref. 2015.07, effective 1 April 2015.
among the components, with military and police (especially formed police units) expected to use ‘all necessary means’ in protecting civilians from imminent physical harm. While close observers of the UN believe that executive mandates are not likely to recur in the foreseeable future, the protection of civilians mandate is very likely to be a feature of future peacekeeping operations.

Thus, according to official doctrine, UN police (UNPOL) today perform two core functions. First, they provide operational support to the host state police (including executive policing when so mandated) for ‘prevention, detection and investigation of crime, protection of life and property, and the maintenance of public order’. UNPOL are expected, when needed, to support host governments in maintaining law and order, but also to restore law and order where it has broken down. And second, UN police provide ‘support for the reform, restructuring and rebuilding of host State police’, specifically support developing host state police capacity ‘to provide representative, responsive and accountable police service of the highest possible professional standard’.

The performance of these functions reflects a general division of labour within the police component. Formed police units (FPUs) are cohesive, mobile, and self-sustaining groups of 120-140 armed police officers that possess the capacity for a more robust response than individual police officers. FPUs are responsible for public order management, providing for the safety and security of UN personnel and missions, as well as providing support for police operations that may entail a higher risk and require a formed or concerted response. FPUs are generally not directly involved in capacity-building or development tasks, which is carried out by individual police officers. The use of FPUs in UN peacekeeping has grown significantly since 2003, and today they represent the majority of police deployed on UN peacekeeping missions, amounting to over 10,000 police in 71 FPUs authorized for UN peacekeeping operations in 2016. (By 31 December 2016, a total of 13,200 police – encompassing all categories of police – were deployed

13 UN ‘Formed Police Units’,
to UN peacekeeping missions.\textsuperscript{14} FPU personnel thus accounted for 75% of deployed UN police in 2016.)

The growth of FPUs was in part a response to growing demand by host states for more UNPOL operational support and involvement in the protection of civilians.\textsuperscript{15} The need for new peacekeeping missions to be prepared for possible volatility and heightened risk has justified the provision of FPUs who are trained and equipped to respond robustly to public order contingencies that did not involve extensive use of firearms, and thus to which the military component would not respond.\textsuperscript{16} However, FPUs are also perceived as a means of addressing recruitment gaps, as they are more readily recruited as formed units than as individual police.

In contrast with the role of FPUs, individual police officers (IPOs) are generally tasked with supporting the reform and restructuring of the host state’s law enforcement institutions. Accordingly, IPOs are often involved in mentoring, training, and advising host state counterparts on building an effective, accountable and responsive police institution. IPOs are recruited on an individual basis, and can be contracted individually or seconded from PCCs. Tasks relating to police reform, particularly capacity-building and development, require more specialized knowledge and skills from police in a peace operation than earlier peacekeeping functions that largely entailed monitoring and reporting on host state police behaviour. Capacity-building is recognized by the UN as requiring a wide array of specialized skills within the mission’s police component, including management, administration, change management, budgets/procurement, planning, legal affairs, and resource mobilization.\textsuperscript{17} Additionally, contemporary peace operations may require specialized police skills in investigation, logistics, training, gender, crime analysis, human resources, forensics, and information technology.\textsuperscript{18}

A third category of UN police personnel has recently emerged -- specialized police teams (SPTs), or groups of experts with specialized experience and capacities in a specific area of policing. SPTs are

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{15} Interview with former senior UN Police official, 2015.
\textsuperscript{16} Interview with former senior UN Police official, 2015.
\textsuperscript{17} UN Police Policy, para. 38.
\end{flushright}
seconded by individual PCCs or groups of states to serve in a peacekeeping operation or special political mission. An SPT brings to a peacekeeping mission and host state a concentration of specialized skills among a closely coordinated team of experts, presenting distinct advantages for coherence and impact in projects such as host state police training and capacity-building. However some specialized teams, such as SWAT, may also be deployed to fulfil operational roles.

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19 UN Police Policy, p. 27.
20 For example, see discussion of the Norwegian-Canadian SPT deployed to MINUSTAH that has focused on building capacity of the Haitian police to investigate sexual violence, in Marina Caparini and Kari Osland, ‘MINUSTAH’s Specialised Police Team to Combat Sexual Violence in Haiti’, NUPI Working Paper No. 867 (2016).
Core elements of the system for recruitment, selection and training of UN police

Recruitment and selection

The UN’s recruitment system for peacekeeping operations differs for each component. Civilian personnel are recruited individually, while military contingents are recruited collectively as formed units. Police are recruited under both models – collectively as FPUs and SPTs, and individually as IPOs. The majority of police personnel are nominated by their governments and seconded or loaned to the UN Police Division for a period of six months to one-year. A small number of individual police are recruited through professional posts that are advertised on the UN website.21

The UN Secretariat is responsible for pre-deployment training of civilian staff, while UN Member States hold the primary responsibility for pre-deployment training of their uniformed (police and military) personnel in peacekeeping operations.22 Many PCCs and TCCs have developed national systems of pre-deployment training for police and military personnel, and have based their curricula on UN standards and materials.23 Those PCCs that do not have the capacity to train their own police officers may send their police to receive PDT at another state’s training facility, a regional training institute, or may receive training from a mobile training team.

The responsibility for fielding personnel with the required competencies to fulfill the police component’s responsibilities under the mission mandate is shared between the Police Division, which sets out basic skills and standards for police personnel (and provides induction and in-service training once the police have arrived in mission), and police-contributing countries, which select police officers who meet selection criteria set out by DPKO, and are responsible for pre-
deployment training (and in the case of FPUs, training and equipping) of personnel to be deployed.

The UN Police Division sets the basic minimum recruitment requirements for UN police. A police peacekeeping candidate must be between 25-62 years old, must have five years of professional police experience excluding training, must be proficient in the mission language of operation (French or English), must be in possession of a valid national driving license for at least one year, must have one year of recent driving experience, and must be proficient in the use of firearms. Candidates’ language and driving skills are tested by a Selection Assistance and Assessment Team (SAAT) prior to deployment, and they must pass another in-mission driving test once they have been deployed.24

The UN has also introduced two additional measures to ensure that candidates meet integrity standards. PCCs must certify that police officers they second to Police Division have a clean criminal, human rights, and disciplinary record. And second, the Police Division screens all police candidates to check whether they were subject to administrative measures for misconduct in previous UN assignments. Any UN Police officer who has been repatriated due to misconduct is ineligible for future deployments.25

**Pre-deployment training**

Pre-deployment training (PDT) is a formal requirement for UNPOL, and PCCs are themselves responsible to ensure that the police who meet the basic requirements outlined above and who are deployed to UN peace operations have undergone PDT. Because the functions that UNPOL fulfil in peacekeeping mission are often different from their day-to-day police work in their home countries, such preparatory training based on UN requirements was recognized by the UN to be vital. Consequently, from 2006 the Police Division and the Integrated Training Services in UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) developed, in consultation with interested member states and peacekeeping training centres, standardized police pre-deployment training packages for Individual Police Officers (IPOs) and policy and guidance on Formed Police Units.


PDT for Individual Police Officers (IPOs)

Today the UN provides as guidance for PCCs the Core Pre-deployment Training Materials (CPTM) composed of 3 core modules addressing an overview of the UN peacekeeping operations, mandated tasks of UN peacekeeping, and individual peacekeeping personnel. These three modules are meant to be covered over the course of one week, and are to be followed in the second week by content provided by the Specialized Training Material (STM) for Police, comprising 12 modules covering an array of police functions and tasks in missions, including, among others, reform, restructuring and rebuilding of police and law enforcement institutions, community based policing, mentoring and advising. Together the guidance contained within the CPTMs (2017) and STMs provide a comprehensive basis for preparation of individual police officers for deployment.

The UN’s PDT curriculum for IPOs is multidimensional insofar as it emphasizes, first, certain professional skills needed by the police in the mission, such as report-writing and driving 4x4 vehicles; second, it informs trainees about useful coping skills and stress management; third, it provides information about the UN system and international peacekeeping; and finally, it promotes key values and conduct standards that are upheld by the UN, including respect for diversity and human rights, and the prohibition against sexual exploitation and abuse.

Training methodologies used in the UN’s PDT packages are based on principles of andragogy, or adult-based learning. The andragogical model of learning rests on the following basic tenets: adults need to know why they need to learn something; adults need to be treated as being capable of self-direction rather than being ordered or forced to do something; the use of hands-on problem-based activities to build on adult learners’ experiences and greater frames of reference; the readiness of adults to learn things they need to know in order to cope with real life situations; more effective learning by adults when applying.

26 The CPTMs from 2009 were updated in 2017, reorganizing material from 4 modules into 3, with a stronger emphasis on learning, including through a unified curriculum and learning activities that integrates content across lessons. See United Nations, DPKO/DFS, ‘Instructor Guidance’, CPTM 2017, http://research.un.org/revisedcptm2017
27 In 2017 These materials are available at the Dag (Hamarskold) Repository, http://repository.un.org/
the new knowledge to real-life situations and problems; and adult learners have stronger intrinsic than extrinsic motivations—i.e. they are most motivated by factors such as sense of self-esteem, advancement, recognition, personal growth, etc.  

Pre-deployment training has been shown to provide important background and wider contextual information about the peacekeeping mission to uniformed personnel who are to be deployed on mission, and introduces UN values and certain skills that will be required of them, thus informing them about standards of appropriate conduct while on mission. Pre-deployment training enables uniformed personnel to adapt more quickly to the mission environment, which is considered to make them more effective in fulfilling their functions.

The UN’s Evaluation and Training Division has found that individual police officers (IPOs) who have not received pre-deployment training take longer to acclimatize to the mission, and have knowledge gaps that may affect their performance. These gaps may need to be filled in part by adjusting in-mission induction training, diverting time and resources from regular induction training. Police commissioners have also described IPOs without PDT as less competitive for senior/command police posts than those IPOs having had PDT due to critical knowledge gaps, such as an understanding of how the UN works. As the period of deployment for police to UN missions is relatively short (formerly 6 months, now 1 year, and in certain cases extended for another year), pre-deployment training saves valuable time once the officer arrives on the ground and enables his or her faster adaptation to the mission environment.

Separate surveys of Norwegian and Ghanaian officers who have undergone pre-deployment training prior to being sent on mission confirmed that participants find the training helpful in preparing for the mission environment and understanding local conditions, and have reduced the amount of time needed before becoming operationally

proficient in the mission. Both groups further advocated extending the length of pre-deployment training.\textsuperscript{32}

Andragogical principles were reflected in various teaching practices the author observed in courses based on the core UN PDT curriculum (2009 version), including practical, hands-on exercises, use of group discussions, problem-solving activities, simulations and scenario-playing. Lectures by instructors, for example on the structure of the UN, human rights, or the principle of protection of civilians, were supplemented by personal slides from and films produced by the UN. More practically-oriented components of courses, such as first aid or use of firearms, included hands-on practice and close monitoring and feedback by instructors.

In each of the police PDT courses that the author observed, the police trainees appeared least engaged with static traditional lectures, which nevertheless had the advantage of conveying necessarily detailed information. Some participants in one PDT course felt that subjects such as history and structure of the UN could better be covered by providing required readings to course participants in advance. Police trainees also appeared to be in a passive mode during formal lectures, with relatively few taking notes or asking questions on content.\textsuperscript{33}

Participants appeared engaged by the insights of instructors who related personal experiences and coping mechanisms they had developed while deployed on missions. Other studies have similarly noted the strong influence that experienced international police tend to exert on colleagues who have recently arrived in the mission; this informal influence and knowledge transfer shapes the attitudes of inexperienced new arrivals towards the mission, their tasks and the local context.\textsuperscript{34}

Trainees appeared most actively engaged during the simulation exercise, which in two cases occurred over the course of one full day at the end of the course. The simulation exercise presented trainees with scenarios that they might realistically encounter while on mission, such as meeting and negotiating with village chiefs and elders, navigating


\textsuperscript{33} Course observation, 2015.

unfamiliar and poorly marked roads, dealing with inter-communal violence or mob actions, as well as with hostile action directed towards them. Despite being simulations, the exercise provided trainees with opportunities to experience unpredictable situations in which they were placed under stress and exposed to some types of threats that may arise in a peace operation – followed by detailed assessments and critiques by instructors and other group members to help understand the dynamics and reactions.

**PDT for Formed Police Units**

Shortly after the UN began to develop generic PDT packages for IPOs, it was recognized that attention also needed to be directed towards the preparation and standards for FPUs. The demand for FPUs was increasing and these units with robust policing capacities were playing an increasingly prominent role in peace operations. However, there was a lack of clarity regarding standards for FPU operational capacity, preparation, deployment and use of FPUs. By 2008 a comprehensive assessment of FPUs deployed in UN peacekeeping operations found that 63% were insufficiently competent in basic policing to the extent that they endangered security.\(^\text{35}\) Work commenced immediately on developing a new FPU policy that clearly defined the nature and functions of FPUs,\(^\text{36}\) providing remedial training to already deployed FPUs, and creating a standardized PDT curriculum for FPUs.

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\(^\text{35}\) Carpenter and Sharwood-Smith, p. 187.

Problems in deploying effective police peacekeepers

This section examines four main groups of challenges of deploying appropriately skilled, adequately prepared, and effective police to UN peace operations. The problems they describe fall into the general categories of police supply; recruiting for specific skillsets; pre-deployment training; and performance issues.

Gaps in supply of police to peace operations

Despite the critical role played by police in peacekeeping and peacebuilding, the UN faces a ‘perpetual mismatch between supply and demand for UN police’. There are several factors contributing to this gap between supply and demand. In contrast to the standing military capacities that exist in most states, police are actively employed in policing in their home states and police authorities are often reluctant to release experienced police officers for international service in the face of domestic policing needs. This is even more the case for police officers possessing specialized expertise and skills that are valued at home, and that have become increasingly in demand in peacekeeping missions – such as in countering organised crime.

This gap between supply and demand is compounded by a de facto division of labour that has affected UN peacekeeping from the late 1990s, when developed Western states greatly reduced their contributions of uniformed personnel to UN peacekeeping operations following a series of failures in UN peacekeeping – the shooting down of a U.S. Blackhawk helicopter in Somalia, the UN’s inability to prevent the Rwandan genocide, and similarly its impotence in the face of ethnic cleansing in Srebrenica. While Western states provide financial support for peacekeeping, the continuing absence of their highly-trained, well-equipped and supported personnel from peacekeeping operations has

contributed to the UN’s challenges in meeting demand for sufficient numbers of police who have the necessary skills.38

Gaps in the supply of adequate personnel can also be linked to the nature of the mandates that the Security Council authorizes for peacekeeping operations. Until very recently, these mandates have been likened to ‘Christmas trees’ adorned with multiple complex tasks with no differentiation between those to be undertaken immediately and those requiring longer-term effort. However, the needs of countries emerging from armed conflict typically shift over time as the situation gradually stabilizes and peace is consolidated. As noted in the HIPPO Report, a sequenced mandating approach should be implemented by the Security Council to better reflect these changing needs in the host country and to better respond with the appropriate UN capabilities.39 In terms of the police component, as the local context stabilizes and institutional reform processes can be initiated, the main UNPOL function will shift from supporting the re-establishment of rule of law and providing operational support to host state police (functions performed mostly by FPUs), to supporting the reform and restructuring of police and law enforcement institutions as well as capacity development (functions fulfilled by IPOs).

The recent independent external review of the UN Police Division similarly noted the need for a more nuanced approach to the composition of the police component of peace operations over time, with adjustments in composition and numbers to follow regular assessments of a mission’s police component. Further, the Review recommended separate recruitment streams for FPUs, whose primary functions revolve around protection, and for IPOs whose main task is to support development of the host state police.40

Another dimension of the gap between demand and supply of UN Police concerns the challenge of deploying adequate numbers of female police officers. In 2009 the UN set out the goal to achieve 20 percent female police officers and 10 percent of military peacekeepers by 2014. To achieve this the UN established an all-female Selection Assistance and Assessment Team (SAAT) Training Project to prepare and evaluate

39 HIPPO Report, para. 176.
female police prior to deployment, resulting in the pilot phase a
doubling of the number of African female officers who passed the
SAAT. Nevertheless the 20 percent target has not been easy to meet;
while the proportion of women individual police officers is 19.7 percent,
only 6.6 percent of FPU personnel are women. Female police officers
are also under-represented in police command roles, and in terms of
participation in PDT courses.

The inclusion of women officers in the police component of peace
operations is considered essential for peacekeeping performance. Female police make UN Police more operationally effective at its
mandated tasks, including the protection of civilians, and especially
with regard to women and children. Women officers are recognized to be
especially vital in missions taking place in cultural contexts where
relations between men and women are strictly regulated by religious or
social norms, and women are unlikely to approach or interact with male
police peacekeepers. Increasing the numbers of female police
peacekeepers also is promoted to enable a better response to sexual and
gender-based violence (SGBV) in the mission area, and to other crimes
against women and girls. Female UNPOL are also said to serve as role
models for local women and girls in encouraging them to consider
policing as possible career paths, lending further support to the UN's
mission of supporting the development of effective, inclusive and
accountable police organizations. The under-representation of women
officers in the police component of missions in such environments thus
reduces the effectiveness of UNPOL in performing many of its mandated
roles.

Part of the problem in recruiting adequate numbers of female police
peacekeepers is attitudes in certain PCCs, where female police are often
not afforded the same training and professional opportunities as male

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41 Charles Hurlbur and Dennis Tikhomirov, ‘First ever all female training course for
UNPOL candidates launched’, UN News Centre, 20 October 2014.
https://www.un.int/news/first-ever-all-female-training-course-unpol-candidates-
launched

42 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on United Nations policing,
S/2016/952, 10 November 2016, para. 10. Henceforth ‘SG Report on policing,
2016’.

43 Global Public Policy Institute, The Right Capacities for New Challenges: Making
International Police Peacekeeping More Effective for the 21st Century (November
2013), Report of the High-Level Conference on International Police Peacekeeping,

44 UN ‘Women in Peacekeeping’,
That is, there are often biases against women in police organizations in various PCCs – both in the developing and developed countries – that contribute to the lack of relevant skills among female police. According to an African police officer who formerly served as police commissioner in a UN mission, female police officers in many African countries are not trained to the same standard as their male counterparts, raising further problems of professional competence. Female police in some countries are, for example, assigned different tasks than their male counterparts, such as clerical work or administrative-type duties. Female police in many PCCs thus encounter reduced opportunities to participate in international peace operations, sustaining the under-representation of women police in UN peacekeeping operations, and with consequences for the ability of the police component to fulfil its tasks effectively. An equally serious problem that is a likely consequence of different professional treatment and opportunities provided to female police by certain PCCs is the recruitment of unqualified women police officers to serve in UN peace operations, such as those demonstrating a lack of adequate professional, operational, and interpersonal skills for the complex and dangerous mission environments to which they were being deployed.

In addition to personnel gaps, UN peacekeeping operations continue to suffer from slow recruitment and deployment processes. A recent study found that multidimensional UN peace operations on average take 10 months to reach peak deployment, while African-led peace support operations take even longer, requiring 12 months to reach full deployment. Delays result from the greater logistical challenges faced on the continent, reliance by many of the top troop and police contributors on UN logistical support because they lack their own logistical means, and the absence of highly mobile European contingents from these operations. Moreover, few missions ever reach full deployment – the authorized ceiling of troops, police and civilian personnel. Nevertheless, since 2012, there have been efforts to streamline the process by which seconded IPOs arrive in mission, with a target of six

45 Eckhard et al, p. 20.
46 Interview, former Police Commissioner, Pretoria, September 2014.
months from the date the UN notifies permanent missions to the UN about specific police posts needed for a peace operation.49

**Recruiting for specific skillsets**

While the tasks of UN Police have become more varied and specific in nature, often requiring specialized experiences and skills, UNPOL recruitment and selection procedures have not kept pace. Heads of police components of UN peacekeeping missions have expressed the need for specialized or technical skills, such as planning, budgeting, SGBV investigations, organized crime, etc., but have consistently noted a problem in meeting these demands for police specialists. Peacekeeping missions often do not receive sufficient police who are qualified to perform core roles in supporting structural reforms and capacity-building, which requires the mentoring and advising of host state counterparts. These are not activities that most police officers perform in their home police organizations.50 Certain skills, such as strategic planning for deployment of police components in peace operations, are rare in most PCCs and officers fulfilling such roles require ‘significant training’ and up to a year of experience until working proficiently.51 According to some observers, the problem lies in part in the continued resort to generic criteria to recruit and staff police components of specific missions. As per Samantha Power, ‘UN Member States and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations need to go beyond the basic proficiency tests and increase focus on what skills each mission needs, not just meeting numerical targets for force strength.’52

The recently completed independent review of the UN Police describes the mismatch between officer selection and task implementation as a ‘paradox...between the supply of a large number of regularly rotating personnel, largely composed of generalists, and the medium-term qualitative and structural challenges they are expected to address.’53 The review recommended that recruitment for UN police be

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52 Power (2016).

53 External Review, p. VI.
results-driven, i.e., tailored to protection and support to police reform and development, their two main roles in contemporary peace operations.\textsuperscript{54} Furthermore, the mandate of the police component, and the types of police that it needs to recruit to fill mandated roles, should reflect the changing context in the host state. As mentioned above, while high numbers of FPUs may be necessary for stabilization early on in the mission, police peacekeeping skills required would shift over time as the country becomes more stable shift to fewer but more specialized police and civilians capable of supporting institutional development and reform of the host state police.\textsuperscript{55} It is also possible that different areas covered by the peacekeeping mission may have different requirements from UNPOL, and hence require different types of UNPOL numbers and capacities.\textsuperscript{56}

On the other hand, missions must ensure that when they are provided with officers who have specialized skills, they make appropriate use of them and do not assign them to generic or other UNPOL duties that fall well below their level of expertise.\textsuperscript{57} Some PCCs, especially from developed countries, have complained of deploying officers with niche capabilities and specialist skills that are in high demand in the sending country, but on their arrival at the mission have then been placed in positions that require only the most basic skills, such as performing guard duties over the camp in a watch tower, resulting in frustration for the officers and their sending authorities.\textsuperscript{58} This mismatch between skills and assigned roles may contribute to the noted reluctance of some PCCs to nominate their best officers for peacekeeping missions.

Similarly, the independent external review of DPKO’s Police Division found that Police Division has not been able to provide adequate management and oversight of FPUs, as demonstrated by the continuing misuse of FPUs in missions when they are assigned to static guard duties, in contravention of DPKO’s policy on FPUs.\textsuperscript{59}

Furthermore, police experts may have specialized technical knowledge and experience, but may not have developed the skills to train, mentor, or support institutional reform in a mission environment. Additional training may be necessary to make police with specialized

\textsuperscript{54} External Review, p. VIII.
\textsuperscript{55} External Review, pp. VII, 13.
\textsuperscript{56} External Review, p. 12, note 27.
\textsuperscript{57} Eckhard et al, p. 19.
\textsuperscript{58} Interview with Canadian police adviser, New York, May 2016, Norwegian police, 22 Jan 2016.
\textsuperscript{59} External Review, para 63.
expertise and skills more effective in transferring know-how to host state counterparts.\textsuperscript{60}

There is also a continuing problem with corruption in the selection and recruitment process of police peacekeepers in some countries that may result in the deployment of officers who do not possess the requisite skillsets. The Mission Subsistence Allowance (MSA) received by individual police officers on mission is substantially higher than the annual regular salaries that many of those coming from developing nations receive as police, creating strong incentives for corruption. In 2015, for example, it was revealed that senior diplomats from Côte d’Ivoire who were accredited to UN Headquarters in New York were selling police peacekeeping posts in the missions in Haiti and the Democratic Republic of the Congo to Ivoirian citizens for up to 4000 USD per post.\textsuperscript{61} Corruption similarly is seen in the administration of the qualifying tests in various police-contributing countries.\textsuperscript{62} Even when corruption in recruitment and selection of police peacekeepers is not publicly revealed, some individuals who have held leadership positions in mission have also identified a problem with fake CVs of some international police serving on mission.\textsuperscript{63}

**Problems relating to pre-deployment training**

One of the main challenges of training police peacekeepers is ensuring that those who are deployed receive PDT before being sent on mission. According to a UN assessment conducted in 2012-2013, some 30 percent of police deployed to UN peacekeeping operations had not undergone the required pre-deployment training.\textsuperscript{64} A further challenge is ensuring that those who have received PDT are subsequently deployed. In other words, many of those who receive predeployment training are not sent on mission. An evaluation of a major donor programme that supports police pre-deployment training found that only a small proportion of those police receiving PDT were subsequently deployed. In order to increase the rate of deployment of

\textsuperscript{60} External Review, para 34 (c).
\textsuperscript{61} Andrew Buncombe, ‘Inquiry says diplomats at UN HQ “sold positions” on international peacekeeping missions’, *The Independent* (London), 16 February 2015.

\textsuperscript{62} For example, see ‘Question papers for UN peacekeepers leaked’, *My Republica* (Kathmandu), 16 March 2017, http://www.myrepublica.com/news/16597/

\textsuperscript{63} Interview with former UNPOL team leader, Oslo, 3 March 2016.

trained officers, the programme was encouraged to offer PDT courses only to those individuals who have already passed the Selection Admission Test (SAT), and had already been selected for deployment. It recommended further that officers be trained as close to deployment as possible.65

Further, there are ‘major differences’ in training among those who do receive PDT.66 The UN first developed its standardized UN Police PDT curriculum for Member States and regional police peacekeeping training institutes, and piloted it in the newly established AU-UN Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). At the time, UNAMID had the largest police component of any UN mission, but an assessment had shown that only 10 percent of police were found to have undergone PDT.67 The effort to develop and standardize PDT for police, and to coordinate between PCCs and police peacekeeping training centres to make the standardized training accessible resulted in over 76 percent of police deployed to UNAMID having received PDT by end of 2008, rising to 83 percent by late 2010.68

Another problem relating to PDT according to several interviewed police and course developers is that the information and skills that are the subject of PDT are not sufficient for the more complex tasks that UNPOL are now expected to fulfil in a mission. The range of topics already covered in the existing standardized PDT curriculum that are now considered necessary to prepare police for deployment in peace operations is extensive, including complex issues such as human rights, international humanitarian law, protection of civilians, SGBV, and child protection. The existing PDT core curriculum, updated in 2017, spans a minimum training period of 2 weeks, but is considered by several course participants to be too short to cover the necessary material in sufficient depth. In the view of one senior police training official, topics such as crime investigation, victim rights, and states of emergency are not addressed adequately in the current curriculum contained in the Specialized Training Materials for police.69

Formed police units (FPUs) in particular continue to pose challenges. FPUs play a critical role in peace operations in helping to maintain law and order and protection of civilians. The growing preponderance of

65 Building Blocks for Peace, p. 41.
67 Carpenter and Sharwood-Smith, p. 183.
68 Carpenter and Sharwood-Smith, p. 185.
69 Interview, former senior UNPOL official, Oslo, May 2016.
FPUs within the UN police component has been attributed by some to the advantages posed by these units in recruiting in large groups rather than individually as occurs with IPOs, facilitating the ability of DPKO’s Police Division to recruit high numbers towards ceilings specified in Security Council mandates. Writing almost a decade ago, scholars noted that ‘While recruiting police officers on an individual basis was feasible when police contingents were rare and small, it is simply not a feasible way of enlisting the 10,000 plus officers needed for UN missions in 2008.’

In the view of some observers, however, there has been too much attention to numbers, and Police Division has been criticized for focusing more on attempting to fulfil the authorized police strengths for missions than on ensuring that those police have the needed skills and training to perform their mandated roles.

Several efforts have been made to improve training and preparedness of FPUs. For example, the UN established mobile training teams (MTTs) to bring already deployed FPUs up to standards where possible, and resulted in raising the level of operationally ready FPUs across six UN missions from 30% to over 74.5%. A doctrinal development group was also established, resulting in the publication of a new FPU policy and standards for pre-deployment training, equipment and command and control.

The quality of FPUs has been found to vary significantly, due in part to problems with the levels of training received by some FPUs as well as the quality of their equipment. The UN Police Adviser has acknowledged the need for ‘officers who are properly equipped and properly trained, particularly Formed Police Units’, whose pre-deployment and in-mission training ‘require significant overhaul’. Because FPUs are armed (in contrast, IPOs in most missions are unarmed), equipped with armoured vehicles, and are the most likely members of the peacekeeping mission’s police component to interact with the local population during times of public unrest, it is of critical importance to the success of the mission and its continued legitimacy in

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70 Alex J. Bellamy, Paul D. Williams, and Stuart Griffin, Understanding Peacekeeping, 2nd ed. (Polity, 2010), p. 396.
71 Power (2016).
72 Carpenter and Sharwood-Smith, p. 188.
73 FPU Policy (2010).
75 Stefan Feller, Remarks at the UN Chiefs of Police Summit (UN COPS), New York, 3 June 2016.
the eyes of the host population that FPU personnel are well trained and effective in performing their mandated tasks.\textsuperscript{76}

Another problematic area linked to a systemic gap in training is that of force protection capabilities among police and military contingents. While in some cases this is a matter of insufficient defence materiel, in others it is due to the failure of contingents to treat force protection as a priority.\textsuperscript{77} Police and military contingents must also be prepared for improvised explosive devices, as these are increasingly a threat in operational environments.\textsuperscript{78}

At the same time as they need to be better prepared for dangerous environments, the UN’s Office for Peacekeeping Strategic Partnerships (OPSP) has found that FPUs need to receive pre-deployment training specifically in protection of civilians in the specific context of the mission to which they will be deployed. Additionally, FPUs need training in critical areas such as command and control, crowd management, arrest and detention methods, checkpoints, weapons handling and human rights, and PDT should be customized to the operating environment of the particular mission.\textsuperscript{79} As noted by Cruz, military and police contingents must be operational shortly after arriving in mission, thus they must be trained before arrival as there is not enough time to train them in essential tasks after arrival.\textsuperscript{80} A further problem is that the UN Secretariat is not equipped to provide the missing skills training to police who do not already have them. It is thus imperative that police are selected and trained so that they arrive in mission with the skills needed to perform their mandated duties.

**Problems relating to performance**

Two key areas in which UNPOL performance-related problems are especially relevant to the preparation of police peacekeepers are the protection of civilians and support to capacity-building and host state development. First, police along with military and civilian components


\textsuperscript{77} Luiz G. Paul Cruz, Director, Office for Peacekeeping Strategic Partnership, ‘Mission Evaluation’, Presentation at IAPTC’s 21\textsuperscript{st} Annual Conference, Brazilia, Brazil, 30 September 2015, para 31.

\textsuperscript{78} Cruz, para 35.

\textsuperscript{79} Cruz, paras 37 and 38.

\textsuperscript{80} Cruz, para 34.
are expected to contribute to implementing the protection of civilians (PoC) mandates that are now a feature of all contemporary UN peace operations. Yet UN peacekeepers, including police, have been criticized for their implementation of the protection of civilians, especially their immediate physical protection from imminent harm.\(^\text{81}\)

Inadequate relevant training has been highlighted in evaluations of recent PoC failures, as in South Sudan in 2016.\(^\text{82}\) Training gaps have prompted calls to improving standards for verifying the training and readiness of FPUs in PoC, and after deployment, evaluating their operational performance.\(^\text{83}\)

However more fundamental, as highlighted by the external review, is a critical lack of strategic guidance from Police Division on the role of FPUs in the protection of civilians and weak management by Police Division of FPUs. The absence of sufficient strategic guidance and effective oversight are, in the view of the experts who conducted the external review, resulting in the militarization of FPUs and weakening the objective of establishing non-military, community-oriented policing in states hosting UN missions.\(^\text{84}\) The lack of sufficient guidance from DPKO on the content, structure and methodology of training contingents on PoC, including the need for country- and context-specific scenarios, was echoed in a recent study examining survey and interview responses of TCCs and PCCs.\(^\text{85}\) Critically, the study suggests that PDT be reconceptualized to reflect the primacy of PoC in practically every peacekeeping operation today, rather than treating it as one consideration among several, as is currently the case,\(^\text{86}\) and that an effective mechanism for monitoring and assessing training be developed to ensure that learning from experience occurs and PoC in PDT continues to be effective and adjusted when necessary.\(^\text{87}\)

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\(^{82}\) ‘Executive Summary of the Independent Special Investigation into the violence which occurred in Juba 2016 and UNMISS response’, 1 November 2016, pp. 8-10. [http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/sudan/Public_Executive_Summary_on_the_Special_Investigation_Report_1_Nov_2016.pdf](http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/sudan/Public_Executive_Summary_on_the_Special_Investigation_Report_1_Nov_2016.pdf)


\(^{84}\) External Review, paras 63 and 64.

\(^{85}\) Allen, Rosen and Tarp, p. 20.

\(^{86}\) Allen, Rosen and Tarp, p. 24.

\(^{87}\) Allen, Rosen and Tarp, p. 26.
The second critical area of training-related problems in effective police performance concerns the support provided by individual police officers (IPOs) to the development of host-state police capacities. As detailed by a recent evaluation by the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) of police capacity-building efforts in three peace operations, the UN is challenged in supporting the reform, development, and capacity-building of host state police. Specialized skillsets in a wide array of managerial and administrative functions are required; however, these are not normally activities that most police perform in their home contexts. As noted by the UN’s High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) Report, ‘UN police officers are not usually trained to deliver police reform and the UN’s model of short-term police deployments is supply-driven and unsuited for capacity development. A significant change in approach is needed.’

As discussed in the OIOS report, there is inadequate preparation and developing the skills of IPOs in mentoring host state counterparts. However the evaluation also made clear that training of IPOs in this regard is only a partial solution – additional factors compromising the effectiveness of UNPOL capacity-building efforts must also be addressed. These additional factors include lack of dedicated programme budgets for IPOs who are engaged in capacity-building; resistance from host state police or gendarmerie authorities who perceived IPOs to be themselves poorly trained and suitable to imparting training; donor priorities and preferences that influence the mix of basic and specialized training provided to the host state police, and lack of information exchange and coordination with donors who are supporting police reform in bilateral efforts.

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89 HIPPO Report, para. 156.
90 OIOS, p. 37.
91 OIOS, para 28.
92 OIOS, para 36 and para 93.
93 OIOS, para 112.
94 OIOS, p. 37.
Conclusion and ways forward

While the preceding discussion is not an exhaustive list of the problems relating to the selection, recruitment and training of police peacekeepers, it is sufficiently broad to suggest that, both individually and collectively, challenges are not simply technical issues that can be addressed through simple ‘fixes’. Rather, questions of ensuring adequate quality, capacities and competence of police peacekeepers is closely linked to procedures and structures within the UN. Better, more consistent training will arguably make limited difference if dysfunctional organizational structures and processes are not also addressed. Those organisational factors that are closely linked to performance of police peacekeepers might include: clearer mission mandates, clear elaboration of POC strategies and guidance, and ensuring mission leadership is empowered to shape recruitment and selection through the specifying required skillsets of UNPOL positions.

Recruiting police with specialized skills in institutional development

As discussed above, the role played by UNPOL in supporting host state police reform and restructuring requires specialized skills. The independent external review of UN Police Division noted that “Numerous additional competencies and experience, over and above direct policing expertise, are required for successful police institutional development.” In order to align UN police recruitment more with the end results sought, the review called for the secondment of more individual police officers, teams and civilian experts who possess those institutional development skills.

Mechanisms to help relieve demand for police peacekeepers

Because it has proven so challenging to recruit adequately skilled IPOs, additional solutions have been devised. One approach has been the establishment of the Standing Police Capacity, comprised of 40 staff members with various specialist capabilities who can deploy at short notice to help set up, transition, or draw-down a mission police component, provide specialized skills to a mission when required,

95 External review, para 49(e).
96 External review, para 49(e).
conduct operational assessments and evaluations of UN police components, or provide training support to host States, regional organizations, and specialized training for deployed UN police.\textsuperscript{97}

Further, there has been growing traction for the engaging by peacekeeping missions of civilian experts in various dimensions relevant to policing, law enforcement, security sector reform and rule of law.\textsuperscript{98}

Additionally, new police deployment models have emerged, aiming at providing missions with demand-driven skillsets and at achieving impact. The specialized police team (SPT) is a relatively new mechanism that offers a closely coordinated group of officers with specialized expertise who work to implement a specific project, ideally decided in close consultation with the host state police and mission leadership. \textsuperscript{99}

The advantage of the SPT is it presents the opportunity to recruit officers who have the needed skillsets and can do the specific job for the project for the SPT, and to prepare the personnel of the SPT in advance of deployment.\textsuperscript{100} Other recommendations to improve the needs-skillsets ratio is to recruit civilian experts on issues where professional police experience is not necessary. The UN has also created a senior police leadership roster to enable the recruitment of more IPOs with senior experience and expertise.

**Fill gaps in doctrine and training guidance**

The UN Police Division has recently established the core elements of a policy foundation for UN police, entitled the ‘Strategic Guidance Framework’, or SGF. The SGF consists of a comprehensive doctrinal basis for UN police in peace operations. While this has taken longer than originally expected, the five core documents are now in place, including an overarching policy governing police in peacekeeping and special political missions, approved in 2014, and comprehensive guidance on capacity-building, command, operations, and administration in peace operations.\textsuperscript{101} Further practical manuals and training documents are to be developed to set out the UN approach in specific areas in demand.

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\textsuperscript{98} HIPPO Report, para. 157.

\textsuperscript{99} See Marina Caparini and Kari M. Osland, ‘MINUSTAH’


\textsuperscript{100} Interview with former SPT leader, Oslo, 22 Jan 2016.

from the missions such as border management, and monitoring, advising and mentoring of host state police.\textsuperscript{102} The UN’s Standardized Training Materials (STMs) must now be updated to reflect the new guidance provided by the SGF and supporting documents. Perhaps more importantly, the STMs must be updated to meet the needs of contemporary peacekeeping missions, which they currently do not reflect.\textsuperscript{103}

There also remain important gaps in UNPOL’s doctrinal guidance. These gaps include, most critically, their role in protection of civilians, specifically the physical protection of civilians under imminent threat of harm. IPOs focus largely on capacity-building and development of host-state police, and do not tend to view the physical protection of civilians as an area of their responsibility. Similarly, FPUs which provide operational support and protect UN personnel and facilities, tend to perceive of their role in physical protection as limited to conducting patrols, notably around IDP camps.\textsuperscript{104}

The further development of policy, doctrine and operational guidelines on the role of UN Police (IPOs, FPUs and SPTs) in all three dimensions of protection of civilians, particularly physical protection is needed. These will have follow-on impact on training, and the articulation of training standards is necessary for deployment of individual police, units and teams that consistently meet the basic standards set out.\textsuperscript{105}

\textbf{Revisit PDT}

As described above, the curriculum for police pre-deployment training covers many topics, and many police who have undergone PDT feel that two weeks is insufficient. At the same time, it is important that course directors tailor PDT to the capacities and knowledge levels of the groups of officers taking the course. For example, the director of a northern police peacekeeping PDT course saw little need to spend time on report-writing, since most of the attending officers were familiar with this from their domestic duties, whereas report-writing was an area specifically identified by the head of a police component of a peace operation in Africa as an area in which their mostly African police personnel could have used more training before deployment. Revisiting PDT should begin with a reexamination and updating of the CPTMs and

\textsuperscript{102} Remarks by Stefan Feller, UN Police Adviser, at the UN Chiefs of Police Summit (UN COPS), New York, 3 June 2016.

\textsuperscript{103} Interview with former senior UN Police official, Oslo, 15 November 2015.

\textsuperscript{104} Sebastian (2015), p. 17.

\textsuperscript{105} Sebastian (2015), p. 21.
STMs produced by UN Headquarters. In the eyes of some police PDT trainers, both content and methodology need to be updated: some material is heavily conceptual and academic, while for some trainers the training materials contain far too many slides. Other trainers felt that there was strong pressure to maintain the curriculum and methodology prescribed in the UN CPTMs and STMs, but that these needed to be adapted to become more effective.

**View effective police deployments as parts of a wider system**

While a major focus of this paper has been on training of police peacekeepers, it has also sought to map out the wider context and systemic reasons behind personnel capacity gaps and peacekeeping underperformance. It is commonplace to assume that changing individual behavior and performance through training is the key to achieving more effective institutions. However, organizational studies have identified the limitations of training in changing organizational performance. The problem often is not inadequate training, but the context in which the activity occurs: ‘Context sets the stage for success or failure, so it’s important to attend to organizational design and managerial processes first and then support them with individual development tools such as coaching and classroom or online education.’

Organizations like the UN, and at another level UN peacekeeping missions, are systems, and in such systems organizational behaviour and performance are driven not only by individuals, but by the interaction of multiple factors including organizational structure, processes, leadership styles, people’s professional and cultural backgrounds, and human resources policies and practices. Attempting to change individuals' behavior through training will have little impact if the wider system is unaddressed. It is necessary thus to acknowledge the limitations of focusing on selection, recruitment and training, and the need to address the wider organizational framework of peacekeeping.

The message from organizational studies is that one must start by aligning the organization, management systems and leadership practices with desired changes, followed by changes in training and coaching. The recent HIPPO review of UN peace operations and the

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106 Interview with IPOC trainer, Stavern, 25 September 2015.
108 Beer et al, p. 57.
independent expert review on Police Division provide insightful analyses into some of the main challenges to be broached in overhauling the organizational machinery surrounding peace operations and the police component. Further, in seeking to effect change in UN peacekeeping missions, seeking out the feedback, experiences and insights of those who are doing the work at ground level is all too often overlooked; senior management are often too invested in the systems they have created to objectively identify the problems.\textsuperscript{109}

Resolving the perpetual problem of getting police peacekeepers with the needed capabilities deployed to missions will require more than simple technical fixes such as updated training curricula; the human resources challenge for police (as well as military and civilian personnel) in UN operations goes beyond recruitment and training to include questions of effective guidance, management, resourcing, and the monitoring and evaluation of peacekeeper performance to support institutional learning and adjustment of recruitment and training processes. The problem is complex and multifaceted, not least because the UN is an international organization with management challenges that are distinct from those encountered by national public service organizations. The UN’s organizational structures and processes themselves require attention. Solutions call for commitment and corrective action by PCCs, UN HQ, and the leadership of UN field missions.

Two conclusions follow from this discussion. First, recruitment, selection and training are interactive components of a larger system that shapes the quality and impact of police personnel who are deployed on peacekeeping missions. While efforts can and must be made to improve these discrete parts of the system, an understanding of how the whole functions and is affected by other parts of the system is essential if corrective action is to be effective. And second, actively seeking feedback from police peacekeepers, and from those who interact and work with them, can help us to better identify organizational problems such as management practices and leadership behaviour that help shape this complex system and the ability of police and other components of peace operations to effectively implement their mandated tasks.

\textsuperscript{109} Beer et al, p. 55.
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