Abstract

Having a certain subject in mind, how can it be communicated in drawing instead of words? Applying metaphors is crucial, and metaphoric drawings contain compressed meanings. The first part in this text is separation of meanings. An overview of different types of metaphor in drawing is presented following the cognitive linguistic metaphor theory. Metonymy and elements of narrative also furnish the separation.

A second part where metaphoric drawing is viewed as a language, is based on the foregoing. Different kinds of visual elements and members of categories of meaning systems are brought in interaction and a systematized organization and structure is presented.

Method for the research is examples of newspaper drawings brought in contact with a throughfare of the cognitive linguistic metaphor theory in a visual optic. Cognitive linguistic theory, narratology, pictorial semiotics, and rhetorical tropology are auxiliary disciplines in addition to a platform of pictorial competence.

This text is made of extracts translated from my PhD thesis on metaphoric drawing, *Metaforbasert tegning – undersøkt som et språksystem gjennom avistegninger av Finn Graff og Saul Steinberg med kognitiv metaforteori som hovedredskap*. The Oslo School of Architecture and Design (2008). [http://hdl.handle.net/11250/2390055](http://hdl.handle.net/11250/2390055)
Contents
1 Introduction .................................................................................................................. 4
  1.1 Doctoral thesis: the home for this text ................................................................. 6
    1.1.1 Research object and research issues .............................................................. 7
    1.1.2 Some premises and problems for the research issues ..................................... 8
    1.1.3 Problems and difficulties for the research issues ............................................ 9
  1.2 Two characteristic factors for metaphoric drawing ............................................. 9
    1.2.1 Figurative and formal aesthetic layer ............................................................ 10
    1.2.2 Four category systems and a formula for a metaphoric visual language ........ 11
  1.3 Essence of cognitive linguistic metaphor theory and two mental mechanisms .... 12
  1.4 Metonymy and metaphor in a visual optic ......................................................... 13
2 Visual narrative ............................................................................................................. 16
  2.1 A general platform for narrative ......................................................................... 17
  2.2 Factors in a visual narrative ............................................................................... 18
  2.3 Principles for combination of events in a picture ............................................... 21
  2.4 Compressed picture elements ........................................................................... 21
  2.5 Categories of picture elements .......................................................................... 24
  2.6 Characterisation ................................................................................................... 24
  2.7 Perspectivation .................................................................................................... 28
  2.8 Time ..................................................................................................................... 30
    2.8.1 Successive order ........................................................................................... 30
    2.8.2 Duration ........................................................................................................ 35
    2.8.3 Frequency ..................................................................................................... 36
  2.9 Conclusive remarks on visual narrative ............................................................. 37
3 Metaphor ...................................................................................................................... 38
  3.1 Image metaphor .................................................................................................... 38
  3.2 Several metaphors in one metaphorical expression – and the relation between
      metaphor and visual symbols .............................................................................. 39
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>Conventional conceptual metaphor</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>Image schema</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>Three metaphor types</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.5.1</td>
<td>Structural metaphors</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.5.2</td>
<td>Orientational metaphors</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.5.3</td>
<td>Ontological metaphors</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>On further investigation of some fields in the landscape of cognitive metaphor</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.6.1</td>
<td>Exploration on the EVENT-STRUCTURE METAPHOR, the location version</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.6.2</td>
<td>The object event-structure metaphor</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>Specific metaphors</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>Force-dynamics as cause and causation – or what is it with fences and bonds?</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>Force-dynamic patterns</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.10</td>
<td>Central source domains in drawing</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.11</td>
<td>Common target domains</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.12</td>
<td>The reach of one source onto several target domains</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.13</td>
<td>Image metaphors in interaction with conceptual metaphors</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.14</td>
<td>Formal aesthetic and conceptual metaphor in interaction</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.15</td>
<td>Metonymy and metaphor in interplay</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.16</td>
<td>New creative metaphors and compression</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.17</td>
<td>Summary and conclusions on cognitive metaphor in drawing</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.18</td>
<td>Four paradigmatic category systems</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.19</td>
<td>Three plus two constitutional cognitive mechanisms</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Rhetorical tropes in visual form in combination with cognitive metaphor theory</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>Tropes connected to metaphor</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>Devices to restructure and alterate visual statements</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2.1</td>
<td>The four alteration modes in rhetoric</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2.2</td>
<td>Other strategies for change made by graphic devices</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Metaphors We Draw By

Metaphoric drawing explored as a visual language

1 Introduction

To communicate abstract ideas as visual expressions in drawings is difficult. As a teacher in drawing, I have studied how to create such communication. Metaphors prove to be pivotal in the visual communication of abstract ideas and concepts. The focus in my research is how one can formulate intended themes through drawings instead of using words. My research work tried to answer an aspect of visual communication to meet a need in teaching.

This text presents devices with picture examples on how one can express themes involving abstract concepts such as time and society, in drawing. In addition, I provide a sketch of a visual language system for metaphorical drawing. The text is a translation of parts of my Norwegian doctoral thesis (Ingebrethsen, 2008) entitled Metaforbasert tegning – undersøkt som et språksystem gjennom avistegninger av Finn Graff og Saul Steinberg med kognitiv metaforteori som hovedredskap. (Metaphoric Drawing: Investigating a Visual Language System through Newspaper Drawings by Finn Graff and Saul Steinberg Using the Cognitive Linguistic Theory of Metaphor as Main Frame).

In a sense, this text is a return of knowledge underlying my doctoral thesis. It is particularly addressed to researchers in cognitive linguistics and metaphor theory. My research depends heavily on the cognitive linguistic theory on metaphor developed by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson. Their theory holds that metaphors are a vital part of everyday speech and thought that affects our ways of perceiving, thinking, and acting. Lakoff and Johnson (1980, 1999) analyse speech and present numerous examples of metaphors and ideas that are useful to researchers outside of linguistics. Their approach to metaphors therefore frames a cognitive theory of linguistics which is useful in the conception and perception of phenomena and abstract concepts. It opens an imaginative terrain where construction of meaning and poetic and rhetoric expressions are mediated. This cognitive linguistic theory on metaphor has opened a new field for research in visual communication. Into this field, I could bring my research questions on metaphorical drawing. Cognitive linguists Ronald Langacker and Leonard Talmy have further furnished my understanding of conceptualisation and types of mental structures and patterns that are activated in verbal speech. Their research in cognitive linguistics provides reference and background to my perspective on a visual language.

One aim of this text is to expand the conceptualisation of theory by introducing examples of drawings where the content is communicated by metaphors. Apart from metaphors, such pictures also involve metonyms and narratives. A minimal review of central concepts and theses from cognitive theorists establishes the basis for a survey of analysed picture examples. The analyses are intended to show, firstly, devices one can use to visually formulate ideational, abstract content and, secondly, how different metaphor types constitute intended content in pictures. This text, however, gives only minimal explanations on terms and concepts from cognitive linguistic theory. Readers from the making disciplines and from the pictorial professions, unfortunately, will suffer from such explanations in the text and are hereby appealed to seek out the theories themselves.
A second aim in the text is to bring forth my proposal of a visual language system for ideational content in drawing. This visual language takes shape based on new knowledge evolved in my thesis where theory and drawings come in interaction.

In my discussion, I bring together newspaper drawings by Saul Steinberg\(^1\) and Finn Graff\(^2\) with cognitive linguistic research to analyse different aspects of ideational content in drawing. In addition to the two black-and-white artists come drawings made by other persons which constitute good examples on actual themes and issues. I chose newspaper drawings that are intended to mediate clear, communicable content. In connection to the drawings, it is worth noting an essential difference between Saul Steinberg and Finn Graff. Steinberg’s works stand alone in either newspapers or books, whereas Graff’s are usually presented besides current news commentaries in a newspaper. The special competence of newspaper draughtsmen in general is to compress a certain matter into a striking point.

An example is the picture made by Finn Graff on the political situation in Czechoslovakia in 1992. We here see then-President Havel in an impossible situation: balancing on a broken tightrope. Graff has activated an idiom: to balance on a tightrope. The verbal metaphor is an expression that expresses difficulty and the danger of falling. These concepts can be activated and correspond to the concrete content in the drawing. We can see that it is far down to the diminished landscape and thereby imagine that a fall will be fatal. The tightrope here functions as a main component in the visualised idea complex. The tightrope represents the connection between two places; specifically, it is a concretisation of our cognitive source-path-goal schema. Between a starting point and a goal lies the line that is the possibility to reach the goal. A crisis, as an abstract concept, is characterised as containing both possibility and destruction. We can read the drawing as a crisis or an impossible situation.\(^3\) The broken rope shows that the basis to master the crisis has failed. In spite of this, Havel maintains control with his personal power.

Graff extends the tightrope metaphor by doing something with the rope; thus, he has varied a picture element. The content in the drawing results from a combination of visual components – “symbolised structures which form a more complex symbolised structure”.\(^4\)

---


\(^2\) Finn Graff (1938-) is Norwegian and working in Dagbladet where he delivers a daily political commentary. References from Dagbladet come only with date and year.

\(^3\) A drawing is conceptualised in a less unambiguous way than verbal language. Concepts are evoked by words, but not necessarily by pictorial elements.

\(^4\) The cited terms come from Langacker (2000) and can give a hint forward to my application of his theory on cognitive grammar.
draughtsman has condensed complicated content via a collocation of distinct picture elements. The rope, Havel, and holding are visual representations of visible concrete object, person, and action processes we know from everyday life. It is with such picture elements that one can narrate in pictures and in metaphorical processes also be able to mediate abstract meaning content.

How do draughtsmen manage to do this? What kinds of picture elements do they use? How do picture elements constitute visual language structures? How can picture elements be varied and combined to create complex meaning structures? These questions are challenged in my thesis.

1.1 Doctoral thesis: the home for this text
This text is composed of extracts from my thesis, and I will give some central information about the platform in my research project. This enfolds a discussion of my research object and research issues before explaining two characteristic factors for metaphorical drawings. But first comes a minimal overview of structure, content and research method.

The structure in my thesis is dominated by three main chapters. These are visual narrative, metaphor, and metaphorical drawing as a visual language system. These three chapters also structure this text. The content in the thesis consists of aspects tied to important themes in each chapter. Theoretical aspects are discussed in relation to problems and aspects in drawing. The research strategy to obtain understanding of my complex subject was to move between research disciplines, seeking a more suitable solution for a question of current interest. In the process I put questions arising from the material of drawings and investigated the theories for answers. The questions were shot into the theories. Parallel to this the drawings were investigated with the spotlight on possible solutions for the problems with events, time, etc. Connections could be made between theory and drawings in constant interaction between domains of problems, theories and devices employed in drawings. I call the research method interactive discussion.

Analyses could take place as different theoretical aspects were separated. In the opening phase I read the drawings in my unlimited material and tentatively established categories. The drawings were sorted in heaps on the floor. During the process categories emerged as results of shifting attention between questions about factors in content in the drawing material, and the growing understanding of theoretical factors in circles of diverse systems which seemed entangled in each other. When a drawing was sorted in one or another pile, it was because I chose one factor, one facet which it in my view administered. It can be a facet among several others that the same drawing might be a representative for when formulation is concerned. It is important to emphasize that my analyses never are intended to explain a full content in a picture. Each analysis is intended to exemplify one, or in some cases, a few factors which are attended to as topic of current interest. I seldom employ the term ‘analysis’ for this reason, but rather speak of emphasizing a factor or most often, extract a meaning or a meaning element.

---

5 Two smaller chapters treating two auxilliary disciplines rhetoric and pictorial semiotics take place before the three main chapters. Knowledge from the rhetoric chapter is presented relatively late in this text.
1.1.1 Research object and research issues

The research object is metaphorical drawing viewed as a language system. It is drawing intended to mediate ideational content and needs metaphors and symbols to reach that aim. The research object arises from the question: How can one formulate ideational content through drawing instead of words?

Pictures differ from verbal language, which has words to mediate abstract thought lines and logical arguments. We can narrate and discuss due to relatively firm meanings in words that can be among others a general (abstract) concept. Making a drawing leaves us without such possibilities. Abstract and general concepts resist being caught in separate picture elements. In spite of this, some visual artists like Graff and Steinberg communicate meanings and a relatively clear ideational content in each of their personally developed pregnant visual language.

Examining their drawings, I build on the presumption that drawing and verbal language have a common conceptual basis. This view holds that there exist some principles and mechanisms that provide a foundation for visual meaning mediation to take place. Further, these mechanisms exist in and also structure our thinking. They determine how we conceive and constitute our imaginations about the world in and around us. They are cognitive mechanisms which thereby also structure our concepts. Through language, we have admission to the concepts we think by. These basic principles and mechanisms influence language structure as well and can be examined in the structure and grammar of words, as cognitive linguists do.

Drawing differs from the languageness of words. Pictures have their own nature as a medium in opposition to the verbal language medium, and they mediate meanings of a picture-specific kind. My study is concentrated on the exposition of elements and structures existing in the common meaning formation sphere, and how they function in combination with visual elements within the special frames of the picture medium. At the same time as I maintain the distinction between picture and language, I explore drawing as a parallel to language — as a visual language, an alternative communication system. I view communication as central in language. Pictures in our culture often fill other main functions. My focus, however, is on figurative drawings which are meant to be understood by their intended audience.

The research issues I pursue are:

1. to explore how picture elements can be combined and varied so that different meanings get mediated, and
2. to explore and discuss what constitutes and structures metaphorical drawing as a visual language system.

The first issue is how one can formulate an intended ideational topic, theme, in a drawing. This is a practical pedagogical issue to find a register of means and devices for visual formulation. The second issue is an extension of the first one. It is a theory-building issue focusing two kinds of constituents: picture elements and mental mechanisms. This issue concerns what and how the metaphorical visual language is. The issue sets forward claims to describe which kinds of picture elements are being employed, which categories exist, and how elements are combined. I presume that such categories function based on our mental mechanisms. Which mental mechanisms and devices, strategies, for formulating meaning

6 The concept symbol here corresponds to what art theorists have in mind when talking about pictorial elements with a reference function more than the linguistic concept. The latter stands for a word with a stronger referential connection.
content are active by visual meaning constitution? In answer, I present some central mechanisms. The interaction between the different constituents form the structure in the system to be explained. The exploration takes place by analysing different categories of picture elements and describing how elements from the categories can be combined. The exploration closes with a proposition for a metaphorical visual language system.

1.1.2 Some premises and problems for the research issues
In this text, I can only mention some premises and problems which are more thoroughly explained and discussed in the thesis. Holding verbal language as a reference system, we must take in consideration that this is a system with meanings on several levels, with units and components on each of these levels. Language is a categorisation of meanings compressed into words and sentences that can be grammatically analysed.

The first premise to be able to work with the research issues is that meanings in pictures can be sorted out. We can see picture meanings as if they are lying in packages to be unpacked at first and thereafter categorised and understood in a new synthesis. We conceive content in a drawing as loaded with diverse meanings. We conceive in a normal everyday reading these meanings as kind of a meaning unit. With focused interest, we can direct our attention on several aspects of this meaning unit. We can analyse content and form quite a way along, but several meaning aspects will lump together and be difficult to extricate. My intention is to unpack, or separate, several types of meanings. Through this analytical separation, I am able to find categories where different meanings have been compressed.

The second premise to see metaphoric drawing as a visual language system is that picture meanings can be organised together with other picture meanings; furthermore, one can describe in what ways such organisation takes place in a combinational system. Holding verbal language as a reference system opens a model for a combinational system. In verbal language, one operates with different categories, in syntax as well as on other levels, categories functioning in frames of rules for how words in a language can be combined in meaningful sentences. Morphological meanings comprising regular morphs embodying information regarding singularity, plurality, gender, etc. offer the language users choices about which meanings to enclose in any sentence. Language users continuously have to take such choices about which information should be enclosed in every sentence when they utter something verbally. Words and parts of words embody different meanings within the forms the particular language offers. Kinds of meanings can be collected in paradigms or ranges, and the language users continuously have to select within the paradigmatic categories.

In their acquisition of verbal language, language users have automatized their internalised understanding of paradigmatic systems, and they execute many choices continuously in speech. In school, they learn to name paradigms, and they learn spelling and grammar. They thereby can gain insight into and reflect on the language system. Draughtsmen, in contrast, do not learn many names for such kinds of visual paradigmatic categories, but they continuously execute choices when they manifest visual utterings.

Language users choose between members in several paradigmatic category systems and thereby combine meanings, information, lying in each chosen member, language element, to connected wholes. Verbal language has conventionalised language elements so that meanings combine in sentences following morphological and syntactical rules. Such conventionalised rules are not registered for a pictorial combinational system. I establish a design for a combinational system concerning metaphoric drawing. I describe how categories of picture
elements appear within meaning paradigms and further on how meanings from different paradigmatic categories can be combined. My indispensable condition for a metaphoric visual language system then is the possibility for a description of a combinational system.

The third premise to treat metaphoric drawing as a language is dependent on the view upon meaning creation as a mental phenomenon that can connect both to the verbal and the picture medium. Linguistic research has revealed that our thought can be analysed to build on a register of basic mental (cognitive) patterns. Such patterns are described in cognitive linguistics, and they must in my opinion necessarily be active also in meaning creation in the picture medium, even though they are studied and found in linguistic research. Researchers in cognitive linguistic metaphor theory reveal that basic patterns appear in and constitute abstract thought. Concepts with concrete meaning content serve as material for concepts with abstract content, and abstract concepts function by the metaphorical mechanism. Mental patterns, I claim, will be highly in force when we apprehend picture meanings.

Mental patterns provide the basis for and structure grammar, and grammar is semantically conditioned. According to cognitive linguistics, the semantic, meaning-holding aspect establishes the grammatical forms. The semantic aspect will consequently provide a basis to describe an order in the visual constellations of forms of the actual picture medium as well.

The fourth premise concerns categorisation. Just as language categorises, metaphoric drawings categorise, too. We can systematise categories of meanings in grammatical groups (categories such as prepositions and in an order of different cases), so it must be possible to systematise categories of picture meanings. This implies showing how mental material is connected to visible picture elements. A superior premise is that we are given possibilities and limits in the brain we have.

1.1.3 Problems and difficulties for the research issues
Problems and difficulties are clear and obvious. Most obvious is that words are conventional signs with a certain amount of unambiguity in contrast to picture elements, which are characterised by ambiguity at least when it comes to which concept is in focus. The ambiguity, however, can be narrowed with selected elements carefully combined, and utterly diminished when a context is set for the spectators or when a title or caption is added to the picture. In this connection, a visual communicator is drawing on a contract between her or him and the addressees. It is pivotal that the addressee recognises the elements and has access to their semantic potential. The draughtsman has to draw upon common knowledge between him or her and the addressee.

Several other problems will be presented more gradually, like the problem of time and events in succession. These two problems appear when narration in drawing is to be explained and defined.

1.2 Two characteristic factors for metaphoric drawing
Opening the research issues, let us start with two important explanations. The first is a basic dichotomy in picture elements connected to a figurative and a formal aesthetic layer. The second is a minimal presentation of four levels in the system of metaphoric drawing. These four levels, which I call four category systems of meaning, have certain characteristics and implications.
1.2.1 Figurative and formal aesthetic layer

To be able to separate and describe meanings in pictures, one can treat them in two layers. One layer is the layer of depiction, which is called the figurative\(^7\) layer. The other layer is formal aesthetic. In the figurative layer, meanings appear which refer to persons or events that can be perceived and conceptualised in daily life (e.g., chairs, animals). In this layer, illusions are created of something on the picture plane that is conceptualised to remind us of things and situations taking place in the world we live and act in. The formal aesthetic layer, in contrast, is constructed from elementary properties which are real properties on the picture surface. Such real properties are, for instance, round and angular forms which can stand as expressions for abstract concepts like softness and hardness. Two-dimensional forms, colour, and texture in a picture element belong to the formal aesthetic layer. At the same time, these properties constitute the picture elements in the figurative layer. A round, yellow form is the expression for the meaning (the content) ‘sun’ in the figurative layer. At the same time, the round, yellow form has meanings (e.g., warm and soft) in the formal aesthetic layer. A picture element accordingly has (or can have) both expression and content in the figurative and in the formal aesthetic layer. The formal aesthetic content is not necessarily identical with (an abstraction of) the figurative content. Consequently, the formal aesthetic meanings must be decided for themselves and later be related to the figurative meanings.\(^8\) In beholding and analysing a picture, one may direct the attention upon either the depictive figurative or the formal layer, and one can switch between meanings in the two.

As a consequence of the distinction between the two layers, I make a distinction between picture elements belonging in either of them and operate with figurative and formal aesthetic elements. The category of figurative (depicting) elements occupies the central part in my study, but formal elements are indispensable in visual meaning-making and are treated in this respect. Elements from both categories constitute the inventory of metaphoric drawing. Regarding complex meaning structure with the intention to separate and thereafter combine meaning units, I analyse the two types of elements in two systems. Figurative elements in combination constitute what I call a figurative combination system,\(^9\) and formal aesthetic elements constitute and take place in composition.\(^10\) In the category of formal elements, I place picture elements without the earlier mentioned function of depiction. Dark, light, colour, line, and shape are some of these elements. They are visual elements, but they can activate impressions from other sensory domains. A dark element may thus be conceived as heavy.

---

\(^7\) Figurative is one term for this layer. ‘Figurative’ here is not to be understood as metaphorical, or representing figures of speech. The term is used instead of ‘pictorial’ by art theorists and in my art pedagogical milieu. Some pictorial semiotic researchers use the phrase ‘pictorial layer’. Göran Sonesson (1989, 1992) employs the concepts pictorial versus plastic layer. In my thesis, I followed his description and terms, but in practice these terms seem strange in pedagogical and art circles and require diverse explications. Consequently, I prefer the dichotomy figurative versus formal aesthetic layer instead of pictorial and plastic. The following description is adopted from Sonesson (1992) however.

\(^8\) The preceding explanation is taken from Sonesson (1992, p. 170) with the exception of the two main terms. Sonesson and art historian Ernst H. Gombrich emphasise that a picture sign has its primary semiotic function to depict. This function, in their opinion, defines the picture as such, as category, and separates it from other kinds of signs.

\(^9\) ‘Combination system’ is a less instructive term than my preferred Norwegian term kombinatorikk.

\(^10\) The term ‘composition’ in visual media and art can mean collocation of either formal elements creating formal structures or both figurative and formal elements being placed and analysed together. Regardless, the term ‘composition’ directs attention upon the formal aspects, and for this reason I choose the term to play that part. Theoreticians in art and visual design have made systematic studies of the formal aspect in pictures. They may use different terms and explanations but have rather common understanding. One simplified order or schematic structure is offered by categorising six formal aesthetic elements: point, line, volume, colour, shape, and texture. These elements can in turn create six formal aesthetic functions: direction, movement, rhythm, balance, and harmony.
Lines have directions; for example, a line can be horizontal, vertical, or diagonal. In addition, a line has size, length, and breadth. These properties can perform meaning through impressions activated in the viewer.

### 1.2.2 Four category systems and a formula for a metaphoric visual language

I separate the different kinds of meaning with the aim to demonstrate how different types of meaning interact and combine in complex meaning structures. The constitution of the actual visual language system necessarily must contain a superior combinatory structure and a category structure.

Separation is conducted in diverse operations. The first operation is undertaken in the frame of narrative. In this frame, I extract a group of semantic categories of figurative elements. I claim that the semantic categories, which are the inventory in the figurative category system, have picture elements that can be paradigmatically exchanged with each other. I consider this first category system to be the central and to involve the three others. This first category system consequently is named the figurative categorical system and it will be outlined in chapter 2.

The second category system consists of elements in the graphic, formal aesthetic layer. Formal elements and functions are related to figurative elements like the front and the back side of the same coin. The formal system also can be divided into categories with elements which interact with each other and with figurative elements. Such categories are material for composition of elements in the graphic world and will be treated in chapter 5.

The third category system concerns conventional conceptual patterns. It enfolds the inventory of cognitive patterns necessary for daily abstract thought. This system comes forth in chapter 3 where I broadly examine metaphor and metonymy.

The fourth category system involves rhetorical devices. When discussing a rhetorical device, I mean the main strategy or significant strategies a visual communicator chooses to formulate the theme she or he is about to draw. Rhetorical devices are tied to formulation of indirect, abstract meanings involving different types of metaphor and metonymy etc. An example is the solution Finn Graff made when he commented on the impossible political situation in Czechoslovakia (figure 1). He chose a visual metaphor where balancing on a tight rope functions as a source to mediate the target conception containing an impossible situation. An oxymoron is the main rhetorical device here, created upon a few conventional conceptual metaphors. There are diverse types of metaphor and several other strategies to create transferred meaning content in ideational drawing. Some of these strategies are presented in chapter 4.

These four category systems will reveal an ordered diversity of possible choices that a visual communicator may dispose of in constructing her or his intended topic. To reach my goal of constructing a metaphoric visual language system with constituents and structure, I lean on Langacker. I build a platform for metaphoric visual language upon the way semantic structures linked to graphic structures form symbolic structures. This is my formula which will be employed in chapter 5.

---

11 Langacker (2000, p. 1) “… language necessarily comprises semantic structures, phonological structures, and symbolic links between the two.” He continues to say that the central claim of cognitive grammar is that nothing else is needed. I adopt his formulation and convey and adapt it to metaphoric visual language.
1.3 Essence of cognitive linguistic metaphor theory and two mental mechanisms

The minimal essence of cognitive linguistic metaphor theory is that we form mental content by great amounts of cognitive metaphors. This is to say that we employ concepts which are well-known to us to understand less familiar concepts. The well-known concepts often are of a more concrete nature than the less familiar ones, which may be abstract. A concept which shall be understood by another concept gains its explanatory potential when knowledge from one cognitive domain – the so-called source domain – is projected to another cognitive domain (i.e., the target domain). Such projection takes place with the metaphorical mechanism, that knowledge is blended between the two domains. The term ‘metaphor’ is, for Lakoff and Johnson, tied to this mental mechanism. With this mechanism, great amounts of conventional conceptual metaphors come into being. They are thought patterns, or constellations, such as our understanding of life as a journey. This thought pattern, the conventional conceptual metaphor called LIFE IS A JOURNEY, can take place in several linguistic expressions, such as “I am at a crossroads in my life.” Conventional conceptual metaphor is the main category in the cognitive metaphor theory.

There is one minor category which Lakoff and Johnson name image metaphor. These metaphors, based on image, are rich in imagistic detail. An image metaphor has an imaginative content which can be formulated in linguistic expressions where one concept is projected onto another concept by similarity or by overlapping with common shape in a sensory-based form. An example is an hourglass projected onto the waist of a woman. Image metaphor can be in other sensory modes in addition to vision. Lakoff and Johnson explain image metaphors to be “one shots” (i.e., special cases) for each metaphor in this category. Image metaphor is not restricted to visuality. Accordingly, they are visual, audible, or other sensory-based imaginations, all of which can be rich in details.

According to Lakoff and Johnson, metonymy is another important mental mechanism in addition to metaphor. Two conceptual entities stand in connection to one another. In contrast to metaphor, where two concepts in two different domains are blended, a metonymic replacement takes place between a vehicle entity and a target entity. Metonymy can be defined as a cognitive process in which one conceptual entity, the vehicle, provides access to another conceptual entity, the target, within the same domain. Kövecses (2002, p. 145) makes this explanation. He further states that it is a basic feature of metonymically related vehicle and target entities that they are ‘close’ to each other in conceptual space. Thus, a producer is conceptually ‘close’ to the created product. An example is seen in the uttering “She loves this Picasso.” The meaning (i.e., the target concept) is Picasso’s picture, while the painter is mentioned and is the vehicle concept. The cognitive domain in this case contains our well-known experience of products (pictures), producer (painter), and paint and brushes (material and tools). These entities form a coherent whole in our experience of the world because they co-occur repeatedly. There are several such conventional metonymies. They are marked in small capitals, for example THE PRODUCER FOR THE PRODUCT and AN OBJECT USED FOR THE USER. 12

Metaphor and metonymy as mental mechanisms are vital in linguistic as well as in visual idealistic expressions. They can be seen as a brother and a sister playing together and are not always easy to separate from each other. They differ in two ways, however. Apart from the

---

12 This explanation is an adaptation from Kövecses (2002).
previously described difference in the number of domains, there is firstly a difference in the kind of relationship between the actual concepts. The two concepts participating in metaphor stand typically in the relationship of some similarity. Metonymy, conversely, is based on the relationship of contiguity, or nearness. The second difference is a difference in function. The main function of metaphor is to understand one thing in terms of another. Understanding is achieved by mapping the structure of the source domain onto the target domain. The main function of metonymy, in contrast to metaphor, is to provide mental, cognitive, access to a target entity. Metonymies are used to direct attention to something – in other words, to create reference.

1.4 Metonymy and metaphor in a visual optic
In order to make a visual uttering about a theme the picture maker must produce visual elements. Those elements must be recognised as something by the viewer and activate the viewers thought of the thing. A drawn chair for instance, will refer directly to a chair, a concept we know from experience. Indirectly the drawn chair can refer to several semantic meanings such as: to sit, to rest, a condition, etc. Without the metonymic mechanism draughtsmen would stand helpless facing the problem of ambiguity in pictures. This metonymic mechanism plays an important part for the visual symbols which are needed in production of ideational drawings. Metonymy, symbol and metaphor are major phenomena in my visual rhetoric.

Making a verbal uttering about a subject comes rather easily, because language is automatized in every person’s acquisition of it. To make a visual uttering on the contrary, normally brings challenges, because a visual uttering normally must be constructed without such an acquired automatized communication medium. To obtain such visual communicative competence demands active practice. In my opinion rhetorical tropes can be helpful here, opening a range of possible strategies to formulate ideational content.

Both metaphor and metonymy are concepts from the rhetoric discipline. Rhetorical tropes are an inventory in the elocutio phase in rhetoric. This is the phase where the speaker takes decisions about how to formulate her or his intended thought content. A trope is a term for the ‘turn’ of the meaning of a word or an expression. When it comes to metaphor and metonymy as tropes, I bring forth the cognitive metaphor theory and understanding instead of the traditional rhetorical definition.

---

13 I continue to lean heavily on Kövecses to employ his concise descriptions where I might easily be less distinct in my translations from my own Norwegian thesis.
14 The term ‘trope’ usually refers to single words, and when a full expression is transformed, ‘figure’ is the common term. These two names often vary, though, and I choose ‘trope’ especially to reduce the different meanings tied to the term ‘figure’.
Metonymy\textsuperscript{15} is a trope which gives a word another, but related meaning. Several types can be sorted out: effect for cause, action for result, material constituting an object for the object, etc. This drawing from Graff employs metonymy to let sensory organs stand for the senses, where an eye and an ear take the place of faces. The theme is what is served in television and the mouth here is metonymy for eating what is served. This is one way semantic meaning can be created in ideational drawing: where we normally would expect to see a face, the presence of something else gets our attention. The role of metonymy in metaphoric drawing is to give disposal to a concrete object which can refer to the intended conceptual matter. In this case, picture elements (i.e., eye and ear) are visual concretes giving access to the more abstract concepts of vision, hearing and entertainment.

Symbol as a rhetorical trope is especially used when a drawn object stands for the activity or other abstract concept being associated to the object. The cross is a conventional symbol which can stand for Christianity or for death. In traditional art history and rhetoric the concept symbol has a rather restricted meaning. I for my part extend this concept to include figurative picture elements giving access to a conceptual, semantic, entity. In ideational drawing, symbols\textsuperscript{16} are necessary – both conventional well-known symbols and more specific visual elements that can give access to a reference conceptual entity. Symbols most often work by the metonymy mechanism. When speaking about a visual symbol, one may often use the term ‘metonymy’ to describe synonymy. The eye in figure 2 as a symbol for vision and the tightrope in figure 1 are symbols that can activate the metaphorical expression. One essential question in the creation of visual ideational expressions is to find and choose the symbols which can activate the telling metaphors.

Metaphor\textsuperscript{17} is, according to cognitive linguistic theory, defined as understanding one conceptual domain in terms of another conceptual domain.\textsuperscript{18} Lakoff and Johnson define the term ‘metaphor’ as the thought structures created by the metaphorical mechanism, and they make a distinction from metaphorical expressions. A metaphorical expression is based upon a metaphor; for instance, the LOVE IS A JOURNEY metaphor comes into play when we use the metaphorical expression “We are at a crossroads.”

I view metaphor in drawing as two main categories, conventional conceptual metaphors instantiated in graphic expressions and image metaphors. Conventional conceptual visual graphic expressions are instantiated cognitive projections/mappings from a source domain onto a target domain. There is a great amount of metaphors in this main category. And there may be several conceptual metaphors in one drawing.

\textsuperscript{15} Gr. Metonymia ‘renaming’, from meta ‘over’ and ónoma (ónyma) ‘name’.  
\textsuperscript{16} I am here speaking of symbols as rhetorical tropes, but symbols also stand for direct reference as for instance when a drawn finger refers to the concept ‘finger’.  
\textsuperscript{17} Gr. metaphérēn ‘transference’ from meta-phērēin ‘transfere’.  
\textsuperscript{18} Kövecses (2002, p. 4).
An image metaphor has two picture elements with an overlapping, common shape or contour. Figure 3 depicts then-pope Johann being criticised for his view on contraception. Here the papal mitre has the same shape as the condom. The condom is most prevalent in form, but the tall mitre is present as well apart from the decisive pointed part on top. This image metaphor is combined to the conventional conceptual metaphor KNOWING IS SEEING. By this follows that NOT KNOWING IS NOT SEEING. Ignorance is here caused by the mitre and condom before the eyes.

Metaphors in drawings are formulated mainly by figurative picture elements, but also as formal aesthetic metaphors/metaphorical expressions. I introduce two kinds: figurative and formal aesthetic metaphors/metaphorical expressions. Figurative metaphors have source domains taking place in figurative picture elements, while formal aesthetic metaphors have source domains taking place in formal aesthetic elements.

Figurative metaphor is realised in the drawing of Havel in Figure 1 as we have seen. Havel balancing on a rope is visualised in two figurative elements (Havel balancing and rope). Such balancing is placed in the source domain. In addition, the figurative hands instantiate the conventional conceptual metaphor CONTROL IS HOLDING (SOMETHING IN THE HAND). The mitre and condom in Figure 3 are likewise figurative elements belonging to the source domain mapped onto ignorance in a target domain.

Formal aesthetic metaphor is realised in figure 4 where Steinberg has characterised individual persons by thin or thick lines, dots, etc. Dots and lines with different properties are formal aesthetic elements. Abrupt thin contour lines for instance, become attributed as personal property to the man in the center who thereby appears as insignificant and unimpressive.

Metaphor can be divided into different types in different ways. I have mentioned two main categories in the cognitive tradition (i.e., conventional conceptual versus image metaphor) as well as two types in my metaphoric drawing genre, namely figurative versus formal aesthetic metaphors. In the metaphor chapter I shall return to different types sorted out in the cognitive linguistic metaphor theory and exemplify them in drawings. Rhetoric as discipline also distinguishes different types of metaphor, as we will see in an overview of rhetorical devices in chapter 4.


2 Visual narrative

To draw ideational subject matter incorporates narrative; in other words, it is to tell something in a picture. To tell can be seen as a basic cognitive mechanism, like the use of metaphor and metonymy. By telling (i.e., narrating), we can give understandable form to our experiences and lives, and I assume the narrative mechanism to be active in processing content in different media. Verbal narrative, including the role of metaphor, is well-described and analysed. When it comes to contemporary cultural tradition, however, we do not have satisfactory descriptions of how the two mechanisms, narrative and metaphor, are included in and structure pictures. This chapter concerns the role of narrative in metaphoric drawing.

As a start, let me present a minimal version of my criterion for narrative pictures: namely, it states that event shall be included. An example including event and thereby narrative is shown in this drawing by Saul Steinberg, in which a man is carrying a column. The carrying is the action process that makes the picture a narrative. The way that the column is fundament for the man’s bust, it here forms an integral part of a metaphorical description of self-conceit.

Narrative linguistic theories hold events, actions, and processes to be central. Body actions are easily and fully described in pictures, but it is problematic to show several successive events in one picture. How then does narrative play a part in pictures, and which possibilities exist for visual succession of events? My aims are three in exploring narrative: The first is to map visual narrative techniques, the core subject in my practical research aspect. The second is to account for the narrative aspect as part of the theory-building aspect: Which mechanisms structure metaphoric drawing? The third aim is to extract categories of picture elements which constitute and structure metaphor drawing.

These three aims are thoroughly explored in the thesis. They are entangled in each other and mutually conditioned. Regarding the first aim, I consider visual narrative techniques to be devices, or modes to produce intended meaning content. As a model to map such devices, I use fictional literature narratology, with a selective survey of corresponding devices for verbal narrative, as well as rhetorical devices. Concerning the second aim, some mechanisms structuring metaphoric drawing are enfolded in what pictures are per se (i.e., how pictures work as a communication medium) because they are subordinate to visual perception and conception. Other mechanisms belong to narrative, and as such I concentrate on narrative as a cognitive main mechanism. For the third aim I combine basic narrative elements with types of picture elements. With this operation, I will be able to explain how pictorial grammatical structure can appear when narrative structure is projected onto graphic structure. In the thesis, I chose to structure visual narrative based upon four fields debated in verbal narratology. These four fields are events, characterising, perspective, and time.

19 Shlomith Rimmon-Kenan’s Narrative Fiction: Contemporary Poetics (1983) is the main source to the choice of fields and following treatment. In my use of Rimmon-Kenan’s narratology, I select parts with potential for transmission to the actual picture medium.

20 Rimmon-Kenan’s term ‘focalization’ I exchange with ‘perspectivation’.
This chapter will contain a minimal theoretic platform on narrative leading to factors in a visual narrative. Then follow principles for combination of events in a picture and how information is compressed in picture elements. Extraction of different types of picture elements are presented before three narratological fields, characterisation, perspective and time, will be treated connected to drawings.

2.1 A general platform for narrative

Let three theorists mark some cornerstones to build on. Aristotle regards narrative as active construction, verbal mimetizing about what people do, human action. He asserts that to narrate is to establish an order. This order defines a wholeness, with a beginning, a middle, and an end. The beginning shall be chosen, without a necessity. The middle part shall have a turn, and the end must be necessary and reasonable.

Paul Ricoeur continues with the mimesis concept in his explanation of narrative as a three-stage process. The first stage is called prefiguration, the second configuration, and the third is refiguration or new figuration. Prefiguration is the use that narrative makes from the world of acting in daily life. Narrative mimes such material, is anchored in the everyday world, and takes the stories from here. Ricoeur’s term ‘prefiguration’ refers to the narrative’s previous understanding of practical life. When narrative is meaningful for us at all, it is because we are familiar with its previous understanding of practical life, and also because we have language competence to interpret it. The second stage, configuration, is the creative activity that composes the story: the beginning, middle, and end. The configuration expresses the idea, point, or theme, which the narrative is about for us, when we have followed the events and recalled the story. The narrative competence performs this configuration by extracting a continuous story course from the scattered events, by summarising the different factors (actor, aim, means, etc.) into one action, and then by enfolding this action in such a way that the succession of episodes explains how and why just this and not another succession has led to the end of the narrative.

In the third stage, refiguration, we acquire the text and experience it as narrative. According to Ricoeur, something happens to us when we attend to the story. We become “new persons,” the narrative configurates our lives anew, and reconstructs our world of action.

The configuration stage transferred to the visual medium corresponds to how picture makers operate with mimetic figures on paper. Drawing human actions and events serves to bring together selected figures on a background. The three-stage process drawing primarily corresponds to verbal narrative. As order, in contrast, the decisive difference appears. This is the difference between the form of two media, between the words following each other in so-called linear order, and the picture organisation with figurative elements conjoined in all directions. The prescribed order from Aristotle can be viewed like a string of pearls from selected events. The selection of events takes place in both media, but the quantity of events which can be realised is radically different. The draughtsman must choose one pearl.

---

21 The concept ‘story’ means a wide conceptualised whole which, for the teller, can be material lying as a point of departure for the narration (i.e., configuration). For the recipient, story is the conceptualised, imagined wholeness brought into being from the narrative. Rimmon-Kenan makes a distinction between story and text, which for visual narrative can be story versus the combined picture elements.

22 Kemp (1995, pp 35–36). Kemp is the author of these lines which I have translated here. When speaking of action here, Ricoeur (1985, p.10) uses the concept in an enlarged sense including the moral transformations of characters, growth and education, etc.
The quantity problem will be reduced when we take into account what Mark Turner calls ‘small spatial narratives’. This term belongs to cognitive linguistics and the level of sentences. Turner exemplifies. A mother pours milk into a glass, a child throws a stone, and the wind is blowing leaves through the air are basic stories about events in space. Such stories constitute our world. The ability to recognise and perform small spatial narratives is what human beings have instead of a chaotic experience. We know how the small spatial events elapse, and we dispose of a wide archive of such basic experiences. These are parts of the unconscious knowledge making our lives possible. Such small narratives will be more compatible with quantities in a one-pearl visual narrative. In spite of the difficulties mentioned, it is clearly possible to describe several events in one picture.

2.2 Factors in a visual narrative

In order to get an overview of elements in a visual narrative I will examine Charles Fillmore’s case model as an opening. The following presentation has a minimal explanation of the model. To analyse an event, one will confront questions about: Who did what (or whom) for whom? When, where, and how? By which cause, by which means, with which effects? These questions can be equipped in a model based on Fillmore.

---

24 The three first questions concern three semantic roles. The next three concern circumstances about the execution of the event. The three last questions concern conditions which our human, more or less culturally decided, patterns of thought thrust on reality. We take for granted that everything that happens has a cause and results in consequences (no reaction is a consequence, too). Finally, what is executed has to be done by some means, or instrument. These elements are of an abstract character, and are often difficult to decide. They will have to be objects for a rough estimate. Cause and result are final points on one and the same scale, and by effect one may understand several things. “Intention” is the intended effect, while “product” is the obtained effect. “Results,” “consequences,” etc. are only specifications of the concept “effect.” The floating border favours the use of unspecified daily names for these roles. This explanation of Fillmore’s model is taken from Øyslebø (1979). It is first taken further into the field of narrative drawing by myself in my post-graduate thesis (Ingebrethsen 1990).
It is a model with practical use prior to completeness. A communicator can use it as schema without filling in all the roles. Roles can be subdued or emphasised; in other words, one does not always need to communicate all of the information which is possible to place in the message. A text or a picture is a surface structure of a statement, which an analyst can examine. Then it is up to the analyst to estimate how relevant this or that role is in the picture.

As analysts, let us try the model on Graff’s drawing *Jews in migration*. The ingress in the article is: “Israeli authorities claim that approximately 750,000 Soviet Jews will emigrate to Israel during the coming six years. This has evoked anxiety in the Arab world, especially among the Palestinians who fear that a great part of these immigrants will be placed on the occupied West Bank.”

Agent: The drawing shows Prime Minister Shamir. The text says”Likud circles in Israel” and “the Israeli government”. Shamir consequently represents the government and some political factions in Graff’s description. Shamir does two things: he places Jews and runs over Arafat. In the schema, the Jews will be categorised as the patient. Upon being struck by the external jagged force and thereby changing condition, Arafat is seen in a patient’s role as well. Arafat is also the experiencer. The way Arafat is placed nearest to us in the picture plane emphasises his reaction. The point of time cannot be read in the picture. With contextual priming, the two palm trees can show the site called the West Bank.

When it comes to the question of cause, we can fill in the action of the agent as the cause to the damage on Arafat. However, we do not see why Shamir acts the way he does. The causes
for damage on Arafat can be seen as several. The direct instrument is the sharp Star of David. It is part of the wheelbarrow, a moving object/mover\(^{25}\) by which the Jews are moved. This moving object runs along a path directed over Arafat’s body. At the same time, the wheelbarrow is a sign for Shamir’s decisive power. With the official symbol for Israel, the Star of David, we may say that it is the Israeli governmental power which is here the referent for the picture element wheelbarrow. In the schematic frame for effect, what is to be filled in here? Potentially, we abduce that the occupied Palestine land will be filled with Jews. We know that this is going to lead to consequences for groups of people. The effect we see is that Palestinians suffer from the damage. The drawing, which shows Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) leader Arafat, is a personification of Palestinians, a metonymy where the leader stands for the people.

This model is too narrow to catch what we need, but useful as an overview and starting point for further analysis. Two things need more space: the metaphorical aspects and the factors in the event structure. The metaphor mechanism works on several points in the above drawing. Till now, we have seen Shamir and Arafat as personified peoples. They are in the mental input room as singular self-moving beings, but they obtain meaning by blending through interaction with the other picture elements and our knowledge of the situation in Israel. As a result, the two individual persons project onto the Israeli leadership and people, and the Palestinians as people. Each of the two persons can be read as two meanings. The star and the wheelbarrow can likewise be read as concrete object and as something close to abstract concept, namely abstract content. The concrete action to run over, which takes place in the so-called mental input room, is imposed on the situation on the West Bank to the relations between populations. This situation exists in Mark Turner’s terms in the mental target room in the viewer, and blend\(^{26}\) takes place.

It comes clear with Fillmore’s case model that a picture element refers on two levels: the visual, concrete level and the projected, abstract level. We see Arafat and can imagine the PLO/Palestinians (dependent, of course, on our disposal of the relevant knowledge which is necessary for the content to be understood). We see a star and can imagine a wheel, Israel, and a damaging instrument. We see persons doing distinct bodily actions, and we project these actions onto political abstract situations. The abstract situation is the target domain which conveys the content in the visual narrative/uttering about the political situation in the Middle East. The abstract situation cannot be visually formulated without being projected onto the spatial situation, the metaphorical source domain.

Drawing is a medium where the elements are organised in spatial order. We see participants in a visual narrative spatially related to each other. What is visually spatial can be shown in pictures. To formulate abstract content in pictures, we have to convert it, or be able to connect it, to spatial picture elements and concrete body actions.

\(^{25}\) The mover, in the words of Ronald Langacker (2000), or the moving object according to Lakoff and Johnson (1980, 1999).

\(^{26}\) Blending as mechanism is a theory espoused by Turner (1996) and Gilles Fauconnier (1994). The theory is built on Fauconnier’s concept of mental spaces. The idea of mental spaces is a theoretic construction, holding the view that our imaginations occur in different mental spaces, these spaces being cognitive. When a story is able to be transported onto another story in a parable, this can happen because the two stories take place in one mental room for each of them. These two rooms are called the input room and the target room. A blending between the two stories takes place in a third space, the blending space. This third space contains a new logic, a central inference which is the output of the blend. The blending space gets input from the two other spaces.
2.3 Principles for combination of events in a picture
Combination of events in a picture can be defined as spatial simultaneity and relational connection. All elements are in place in synchronous order (although they are being read during a succession of time). In verbal narrative, on the contrary, the main principles for combination of events are temporal succession and cause.27

Pictorial presentation of content is decided by placement of content elements in relation to each other, partly following rules which we intuitively use in our manoeuvring in the life world. Relations between figures and their spatial placement can be seen as belonging to the story, and the elements in the configuration must be administered according to rules reigning inside the picture frame. Just as our brain establishes pseudo-causal connections between the phrases “The king died, and then the queen died,” it also creates connections between two picture elements. Meaning can be intuitively created; in other cases, we can follow “the effort after meaning”28 consciously, being aware of how we scan the bits and pieces in a picture till they fall into place as an imaginable object or event. It is this totality we conceive and check in the picture in front of us. The scanning process will be open to us especially in cases where intended meaning is unclearly formulated or the combination between picture elements is accidental.

2.4 Compressed picture elements
Combinational principles concern how information is organised in a medium. Picture elements, being spatially and simultaneously organised, can be compared to verbal text. Text also is spatially placed on a two-dimensional surface, but in a linear order. The difference in the way the meaning-bearing elements are combined is that the written information comes in length extension, while picture meaning is compressed in flat lumps distributed over a bounded surface.

I claim that, in metaphoric drawings, the compression of information is a special and marked combinational principle.29 On three levels, this compression principle wins through in this picture genre: (1) as condensation of space and time through organisation of content elements, (2) as semantic overlapping of various syntactic categories, and 3) as metaphorical overlapping.

---

27 This principle for verbal combination is according to Rimmon-Kennan (1983, p. 17) with the following examples and reflections. “The king died, and then the queen died” are two events in temporal succession (the ‘and then’ principle). “The king died, and then the queen died of grief” is combined with cause (‘that’s why’ or ‘therefore’). In the first statement without cause information, we often will project an inference about the cause because we interpret it as a narrative with a kind of completion, or closure. Our way of understanding things in the world is heavily based on a so-called natural chronology. Something happens and something else happens later on, and we connect these two events. Thereto comes our disposition to interpret events as cause or effect in a coherence. We conceptualise such sequences of events as a whole.

28 E.H. Gombrich (1982, p. 5) refers to F. C. Bartlet for ‘the effort after meaning’ concept and explanation.

29 Talking about a drawing by Daumier in The Cartoonist’s Armoury in The Hobby Horse, Gombrich (1985, p. 130) states, “It is in this condensation of a complex idea in one striking and memorable image that we find the continued appeal of this great cartoon. And condensation, the telescoping of a whole chain of ideas into one pregnant image, is indeed the essence of wit.”
The first compression effect comes to sight when we compare drawing to photography. Néna (age 10) drew a situation from our summer vacation. We were going out to a café when it started raining. We were running, and it probably looked a little strange because great-grandmother was a bit dismayed by the speed of her wheelchair. A man stood laughing under the awning outside his shop. After we had rounded the corner and progressed far down another street, we ran by two girls making faces with wide eyes and open mouths. A photograph could not have shown the girls together with the laughing man because they were on a different place and a different time in relation to those of us who were running. But Néna reduces the distance and places the girl figures near the man, which would be impossible for a photographer to do. Drawn picture elements consequently can be compressed without some geographical and temporal restrictions that adhere to photography.30

The second compression effect concerns the different ways picture signs carry meanings. One figure carries several pieces of information simultaneously; in other words, meanings are compressed in packages. A signifier element, such as the great-grandmother, shows both that she is sitting (shows action, carries the function of a verb compared to linguistic information), how she is sitting (adverbial function), and what clothing she wears (adjective function). A more advanced draughtsman might also have shown age, emotional expression, etc. We who are signified recognise ourselves, and find great-grandmother’s identity in the plastic hood she wanted to wear to protect her hairstyle and of course in her wheelchair. The signifier element that verbally may be translated to ‘great-grandmother’ fills the signifier function to show identity and also the function to show action. In a richer descriptive register is the function of characterisation multiply accessible. The syntactic signifier element ‘great-grandmother’, compared to the word ‘great-grandmother’, can convey information that would take several sentences to communicate in words. In the sentence, “the old great-grandmother was in dismay,” the noun certainly carries much semantic information: family relation, gender, and singular. However, the other information is distributed among the other words in the sentence, in regular parts of speech, and in the inflections.

The third kind of compression comes into being with the presence of metaphor and metonymy. Néna’s drawing does not contain projected meanings on this level. To demonstrate this third effect I shall use my own drawing made a few months later. Nena’s great grandmother, my mother, died. I wanted her to still be I my thoughts and drew how she died. As a result of a stroke she was disabled in the right side of her body and used a wheelchair. She lived alone and coped. The nights, however, brought dangerous balancing acts between the bed and the toilet chair right beside. She lived on a knife edge for 9 years, until she fell one night, broke the neck of her thighbone, and died two days later. How can one

30 Speaking of photography, I here mean traditional photography without manipulation. In the new age of digital photography, however, digital picture programs have opened new creative visual genres that, in many ways, are especially suited for metaphorical devices on the same level and interest as metaphoric drawing.
encompass this narrative in a drawing? Should it be with a portrayal of the real situation or the metaphorical knife edge? The problem with time and changes which take place in succeeding phases of events pops up. Should it be shown that she falls, has fallen or is dead? How can the broken neck of her thighbone be shown as the cause of her death?

Now that the reader has been introduced to the thematic subject of the drawing, the content can be presented by a few picture elements in figure 10. The reader knows she was a wheelchair user. The wheelchair shows her identity. So does the thighbone. It is her thighbone that is broken. The wheelchair and the thighbone metonymically refer to the old woman. The wheelchair stands for the owner in in the metonymy type POSSESSED FOR POSSESSOR, and the thighbone stands for the old woman in the metonymy type WHOLE FOR THE PART. The thighbone has two semantic meanings. It lies there as a bridge or path where the wheelchair has been driven on, but can drive no longer. The thighbone as knuckle, is overlapped by the same element as a bridge in an image metaphor. The placement of the wheelchair upon the thighbone makes the knuckle a bridge. The bridge conceptualization is fulfilled by the knuckle arching over a dark landscape. Finally, the light area above is logically imagined as the sky.

The wheelchair and the thighbone bridge in turn activate the conventional conceptual metaphor LIFE IS A JOURNEY. This metaphor has a structure in the source domain with a set components: one or more travelers, a vehicle and a path from a beginning to a destination. This structure, or parts of it, is mapped onto the target concept life. We see the wheelchair that has come to a place on the bridge path where the journey ends. Breaking her thighbone neck was the offsetting cause of death for the old woman. The device that shows it in this drawing is to place the breach before the wheelchair. Through experiential knowledge we immediately understand that the life journey has come to the end. The old woman is no longer sitting in her wheelchair.

Compression of meanings come into being in three semantic components linked to the same graphic element, the thighbone. Three mental patterns are activated. Metonymy referring to the dead old woman is active and so is the life as journey metaphor. Image metaphor with bone and bridge in common contour is active. Narrative visual organization also gives room to show the cause for the death.

We may recall the drawing Jews in migration, figure 7. Here is a striking example demonstrating the effect of several semantic overlappings in one single element. It is the Star of David. The star simultaneously means wheel, Israel, and damaging instrument.

“Condensation, the telescoping of a whole chain of ideas into one pregnant image…” (Gombrich, 1985) has taken place.
2.5 Categories of picture elements
The process of opening up and separating meanings in compressed visual information leads to an effort to extract categories of picture elements attached to mental conceptions. Such elements can be either figurative or formal aesthetic, and they have special functions. As a point of departure from Fillmore’s model, I have taken: agent, patient, experiencer, and instrument (means), which are roles belonging to process. During analysis of drawings in interaction with theory from Ronald Langacker and Leonard Talmy, I made a selection of categories that seemed to fill different relevant functions. The categories are tentative and need to be discussed with interested peers and theorists.

The categories are comprised of first-hand roles involved in the process: agent, patient, experiencer, action, instrument, and scene/setting (for the semantic roles); identity signs (elements standing for and showing who or what something is); spatial relation signs (where two or more picture elements are conceived of as in a spatial connection with each other); movers: moving objects, self-moving things, and living beings (e.g., the wheelbarrow and the wheel in figure 7 are movers as well as Shamir); and dynamic objects (including instruments) and dynamic living beings, which are elements representing force dynamic processes. The wheel against Arafat in figure 7 represents force being a dynamic object, and Arafat, representing opposed force to the dynamic wheel, is a dynamic living being.

Then come types of elements active in characterisation: Property signifiers show properties or qualities adhered to or belonging to objects or living beings. Value signifiers show attitudes and emotions. They mediate the value-evaluating aspect which Aristotle holds important, and they can be grouped as attitude-, emotion-, and valuating markers.

Picture elements referring to time are mostly metaphorical. I have named them with concepts from a tradition outside cognitive linguistics: Chronotopes: point- and length-chronotopes.

The categories of picture elements are one of four systems furnishing the visual language system for metaphoric drawing, and as such will be treated in the last chapter. Now we continue a short tour in the visual narrative field where there will be small stops in the themes of characterisation, perspectivation, and time.

2.6 Characterisation
My interest for exploring characterisation lies in narrative techniques in drawing. These techniques are devices for visual descriptions of traits in persons, groups, institutions, actions,
etc. As distinct from my thesis, which presented an inventory of means in drawing, I will in the following show only three examples.

To characterise is to categorise. We see persons and things as something and handle them mentally by placing them in different categories. Here they can be analysed in at least three ways, according to Sonesson (1992): (1) by their visible parts, (2) by their properties, and (3) by the visual angle they are presented with. The visual utterings which follow are constructions. The parts forming wholes, which we recognise as something, are elected as identity signs by the draughtsman. Properties we ascribe to others and ourselves are just attributive, elected and attached by the one speaking/drawing in meaning-giving visual angles.

In drawing, two main functions are important. The first is to present the persons or actual figures in such a way that they will be recognised, conceived as individuals or representatives of a class or group. This is to show who they are. The second function is to present them by intended properties, to show what and how they are. This function is related to values. Positive or negative judgments are passed onto the object of characterisation. For these two functions, one needs identity signs, property signifiers, and value signifiers. Identity signs are figurative elements which bring recognition or which refer to the participant. I define ‘property signifiers’ as elements referring to a property. Value signifiers show attitudes and emotions. They mediate the value-evaluative aspect that is important to Aristotle, and can be grouped as attitude-, emotion-, and valuating markers.

The description of recognisable individual persons can be done on a scale between realism and abstraction to a few pertinent traits. One can draw Chaplin and Hitler with a few lines, and they can be recognised by their beards and respectively by a bowler hat or a hair forelock, combined with a stick and outpointing shoes versus an arm salute or swastika. This style represents the most pictographic pole. On the other pole lies the line from Finn Graff’s pencil’s concentrated contour wanderings in eye hollows and mouth formations, worked out to resemblance. Graff takes care of resemblance first and foremost in the face and head. These thoroughly worked out identity features are then available to be used in repetitions, like names are used. Then bodies can be included in actions. Combined with artefacts (i.e., the things we surround ourselves with, such as clothes, tools, etc.), heads and bodies are the most important identity signs. With rhetorical devices, these things offer an infinite archive for characterisation.

A kiss from the pope in figure 3 is an example. We can recognise the face of the pope, and we know him on the dress with the cross. The headdress is the most important identity sign. Even though it is substituted with the condom it still has the main shape as the papal distinguishing mark, but in addition it is property signifier for not wanting to understand or see. The physical visual perception metaphorically maps the intellectual psychic phenomenon to understand. Letting someone appear with something before the eyes, without eyes, or with closed eyes is using eyes as property signifiers for missing visual function and thereby non-comprehension. This is a relatively customary device for characterisation. In addition, the other sensory organs can be employed to describe psychical function by sensory function, or more often lack of function.
We see the same eye device in this drawing where then-Prime Minister Thatcher is smearing lipstick. She is slovenly both in clothes and hair, as is the animal in her lap and her surroundings (with a broken comb on the toilet table). The subject of this picture is pollution of England and the North Sea, with Thatcher as contributor. She is characterised by action. The act of making up her lips in combination with the untidiness markers including a dirty face is metaphorically projected onto pollution.

When eyes are shut or removed, it also is a rhetorical device to show something (visibility/understanding) that does not exist. Pictures hardly reach negotiation closer than this. Pictures lack signs in the form of conventionalised words such as ‘not’ or ‘without’, which are signifiers for making argumentation. One may speak of two kinds of actions a person can do, according to Rimmon-Kenan: (1) an act of commission, which is something the person does, and (2) an act of omission, which is something he or she should, but does not do. The lack of eyes in Thatcher’s face refers to an act of omission. It might be seen as a coaction\(^{34}\) to the act of commission she is executing, namely the pollution; in this case, the readers were primed to see pollution based on the verbal newspaper title/article. One may say that Thatcher is doing the opposite of what she should be doing. According to the text, she omits doing what she should do, namely to impede pollution, which is her mandate. Graff shows what she does not do, by what she on the contrary enacts. The act of omission here leads to the negative act of commission.

The action evokes consternation as we can see in the body language and mimicry of the animal/England. Mimicry and body position are attitude- and emotion markers. Valuation markers are those picture elements that refer to slovenly actions, and these picture signs are property signifiers for Thatcher. Identity signs are Thatcher’s recognisable head and the image metaphor of England on the geographic map traced on the animal.

The draughtsman operates with common knowledge, and stereotypic knowledge is like gold for him. The employed signs must be immediately conceived by the viewer, meaning that they must be clearly readable as representations of visible objects. We have to see the lipstick as such, like an equivalent to a linguistic term for a concept. A draughtsman may be in doubt about what type of object to choose. Shall one choose an old-fashioned desk or a table with a chair to activate the school concept, or a modern calculator or an old-fashioned cash register for trade? This is the dilemma between new apparatuses which look almost alike and have invisible functions, in contrast to old-fashioned but visually distinctive items that are no longer employed. Graff operates with antiquated cash registers with drawers and knobs, and he alternates between desks and tables with chairs according to requirements. Such objects are reemployed steadily, being picked like clichés from the typographers’ letter cases. Like verbal language needs clichés, metaphorical drawing needs them.

---

\(^{34}\) Talmy (2000, volumes 1 & 2, p. 8) explains how coactions form part of frame actions in sentences. Coactions take place together with motion actions, as manner or cause which Talmy offer thorough elaborations.
An example of how the property of a group can be characterised is age retardation as loss of brain substance. We see an old person (metonymically standing for the group) in an institutional corridor with numerated doors. He is known by the walker and also has an apron as a signifier for his lack of ability to take care of his hygiene. With rhetoric comparison, youth is presented outside the institution. Identity signs for this group include a skateboard, caps, and trousers in a youth-coded style. When a draughtsman chooses identity signs for a group or an individual, the choice usually ought to cover at least two functions: to show the identity and thereto a property or quality of the person or his action. Additionally, the signs also ought to show what kind of situation or action is going on. In the requisite archive for age, there thus are sticks, hats, glasses, old women’s bags, etc. Very often these objects will be employed metonymically. Metonyms for childhood are a rubber nipple, teddy bear, and pram, and ethnic metonyms can be ski shoes, curly topped shoes, burqa, and chopsticks. They are being elected by the relevant aspect of a situation to be focused.

The strongest identity sign for age retardation is the open back of the head from where the brain is falling. This is a concrete symbol for loss of memory and thought. The great black space that the man’s face is directed toward is a formal aesthetic, graphic, metaphoric element showing what the man understands. It also evokes the metaphor BAD IS DARK. This metaphor is a strong value marker, as are the lumps of brain that have fallen to the floor and are being washed up as garbage.

Visual characterisation of a deadly epidemic can be shown in a few narrative picture elements and their semantic roles. The topic in this drawing is AIDS in Africa. DEATH IS A REAPER is the traditional metaphor in action. A skeleton is the agent with the deadly scythe instrument. Skeleton and scythe are identity signs for the personified death. Identity sign is also the Africa map, holding the semantic role for place. Africa is the place where the epidemic rules. An empty landscape with a tree and a mountain in the horizon also functions as identity sign for geographic place. The third and most alarming identity sign for place is the two models of the earth showing us that death has the whole earth in sight for his action. Force of action is in the body walking energetically forward. This walking is a striking example on our employment of automatised, unconscious embodied metaphorical thinking. We also see a symbol for direction of action. This symbol comes forth in the
erected penis which in turn is the symbol for the sexual infectious epidemic. With a loose employment of the narrative semantic roles onto this picture, we find that the characterization of the dramatic AIDS epidemic also includes the sexual cause and force. Death for his part is in addition characterised with a grin as valuating emotion marker.

A closing remark may be that characterisation in drawing goes on by direct description of individuals with the selection of simple visible traits and indirect by transfer. The principle of compression is at work, and identity signs can mingle with valuating markers. This happens because the visual communicator chooses picture elements which can interact. Characterisation always takes place in some connection, based on one or another aspect in attention. In this way, characterisation is woven into the narrative of the picture, involved in something going on in a space of action. This space of action has several functions. It opens up for the viewer’s sight into a delimited narrative, and it gives a setting that can define or clarify actions. Details or participants in the setting can be both identity signs for place and attitude markers. The polysemy in a picture element and the interaction between the references are actually the amazing fact in metaphoric drawing: that there exists a system in and between the lumps of meaning. Some picture makers are acquainted with the system and choose their signs so that they are able to characterise the impossible, in re- and new employment of picture elements from different classes.

2.7 Perspectivation
I choose the term ‘perspectivation’ to mark an active aspect upon what may be known as visual angle, point of view, or focalization in different traditions. Perspective is the mother of my term, and has different meanings. It is a physiologic phenomenon which takes part in what we see, and how we perceive and conceive physical things. Perspective also is an intellectual, psychological attitude to things and cases. It is a field in narratology. It also is an unavoidable phenomenon for draughtsmen, where they take choices whenever they are going to draw a thing, choices that determine what that thing shall be seen as. I choose the term ‘perspectivation’ to emphasise that it concerns directing eyes. That is my comprehension of what draughtsmen do: they direct the viewer’s attention and understanding. That is how draughtsmen communicate. From this follows that they have to know that they have many choices to make. They must know from which position they will see their physical object, and which of diverse aspects of the object they want to show. The same counts for the subject, the story they are about to draw. Here are as many choices to make. Such choices concern which psychological, emotive, and ideological aspects are to be shown. The draughtsman as rhetorician has to consider those facets; in turn, she must position herself according to them.

Skilled picture makers know and employ perspectival modes in both the direct graphic and in the indirect narrative ways. Direct graphic modes are based on visual three-dimensional perception brought into the two-dimensional bounded picture plane. This includes devices to show illusion of depth and distance. The paper’s framing in four bounding lines function as reference markers for vertical and horizontal position and direction. Perspective in the direct meaning concerns the relation between the viewer and the thing she views, the relation between the viewer’s sight position and the focal point. The concrete meaning of perspective also concerns what we have in the visual field (i.e., the scope). Do we have a broad or narrow field, is the distance long or short, and do we look at the motive from above, from below, or diagonally? A picture maker must make a choice of cut, segment, and also angle of view. Normal, bird, and frog perspectives are popular terms for such modes, and they are devices
especially employed in cartoons. They function well in metaphorical presentations, traditionally mediating psychological attitudes: for example, frog perspective in combination with enlargement signals power, while in contrast, bird perspective combined with reduced size can signal timidity or reduced self-esteem.

Spatial organisation in pictures includes factors like diminution, shortening, overlapping, etc. Placement decides whether a thing is interpreted to be distant or near. Distant figures stand in the upper part of the paper plane and are smaller than figures lower on the paper. We make these automatized interpretations because distance in real life reduces the size of what we see. Drawings meant to be read immediately must, as explained earlier, avoid indistinct figures. Readability of depicted objects is best when viewed from the side or front. Viewed from above, too many significant traits are lost. One may speak of a prototypical angle of view, which in a great many cases will be from the side, for instance for animals in whole figure. The old Egyptians had found prototypical sides for parts of the human being, using heads and feet in profile, with eyes and torsos en face like formulas. In contrast to Egyptians, we vary according to requirements, and direct our efforts on readability according to the consistency principle, where one figure is understood as part in a coherent connection.

In assessing perspectivation, we also have to decide what is going to be included in the picture. Then we have to take into account both distance and visual field. These are connected, in the way that the closer we see an object, the more the visual field diminishes. In practice, we take into account a coarse paradigm for representation of, for instance, a person: cut showing overview picture, whole picture, half near, near, or ultra near. But when the story shall be materialised and several figures are to be placed in a narrative interaction, the draughtsman can have different position to the individual figures or configurations. She is not dependent on following a consistent descriptive system. Precisely the active use of angles is one graphic means to create meanings. Angle from below will give an effect of the thing or person we see is standing above us, and thereby can have power. It is usual to combine this means with enlargement to strengthen the effect. Likewise, one will be able to diminish what is intended to look defenceless, and also view it from above. When relations are altered like this, we conventionally speak of value perspective. Proportions, however, can be altered to fill other needs than valuation. We may liberate optical norms from real-world proportions. The intention can be to create strange or surprising pictures, like Magritte could let an apple fill a room in a house. Conversely, we can create highly ideational expressions.

---

35 Art history has several epochs and traditions with different perspectival conventions, e.g., Egyptian utbretting with trees seen in profile around a water basin seen from above, inverted perspective in the Middle Ages, etc.
Complex perspectivation can be created by mixing different angles as in figure 14. A map is a plain sheet. Sheets can be placed in different planes. ‘Plane’ is a visual aesthetic term for a sheet viewed on the property position/angle in space. Plane can be related to the earth as horizontal or vertical, but can also be related to the one who experiences in reality. In a picture, sheets can be described as planes in different ways dependant on the angle of view. In this drawing, the maker has juggled with simultaneously shifting angles to show the topic, which is that African immigrants are restricted from coming to Norway. The restriction is symbolised in broken ladder steps.

The point of departure is a map showing Africa in the bottom, parts of Europe in the middle, and a simplified map of Norway on the top. The territories are seen from above with dark sea surrounding them. We also view a man praying for Africa in this radical bird perspective. At the same time, we see Norway personified in a head bearing a red stocking cap, an identity symbol for Norwegians. The head is an elevated shape. Up to this vertical shape, a ladder is elevated from the horizontal African continent. I interpret the ladder to stand and reach the land which simultaneously is both standing and lying. These simultaneously contradictory angles of view are an oxymoron.

In addition to these shifting perspectives are two positions for the face. The lower face, including the nose, is seen in profile, while the eye section is in en face. The profile is chosen because of the conjoining shape which can be made with the map. But the closed eyes, symbolising lack of understanding, must be orientated toward Africa. In conclusion, there is the valuating perspective in terms of Norway portrayed with a great self in relation to Europe and Africa, this being a means for ideological evaluation.

Perspectivation provides a picture maker with rhetorical devices especially in characterisation. Characterisation and perspective are reciprocal involved, and characterisation takes place on account of mental attitude and with concrete perspective. In addition, there are semantic meanings connected to the bodies especially showing emotional and psychological aspects of the participants. Here comes direction of gaze and bodily position in addition to emotive bodily expressions and actions as indicators for participants’ cognitive and emotive attitudes to other participants and subjects. The main principles here will be bodily orientation and direction of gaze. A difficulty, though, is to make a distinction between the perspectives of participants and the perspective of the picture maker.

2.8 Time
Time in a picture is inextricably tied to the problem of showing events in succession, first and foremost to show several events. This is the problem of order, or succession. Connected to succession is duration and frequency; namely, events take time, and they can be repeated. I will in this chapter give some examples on how these three aspects of time can be treated.

2.8.1 Successive order
Events and actions are conceived as happening in successive order. Successive order in pictures must give information about ‘when’, which involves answers involving what happens
first, last, before, after, etc. This concerns the ‘and then’ problem in drawing, where several sequences normally cannot be seen. It also concerns the problem whether an actual event has happened or is going to happen because a picture normally establishes a now. In reading a picture, we may mentally scan it backward and forward in time and space, thus deciding whether a retention to the past or a protention to the future is activated. This may depend on whether the narrative is a new story taking place solely inside the picture, or a story in a context also outside the picture. Protention is activated in this picture. In the continual now of the drawing, we can imagine protentionally the shot. The balloon will be blown to pieces and fall down. The cause for this radical process of change lies in the instrument. The boy does something to the balloon, which we may call object manipulation. The change is trigged by a force-dynamic object, an object which can trigger changes in other objects, and also in living beings and substances. Pistols, scissors, and sharp instruments belong to this category. With such means, draughtsmen are able to get in contact with time. Another category is movers like a wheelbarrow, a car, or an arrow. Such movers have a direction, a front and a back, and movement directed forward. They also move on a path, from a start point to a destination point. We imagine the path as a line. A moving object can also be a dynamic object, and vice versa. A pistol bullet has both a directed path and the ability to trigger change in other objects. What analysis category the bullet represents depends on what property our attention is directed to. Time is an abstract concept and difficult to catch in drawing. We cannot observe time. We can see objects and moving objects. Movement is a fundamental phenomenon; in fact, we have visual domains in the brain which create the conceptual phenomenon of movement. Movement is involved in our way of conceptualising time. Due to the limitation that movement per se is excluded from a drawing, draughtsmen have to rely on something that can refer to the phenomenon, to show something connected to movement, and thereby get an impression of movement into the bargain. It most often is a metonymic conceptualisation (i.e., movement is a property in the object). Described animals running, people throwing, and bodies in action are such movement-adopting symbols, and so are wheelbarrows and other vehicles. Theorists in aesthetics, however, make other demands upon artistic presentations of movements. They want to see a kind of movement in the drawing style, for instance traces from the artist’s own dynamic motion in the line. There are diverse conventions for alluding to movement and motion, speed-lines in cartoons, double contour-lines, etc. The futurists developed strategies with body parts in several simultaneous positions. Leonardo da Vinci introduced *sfumato*, blurring of lines (for instance in the corner of the mouth) to offer a margin for *Mona Lisa*’s expression. Such stylistic devices may be employed together with the pictorial ones I concentrate on.

Lakoff and Johnson explore metaphorical understanding of time. They, among other cognitive linguists, maintain that most of our conception of time happens as a metaphorical version of motion in space. They also find it “conceivable that the same neural system engaged in

---

36 Object manipulation is a category in cognitive linguistics, especially in Lakoff and Johnson’s theory.
perception (or in bodily movement) plays a central role in conception.” (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999, p. 37 - 38.) After empiric explorations in language, they find that the most fundamental metaphor for time has an observer in the present now. The observer is standing with the future in front of him and the past behind him. Lakoff and Johnson name this mode of understanding THE TIME ORIENTATION METAPHOR. It is a spatial mode of understanding; however, it does not say anything about motion.

Two other metaphors can connect to this TIME ORIENTATION METAPHOR. These two have motion and are named THE MOVING TIME METAPHOR and THE MOVING OBSERVER OR TIME’S LANDSCAPE. This last metaphor has an observer in motion, and the landscape is time. Each step on the observer’s path is a time. The location of the observer is the present now.

This drawing is an example of THE MOVING OBSERVER.

Steinberg has made several versions of a cat moving toward summer. In some of them, the observer is on the bridge, i.e. in an earlier point of time in spring. The metaphorical mapping of a spatial schema onto time also incorporates transmission of logical inferences from the spatial source domain to the target domain time. We correlate the spatial distance traversed with the amount of time passed.

We see two parts of a landscape divorced by a river. The river has no other time function here than being a border between two places. Steinberg had to employ words to mark time as a theme. Then, with the names of the two months, this drawing is a realisation of THE MOVING OBSERVER METAPHOR. We recognise our own understanding of time period as spatial regions. A month can be conceptualised as a more or less delimited region or as a length of time. Time is a road, or a path, metaphorically conceived. Time is invisible, despite being an inseparable dimension in events. Time cannot be drawn; it only has to be present together with visible phenomena or elements. Time is change; the picture maker has to find objects offering change. A bridge here symbolises passage between two regions and between two periods of time.

Bridges, roads, paths, tunnels, and staircases are objects in the picture category which I have chosen to call chronotopes. The concept ‘chronotope’ comes from Michail Bachtin. The concept holds time and place together, which is why it functions so well. Road is one type of chronotope. Points on or along a road, or points on a line, belong to a spatial image schema, and we can project them onto time. For draughtsmen, there are more chronotopes, and those most interesting are chronotopes with a direction. They will most often be combined with moving objects or self-moving living beings and can also be combined with dynamic objects. Steinberg’s bridge in figure 16 is a point on a timeline. It can contribute to the question of succession in a process. The bridge is a reference point to the observer’s now position. A road can have more points, there can be a hole in the road behind the observer, a crossroad ahead. These are points of time for possible events, and there are distances between the points which can be measured. They can tell about duration.

37 Lakoff and Johnson (1999, p. 140).
The so-called source-path-goal image schema gives a thorough explanation on our basic conception of space mapped onto time. This schema has the following elements:

- A trajector that moves
- A source location (the starting point)
- A goal, that is, an intended destination of the trajectory
- A route from the source to the goal
- The actual trajectory of motion
- The position of the trajector at a given time
- The direction of the trajector at that time
- The actual final location of the trajector, which may or may not be the intended destination (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999, p. 32)

The schema has a spatial logic, and can be extended with a vehicle, the speed of motion, obstacles to motion etc. according to Lakoff and Johnson. Extensions are frequently made in drawings, and the logic is at work in for instance Havel balancing on the tightrope (figure 1), in the Steinberg’s drawing of the balloon shooter (figure 15), and in March – April (figure 16). Spatial logic in interpretation of Havel includes our knowledge that the rope is tied to something in both ends. These two points being the starting point (source location) and the goal, are not in the picture. Thus only part of the path is presented here, and we cannot know whether Havel will reach his destination or not, neither can we know how long the distance is from his starting point. But the spatial logic in the schema allows reflections upon such matter. In the drawing of the balloon shooter there is an invisible, imaginable line that the bullet will follow. In this case, both source (the pistol) and goal are present. Time is not the topic in these two examples, in contrast to the third example in figure 16. Here the cat is trajector and the arrow with the written word ‘summer’ points to a destination. The road is the path without end or beginning. The bridge is the visual symbol that metaphorically marks the point of time here in the ongoing walk.38

---

38 Leonard Talmy and Ronald Langacker both show in their works how much the same of the geometrical structure in spatial conceptualisation also takes place in the language of the temporal dimension. Talmy systematically analyses how language structures space and time, showing mental transfer of spatial relations onto time where we operate with points and lengths on lines. He explores complexity in the relation between ‘stationarity’ and ‘movement’ (Talmy, 1983, pp. 254–255). In the thesis, I have referred his examples, and suggest visual exploration in drawing to test the field of possibilities for these mental patterns. Ronald Langacker on his side demonstrates with visual schemas how we conceptualise time in language, with tempus and aspect. He says that we may see and analyse an event in one of two ways, as sequence (like points on a line) or summary, compressed to form one single gestalt. Langacker offers attention to the fact that, when we speak, we can shift between mental time positions several times in one sentence. He says that the time of speaking can be a temporal vantage point (Langacker, 2000, p. 207). He continues by explaining that the speaker’s location can also be considered a reference point, just as the reference time can be considered a temporal vantage point.
The body in space is basic for our understanding of great amounts of the abstract concepts we attend to continuously. Horizontal timelines are usually straight, seen in a prototypical angle, and they follow the same direction in which we read text. This prototypical timeline perspective also manifests itself in pictures, so that we may say we have an impression of time moving from left toward right. This is supposed to be connected to our direction in reading from left to right, in our culture. It is probable that reading establishes neural structures that easily activate this conventional impression for process direction. In opposition to this pictorial direction comes the old heraldic rule for figures in a coat-of-arms, stating that figures are to be profiled with their front to the left side. For this, another impression seems to be basic: the same impression employed in advertising when the forces of cars are to be emphasised. A jeep most often will be photographed diagonally uphill to the left. We have an impression of the river of time flowing from the left to the right in a picture. Similarly, the wind blowing the flag comes from the left. It is rare to see the flag standing out left from the flagstaff, in a picture or in a mental image. In this way, there is a form of time’s direction in pictures. But on the other hand, any prospect can be seen with any visual angle, not least in reality outside a picture.

In aesthetic practice, we attend to and evaluate directions and lines in pictures. We talk about movement in pictures and thereby mean such things as direction in visual or imagined lines, formal elements in certain collocations, elements that trigger movement of the gaze of the viewer. Formal aesthetic devices to present time will be able to support and strengthen figurative devices, and of course also to weaken or contradict a strategy.

Let us return to successive events and chronotopes. I make a distinction between what I call point chronotopes and length chronotopes. This drawing (figure 18), like March–April (figure 16), is a point chronotope because a point of time is emphasised. Here the point is the door which the man is going to pass through. In figure 16, the point is the bridge marking the passage of the cat. Figure 18 is a commentary on a situation where the Norwegian President of the Supreme Court of Justice, Smith, is ending his professional work. We see the man going through the door, out of his job and also out of the picture itself. He is dressed in sportswear, walking energetically into the future waiting outside the door. The difference in disposal of direction compared to Steinberg’s cat having passed over the bridge, is connected to force dynamic, or to which forces the agent activates in the action. One of the agents, the cat, is moving along the timeline, while the other, the man, activates more force and consequently appears more active himself.

Doors, bridges, and portals are elements for point chronotopes, a type showing a clear passage between two spaces, and thereby two periods. They present the point of time for the passage. The President of the Supreme Court of Justice is in a starting process going through the door

---

39 Srinu Narayanan (cited in Lakoff & Johnson, 1999, p. 581) has a structural schema for mental higher level motor control. Ten phases are described: (1) getting into a state of readiness, (2) the initial state, (3) starting process, (4) the main process (either instantaneous or prolonged), (5) an option to stop, (6) an option to resume, (7) an option to iterate or continue the main process, (8) a check to see if a goal has been met, (9) the finishing process, and (10) the final state. In the thesis, I discuss the problem of how to delimit a phase of bodily action

34
out to his free time. He is actively walking. The time aspect is imperfect present. The finishing process in professional life is marked by the black judge gown, which has been left hanging on the Supreme Court chair, metonymically showing a final phase. The gown can be seen as an equivalent to a verbal finite past. The body action alone cannot show the phase in the topic: to retire. It is the relation between the picture elements that constitutes the semantic meaning. One may speak of a superior relation principle which makes it possible at all to constitute systems for language and visual language.

2.8.2 Duration

Duration is the second of the three aspects of the narrative time dimension. I view duration as the extension/extent between points of time and as extended points. It is lengths or distances in chronotopes (or paths) with a direction, and more or less domains in space. The invisible time dimension here, as well as in time succession, is converted to the visible spatial dimension.

Duration can be objective or subjective. Objective duration is measurable in seconds and years, while subjective is how long a time period is experienced by individuals. Time cannot be experienced without being connected to something; indeed, it does not appear in any isolated or absolute form. It is always experienced as a manifestation of events or actions, or as change in objects in space.

When I have treated time in the above standing text, it has been as an implicated phenomenon. When time per se is the topic in a picture, it has to be marked with, or be placed as the main motive for, some symbol for time. This can be done by measuring instruments like a watch, an hour glass, or a metronome. To show metaphorical statements about time, artists use several devices; for example, time wheels can be inclined, watches can be Dalibent, and time signifiers can be deformed or be plucked to pieces. There also are symbols like the old ouroboros: the snake eating his own tail. The ouroboros, like the circle, is an eternity symbol. The circle, the snake, and the wheel are symbols containing both succession/duration and repetition/frequency. It depends on which aspect we direct our attention. I also will include chronotopes as such symbols.

Length chronotope is, in my terms, a picture element with a length or distance letting the spatial dimension be mapped onto the time dimension. One typical example is a road which, winding from a starting point in air-perspectival sfumato and growing in size as it draws toward us, can be a symbol for duration. Most often, it is subjective time being described, and how it is being experienced or felt. In addition to duration, the character and form of the road informs something about the quality in the experienced time, and the road cannot be shown as a road without also saying something about the surroundings.


when we are about to translate the visually given action to words. Simple body actions like walking or eating are numerous in pictures. The picture’s now, however, is often stretched out in a continuum with before and after implied.
In the drawing (figure 19) where the road is a writing process, it is a symbol for a winded, unbounded activity in time. In the time space, no other events than writing have taken place.

Chronotopes with a direction can be varied in different picture directions. I will also confirm duration connected to depicted length.

Per Marquard Otzen[^40] draws the philosopher Søren Kierkegaard’s rising circuit where we see no end or decrease. Any length chronotope can be installed in all directions inside the picture frame. The path schema is the basic conceptualiser in length chronotopes. In the two picture examples, we find different active zones from this schema. In figure 19, the trajector (the writer) is on a location toward the destination although the destination is not shown or reached. The starting point is not depicted either, as it melts away into the horizon. The path ends in the present, but logically will continue and grow as long as the man goes on writing. In contrast, the stairway path in figure 20 continues outside the picture, and here the starting point is visible.

Such artistic choices, based upon the source-path-goal logic, represent duration, as does the employment of metonymical symbols. Artists in the baroque epoch manipulated symbols such as using a wax candle in a metaphor for the duration of life, *LIFE IS LIGHT*. When the candle is burning, life is going on. When the light is put out, life is ended. If the candle has burned all the way down, life has been long and naturally has come to an end. A blown-out flame in the beginning or middle of the candle will be interpreted as death in childhood or in the middle of life.

### 2.8.3 Frequency

Frequency is the third aspect in the exploration of the time dimension in pictures. There are conventions for showing iterative events such as showing several simultaneous positions. The device I will concentrate on is connected to metonymy, which is the mechanism that has to carry visual presentation of a successive single event. A black-and-white artist has to find iterative moving objects, including rocking chairs, swings, metronomes, or carousels, things we associate with repetition. Instruments may have iterative properties: scissors open up and bite, while needles and toothbrushes move up and down. Also living beings’ predictable repetitive motions and rituals have iterative potential.

[^40]: Per Marquard Otzen (1944–) draws in the Danish newspaper *Information*. 
2.9 Conclusive remarks on visual narrative

This chapter brought forward narrative techniques in some examples. I presented devices for characterisation and to formulate utterances about time, and I treated the role of perspectivation.

To start answering the question of what it is that constitutes and structures a visual language system for metaphoric drawing, I presented constituents as categories of picture elements comprised in narratives, and I demonstrated how meanings take place in categories of picture elements. We have seen how one figurative element, the Star of David, simultaneously may have three semantic meanings (wheel, Israel, and damaging instrument) and stand in three picture element categories as mover, identity sign, and dynamic object.

The meaning structure in metaphoric drawing has been revealed to some extent as principles for combination of events in a picture, which can be defined as spatial simultaneity and relational connection. Compression of information is a special and marked combinational principle. In the final chapter, which presents constituents and structure of a visual language system for metaphoric drawing, a demonstration takes place in a combinational process of semantic categories. There I will demonstrate that the way semantic structures linked to graphic structures form symbolic visual structures, can render a platform for a metaphoric visual language system.

This chapter on visual narrative reveals a necessity for metaphorical descriptions in meaning expression. The role of metaphors is the next subject.
3 Metaphor

Cognitive linguistic metaphor theory has systematized an apparatus of understanding which is applicable to metaphoric drawing. It demonstrates kinds of metaphor, relations between them, and how they are used and can be used. The theory works like a tool for understanding mechanisms and structures of thought. I highly appreciate it in understanding visual communication. In thought structures, the theory separates something to be not-metaphorical and concrete (roughly speaking) and much to be abstract and metaphorically understood. In drawing, one operates with representations of concrete objects and bodies, and one is dependent on devices with ‘concretes’ to express abstract topics.

In this chapter, I insert cognitive metaphor theory into drawing. This goes on along a broad passage through different kinds of metaphor. The passage also involves metonymy and mechanism and patterns for cause and causation. The passage considers the practical aspect of the research question, namely an archive for visual formulation, and it will in addition give one of four category systems for the visual language system on metaphoric drawing.

The cognitive linguistic metaphor theory developed by Lakoff and Johnson will not be further explained here past a reminder of the short introduction in the introduction chapter. For readers without knowledge of the theory, I enthusiastically recommend the original works and the practical introduction by Zoltán Kövecses (2002). Instead of delving into a deep explanation of the theory, I go directly to metaphor and how drawings implement cognitive metaphor via a broad range of examples.

There are two main categories in the cognitive theory as I conceive of the phenomenon. The first and most important is conventional conceptual metaphor. This category contains our huge inventory of so-called cross-domain conceptual mappings, based on the metaphor mechanism. This mechanism is at work when we are understanding one conceptual domain in terms of another conceptual domain. This happens continuously, unconsciously, and automatically in our daily thoughts and speech, according to the research of Lakoff and Johnson, and causes an indefinite quantity of metaphorical expressions. Such expressions are mediated in drawings as well as linguistically, as we have seen already in this document. The second metaphor category is image metaphor.

3.1 Image metaphor

Image metaphor in drawing plays a special role and differs slightly from linguistic image metaphor. I will therefore bring forth a description from George Lakoff and Mark Turner:

Metaphoric image-mappings work in just the same way as all other metaphoric mappings – by mapping the structure on one domain onto the structure of another. But here the domains are mental images. Image structure includes both part-whole structure and attribute structure. In images, part-whole relations are relations such as those between a roof and a house, or between a tombstone and a grave as a whole. Attribute structure includes such things as color, intensity of light, physical shape, curvature, and, for events, aspects of the overall space, such as continuous versus discrete, open ended versus completed, repetitive versus not repetitive, brief versus extended. It is the existence of such structure within our conceptual images that permits one image to be mapped onto another by virtue of their common structure. (Lakoff & Turner, 1989, p. 90.)
This presentation concerns poetic metaphor, and the examples illustrating image metaphor are parts of poetic verse. Lakoff and Turner (1989, p. 90) quote an example of mental images from a poem: “My wife . . . whose waist is an hourglass.” Here the imposition of an hourglass onto a woman’s waist takes place by virtue of their common shape. According to Lakoff and Turner, the locus of the metaphor is the mental image, rather than in the words themselves. Although conventional mental images are parts of the structures in the two domains, linguistic image metaphors are characterised by proliferation of detail, which limits them to highly specific cases. Lakoff and Turner therefore refer to them as “one-shot.”

For black-and-white artists, I value image metaphor as a cardinal device and make the distinction between this type and conventional conceptual metaphor as two main categories, with the “one-shot” quality marking the difference from conventional conceptual metaphors which are highly repetitive in use. In turn, there can be seen a most obvious difference between visual and linguistic image metaphor which, in my opinion, is the presence of two visual elements (which of course are mentally interpreted) in the visual medium. In pictures, the function of the overlapping visual elements often is referential, where the poetic function reigns in the linguistic medium. In figure 22 with two image metaphors both of them are first and foremost referential. The mapping of a northern half-globe onto the pig is referring to the northern societies, and the lying half-globe mapped onto a bowl for food refers to the southern so-called third world. The choice of a fat pig eating the third world’s nourishment is the negative moral statement in the drawing made with the rhetorical device of image metaphor.

Visual image metaphor can take place where two picture elements with common form or shape are brought to overlap. The common form most often will be a common contour, but can also be common texture, colour, or light value. The common form may be clearly present at the outset, or it can be established as visual similarity by the draughtsman. The round ball shape is suited for making visual metaphors. Training to be aware of possible visual iconicity by looking for possibilities of common shape can result in established similarity where a pig’s back is rounded to common form with a half-globe. The possibilities increase with potential to alternate between different visual angles and aspects for an object to be represented.

3.2 Several metaphors in one metaphorical expression – and the relation between metaphor and visual symbols

A general principle must be mentioned concerning metaphorical expressions. A majority of metaphorical expressions are daily expressions based upon conventional conceptual metaphors and image schemas. The principle I have in mind here is that several metaphors often will be involved in one expression. This holds for both linguistic and visual metaphorical expressions. Johnson and Lakoff point to what they name new poetic metaphors. These are metaphorical expressions built on the material of conceptual metaphors, and they can appear in constructions involving more than one metaphor. For the sake of visual new creative metaphor, the construction most often comes to being through combinations of metaphors.
For example, RESOURCES ARE FOOD and SOCIETY IS AN ANIMAL can be said to be activated\(^4\) in figure 22 in combination with the two image metaphors. The idea of new creative metaphor will be further considered later in this text.

Visual symbol and metaphor may be difficult to grasp. To aid understanding, I will answer the questions: what is a visual symbol in my understanding, and what is the relation between symbol and metaphor? When somebody is about to draw an ideational topic, he or she has to draw something that can refer to something in the topic. A figurative element with a semantic meaning is needed – that is, a pictorial element depicting a concrete thing like a pig, an apple, or anything that can be recognised as such. Such a figurative element is a visual symbol, even though its semantic meaning can be unclear. A visual symbol can be more or less culturally conventionalised, for instance the cross which in our culture refers to Christianity or death, depending on the context and on the surrounding elements establishing some sort of a narrative. The cross as symbol has come into being on account of the metonymy mechanism: the cross is part of Christianity. This happens in a cognitive process in which one conceptual entity (the vehicle) provides access to another conceptual entity (the target) within the same domain, as explained in section 1.3. A great part of visual symbols function by the metonymical mechanism, and often are metonyms. As metonyms or just visual symbols, they can activate a metaphor. This often happens where a visual symbol (i.e., a figurative element) appears as part of a metaphor. This is the relation between symbol and metaphor that plays a central role when it comes to understanding interaction and functions of the two concepts in metaphorical drawing.\(^5\)

3.3 Conventional conceptual metaphor

Conventional conceptual metaphors are mental patterns entrenched in our mind and in the cerebral network of neurons. These patterns are material for abstract concepts and thought. The cognitive linguistic metaphor theory establishes three characteristics: (1) that thought is mostly unconscious, (2) that abstract concepts are largely metaphorical, and (3) that the mind is inherently embodied. The last statement means that most of these metaphors are based on bodily experience and knowledge of objects in space.

3.4 Image schema

Image schemas are automatized, unconscious, and spontaneous schematic structures that organise our mental representations. They function at a level more general and abstract than the level where we form particular mental images. They are not limited only to visual properties. According to Johnson (1987, p. 25), they have a certain kinaesthetic character. They are not tied to any single perceptual modality, though our visual schemas seem to predominate. Johnson (1987) notes, “It would seem that image schemata transcend any specific sense modality, though they involve operations that are analogous to spatial manipulation, orientation and movement” (p. 25). One may say that an image schema is an abstract structure, a pattern, or a skeleton of many experiences connected to a word. Johnson and Lakoff give names to the most predominant ones. We have a relatively small group of basic image schemas which structure systems of spatial relations. We learn them through

---

\(^4\) When referring to conventional conceptual metaphors, I follow metaphors presented by Lakoff and Johnson or Kövecses. Now and then, however, I state what I myself find credible, as in this case animal as source domain for society.

\(^5\) My colleagues working as picture teachers find this functional relation between symbol/metonymy and metaphor difficult to understand.
bodily experiences early in life. Each schema has a built-in logic; the structure in the pattern provides us with cognitive material making it possible for us to reason and make inferences. We have already seen the source-path-goal schema in figure 17. The container schema plays a similar capital role in daily thought.

The container schema has a structure of an inside, a boundary, and an outside, and it is topological insofar that the boundary can be made larger, smaller, or distorted. This gives the possibility for something to be inside or outside, or in a moving position of into or out of. This schema can be imposed on a visual scene or on a theme of music that we conceptually separate from a whole song. The schema can be physically instantiated as a concrete object, like a room or a bowl, or as a bounded region in space, like a football field.

Steinberg’s drawing of the cat contemplating with the head inside the four number will be interpreted by this schema. The number four semantically is a maximally abstract concept. The graphic symbol for this abstract concept is a two-dimensional absolute flat constellation of a few straight lines. We see the number as an image metaphor with an instantiated box seen in profile. Steinberg has seen the potential box and opened a room for the cat to wander in. He might have done something with the thickness of the walls, or he might have placed things in it or outside, made the number smaller or bigger, etc. He lets it stand simply, however, not least to make the readers of the drawing take part in number abstraction. Another drawing with the container schema is figure 18. Here the schema is instantiated as a room where the main character is leaving through the door. Instantiation as a bowl appears in figure 22.

Several image schemas concern bodily projections. We conceptualise taking advantage of inherent knowledge of front and back; specifically, seeing takes place on the front side of the body, and we normally move in the direction the front faces and also interact with objects and other people at our fronts. In opposition, the back side of the body plays a secondary role. We project fronts and backs onto other objects, according to the side with which we normally interact. This understanding is material for metaphors where IMPORTANT IS FRONT SIDE and LESS IMPORTANT IS BACK SIDE. The back side is connected to the private, the less representative, and also the less representable that we do not want to show to others because it is negative or not quite permissible. This picture shows this opposition between the officially representable and the private excess.

In this picture, both the front-back schema and the container schema are instantiated. Other image schemas for spatial relations are balance, bondage, and vertical and horizontal orientation. The balance schema obviously is active in figure 1 showing Havel on the tightrope. For topics of social and personal psychological relations, bonds and bondages are extremely interesting in visual expressions. Students immediately respond when presented to possibilities of change in human relationships by types of bonds like steel chains, thin silken threads, coarse ropes, or pearl necklaces which in turn may be worn near to broken hearts.
One drawing from the dramatic post-Soviet period after Yeltsin’s tank attack on the Duma describes Yeltsin and Gorbachev as entwined in the events of destruction symbolised by the tank’s ribbon.

Ontological experience is material for some schemas, and there are schemas for how something comes into being and perishes: the build-construction-destruction schema. This schema embodies both action/event and the building object.

The future post-Soviet system is the topic between then-presidents Bush Sr. and Gorbachev in figure 26. The start phase is depicted with metonymic symbols needed for making a foundation wall. The process may not start, however, since the two builders are standing in cement which, as we know, gets stiff. Image schemas play a formidable role as sources in our metaphor world, and are basic material in visual metaphor.

3.5 Three metaphor types

Three metaphor types with different structure and functions are, according to Lakoff and Johnson, structural metaphors, ontological metaphors, and orientation metaphors. On the way to visual structural metaphor, I will point to what Lakoff and Johnson (1999) call primary metaphor. They present a range of examples of primary metaphors and explain how...

43 Primary metaphor is based on Joe Grady’s theory on this topic, which in turn relies on Christopher Johnson’s theory on conflation. Conflation of two phases in children’s acquisition of metaphor where a sensory experienced knowledge like to see is a prerequisite before the metaphorical conceptualisation of to understand can take place. Grady continues with his theory holding that “early conflations in everyday experience should lead to the automatic formation of hundreds of primary metaphors that pair subjective experience and judgments with sensorimotor experience” (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999, p. 49).
knowledge based on one sensory modality is mapped onto knowledge from another sensory modality. Two examples are below:

KNOWING IS SEEING.
Subjective Judgment: Knowledge
Sensorimotor Domain: Vision
Example: “I see what you mean.”
Primary Experience: Getting information through vision.

STATES ARE LOCATIONS.
Subjective Judgment: A subjective state
Sensorimotor Experience: Being in a bounded region of space
Example: “I’m close to being in a depression and the next thing that goes wrong will send me over the edge.”
Primary Experience: Experiencing a certain state as correlated with a certain location (e.g., being cool under a tree, feeling secure in bed). (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999, p. 52)

Lakoff and Johnson (1999, p.49) speak of complex metaphors and follow Grady’s theory on primary metaphor which states that each primary metaphor “is simple, an atomic component of the molecular structure of complex metaphors.”

3.5.1 Structural metaphors
Structural metaphors have the cognitive function of giving one the ability to understand a concept, or target domain, by the structure in another concept, the source domain. In this metaphor type, the source domain provides the target domain with a relatively rich structure of knowledge. LIFE IS A JOURNEY is the most well-known example of a structural metaphor. SOCIAL ORGANISATIONS ARE PLANTS is another. This metaphor seems to be characterised by the following set of mappings, according to Kövecses:

- The source is a plant; the target is social organization.
- The whole plant maps onto the entire organization.
- A part of the plant maps onto a part of the organization.
- Growth of the plant maps onto development of the organization.
- Removing a part of the plant maps onto reducing the organization.
- The root of the plant maps onto the origin of the organization.
- The flowering of the plant maps onto the best stage, the most successful stage.
- The fruits or crops map onto the beneficial consequences.

---
44 I have reformulated Kövecses’ way of presenting the sets of mappings/projections taking place in the metaphor. (Kövecses, 2002, p. 8.)
Like in many of Graff’s drawings, the target domain is not explicitly apparent, but is contextually given in the newspaper. The situation depicted is again the unknown future for the post-Soviet organisation. A plant in an early stage is the source, and there is a gardener who fits in the plant metaphor structure.  

3.5.2 Orientational metaphors

Orientational metaphors do not provide much conceptual structure for target concepts. Their cognitive function is “to make a set of target concepts coherent in our conceptual system” (Kövecses, 2002, p. 35). We use them in evaluation. They are called ‘orientational’ because most of them have to do with basic spatial orientations: up-down, front-back, centre-periphery, etc.

We have attitudes and evaluative approaches toward much of what we talk and think about. We evaluate a lot unconsciously. Many of our evaluations are tied to spatial relations and are automatized in orientational metaphors. With these metaphors, we conceptualise certain target concepts in a uniform way, and thereby large groups are made coherent. One example is the following concepts being characterised by an ‘upwards’ orientation, while their ‘opposites’ get a ‘downward’ orientation: HEALTHY IS UP, while SICK IS DOWN. HAPPY IS UP, but SAD IS DOWN. RATIONAL IS UP, while NON-RATIONAL IS DOWN. GOOD IS UP, but BAD IS DOWN.

Orientation upwards tends to mark positive values. We see this tendency in figure 27 where Gorbachev is standing on the top of the political system, and a communist officer symbolised by the sickle is tumbling down from a ladder upon which he tried to mount to control. CONTROL IS UP and LACK OF CONTROL IS DOWN are the pair of orientational metaphors activated here. Ladders, staircases, towers, and columns are visual symbols at hand for drawing positive evaluations. Steinberg has made a humorous point in figure 28 playing with the height of the sculpture’s pedestal and the conceptual pattern IMPORTANT IS UP.

45 In a metaphor like COMPLEX ABSTRACT SYSTEMS ARE PLANTS there are some central mappings. And there is also an amount of entailments to the central mappings, activated by our additional knowledge about plants. A gardener may be an entailment to the constituent mappings in the plant metaphor in figure 27. I renounce from pointing out entailments to metaphors, and am content to point to the metaphor of current interest.
3.5.3 Ontological metaphors

Ontological metaphors provide far less cognitive structure to target domains than structural metaphors but more than orientational ones. Their cognitive function is to give an ontological status to general categories of abstract target concepts. This means that we conceptualise our experiences as objects, substances, and containers quite generally, without specifying what kind of object, substance, or container is actual. Since our knowledge of objects, substances, and containers is rather limited, we cannot use these general categories to understand much about target domains. Kövecses writes:

But it is nevertheless a cognitively important job to assign a basic status in terms of objects, substances, etc. to many of our experiences. The kinds of experiences that require this the most are those that are not clearly delineated, vague, or abstract. For example, we do not really know what the mind is, but we conceive of it as an object (note the word what in the first part of this sentence). This way we can attempt to understand more about it. (Kövecses, 2002, p. 34)

Physical objects can be source domain for psychological or abstract entities, events, or actions. This is reification in rhetorical terms. Steinberg has reificated the action to scribble in figure 29.

The man in figure 29 is carrying an object, a fingerprint. I assume it is the man’s own fingerprint, and read it as metonymy for identity. The fingerprint object is big and heavy. It is big in relation to the size of the man, and it is made big with the rhetorical alteration strategy of scale of size. The object is attributed with visualised weight via darkness. This darkness functions as a visual sensorimotor equivalence to the kinaesthetic weight quality and is a formal aesthetic sensory cross-domain, inter-sensory, metaphor. In figure 30 the man’s object is objectified by his signature. This object too refers to identity, in this case to a big and aestheticized self-conception. Steinberg has chosen an object which he has treated by style and size. We see in both drawings that each object is presented as a thing because it is being held and carried. To carry is a visualisation of ‘to have’. This is a contradiction to the two actions: print the fingerprint and write the signature. Seen as comparison to verbal language, we are in a nearness of pictorial parallels to nouns and verbs, by ‘have’ versus ‘make’.
In drawn expressions, mind will often be represented as an object. The mind, psyche, and emotions, can take form as heart, stone, or a fingerprint, and it has to be with concrete objects. These objects will entail more or less specification. Very often, the objects are parts of structural metaphors. These metaphors open up for modes of treatment or extensions of the metaphoric content. The eternal problem, though, is that it is impossible to catch an abstract concept in the target domain. Pictures are always defeated by words here.

Kövecses points to personification that can be conceived of as an ontological metaphor. In personification, human qualities are attributed to non-living phenomena. In this way, personification makes use of the best source domains we have at our disposal: ourselves. It may be easy to read figure 31 as a metaphor for mind. Steinberg then has made a personification where the mind ladders. MIND IS BODY is activated.

3.6 On further investigation of some fields in the landscape of cognitive metaphor
After the foregoing presentation of cognitive metaphors, I am going to strengthen contact between drawing and some of the presented fields. In my thesis, I explore two general metaphors from the linguistic research, namely the two event-structure metaphors and metaphor for change and cause. A rather short presentation of these explorations follows. After that my course is to reflect upon some source domains for one target and vice versa upon several targets for a single source domain. In the next and final turn, I show how complexity increases. Conceptual metaphors are brought to interact with figurative image metaphors, and thereafter formal aesthetic metaphors are included. I further explain the complexity for visual metaphoric expressions with interaction between metaphors and metonymies.

3.6.1 Exploration on the EVENT-STRUCTURE METAPHOR, the location version
To test the relevance and credibility of Lakoff and Johnson’s theory for metaphoric drawing, I explored the so-called event-structure metaphor, which has two versions. I did this in four phases. Firstly, I chose one drawing which seemed potent with the points in question to be analysed as the first version. Secondly, I scanned my archive of newspaper drawings to find examples containing the sub-metaphors of the first version. Thirdly, I searched the sub-metaphors of the second version of the event-structure metaphor for good examples. At last, I made a tentative quantitative overview of my whole body of research material in accordance to event-structure.46

Some metaphors are activated continuously and operate on a general level. The two BASIC EVENT-STRUCTURE metaphors are general in this way. According to Lakoff and Johnson (1999, p. 178), our most fundamental understanding of what events are comes from these two

46 This exploration is tentative, not least because my material of drawings is an open collection, never brought to a close. In analysing the drawings, both in this case and in categorisation, the method was spreading drawings on the floor and sorting them in groups.
metaphors. They are called respectively the LOCATION and OBJECT EVENT-STRUCTURE metaphors. I start with the LOCATION EVENT-STRUCTURE METAPHOR. It is a structural metaphor with several sub-metaphors, which are mappings or correspondences belonging to the basic metaphor. The source domain for this metaphor is the domain of motion in space, and the target domain is the domain of events.

The sub-metaphors in the LOCATION EVENT-STRUCTURE METAPHOR are:
1: STATES ARE LOCATIONS (interiors of bounded regions in space).
2: CHANGES ARE MOVEMENTS (into or out of bounded regions).
3: CAUSES ARE FORCES.
4: CAUSATION IS FORCED MOVEMENT (from one location to another).
5: ACTIONS ARE SELF-PROPELLED MOVEMENTS.
6: PURPOSES ARE DESTINATIONS.
7: MEANS ARE PATHS (to destinations).
8: DIFFICULTIES ARE IMPEDIMENTS TO MOTION.
9: FREEDOM OF ACTION IS THE LACK OF IMPEDIMENTS TO MOTION.
10: EXTERNAL EVENTS ARE LARGE, MOVING OBJECTS (that exert force).
11: LONG-TERM, PURPOSEFUL ACTIVITIES ARE JOURNEYS.

The drawing analysed is a situation before an election for the Norwegian government where three conservative leaders walk on their political wave symbol while the reigning socialist party’s financial minister is down in the river because of an ill-judged financial operation. The four first sub-metaphors are especially general and, in my opinion, active in the drawing. Sub-metaphor 1 STATES ARE LOCATIONS is instantiated in at least one state we can see as a location: the state of the financial minister is unpleasant in the water (location). We may also see the three politicians in a positive state on the bridge. Sub-metaphor 2 CHANGES ARE MOVEMENTS also is a parameter clearly fulfilled as the troika is changing position toward governmental power into a new region at the end of the bridge. Sub-metaphor 3 CAUSES ARE FORCES is instantiated in the soon resigning minister who is part of the bridge fundament with the calculating machine. He is the force cranking the machine and thereby the budget strip which is the cause of the political situation. Sub-metaphor 4 CAUSATION IS FORCED MOVEMENT is consequently instantiated by the movement made with the crank. Sub-metaphors 5 and 6 are also realised in the drawing. Specifically, 5 ACTIONS ARE SELF-PROPELLED MOVEMENTS is especially general and comes forth in the three persons walking and the fourth cranking, while 6 PURPOSES ARE DESTINATIONS appears in the location we see the three persons moving onto. Sub-metaphor 7 MEANS ARE PATHS is visible in the path of the bridge/conservative logo. 8 DIFFICULTIES ARE IMPEDIMENTS TO MOTION is not realised in this picture. In contrast, 9 FREEDOM OF ACTION IS THE LACK OF IMPEDIMENTS TO MOTION is implicitly fulfilled since there are no impediments to motion in the picture. (In other pictures, we find this sub-metaphor explicit in

---


48 The logo for the conservative party is a blue waved ribbon.
impediments being removed.) As with 8, I do not find sub-metaphors 10 and 11, EXTERNAL EVENTS ARE LARGE, MOVING OBJECTS (that exert force) and LONG-TERM, PURPOSEFUL ACTIVITIES ARE JOURNEYS.

In this passage, 8 out of 11 sub-metaphors are realised in the foregoing drawing. This is an unusually great amount of many parameters for the presence of the LOCATION EVENT-STRUCTURE METAPHOR. Below, I continue with examples in diverse drawings of some sub-metaphors from the same metaphor.

Sub-metaphor 5 ACTIONS ARE SELF-PROPELLED MOVEMENTS stands for actions seen as movements an agent performs with the agent’s own force. There are five entailments to this metaphor, and several aspects of actions are connected to corresponding aspects of movements.49 Let us observe those five entailments in drawings.

AIDS TO ACTION ARE AIDS TO MOVEMENTS is realised in figure 33 where an elderly worker in nursery school helps a child to move on a seesaw. The topic in this drawing is when the Norwegian government wanted to enact a law strengthening the role of Christianity in nursery schools. SUSPENSION OF ACTION IS THE STOPPING OF MOVEMENT comes to realisation in the next phase of this event, where a cross is going to stop the child’s movement.

CAREFUL ACTION IS CAREFUL MOVEMENT is involved in figure 34 when someone is walking on thin, broken ice.

FREEDOM OF ACTION IS THE LACK OF IMPEDIMENT TO MOVEMENT is the metaphor giving effect in the mediation of content in figure 35. We see the impediment which has been removed: the gates are opened so that the members of the states in union have run out of the container, the Soviet Union. According to the last of these five entailments, SPEED OF ACTION IS SPEED OF MOVEMENT, the action of the Soviets leaving the Union is performed rapidly.

Difficulties. When difficulties are targets in the LOCATION EVENT-STRUCTURE METAPHOR, and actions are conceptualised self-propelled movements, difficulties of action are conceived of as anything that can impede movement. Lakoff and Johnson find at least five such kinds of difficulties via the English language: blockages, features of the terrain, burdens, counterforces, and the lack of an energy source.

Fences, gates, bars (as in figure 36), and other blockages are well-used means in metaphoric drawing. A feature in the terrain like a rock in the sea in figure 37 represents difficulty in reaching the destination ahead for the politicians in the boat. With a perspective from the suppressed masses in figure 38, politicians can be seen as burdens impeding action.
Counterforces impede Yeltsin in moving very far in figure 39. Lack of an energy source, here the lack of air, punctures advance in police control in figure 40.

Arafat’s walking is not completely lacking force, but the crutches indicate that his capacity to walk is reduced. In addition, the crutches are tangled in the Palestine shawl, which functions as a counterforce leading to fully stop the movement/action. We here see how the draughtsman can strengthen the content of difficulties for movement/action in two steps.

3.6.2 The object event-structure metaphor
After this relatively solid passage of some vital parts of the LOCATION EVENT-STRUCTURE METAPHOR, I will exemplify the second version, the OBJECT EVENT-STRUCTURE METAPHOR. This version has basic correspondences in common with the location version. But, where the location version concerns being on locations, the object version is centred on having something. It has the following sub-correspondences:

1: ATTRIBUTES ARE POSSESSIONS.
2: CHANGES ARE MOVEMENTS OF POSSESSIONS (acquisitions or losses).
3: CAUSATION IS TRANSFER OF POSSESSIONS (giving or taking).
4: PURPOSES ARE DESIRED OBJECTS.
In a picture, to carry or to hold often will be a sign for possession. We have seen Steinberg’s agents carrying a column, a fingerprint, etc., and those are being conceptualised by ATTRIBUTES ARE POSSESSIONS. With the built-in polysemy, which pictures live with, one cannot always be sure when postulating possession for something being carried. To be sure of a held or carried object being more certainly conceived of as possession, more consistent elements must be added. The drawing of Nelson Mandela coming out of jail is satisfactory here. The gateway is open in front of the jail building behind him. Mandela is holding the chains in his own hands. He has made an acquisition of them.

I have some reflections on the two event-structure metaphors after having more or less systematically explored them connected to my research material in the beginning of this millennium. Before the investigation of classified piles of drawings with the purpose of finding examples of sub-correspondences in the two complex metaphors, I had a hunch that many would be found, even though in the earlier intensive analysis I had registered a rather small amount of drawings fulfilling many parameters for each of the two metaphors. Still, there were quite a lot of drawings having one or two sub-correspondences activated. However, around that time, I had an intuitive belief that there ought to be some amount of vehicles, paths, and picture-elements referring to walking (location event characteristics), i.e. movement objects, living moving beings, and objects in motion (object event characteristics). I had presumed that cars, roads, shoes, etc. would be more present than they actually appeared to be, taking into consideration that a general structure for events would be assumed to include all events.

In my material, great amounts fall outside, or only implicitly inside, the two event-structure metaphors. As mentioned above, entailments of STATES ARE LOCATIONS and ATTRIBUTES ARE POSSESSIONS can be conceived as realised in many pictures; in fact, they may with weak analytical claims almost seem activated in any representation. It will often happen that we objectively do not see, for instance, a location, but we abuse it, as in the bounded region in space at the end of the bridge in figure 32, Courage failed. These kinds of unclear possibilities occur, and we will have to live with this ambiguity in picture analysis. It will demand professional discussions to decide where to set borderline between implicit and explicit meanings like this.
3.7 Specific metaphors
The two event-structure metaphors belong to general metaphors. My research material contains great amounts of specific metaphors. The difference between general and specific metaphors is that the general metaphors are in a superior form, and thereby can count for many specific ones. Kövecses notes there are great numbers of specific metaphors. In the drawings appear bodily actions like kick, greet, etc. and working operations like hammering, sewing, etc. Many of those concern manipulation of objects. They are very often manifested in a broad register of tools or instruments like scissors, knives, and spades. Figure 43 is a specific metaphorical expression, where then-American President Bush Sr. is spanking Saddam Hussein. The spanking is a specific metaphor for reprimanding.

3.8 Force-dynamics as cause and causation – or what is it with fences and bonds?
Some figurative elements often appear in the drawing material. Fences and brick walls, bonds in diverse forms from chains to brittle ribbons, and sharp implements like knives and threatening teeth appear. Bonds take part in descriptions of part-whole image schema, and they also play a role as elements when our attention is set on cause and causation. Fences and brick walls are blockades, and blockades are difficulties (in the location version of the event-structure metaphor). These often-drawn things seem to be so useful just because they involve several connections and play several roles. The role of interest now is the function of these things as force-dynamic entities. In the chapter on visual narrative, I introduced the categories of dynamic objects and dynamic living beings. Now I am going to show how fences and bonds are parts in a repertoire for visualisation of cause relations.

I will open this section with a drawing where change of form is taking place. In figure 44, a change is forced on then-Prime Minister Thatcher, who is made of iron. The change of shape is that she is rusting from the saltwater in the North Sea, which chemically erodes iron. A transformation is taking place. Transformation can be understood in Lakoff and Johnson’s terms as CAUSATION IS A FORCED CHANGE ON SHAPE. According to Lakoff and Johnson, there are cause and causation metaphors. Cause is connected to change, and a central question is: what causes diverse changes? CAUSES ARE FORCES is presented as a sub-correspondence in both of the event-structure metaphors. Cause occupies an important role in narratives as we have seen. In this section I will follow Leonard Talmy’s work and take a challenge when I employ basic mental patterns on cause and causation in pictorial analysis. Those patterns are found in, and belong to linguistics. In linguistic utterings distribution of attention is rather clear, in a way that is impossible in pictorial utterings. The territory in between verbal and visual communication is uncertain and intriguing with regard to presentation of cause, but I will try to manoeuvre.

43. Graff, USA’s credibility. 15.1.1993.
44. Graff, The Iron Lady is rusting. 23.2.1990.
Leonard Talmy claims that force-dynamic relations are the mental materials we dispose of to conceive cause and causation. He demonstrates how two physical forces in opposition to each other form the core in cause thinking and the linguistic mastering of this cognitive material. Physical force and counterforce in different constellations (where something is brought in motion, to rest, or into extended motion) interact with different factors, and we experience these dynamic processes as cause relations. The prototypic cause appears where an object in motion comes in contact with another object in a state of rest and the last object is set in motion. Talmy finds a small number of similar meetings between physical entities and some factors contributing to how we conceptualise these entities’ dynamic force oppositions as causes. He examines linguistic expressions and holds one of the factors to be a tendency in each of the two forces, either to rest or to motion. Talmy (2000) states, “The ball’s hitting it made the lamp topple from the table” (volume 1, p. 418). The lamp had a tendency to rest, and the ball had a tendency toward motion/activity. The motion force in the ball is stronger than the rest force in the lamp and results in motion for the lamp. Here the motion force conquers the rest force and is cause to the lamp toppling. We have a case of onset motion, the causative prototype. Another case is “the ball kept rolling despite of the stiff grass” (Talmy, 2000, volume 1, p. 418). Here there is contact between two entities, with the one entity’s tendency to motion (the ball) and the other’s tendency toward rest (the grass). With attention on the ball, the result is continued tendency to motion for it. Two factors also involved are the relative strength between the two entities and the distinction beginning/extended motion. In the latest utterance, the strength in the ball’s motion is stronger than the stiffness in the grass, and the result gives no change in the ball’s tendency to motion. Talmy names this linguistic and mental type the “despite” category.

The above section is a rough report of initial analysis performed by Talmy in his extremely systematic procedures. His linguistic research material departs from mine where attention and focalization cannot be fixed like in linguistic expressions. I am restricted to emphasise what in drawing corresponds to Talmy’s research. He shows that two contrary force constellations are the cognitive basic material concerning force cognitively. It is by experienced kinaesthetic internalised subjective knowledge of physical force dynamics that we constitute what we think and speak of psychic and abstract cause relations as well. This is where fences and bonds appear both as words and drawing, and chains not least as drawing. Talmy demonstrates psychologic and social interactions whereto the metaphoric mechanism projects physical force-dynamics. In ‘my’ drawings, we find these cognitive operations realised visually.

3.9 Force-dynamic patterns
The core in the causality complex is two oppositional elements with a tendency either to action or rest. Movement thereby is a basic factor in the interplay between two force-dynamic elements. The relative strength in the two entities is important. The entity which is able to manifest its tendency at the expense of the other is the strongest.

When talking about cause relations, we use the concepts ‘because’, ‘in spite of’, etc. These concepts are established conceptual patterns. They will be activated when we attend to cause relations in drawings and in thinking as well. I will show only a few examples of how these mental patterns can be activated in the reading of pictures. The following focuses on only the concrete visual narratives, without metaphorical meanings. Through simple visual concrete cause relations, draughtsmen can formulate something about the abstract relations which are the content in each case.
“Bibi” Netanyahu is the strongest part here. He has come in contact with the tree and caused it to be changed from a state of rest to a state of action. Language administers this pattern in the sentence, “Because ‘Bibi’ hit the tree, it broke.” According to Talmy, this pattern is the prototypical causative form, the type most often connected to causation.

Two contrary forces are the pig and the rider with the whip in figure 46. Here is an example of a pig with a tendency to rest and a rider with a tendency to action. In this case, the rider is the weaker counterforce. The pig is strongest and manifests its tendency to rest. Linguistically, this appears in a sentence like “The pig kept standing despite being whipped.” This is an example of the ‘despite’ category.

If we say, “The child continued his path in spite of the tall fence,” we again have a stronger force (the child) with tendency to action, and action here is the result. The weaker counterforce is the fence. This is the “despite” category, too. The difference between this example and the foregoing is manifested tendency to action rather than to rest.


50 Talmy (1985, p. 300).
In figure 48, the last picture exemplifying ongoing state, I will pay attention to Arafat. I see Arafat with a tendency toward action in raising his head. Netanyahu is the entity with a stronger counterforce; with his tendency to rest, he impedes the power of action in the weaker entity: “Arafat was kept lying under because of Netanyahu’s weight.”

During the reading of these examples, one will react to at least two things. One is that each of these sentences chosen to formulate the content in the pictures is far from the only, or even the most natural, way to represent the content. This is the cognitive discrepancy between verbal language and picture in the distribution of attention. Language restrains attention to one selected entity after another. A picture with all elements present simultaneously lacks this type of stringent reading. And although a cause is clear to decide in an event, it can be told in different ways of speaking. The second thing calling our reaction is the plurality of possible choices for deciding what might be said to be cause in a case.

One category concerns the end of influence. Talmy (1985, p. 301) names these “letting” patterns. “The bond bursting will let the Scotch dog move freely” illustrates this letting pattern. Here in figure 49, we see an entity (the bond) which until now has been an impediment to another entity in opposition (the dog) with a tendency to movement. Now the bond is about to burst and let the dog be free to manifest its tendency.

Drawings can show more or less complex orders of causes. How can one draw several sequences in a cause relation? Talmy presents an order with a range of several sequences. We ascribe cause to an event in different modes, dependent on where we direct attention. Thus, we choose between seeing, for instance, an agent or an instrument used as cause for result. Analytically, we differ between autonomic cause, instrumental cause, agentive cause, and others, according to Talmy. Figure 50 depicts a process involving two cause sequences. Yeltsin with a ball of wool is unravelling Gorbachev via his sweater. Yeltsin is removing him...
with the yarn. Gorbachev’s force is reduced with Yeltsin as the agentive cause. Then comes Chevardnadze who in turn reduces Yeltsin’s power of force by cutting his sexual organ. This action is the second agentive cause. Graff might have continued and have shown inducive causation, by adding something or somebody influencing Chevardnadze. Drawing offers possibility for open-ended generativity of more force-dynamic sequences in both ends. In the foregoing sections, I have attended only to concrete content in the drawings. The metaphoric meanings we interpret are my main concern, however. In Talmy’s treatment of force-dynamics, he emphasises words with origins in the physical referential source domain which are being projected onto target domains when abstract meanings are being communicated. Thus, he emphasises some concepts and conceptualisations which continually are repeated when we speak and think. These concepts/conceptualisations occur as strong elements in our cognitive structure and are equivalently involved when abstract content is to be manifested in drawing. We have come to be attentive to force-dynamic influence, impediments, and the removal of (or lack of) impediments. We have seen that physical things in terms of fences and bonds are such impediments; namely, they are force-dynamic elements. Talmy also emphasises the concepts hold, help, support, be, remain, press, push, and pull. These will be activated in abstract connections also in drawing. Help and support imply strengthening of a force, and we will often see somebody supporting and helping others, both in political but especially in psychological and social matters.

Let an example of the so-called divided self be a closure in a psychological theme in metaphoric force-dynamics. Both Talmy and Lakoff and Johnson demonstrate that we cognitively operate with several parts or oppositional agentive roles in the way we conceptualise our self. “The divided self” is a basic semantic configuration in language which can be seen in formulations like “I held myself back from responding.” Talmy (2000) explains, “The sense of such expressions is that there is one part of the self that wants to perform a certain act and another part that wants that not to happen, where the second part is stronger and so prevents the act’s performance” (volume 1, p. 431). In figure 51 we recognise a basic force-dynamic pattern applied to intrapersonal urges. The drawing shows a former Norwegian politician in conflict with himself. Two oppositional dynamic forces are metaphorically representing his two incompatible wishes or choices. The concept ‘pull’ is active here.

51. Graff, An ethical model?
10.11.1998.

51 Talmy (1985, p. 308).
52 Talmy (1985, volume 1, p. 314) states for linguistics that “…the force dynamic system in language has the property of open ended generativity.” Talmy (2000, p. 472 – 474) also treats rows of causation types. Verbal utterings can have: autonomous event, resulting- event causative, causing event causative, instrument causative, author causative – i.e. with unintended outcome, agent causative, - i.e. with intended outcome. Self agentive causation and induced causation are among types included in the here mentioned row. For my part (in the thesis) I exemplify each of these types in a row of simple drawings. This analysis develops with addition and reduction of information, i.e. addition and reduction of picture elements.
3.10 Central source domains in drawing

A source domain is, as we will remember, a concept or conceptualisation mapping meaning onto a target domain in a metaphor. Some source domains appear more often in drawings and seem to be more applicable than others. I have found that some figurative elements are often seen. These are knives, teeth, and other sharp, dangerous things. Other kinds include fences, bonds, and items that can either hold objects/people together or separate them. These things consequently seem to have abilities to represent something common that we are steadily in contact with. Threats of danger are common, and a knife or a tooth metonymically represents danger. Other sharp and dangerous instruments likewise are suited to damage living beings or objects and will often appear. A topic we frequently encounter is in fact something or someone breaking or being destroyed. This concerns all kinds of abstract matters, states, social relations, social institutions, etc. and often the question is about the subject’s existential, ontological state. We are well aware of the cliché of hearts breaking. To be destroyed is a physical state of event with a metaphorical projection to a great amount of target domains. I believe, without having made any quantitative tests, that this metaphorical projection is one most central in drawing, and especially convenient in introducing the genre of metaphoric drawing to students.

Threats of destruction for human beings in addition to connections with dangerous instruments come forth in situations with risk for falling. People balancing on a line or moving on the edge of a precipice are frequent in satirical drawings. Edge and line are visual symbols activating the image schema of balance. In addition to general source domains like other image schemas (for instance, container-, path-, and up/down schemas), there are some source domains being especially common. Kövecses (2002, pp. 16–20) emphasises 13 central sources in linguistic forms. These are: the human body, health and illness, animals, plants, buildings and constructions, machines and tools, play and sport, money and economic business, food and cooking, warmth and cold, light and darkness, forces, and movement and direction. Most of them will play a similar part in drawing. The human body, for instance, is an ideal source because it is clearly delimited and has parts that (mostly metonymically) connect to actions and states. Almost anything can be personified and be seen as body or bodily part. What can happen to a body, an arm, or a heart will be mapped onto a source domain and describe its state. Thus, health and illness are good sources and will be used visually through crutches, bandages, or lying in bed. Plants, buildings, machines, and especially tools are other frequent sources.

Characteristic visual formal aesthetic means are light and darkness. Light and dark follow white and black, which are the visual substances in drawings. I assume these two domains create the most important formal aesthetic projections taking place in picture. Light and dark have strong symbolic power, first and foremost as evaluative source domains for good and bad, as religious narrators have known since the Middle Ages. Especially in the Middle Ages, heaven and hell were described respectively by light and darkness, and in addition could be evaluated as positioned up or down. Heavenly light also would be painted with gold, the most precious material. Light and dark can be projected onto many abstract target domains (e.g. morals, mind, emotions) where evaluation is needed. Movement and direction have some of the same potential. Pictorial movement is connected to living beings and things joined with this property, and they show movement direction. Direction also exists formal-aesthetically in the picture, as up or down in the picture plane. Here we are at the frequent appearing source domain pair up-down. Status, age, and gender can be evaluated with this means. The up/down
pair can be used formal aesthetically only or marked by orientational objects like ladders or stairs.

In addition to those 13 sources reported by Kövecses and general image schemas with containers, physical objects, and substances, we have source domains which are properties of things and substances. Kövecses mentions properties such as shape, colour, size, weight, hardness, transparency, and sharpness. For contemporary artists, these properties are central in their accounts of a thematic which often will be just indicated, or so formal or visually abstract that it will be open for several metaphorical readings. Shape, colour, and size can have symbolic meanings in themselves, depending on context. In addition, they have the sensual potential to evoke pathos in viewers. Shape, colour, and size belong to the formal aesthetic layer. Transparency and sharpness can be source domains for target domains demanding properties like clarity or firmness and can be conceived as threatening or inspiring confidence. Transparency can be drawn more or less sensually depending on professional competence. Weight and hardness to some degree follow items we know as heavy or hard. Graphically the illusion of these traits can be obtained with darkness or the colour black.

I will present an example in sculpture which has religions’ intolerance as theme. Norwegian artist Kjersti Wexelsen Goksøyr in figure 52, has made four stones representing four world religions. Source domains here are the heavy, steady, and massive form and spikes wreathing a slightly convex inserted circular glass region. In the context given by the fact that each stone has a text about its religious doctrines, properties like heavy, angular, spiky/repulse will be projected to the religions. We will apprehend them as severe and high-handed (also because of the physical positions between them).

3.11 Common target domains

The central source domains in the section above are mapped onto common themes or abstract target domains. Deciding what a target domain in a drawn expression is brings difficulties, as mentioned earlier. I prefer in many cases to talk about a theme instead. When a drawing is supported by a contemporary text, we may find the best equivalent concept there, but in many cases it will be safer to translate with concepts from the superior category complex systems and social relations before respectively theory or thoughts and friendship or love, which can be difficult to separate in visual semantics.

What becomes obvious while working with cognitive metaphor is that a conventional source domain can be connected to many of the common target domains, and that a common target domain can be connected to many of the common sources. Why is this so? The reason is that any concept, visual figure, or theme, both the concrete and the abstract, has several aspects.

54 My cut from photo by Bjørn Aslaksen in the newspaper VG 1.2.2004. I do not know the title of this work in an exhibition at Vigelandsmuseet in Oslo spring 2004.

55 Kövecses (2002, pp. 21–25) presents a surveillance of 13 common target domains in linguistics. He points to the fact that such domains are abstract, diffuse, and lack delineation. He brings forth emotion, desire, morality, thought, society, politics, economy, communication, time, life and death, religion, and events and actions as those most common targets, and refers to a few sources frequently working in each target.
When metaphorical projection takes place, it is not the complete source domain that is being mapped, but aspects of it. Then those aspects correspond with the actual aspects in the target. This partial nature of metaphor\textsuperscript{56} can be demonstrated in showing several different sources accounting for different aspects in a target. For instance, the abstract concept ‘death’ is understood via several sources and the metaphors: death is rest, death is night, death is the end of a journey, and death is a reaper. The reaper as source appears in figure 13 about AIDS in Africa. Different sources to one target may be mentioned in short here, reminding us of two drawings (figures 27 and 26) showing Gorbachev taking care of a plant and Gorbachev together with Bush in an initial building process. The superior target decided to be a complex abstract system is depicted with the very common plant and building sources. A more specific source is sewing, as seen in this drawing where Gorbachev is occupied in his problematic efforts to solve the complex abstract system of the post-Soviet regions.

3.12 The reach of one source onto several target domains
Now I will show how material in one source domain has application in several target domains. We shall see the potential of building as a source.

We have earlier seen Gorbachev and Bush Sr. (figure 26) in a planning phase for a future society. In figure 54 there is a started process, but a chaotic one. The target domain is, as the picture title says, (political) power and cooperation. Then-Norwegian Prime Minister Jagland established the metaphor “the Norwegian house” for the society’s development. In figure 54 two leaders from other parties try to take part in the construction which is led by Jagland. He is the one carrying the materials; he has the executive power. The source here informs about the working activity of the participants, their wish to participate, and what contribution they are allowed to make. The source also informs viewers about the building process, both according to the workers and to the stage of construction. The building has ascended. We do not see the foundation wall, although it must exist beyond, since a professional scaffolding is standing at the top of a staircase. The leader is walking forward, and he is the one carrying the tools. What is projected is not difficult to see (e.g., the positions and conditions, the stage of process and assumable further progress, and the quality and size dimension of the building are also visible in the type and segment of the scaffold). Deciding what the target domain is, however, may involve more concepts than just power and cooperation.

\textsuperscript{56} This explanation of course comes from the cognitive linguistic metaphor theorists.
Wealth of money is seen as buildings in figure 55. Cash registers are containers with money inside, and these containers are made to be houses in an urban style, connoting economical high consumption. The draughtsman has extended the building metaphor by showing the inhabitants or users. It is the function of the buildings which is projected to the target being unethical wealth.

By virtue of the Disney allusion of the three little pigs and the big, naughty wolf that blew the house down, the target domain may be happiness in figure 56. We understand that happiness will not last for long because the building, their protection from danger, is weak with only two walls. ABSTRACT STABILITY IS PHYSICAL STRENGTH is active in this expression.

The murdered Yitzhak Rabin’s coffin is the terminal element which still keeps this construction standing in figure 57. The round arch symbolises collaboration and possible commonality between Israeli and Arab societies. This target domain is shown via the main meaning focus of the source: (lack of) duration and strength.
The building metaphor in a conventional visual form where making mistakes and destruction are main themes appears in figure 58. The central correspondence is collapse, and the target domain is a complex abstract system.

In this passage through common source and target domains for conceptual metaphors in drawing, I will again emphasise image schemas and all kinds of body-based processes as sources. There is one most convincing discovery, however, namely the great amount of instruments which make distinct special actions and processes. In a tentative count of instruments in my Graff drawings, I find a very great number of different tools and remedies. These tools give indications of the range of specific actions from work-, entertainment-, and other very diverse modes of living.

3.13 Image metaphors in interaction with conceptual metaphors

Image metaphors in interplay with conceptual metaphors are characteristic in metaphoric drawing. I will demonstrate how these two capital kinds of metaphor interact. We shall observe how one visual form, the former logo of the leading Norwegian socialist party (Det Norske Arbeiderpartiet, AP) can be changed to be part in different meaning constellations given by conventional conceptual metaphors. The logo represents the party; therefore, let us say it is the labour party when it appears in a drawing. The logo has the shape of a geometric gestalt (a conventionalised ‘A’). It is asymmetric and has a simple complexity with potential to give one’s visual imagination free rein. The shape is so simple that it can map idealisations of many pictorial representations. The strategy in the following examples is to create a common exterior form, or contour. This is an example of the visual imaginations draughtsmen can practice to perform. Then the cognitive underlying strategies, of which the draughtsmen are consciously unaware, take care to make the conceptual content follow in their patterns.

The logo in figure 59 is made to be three-dimensional. It has common shape with a building. Both source domain (building) and target domain (political party) are present. Mentally two cognitive structures are activated. This is an image metaphor with the conceptual building metaphor in interaction. The fall of the building is mapped onto the political party.

57 I keep vehicles apart and take in account tools and instruments used to manipulate objects and living beings.
The situation in figure 60 illustrates a member of the party who is taking a leadership position in the political party. The commentary directs attention to the party being in a crisis. This state is symbolised by the BAD IS BLACK metaphor in combination with STATES ARE CONTAINERS. In addition, one may analyse the location event-structure metaphor on account of several sub-correspondences (for instance, CHANGES ARE MOVEMENTS, ACTIONS ARE SELF-PROPELLED MOVEMENTS such as walking and opening, and PURPOSES ARE DESTINATIONS).


The logo is made three-dimensional in figure 61 as well, but in a thin version as walls in a room. The container schema is instantiated in the room, and the schema is combined with fighting, fight => control of power.


AN ORGANISATION IS A PERSON. Almost anything can be made to be a person only by adding a few distinctive symbols, first and foremost eyes and a little line underneath representing mouth.

ideas are food and greed is food are source materials in figure 63 which depicts a rat, a greedy Norwegian politician, in a cheese.

These samples of image metaphor in interaction with conventional conceptual metaphors reflect the existence of a great potential for visual similarity. Any skilled draughtsman thus has a broad register of possibilities to insert similarity. In theoretical discussions about similarity, whether on mimesis, visual iconicity, or similarities between elements in a metaphoric expression’s source and target domain, it is the possibilities to insert or create a similarity that strike me as conspicuous and intriguing. This gives a glimpse into human phantasy being supple and acrobatic. As viewers we have this active phantasy which immediately lets us accept the visual assertion about a geometric simple form complex as a person observing his own navel.

3.14 Formal aesthetic and conceptual metaphor in interaction

Conventional conceptual metaphors can have formal aesthetic source domain as well as figurative.

In figure 64 we find at least two conceptual common metaphors: bad is black (dark) and difficulties are heavy weight (burdens). 58

Black belongs to the absolute formal aesthetic layer in drawings. The black-white (or dark-light) contrast is the basic visual discrepancy for anything to appear in normal two-dimensional drawings. Here the AP logo is depicted in black on account of the phenomenological impression of correspondence between dark and discomfort, or something that feels bad. The discomfort (i.e., the bad) is connected to the agent’s powerless attempt to pull the figurative metaphoric AP animal with elephant feet in her direction. Difficulties are heavy weight is also mediated by the black. The kinaesthetic quality of weight has to be transferred into visual qualities, and these are darkness and shape. The oblique, slanting form of the logo, which gives it a large base, and its breadth, which

58 I prefer referring to conventional metaphors presented by Lakoff and Johnson or Kövecses. My dilemma as a solitary interpreter comes forth here where I would like to state difficulties as ‘heavy objects’. I follow my phenomenological perception here and choose ‘heavy weight’, not least to mark this problem with which external users of the metaphor theory will come into contact. In the phase of making visual heavy weight in turn, three formal aesthetic metaphors with source domains black, broad shape, and big size emerge. These three often will appear together, like in figure 64.
gives the impression of massive solidity and balance, lends the logo metaphorical weight and stability. The impression of heavy weight is added by the size of the object/animal. The formal aesthetic HEAVY IS BIG is supported by the figurative elephant metaphor. In this way, formal aesthetic metaphors interact with conceptual conventional metaphors. As we can register, image metaphor is also active in the correspondent interactions.

The analysis of figure 64 could have been continued, and more formal aesthetic metaphors might be mentioned. Size and direction are other relevant formal aesthetic elements here. IMPORTANT IS BIG is active in the relation between AP and the person in the carriage. When a formal element like the line in the rope is attended to, we conceive of direction as a formal factor. Direction here in the first range is dominated by the orientational pair forward versus backward which maps onto good and bad.

The most important formal aesthetic source domain generally interacting with conceptual metaphors is the light-dark distinction. Thereafter comes formal external, which can be sharp, angular, curved, etc. Such factors are active in DANGEROUS IS SHARP, ANGULAR IS HARD, and ROUND IS SOFT.\footnote{These referred metaphors are from the linguistic metaphor theoreticians. But, we see that in drawing we will need the target domains hardness and softness, which can be shown with the source domains angularity and roundness.} The last two correspondences will, as far as drawings are concerned, have to be conversed in order of source and target domain. The aesthetic basic elements texture, dark value, and colour are likewise incorporated as source domains when they are not attended to as for instance figurative brick structure and green grass. Size proportions, formal directions, balance, and so on can be active as well. Position on the paper can, in addition to figurative markers, establish evaluation in orientational metaphors (for instance BAD IS DOWN, IMPORTANT IS IN FRONT).

3.15 Metonymy and metaphor in interplay

Metonymy is, as earlier explained, a basic cognitive mechanism on level with metaphor. The main function is to provide mental access through one conceptual entity to another. Metonymy is thus a means to direct attention to something, to create reference, while metaphor’s main function is to understand one thing through another. Very often these two tropes are woven into each other, both in linguistic expressions and in visual ones.

This drawing is an example of the interaction between metonymies and metaphors. It has four distinctive figurative elements: a headdress, a clenched fist, a beard, and a garment on the upper part of the body. We recognise the beard and clothes as standing for an Iranian mullah. It is three metonymical parts which together refer to a person: PART OF A THING FOR THE WHOLE THING. We have to recognise this person to get access to what he represents in western opinion: religious fundamentalism. This gives one more component in a part-whole metonymy: MEMBER OF A CATEGORY FOR THE CATEGORY.

Then there is the clenched fist. It is an indicated image metaphor with an (approximated) common contour of fist and head, or it is a substitution of a face. In my opinion, it is a both-and case, with head more important than face.

65. Graff, Fatwa. Graff and Solstad
Inside this clenched-fist metaphoric expression lies the metonymy clenched fist for violence. BODY-PART FOR ACTION is involved.

Kövecses (2002, p. 156) suggests many conceptual metaphors derive from conceptual metonymies. He also states (Kövecses, 2002, p. 159) that particular linguistic expressions are not always clearly either metaphors or metonymies. He says that the two tropes can blend in a single expression and that, in these cases, we have individual examples where metaphor and metonymy interact.60 Let it be clear that the clenched fist is both vehicle for metonymy and source for metaphor. Via the metonymic reference to violence, the metaphorical expression can be activated. This works by the general metaphor THE MIND IS THE BODY and the specific image metaphor/substitution showing us that the mullah’s/fundamentalism’s mind is violence. It may also be relevant to see the head as a container where the STATES ARE CONTAINERS metaphor is initiated to a degree where the whole container is filled with violence. Conversely, one may see the violence as metonymy in the content-domain as CONTENT FOR CONTAINER. In this analysis, I have touched on the difficulties which may occur when trying to separate the two tropes intertwining. Let a preliminary conclusion here be that there are tight connections between metonymy and metaphor in interaction.

As mentioned earlier, visuality in drawn semantics takes place in elements being symbols and those symbols often work by the metonymic mechanism. Langacker (2000, p. 199) states that metonymy is prevalent in conceptualisation and that we have a fundamental ability for this kind of reference, which he names reference point. He continues by saying:

> Metonymy allows an efficient reconciliation of two conflicting factors: the need to be accurate, i.e. of being sure that the addressee’s attention is directed to the intended target; and our natural inclination to think and talk explicitly about those entities that have the greatest cognitive salience for us. By virtue of our reference point ability, a well-chosen metonymic expression lets us mention one entity that is salient and easily coded, and thereby evoke – essentially automatically – a target that is either of lesser interest or harder to name. (Langacker, 2000, p. 199.)

Metonymy accordingly gives us a possibility to refer more indistinct to something, without thereby making us confused but still well capable to understand which unit has the attention. When it comes to drawing metonymy is totally necessary. Metonymy very often is the symbol, the sign that is visual. A body part is visual. An action is determined by motion outside the static drawing medium. The visual body part that executes the motion then stands as the symbol, the visual sign for the motion, the action. In figure 66 we find three metonyms

---

60 Kövecses finds that there are two kinds of blendings in which metaphor and metonymy can interact. It is metonymy inside metaphor, and it is metaphor from metonymy. I refrain from broader elucidation or bringing the two modes over to drawing.
on body part for action: long leg for long step, lacking arm and hand for lacking ability for control (hand stands for control) and eyes covered up for lacking ability to see. (These metonymic entities accordingly have their metaphorical correspondences action is motion, control is holding, and understanding is seeing. The three metonymic entities leg, lacking hand and eyes are the direct reference points that evoke our conception of steps, lack of ability to hold something, and lack of ability to see. We may talk about and think like: “Bush takes a long step, but he does not have control and he does not understand.”)

The cognitive function of metonymy makes it essentially on level with metaphor. Metaphor and metonymy are like brother and sister: they resemble each other, but have individual characteristics and functions. They need each other’s nearness throughout life, and they are often in tight contact. Visual rhetoric is a house where the two of them rush around with the energy of playful children. They run from each other and together again in multiple meetings and dynamic infiltrations.

3.16 New creative metaphors and compression

When new creative metaphors come into being, conventional conceptual metaphors are the material, according to Lakoff and Turner who explore poetic, novel metaphors. They state that, for the case of metaphorical conceptions of life and death, we have rather few mental patterns to understand and make sense of these fundamental mysteries. There is a small number of basic metaphorical conceptions involved in this mental task:

Though these can be combined and elaborated in novel ways and expressed poetically in an infinity of ways, that infinity is fashioned from the same small set of basic metaphors.

This tells us something important about the nature of creativity. Poets must make the most of the linguistic and conceptual resources they are given. Basic metaphors are part of those conceptual resources, part of the way members of our culture make sense of the world. Poets may compose or elaborate or express them in new ways, but they still use the same basic conceptual resources available to us all. If they did not, we would not understand them. (Lakoff & Turner, 1989, p. 26.)

This argument holds for visual expressions as well. I prefer the term ‘new creative metaphors’ for visual expressions and value several of the drawings in this document to be classified as such, in various degrees. My curiosity aims to answer the question of how novel metaphors can be created. Lakoff and Turner (1989) describe four modes, of which I turn to only one, which is to bring conceptual metaphors in position in a mastery way. There are three main devices to do this, and those are: to extend, to elaborate, and to combine them. To extend a conceptual metaphor is, in Kövecses’ terms, to introduce a new conceptual element in the source domain. To elaborate differs from extension in that “it elaborates on an existing element of a source in an unusual way. Instead of adding a new element to the source domain, it captures an already existing one in a new, unconventional way” (Kövecses, 2002, p. 47). To combine is to use several conceptual metaphors in one new constellation. This may be the most powerful mechanism to new creative metaphor, according to Kövecses (2002, p. 49).

I shall evade the problem of distinguishing between extension and elaboration in drawing here. Instead, I will simply introduce a point of discussion. Earlier we have seen (figure 27) a ladder being turned down from the top of a flower pot where Gorbachev is standing. A similar drawing with some people on top in another container, a hat in this case, also has a ladder.
A first step toward a creative treatment of the ladder can be to hoist it up. This is done here in figure 67 with the meaning: refused admission to the good on top. Other devices may be to destroy rungs like in figure 14 *Dark Africa*, let the ladder overturn, etc. These are not advanced devices but communicative and a start to an individual creative metaphoric visual activity.

‘Compression’ is the term I chose to describe the combining of several conceptual metaphors in one new constellation with a dense and rich content packed into a lump. This is the mode where composite metaphors are simultaneously formed by two or more metaphors showing different aspects of the same phenomenon in the same verbal passage or sentence. In the visual language, I will point to figure 1. Why is the drawing of Havel balancing on the tightrope a new creative expression? It contains several conventionalised metaphors. Three cooperative sub-correspondences in the location version of the event-structure metaphor are activated: PURPOSES ARE DESTINATIONS, MEANS ARE PATHS (TO destinations), and DIFFICULTIES ARE IMPEDIMENTS TO MOVEMENT. This counts for President Havel himself. His purposes cannot be reached because the path (the tightrope) he is walking is impossible to walk. The means to fulfil his purposes is unattainable to him because the difficulties are total by the absolute impediment to movement formed by the broken rope. Together with the event-structure metaphor comes CONTROL IS HOLDING (SOMETHING IN THE HAND). The logic in this picture is clear. To keep the control, Havel must not let go his holding. At the same time, the necessity to keep holding is the same as what ties him to not being able to move. This impossible situation is made up by the combination of conceptual metaphors. The arrangement of the conceptual elements also creates the oxymoron, the one in a real-life impossible position. The complexity of the visual expression holds even more moments. It is STATUS IS UP, and also ABSTRACT STABILITY/DURATION IS PHYSICAL STRENGTH. What I name ABSTRACT DESTRUCTION IS PHYSICAL DESTRUCTION absolutely is instantiated here as a protensional ending of the situation.

Let us unpack the compressed content from figure 68 following what might have been Lakoff and Turner’s arguments. The situation in autumn 1990 was a long prelude to the Gulf War. The drawing shows possible results of such a war. We see Bush Sr. and Saddam Hussein standing sharpening their scythes. We recognise them installed in the DEATH IS A REAPER personification. This personification takes place as a composition of EVENTS ARE ACTIONS and PERSONS ARE PLANTS. EVENTS ARE ACTIONS is, as we know, in the basis of our conceptualisation. An
agent acting very often is a person. Death in turn is personified as a person and can occupy
different roles as such. These roles are decided from the special function to be emphasised in
each actual aspect of death. When death is personified as a reaper, this role is established
because the function of mowing grass or corn belongs to the mental domain of cultivating
plants. Because we compare human lives with plant lives — PERSONS ARE PLANTS — and stages
in human life are understood by this plant domain, the special agent comes in, he who reaps
the mature corn. These are the grounds for the conventional DEATH IS A REAPER personification.

In the drawing, the new creative combination evolves by further devices. Firstly, this is done
by extension/elaboration of the personified death with two new moments: (1) there are two
reapers instead of one, and (2) death, which normally is illustrated by a skeleton, is substituted
with two individual persons. Two reapers have potential for more interpretations, among
others for associations to more reapers who together more effectively lay down greater
amounts of crops. The main meaning in 1990 was concentrated upon the long waiting stage of
preparation and threat. This comes forth in the action the two agents perform, sharpening the
tool. Sharpening stones are entailments to the DEATH IS A REAPER complex.

Other devices the draughtsman uses are made with the plants. These he shows as human
beings, with heads and loosely indicated bodies. It is an image metaphor with both source and
target elements visible. The human beings are shown as both persons and mass, as individual
elements and as field. Two pieces of information come forth. One is shown by the way
individual elements are separated from the mass, not in just a sliding transformation, but in a
perspective with some persons looking at us, and with increasing mass density from Bush to
Saddam. This may give indications to reflect upon what kind of persons they may be able to
kill. Those who do not see ‘the other’ as fellow human beings can kill. Then there is the
spreading of crops/people which is unlimited in depth in the picture cut. This informs the
viewer about the mass deaths of people.\textsuperscript{61}

After this passage through new creative visual metaphor demonstrating my claimed principle
of meaning compression, I shall end this chapter on metaphor with some conclusive remarks.

3.17 Summary and conclusions on cognitive metaphor in drawing
I find the cognitive linguistic metaphor theory to be an adequate tool for exploring and
explaining metaphoric drawing. The aim has been to understand the complexity of meanings
involved in a visual expression and how meaning content can be brought to take place in a
drawing. This includes knowledge of professional devices.

I conducted the exploration using a three-step method. The first step was to unpack meanings
by separating different aspects of content. This step was a rather systematic exploration of
kinds of metaphor. This exploration was structured according to Lakoff and Johnson’s and

\textsuperscript{61} Lakoff and Turner point to the fact that PEOPLE ARE PLANTS is not a personification. It is plant as source, which
is being mapped onto person. When looking at the drawing, it may be easy to see the relation inverted. Here, the
visual factual, “literal” situation is two men going to mow a field. From the picture maker’s perspective, it might
be conceived as if he should turn straws to persons by adding in eyes and shoulders. That would be like taking a
quadrat and putting eyes and mouth on it. Then the quadrat is personified. What one must be aware of, though, is
that the straws are being drawn as persons because it is persons who shall be seen as straws. The target domain
person is the point of departure which on the visual level is going to be made a straw. When the logo for the
socialist party is made a person, a building, etc., it is because the target domain (the party) shall be seen as the
source domain’s person or building. Then it is visual and conceptual personification in one direction only, while
there may be visual and conceptual divergent direction when a plant is drawn as personification. It is the
conceptual metaphor which is superior.
also Kövecses’ explanations and brought into my visual dimension via exemplifying drawings. In addition to presenting a range of kinds of metaphor, I made a further investigation in operations on event-structure and patterns of cause and causation.

The second step provided an overview on central source and target domains in drawing.

The third step was rearranging kinds of metaphor by building up a complexity. I demonstrated how similarity in visual elements form image metaphor, how this kind in turn interacts with conceptual conventional figurative metaphors, and how this combination in addition interacts with formal aesthetic metaphors. This combinational principle is the fundament for an infinite register of new creative visual metaphorical expressions. Metonymy is indispensable in such combinations as the mental mechanism in the visual symbols materialised on the paper. It is by metonymy and symbols that we can refer to intended mental entities, and often a central metonymic element as part of a metaphor activates this metaphor.

As for the first step, I must confess a rather long period of confusion or bewilderment in the process of separation. Experience for my part solved this confusion when I understood that a visual metaphorical expression involves many aspects. In the process of analysing, one can and must shift direction of attention among several such aspects. One aspect is the metonymic, where attention is directed to symbols with a reference. Another aspect is the metaphorical, which may be evoked by a metonymic symbol or more. In the same way, attention can be directed upon events and event-structure or, in turn, be moved to cause and picture elements involved in this aspect.

A point to be recaptured here is the difference between figurative and formal aesthetic elements appearing in visual metaphor source domains. When a figurative element is the one that activates a metaphor and its meanings map onto the target, the actual conceptual metaphor is figurative in my terms. On the other hand, when a formal aesthetic element is the dominant element in the source, the activated metaphor is formal aesthetic. When it comes to complex interactions of kinds of metaphor, figurative and formal aesthetic metaphors can be compressed together with each other and with all other kinds.

In the explorations of visual metaphors, some tendencies appeared. Certain kinds of elements turned out to be connected to parts or aspects of, for instance, event structure and patterns involved in cause and causation. Such elements are ladders, fences, and threatening sharp knives and teeth. These elements appear both connected with the location version of event-structure metaphor and with cause and causation metaphors. Sharp knives and teeth are objects that can be categorised either as moving objects connected to events and actions or as instruments or dynamic objects in a perspective of cause and causation.

This chapter on metaphor in metaphorical drawing has revealed devices to draw ideational content, although this is an aspect which only indirectly can be traced. Nevertheless it is an important aspect for the terminal aim of my study: a visual language system for metaphoric drawing. The structure of this language system I construct upon four category systems. These are meanings in pictures belonging on four different levels. I have earlier extracted a collection of categories from chapter 2, Visual narrative. The outcome now in chapter 3, Metaphor, yields a range of established metaphorical and metonymical unconscious and vital thought structures and patterns. Such conceptual patterns contain meanings on a second level next to the level for meanings belonging to picture element structures.

This leads to a return to what was presented as a terminal aim of my study: a visual language system for metaphoric drawing. A structure of such a system involves constitutional visual
entities and mental mechanisms and patterns on several levels. I have demonstrated how meanings are compressed in ‘packages’ and have made systematic separations of meanings and located where they can take place. I claim that compression is effectuated by different visual graphic elements connected to mental operations so that semantic meanings are constituted, and that interactions of different elements in combination with mental patterns form complex visual communicative structures. To get a grip on a structure for the system I seek, I present four category systems. My claim further is that these four category systems contain paradigmatic groups of categories for a picture maker to select within. Combinations of elements or patterns from categories in one category system in turn are set in interaction with members from the other paradigmatic category systems.

3.18 Four paradigmatic category systems
The four categorical paradigms concern: (1) figurative elements, (2) formal aesthetic elements, (3) conceptual patterns, and (4) rhetorical devices.

Categories of figurative elements are types of representing figurative elements which interact with each other during the formulation of content in narrative pictures. In the chapter on visual narrative, I extracted a register of categories. The categories are: agent, patient, experiencer, action, instrument, and scene/setting for semantic roles. Further categories are identity signifiers, spatial relation signifiers, moving objects, self-moving things, living beings, dynamic objects, and dynamic living beings. In addition come property signifiers, value signifiers including attitude-, emotion-, and valuating markers and chronotopes which include point- and length chronotopes. Those categories which are presented in a slightly more explicated manner in section 5.4.1 are an initial tentative selection, far from thoroughly evaluated. They need to be tested in further practical analyses and in critical peer discussions.

Categories of formal aesthetic elements are related and connected to figurative elements. Both element types are graphic and visual physical marks on paper. As such they function as graphic structures which can be interpreted in contact with mental structures. Formal aesthetic elements have only been superficially treated hitherto in this text, but will be examined in chapter 5, Metaphoric drawing as a visual language system.

Categories of conceptual patterns belong to the inventory of mental patterns structuring our imaginations/apprehensions and thought. Such patterns are constantly activated in language processing as Lakoff, Johnson, Talmy, and Langacker show, and I have in this chapter demonstrated where they can be instantiated in the processing of drawings. Conventional conceptual patterns form image schemas, and they structure the conventional metaphors. Draughtsmen with an ideational complex to be formulated operate with shifting patterns more or less unconsciously and to a more or less advanced degree. The visible graphic elements appearing on the sheet of paper originate in the actual mental patterns which are chosen to conceptualise the content. The content is packed in graphic figurative and formal aesthetic picture elements launched through conceptual schemas and patterns. When a picture maker spontaneously draws, for instance, a ladder and a person, she employs an orientational metaphor she is familiar with in performing visual messages. When a picture maker carefully considers how she can best formulate a more difficult theme, she mentally tries different patterns against each other, turning some of them down, and eventually choosing an option. She will be able to choose between different kinds of metaphors (structural, ontological, or oriental metaphors) according to requirements from the theme. Conceptual patterns also include metonymy and various forms hereof to be taken into consideration in visual production of meanings and in constructive reading/apprehension of pictures.
Categories of rhetorical devices are presented in the forthcoming chapter. This category system is furnished with a register of rhetorical devices, strategies, as application on ideational visual content.

A question arises: will conceptual patterns and rhetorical devices not mingle into each other? In a way, yes, since rhetorical devices contain conceptual patterns. I hold them apart, however, as two groups diverged by describing rhetorical devices as the superior or prominent strategies chosen to communicate the actual topic in the best way valued by the communicator. This will involve options among rhetoric tropes. Conceptual patterns as paradigmatic categories, in contrast, direct attention to the cognitive content which is necessary in the processing of the content information in the expression.

In the final chapter, I will present a more overall discussion of how units in the four paradigms interact.

3.19 Three plus two constitutional cognitive mechanisms
One of my research issues is what constitutes and structures the special visual language system, and this issue embodies some cognitive mechanisms. My answer is three cognitive capital mechanisms and two less central. The three capital mechanisms are metaphor, metonymy, and narrative. These three have been accounted for as necessary thought mechanisms respectively by Lakoff and Johnson and Turner.

The two less central mechanisms are cause and time. Talmy considers the phenomenon that we ascribe causes to events and actions as a disposition we have. He views this as a cognitive mechanism on a level with the mental mechanisms we have for metaphor, metonymy, and narrative. Langacker holds the view that we are disposed to conceive time and that this disposition also is a cognitive mechanism.
4 Rhetorical tropes in visual form in combination with cognitive metaphor theory

There is a weighty reason for bringing forth rhetorical tropes as one of four paradigmatic category systems. The reason is my basic interest in formulation, the productive aspect in metaphoric visual language. To produce a communicative visual statement on an abstract topic requires creative competence and devices. Rhetoric is the ancient discipline teaching good speech. Rhetorical devices in my research on ideational drawing can open a specter on creative visual formulation, production of intended content in a drawing. A rhetorical device in my perspective can be vital for creating a striking uttering, a visual idea.

Rhetorical tropes are an inventory in the elocutio phase in rhetoric. This is the phase where the speaker takes decisions about how to formulate his or her intended thought content. A trope is a term for the ‘turn’ of the meaning of a word or an expression. I present some tropes which, in my opinion, can be useful devices in ideational drawing. I do this with an exemplifying picture (or reference to a picture) illustrating each trope. The structure in this overview is a rather plain presentation of tropes found in a Norwegian rhetoric lexicon. I have grouped them in two parts. The first part are tropes connected to metaphor. The perspective in the last part sets attention to alteration and restructuration of a visual statement.

4.1 Tropes connected to metaphor

Metonymy, symbol, and metaphor have already been presented as tropes in section 1.4, and I start this presentation with tropes connected to metaphor.

Simile is a comparison. It is a kind of metaphor where the two parts in a verbal expression normally are separated by the word ‘like’, as in the expression “The two actors are like columns in Norwegian theatre.” Theorists differ in attitude to simile. Some will not see simile as apart from metaphor, while others maintain the difference. In pictures, I maintain the formal difference and decide simile to be two (or more) separated elements where one of them is compared to the other. This is the case in figure 69 where two well-known Norwegian actors are photographed in front of and close to two columns. A draughtsman might have united the men with the columns making a metaphor, but...
the newspaper photographer cannot do that. The columns are the source domain, and the
actors are the target domain. The strength and the aesthetic quality of the columns are
projected onto the actors in a familiar mental blending as in a metaphorical expression.
Consequently, the conceptualisation involves the metaphorical mechanism, and thereby simile
is a type of metaphor.

One type of simile we may describe as parallelism. This is the conjunction of two syntactic
components of the same value. One may speak of psycho-physical parallelism in Edward
Munch’s Scream. The psychic condition appears in the person by mimicry and gesture. This
is aligned with the waving colours in the physical nature in the other component.

A painter who uses this device is Frida Kahlo. Figure 70 depicts
a deeply cracked landscape that serves as a comparative
figurative component to her metaphorically depicted pain,
evidenced by the pins in her skin caused by her broken spine.
Pain as feeling is a psychic phenomenon which here is compared
to the physical landscape. In this case, we may call it a figurative
psycho-physical parallelism because the source component (i.e.,
the cracked landscape) is a figurative picture element. I consider
the colours of the landscape as a naturalistic description. In
contrast, I conceive the landscape colours in the Scream painting
to be metaphorical. As colours are formal aesthetical elements, I
classify the Scream landscape colours as an expressive formal
aesthetic psycho-physical parallelism.

Comparatio\textsuperscript{67} is the name I will use for two or more
components which by their similarity in expression
mark divergence in content, but not as sharp as
complementary contrasts. In figure 71 we can register
a similarity between three picture elements, the three
sites where rings appear. This is similarity on the
expression plane in contrast to similarity more on the
content plane in the foregoing examples. (Columns and
persons in figure 69 are first and foremost presenting
similarity in identity content.) Here in figure 71, the
figurative similarity – rings – introduce the difference
in what the three ring-elements represent. The theme
(i.e., the target domain) is forced marriage in an unfamiliar culture in the traditional
Norwegian perspective. The source domain is threefold. We see a father who wishes marriage
between his daughter and the third participant. This wish is metaphorically/metonymically
shown by the two combined (marriage-) rings instead of eyes. The daughter’s ring is a
metonymic symbol for the modern, independent Norwegian young woman in a Norwegian
sweater and tight clothes and with piercing. The planned future husband is metaphorically
shown as a dangerous bull needing control through a ring in the muzzle. The differences (i.e.,
the desired marriage, young female independence, and a threatening raw force) referenced by
the three ring elements make this expression a comparatio in my meaning of the term.

\textsuperscript{66} (from gr. parà ‘by the side of’ and allélos ‘hverandre)
\textsuperscript{67} (lat. ‘comparison’ from comparare ‘compare’)
Antithesis is an order of words and sentences grouped in pairs of contrasts. Figure 72 shows a pair of contrasts between over- and under-nourished countries. Two figurative elements stand metonymically for person for country and present several pairs of contrast: white/black race, adult/child, and big stomach caused by over-eating versus lack of food. The difference on the content level is formulated through similarity on the expression level via the same shape of the stomachs. In addition, there are contrasts in form by size and colour. The formal aesthetic components shape, size, and colour play a central role, and we hereby have the antithesis of formal aesthetic character.

A conclusive remark on the three foregoing tropes is that every one of them employs comparison, but in a different mode or strength. In the first, simile, the comparison is upon similarity in content, and in the second, comparatio, attention is upon difference in content. In the third, antithesis, the difference in content is strengthened to contrasting oppositions.

Metaphor counts as a capital trope in traditional rhetoric. I have elaborated metaphor in this text and hitherto accounted for a diversity of types. Superior kinds are conventional conceptual metaphors, image metaphors, figurative- and formal aesthetic metaphors. I will give place here to a special kind of formal aesthetic metaphor.

The sun in figure 73 is the national Japanese symbol of the rising sun. The drawing is a commentary on Japan’s descending economy. In this context, we read the sun as descending and the black colour as two conceptual metaphors: bad is dark and heavy is dark. The last one is an inter-sensory metaphor. Several metaphors come into being with their source coming from the body’s sensorimotor system. Examples are knowing is seeing, bad is stinky, and time is motion. (Seeing, stinky and motion are concepts belonging to the different sensorimotor domains: vision, smell and motion.) When both the source and the target domain are sensory qualities, I call the metaphor inter-sensory, or cross sensory, as is the case for HEAVY IS DARK.

Classical rhetoric distinguishes between different types of metaphor. These types are most often tied to different categories of source domain. Metaphors with a person or animal as source domain differ from those based on things. Thus one may distinguish between personification and reification.

68 (gr. antithesis, from ‘anti-thiténai ‘place in opposition’)
**Personification** is a metaphor type where abstract concepts are presented as human creatures or are being attributed with human properties. Animal metaphor is included in this type, but being a highly conventionalised device, especially in caricature drawing, it ought to stand as an individual type. Death is an abstract concept and is often personified as a reaper with a scythe as in figure 13, where AIDS in Africa is the subject matter.

**Reification** is when abstract concepts are made to be things or objects.

There are devices characterized by self-contradiction.

**Oxymoron** or paradox is a combination of concepts which logically exclude each other, such that a striking self-contradiction appears. **Paradox** is a statement that logically is self-contradictive but nevertheless appears to contain a deeper truth. Meret Oppenheim’s fur cup is a visual oxymoron because of the collision between expected function (drink) and texture (which contradicts drink). Oxymoron and paradox are conceptually similar, but oxymoron takes it a step further.

4.2 Devices to restructurate and alterate visual statements

More visual rhetorical devices can be found in addition to the foregoing. I will in the following take a more technical view upon the subject. The first part discusses modes for making changes in statements; in rhetoric, these are called the four alteration modes. I conceive of those as restructuring alternatives one can use when one is occupied with making an utterance, having some elements in mind to be altered. An individual can use the

---


Personification is related to animation, which means that lifeless things are attributed with human properties. Anthropomorphism (gr. Anthrops ‘human being’ and morphe ‘form’) is a related expression mode presenting nature or forces in nature as human creatures. I choose ‘personification’ as the superior term which in cognitive theory incorporates animal metaphor. Differences exist, however, in the ways animal metaphor and anthropomorphism are used. Animal metaphor is used about a person to show behaviour or a character trait which we normally have attributed to an animal. Anthropomorphism, on the other hand, is often used in child narratives where animals behave like human beings (e.g., Donald Duck).

70 (gr. ‘acute-stupid’ from gr. oxýs ‘sharp’ and moros ‘stupid’)

71 (gr. parađoxos ‘against expectation’, ‘incredible’ from pará ‘against’, ‘in conflict with’, and doxá ‘expectation’)

72 In analysis of drawings seen in a reception perspective, it may be problematic to decide from what the picture producer has made alterations. This problem is diminished seen in the perspective of the producing picture maker. One can alter from a phase in the drawing or thinking process, like in class situations where the teacher
alteration modes to create devices described above. In addition to these four modes I will offer an extension. This second part contains new dimensioning of size, for instance. I present particular visual devices belonging to the graphic, formal aesthetic domain. A third part for reformulation concerns fortifying constructive modes. A last fourth part contains devices available for draughtsmen to show processes, or events where changes take place.

4.2.1 The four alteration modes in rhetoric
When at work with a visual utterance, one can choose among different strategies to alter an expression in order to create ideational meanings. Rhetoric offers four basic modes: *adjectio*, *detractio*, *immutatio*, and *transmutatio*.

*Adjectio*\(^{73}\) is the addition of a sound in language, a word, or a thought. Many rhetoric tropes are created by addition. We may see the rings in the nose and muzzle in figure 71 * Forced marriage as additions.

*Detractio*\(^{74}\) is the removal of a sound in language, a word, or a sentence. In figure 44 *The Iron Lady is rusting, the eye* is removed from Thatcher’s face in profile. This is a metaphorical treatment of the metonymy EYES FOR SEEING.

*Immutatio*\(^{75}\) is to substitute something for something else. We can see this in figure 70 *The broken column* where the column has substituted the spine of Frida Kahlo and in the two rings substituting the father’s eyes in *Forced marriage* figure 71.

*Transmutatio*\(^{76}\) is the exchange of two things with each other (i.e., redistribution) in terms of, and exchange of, sound in language, words, or thoughts. The position of hierarchy order is exchanged this way in figure 76 by Margaret Thatcher’s appropriation of the queen’s train of the gown and exchange of frontal/backside representation towards members of society.


---

\(^{73}\) (lat. ‘addition’, from *ad-aticere* ‘add’)

\(^{74}\) (lat. ‘detraction’, ‘leaving out’ from *de-tráhere* ‘remove’)

\(^{75}\) (lat. ‘replacement’, from *immutare* ‘replace’)

\(^{76}\) (lat. ‘transfer’, from *trans* ‘over’ and *mutare* ‘move’)
4.2.2 Other strategies for change made by graphic devices

One can re-dimension elements. Rhetoric operates with some terms that, in my opinion, function in drawings as well. I will point to one such strategy:

Hyperbole is exaggeration, that is, an expression too strong to be taken literally. Hyperbole can appear as a trope in a source domain. Thatcher’s head in figure 76 is an example of this strategy. Caricature, one might say, in general is founded on hyperboles.

Chiasmus is a word position trope where the components appear in inverted order (i.e., “cross position”). A visual example is figure 77.

4.2.3 Tropologic development

Picture makers can cultivate and extend some of the referred tropes. First and foremost, one can further develop and elaborate conventional conceptual metaphors, as will be shown in the chapter on metaphor. In addition, one can extend a metaphor to a wider picture or story, where more elements make up coherent metaphorical expressions.

Allegory is the term for building out a metaphor onto a greater picture. This often will happen in metaphoric drawing, especially in political satirical pictures. In cases where one will characterise the wholeness of content in a picture as a metaphor or as a story with several events, this often will incorporate allegorical picture elements. Here I will not refer to examples, because I find it difficult to decide on allegory.

Allusion describes a reference to a word, sentence, quotation, or story that is generally known. Visual allusion brings about elements known from different cultural domains, such as proverbs, biblical stories, or artworks. The Good Shepherd is a well-known concept from the bible which here is material for a satirical comment.

A further way to add more information in a picture can be by choosing picture elements which serve several referential functions, resulting in richness in content by only a few elements with especially strong metonymic potential. This will be shown in later chapters.

---

77 (gr. hyperbole ‘exaggeration of scale’, from hypér ‘over’ and bállein ‘throw’)
78 In art and visual communication, the name for this device is value perspective or scale perspective. Now, rhetoric also has two tropes which can be seen as opposite devices to hyperbole. A diminishing effect is created in euphemismos, substituting a more favourable for a pejorative term, and in litotes, emphasising a thought through modesty in a linguistic expression in a special way. I prefer instead of these two tropes a term like ‘diminished scale’.
79 (gr. chiasmós, from the Greek letter X (chi))
80 (allegoria ‘to say something other’ from állos ‘other’ and agoréuein ‘speech’)

4.2.4 Particular devices to show processes

Draughtsmen should know devices to show processes because it is difficult to comprise events where change is the subject matter, into a single drawing. Change in a succession of events (i.e., a process) in real life takes place in several phases. Proficient draughtsmen, however, master such devices and use them to solve visual challenges. I deduced the following devices from what some black-and-white artists do, and I have given them names in the terminology of rhetoric.

Metamorphosis\textsuperscript{81} is change of guise or form. Transformation shows change through transition from one form to another. It concerns an ongoing process while metamorphosis rather denotes change that has taken place.\textsuperscript{82} Tatjana Myenkova’s drawing (figure 79) thereby most likely can be termed as transformation. Communism here metonymically shown with the head of Karl Marx is portrayed with a fly structure of texture/shade. The flies are metonyms for putrefaction and decay.

Deformation and deconstruction\textsuperscript{83} are closely related and may together with the two previous concepts tend to mingle. Deformation is a powerful change or distortion of expected form. Deconstruction shows a breakdown or fragmentation, like in this drawing of Pinochet, who is cracking and being eaten by the rat in his head.

Concluding this chapter on rhetorical devices, here is a reminder of the cause for this tour among pictorial examples. We are now aware of a register, an archive of categories of devices, at the disposition for a person with a pencil in hand and an abstract ideational subject in mind to be drawn on paper. Among these categories of rhetorical devices, the drawing person can make choices of angles of incidents for his or her subject matter. In my structure of a metaphorical drawing language, rhetorical devices form one of four layers (category systems) where different sorts of meaning come into being. Categories of rhetorical devices are thus one of the last pieces and parts unpacked from the lump of meanings in metaphorical drawings. In the terminal chapter in this text, different types of pieces shall be assembled in a logically structured order.

\textsuperscript{81}(from gr. \textit{meta} ‘after’, ‘out over’ and \textit{morphe} ‘form’). Lothe, Refsum, and Solberg (1997).

\textsuperscript{82}The difference between these two terms comes from \textit{Bildanalys}. Cornell, Dunér, Millroth, Nordström, and Roth-Lindberg (1985, p. 321). Likewise, the description of deformation and dismantling is from this book.

\textsuperscript{83}Terms from Cornell et al. (1985).
5  Metaphoric drawing as a visual language system

What constitutes and structures a metaphoric visual language system? This is the question to be answered in my research project. Two kinds of constituents are attended to: cognitive mechanisms and categories of picture elements. I have accounted for three main cognitive mechanisms (plus two less central) which are active in apprehension of content in drawings with a relative abstract content. The narrative, metaphorical, and metonymical mechanisms are constituents in the sense of being conditions for meanings to come into being. Categories of picture elements are first and foremost the different types of figurative semantic elements which interact together when content in narrative pictures is formulated. My requirement to plead the term ‘metaphoric visual language system’ is that elements from each of these categories can be substituted with other elements in the same category. The structure of this figurative system is decided according to how elements are organised and how different types of such picture elements are combined and interact so that meanings are created. I view the figurative categories of picture elements as one paradigmatic category system. Formal aesthetic picture elements form another paradigmatic category system. Two additional paradigmatic systems are based on cognitive operations: conceptual patterns and rhetorical devices. Picture makers make their choices within all these paradigmatic systems. Elements in each paradigmatic system can be combined with elements from other categories in this system and then with members of the other paradigmatic systems.

The visual language system now to be presented is culture-dependent, dynamic, and constantly changing. It covers a specific aspect in general visual language. With the multiplicity of existing picture genres, only some pictures operate in the genre of metaphoric drawing. Metaphoric drawing is a segment in the superior field of pictures as communication medium. As a member of the superior picture medium, the specific field, genre, has many general picture characteristics. After introducing the specific genre, I will give a minimal presentation of the superior system. Then I will define and describe the central subject, metaphorical drawing, in regard to organisation, category structure, and combination structure. Firstly, though, I will narrow my comprehension of visual language.

5.1  What is a metaphoric visual language system?

A language system in my terms is a system to mediate information to other people. It is a dynamic system with symbols which activate the performers’ mental archives of knowledge both of the things and themes being referred to by the system and also the culture-created unconscious acquisition of the medium as a communication system. Such a system can be analysed with regard to parts, structure, and function. It can also be learned by conscious methodical strategies.

A metaphoric visual language system may allude to verbal language. I view the term ‘language’ as a synonym for communication. I have chosen the term ‘visual language’ as a professional name based on time-honoured, established usage. That is the way picture makers and artists talk about their communication medium. Visual language is a synonym for visual communicative information. ‘Metaphoric’ here points to mediating of abstract content such as love, time, and life. This is more than just representation of picture elements referring to concrete things (chairs, cars) and concrete actions (sit, drive).

---

84 In addition to these three main mechanisms, there are two which I here repeat in short. These are a cognitive mechanism for cause and causation and a mechanism for time. Talmy is of the opinion that we have a disposition to ascribe cause and causation upon events and actions. This disposition operates as a cognitive mechanism. Langacker in turn points to our inborn ability to sense the passage of time.
Drawing is the specific picture medium being explored. As a graphic medium, drawing in black and white is characterised by its operation with visual elements based on the black/white contrasts and the light/dark contrasts in between the two poles. Line is the most marked graphic trait in this drawing medium, followed by planes. This medium lacks colours, when seen in relation to other picture types.

Verbal language and pictures are two communication- or semiotic media with both similarities and differences. The primary similarity is the sharing of a common communicative material. Regarding differences, the distinction language/picture will appear almost like a concept. There is a tradition to regard picture as an analogy to verbal language, and this requires evaluations of both similarities and differences. Such evaluations, however, must be omitted here. When I join in this tradition, it is with the purpose to find out how drawing can mediate abstract, cognitive content. This is visual semantics, relations between graphic, visual elements and conceptualisations. It is conceptualisations of drawn concrete things and abstract themes. I use verbal language as a reference system first and foremost because cognitive linguistic research has brought to light knowledge of how our thought is structured in this matter. This knowledge shows that we conceptualise complex themes by means of more simple experiences. Mental abstraction takes place via more simple patterns or models of mental concrete experience material. I view similarity between verbal language and picture primarily connected to the common thought structures which are active in users of both media.

What is a language then? It is information-rich messages intended to convey meaning. It is the ability to use words for mediating thoughts and concepts to others. Thoughts and concepts are mental phenomena, while words are sound signs (or written signs based on sound signs). With the material audible or visual words, we can mediate mental thought sequences including concepts. When we combine words in a sentence and utter the sentence to an addressee, it is with the purpose “to evoke in the listener a particular kind of experiential complex, here termed a cognitive representation...”. I agree with both Talmy’s and Langacker’s opinions of language as cognitive representations evoked by audible or written visual signs. Langacker describes language as symbolic structures. He says that the basic semiological function for language is to allow the symbolisation (or sign creation from semiotics) of conceptualisations by means of phonological sequences.

Granted this function, language necessarily comprises semantic structures, phonological structures, and symbolic links between the two. The central claim of CG is that nothing else is needed. The theory maintains that lexicon and grammar

85 Ramachandran and Blakeslee (1999, p. 231).
86 Talmy (2000, volume 1, p. 21).
87 A prosaic description of the sign made by C. S. Peirce is “something which stands for something to somebody in some respect or capacity” (Bouissac, 1998, p. 574).
88 Langacker (2000, p. 1) states “(...) in view of the basic semiological function of language, which is to allow the symbolization of conceptualizations by means of phonological sequences.” Langacker proclaims a radical position in his theory on cognitive grammar (CG). With the theory, he claims that grammar can be reduced to the structuring and symbolisation of conceptual content, and thus has no autonomous existence. By the structuring and symbolisation of conceptual content, he means such things as the preposition (prepositions are grammatical elements) in or inside shall be regarded on the mental pattern to be inside something, for instance to be inside a container. The semantic content in the preposition/the grammatical element is thus more important than what traditional linguistics has estimated. Traditional linguistics focuses on formal grammatical theory. Both Talmy and Langacker focus on cognitive semantics. But as their choices of names for their own research fields demonstrate, their specific interests differ. Talmy’s field is cognitive semantics, while Langacker’s is cognitive grammar. I eclectically select formulations from both of them according to what I can use.
form a continuum, and that only symbolic structures – each residing in the symbolic linking of a semantic and a phonological structure – figure in their proper characterization. (Langacker, 2000, p. 1.)

I connect to the two structures and the concept symbolic linking. I understand semantic structures as mental referential structures or cognitive representations (i.e., meanings). I understand phonological structures as sound combinations allowed in a natural language and which language users perceive. In transition of the linking of these two structure forms (a semantic and a phonological structure) to the picture medium, I will operate with a definition for drawing as a visual medium parallel to audible language, by substituting medial phonological structures with graphic, visual, structures. Graphic structures in this connection, I understand as the constellations of visual marks or structures in the formal aesthetic layer that a picture genre allows.89

My preliminary definition thus is: Metaphoric drawing is a visual language comprising semantic structures, graphic structures, and symbolic links between the two.

This definition may hold for picture in general, but will have more or less relevance for different genres. I delimit visual language to be one angle of incidence to pictures. Pictures have other angles of incidence where the language analogy is irrelevant and inappropriate.

5.2 A superior visual language system

Many theorists have described a superior visual language and have emphasised different aspects of what pictures are and do. Theorists have decided which minor units to be considered relevant and the formal aesthetic aspect is thoroughly accounted for. When I, in the forthcoming, treat such moments, it is as commonly known descriptions. What researchers hitherto have not described, however, is the complexity of meanings embedded in the figurative metaphoric and rhetoric field. By means of the cognitive linguistic research and in turn my transition of parts of this research onto drawing, my task is to introduce new knowledge first and foremost in the specific metaphorical genre, and with this knowledge also enrich parts of a superior visual language system. I have omitted a thoroughly made description and discussion in this text, and will present only a delineation and a brief summary overview.90

5.2.1 Basic units

Basic units in a superior visual language system are of two kinds: basic, minimal, representing units and basic, minimal, non-representing units. The smallest representing units in pictures are elements that can be recognised as something concrete where they appear together with other descriptive elements or alone. They are elements in the figurative layer. These elements obtain semantic value in relation to the surrounding recognisable elements. A drawn small circle is understood as a button when it stands in a described garment where we are used to find buttons. A drawn small circle is understood as an eye when it stands in a described face in the location eyes have. The semantic meaning of the graphic circle sign is created by us

89 Two points ought to be mentioned here. The first is that with this definition there will follow a certain parallelism between natural languages and picture genres. This suits my view upon a misconception often appearing when all pictures are regarded as one category. This misconception appears when an assertion is presented which is reliable for one type of pictures, but is not as reliable for another type of pictures. Photographs and diagrams, for instance, differ in terms of abstraction. The second point is that phonological structure is more regularly connected to semantic structure in verbal language than graphic structure is to semantic structure in pictures.

90 A systematic treatment and discussion on a superior visual language as a system exists in my thesis.
giving the circle a symbolic value, a sign meaning, because we recognise it as button or eye dependant on the circle’s location in relation to the surrounding symbolised structures. This happens by resemanticization. A button or an eye also can stand as the only element and get its semantic meaning by iconic recognition. The button or eye is then drawn with such characteristic traits that it looks like its referent so that we “see” and recognise the referent.

Then we have minimal non-representative units. It is the form of a graphic, formal aesthetic structure that mediates content. Buttons and eyes are mental concepts/conceptualisations (i.e., mental content) which come into existence via graphic structures. An eye and a button are distinguished when they stand as two separate figures beside each other. It is the combination of curved lines, shape, and size of the planes which the lines separate which give us clues to read and recognise the figures as respectively eye and button. The minimal graphic elements we operate with are point, line, and shape. In addition come texture and colour. With these elements, we can create curved and straight lines which in turn can take place in all sorts of combined shapes. Contour lines delimit planes. More or less illusory lines automatically are perceived where two planes meet in a clear delimitation. Planes also can slide into each other in a diffuse way because of a gradual change in contrast between light and dark, or between colours. The basic distinction between graphic elements is visual contrast, and first and foremost between light and dark.

5.2.2 Two layers assign meanings in pictures

When the issue is components in, and organisation of, a superior visual language system, we have to take in regard that graphic structures are related to two layers in pictures. It is the figurative and the formal aesthetic layer. In the figurative layer, graphic structures stand representing recognisable referents in a relatively clear semantic relation. In the formal aesthetic layer, where meanings are created in the real qualities appearing in the picture planes’ lines, shapes, and, colours, the semantic and the graphic pole are more uncertainly linked according to vague impressions.

Meanings are thus created in two layers in pictures. We can behold any figure in a picture as figurative referential element and as formal aesthetic element with formal qualitative links. A depicted button graphically made with only black curved lines in contrast on a white paper is recognised, categorised, and mentally treated as the concept button. We might be interested in whether the button is thick, old, worn, or made of gold. In this case, we have no information of such qualities. We just have the identity signs for the object. Here we have directed attention to the figurative layer.

Directing attention to the formal layer, we still see the same graphic structure, but now we will consider such things as the circles’ form and size as such. We can consider the qualities of the line, the unevenness in both changes in direction and in black- or greyness. These are genuine formal properties or qualities. Picture makers hereby count on these genuine, real qualities to be projected onto the mental conception of the depicted object, onto the button as figurative object. Understood in this way, I would say that real qualities in the formal layer ‘paste’ themselves onto concrete objects, living beings, and substances in the first round and then further onto abstract themes. These projected properties or qualities are then included in the semantic pole which is linked by the symbolisation to the graphic pole of a figurative picture element. The conceptualised button gets the unevenness of the line as an attached property.

---

91 Resemanticization is a term from Sonesson (1989, p. 299).
This described projection of qualities from the formal to the figurative layer is one of more processes compressing information in a picture element. It adds more information, more meaning material into the actual element’s or the actual graphic structure’s content package. With a transparency metaphor, the information from the two layers is overlaid and unified. We conceive the whole content of the two layers, but can by analysis separate the meanings. Let us call this compression of layers the layer-compression of meanings. When graphic elements for expression in this way influence figurative content, it is a visual metaphorical transition. The source domain is graphic and formal (e.g., the qualities of the line). With the definition for formal aesthetic metaphor connected to a formal source domain, we here have a type of formal aesthetic metaphor. This type with layer-compression can be distinguished from another type of formal metaphor. The other type can be placed within inter-sensory metaphors, and within the formal source domain. Inter-sensory metaphors in many cases can alternate in descriptions of themes. A theme which can be conceptualised as heavy, for instance, can visually be expressed as dark. Alternative visual quality dichotomies are low/high, angular/round, dark/light, etc. This other type is thus formal aesthetic inter-sensory metaphors.

Is it then relevant to speak of representation in the formal layer? It is problematic to do so because the normal meaning of representation refers to figurative representation. However, considering a black picture element which is conceptualised as heavy, one will have to consider heavy as a referent for black; in other words, the graphic unit black is symbolised in the semantic unit heavy. This connection between graphic black and semantic heavy, between formal source and formal target, would better be termed para-representation. Weight is a formal metaphorical referent. The kind of meanings arising from elements in the formal layer will be a special kind that with a cry of distress may fall under an extended representation concept. I prefer to call this type of connection between formal graphic and semantic symbolisation an impressional sense-based, fictive connection.

5.2.3 Composition of formal graphic structures

Complex structures of formal aesthetic elements are made with configurations based on basic elements. In working with complex graphic structures, we consider their effects upon us. The graphic structures activate mental structures, and we perform evaluating mental operations to create a picture that corresponds with what we want to utter. We compose with graphic elements and manipulate them by using alteration factors, or variation means. These means for alteration exist in a register of different categories of formal aesthetic elements. These variation means belong to the paradigm of formal aesthetic elements. Choosing between paradigmatic formal elements sets the mental aesthetic apparatus in play, and we get impressions of meanings that arise from sensory experiences. Some of these experiences are kinaesthetic, and many of them are visually based. We take these sensory experiences seriously; we think with them and consider relations between elements with them. It is aesthetic thinking, and this thinking includes what is called aesthetic functions. These are proportions, contrast, movement, rhythm, and balance. They are graphic principles organising the basic elements which can vary in scale, number, strength, position, and intensity. The term ‘composition’ stands for use of formal elements in aesthetic complexes. Composition as term is employed especially when an aesthetic perspective is attended to. I make a distinction between ‘composition’ and ‘combination’ which, in my terms, stands for complex figurative elements. At the same time as figurative combination is organised in a picture, we cannot

---

92 Langacker (2000, p. 214) introduces this term when he sees two component structures with different content as seen together like placed on two transparent plastic sheets laid over each other. Then a composite content appears incorporating both the two individual contents.
avoid also to bring forth information bringing meanings based on compositional formal structures.

5.2.4 **Organisation of picture elements**
Gathering various graphical objects takes place on a two-dimensional picture plane, but we conceive a three-dimensional spatial effect. We sense that the objects exist in a three-dimensional setting. Objects can be placed together in groups, with variations in distance between them. Groups can be big or small, and the spreading between individual elements can be big or small, even or uneven. Several factors can be activated: which angular plane a group forms, whether a group is three-dimensional, is centrally or peripherally placed, etc. Variations are conditioned by relations between the objects, relations between the objects and the picture plane, and relations to the beholder (distance, eye level, etc.).

The organisational principle for visual elements is spatial simultaneity. The elements in a picture are organised in a spatial order, and all elements appear simultaneously. This means that all information is simultaneously accessible. The meanings are created based on relations between the elements. In reading a picture, the viewer will seek the information she is interested in. (Reading of course is directed in accordance with the direction of attention in the picture maker’s organised elements.) Thus, reading of pictures is distribution of attention in a process of conception and reflection which will proceed during more or less time.

As for organisation of a visual language system, we can make a distinction between two levels of meanings in pictures, a primary and a secondary level. The primary level is where the visual creation of signs takes place. The secondary level is where rhetorical, indirect, meanings appear. The following section will describe the primary level, the visual sign creation, and the relation between expression and content in pictures. Here we also have to regard the twofold sign function in pictures, by the fact that meanings take place in two layers.

5.2.5 **Closing remarks on a superior visual language and categories in the formal aesthetic paradigmatic category system**
This short version of a superior visual language system has favoured the formal aesthetic aspect. The reason for this is a necessity to clear out relations between figurative and formal conceptualisations, and to shed some light on graphic structures with the two roles basic formal elements play as both constitutive for figurative elements and as carriers of meaning by their own qualities. The term ‘symbolic’ from Langacker’s model, which I have adopted in my definition of visual language, may be slightly worrying. The term ‘symbolic’ stands for a more or less conventional relation between words and concepts in verbal language. Cognitive linguistics, however, demonstrates that words often have ambiguity and flexibility. Picture elements have ambiguity and flexibility as a characteristic property, and especially formal aesthetic elements have insecure connections between graphic structures and semantic structures. To speak about semantic structure with respect to a formal element such as a black space can seem to be a fallacy. We have seen, though, that it can be explained as an intersensory metaphorical connection when we conceptualise a black shape as heavy. This conceptualisation, however, is a conventional understanding among picture makers and analysts. In addition, a black formal element is involved in a complex graphic structure, and as such will be resemanticized as well as figurative elements are. In this way, I find it

---

93 It is an issue for discussion, however, to set a boundary between explicit rhetorical meanings and language/visual language. As stated in the chapter on visual narrative, the necessity of metaphor and metonymy is tightly woven into and establishing for abstract meanings. Both the words’ and the pictures’ semantics rest upon these two mental mechanisms. The sign creation thus encapsulates rhetoric mechanisms.
legitimate to speak even of formal aesthetic structures linked by symbolic structures to semantic structures.

A second reason for the heavy attention to the formal aesthetic aspect of visual language is to account for the formal aesthetic paradigmatic category system. A paradigmatic category system in the formal aesthetic dimension is not yet specified in this paper. Formal elements and structures are related to figurative structures like the front- and back-side on the same coin. Structures in the figurative paradigmatic system are brought together and come into existence by formal elements. Which structures are created in each case thereby depend to a high degree on the choices made by the picture maker in the formal paradigm. If the choices are multiple in the figurative paradigm, they are not fewer in the formal. I will mention some categories in which choices must be taken.

Cut (i.e., picture frame) is a category with a small register. Here one may choose between the members where for instance a person is the motive: (1) over-view picture, (2) total picture where the whole person/motive appears, (3) half total (person is shown down to the waist), (4) half near (head and shoulders), (5) near (head and neck), and (6) ultra near, where we are close to a detail. Another category is perspective and angle of view with options like the normal, frog, and bird perspectives previously described. An advanced digital program for picture treatments (e.g. Photoshop) brings forth a broad spectrum of alternative formal means in which a picture maker can, and in many cases has to, make her selections.

The connections and interactions between graphic and semantic structures when meanings are created is a multiple construction of different types of factors woven together. Material for a register of means to count for a superior visual language system would have to include possible concrete picture materials, tools, techniques, styles, etc. In each individual picture, only some of the factors will be used. Furthermore, some of those will be relevant and emphasised for the meanings taking attention, while most of them will be unnoticed but necessarily present.

5.3 The metapophoric language system in drawing
My demand to present metaphoric drawing as a visual language system is that it can mediate information which can be understood by interested and competent viewers. Such a system must have categories of picture elements, and elements inside these categories must be able to be varied and substituted with each other in a kind of paradigmatic order. I claim that there can be found a category structure and a combinational structure in the metaphoric system. I will demonstrate how interaction goes on in all directions between different categories and different paradigmatic systems and demonstrate both category and combination structure in this metaphoric system.

5.3.1 Definition and organisation of metaphoric drawing
I define metaphoric drawing as drawing with the main weight on figurative narrative content where abstract themes are formulated by cognitive and rhetorical mechanisms. It is a visual language comprised of semantic structures, graphic structures, and symbolic links between the two.

Organisation of picture elements takes place in a spatial distribution where all elements simultaneously exist. The elements obtain meanings in two layers respectively of figurative and formal aesthetic nature. Figurative production of meaning is central in metaphoric

---

94 This model is based on cinema analysis and may seem too media specific, but it may indicate possible choices.
drawing, and combination of figurative picture elements thus has a corresponding position above formal aesthetic composition.

There is one principle for metaphoric meaning in drawings that appears most broadly in image metaphor. In image metaphorical utterances, concrete and full overlapping of elements takes place. Combined with metonyms and conventional conceptual metaphors, image metaphor offers optimal conditions for several indirect meanings to be interactively compressed. I maintain that this **tendency for meanings to be packed in several dense layers into each other, and where interactions between the picture elements take place in many crossing directions, is the main principle for organisation and structure characterising narrative metaphoric drawing.** Compression of semantic structures is essential in organisation of graphic structures.

5.3.2 **Combination structure**
A combination structure can be established based on what was a secret in metaphoric drawing: categories of picture elements can be seen to exist and the individual elements will interact. I claim that elements within these categories can be seen as paradigmatic categories, with options for substitution within each category, and with great combinational possibilities between elements from different categories. Combination structure encompasses, in my terms, interactions between entities/members in all paradigmatic categories and further between members in other category systems.

What kinds of selections and devices are at disposal then, when picture makers are about to formulate themselves about invisible things and processes? Which categories can be sorted out in this inventory of elements or members comprising the visual language system in metaphoric drawing?

5.3.3 **Category structure in four paradigmatic category systems**
I establish four paradigmatic systems of categories. Each category has members with possibilities for paradigmatic choices among the members. I mostly speak of ‘elements’ where I often might say ‘structures’. This lack of distinction just has to pass uncensored.

*The first paradigmatic system is the figurative categories of picture elements.* Narrative is a key to metaphoric drawing. With that key, a group of picture elements has been extracted as categories of figurative elements. This system is the central one that involves the other three.

*The second paradigmatic system consists of elements in the formal aesthetic layer.* Formal aesthetic elements and functions are related to figurative like the front and back side of the same coin. The formal aesthetic inventory can be separated into categories with elements which interact with each other and with figurative ones. Figurative and formal picture

---

95 Some picture semioticians maintain the paradigm concept to be useless when a combination structure is in question. They will assert that no categories with substitutional entities in pictures can be found. In response to this allegation, I will point to two different angles of picture research. One angle is the angle of rhetoric with production process for good speech and means for formulation. The second angle is the study of pictures as reception of created visual expressions. With this reception perspective, it can be problematic to estimate what should be paradigmatic categories. With the productive perspective, on the other hand, one will orient oneself from the phase in content-expression relation the picture maker is in on the actual situation where choices are to be taken. As earlier mentioned, most choices are taken without profound reflections, like in verbal language processing, while other choices are made under great reflections and often with experimentations. As in the production of oral or written language where automatized choices are performed in rapid order and can be systematised by theorists, I likewise mean that the choices can be systematised for the meaning production in picture productive utterances.
elements form two main systems of categories. One must take in account concrete and abstract content according to both figurative and formal structures of elements.

The third paradigmatic system is conventional conceptual patterns. Abstract content demands, as we know, a concrete skeleton to be conceptualised and expressed. Visual narrative with abstract content demands metaphor and metonymy to be realised. Conceptual patterns offer a paradigmatic range of different kinds of metaphors and metonymies. Conceptual domains are of vital importance where one can choose between these with metaphoric and metonymic employment.

The fourth paradigmatic system is rhetorical devices. Rhetorical devices regard which main strategies to choose to communicate a theme in the best way according to the picture maker. This will involve choice of, for instance, metaphoric or metonymic expression, and which form it has as a trope. This system divides from the system of conceptual patterns, where attention is on the mental content being necessary in the expression of content, and where these patterns can be implicit activated. A rhetorical device will have to appear and be decided explicitly and be superior to conceptual patterns. Rhetorical devices also include the so-called rhetoric alteration modes. Borderlines may be somewhat blurred between rhetoric and formal aesthetic alteration modes.

5.4 Sketch of categories in the four paradigmatic systems
The groups of categories are tentative proposals. I can indicate only a sketch of a system which peer and student critics in practice may work out into a more stringent system. The paradigmatic categories differing in nature are at disposal for a picture maker expressing an utterance, and he or she will make more or less conscious choices between elements, members, in categories within the four paradigms. Analysts in turn will pay attention to those being relevant to their interests. Some categories are infinite, and others have only few members.

5.4.1 Categories in the figurative paradigmatic system
Categories of figurative picture elements extracted from the chapter on visual narrative form the inventory of the central mimetic, referential system. It is the semantic role the graphic element plays in the actual drawing which incorporates the element then and there in the category. The element is in the actual category by the cognitive routine it is embodied into.

Concrete mimetic representations of objects, living beings, and substances constitute one category, and body- and other actions and processes belong to another basic category.

Categories comprised of roles involved in process are:
agent, patient, experiencer, action, instrument, and scene/setting (for the semantic roles);
identity signs (elements standing for and showing who or what something is);
spatial relation signs (where two or more picture elements are conceived of as in a spatial connection with each other); and
movers: moving objects and self-moving things and living beings. Dynamic objects (including instruments) and dynamic living beings are elements representing force dynamic processes and are vital in cause relations.

Types of elements active in characterisation are:
property signifiers, which show properties or qualities adhered to or belonging to objects or living beings; and
value signifiers, which show attitudes and emotions. They mediate the value evaluating aspect
which Aristotle holds important, and they can be grouped as attitude-, emotion-, and valuating
markers.

Picture elements referring to time are mostly metaphorical. I have named them with concepts
from a tradition outside cognitive linguistics:
Chronotopes: point- and length-chronotopes.

5.4.2 Categories in the formal aesthetic paradigmatic system
Point, line, shape, texture, light-dark value, and colour are categories in the formal aesthetic
paradigm. Alteration modes are available with visual contrasts like light/dark, big/small,
curved/straight, etc. standing in categories. We also have to choose placement and position for
each picture element on the sheet of paper (high/low, at left/right,
vertical/horizontal/diagonal), related to the frame (against or breaking the frame, etc.), and the
elements in relation to each other (overlapping, in front/behind, over/under, etc.). Categories
of perspective include normal-, bird-, frog-, and other perspective types.

5.4.3 Categories for conventional conceptual patterns
Meanings arising which we want to have knowledge about, come into being in great parts by
conventional conceptual patterns. Graphic elements and structures connected to semantic
structures need great amounts of conceptual patterns to constitute or activate abstract content.
When figurative elements are able to be substituted with others in the same category, the
reason for such substitution often will be that the meanings they have are semantic structures
performing in conceptual structures. Both linguistic and drawn expressions obtain their
meanings by being associated directly with conceptual patterns and diverse conceptual
domains. Different domains come into contact with each other, and content in one domain can
be projected within the same or onto another domain. This is what happens by metonymy and
metaphor.

Conceptual patterns will come in categories of image schemas. Members here are container-
and path-schema, as are conceptions of part/whole, centre/periphery, bonds, etc.

The whole army of basic level categories (chairs, swim, families, anger, etc.) come in regard
as material for source domains for metonymy and metaphor. A basic level category has
subcategories with alternative members.

The different kinds of metaphor will form categories, and so will kinds of metonymy.

5.4.4 Categories for rhetorical devices
Categories for rhetorical devices are mainly rhetorical tropes.

Metaphor of different kinds can be a clear superior device to create a striking point for the
intended communicative target. Image metaphor is one category, as are personification,
reification, and allegory.

Tropes employing comparison include simile, parallelism (like psycho-physical parallelism),
comparatio and antithesis.

Paradox and oxymoron are self-contradictory devices with possibilities for striking points.

Symbol and metonymy with unusual properties or referential connections are categories, as is
allusion with reference to culturally known artworks or phenomena.
Devices to show process and changes include at least three categories: *metamorphosis, deformation, and deconstruction* show change of guise or form in different ways.

The four alteration modes in rhetoric are accessible when one is at work with a visual utterance and seeks to alter the expression in order to create a clear ideational meaning. *Adjectio, detractio, immutatio, and transmutation* are categories here, respectively standing for the addition, removal, or substitution of one or more elements, or the exchange/redistribution of elements.

5.5 *Balloon shooter* in figurative paradigmatic alterations

How picture elements in the figurative paradigm can be selected and exchanged within categories in the figurative paradigm will be exemplified by Steinberg’s drawing of the boy going to shoot his balloon in figure 15.

This is a simple, non-metaphorical drawing with few elements. The elements are an agent (boy), a patient (balloon), and an instrument (pistol). Each of these elements stands in its category. Each of these categories affords a selection (i.e., a paradigm) of picture elements which can be selected to stand instead of the ones in the drawing. In a still ‘literal’ utterance where one would want to replace the patient but keep the two other elements with their graphic structures position intact, a flower, a butterfly, or a shooting star can be among several actual members of the category. The meaning in the visual utterance will be changed, with the content of the exchanged element. The exchange is here made with a form similarity containing a vertical thread (butterfly in a string, flower on a stem, and shooting star on a bar). With a form similarity, the paradigm will be somewhat limited. However, if we remove the claim for a position and form which keep the graphic structures of the instrument and the agent unaltered, we may choose a shorter and thicker patient, for instance a burning candle held in the hand without the height made by the string. The consequence demands change in the direction of the pistol, the boy’s glance, and his hand posture. Agent and instrument, however, will still be in their semantic roles.

Then we make the drawing metaphorical. The patient element can easily be made an earth globe with an image metaphor. Another selection object can be a physical thick person. The possibilities are not limited by direct shape similarity. It is fully possible to make a building appear as a balloon. The balloon also is only one of many selectable elements in the patient category.

Agent as category likewise offers legio possible picture elements. The boy can be substituted with a girl, an old woman, a personified version of a pencil, or any personified bullet, ball, or balloon depicted with hands and eyes. Let us steal two elements from Graff. The agent boy is exchanged with former President Bush. The patient, a normal balloon, is exchanged with an earth globe in figure 82.
The instrument category offers a selection where I immediately associate a needle or other sharp objects in relation to the balloon. Which other objects threaten the existence of a balloon? Answers could include a cannon, an airplane, etc.

The figurative categories with such general roles as agent, patient, and instrument have inventories of infinite members. What is to be formulated, and the picture sphere which is set, will restrict which elements are to be relevant in each individual utterance. The categories of instrument and moving objects are distinct to analyse for their members. We can register basic categories of moving objects (e.g., cars, boats) and can find subcategories being used to give more information. Instruments will to some extent, be possible to count and thus form an inventory in a relatively limited category. When one is introduced to a simple digital image managing program, some of one’s first discoveries are just the possibilities and demands to exchange and select between readymade figurative elements which can be placed into a simple visual narrative. In a stage where one renounces from drawing oneself or choosing figures from a broader selection on the Internet, for instance, one will be compelled to a limited figurative archive for what can fill the relevant semantic roles.

Identity signifiers can be seen as an entire structure (e.g., the boy), but also as component structures (e.g., hair style, short trousers). Such component structures constitute the boy composite. The figurative paradigmatic system is hierarchic in the sense that some element categories fall under other, superior categories. Any formulated agent, patient, etc. must have identity signifiers. Identity signs thus fall into the semantic roles.

When we formulate visual metaphorical utterances, we do so by making interaction between picture elements in the figurative paradigm. Meanings ‘live’ in each element in the individual category, and more meanings are formed in the relations between categories. The relational category that I call spatial relation signs is paradigmatic, too. Here, one can choose between different spatial positions. The positions can concern two or several elements in relation to each other. Moments like distance, direction, distributional order, etc. are added. A figure can move out of, into, through, over, or along a figure, just to name a few possibilities. More figures can be spread over a field, appear close or scattered, be arranged irregularly or in rows, etc. I regard this category as a parallel to prepositions and other devices in verbal language informing about spatial relations, and I mean we can find diverse registers for selection.

5.6 Interaction between elements in the four paradigmatic category systems
Metaphoric drawing as a visual language system is a dynamic organism, with endless possibilities for combination of visual elements. Combinations take place both between categories in each of the four paradigmatic systems and between elements in different systems. I will demonstrate how such interactions can be made via some examples in expanding complex combinations. I will start by directing attention to metonymy and then demonstrate addition of metaphor involving diverse semantic roles and simultaneous figurative polysemy. Then I will emphasize formal aesthetic metaphors which in turn can be realized in simultaneous semantic polysemy complexity.
I use some of my own drawings where drawing of a pencil takes place as examples. Meanings are determined by at least one visible figurative picture element. Metonymy usually attends to a necessary reference function. Figure 83 is a drawing without metaphor, only with metonymy. This is my view as the picture maker. It is my message to my leader. The pencil metonymically stands for me. It refers to me as the draughtsman/writer (INSTRUMENT FOR PRODUCER). I was ill, so the metonymic pencil is ill. Ill is shown metonymically, by lying on a pillow under a rug. Two metonyms constitute the content.

In the same message, this drawing (figure 84) followed, succeeded by the text, “The body signaled danger.” The pencil still is metonymy for me and is now connected to the metaphor PSYCHICAL IS PHYSICAL and THE MIND IS A BRITTLE OBJECT. The pencil is broken in two spots. The broken nib implicates that the drawing/writing action preliminarily has stopped, while the more brutal break describes mind as body/object. Metonymy in interaction with metaphor is compressed in the figurative simple configuration established in its graphic structure.

The message can be fortified with the formal aesthetic metaphor BAD IS DARK. By placing the darkness on top in the picture, in the place of the sky, a feeling of weight pressing downwards on the subject is obtained. Thus, the inter-sensory formal aesthetic metaphor HEAVY IS DARK comes into play. We can see conventional visual usage modes for BAD IS DARK in connection with STATES ARE CONTAINERS or STATES ARE LOCATIONS. Such combination is activated when a person in a picture is positioned with a dark plane in front and a light plane behind her, or vice versa, with the meaning of shifting between negative contra positive state of mind. In figure 85 where the formal dark space is added to the elements from figure 84, the draughtsman has taken her choice in the formal paradigm for placement by placing black above the other elements.

Pencil as instrument in the action of writing is as semantic role in this narrative, not alone. Here is an agent in addition and a small marker of attitude (dirt). The agent can be recognised in the identity sign in the facial profile, and the mode of action – slowness – appears in the choice of a turtle as the specific basic concept. Turtle metonymically refers to slowness. It is a figurative animal metaphor where slowness is mapped onto the writing action. Time is here shown by the self-moving living being turtle. The theme is tempo, and it is constituted with animal metaphor, with representation of the action of writing shown by agent, instrument (pencil), and the setting (paper sheets) for these semantic roles. With the explicit information lying in the description of the action with several semantic roles, the pencil has neither metonymic reference to me (as INSTRUMENT FOR PRODUCER)
nor reference to writing (as INSTRUMENT FOR ACTION) since writing is directly shown. It may be difficult to limit the metonymy concept in pictures. We will be able to say that many picture signs are metonyms. Face refers to the whole person, and thus we have more metonyms in the drawing. If one reads the two small blots below the turtle shell as dirt and observes the similarity in the row of written marks, one will find a simile. A simile stands together with a figurative image metaphor (overlapping turtle- and human head).

Here again is a pencil metonymy for writing in figure 87. At the same time, it is an instrument in interaction with the conventional image schema part/whole instantiated in puzzle parts.

Here is an example of an image metaphor where the pupil and the lead in my last pencil are overlapping. In the paradigm for perspective, I chose bird perspective in contrast to normal perspective in the previous pencils. If we turn this drawing upside down, we will notice that solution in the perspective paradigm is altered. The bird perspective no longer is prevalent. The pencil, however, now has a direction inwards in the picture where it originally stood in a direction downward. The formal alteration can influence invitation figuratively to other narratives.

Figure 89 is a drawing commenting on the Danish drawings about Muhammad which aroused anger in Islamic circles. Here again the balloon is an image metaphor for the earth. Nobody holds the string, but a pen is coming in and can puncture the earth. With this drawing, I want to call attention to and repeat three points. One is that metonymy functions effectively in instruments. The second point is that picture elements, which metonymically refer to something, often refer to several things simultaneously, an effect picture makers take advantage of. The pen as instrument refers to the Muhammad drawings, to drawing/communication, and to destruction by a sharp instrument. The figurative meanings being compressed in the pen lie in the identity sign for draughtsmen, an instrument for destruction, and a geographical place marker (spatial relation signs). The third point is that a few figurative elements (i.e., pen, balloon, earth) contain the compressed content.
Formal aesthetic metaphors may take form as image metaphors when regarded by common shape. The situation in figure 90 deals with then-Prime Minister Jagland welcoming one of his ministers returning home from travel. This minister was earlier declared almost genial by Jagland, but now he had been revealed to be economically dishonest. A red carpet standing for honour is the rhetorical device. We here have a formal aesthetic metaphor. Black in this case stands for both red and black. This is a statement I will argue as follows. When we are drawing in black and white, we have two colour options. To mark that two planes beside each other have different colours, we have to show one as black and the other as white. The pictorial redundancy, that is what we know about the two planes because they represent things we know (red carpet beside floor), activates knowledge about the red and connects the black graphic structure to the red semantic structure. By saying the red semantic structure is symbolised by a black graphic structure, I mean the red carpet is semantically realised. This red carpet is in addition simultaneously semantically realised as a black semantic structure. The black semantic structure is linked to the black graphic structure as source domain in the conventional conceptual metaphor BAD IS BLACK. This understanding simultaneously gives both red and black carpet. Two semantic picture elements, red and black carpet, overlap as graphic elements in a common shape. In addition, we have a third semantic picture element in part of the same overlapping shape: a black fluid in which the minister has sunk down. This black fluid is connected to our understanding of shame, like in the expressions “deep shame” and “sinking in deep shame”. Here, we consequently have a triple formal metaphor, or at any rate a formal image metaphor where three semantic structures overlap. These three semantic structures give us three metonymic picture components: red carpet, black carpet, and black fluid. Three metonyms interact with conventional conceptual patterns of metaphoric nature via formal aesthetic image metaphor.

We have at least three kinds of access to formal aesthetic metaphors. One is by inter-sensory metaphorical para-representation where, for instance, weight is connected to darkness/black and lightness to light/white. This is an impressional sense-based kind of symbolisation. The second access is by overlapping or common graphic structures taking place in common shape, colour, or texture. These will mostly come into being perceived in relation to figurative, representational, graphic structures. The third access is formal aesthetic source domains in conceptual metaphors.

---

90. Graff, Jagland’s dilemma. 23.11.1996.

96 The trope cannot be recognised as metaphor, the black for the red, if the red carpet concept is not activated in the viewer.

97 This statement can be discussed. It will be possible to see the black fluid as figurative and not formal. That is, the fluid is read as fluid because it surrounds the head. Then one might hold the fluid and the blackness distinct as two moments and say that the blackness as such is source domain to the metaphoric target domain bad.
The rhetorical device employed here in figure 91 is directed toward the stripe pattern as a formal element. The figurative and the formal elements literally are infiltrated into each other as rhetoric form. The result is an oxymoron.

Yeltsin’s former life guard leader has written a book about him. This is the topic in figure 92. The formal element, where the black colour is utilised together with the contour around it, constitutes a compressed assembly of meanings. Firstly, the cap and weapon make it an identity sign for the life guard leader. Here, the weapon is metonymically shown, MEMBER OF A CATEGORY FOR THE CATEGORY, the sword for weapon. Second, the action of the agent is given: he is piercing. Then there is an image metaphor where a big profiled head and a body with head are both present in a common shape, where nose is arm. The agent also is experiencer in the big head; he is laughing. Fourth, the black is a value marker: BAD IS DARK. Fifth, it is the shadow of Yeltsin who is patient, with the associations this can activate. Finally, the sharp part of the black figure in addition forms part of a kind of simile with the scar of the recently sewn/operated heart of Yeltsin.

5.7 Conclusive commentary on this text
I have propounded a description of a structured system for metaphoric drawing. The system is explored in all directions, firstly through a broad range of means in a drawing repertoire. This repertoire has exemplified how three (plus two) main mechanisms work in a multitude of visual expressions whereby meanings are created. Meanings have been separated, and thereafter the structure in which they are embedded is shown. The structure comprises different meaning categories sorted into four paradigmatic systems. Those systems result from extractions through the text in an unpacking of meaning complexity. To draw an ideational statement, one can, and to some extent must, choose among members in those categories. In the last part of this text where the paradigms are presented, it is then demonstrated step by step how meanings increase in complexity by compression.

Regarding research methodology, one might want a distinct presentation of how the different theories are integrated in the analyses of drawings. I am of the opinion that I have established a unity between those different theories. I mean that even the integration of the great theories into a whole, which is useful in analyses of meanings in metaphoric drawings, is one important finding in this research. What is this whole, what does it comprise, and how will it function in practical analysis work? The research project’s optic is picture pedagogical with
the perspective directed to the rhetorical: the communicator’s (i.e., the draughtsman’s) problem solving sphere and competence in picture language applicable in visual utterances. The new innovative knowledge generated in this research lies open to be used and invites interested person to test it in different milieus. Then I hope its potential will be tried, criticised, and further developed.
List of pictures

4. Steinberg, *Party participants.* Steinberg and Hollander ................................................................. 15
5. Steinberg, *Column carrier.* Steinberg and Hollander ................................................................. 16
6. Øyslebø (1979, p.142). *Case model based on Fillmore.* ................................................................. 18
8. Ingebrethsen (1990 revised) ......................................................................................................... 19
10. Ingebrethsen, *Thighbone bridge.* ................................................................................................. 23
15. Steinberg, *Balloon shooter.* Steinberg and Hollander ............................................................... 31
16. Steinberg, *March – April.* Steinberg and Rosenberg ................................................................. 32
17. *Source-path-goal schema.* Lakoff and Johnson (1999, p. 33), my version. ...................................... 33
18. Graff, *Dorum’s final examination.* 2.2.2002. .................................................................................. 34
19. Unknown artist, *The long path of writing.* Weekendavisen, unknown date ..................................... 35
21. Steinberg, *Rocking chair.* Steinberg and Hollander ................................................................. 36
23. Steinberg, *Cat in a four number.* Steinberg and Rosenberg ........................................................... 41
27. Graff, *Gorbachev’s future.* 23.8.91. ................................................................................................. 44
28. Steinberg, *Matron on pedestal.* Steinberg and Hollander ............................................................. 44
29. Steinberg, *Fingerprint carrier.* Steinberg and Hollander ............................................................. 45
30. Steinberg, *Signature carrier.* Steinberg and Hollander ................................................................. 45
31. Steinberg, *Man ladders.* Steinberg and Hollander ................................................................. 46
41. Graff, *Arafat and the order of succession*. 10.6.92. ................................................ 50
43. Graff, *USA’s credibility*. 15.1.1993. ........................................................................ 52
44. Graff, *The Iron Lady is rusting*. 23.2.1990. ............................................................. 52
48. Graff, *This is war*. 27.2.1997. ....................................................................................... 55
51. Graff, *An ethical model?* 10.11.98. ........................................................................... 56
64. Graff, *Tied up for four years*. 9.8.1996. ............................................................................. 63
69. Truls Brekke, *Maurstad and Skjønberg like two columns*. Dagbladet 10.4.05. .......... 72
70. Frida Kahlo, *The broken column*. 1944. ....................................................... 73
72. Graff, *Food at a right price*. 23.9.1990. ......................................................... 74
73. Graff, *Profit, no thank you!*. 5.6.1998. ......................................................... 74
74. Steinberg, *Reificated speech*. Steinberg and Rosenberg. .................................. 75
75. Meret Oppenheim, *Fur cup*. 1932. ............................................................... 75
79. Tatiana Nyemkova, *Great Ideas Also Have Their Fates*. Sylvestrova et. al. (1992). ... 78
81. Steinberg, *Balloon shooter*. Repetition of figure 15. ......................................... 89
82. Ingebrethsen and Graff, *Balloon shooter, Bush, the earth*. ................................ 89
83. Ingebrethsen, *Sick pencil*. .............................................................................. 91
84. Ingebrethsen, *Broken pencil 1*. ....................................................................... 91
85. Ingebrethsen, *Broken pencil 2*. ....................................................................... 91
86. Ingebrethsen, *It goes slowly*. .......................................................................... 91
88. Ingebrethsen, *Pencil with eye*. ....................................................................... 92
90. Graff, *Jagland’s dilemma*. 23.11.1996. .......................................................... 93
93. Graff, *The researcher*. Front page drawing. .................................................... 98
References


