Humanitarian assistance during conflict in a state-less society: The case of Somalia

Siegfried Pausewang

WP 1999: 5
Humanitarian assistance during conflict in a state-less society: The case of Somalia

Siegfried Pausewang

WP 1999: 5


Chr. Michelsen Institute Development Studies and Human Rights
This series can be ordered from:
Chr. Michelsen Institute
P.O. Box 6033 Postterminalen,
N-5892 Bergen, Norway
Tel: + 47 55 57 40 00
Fax: + 47 55 57 41 66
E-mail: cmi@amadeus.cmi.no
Web/URL:http://www.cmi.no

Price: NOK 50 + postage

ISSN 0804-3639
ISBN 82-90584-38-5

Indexing terms

Humanitarian assistance
Conflict
Public administration
Local partners
Somalia

© Chr. Michelsen Institute 1999
Summary

This working paper was prepared for the workshop on “Aid and Humanitarian Assistance in Africa” in Arusha, 27-29 June, 1998, with financial support from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It is based on a series of interviews with aid agencies operating in Somalia after the crisis of 1992-1993. It tries to map out how different agencies reacted in a state-less society, which efforts they made to help re-build local administrative and political structures, which local partners they worked with, how they dealt with security issues, and how they assessed the prospects for the future of Somalia.

The report first gives a critical overview over the problems and the different positions held on these issues, before giving a short overview over the responses of the different agencies.

The central observation of the report is the dilemma faced by agencies which want to give humanitarian aid to the affected people without compromising the efforts of the local population to form new local structures, and without contributing to a continuation of internal warfare. It shows that agencies find different solutions to these problems, and act on different assumptions and hence with different objectives - though towards a common goal.
Recent Working Papers

WP 1997: 12  WIIG, Arne
Microcredit programmes: Methods for solving dilemmas of credit expansion.

WP 1997: 13  NORDÅS, Hildegunn Kyvik
Economic development and industrial structure - an overview. Bergen,

WP 1997: 14  WIIG, Arne

WP 1997: 15  MARQUETTE, Catherine

WP 1997: 16  MARQUETTE, Catherine

WP 1997: 17  KNUDSEN, Are
Mountain protected areas in Northern Pakistan: the case of Khunjerab National

WP 1997: 18  NORDÅS, Hildegunn Kyvik
Some reasons why capital does not flow from rich to poor countries. Bergen,

WP 1998: 1  HANSEN, Cecilie Fosse

WP 1998: 2  SKAAR, Elin
Profitt eller moral? Ein diskusjon om næringslivsinteresser og menneskerettar.

WP 1998: 3  SUMAILA, Ussif Rashid
Protected marine reserves as fisheries management tools: A bioeconomic

Cannibalism and the optimal sharing of the North-East Atlantic cod stock: A

WP 1998: 5  FJELDSTAD, Odd-Helge
Why people pay taxes. The case of the development levy in Tanzania. Bergen,

WP 1998: 6  NORBYE, Ole David Koht

WP 1998: 7  KNUDSEN, Are

WP 1998: 8  FJELDSTAD, Odd-Helge

WP 1998: 9  KNUDSEN, Are

WP 1999: 1  BRÄUTIGAM, Deborah and Kwesi Botchwey

WP 1999: 2  BRÄUTIGAM, Deborah

WP 1999: 3  SUMAILA, Ussif Rashid

WP 1999: 4  HELLAND, Johan
Table of Contents

**Humanitarian assistance during conflict in a state-less society:**
The case of Somalia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td><strong>DILEMMAS OF PROVIDING ASSISTANCE</strong></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Humanitarian assistance and security</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reconstructing the Somali state?</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The position of aid agencies in Somalia</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td><strong>REPORTS FROM INDIVIDUAL AGENCIES</strong></td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Norwegian Red Cross</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC)</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Life and Peace Institute (LPI)</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Christian Aid (CA)</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Save the Children (SC)</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Médecins sans Frontières (MsF)</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dutch InterChurch Aid (DIA)</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CARE Somalia</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Norwegian Church Aid</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Norwegian People’s Aid</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>United Nations Development Office for Somalia (UNDOS)</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Schematic summary of agency responses</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Annex: Important events in the Somali crisis</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>References</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Interviews with aid donors</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Humanitarian assistance during conflict in a state-less society: The case of Somalia

Aid organizations which continued to operate in Somalia after the civil war in the early 1990s are faced with an extraordinarily difficult situation. There is a great need for humanitarian aid, but there is no legitimate state authority to which the organizations can relate, and the identity of partners for collaboration is uncertain. Even more problematic is the confusion about who are the recipients of aid. The lack of clear structures on both the authority and recipient side raises the prospect that instead of reaching people in need, aid may go to the warlords and fuel the conflict. The problem has been noted in many situations, but is particularly serious in the Somalia case (Alex de Waal 1995, 1996, Mark Duffield 1996, John Prendergast 1996, 1997, Michael Maren 1997).

The humanitarian motivation of giving aid to save lives and reduce human suffering is not invalidated by the fact that relief aid, once it assumes massive proportions, necessarily constitutes an intervention that rarely is neutral in its effect on the conflict. However, the aid intervention in Somalia has been sharply criticized for having little or no relation to Somali society or the decision-making processes of the recipients.

This paper discusses some of the dilemmas of providing humanitarian assistance during conflict as these appear in the context of Somalia in the 1990s. Specific attention is given to the issue of the relationship between aid and authority, and the role of the Somali state – or its alternative – in the transition from relief aid to development assistance. The analysis is partly based on structured interviews with major Scandinavian and other international aid agencies that operate in Somalia in the 1990s. A summary of these interviews is given in the second part of the report.
I: DILEMMAS OF PROVIDING ASSISTANCE:

An understanding of the dilemmas facing foreign aid organizations must take as its starting point the nature, and disappearance, of the Somali state. Somalia, it will be recalled, was for two decades known as the only ethnically homogenous state in Africa. This gave reason for concern among neighbors when Somalia claimed areas inhabited by Somali people in Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya, all of which had considerable Somali minorities in the border areas. A "Pan-Somali" ideology might have served the military regime to create an alternative legitimacy for the centralised nation state. Yet, instead of uniting the Somali people in all these areas into one nation, the Somali state broke apart in internal fighting.

Several observers have argued that the Somali government never represented the Somali people in any meaningful way. The Somali state was purely a creation of the colonial powers. The Somali people were divided between British Somaliland, Italian Somalia, Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti (or French Somaliland). At independence, the Italian and British colonies of Somalia were united under one state, and its administration handed over to Somalis who were at hand and could take over: persons and parties created by the colonial authorities from elites in their service. They inherited a state apparatus and a military, but no meaningful relations to the cultural life of the nomadic clans and families in the countryside. The Somali society - which revolves around, and is structured into, clans, subclans, lineages and families - did not even provide the tax base for a central government: the latter existed largely on resources provided by foreign aid, including military assistance (Heinrich 1997:124, Lewis 1996:24).

While the clan structure continued to govern local life, the government was confined to administer Somalia’s participation in the international world of states. Based on military power and functioning in the margins of the society, the leaders were viewed by the people as the donors’ government - or, after the coup which brought General Siad Barré to power, that of the military establishment. When Siad Barré tried to establish control over the country, clashes ensued, and the government responded with military force. That eventually brought the clan structure up against the government and led to civil war. When Siad Barré was ousted and sent into exile with his military elites, a structure of warlords develop in the military power structure which existed alongside the clans, each of them aspiring to inherit state power. The clan leaders, however, generally did not see a need for a new government, and were unwilling to provide resources for its establishment.
Somewhat simplified, the present "amorphous" or "anarchic" situation in Somalia can thus be described as a competition between two opposing concepts of political order: the "central government and military" tradition of the warlords, versus the people's representation in clan leaders, elders, local councils.

In this perspective, the "implosion" of government, as it is termed in an international context, may from a Somali point of view appear far less dramatic. Somalis may simply see the dissolution of an unnecessary, predatory and dysfunctional structure, whose absence makes possible a more "natural" development and more representative forms of self-determination, - a freer life for the clans.

It has been said that those who attempt to explain the Somali clan systems to others, have not understood anything of it. It can at best (drawing on I.M.Lewis) be described in glimpses:

The clan and the subunits live in a nomadic economy, and constitute loose, situationally cooperating groupings. An elaborate balance of power, with a system of cross-cutting and shifting alliances, assures that no single clan or group becomes too powerful. The primary function of clan, family and tribal structure is to secure every member's physical safety, life, and health. The traditionally flexible system of fragile alliances serves to aid the weak and secure their "democratic" rights. Everybody is bound to stand in for anyone else who is in trouble. Somali rally automatically and unquestioningly around any member needing their support against another clan or an outsider. An unlimited right to solidarity with members can mean a family standing against another family, it may mean one clan against another or all the Somali against other peoples. These situationally fluctuating levels of solidarity help to maintain an equilibrium which does not allow domination of one over the others. In that context, one family might even command the support of another more distant family or clan against a nearer one in a situation where the adversary is becoming too strong and potentially dominating.

This mechanism also has a conflict-generating aspect. As I.M. Lewis describes it: "One of the main problems is that all these units are in principle flexible and fluid, they are reactively defined in opposition to opponents" (Lewis 1996:16). It is me against my brother; it is me and my brother against my half brother; it is the brothers against our uncle; it is the family against another family; it is both families against a neighboring group; and it is the whole clan against another one. On the other hand, when a family feud threatens to disrupt the peace or the balance, elders will start negotiations for reconciliation, a compensation will eventually be agreed and paid, and that puts an end to the hostilities. Balancing mechanisms favoring
peace are also found in the "Xeer", the traditional oral law, the judges administering it, and the religion. A factor of considerable importance may be the relations any Somali has to other families and clans through their wives' close relationship to the family-in-law. The women can thus assume a central role in maintaining peace.

One critical operational question for the donors in this kind of situation is to find appropriate structures of authority with which they can work. All donors say they support the people. But they differ in their views as to who represents the people, and which administrative links to use for bringing their aid to the people. Should they work with the warlords who wield very tangible power in their respective areas of control, or work with "local representatives"? In the latter case, who are the legitimate local representatives - the district councils, or the clan leaders and elders? Or should the aid organizations wait for a new national government to be formed, or for local representative bodies to emerge out of the slow, Somali social process of achieving consensus through continuous debate and negotiation?

Another set of questions concern the purpose and consequences of aid: Does aid in practice feed the war? Does it reach the local people who are most in need? And does it help them to re-construct social conditions and an economic base that encourage a return to self-sufficiency? Or does aid create and perpetuate their dependency as receivers? What is the effect of aid on the re-emergence of indigenous structures of authority, administrative capacities, and lines of representation? In particular, how does aid affect the balance between the opposing concepts of political order: the European-style central state or the traditional balance of power system of the clans? More generally, does aid strengthen the emergence of a new administration from above, or an administrative capacity legitimized through representation from and accountability to local and indigenous social structures?

The dilemmas of relief versus dependency are aptly illustrated by an experience recorded by the Médecins sans Frontières in Kismayo. Local people wanted to use the local MSF-established hospital, but saw its operation as the responsibility of MSF. They were not willing to contribute to costs or to share administrative responsibilities. For MSF the question was whether to hand over the hospital nevertheless, with the possibility that it would fall into neglect within a short period, or to continue to run it themselves. As long as the local people could rely on a donor to operate the hospital, they would not invest their resources to maintain it. If the MSF pulled out, the local population might then wait for another donor to come to their rescue. For the MSF, the question could come down to how many innocent people would have to die for the principle of handing over responsibility? (Jan Stevens, MsF, Kismayo, interview 28.4. 1998).
Some foreign aid workers maintain that "handing over" is not possible because the Somali have no concept of public resources, and cannot convert public into private. In one story from Gadabursi, a man was given the responsibility to maintain the local well and charge fees, 50% of which he was to keep as his salary, the other 50% being a collective revenue. Within few weeks the man was killed by his cousin, because he refused to share the (common) resources he collected. (Michael van Notten, EHDA, interview, 20.5.1998)

The dilemmas of relief versus dependency relate to the more fundamental question concerning recipient responsibility. As soon as the immediate emergency is over, the issue of recipient orientation, responsibility and self-sufficiency reappear on the agenda. In the long run, it is not possible to aid recipients who seem to lack the will to become self-reliant again. However, adaptations may nevertheless lead to "self sufficiency strategies" in which donors are to remain a regular source of supplies.

Donor agencies are not always clear as to who the recipients are, who represents them, who can organise and finance permanent solutions. Often it is unclear who is administratively responsible for the recipients. Can aid be given without administrative authorities? How can aid lead over to rehabilitation if, as in Somalia today, there are few structures available for a "recipient orientation"? The very term "recipient" is interpreted differently, meaning anything from the individual accepting a dish of food at the field kitchen of the Red Cross, to the state authorities with which aid agencies negotiate the terms of assistance.

It is by now commonly accepted in donor communities that aid agencies must assess the capacity of recipients to organise, otherwise they may easily be manipulated by their supposed clients. Negative forms of recipient organisation may occur for manipulative purposes, as observed in refugee camps in the Ogaden. Donors insisted on controlling food distribution and defining rations by their own standards. As the Somali refugees in the camps were not given any influence on distributions, they tried to maximise them. Their self-styled leaders justified taxing the camp population, arguing that only their organised pressure could guarantee undisrupted supplies of donations. They put pressure on the donors for more distributions, sabotaging all attempts of donor agencies to encourage self-help, and emphasizing the refugees’ claim to distributions. When donor agencies decided to reduce handouts, the self-styled leaders brought together starving children, threatening to present them to the international press as victims of arbitrary donor policies. Some donors suspected the camp leaders were deliberately keeping some children severely undernourished as a proof of continuing need for aid. The camp leaders, for their part, clearly considered the donors as a normal source for resources, and were willing to take violent action to maintain this
"rightful" supply of income, to which they considered having a legitimate claim, a traditional right (Pausewang 1994).

In principle, then, it is vital for donors in emergency situations to develop early and solid relations with organisational structures of the recipients, to help rebuild indigenous capacities to administer services which can only temporarily be provided by the donors. Failing this, the most likely result will be that recipients turn into clients, and recipient structures into permanent pressure groups or even criminal gangs set on extracting aid. How a workable strategy can be developed in practice, however, is unclear. There are no set recipes.

**Humanitarian assistance and security**

The involvement of aid agencies in Somalia was further made difficult by acute security problems. At the height of the civil strife, in the early 1990s, looting of relief supplies, attacks on relief transport, burglaries in food depots and hijacking of aid agencies were rampant. Even burglaries in the homes of Somali families who had received aid distributions became common, while in some areas warlords or factions "taxed" the population on the distributions received.

The aid agencies reacted differently to this situation. Some pulled out, while others hired armed guards to protect their operations. Others tried to protect themselves by negotiating with dominant warlords or local clans. The agencies recognized that negotiating with warlords would add to the legitimacy of the latter, hence indirectly they became involved in the conflict. But accepting that a proportion of aid deliveries would get to the warlords, through direct theft or through taxation, meant directly feeding the war.

Another aspect of the security problem was the *chat* traffic. *Chat* (or kat) is a local drug widely used in Somalia, its use spreading rapidly in wartime. The production and trade of *chat* has become a major economic activity at the expense of local food production. There is a distinct danger that food aid could perpetuate the *chat* business. By depressing food prices, food aid might simultaneously make local food production less attractive than growing *chat*.

Transporting *chat* by road and air constitutes a growing business. *Chat* planes arrive daily in Somalia and Somaliland from Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti, as the local production can not
keep pace with demand. *Chat* planes are the most regular and reliable means of transport, and aid agencies have frequently used *chat* planes on the return run for their own transport. *Chat* transport by car constitutes an increasing danger in road traffic, as drivers hurry to get their cargo fresh to the market and often are intoxicated themselves.

**Reconstructing the Somali state?**

The question of indigenous responsibility and administrative capacity is essential if relief aid is to be handled and terminated responsibly. Customarily, administrative responsibility is organised in a state. In a situation as in Somalia, where the state in 1990 ceased to exist, donors might be tempted to support the re-establishment of a central state authority. However, it could also be argued that the implosion of the Somali state freed the Somali society from a straight-jacket and offers a unique opportunity for Somalia to develop new administrative structures that are based on delegation from the bottom upwards, and hence represent the majority and are accountable to the local people. In that case, a new central state administration should, if at all, come at the end of the process which would be aborted by an early formation of a central state apparatus.

The United Nations intervention in 1992-94, which for some time was almost totally dominated by the United States, has been criticised for being preoccupied with re-establishing a central state in Somalia (Prunier 1997). The UN intervention has been described in several publications and need not be repeated here (see Heinrich 1997; Sahnoun 1994; Samatar 1995). What is important for our analysis is that part of the UN initiative which led to the Addis Ababa agreement in 1993 to organise "district councils" in Somalia. Utilising local foci and opportunities, the district councils were negotiated with local elders and other persons seen to represent, in one capacity or other, the local constituencies.

The process of district council formation was uneven. In some areas the councils were hardly representative, elsewhere they seemed to develop into genuine representation. In some places the process turned sour, in others it was abandoned altogether. One important dividing line between aid agencies is the position taken on the emerging district councils. Some see in the district councils the nucleus of a genuine bottom-up representation of the people, others see the top-down approach of the United Nations in initiating the process. This view holds that the councils can never become democratic, administrative bodies.
The Life and Peace Institute (LPI) in Uppsala, Sweden, was invited in 1992 by the UN Special Representative of the Secretary General in Somalia to assist in strengthening the role of the civil society in the peace process. This assistance was based on an understanding that "peace is not a condition that can be achieved by signing agreements at conference tables, but rather, peace is a process that has to involve the entire society". In line with that philosophy, the LPI, according to its own assessment, "supported traditional leaders of the Somali communities, chiefs, elders, religious leaders, but also women's groups and intellectuals to play an active role in peacebuilding on the local level. By supporting the formation of councils for self-administration on the district and regional levels, the LPI - in its own view - has combined a community-based peacebuilding approach with 'institution-building'" (Heinrich 1997:xi).

Wolfgang Heinrich has recently made a comprehensive assessment of the institute's experience in this process (1997). He clearly sees the district councils, in those areas where they became permanent, as genuine representation of the people and as a nucleus for a bottom-up reconstruction of an administration. He criticises other NGOs for questioning the legitimacy of the councils, claiming that the NGOs otherwise tend to uncritically register and negotiate with any "authorities" for fear of being evicted or losing work permits. He claims that a "constructive engagement" could be a more adequate approach for NGOs. In that way "NGOs could strengthen the foundation of a system of 'good governance'. To wait for the establishment of a national government, which will most likely attempt to reinstall another top-down, administrative structure with centralised control, is definitely the worst alternative" (Heinrich 1997:123). He expects that the emerging and growing control of the district councils will eventually marginalise the warlords, drying out their support and source of finance and supplies.

Heinrich’s analysis conveys a vision of a bottom-up reorganisation of Somali administration. It goes from the district councils to regional councils and eventually up to a loose federation-type national roof-administration, without military power and dependent on a tax base under the control of the lower councils, and is thus controlled from below. Instead of re-establishing a state apparatus in the classical sense, Somalia could do without a central state, thereby giving room for strong and self-reliant local units and self-administrations. The sovereign would be the people, as represented in the district councils, and the state apparatus would be nothing but a roof - a coordinating body depending on popular control and consent. Reflecting this vision, the LPI advocates establishment of a local police force responsible to local councils, a local tax base for the district councils, and independent local courts based on traditional law and nationally negotiated codes. (Sture Normark, LPI, interview 31.3.1998)
There is a question whether the LPI District Councils-approach is the best road towards the envisaged goal, or whether the Somali clans consider the district councils yet another imposition which prevents them from developing their "Xeer" and their own system of fluctuating alliances into a viable system of political authority from below. Other agencies criticise the district councils as a UN-imposed structure without legitimacy or representative qualities. Less critically, Said S. Samatar describes the district councils as an attempt at bottom-up organisation, but criticises them for having unclear functions and authority, and lacking legitimacy. Part of the problem was the speed at which UNOSOM implemented the programme, which left no time for local reconciliation. While the UN initiative was designed to marginalise the warlords, the process was neither impartial nor indigenous (Minority Rights Group 1995: supplement p. 2-3).

Possibly an alternative "Somalia style" democracy might emerge after a protracted process of reconciliation and debate, and materialise as a highly decentralised administration on local and district levels, controlled by and accountable to the people through the traditional clan and family structure. Democratic decisions might be reached by consensus after long Somali-style public debates, and positions might be assigned according to a general feeling of clan balance, rather than (or in addition to) elections. The structure would have a coordinating body at national level with no military or other coercive power.

The position of aid agencies in Somalia

Analyzing the current history of aid agencies in Somalia with reference to questions of authority, collaborating partners, and recipients, several distinctions appear.

Agencies can be distinguished with respect to the principles of neutrality versus solidarity. Typical for the first position, of neutrality, is the Red Cross and Red Crescent family of agencies offering relief regardless of political position and social or other standing. For them, neutrality and impartiality is a precondition for their ability to act in conflict situations, on both sides of the frontlines, and on all sides in emergency situations. They do not take a position on the district councils.

Those adhering to the solidarity principle can be further subdivided. Two distinct positions emerge in relation to the district councils. Some donors actively support the district councils, in line with the arguments most forcefully presented by Life and Peace, and try to encourage
their assumption of responsibility and local control. They train personnel of the district councils and improve their administrative capacities so they can develop into effective local government. Others question their legitimacy, seeing them as alien bodies imposed on Somali society by the UN. These groups prefer to work with local elders and religious leaders, hoping for a process which eventually will bring forth a genuine representation of the Somali people in locally legitimised administrative bodies.

Yet other donors leave the question of administrative relations entirely to their Somali counterparts, working only through indigenous NGOs through whom they distribute their aid.

Agencies which flag solidarity know that the district councils may not be ideal, yet offer a nucleus for a positive development towards grassroots representation. There is still a risk that the district councils may develop in the "wrong" direction, becoming new bodies of control, and eventually a central authority with control from above. On the other hand, this danger can be minimised by active support to capacity development and nurturing of genuine democratic attitudes and practice.

Aid organisations who do not support the district councils, have little choice but to work with local leaders on an ad hoc temporary base. This position, however, runs the risk that other forces within Somali society, with ambitions to re-establish the military central state structure, will re-align and entrench their grip on central state power. This risk is, of course, also present for aid organisations that leave it to their local partners to solve their political affairs alone.
II: REPORTS FROM INDIVIDUAL AGENCIES:

In order to map out the views of the aid agencies further, we conducted structured interviews with several Scandinavian and international agencies active in Somalia after 1990. Interviews were made on telephone, mail and/or E-mail, often in a combination. A set of questions was sent to all respondents to serve as a guideline with respect to the following issues:

- Who are the receivers of aid?
- the issue of dependency
- Reconstruction of authorities
- Democracy
- The relation to the state
- Security
- Empowerment.

A summary of the interviews with each agency follows below. These are presented in the nature of "field notes". All were conducted in early 1998.

The Norwegian Red Cross, Oslo (Jan Håkonsen)

The Norwegian Red Cross (NRC) has been involved in Somalia since 1981 when it started rebuilding a rehabilitation centre for the handicapped in Mogadishu. Since 1988 NRC is also supporting a hospital in Berbera. Since 1991, when the crisis reached Mogadishu, NRC has supported the emergency aid of the I C R C, and also the I F R C. In recent years, NRC has spent 10 to 12 million NOK annually in Somalia.

The primary aim was to rebuild and strengthen the Somali Red Crescent. Support to the local organisation of the Red Crescent was all the time given through I C R C or I F R C.

The Red Cross is constitutionally mandated to be neutral. The Red Cross could therefore not involve itself in political processes. Staff members took care not to be seen together with UN authorities, especially when the UN became part in the conflict, in 1993. This caused a dilemma, though, because one was aware that neutrality in practice can favour one side.
In 1990, the Red Crescent was the only local country-wide aid organisation to relate to. This applies also to Somaliland at that time.

The district councils which the UN later tried to build up, did not function well. They were created by UNOSOM, on basis of outdated clan maps, there was little public representation, no delegation, no "ownership", they were rather built on the opportunism of individuals who saw a chance to cooperate with them. The Red Crescent built its work mainly on its own national organisation. Later, when Somaliland emerged, there were independent authority structures in the North. In the rest of the country, there are no authorities to work with. In fact, owing to the lack of authorities, the Red Crescent Mother-and-Child-clinics functioned for some time as a kind of Ministry of Health.

In the North East, there is now a process going on to build up a "Puntland state", as a regional authority built on local administrations, without ambitions of secession and international recognition.

Security: Somalia was the first time the Red Cross resorted to the exceptional practice of hiring armed guards. Hiring was entirely clan based: the clans, not the Red Cross, paid and organised them. "We even had to change guards when crossing the 'green line' in Mogadishu".

Local volunteers who know the situation suggested that the Red Cross introduced public kitchens in Mogadishu. This greatly reduced the danger of looting, since ready cooked food has low resale value for soldiers.

Chat is seen as a big social problem and a drain on local resources. In the North, there is no big problem with chat production replacing food. Chat is mostly imported, since Siad Barré’s government in 1989 tried to stop chat production by burning and destroying the fields. Production stopped while consumption continued. In Somalia, an estimated 100 to 200 000 dollars is spent daily on chat import, earned through export of hides, meat, and cattle.

To avoid dependency, the Red Cross is conscious of the need to reduce relief aid as soon as possible, and to strengthen local Red Crescent organisations. Receiver orientation takes the form of support to the Red Crescent, which has its own local network and relations to the clan structure. In 1992, as soon as the crisis was over, food distribution was reduced to encourage home production. When local food distribution became necessary again because of recent
floods, the Red Cross used local traders for distribution. Thus food prices were kept low and affordable for the poor. Distribution is continued only as long as absolutely necessary.

The Norwegian Red Cross saw the UN as part of the conflict, not as a neutral mediator. At the beginning, as long as Mohammed Sahnoun was the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General, there were attempts to support local initiatives for a solution. Later the UN initiative became a massive operation with an unclear mandate.

The District Councils were never representative, because they were not created in direct contact with the people. Legitimate authorities do not exist today. The only people with authority are the local elders and clan leaders. They will have to negotiate the issues in their way. Only the Somalis themselves can solve the crisis and to work out their form of democracy. There may eventually be a kind of federal government as a roof over local or regional units. We can only help indirectly by not supporting the undemocratic forces.

The biggest problem in the relationship between humanitarian aid and administrative reconstruction is that outside interests get involved and meddle in Somali issues. The Red Cross is mandated to keep neutral. We have to be careful not to involve ourselves in things we have no control over. First and foremost, we should avoid flooding the country with outside help. The Somalis have to do the groundwork themselves.

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Genève (Laurent Felley)

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has been involved in Somalia since the Ogaden conflict in 1982, when it visited and protected prisoners of war. Later, ICRC offered general support to the Somali Red Crescent. In the 1992 famine it had a feeding programme through public kitchens which distributed ready cooked food to up to one million people.

There was a definite concern to avoid dependency by involving local communities, and particularly women, in the programme activities. The distribution of seeds and tools, support to fisheries, cattle vaccination etc. were intended to support self-sufficiency. The Red Cross tried to avoid price deterioration through reduced food production. They also were concerned not to create tensions with traders.
Security problems were continuous by 1993. All values were exposed to robberies, including cars, communication equipment, stocks and warehouses. When the situation became intolerable, the ICRC moved to Nairobi, leaving the work to the local Red Crescent or local Somalis under ICRC contract. Distribution was also organised through existing commercial networks. The traders could do the transport much more efficiently and care for safety by themselves.

The ICRC says it worked through local elders, but also coordinated with politicians, including the warlords where necessary. It kept links with the UN, but took care to coordinate with them - not to be coordinated by them. It was difficult to have neutrality accepted. It demanded efforts in networking and talking to all sides. Neutrality had to be proven by actions. Coordination was done only to avoid duplication and to close gaps. Keeping independent to protect neutrality was a major concern of ICRC.

Receivers: The Red Cross distributed directly to the beneficiaries, and ICRC had its own specialists in the field assess the needs, on the basis of information from field officers. Expert staff checked the information on the spot and decided on needs.

ICRC holds that aid should not be used to support political or administrative reconstruction. The goal of aid is only to offer relief for the needs of people affected. There is a big debate going on whether aid can prolong a conflict. However, one can not just let people die to shorten the conflict. One has to be careful about the way one is operating, to make sure food is going to the civil population, not to soldiers. The aim is not to achieve peace, but to show humanitarian solidarity in case of emergencies. This work necessarily implies many disappointments and few successes.

The International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), Genève:

The interview came at an extremely difficult time, - the hostage crisis in Mogadishu was going on. I was advised to talk to Jan Håkonsen from the Norwegian Red Cross, and take his answers for the IFRC’s: "...he is our best reference..."
Life and Peace is involved in Somalia since 1992 when it was invited by the UN as adviser to the local democratisation process. Life and Peace supports the process of rebuilding governmental structures from the local level and upward. This process was described before, with reference to a recent evaluation (Heinrich 1997). Life and Peace sees in the Somali situation a historically unique chance to create a governmental structure from the beginning, involving the local communities and the people. "This offers a unique opportunity to build a decentralised administrative structure that can be effectively controlled by its constituent communities" (Heinrich 1997:124). Life and Peace tries to organise assistance for the empowerment of these nascent local structures.

Life and Peace considers that by now (1998) the district councils have been well established. Hence, all NGOs should work with them on the local level. Some years ago, several NGOs had their own local contacts, but the councils have now become so strong that all NGOs should recognise them as local authorities.

Life and Peace works on capacity building in the councils. Education and training were given priority. The Somalis demanded help in training. Life and Peace concentrated much of its help on educational measures, including on the job training, democracy training, administrative skills, book keeping and other skills.

As far as authority on a higher level is concerned, Somaliland can serve as a model, LPI says. Here, state authorities were constructed as a roof over the local councils. Later a federal Somali state government might be formed. The process has to grow from within and from the bottom, care has to be taken to avoid an imposition from above.

Local authorities must successively recapture power from the warlords, gradually marginalise them, dry out their resources and their support. That is not possible without support for the councils from outside. It will only work if all NGOs support the local structures created in the councils. An interplay between humanitarian aid and reconstruction is absolutely important. "Peace and development are one and the same". Life and Peace is continuing to work with this interrelationship. Aid agencies ought to recognize this relationship and direct their assistance to support the reconstruction of peaceful future administrative structures, not to interfere with it.
Security was a big problem. Cars would be stolen or hijacked at once. To keep lower costs, LPI had to hire cars from local businessmen who took care of security and assurance. Sometimes they sent cars with their own security guards, but usually they had their local contacts assuring safety. Transport was the big cost factor. UNOSOM had their own cars, but were also sometimes forced to hire private cars.

*Chat:* Life and Peace works on a research on the effects of *chat*. It is important to work with local organisations. It is difficult to intervene in the *chat* business, because significant economic interests are involved, which oppose any intervention. Only if the local authorities take up the matter and initiate a local debate, can anything be done against the *chat* trade.

**Christian Aid (CA), London (Phil Craine)**

CA is not an operational agency. It funds only local NGOs who carry out projects in Somalia, mainly EDGS (Ecumenical Development Group for Somalia). It started work in Somalia as early as during the drought of 1985. Since 1987 it changed emphasis to long-term development work, rehabilitating water boreholes in the North East.

CA reports problems of making local communities contribute to, or take responsibility for, programmes and projects. This is probably due to EDGS' reputation of being a "soft" donor agency, considered as a charity. Communities simply refused to take their share of responsibility and finance for projects. They left it to EDGS to run them - or to let them break down.

EDGS is said to have had relatively few security problems, apart from the death of one staff member. Security problems were in general lower in the North East. They do report, however, problems of being accused by the Islamic Front of having foreign, particularly Christian support.

CA had little direct contact with the district councils, but welcomed them as worthwhile initiatives who have stood their test after the UN left. At the same time, CA notes the apparent inability of the UN to impose a political settlement. In retrospect, they say, it was probably the right decision to leave in 1995.
In the North East, CA sees the clan elders as strong local authorities, but also the local clan-based militia. "The newly emerging local authorities (including the North Eastern regional authority in Bosaso) must be taken into account too. These all have some degree of legitimacy I think. In the South, the warlords have taken over, and legitimacy is much less!" - "Eventually a central government will be formed with power sharing mechanisms to ensure multi-clan representation. It could take a long time... I think Somaliland will finally come back."

CA sees no relationship between short term emergency relief and administrative reconstruction. But in long term development projects one has to consider the effects on reconstruction. Only the Somali people themselves can bring peace to their country, but foreign powers can offer economic incentives to foster democracy and reconciliation.

**Save the Children (SC), London / (Ann Mulcahy, Nairobi)**

Save the Children was in Somaliland already in the 1950s, and has been in the South since the late 1970s. In the 1980s the agency worked with refugees, from 1991 to 1996 in Somaliland. In Mogadishu it worked with refugees earlier. In the South, it closed down in 1994 due to security reasons.

There is much concern to make the receivers participate and take responsibility, share tools and organise themselves (e.g. to administer seed multiplication on a common patch of land, and other tasks). Long term involvement is encouraged. In the North, the clan structure made such efforts difficult. When the agency felt that it was manipulated by the government of Somaliland, it closed down its operation.

SC follows a "food need" approach, by diversifying food production according to needs. They encourage production, especially of vulnerable families. Besides food needs, the need to pay education and health fees is considered in measures to stimulate production.

SC works with village elders and, to some extent, the sharia administration. "There will probably be no efforts to establish a national government yet for a long time to come", is the organisation's assessment. The problem is to keep a roof over the clans. For the time being there are not even any strong local authorities.
Political-administrative reconstruction is a difficult issue in Somalia. At the moment it is too early to pursue it. The experience of UNOSOM shows that it will take a long time. At some time. "Hargeisa tried to utilise our programme but we withdrew... To use humanitarian aid to strengthen administrative structures is not the way to go. Political influences do unfortunately come from outside. Ethiopia, Egypt, and IGADD have their agenda in Somalia. That does not make reconstruction easier. Maybe keeping things separate is not a bad thing..."

SC holds that democracy can at present at best be supported in small ways, on local level, at the 'Beeo' level. Decision-making processes can only be encouraged in very practical matters. One can see people discuss and come to agreements on issues like sharing a fax. People come together - but not for longer-term planning. But one can try to encourage more dialogue and debate. Or there is a chance to work with women's groups, such as OXFAM does.

Security problems were at times very serious. At one time, when Aideed took over Beletswaine for nine months, a local team continued the work while the agency pulled out. SC also had to hire watchmen, although one felt uncomfortable with it.

The chat traffic has a tremendous impact in Hargeisa (Somaliland). It influences the programmes of the organisation. The drain on resources is tremendous. There are security guards chewing chat for more than twice their salaries, and the women have to make up for it by working... Land is increasingly being reverted to chat production.

At some point in the early 1990s, the United Nations had a positive role through UNOSOM. But later they got out of touch with life on the ground. They have developed their own agenda. The district councils, or whatever remains of them after the UN pulled out, are not representative at all (at least in Beletswaine region). They were set up in a hurry. It takes much more time to settle issues with the clans. The people are still left outside, remaining without representatives. There is little authority that can act across the district.

Save the Children tries to cooperate on a local level, keeping direct links to the elders. In an urban context, they keep the administration informed but don't involve themselves.
Médecins sans Frontières (MsF), Nairobi / (Jan Stevens, Kismayu)

MsF has been active in Somalia since April 1992, initially as a temporary emergency intervention to give health assistance to the population in Kismayu and upgrade the local hospital. A "receiver oriented approach" was soon established, MsF says, by creating a hospital managing board trying to shift responsibilities to the hospital staff and the community.

MsF supported the independent police created by UNOSOM. There are no other administratively responsible authorities in place, says MsF. Problems are tackled through elders and other influential people in town. MsF has withdrawn from Kismayo five times in six years, mostly to put pressure on the local population to take more responsibility.

MSF considered the district councils a very good initiative and cooperated with them when needed. However, after the UN retreated, the councils lost most of their potential. At the moment, MsF judges that there are no legitimate authorities on local level, only elders. In the near future, one might expect "some kind of trans-clan administration in a regional set-up... or a hyper centralistic military or religious regime". Hopefully, regional developments might eventually join up in a federation.

The MsF representative expresses his fear that aid money could only interfere with any honest administration building, and corrupt the process. Democracy, he is afraid, "might not be the most appropriate system for Somalia".

Dutch InterChurch Aid (DIA), Utrecht (Bea Stolte)

DIA got involved in Somalia in the beginning of the 1980es- by aiding refugees. Later water rehabilitation was added. The basic aim was to make people self supporting, and to assist in emergencies. DIA also supported fisheries rehabilitation and development along the North-East coast. DIA worked with EDGS as local partner, the same organisation as Christian Aid supported.

Emergency aid should always be related to rehabilitation. To enhance the ownership of the programme, the local partners (EDGS) always negotiated with local structures.
There have been security problems. These were always solved through negotiation with elders. The traditional structures have assisted EDGS so it could remain in Garowe region, even during the most difficult times, when DIA had to retreat. DIA had no direct cooperation with UN personnel or structures. But EDGS did involve itself in meetings organised by the district councils.

Concerning development of a national government, DIA reports a remark of an elderly lady saying: "The international community is trying to impose a government upon the Somali society. When they stop meddling, we will come with our own solution."

Traditional authorities should have a role but it will take a long time until new structures emerge. Aid can only help to the degree it can strengthen the independence of people. One should listen to the existing traditional structures and hear what they have to say about this.

**CARE Somalia, Nairobi (David Neff)**

CARE started in Somalia in 1981 with relief aid to refugees.

Security: CARE is facing fewer problems than other agencies because of its longstanding good reputation with the local people. Security problems are often related to labour relations, but CARE deals with such issues "quickly and according to the Somali labour law, and open and respectful treatment of staff is helping to uphold the reputation".

CARE says it keeps open communication with various types and levels of administration. CARE "welcomed the military intervention in 1992". However, by mid 1993 "UNOSOM was so clearly off on the wrong track" that CARE appealed to Boutros Ghali to "set his agency straight". This never happened, and UNOSOM "ended in a failure". The intention was to end the war, provide access to vulnerable populations, and re-establish a government. But the huge amount of material and resources brought in, gave the Somali warlords much to fight over - it was the second golden goose for Somalia.

The UNOSOM district council initiative "was viewed by most aid agencies as misdirected, to say the least". It intended to bring democracy to Somalia, but was not aware of Somali democratic traditions. It enjoyed little credibility in the local community and the aid community.
Receiver orientation: the days of handouts are gone in Somalia. Aid has to get tough conditions. Implementation has to start through local partners. Most donors insist on greater community input, participation, user fee systems, etc. CARE supports different activities to boost food production and to replace aid with self-supply.

Legitimate authority exists to some degree at the community and village level, seldom beyond. "The crisis in Somalia is over. What we expect today is a political process Somalia style. This is characterised by one step forward, some steps back, some steps forward, a step back - and this will go on for years..." A confederation might perhaps materialize in the end. Pushing from outside can only produce a short term, ineffective, central government which will not last more than half a year and might well end in renewed large scale conflict.

CAREs representative distinguishes three time frames for aid: short-term emergency life-saving programmes, medium term mechanisms of employment generation and work programmes, and long-term poverty alleviation, economic and political development, local capacity building etc. All humanitarian aid is in a way political. Working through local NGOs and community structures can help build administrative capacities. But fostering democracy "sounds too much like UNOSOM", "democracy is rampant in Somalia, it needs to be channelled and tamed".

**Norwegian Church Aid, Nairobi - (Petros Wontamo)**


NCA says it was seeking active participation by involving the receivers at all levels from planning to implementation. Everything was done with the beneficiaries' full knowledge and active involvement, "it was their programme". NCA assisted local capacity building by working with district and regional administrative councils. The local community is both the beneficiary and the receiver.

Instead of relief distribution, NCA has wherever possible taken measures to assist the local communities with agricultural tools and seeds and loans to increase food production.

Security: NCA did not encounter major security problems. The programme is "owned and run by the people", the communities in the area are its owners.
The UNOSOM intervention is seen as a top-down approach with little input of the Somalis themselves. The concept of district councils may have been correct and necessary, but lacked adequate background and support. Still, NCA cooperates with them and tries to strengthen them.

There are no legitimate authorities in Somalia now. It is hoped that a transitional national structure with some level of legitimacy will emerge in the future. The Somalis must solve their crisis by themselves. But the international community has a big challenge to offer help to the Somali people in this process. They can use humanitarian aid also to strengthen the process of national reconciliation and socio-political reconstruction. Democratisation in Somalia may be a slow process, it demands planned education at a grass-roots level, "in a traditional gerontocratic society where tradition and ethnicity play a decisive role."

Norwegian People’s Aid, Oslo (Trude Falch)

NPA has worked in Somalia since 1992-3, initiated by a request from Somali refugees in Norway to help with de-mining. However, a fact-finding mission in 1993 concluded that other forms of involvement were more immediately needed. Instead of de-mining, a programme of support for health, agriculture and education in Northern Somalia was recommended.

NPA says the programme from the beginning had a component of strengthening local authorities through cooperation. Re-building structures of administrative responsibility was a central aspect.

Security was a big and continuous problem. There were threats to the management, assaults and pressure on the staff. The organisation hired guards, and after a while the guards were outnumbering the regular staff members by about 45 to 30. The guards were a stabilising factor, but also constituted local employment. The community wanted NPA to continue hiring them even when the need was reduced. Scaling down became a question of negotiating with the community.

The chat traffic did not affect NPA’s work much, although pervasive. Chat is flown in from abroad, and the aid organisations can facilitate their own transport by using the empty
returning *chat* planes. It does not affect agriculture in the project areas, as this is a nomadic area with very little agriculture, and *chat* is not grown.

At present the organisation tries to change its objectives towards reconstruction and capacity building. There is a tremendous need for social mobilisation. A local contribution is expected, but there are no structures to provide a budget for even the most basic things. Offering medical training for health personnel is hardly effective if there are no funds to pay them salaries, or to build health centres. There are councils of elders of the sub-clans, but they have no budget. How can a hospital be made sustainable without any local budget authority?

There were no district councils in the North, where the NPA operated, so the issue of cooperation did not arise. The government in Hargeisa (Somaliland) functions well in areas which accept its authority. But the project area lies in a kind of no-man’s land. Once the district of Puntland is being organised, this may change. There are more or less legitimate local authorities, although it is unclear if they can maintain their positions.

Humanitarian aid and administrative reconstruction are closely linked - aid can attempt to strengthen what could become viable structures. Democracy is a difficult subject in Somalia. But low-level grassroots work, involving the people, is a part of fostering democracy. In Somalia the pattern is for negotiations continue until a consensus is reached. It has to be possible to build on such local traditions. It is the only way left for Somalia.

**United Nations Development Office for Somalia (UNDOS), Nairobi (Gian Paolo Alo)***

The office was established in 1993 to respond to Somalia’s move from an emergency situation to rehabilitation and development. It became a UNDP project in 1994, being seen as the future Somalia Ministry of Planning and Economic Management. The establishment was an effort in capacity building through technical assistance, to strengthen existing administrative structures and make them sustainable. As such, UNDOS considers the local administrations their counterparts as well as partners.
Schematic summary of agency responses:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>active since</th>
<th>authority</th>
<th>district councils</th>
<th>UN</th>
<th>Security</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Christian Aid</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>Develop slowly - eventually a &quot;roof&quot; nat.gov. may be formed</td>
<td>supported</td>
<td>positive but limited</td>
<td>not too much problems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Save the Children</td>
<td>1950s</td>
<td>does hardly exist - only rudimentary</td>
<td>not accepted</td>
<td>Failed</td>
<td>Problems. Watchmen hired.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life and Peace</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Build up support from below - unique chance</td>
<td>Strong supported</td>
<td>Problems. hire cars.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MsF</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Hardly existent. Cooperate-but with care</td>
<td>Lost their effect</td>
<td>supported initially</td>
<td>Problems. Local solutions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch Inter-Church Aid</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>non existent. Takes time to develop. eventually central &quot;roof&quot; govt.</td>
<td>Supported</td>
<td>sceptical</td>
<td>Problems solved by elders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norwegian Red Cross</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>Neutrality. Leave polit. negotiat. to local elders</td>
<td>Were never represen-tative</td>
<td>UN is part of conflict</td>
<td>Problems. Hired guards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFRC</td>
<td></td>
<td>(see Norwegian Red Cross)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICRC</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>Neutrality. Work through elders.</td>
<td>Sceptical</td>
<td>Severe problem. use local Traders</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARE</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>Village level authorities - state yet to be formed - end of a long process</td>
<td>Not represent.</td>
<td>Welcomed UN mil.interv. problem. but wrong track</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norwegian Church Aid</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Not much at present - strengthen process toward representative capacities</td>
<td>sceptical</td>
<td>Top-bottom approach Distribut. through traders</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norwegian People’s Aid</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>In the North there is gov. structure -needs support</td>
<td>non exist. in North</td>
<td>No factor Big problems</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDOS</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>UNDOS is there to strengthen local authorities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donor</td>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>Dependency</td>
<td>Receivers</td>
<td>Empowerment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian Aid</td>
<td>Only on local level developing.</td>
<td>Work with local people</td>
<td>beneficiaries (and their animals)</td>
<td>Work with local elders</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Save the Children</td>
<td>Support dialogue - long term challenge</td>
<td>Self-sufficiency - Food needs</td>
<td>Vulnerable groups</td>
<td>Very little scope at present</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life and Peace</td>
<td>Unique chance - support local democracy</td>
<td>Avoid dependency</td>
<td>Local communities</td>
<td>Central goal of the programme</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MsF</td>
<td>&quot;No good idea for Somali society&quot;</td>
<td>Tried in vain to hand over - frust.</td>
<td>The wounded: has to come from inside</td>
<td>Not much exp.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch Inter-Church Aid</td>
<td>Hear what elders have to say</td>
<td>Put demands to your gifts..</td>
<td>Community ownership difficult</td>
<td>Support local efforts</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norwegian Red Cross</td>
<td>Only Somalis themselves can work out</td>
<td>cautious reduction of rations</td>
<td>Patients, local comun.</td>
<td>Not by Red Cross, don't support the wrong side...</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFRC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICRC</td>
<td>Only Somalis themselves can develop democracy</td>
<td>involve women</td>
<td>Local people</td>
<td>Self-reliance - ICRC politically neutral</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARE</td>
<td>Somalis know about democracy - support them</td>
<td>Put demands</td>
<td>Communities must cooperate</td>
<td>Capacity building</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norwegian Church Aid</td>
<td>Local process, needs support, education</td>
<td>important to avoid dependency</td>
<td>community is beneficiary</td>
<td>Help to selfhelp</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norwegian People's Aid</td>
<td>Local traditions must be the base</td>
<td>avoid depend. - build up production</td>
<td>Local organisations</td>
<td>Strengthen capacities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(see Norwegian Red Cross)
### Annex:

**Important events in the Somali crisis**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Siad Barré flees from Mogadishu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Looting in the town</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 1991</td>
<td>UN begins humanitarian aid to Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May-June 1991</td>
<td>Peace Conference in Djibouti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 1991</td>
<td>Fighting in Mogadishu. In four months 25 000 civilians killed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>United Nations are asked to intervene</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 1992</td>
<td>UN appoints Ambassador Mohammed Sahnoun Special Representative of the Secretary General to Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 1992</td>
<td>Sahnoun resigns after criticising the UN reactions to Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1992</td>
<td>The UN Security Council approves resolution 794 establishing UNITAF. Operation Restore Hope begins.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1992</td>
<td>UNOSOM I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 1993</td>
<td>Addis Ababa agreement of ceasefire between warlords</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 March 1993</td>
<td>Second meeting in Addis Ababa with peoples’ representatives present.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37 March 1993</td>
<td>Agreement signed only by the warlords. Provision for establishing district councils.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 May 1993</td>
<td>UNOSOM II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1993</td>
<td>War erupts again</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June to Sept. 1993</td>
<td>State of war between Aideed and UNOSOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 1994</td>
<td>Last US troops out of Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 1995</td>
<td>Last UN troops out of Somalia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
References:


Willems, Jacques, 1993: *So that we can walk in peace...* Report on a Three Weeks Travel to Djibouti and Somalia. Utrecht: Dutch Interchurch Aid.
Interviews with aid donors:

Christian Aid: Phil Craine, London (e-mail) 22.4.


Médecins sans Frontière: Jan Stevens, Badoia / Nairobi (e-mail) 28.4., 11.5.

ICRC: Laurent Felley, Geneve (on telephone) 28.4.; Brigitte Troyon 19.5. (on e-mail)

CARE: David Neff, Nairobi (e-mail) 27.4. (first part) 28.4. (second part)

Norwegian Red Cross: Jan Håkonsen, Oslo (on telephone) 7. 4.

Norwegian Church Aid: Stein Villumstad: 18.2. Odd Evjen: 5. 4. Petros Wontamo, Nairobi (on e-mail and telephone) 19. /20. 4.

Norsk Folkhjelp: Svein Olsen: 2.4., Trude Falch, Oslo (on telephone), 15.4.

Life and Peace: Sture Normark, Uppsala (on telephone) 31.3.

AG KED: Wolfgang Heinrich, Bonn (on telephone), 20.3., 5.5.

Dutch InterChurch Aid: Bea Stolte, Utrecht (on E-mail) 4. 5.

UNDOS: Gian Paolo Aloi, Nairobi (on e-mail) 29.4.