“Looking for Trouble … ”

An evaluation of International Media Support (IMS): Exploring a model for rapid response to threatened media

Kim Brice
Helge Rønning
Hugo Stokke

R 2004: 5
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Preface

The present report is an evaluation of what the evaluation team has found to be a unique and very interesting institution. International Media Support (IMS) is not yet another media NGO that promotes freedom of expression and free media, and issue alerts regarding media oppression, though it is also engaged in this type of work. It aims to contribute to something that is much more challenging, namely to support media in conflict situations, and to promote media as a tools for conflict resolution. To analyse the experiences and concrete activities of IMS in the short period that the organisation has existed has been an extremely interesting undertaking. We are very pleased that we were given the opportunity to undertake this exercise. It has provided us with new insights into international media support work, but also made us reflect on the various roles of media in different parts of the world. Thus the evaluation exercise in itself has been a learning experience to us.

We hope that the evaluation also will contribute to the valuable work that IMS does, as well as to a deeper understanding of how similar organisations might develop, as well as to providing the Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs with tools and insights that will be of use in its work of providing support for peace and stability and democracy initiatives.

The framework for the evaluation was ideal. We as a team were given the resources to be able to undertake fieldwork, consult with specialists, meet to discuss our findings and work together on several occasions as well as to interact with the IMS staff and the Board.

There are many who have contributed to this report in a number of ways. But we would initially like to express our gratitude to the FRESTA secretariat for providing such an ideal framework for the evaluation and its interest in the evaluation process, and to the Chr. Michelsen Institute that contracted us to undertake the evaluation. Then of course the work would have been impossible without the input from and the frank discussions with Jesper Højberg and Martin Breum of IMS. Their dedication to the IMS is remarkable, and their willingness to enter into proper exchanges around important issues has been invaluable. Tine Rasmussen, who holds the IMS secretariat together, also provided us with much assistance. Our reference group Vibeke Sperling, Astrid Suhrke and Gunnar Sørhø shared their considerable knowledge with us on issues and areas where they are experts. Nils Gunnar Songstad did invaluable work in working out the classification schemes for the IMS interventions. We have also consulted with many others in our work. We have found people to be genuinely interested in the work IMS does, and they have been willing to share their knowledge and their views with us. There are bound to some mistakes in a work like this. They are our responsibility.

The Hague, Oslo, Bergen, April 24, 2003

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# List of acronyms and abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A19</td>
<td>ARTICLE 19</td>
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<tr>
<td>AJH</td>
<td>Haitian Journalists’ Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>BMC</td>
<td>Baltic Media Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAF</td>
<td>Communications Assistance Foundation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEHURDES</td>
<td>Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>CJES</td>
<td>Centre for Journalists in Extreme Situations</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMI</td>
<td>Chr. Michelsen Institute</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPJ</td>
<td>Committee to Protect Journalians</td>
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<td>Danida</td>
<td>Danish Agency for International Development Assistance</td>
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<td>EAMI-S</td>
<td>East Africa Media Institute – Somali Chapter</td>
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<td>EFPJA</td>
<td>Ethiopian Free Press Journalists Association</td>
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<td>FRESTA</td>
<td>Danish Foreign Ministry’s Peace and Stability Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>IBIS</td>
<td>Danish development organisation</td>
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<td>IFEX</td>
<td>International Freedom of Expression Exchange</td>
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<td>IFJ</td>
<td>International Federation of Journalists</td>
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<td>IMPACS</td>
<td>Institute for Media, Policy and Civil Society</td>
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<td>IMS</td>
<td>International Media Support</td>
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<tr>
<td>IWPR</td>
<td>Institute for War and Peace Reporting</td>
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<td>LTTE</td>
<td>Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam</td>
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<td>MAI</td>
<td>Media Action International</td>
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<td>MFWA</td>
<td>Media Foundation for West Africa (MFWA)</td>
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<td>MISA</td>
<td>Media Institute for Southern Africa</td>
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<td>MTV</td>
<td>Music Television</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non Governmental Organisation</td>
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<td>NOVIB</td>
<td>Oxfam Netherlands</td>
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<td>NPI</td>
<td>Nepal Press Institute</td>
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<td>OSI</td>
<td>Open Society Institute</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSISA</td>
<td>Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>PADRIGU</td>
<td>Peace and Development Research Institute Gothenburg University</td>
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<td>PRIO</td>
<td>Peace Research Institute Oslo</td>
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<td>RCFA</td>
<td>Russian Chechen Friendship Association</td>
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<td>RSF</td>
<td>Reporters Sans Frontières</td>
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<td>Samdef</td>
<td>Southern African Media Development Fund</td>
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<td>SIDA</td>
<td>Swedish International Development Agency</td>
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<td>SLMM</td>
<td>Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission</td>
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<td>SOAT</td>
<td>Sudanese Organisation Against Torture</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOR</td>
<td>Terms of Reference</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization</td>
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<td>USAID</td>
<td>The American Governmental Development Support Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>WAN</td>
<td>World Association of Newspapers</td>
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Executive summary

In early January 2003 The Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI) was contracted by the Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), the Peace and Stability Fund (FRESTA) to undertake an evaluation of International Media Support. CMI appointed the following team to undertake the assessment: Kim Brice, Independent Consultant, The Hague; Helge Rønning, Professor, University of Oslo, Hugo Stokke, Researcher, CMI, Bergen. Helge Rønning has served as team leader.

The team presented its final report April 28, 2003.

The report consists of 7 parts and 5 annexes.

Part 1: Introduction
This part begins with an overall assessment of IMS as a new, important and unique initiative in the area of support for media in the struggle for democracy and stability. This is due to seven principal characteristics of the organisation. One, IMS is more than a freedom of expression organisation. Two, IMS is willing to take risks. Three, IMS serves as a catalyst for further action. Four, IMS is flexible. Five, IMS is inventive. Six, IMS is both a donor and implementer. Seven, IMS is run by very dedicated people.

This part provides an interpretation of the Terms of Reference and gives an overview of the methodology employed by the team.

Part 2: IMS in Context
Part 2.1 gives a brief account of IMS’ history highlighting the reason for its setting up namely that there was a need for an institution that could provide rapid, flexible and short-term assistance to media in conflict and crises situations. Furthermore the funding system for the two-year pilot phase is being explained. The funding comes from FRESTA/Danida. The cost of each intervention should not be higher than 200,000 DKK. The interventions are to take place both in developing countries as well as in conflict stricken or – threatened close regions e.g. the Balkans, Caucasus, Central Asia.

Part 2.2 consists of an analysis of the role of media in conflict situations with a focus on the interpretation that IMS has given of its mandate, namely

(….) to promote peace and stability and democratic development by means of strengthening media pluralism and dialogue and by promoting the right to freedom of expression and the right to information. These objects shall be attained by providing emergency and short-term conflict prevention services to media and media organisations/institutions in areas of current or potential conflict.

The main conclusions of this discussion are

• That the criteria for defining what constitutes conflict scenarios and reasons for interventions vary and that they often are unclear. The team points to other models for viewing what conflicts entail than the three stages that IMS uses,
namely pre-conflict, overt conflict, and post-conflict. The concept of a Pre-
conflict situation is particularly problematic.

- Interventions in conflict areas both in relation to media and other forms take
  place in three different time-frames – short-term, medium-term, and long-
term. Short-term is very often insufficient.
- It is very difficult to do the kind of work the IMS has been set up to do in
  societies where there are full-blown conflicts.
- It is important to take into consideration that communication is more than
  news and journalism. In relation to media and conflicts it is necessary to take
  into consideration a broad definition of communication and information
  strategies, and particularly consider how to reach different target groups and
  audiences.
- The question of the role of media in peace building exercises is complex, and
  the indicators for how media and media support initiatives might contribute to
  peace building have not in general been worked out in a satisfactory manner.

Part 3: The Organisational Setup of IMS

This part consists of two sections plus findings and deals mainly with an analysis of
the respective roles of the Secretariat and the Board (3.1) and of IMS’ Working and
decision-making procedures (3.2). The main aspects discussed are:

- There is a measure of confusion as to the exact role of different structures
  within IMS in relation to decision-making procedures.
- The conception that board members have of their role is not totally clear.
- There are not sufficiently clear procedures for identifying conflict of interest
  issues.
- Regular staff is too steeped in project management to allow room for
  monitoring and evaluation and forward-looking planning. Work performance
  was highly regarded by the board, and confirmed by the observations by the
  evaluation team through our interactions with the staff.
- The role of the “regular consultants” is not clear in relation to their way of
  representing IMS.
- Minutes of board meetings read more like narratives of what was being said
  than digests of decisions.
- There is a need for more office space. But it has been a great advantage for
  IMS to be housed in the Centre for Human Rights.

Part 4: IMS’ Implementation Modalities

This part covers five sections plus findings that discuss The IMS Mandate (4.1), IMS’
Framework for Interventions (4.2), IMS’ Role (4.3) IMS’ Network of Partner
Organisations (4.4), IMS’ Comparative Advantage (4.5). The major characteristics of
the analysis in this part are:

- IMS has aptly and justifiably used its pilot phase to explore its options within
  its mandate. This has resulted in a broad interpretation of its overall mandate
  to include interventions in situations where media are threatened whether or
  not organised armed conflict is taking place. Practice also shows that “short-
term” does not equate a “once off” activity and “emergency” does not
  necessarily mean a “life and death” situation.
- Though IMS has some mechanism in place for monitoring and evaluating its
  activities, they remain weak and inconclusive.
With regard to networking, the list of IMS partners is impressive and indicative of IMS’ commitment and ability to work symbiotically with others. Its networking function, arguably its most important, has enabled it to achieve much more than would be expected from a three-person organisation in such a short period of time.

The IMS partners that were interviewed unanimously praised IMS for coming onto the press freedom/media development scene without “stepping on anyone else’s toes”. IMS has been complemented for being creative, flexible and rapid in its actions, having funding available with few strings attached and successfully connecting and forging relationships with and between existing organisations.

Its comparative advantage over other like-minded organisations lies in its ability to provide short-term, rapid assistance; act proactively; interpret the needs of media in conflict situations very broadly; have a unique overview of human and financial resources available at national, regional and international levels; and spend its funds flexibly and with few strings attached and to work in “low profile” countries.

IMS’ double role of donor and implementer risks hindering the organisation’s ability to learn from its activities. As a donor, it does not benefit from having hands-on involvement and therefore first hand learning in order to develop and re-adjust its approaches. Unless its evaluation mechanisms are strengthened, it is not able to learn from the projects it is helping implement.

Part 5: IMS Projects
This part consists of concrete analyses of IMS’ interventions both in the form of an overall overview and through case studies of interventions in four continents. The sections are Analysis of the IMS Project Portfolio (5.1) and 5.2 Case Studies detailing analyses of interventions in West Africa (Sierra Leone, Liberia, The Ivory Coast) (5.2.1), The Horn of Africa (Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan) (5.2.2), South Asia (Nepal, Sri Lanka) (5.2.3), Afghanistan (5.2.4), Central Asia (Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan) (5.2.5), Chechnya (5.2.6), Byelorussia (5.2.7), Ukraine (5.2.8), Haiti (5.2.9). The areas chosen for field visits and the other case studies that have been included in the report are representative enough to give a good impression of the activities conducted by IMS. This is a part of the report that covers many aspects of the way the IMS operates. The main discoveries of the evaluation team are:

- Sometimes IMS seems to move in overcrowded terrains. That is in countries, which may be characterised as very high profile (Nepal, Sri Lanka, Afghanistan, Israel/Palestine, Chechnya). It is a factor that always should be assessed in relation to where to intervene.
- IMS is willing to take risks, and be experimental and creative. And this is a great asset.
- IMS must conduct a proper evaluation of the quality of the workshops and training that it lets partner organisations undertake.
- It is necessary with very thorough preparations for and identification of suitable partners particularly in situations of violent conflict.
- The fact that IMS follows up its missions with concrete commitments and activities, and quickly, increases its credibility with its partners.
- IMS’ involvement in the Horn of Africa exemplifies how IMS has broadened its interpretation of its mandate to include post-conflict scenarios.
• It is not always clear from IMS’ documents what the organisation’s overall objective is in each country, beyond responding to a large spectrum of problems faced by the media, and on what basis it believes it can have an impact on a particular identified problem, especially concerning the role of media in conflict.
• It can be safely said that IMS’ activities in several of the “case studies-countries” have been unique and catalytic.
• IMS’ success also comes from its ability to rapidly link local organisations to international groups.
• In general, it is very difficult to gauge the impact of many of the activities IMS has supported to date. For the most part, outputs are clear but criteria for success have not been developed by neither IMS or by its partners. Furthermore, IMS largely relies on reports from its consultants and partner organisations to assess activities it has not directly been involved with. Of course, impact is also hard to gauge when many activities are still on going. Finally, the longer-term effect of many of IMS activities will depend entirely on whether they continue beyond IMS’ engagement.
• There is a need for continued assessment of how long IMS should stay involved in a given country and how many resources it should invest in a given country over time.
• IMS could, in some instances, consider increasing its grants to local organisations. This is especially true here, where IMS’ investments in missions almost equals its investments in concrete activities. The scale should tip more in the direction of concrete activities.
• In interventions in conflicts zones it is important to seek the media most effective in the local context.
• In depth training in media monitoring issues must consist of more than what can be achieved at short workshops, and it is particularly important that this training takes into consideration local and national circumstances and institutions.
• Provincial and local media are easily overlooked.
• In some countries, there is some uncertainty about which groups to target (publishers, editors or journalists), creating possible problems for the effectiveness of the intervention.

Part 6: Conclusions
This part contains an overview of the most important findings (6.1) in the report plus a list of 20 recommendations (6.2) to IMS and FRESTA to consider in the next phase of IMS’ existence.

The main conclusion is that it is very impressive what IMS has managed to achieve over less than two years. The number of interventions is impressive. The quality of the work is in general very good. The ability to cooperate with partners is fine. The enthusiasm for the project is great both among the staff and the board. And the 17 recommendations are:

1. Clarify IMS’ organisational structure. IMS should develop a policy document that describes IMS’ organisational structure of IMS and, that records all, important procedural principles of the Association. This document should also define the role and responsibility of the General Assembly, the Board of
Directors, the Advisory Council (if applicable) and the Executive Director. It should also present clear policies regarding criteria for the composition of the General Assembly and the Board, as well as the selection and rotation policies for each.

2. **Define processes for dealing with conflict of interest issues.** IMS should develop a working definition of conflict of interest and put in place procedures for dealing with conflict of interest issues when they arise. We recommend that a small committee made up of the IMS Chair and one or two other board members serve as the decision-making body whenever a conflict of interest issue should arise. This will absolve the Executive Director from taking responsibility for decisions on such matters. Decisions taken by this committee should be recorded and signed by the IMS Chair.

3. **Improve communication with board members.** In between meetings, board members should receive short notices on upcoming interventions, assessment missions or other IMS activities in order for them to be able to comment and provide input before an activity is undertaken.

4. **Improve record keeping of the organisation’s decisions.** Minute taking should become an administrative responsibility and accurately describe decisions that are taken at meetings. Minutes from the previous meeting should be reviewed at each board meeting, amendments noted, and signed off by the IMS Chair.

5. **Hire additional programme and administrative staff.** The Executive Director should be released from some of his programme responsibilities in order to take on a more “strategic thinking” role within the organisation. A programme officer, recruited on the basis of an open and international competition, should be hired in the very near future. This position should include a half-time evaluation/impact assessment function. Additional secretarial and bookkeeping support should also be recruited in the near future.

6. **Develop detailed job descriptions.** Detailed job descriptions should be prepared for all staff members.

7. **Second phase.** The second phase of IMS should be extended to a 3 –5 year period.

8. **Redefine and raise the ceiling for funding.** There should be increased funding for IMS in order for the organisation to be able to (a) Raise the funding for certain select projects, and (b) Expand certain select projects into a medium-term framework, and (c) Enter a second phase in certain cases of special projects.

9. **Design a project management cycle.** IMS might consider separating its interventions into a planning and an implementation phase in order to be able to commit larger amounts of funds to interventions that require them. A guideline for expenditure could be set for a planning phase, which usually includes assessments missions, and for a first and any subsequent phases of interventions.

10. **Strategic planning.** An annual strategic planning session, aided by an external facilitator, should be held once a year or every two years, as needed. Such a meeting should be held over several days and include board members, staff and selected IMS consultants and other relevant resource persons.

11. **Improve evaluation procedures.** As much as possible, IMS should work evaluation mechanisms into its projects and, when necessary, provide for an external evaluation process. Evaluation tools will have to be determined on a
case-by-case basis. If IMS is to take evaluation seriously, it will have to dedicate resources to it.

12. **Training partners.** IMS needs to follow up their training partners, particularly the international training partners to whom they outsource training assignments. Use local partners more, couple international and local training expertise. Ask for proper training plans before the workshop is being implemented.

13. **Criteria for interventions.** IMS needs to re-examine and refine its criteria for interventions and its definitions of stages of conflict. As part of a learning exercise, IMS should try to assess which types of intervention work best under which type of circumstances, i.e. conflict phase (escalation phase, armed conflict, reduction phase).

14. **Create a platform for emergency assistance/safety mechanisms.** IMS should take a lead in bringing together organisations that manage emergency assistance funds or are involved in safety issues (safety training, safe havens etc.) in order to improve their coordination and develop overall strategies for this area of work.

15. **Initiate a working group on conflict conscious journalism and peace building media projects.** IMS could bring together groups working on conflict conscious reporting and peace building media projects in order to discuss methodologies and evaluation issues. The latter has been identified by some practitioners as an area in serious need of development.

16. **Documentation of activities.** Documents should more consistently state its author. The origination of the intervention should be more clearly stipulated along with the objective for an intervention.

17. **Greater cooperation with organisations involved with conflict analysis.** IMS’ work would benefit from greater cooperation with peace and conflict research institutes as well as governmental bodies in order to sharpen their analysis and methodologies in conflict situations and, in the longer term, strengthen the choices of their activities in overt armed conflict areas. The question of the role of media in peace building exercises is complex, and IMS should consider working out indicators for how media and media support initiatives might contribute to peace building.

**Part 7: List of select literature**

This part gives a short overview of literature consulted above and beyond the multitude of IMS documents supplied to the team for the evaluation.

**Annexes**

Annex 1 contains the Terms of Reference for the evaluation. Annex 2 is the inception note prepared by the team as per the TOR for the evaluation. Annex 3 provides a full list of people contacted and interviewed by the team during the evaluation. Annex 4 gives an overview of IMS partners. Finally, Annex 5 contains a set of statistical tables, fully explained and analysed in part 5.1.
1 Introduction

When five Danish media and human rights organisations came together on 27th of April 2001 and founded International Media Support (IMS), it signalled the start of a new and unique organisational initiative in the area of support for international media in the context of democratic initiatives and conflict resolution. When the Danish Parliament appropriated funding for the activities of IMS over a two-year period to the tune of 11.5 million DKK, it further created the basis for the remarkable operational work that IMS has been able to undertake in the short period of less than two years.

The evaluation team has found that IMS has been able to carve a special niche for itself in the area of international media support organisations. This is due to the following distinctive characteristics of its mandate and work.

To start with, IMS is doing more than monitoring freedom of expression violations, an area in which there are several other organisations that all do important work. Freedom of expression is a principle that forms a necessary basis for IMS’ mandate, but what makes it special as an organisation is that this principle is combined with a perspective of intervening in situations where media are in conflict seen from the perspective of either being threatened in their democratic function or by operating in a situation of organised violence. This implies that IMS see media as actors in creating the foundations for democracy and peace and stability at the same time. This is a formidable task, and in our analysis of the concrete interventions undertaken by IMS it is remarkable what the organisation has achieved.

Secondly, IMS is an organisation that is willing to take risks and act even if the chances of being successful may be slim, but to act may in itself make a difference.

Thirdly, this is an aspect, which may lead other actors to enter the scene, and thus IMS serves as a catalyst for further activities.

Fourthly, IMS is flexible and unbureaucratic. It can provide support literally at the spur of the moment.

Fifthly, IMS is inventive in its operational mode. This is due to the aspects outlined above, but also due to the short-term nature of interventions.

Sixthly, it functions both as a donor and an implementer. This is mainly an advantage, but it may also create a challenging contradictory role that the organisation so far has been able to tackle.

And finally, IMS is run by a staff and a board who are dedicated to the important role that it has played and hopefully will continue to play in the struggle for democratic media.
1.1 Interpretation of the Terms of Reference

In January 2003 Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI) was contracted by The Royal Danish Ministry of Royal Affairs to undertake an evaluation of International Media Support. CMI appointed the following team to undertake the assessment: Kim Brice, Independent Consultant, The Hague; Helge Rønning, Professor, University of Oslo, Hugo Stokke, Researcher, CMI, Bergen. Helge Rønning has served as team leader.

Prior to starting the work on the evaluation the team worked out an Inception Note, which served as its interpretation of the Terms of Reference for the Evaluation. Both the TOR and the Inception Note are appended to this report. In the following section the team highlights some aspects of its work and interpretation of the TOR.

The evaluation team has in line with the TOR and the inception note regarded its task as providing an evaluation of IMS, which is to serve as advice for the continued activities of the organisation. The team has not interpreted its task as to recommend whether the organisation should continue to operate or not. The team is aware that its work coincides with the planning of the next phase of IMS’s activities. The report has been written with this in mind. The team has thus considered some aspects of future funding for the organisation.

The main emphasis has been on assessing whether IMS has been effective in fulfilling its mandate and tasks and whether it has been of relevance in its field of operations.

In order to do so the team has discussed at some length the role of media in situations of armed conflict, and a section on this issue has been included in the report.

In line with the inception note the team has put special emphasis on the report to be a “learning document” for both IMS and its sponsors that will provide a) an input to the further work of IMS (i.e. suggestions for areas for IMS to continue working in, possible expansion of or further focusing of its field of operations); b) a critical analysis of IMS’ activities; and c) suggestions for improvement of its performance.

The main methodological consideration of the team has been comparative. Thus the report compares IMS to other organisations that work in the same area. It looks at the interventions performed by IMS in the light of other experiences of similar types, and analyses the activities on the basis of broader considerations of media in conflict situations. The concrete methodologies used by the team are discussed below.

In the inception note there was mention of a tentative consultative workshop. The team decided that instead of organising this it would be more useful for the team to meet with the board in connection with the board’s meeting in April and to participate in the formal board meeting. In addition two team members attended workshops organised by IMS partners in their fieldwork.

A Reference Group consisting of the following members served as sounding boards and advisors to the evaluation team on key analytical issues: Vibeke Sperling, former Foreign Editor, Politiken, Guest Professor University of Oslo, specialist on Eastern Europe and central Asia; Astrid Suhrike, Senior Researcher CMI, specialist in international conflict research; and Gunnar M. Sørbo, Director of CMI.
The team feels that the report gives a satisfactory answer to the main questions that the evaluation were to answer:

1. What are the strengths and weaknesses of IMS’ organizational structure?
2. What processes have IMS used to design and implement its interventions/activities? What has been the IMS’ interventions’ contribution to achieving its mandate, promoting peace and stability, and to meeting IMS’ target groups’ needs? What lessons have been drawn for improving future interventions?
3. To what extent has IMS been able to network and partner with other organisations to ensure the sustainability of its interventions?
4. What comparative advantage does IMS have over other media support organisations? What is unique about IMS?

1.2 Methodology, work plan

The team has made use of the following methods in their work:

1. Document analysis. The documents produced by IMS and in connection with its setting up have formed the basis for the analysis of the work of the organisation and its short history. In addition a number of articles, papers, brochures, booklets and books that are of relevance to the area that IMS operates have been consulted.

2. Interviews. The team has interviewed people that have worked with IMS, and have been part of the wider circle of contacts for the organisation. A list of people contacted is appended.

3. Field Work. The team has travelled to three different locations and observed the work of IMS and its partner organisations in concrete situations. Kim Brice visited Nairobi in a fact-finding mission to East Africa/The Horn of Africa. Helge Rønning visited Accra in a fact-finding mission to West Africa. Hugo Stokke visited Nepal and Sri Lanka.

4. Expert opinion. The team has contacted experts and asked them to provide background analysis and assessment of IMS activities in connection with areas and issues where the team does not possess first hand and expert knowledge. This is among others the case for IMS interventions in the former Soviet Union.

5. Case Studies. The areas chosen for field visits and the other case studies that have been included in the report are representative enough to give a good impression of the activities conducted by IMS. They comprise two distinct different areas of Africa with conflicts of different kinds, ranging from media oppression (Ethiopia) to full scale conflicts (The Ivory Coast) of which one may be in the process of leading to a solution (Sudan), to post-conflict situations with media repression (Liberia) and/or deep emotional wounds (Liberia), and a state of anarchic order (Somalia). Several of the areas in Africa are zones that have been “forgotten” and thus constitute low priority conflicts. Furthermore Nepal and Sri Lanka, two Asian countries in different stages of a peace process, have been covered. Afghanistan with a situation of low-key war, but hopeful moves in the direction of peace and some sort of democratic system has been evaluated through the input from the Reference Group. Central Asia, where there is no overt conflict, but suppression of
freedom of expression, has been assessed with the aid of expert input. So has Chechnya in the Caucasus with a situation of armed conflict and oppression. Byelorussia and Ukraine are East European examples of restrictions on the media. Haiti, a country in the Americas, characterised by marked permanent conflict and oppression, has been included and assessed by Kim Brice who has previously worked there. An issue in relation to the IMS mandate is whether the countries of intervention may be classified as high profile or low profile countries. This has to do with whether the conflicts figure prominently in the international news and/or there is considerable international concern about the outcome. Of the countries chosen for case studies the team has classified the following as high profile: Nepal, Sri Lanka, Chechnya, The Ivory Coast. The rest are low profile, and some have more or less been forgotten and written off by the international society, e.g. Liberia, Somalia.

6. Classification Sheets. Classification sheets have been compiled for all the interventions that IMS has undertaken. These have been used as background information for statistical analysis of IMS activities and for reaching an understanding of the overall picture of IMS interventions and the reasoning behind these. The classification schemes are appended in the electronic version of the evaluation report.

The team started its work with a meeting with representatives of FRESTA and DANIDA and IMS staff on January 31. Following that meeting the inception note was written. The next meeting of the team took place in Copenhagen February 12 – 13, and consisted of discussions with the IMS staff. The team conducted its fieldwork in March followed by working session and meetings with IMS and FRESTA in Copenhagen March 21 – 24. Meetings were also held in March in Bruxelles and London with an array of IMS partners. On April 4 – 5 the team met to discuss and work on the draft report, meet with DANIDA, and to discuss the evaluation with IMS Board. The team attended the Board Meeting of IMS on April 6. The draft report was submitted electronically to FRESTA with copies to IMS on April 12. In addition the team has conducted telephone interviews with a number of informants, and had several telephone conference meetings between themselves.
2 IMS in context

2.1 A short history of IMS

The history of International Media Support may be described as comprising three stages. First there was an exploratory stage (1999 – 2001), followed by the formalised setting up of the organisation and the securing of its funding (2001). The third stage is the operational phase (2001 -), which is the object of the present evaluation.

It seems that possibly the first voicing of plans for a project of support for media in a situation of violent conflict came from the Danish journalist Lars Møller. Based on his experiences in the former Yugoslavia he aired the idea with FRESTA of establishing some sort of project, which could support the media that fostered peace building and conflict prevention, and thus serve as alternative to hatemongering. It also seems that The Baltic Media Centre came up with an informal proposal or idea for activities of this kind to be included in its portfolio of actions. On the basis of these initiatives FRESTA in cooperation with individual journalists with experience from work in conflict zones and representatives of media organisations arranged meetings and discussions about the feasibility of establishing a project that could provide support for media in conflicts.

After the informal discussions of the idea, FRESTA decided to conduct an assessment of the needs for and the operational modalities for an organisation that would have as its objective to provide flexible and short term support to media in conflict zones, and to use media to de-escalate violence. Jesper Højberg, who later became the executive director of IMS, undertook the consultancy. In January 2001 an international conference was organised in Copenhagen to discuss whether there was need for a new organisation with a mandate to both act in relation to the role of media in conflict situations, and to support threatened and oppressed media. The conference expressed the view that there was no organisation that had that special combined role, and that there in particular was a need for a type of media support that could be flexible, rapid and short-term.

The second stage of the IMS history starts on April 27 2001 when five Danish media and human rights organisations founded IMS as a Danish NGO. The founding organisations were The Baltic Media Centre, The Danish School of Journalism, The Danish Newspaper Publishers Association, The Danish Union of Journalists, and The Danish Centre for Human Rights. They constituted the permanent members of the board of the organisation. The board was later expanded with four international members with a background in media organisations. On May 15 the Danish Parliament appropriated funding for the activities of IMS over a two-year period to the tune of 11.5 million DKK. This was done on the basis of the consultancy report and the project proposal resulting from that. In the appropriation document the following aspects were emphasised, within the framework of the project proposal to carry out approximately 65 short-term interventions within the two year period of the
pilot phase of the project; the cost of each intervention should not be higher than 200,000 DKK.\(^1\) (The evaluation team will return to the implications of this ceiling later in the report.) The interventions are to take place both in developing countries as well as in conflict-stricken or -threatened close regions e.g. the Balkans, Caucasus, Central Asia. The funding for the project is to be taken from votes for development cooperation (§ 06.36.04) constituting 40 percent of the total, and from various multilateral contributions and from the FRESTA/Democracy Fund (§ 06.11.17) representing 60 percent of the total vote for the project.

The post as executive director was announced in early July 2001 and interviews held in early August. Jesper Højberg was chosen to lead IMS, and later Martin Breum was appointed as Vice Director. The appointments were confirmed by the board at its meeting in September 2002. Some time later Tine Rasmussen was appointed as Head of Administration.

IMS’ mandate states that the organisation is

(…) to promote peace and stability and democratic development by means of strengthening media pluralism and dialogue and by promoting the right to freedom of expression and the right to information. These objects shall be attained by providing emergency and short-term conflict prevention services to media and media organisations/institutions in areas of current or potential conflict.

The discussions of the IMS mandate has from the very beginning been centred around four main issues. The first concerns the tension between what could be characterised as the concern of the professional media organisations for a clear adherence to professional standards of journalism such as objective reporting, checking of sources etc, and no interference with the media. The second is the position of a media agenda representing peace activism and possibly censoring of media contributing to escalation of conflict. The latter relates to the balance between on the one hand only to intervene in direct open conflicts and on the other a broader interpretation of where IMS interventions could take place in situations where media freedom is under serious threat, but where there is no perceived conflict. The third issue has to do with the relationship between what could loosely be termed FRESTA regions on the one hand and DANIDA areas on the other. As regards both these issues it seems that IMS has been able to maintain a balance that takes all aspects into consideration. The relatively wide interpretation of the mandate used by IMS has been an advantage to the activities undertaken, and not the least constitutes an important aspect of the flexibility IMS has shown in its work. A fourth issue, which is a dilemma for IMS, is that it serves as both a donor to other organisations and projects, as well as being an operator and implementer of projects. This issue is further developed in the section on IMS implementation modalities (4.1).

In conclusion the first two years of IMS has shown that the organisation has undertaken an impressive number of activities. It has established itself as an important

\(^1\) In a letter to IMS June 13, 2001 it was stated: Opmerksomheden henledes på, at der er fastsat et maximumbeløb på 200.000 kr. til den enkelte IMS intervention inkl rejsedugifter og honorarer, der maximalt kan udgøre 75.000 kr. En given intervention kan inden for dette beløb omfatte et sammenhængende forløb af flere missioner til/aktiviteter i et givet land eller konflikтомрåde. (brev 13 juni 2001)
player in the area of media support. But IMS is also in an early phase of its existence and needs to create and further develop its identity in a way that sets it more clearly apart from other organisations. It has found a niche, but it is necessary for to it identify that niche even more distinctly.

2.2 Media in conflict situations

In the report that served as a background to the setting up of IMS, and in the debates among the founders of the organisation, as well as in the work of IMS since it started operating, a central aspect of its discussions has been attempts to define the role of media in conflict situations. The evaluation team thus feels that it is important to reflect upon how this issue is being treated in different IMS documents and in what has been written elsewhere on the issue. It is also important to assess how the concrete IMS interventions function in relation to this particular aspect of its mandate. This is being done in order to attempt to set the framework for the continuing work of the organisation and as a way of reaching an understanding of the modalities of its operations.

As noted in the short overview of the background to the setting up of IMS, it has never been the aim of IMS to serve as yet another duplication of the many international organisations that concentrate around issues of defending freedom of expression and monitoring threats to press freedom. This would probably be a much easier task to undertake than the one that IMS was set up to fulfil. While the protection of media freedom obviously must be a central part of IMS work, the organisation was established to combine this task with a special mission of supporting media in situations of violent conflict, and particularly to contribute to turning media into instruments of conflict resolution and peace building. To provide support to media initiatives that might serve to deescalate conflicts is a very prominent aspect of this mission.

The focus of IMS work is ideally on how internal media can be assisted to move towards a positive influence on peace and conflict. The role of the media in creating conditions for peaceful solutions to violent conflicts may be summed up in some simplified reflections based on experiences with media in different forms of conflict areas, some of which are among those areas in which IMS has chosen to intervene. IMS typically concentrates on professional media, and they deal with experiences with local media, not the international ones.

The IMS Analytical Framework and its Context

In the period after the conflicts in the Balkan and the genocide in Rwanda attention and thought have been given to the role of the media and particularly the news media in situations of overt conflicts and especially when genocide has taken place and/or when grave ethnic antagonisms have arisen. The role of media in internal and regional conflicts seems now to be taken more seriously than before. There has been an expansion of institutional resources and of political attention devoted to media reform and development, above all in areas of actual or potential conflict. IMS is in itself an example of this trend. The media within regions of conflict have attracted the

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2 As this chapter is intended more as a contribution to an ongoing discussion rather than as an evaluation exercise it is not followed by any findings as such.
attention of human rights organisations, peace initiators, donors and NGOs because there have been several examples of how the media have been used to fuel or incite conflicts e.g. by broadcasting hate speech and engaging in blatant partisan reporting.

With reference to particularly the infamous role of Radio-Television Libre des Milles Collines in Rwanda and the events in the Balkans the following questions have been debated among journalists, international peace and human rights NGOs, and among politicians and diplomats:

Can the media influence and shape public opinion in times of war? To what extent can the media be held responsible for instigating conflict? Can journalism be considered as a factor in the causes of conflict? What is the role of journalists in covering armed conflicts? Is there such a thing as objective journalism? And how can the media be used for easing conflicts when they either are about to develop, or play themselves out? And can media contribute to social reconstruction in the immediate period after a truce in an armed conflict?

Such considerations have informed the work of IMS, and they have also influenced the analytical framework behind the interventions that IMS engage in. This is evident in documents such as *IMS Intervention Criteria of Conflict* which comprises short definitions of criteria for intervention, Intervention Models and an ‘IMS toolbox’.

This and other IMS documents and considerations have been influenced by the work of the Canadian journalist Ross Howard, who wrote the IMS/IMPACS handbook *Conflict Sensitive Journalism*. In this context Howard’s IMPACS booklet *An Operational Framework for Media and Peacebuilding* has served as important inspiration. Of particular importance has been the emphasis on the role of media as possible peace builders and the development of a conflict- and peace-conscious form of journalism. Based on Ross Howard’s work IMS operates with three stages of conflict namely “Pre-conflict”, “Overt conflict”, and “Post conflict” and with corresponding examples of “Warning Signs” and of “Examples of impacts on media”. Based on general reflections on conflict in relation to media and the possibilities for media interventions, Ross Howard presents templates of five types of media interventions and indications of why such involvement may be necessary.

The appeal of Ross Howard’s model is obvious. It is general, and it is applicable to different situations. He should also be credited for being one of the few international journalists who have attempted to create practical tools for understanding and action in conflicts situations. However, while this is a strength in some aspects it also a weakness in other. It is true that Ross Howard emphasises that it is necessary to bring local conditions into the analysis when one is to intervene in a conflict situation. The model he puts forward, however, also has traits that may be used indiscriminately as a tool for understanding all conflicts. It might therefore underplay the necessity of detailed analysis and understanding of local conflict settings and the characteristics of the media sector in particular societies. This problem is linked to our feeling that the three-stage conflict model that Ross Howard and IMS employs is too simple a concept of what conflicts imply. In the model that IMS refers in its documents it seems that conflicts are the same whether they are violent or not, and regardless of what their origin may be. However, it should be noted that the concrete interventions undertaken by IMS often are different from the model that is found in the background material that is being discussed here. Often it seems to us as if there may be a form of
discrepancy between the conceptual framework and what is taking place in the field.

In order to provide a contrast to the three step conflict model, which in no way must be seen as the truth in regard to how to understand the relationship between media and conflicts, we would as an example like to draw the attention to the way Michael Lund perceives different conflicts. He has pointed out that conflicts can be on the one hand peaceful and constructive, and on the other violent and destructive. He has presented an instructive model of conflict parameters that is reproduced below.\(^3\) Michael Lund points out that conflicts may be perceived as going through stages (cp. Figure 1 taken from Lund 2002: 3). They may typically encompass a variety of simultaneous facets including stable peace in relation to unstable peace; crisis with high levels of tension and confrontations, and breakdown of regular political mechanisms; war, stalemates; de-escalation or cessation; negotiations of settlements; settlement implementation; and post-settlement reconstruction and reconciliation. And several of these characteristics often occur at the same time. Conflicts are not unilinear phenomena.

One of the problems with employing too simple a model is that there often might be a situation where different aspects or stages of a conflict occur simultaneously and that the intervention must take this into consideration. We are particularly critical of the concept of “pre-conflict” which seems to signify all or nothing, and which must be almost impossible to make operational. And it is significant that when we analyse the different concrete interventions that IMS has been engaged in, this concept has never really served any purpose in the reasoning behind the choice of intervening. And programmatic documents do not seem to have been the reason for concrete IMS interventions. They have been based on concrete analyses of specific situations. It nevertheless is a paradox that there seems to be a need in IMS’ thinking for simple models that may be put forward in more programmatic statements.

Looking at the dilemmas that IMS is faced with in relation to the choices it has for intervening or not, it seems that rather than viewing the development of conflict in three stages with parallel indicators to what happens in relation to the media, IMS has been acting on a model that involves various combinations of the variables armed conflict and threatened media, and that this forms the parameters for IMS’ decisions.

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Figure 1 Basic intergroup-relations in society

It is possible to illustrate the factors that IMS encounters in relation to the many challenges it has faced in its actions through the tables 1 and 2. The tables indicate that there is a need for there to be a threat to the media as well as a degree of conflict for IMS to consider intervening. Later in the evaluation report (p.48), we have invested the different IMS interventions in these tables. One important aspect of our way of looking at the parameters for what constitutes conflicts that may call for interventions, as defined in the mission of IMS, is that the conflict has to involve organised armed violence. It is not sufficient that there is a situation of even serious contradictions in a society as long as they do not involve organised violence. The type of high incidents of violent crime, found for instance in South Africa, is not a sufficient reason for intervention.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Media Threat</th>
<th>Conflict</th>
<th>Armed conflict</th>
<th>Not armed conflict</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Media threatened</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media not threatened</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1 A simple model of IMS interventions
IMS might intervene in all situations that represent combinations of these variables except the one represented by the lower right hand box.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Media threat</th>
<th>Stage of conflict</th>
<th>Escalation/intensification</th>
<th>Full-blown armed conflict</th>
<th>Reduction/ Resolution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All media threatened</td>
<td>“pre conflict”</td>
<td>“overt conflict”</td>
<td>“post conflict”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some media threatened</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media not threatened</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2 A complex model of IMS interventions

This table is more complex and provides the opportunity for reflections on when intervention is essential, but also possibly very difficult, e.g. the top box in the middle column would leave little scope for intervention, or not so important, e.g. the lower right hand box might seem to give only a weak case for intervention. Under media threat, we are referring to private media, whether commercial and not.

*Forms of journalism, conflict conscious reporting and monitoring*

One of the most difficult issues in relation to the role of media in conflicts is the potential contradiction between on the one hand professional journalism and what in some instances has been called peace journalism. On the one hand one finds representatives of mainstream media and press organisations insisting on the professional role of journalism and the objectives and ethics associated with this role. On the other hand there are peace-conscious activists and communicators who have maintained that it is the duty of the media to report from the perspective of what serves the easing of tensions and the building of peace. This may ultimately imply the censoring of coverage of events that might incite further conflict, and the playing down of the reporting of issues that are central to the conflict situation. So-called peace journalism may introduce parameters for reporting that go beyond professional ethical standards and possibly imply forms of self-censorship and undue peer control.

Within the configuration of professional reporting and peace journalism, there is a third term, which often is being understood in a number of ways, and that is conflict conscious reporting. Properly understood this entails an attitude to professional reporting, which involves more than the superficial conflict reporting where the emphasis is on the bare day-to-day events, the most spectacular and clear issues. Instead it involves a form of process oriented reporting that explains the background to the crisis, shows its many aspects and its often contradictory nature. This is a form of reporting that presupposes considerable background knowledge. This journalistic practice is important to analyse and to evaluate properly for its contributions to peace
processes. Such analyses must be based on specific experiences and concrete cases. We are aware that this may be extremely difficult to do because impacts of such activities may only be manifest after considerable time, and that reporting of this kind will also only be one of many factors that may have contributed to change in attitudes. It should be noted that IMS in its activities have insisted on working within the concept of conflict conscious reporting rather than from the perspective of peace-journalism. This is an area where IMS may be said to part ways with some of the implications of what is found in some of Ross Howard’s writings.

Media may contribute towards peace building in situations of grave conflicts by addressing issues concerning peace and conflict. This will include reporting that improves the concrete and local knowledge of the causes of conflict, inter-ethnic understanding, discrimination, truth commissions and war crimes. The attempts to create a better atmosphere by reporting on truth and reconciliation processes are examples of such attempts. The aim of such reporting is to provide incentives for changing attitudes, enabling societies to deal with the past and build a common future. This is not necessarily the same as building democratic media, but it may serve as an important initial step in the direction of the development of democracy.

The media may influence the process of deescalating a conflict by providing non-partisan news and reports that try to present news from more than one angle. Thus they may create alternatives to the partisan views of other biased media that fuel conflicts by transmitting false images or propaganda. This is, however, extremely difficult particularly when a conflict is escalating. And it is important to bear in mind that such activities are not apolitical or neutral. Those who are in power and have interests in furthering the conflict would regard media that took such a line as taking sides. The actors in the media and peace-building sector need to clarify the role they attribute to journalists and other communicators. This has consequences for project design in the short-term perspective as well as for the long-term orientation of the media sector. This is equally valid for any additional tasks journalists might or might not take over, for example mediation, facilitation or practical local peace building.

In a situation of intensification or deescalation of a conflict, the media typically can influence the situation by fostering tolerance and informing about different opinions and views (including the views of the “others”), and contribute to knowledge about politics, local concerns and conflict issues. The situation in Sri Lanka may be seen as an example of this. Particularly in a situation when a country is moving out of an authoritarian system to democracy, the role of the media would typically be to build well-informed and unbiased opinion, and enable people to take care of and decide on their own issues. Ideally the situation in Somalia might move in this direction even if it has a long way to go.

An important tool for organisations that has as their aim to support democratic media

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4 The situation in former Yugoslavia is often referred to, and Mark Thompson who is one of those who has written with greatest insight on the role of the media in conflict situations has analysed the situation there. He does this in the excellent book *Forging War: The Media in Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia and Hercegovina*, (University of Luton Press (1999)) which analyses the role the media had in the destruction of Yugoslavia, by creating and fostering conditions which paved the way for war.
and to investigate the role of the media in conflicts is to monitor media development. The term, however, covers two very different forms of activities. One form of monitoring involves recording examples of media oppression, attacks on journalists, and on the media in which they work – be they perpetrators, authorities or warring parties. This is done systematically by local organisations devoted to media freedom or by special monitors that have been given the task to report on such violations in times of conflict. The next step in the process is to disseminate the information as widely as possible through alerts. This work is often performed by regional and international organisations whose aim it is to defend freedom of expression. Examples of organisations that send out such alerts are Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA) and IFEX.

The other form of monitoring is quite different. It is an activity that is closely related to the content analysis that is an important part of contemporary media research. It involves analyses of how the media cover specific issues over time and draw comparative conclusions about this coverage both in a long-term perspective and in the difference between the various media. The methods used are both quantitative and qualitative. They are based on surveying representative selections of large amounts of material and of close readings of select items. In relation to the coverage of wars and armed conflicts such monitoring aims to find out whether the media change the coverage as the conflict progresses, whether they favour one part over the other, what kind of images are being transmitted, what kind of characteristics are being used about the warring parties, what sources there are for the news, what methods the journalists use in newsgathering etc. It is obvious that if this sort of monitoring is to be comprehensive it is rather elaborate, costly and time-consuming research. However, a certain impression may be garnered from more limited exercises. Often there is not enough appreciation of the amount of resources that are necessary for proper content monitoring.

With the limited resources that IMS has at its disposal it is obvious that it cannot contribute in any great scale to media monitoring of the second kind. However, it may serve as a catalyst for starting media monitoring processes of this kind. They are often important tools both for understanding how conflicts develop, and how the media act in relation to conflicts, as well as providing insights into creating new forms of proper conflict conscious reporting.

Time frames
As the usual context of media in peace and conflict is a country or society in violent conflict (latent, ongoing or shortly after the cessation of violence), the role of the media can work along two timeframes: a short- and medium-term perspective, or a long-term perspective. The first refers to initiatives between a few weeks and up till at most one year, while the latter applies to the development of projects that normally run longer than two years. A medium-term perspective might be defined as any intervention that lasts from one till two years. However, there is no exact boundary, and there is a zone of overlapping between these time perspectives. It should be mentioned, however, that particularly in situations where conflicts are in the process of “reduction/resolution” or the threat to the media is in the form of an oppressive regime that fears for its ability to stay in power, medium-term interventions might prove more relevant than short-term actions. Examples from the IMS portfolio may be Chechnya, Somalia, and Liberia.
The mandate of IMS is to work in an extreme short-term perspective and this is a limitation on some of its activities, as there may be examples where a somewhat longer time frame would have contributed to a more lasting impact of the intervention. This is particularly the case where the situation is such that long-term support and commitment is needed and it is for different reasons difficult to find other donors to follow up the IMS initiative at short notice. A good example of this is in relation to the IMS intervention in Somalia and perhaps even the Sudan.

In the short- and medium-term perspective, the role of professional media is mainly to provide non-partisan news, report and analyse contexts of the conflict and its background factors, gather different views and opinions, focus on specialised peace and conflict issues, ensure conditions for receiving and imparting information, create a platform for all people to voice opinions, prevent the incitement of conflict through hate messages. The role of the donors in such a situation is in a short-term perspective to assist victims and refugees, to lay the ground for media organisations and thus prepare the ground for a sound media sector development in the long run. They should contribute to training and thus raising professional standards.

In the long-term perspective, the general role of media in democracies comes into focus. This involves laying the ground for the development of structures for free and independent media and thus establishing a sector that provides a free flow of information ensuring that citizens have the opportunity to make informed choices about their future, as well as to provide a watchdog function. In this context there is a need for long-term media development support of the kind that IMS is not the right organisation to provide.

Choices, outputs and impact
For all media development initiatives the selection of the right partners is a major challenge, especially in countries of conflict. There are no general answers to the crucial questions: Which are the right media to support? Who has the potential of surviving in the long run without donor support? How to decide on partners in a different cultural setting with different models of the role of journalism? How to avoid relying on gatekeepers? However, the analysis and inventory of the media sector, due before the initiation of every major media activity, should at least provide better insight into the local actors and thus help to clarify the larger picture of actors, their interests and goals. As IMS is a global organisation this point is a formidable challenge, as it is easy to be drawn into situations where one has to trust second hand information from people who often have vested interests in the situations that IMS might intervene in. This is, however, a challenge that all organisations are faced with, and in general it is our impression that IMS in its short existence has been remarkable successful at identifying suitable and reliable partners.

One of the most important conclusions in the Report on Media and Peacebuilding, Concepts, Actors and Challenges (2002) from the Swiss Peace Foundation is that there is a need for quality evaluation of media assistance projects and their impacts. The report points out that very little conceptual work on media impact has been done. The media support sector requires more in-depth research and improved evaluation methodology. Many project reports simply describe quantitative results or outcomes and lack data on audience, as well as qualitative indicators. They typically concentrate
on outputs such as number of people trained, booklets distributed etc., rather than on assessment of impacts that are indications of changed conditions. This is also the case with the reports provided by IMS. For all organisations working within the area of media support, but particularly for those that concentrate on conflict and freedom of expression work in a more short term or alert perspective, it is necessary to foster impact measurement in strategic projects.

Projects aiming at contributing to peace building often require better links or orientation to the overall peace building strategy. They sometimes target minor issues, not the core problems of the conflict. We are aware that this is difficult to do, and particularly in a situation where rapid response is required there might not be sufficient time to first identify the peace building strategy, and then to clarify how the media projects can fit into such an overall framework. This is a formidable challenge as it is very difficult to do proper work with media in full-blown conflict situations.

One of the challenges to media initiatives in relation to peace building activities and plans is that in many cases the media initiatives take part outside an overall strategy for peace. There are several reasons for this. Maybe the most important is that the media will have two agendas in relation to a conflict. The first is that the media are to cover the conflict independently and not get involved in the agenda proposed by any of the actors in the conflict, including those that further a peace initiative. The other may be that some media side with one or more of the parties and thus are difficult to bring together in some sort of concerted initiative. Yet another reason is that media are often looked upon with suspicion by those who are engaged in the peace process and they are kept at arms length and only utilised to disseminate the information that the peacekeepers and the humanitarian organisations have an interest in. A third is that those working for media as a tool in the process of conflict solution have another agenda than the main actors in the peace effort. The lessons to be learned from the role of different media and actors in the conflicts in the Balkans are very interesting in this context.

An important aspect of peace building and conflict resolution is to identify the proper means of communication with the local population. In much of what has been written on media in conflict situations the focus has been more or less solely on news media and journalism. It is important to be aware that also other forms of media content than news play a role in shaping people’s minds and attitudes. This is the case entertainment of all kinds, music, TV and radio shows and fiction. But it is also relevant to take into consideration that there are societies where there hardly exist any media in the sense that are associated with journalism. And this is particularly true for print media. In such circumstances it is necessary to find other communication channels, for instance through NGOs and local associations of all kinds. The situation in Southern Sudan is an obvious example from the IMS portfolio. And it is always important to remind oneself of that in Africa radio is the most important mass medium. This aspect obviously has to with the need to identify target groups and audiences when one decides to use media for conflict intervention. There is a tendency in the literature on the issue to concentrate on the situation of the media and the people working in them rather than on the audiences and their interests and concerns.
For an organisation such as IMS and those it cooperates with, it is important to be aware of the often very complex organisational and strategic aspects of peace building operations. If media initiatives are to be of value they must be integrated in a larger context. The lessons learned from the interventions in Ivory Coast point in this direction. It seems that there is a need for more principled reflections around this issue. As a first step, it would be useful to create indicators for how media and media support initiatives can contribute to peace building. One way of initiating work along these lines may be for IMS to enter into closer cooperation with the prominent Nordic peace and conflict research institutions (PRI, PADRIGU) with the aim of trying to work out indicators and parameters for analysing this.

Until now, only a few efforts have been made to draw lessons from successful media assistance for peace building. But maybe the experiences from concrete analyses of media in violent conflicts are that it is not easy or indeed useful to isolate the support for media as peace building tools from a more long-term principled strategy for building democratic media.\(^5\) This implies to struggle for laws and regulations that protect media freedom and freedom of expression; to support the development of professional standards and ethics in the media, but particularly in journalism; strengthen the organisational capacity of the media (trade unions, media councils etc.); support independent media and the transformation of state broadcasters into real public service institutions. Consequently, to support media that promote conflict resolution is to promote democratic media institutions and the principles of freedom of expression and information that are the basis for this development.

3 The organisational setup of IMS

3.1 Relationship secretariat – board – advisory board

Formal provisions
International Media Support is organised as an NGO with its office located in Denmark. The association is founded by five Danish members, as listed above in section 2.1. These five associations are the founding members of IMS, and they constitute the permanent members of the board.

Financing may come from both public and private sources, inside Denmark as well as outside. It is one of the tasks of the Board to ensure the independence of IMS from any influence by the funding sources. The basic grant comes wholly from the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but the Ministry is not represented on the Board, which is the common practice as regards Danish NGOs.

The Board, in addition to the permanent Danish member associations, shall also be comprised of additional four – five members “who due to their involvement in international organisations or institutions are engaged in journalism, publishing and/or promotion and protection of fundamental freedoms“. All members, whether among the “permanent five” or among the “additional”, are to serve in their personal capacity, according to the statutes. All members sit for two years, but can be reappointed for additional two terms.

The board is to meet at least twice a year and more frequent meetings can be called by the Chair, the Executive Director or by one third of the Board members. Once a year there is to be a General Assembly. Its functions are, among others, “discussion of suggestions for work programme, discussion of submitted proposals, and election of members of the Board and alternates”. This procedure puts the election of board members under the authority of the General Assembly, while “the Board shall make all decisions in relation to the admission of new members of the Association”.

The statutes also contain provisions regarding potential conflict of interest issues, viz. “(m)embers of the Board shall not participate in the handling of questions relating to agreements between the respective Board member/the represented organisation and the Association, (…) if the respective Board member/the represented organisation has a considerable interest herein, which may be contrary to that of the Association”. The statutes do not specify whether agreements that are not contrary to the interests of IMS are thus permissible.

The statutes also provide for an Advisory Council. The Council “which is to advise the Board in respect of questions which relate to media assistance provided by the Association and ensure coordination with other international initiatives within this area”. The Council is to meet once a year and is to be convened by a Coordinator. The Convener “may be invited to participate in the meetings of the Board, but without voting power”.

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Finally, the statutes provide for a Secretariat: “To manage the day-to-day running of the Association, the Board shall employ an Executive Director. The Executive Director shall keep the Board informed about the day-to-day running of the Association. A secretariat shall be established which on the basis of a network of media experts shall be able to carry out assignments on behalf of the Association”. In the day to day running of operations, the association is bound by the signature of the Executive Director. There are further provisions on financial management wherein the Board is legally responsible for the audited accounts of the association and signs off on them collectively. Provisions also exist for the amendments of the statutes and for the dissolution of the association.

These are the formal statutes, but practice may sometimes depart significantly from formal provisions. In the following, we shall look at some key points.

*The composition of the Board*

The board is composed of five permanent members, representing five different Danish associations. There are the employers’ and workers’ organizations represented, not unexpectedly. Mogens Schmidt represents the Danish Publishers Association and is also the Assistant Director General of the World Association of Newspapers. As he is about to take up a position with UNESCO in Paris, he will be replaced by another representative of the publishers. Mogens Blicher Bjerregård is the representative of the Danish Union of Journalists in his capacity as Chairman. There is the premier educational institution and there is the premier national human rights institution, probably because an association like IMS working on conflict and freedom of expression would benefit from having a human rights centre on the board. Kim Minke is the Director of the Danish School of Journalism and Birgit Lindsnæs is the Deputy Director of the Danish Centre for Human Rights. However, the fifth member, Baltic Media Centre, is not an institution in the sense of the other member associations, but a media training and production company. Simon Holberg, current Director of BMC is a new member of the Board, replacing Bent Nørby Bonde, the former Director. We have learnt that BMC came to be represented on the board for historical reasons. It was involved in the preparatory work, but, also, at some point, sceptical towards the setting up of IMS as it thought IMS objectives might as well be handled by BMC itself. There is thus a danger that it may see itself as a competing organization and not as an institutional backbone of IMS. It is clear that at the outset some board members saw IMS as a competitor to BMC and thus doubted its rationale.

In addition to the permanent five, there are the non-permanent four which at the moment is Sarah de Jong, representing The International Federation of Journalists, Andrew Puddephat, representing Article 19, Bhorat Koirala, Chairman of the Nepal Press Institute and Director of the Media Services International and Methaetsile Leepile, former Executive Director of Southern Africa Media Development Fund. In addition, there is the Chair, Torben Krogh, who is also Chair of the Danish School of Journalism and Lars Møller, who is a journalist and the convenor of the Advisory Council. However, there is only Møller who can be said to be there in a purely personal capacity, but as the convenor, he is not a full member of the board and thus without voting rights. Through our discussions with board members, it is clear that most board members see themselves as representing their organisations. An example of this is that Bettina Peters, representing IFJ, resigned from the board when she was no longer with the IFJ, and another IFJ representative replaced her. It is the
association with a partner organisation to the IMS, which is the greatest asset of board members, and not, it would seem, the purely personal qualities of the individual board member. If it were, we might expect to find, say, working journalists and academics with no associational linkups. Another point may be the omission of a member representing “the FRESTA countries”, i.e. Eastern Europe and the countries of the former Soviet Union. It is also seems to us that in view of the IMS mandate there ought to be someone on the board with considerable experience of media in conflict situations.

One topic, which the board has started discussing, is expanding the revenue base, for example by seeking funding from other Nordic countries. This may have implications for the composition of the board, either by replacing some of the present board members or by extending the list.

The General Assembly
The assembly is, among other functions, entitled to elect new members to the board. As such there was a “brief General Meeting”, as recorded in the April 2002 minutes of the Board, to appoint a new member to the Board. Similarly, at the April 2003 meeting, it was agreed that the GA would convene in June to consider potential changes to the board as the two-year tenure of the current board expired in April 2003. It is not recorded in the minutes that the GA has been convened for any other purpose.

The Advisory Council
The Council, despite its advisory nature, has not met as such in the two-year history of IMS. Prior to the launching of IMS, there was a preparatory conference in January 2001 with many key stakeholders on the international media community scene. The conference provided an opportunity to discuss media, conflict and emergency issues in general as well as to solicit suggestions and ideas as to what IMS was going to be and do. A follow-up conference was organised in October 2002 on “Emergency Assistance to the Media”. A large number of participants assembled in Copenhagen. From the discussions the team has had with some of the participants, the fairly free-form talk shop format was found congenial for discussions with no strings attached. Again, none of the participants met by the team thought of the conference as being in any way directly advisory.

The Secretariat
The Executive Director, Jesper Højberg, was hired by the Board after public announcement and interviews with potential candidates. The Vice Director, Martin Breum, was hired directly by the Board without any public announcement. Finally, the Administrative Assistant, Tine Rasmussen, was hired a while later, also after public announcement. Finally, none of the members of the Board and the Directors could recall any job descriptions having been prepared. The secretariat is in charge of the day to day running of IMS. The Executive Director normally consults with the Chairman of the Board in the case of doubt about how to act in a given situation and with the deputy chairman in the absence of the Chairman. However, some members of the Board requested more information on IMS project interventions, basically to be informed about developments, and not necessarily consulted.
The secretariat of three persons spends practically all its time on project management, allowing them little opportunity to think ahead and make strategic choices for the future. Evaluation and learning are similarly negatively affected by the overall focus on project implementation. There may be a case for expanding staff to allow room for these functions.

We would also like to point out that the office the staff has as it disposal clearly is inadequate. They work from one relatively small room in the Human Rights Centre. When there are visitors and several telephone calls taking place at the same time, it is clearly impossible to perform well. The close contact with the Human Rights Centre is very positive, but more space is required.

Furthermore, due to the smallness of the staff, consultants do the brunt of the work and may be “representing” IMS or to some extent see themselves as “insiders” and extensions of the regular staff. We are not sure whether representing can be said to imply “speaking on behalf of”. There may be room for clarification about the borderline between staff and consultant.

The conflict of interest issues
As most board members represent associations with which IMS regularly partners, the team was keen to find out whether any conflict of interest issues had come up in the course of operations so far. It has to be borne in mind that these issues emerge when the association feels in various ways pressured into taking action which it otherwise might not have or is generally compelled in various ways to act against its perceived self-interest. Considering that IMS has worked with most organisations represented on the Board, it may be quite possible that such issues may indeed have come up from time to time. From discussions with IMS secretariat and board and others, only one borderline case was mentioned, concerning Baltic Media Centre’s radio project in Afghanistan. According to information received by the team, the BMC used the assessment mission to Afghanistan for very specific project planning purposes whereas the purpose of the mission, at least for the other members concerned, was to be much more exploratory and optional with few preconceived objectives. Hence the perceptions of the purpose of the mission may have varied considerably among team members, to put it mildly. Apart from this episode, the team has not heard of any other episodes, which point in the direction of a conflict of interest, in the sense above. Even though board member associations regularly are partners with IMS in project execution, we are not aware, through our discussions with board members, that this practice has been perceived as a problem. In any case, we would recommend procedures established that would clear any ambiguities as to conflict of interest issues and, in particular, what is a conflict of interest.

These are some specifications drawn from another organisation:

- When a board or staff member takes part in a decision in which she/he may be unable to remain impartial or maintain objectivity in choosing between the interests of the organisation and his/her personal interests;
- When a board or staff member permits others to use privileged information obtained in the course of the organisation’s services for personal benefit and use;
- When a board or staff member or his/her family member has a
financial interest, or appears to have a financial interest in the grant-making or contract awarding;

- When a board or staff member has an affiliation with a grant recipient or other conflict of loyalties that may lead to or suggest influence in the foundation's decision, even if there is no personal financial gain.

Of course, these specifications speak of personal gain, which in the case of organisational representatives may not apply as such, though represented organisations may benefit in this way, if not representatives personally. However, statutes speak of board members attending in their personal capacity, thus adding to the lack of clarity.

3.2 Working- and decision-making procedures

In assessing the procedures of the board, it has to be taken into account that the work of the secretariat is the most important to the running of the association. It is our impression that the role of the board is not that of hands-on management, but rather that of an advisory council. There is a close working relationship between the secretariat and the Chairman who are in regular contact when the need arises to consult the Board about whether to intervene or not or what to do in a given context. For many of the other board members, they tend to keep a “low profile” as described to us by one of them. They can similarly be consulted if and when the need arises or they may function as sources of information or recipients of IMS information that can be used for their own work and for their own organisation. The fact that IMS is located at the Danish Centre for Human Rights is of importance for the exchange of information on an informal basis and we gathered the impression during the board meeting the team attended in April 2003 that IMS would still prefer to be located inside or in close proximity to the new Danish Institute of International Affairs. The issue of possible relocation was discussed and even though the availability of office space is not an issue, being in the academic foreign policy community was considered an asset.

As IMS is premised on taking fast action and being flexible in response, a hands-on type of board management is probably inappropriate for an association of this type. Nonetheless, some board members requested more information about interventions so as to continually be briefed about IMS plans and actions. The board does discuss interventions, both those undertaken and those at the planning stage and advises about whether to take action and what action to take. The minutes of the various board meetings attest to this advisory type of work. For many organisations of a certain size and complexity, the minutes will only record the actual decisions taken and often based on prepared drafts by the management on which discussions centre. The minutes of the IMS board meetings in general read like a narrative of what was being said by whom during the meetings and thus give a flavour of the range of opinion inside the board on specific policy issues and operational choices. The advantage of this approach is that it gives the secretariat maximum flexibility. On the other hand, it makes it more difficult for the board to accumulate a digest of decisions, which may be useful to potential new board members who might want a concise guide as to where the association stands and where it is heading. An updated guide or policy document may therefore be of use to bring new members quickly on board. As the pilot phase is coming to a close, some policy procedures and decisions would
probably have to be put down on paper once, assuming that IMS will be continued, the association is put on a more permanent and routine footing.

Nonetheless, it was our distinct impression that the board is quite satisfied with the work undertaken by the secretariat and that the debate on the general thrust of IMS interventions is less contentious today than it was initially. Some of the initial scepticism, related to the conflict-sensitive reporting component of the mandate appears to have dissipated and also the perception from the publishers’ side that IMS might be too close to the foreign policy objectives of the government and in a sense “directing” journalists and other media workers on what and how to write. The basic contention between the “fundamentalists”, stressing the conflict perspective, and the “modernists”, stressing also the freedom of expression perspective, has been fairly much settled in terms of a broad interpretation of the mandate.

There were different perceptions on the general contributions of individual board members to the work of the board. The international board members were there as points of access to the wider partner network of the IMS, but those representing the south were either consulted (or involved) pertaining to their individual country (Koirala) or not personally consulted (Leepile). On the other hand, some of the permanent five members had less international exposure and might have less to contribute in terms of reasoned advice to potential IMS interventions internationally. This is an issue that the board may have to work out to ensure that international interventions are matched by the best international advice there is.

### 3.3 Findings on organisational matters

- There is a measure of confusion as to the exact role of the General Assembly in relation to the board on the election of members.
- More diversified funding may imply changes in the composition of the board.
- The board seems to act generally in an advisory way and the Advisory Council, which formally should have that role, does not exist as such.
- Operational decisions are taken by the Executive Director and when the need arises, in consultation with the Chair.
- Board members said to sit in their personal capacity perceive themselves as representing institutions. The only regular participant, except for the Chair, sitting in a personal capacity is not a full member of the board.
- Conflict of interest issues are framed in terms of personal gains and do not speak of organisational gains accruing from board membership.
- Regular staff is too steeped in project management to allow room for monitoring and evaluation and forward-looking planning. Work performance was highly regarded by the board, and confirmed by the observations by the evaluation team through our interactions with the staff.
- There was a request from board members for more regular information on IMS activities between meetings.
- Contentions between board members as to the “real” mission of IMS appear to have dissipated over time.
- Consultants “represent” IMS, but it is not clear whether consultants thereby are entitled to speak on behalf of IMS.
- Job descriptions for the regular staff are still non-existent.
• Minutes of board meetings read more like narratives of what was being said than digests of decisions.
• There is a need for more office space.
4 IMS’ implementation modalities

4.1 The IMS mandate

According to the statutes, the IMS objective is “to promote peace and stability and democratic development by means of strengthening media pluralism and dialogue and by promoting the right to freedom of expression and the right to information. These objects shall be attained by providing emergency and short-term conflict prevention services to media and media organisations/institutions in areas of current or potential conflict”.

IMS’ overall objectives are based on several assumptions:

• freedom of expression is a foundation for peace and stability;
• media play either an escalating or de-escalating role in conflict;
• IMS can contribute constructively to alleviating the consequences that a given conflict will have on the media;
• IMS can positively influence media in playing a de-escalating/constructive role in a pre and overt conflict situations, especially in contexts where it is difficult to initiate long-term media development projects.

IMS says that one of its key principles is to remain neutral. However, in such politicised contexts, inevitably some of its activities will be considered controversial, such as a Chechen women’s magazine or a project to bring northern Sudanese journalists to restricted zones in the South. It is important that IMS be able to take these political risks and not be tied to the political considerations of its donors. However, in this context it is also very clear that IMS must take into account that they may enter into situations where it is extremely difficult to negotiate between what is possible to do without coming into conflict with wider political considerations, such as those guiding Danish foreign policy. Sometimes an intervention may contribute to the escalation of a conflict rather than to ease it. This sort of the tight rope balancing acts is a necessary aspect of the work of an organisation that has the advantage of being able to act in an immediate and flexible manner. But it presupposes the ability to make mature decisions.

IMS defines conflict as “two or more armed combatant groups engage[ing] in violent interaction”. According to IMS staff and Chair, this strict definition has been broadened to include situations where media are under threat, whether or not an organized armed conflict is underway. This accounts for IMS inclusion of pre and post-conflict stages in its criteria list for intervention.

Some level of criteria has been developed for three IMS stages of conflict (pre-conflict, overt conflict and post conflict). However, the criteria for pre-conflict are too general to be useful in our view. This argument is further developed in the section on “Media and Conflicts” elaborated earlier in this report.

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6 Quoted from the IMS Intervention Processes document
**Emergency support**

IMS project documents do not provide a clear definition of emergency support. IMS does say that it seeks to prioritise its support to “acute needs in acute situations”.\(^7\) Strictly interpreted, emergency support constitutes support for “life and death situations” for individual journalists, media rights/press freedom NGOs or private media enterprises. However, the IMS interpretation of this term is broader and includes activities that address emergency issues in the longer-term (such as media monitoring), or that may prevent or de-escalate an emergency situation, or that preserves and strengthens alternative, independent voices in a repressive environment.

**Short-term support**

There is no clear definition of what constitutes “short-term support” for IMS. Its support is shaped by the circumstances in each country or of each project. In some cases, short-term is limited to a “one-off” activity when appropriate such as bridge funding or specific assistance to an emergency situation. In other cases, short-term translates into multiple activities over a period of several months or even a year.

### 4.2 IMS’ framework for interventions

Generally IMS decides to consider investigating the media context in a country or supporting a specific project following an alert or request from a partner organisation, board member or donor; or following staff’s personal initiative. From the documents, however, it is often very hard to know the origins of a project.

During this pilot phase, IMS says it has adopted a “learning by doing” approach, at times knowingly engaging in projects that may not fit within a narrow interpretation of its mission and objectives. This said, IMS has developed distinct criteria for its work.

**Criteria for involvement**

IMS considers the following “checklist” of issues in deciding whether to get involved in a country or to support a specific project. These include:

- An emphasis on “low profile” countries (i.e. countries that are “off the foreign aid highway” and have “a low degree of media exposure”);\(^8\)
- An analysis of the stage of a conflict;
- An analysis of the media environment and conditions for press freedom;
- An analysis of the relationship between media and conflict (positive or negative);
- The sustainability of an intervention, i.e. the existence of relevant partners that can ensure local grounding as well as regional and international backing.

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\(^7\) From IMS 2001 project proposal.

\(^8\) It seems that the concepts of low-profile and high-profile are not necessarily very useful. Low-profile may imply countries that have been “forgotten” by the international press or written off even by international relief organisations. And high-profile may mean both high media exposure as well as much aid being pumped in. Neither if these sets of categories are indicative for the need for assistance to the media in the form of IMS interventions.
In addition to the criteria above, more detailed criteria have been developed for the three stages of conflict that IMS delineates for its work: pre-conflict, overt conflict and post conflict stages. These stages and criteria have (as pointed out in 2.2) in part been inspired from An Operational Framework for Media and Peacebuilding published by IMPACS and written by Ross Howard, an IMPACS associate and IMS consultant.

Monitoring and Evaluation
Monitoring is carried out by “management” through on-going assessments as an activity develops. Evaluation is based on reports written by project implementers, which provide narrative accounts of activities undertaken. In some cases, IMS staff observes and participate in an activity, which provides an additional level of analysis and evaluation.

IMS staff says they find it difficult to document some of their achievements because they are often small (though significant) and often intangible. According to the IMS chair, “the weakness of the organisation is that it does not assess over time the impact of its activities”. In many cases, as is elaborated in our case studies below, it is very hard to gauge the impact of many of IMS activities and more often than not mechanisms are not in place to help IMS measure their achievements.

Budgetary issues
According to guidelines set by its donors, IMS should not exceed a ceiling of USD25,000 (or DKK200,000) for an intervention. Within this spending guideline, the IMS project document proposed 20 interventions in its first year of operations and 30 interventions in its second year. While IMS has been cautious with its expenditures, a list of its intervention expenditures between from September 1, 2001 to April 1, 2003 presented at an April board meeting shows that IMS has surpassed its ceiling in 8 countries.

However, as the section of this report on “Media in Conflicts” and the following section on our “Case Studies” explain, the ceiling may be harming IMS’ ability to make a difference in some circumstances. Spending should respond to the needs on a case-by-case basis within acceptable parameters. The spending ceiling has become problematic because of IMS’ interpretation of an intervention. At the moment, an intervention constitutes both a planning and an implementation phase. We propose that in special circumstances where additional funding may be difficult to find on a short term basis, and where the immediacy of the situation clearly indicates that there is real need for further IMS input in order to make the project either sustainable or to achieve its goals, IMS should be able to go beyond the ceiling, possibly by entering into a second phase of the intervention. Of the cases studied we can think of three examples where this might make a difference: Liberia, Somalia and Central Asia.

The spending ceiling has also become problematic because of IMS’ interpretation of an intervention. At the moment, an intervention constitutes both a planning and an implementation phase. We propose that IMS consider the following project management cycle and that budgeting for the planning phase ought to be separated out from the implementation, monitoring and evaluation phases. Budgeting for evaluations may be incorporated into project budgets. However, in some cases, a special additional budget may be required.
According to IMS, “we base our intervention on an understanding of the dynamic of the conflict and based on an assessment of what we think we can achieve”. This has translated into the following types of activities:

- **Assessments**
  As matter of course, IMS hires consultants to conduct a rapid and thorough assessment of either the media situation in a country or a specific media-related project before making decisions about what to support and how to support it. Though largely conducted for internal purposes, these assessments are made available to a wider audience via the IMS web site and are directly e-mailed to interested parties. Though these assessments make up an important
part of IMS’ body of work, they are used more as a planning tool and are not an end to themselves.

In other instances, an assessment is conducted to provide timely and detailed analysis, which may not be readily available, to interested NGOs and donors in order to compel their commitment to supporting media in that given context. These assessments are usually conducted at strategic moment, in time for a donors’ meeting on the Sudan or Angola for example.

- **Core administration and project funding to media organisations and private media enterprises**
  IMS provides financial support for running costs (rent, salaries, etc.) as well as project activities of both press freedom organisations and private media enterprises.

- **Equipment provision**
  IMS provides financial support for equipment for media organisations and private media enterprises.

- **Training**
  IMS sponsors training in the following areas:
  - Media monitoring (monitoring of attacks against the press)
  - Journalists Safety
  - Conflict sensitive reporting
  
  This training is delivered via workshops, train-the-trainers sessions and on-the-job training, which includes team reporting exercises and twinning projects between local and foreign media. As part of its training efforts, IMS has supported the development and publication of a training manual for conflict sensitive journalism.

- **Seminars**
  IMS initiates and supports seminars mainly intended to shape projects that they may consider funding.

- **Income generating activities**
  Very recently, IMS has taken on a consultancy for a donor in order to raise operating funds for itself. For the time being, IMS does not consider this a core activity. And it is our opinion that it should not be.
4.4 IMS’ role

IMS has three separate but linked functions:

A donor. In this role, IMS provides funding to an organisation that implements a given activity.

![Figure 3 IMS as donor](image)

A donor and implementer. In some cases, IMS works both as a donor and an implementer of an activity, taking an active role in initiating an idea for a project as well as planning and executing the activity and funding it. As part of its implementing role, IMS continuously seeks to identify and develop suitable approaches to short-term assistance.

![Figure 4 IMS as donor and implementer](image)
A *networker*. IMS consults and cooperates with a number of organisations in a variety of ways.

**Figure 5 IMS as networker**

In order to avoid duplication with existing organisations with similar objectives and to try to ensure that its activities are sustained beyond its term of involvement, IMS strives, whenever possible, to link up with other organisations in implementing and funding initiatives.

IMS and its partners regularly share information and ideas. IMS is often asked to comment on their partner’s projects and vice versa. IMS also creates a platform for partners to provide input on IMS activities through a yearly “advisory” meeting (held in January 2001 and October 2002). The October meeting was consistently viewed as valuable by those interviewed as an important avenue for like-minded organisations to discuss issues of substance. IMS admits, however, that the meeting did not provide it with much valuable input on its activities per se.

IMS often provides funds for its partners to conduct activities; plans and implements activities with its partners; or identifies “entry points” for its partners. According to Article 19, for example, IMS has been “a useful conduit” to credible groups and individuals in such countries as Somalia and Sudan, two countries they plan to get involved with once a peace agreement is reached. For IFJ, IMS identified their safety training as a useful tool and enabled the organisation to conduct many more training programmes than they had hoped due to lack of funding.
Because the evaluators feel that the networking arm of IMS work is its must vital function, some detail follows on IMS’ network and its position within that network.

4.5 IMS’ network of partner organisations

Currently, IMS partners consistently with at least 18 separate organisations, which fit the following categories: a) international freedom of expression and media development NGOs working both in conflict and non-conflict situations; b) regional and national freedom of expression and media development NGOs; and c) governmental and non-governmental donors supporting freedom of expression issues and media development.

A detailed list of IMS partners and a description of the nature of their relationship are annexed to this report. The list is by no means exhaustive. For example, IMS also works with a number of organisations that work on a national level, some of which are mentioned in the case studies section of this report. IMS also works with an array of individual consultants that either conduct assessments on behalf of the organisation or implement activities such as training.

- **Freedom of expression and media development organisations**
  The list of IMS partners attests to the fact that there are many dozens of organisations working in fields related to IMS’ work (i.e. press freedom, journalists’ safety, media development and media development specifically in conflict situations). In some cases, aspects of these organisations’ missions and objectives overlap with IMS’. Some organisations, such as IFEX for example, have a membership base that much resembles IMS’ network of partners. To our knowledge, this overlapping of interests and mandate became contentious in only two cases, with the Baltic Media Centre over activities in Afghanistan and with the IFJ with regard to work on safety issues. It is our understanding that these disagreements have been discussed and resolved between IMS and their partners.

  Representatives of the partner organisations we spoke with were divided in their perception of IMS’s core activity. Some understood the organisation to be working more with media in conflict situations and others saw it as an organisation supporting threatened media no matter the context. Some have collaborated with IMS in a more “donor/recipient” relationship and others on an “implementing partner” relationship. All agree however that IMS’s approach, though short-term in scope, is developmental in its nature

- **Emergency Funds**
  According to the list of IMS partners, there are many emergency assistance mechanisms in place. Some of these funds may have negligible budgets but all are relatively flexible and respond rapidly to requests for assistance. IMS does not duplicate such funds since it does not want to get “caught up in providing support to individual journalists,” though it does not exclude such an activity. IMS also

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9 There are several other emergency funds not listed above including the Hellman/Hammett grants programme administered through Human Rights Watch; International PEN’s Emergency Fund (USD50,000/year); and the The World Press Freedom Committee’s “Fund Against Censorship,” and CPJ’s Fund (USD25,000/year) for example.
distinguishes itself from these other funds because it works pro-actively rather than reactively and because it interprets its “emergency assistance” mandate in broader terms. These other emergency funds can only be an asset to IMS. They provide IMS with sources of co-funding or with a choice to leave smaller emergency assistance projects to others.

- **Danish Organisations**\(^{10}\)
  IMS has worked with several Danish media organisations in project implementation, namely the Danish Association of Investigative Journalists for a project in the Ukraine, the Baltic Media Center in Afghanistan and India, and the *Kristeligt Dagblad* and *Jyllandsposten* newspapers in a twinning project with Palestinian and Israeli journalists. In general, it is difficult to assess how IMS is generally viewed by related Danish organisations. The IMS board members, who represent some of the main representative media bodies in Denmark, view IMS in a positive light. The October meeting IMS organized last year received considerable national media attention.

- **Donors**
  IMS has a very strong relationship with FRESTA and a more distant relationship with Danida staff based at its headquarters. Danida explains this by the fact that FRESTA staff is centralised in Copenhagen and Danida decentralised, working from local Danish embassies. While IMS has had several fruitful relationships with staff at local embassies, IMS would welcome a stronger relationship with Danida staff in Copenhagen.

  IMS has not directly sought core funding from other donors though it has initiated a dialogue with NORAD. IMS is seeking to target its fundraising activities to other Nordic donors and possibly USAID and its sub-unit OTI. It has successfully raised funds for several of its activities or partners’ activities from an array of donors and NGOs.

**Weaknesses in the IMS network**
IMS does not appear to work closely with any organisations working in the field of conflict analysis and peace studies in Europe or elsewhere, such as the Peace Research Institute in Oslo or the Peace and Development Research Institute in Gothenburg. Though IMS is most certainly aware of many of these organisations and use their information and have informal contacts with some of them, a closer relationship might benefit the conflict analysis aspect of its work.

It would also be useful for IMS to forge stronger links with governmental organisations. As one partner stated, “it is not enough to find funders or NGOs to take up their activities. In conflict situations, it is very important to have an open dialogue with national and international governments. IMS might benefit from getting international governmental agencies on board who have the structures to make representations to governments that are normally hard to dialogue with, especially in times of crisis”.

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\(^{10}\) We distinguish Danish organisations from other organisations in order to be able to respond to specific items in the terms of reference for this evaluation.
4.6 IMS’ comparative advantage

Though aspects of IMS’ mandate overlap with many of its partners, in sum, IMS’ comparative advantage comes from its ability to:

- provide short-term, rapid assistance;
- act proactively;
- interpret the needs of media in conflict situations very broadly;
- have a unique overview of human financial and organisational resources at a national, regional and international level in order to implement their activities;
- spend its budget in a flexible way with few strings attached;
- work in low profile countries.

As a UNESCO representative put it,

“There are various ways of supporting media in conflict situations. Facilitating information on humanitarian aid, implementing media projects that promote peace, or reinforcing vulnerable, independent local media. The latter is the most sensitive type of work. IMS is “quick impact” but working to strengthen local media at the same time. That requires a medium and longer term vision in order not to cause harm to the media and not to engage in useless activities. It would have been strange had they not gotten involved in broader media development and media rights issues.”

4.7 Findings related to IMS’ implementation modalities

- IMS has aptly and justifiably used its pilot phase to explore its options within its mandate. This has resulted in a broad interpretation of its overall mandate to include interventions in situations where media are threatened whether or not organised armed conflict is taking place. Practice also shows that “short-term” does not equate a “once off” activity and “emergency” does not necessarily mean a “life and death” situation.
- IMS needs to re-examine and refine its criteria for interventions and its definitions of stages of conflict.
- Though IMS has some mechanism in place for monitoring and evaluating its activities, they remain weak and inconclusive. This issue is further elaborated in the case studies section of the report.
- With regard to networking, the list of IMS partners is impressive and indicative of IMS’ commitment and ability to work symbiotically with others. Its networking function, arguably its most important, has enabled it to achieve much more than would be expected from a three-person organisation in such a short period of time.
- The IMS partners that were interviewed unanimously praised IMS for coming onto the press freedom/media development scene without “stepping on anyone else’s toes”. They have been complemented for being creative, flexible and rapid in their actions, having funding available with few strings attached and successfully connecting and forging relationships with and between existing organisations. Its comparative advantage over other like-minded organisations is clear.

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11 Phone interview with Sylvie Coudray.
This said, IMS’ double role of donor and implementer risks hindering the organisation’s ability to learn from its activities. As a donor, it does not benefit from having hands-on involvement and therefore first hand learning in order to develop and re-adjust its approaches. Unless its evaluation mechanisms are strengthened, it is not able to learn from the projects it is helping implement.
5 IMS projects

5.1 Analysis of the project portfolio

As part of the evaluation, the team undertook a classification of all 23 interventions undertaken by IMS by the time of the inception of the evaluation, in February 2003. The full information has been kept in electronic form. However, to the extent the information can be quantified, we have compiled statistics on some of the variables in the data set. Below are our findings.

About half of the projects (12) have been initiated by IMS. Other media organisations, international or domestic, have initiated the other projects, and at some stage included IMS in the planning and implementation process. This shows IMS to be quite proactive in its way of working.

Close to 50 per cent of the projects are located in Africa (11). One fifth of the projects are located in Asia (5), a few in Europe (3) and the Middle East (3). Also the Americas (South America and the Caribbean) are represented, with one project in each of the regions. Clearly Africa is the dominant region in terms of interventions, which is also borne out by statistics on aid flows from Denmark and other Scandinavian countries and the number of conflicts on the continent.

Approximately 90 per cent of the cases are reported to be troubled by media oppression or security threats to journalists, in most cases a combination of both problems. Censorship, financial constraints and restricted access to information are other challenges faced by the media institutions. Clearly media oppression is a very significant cause for IMS interventions.

The countries/regions are sub-divided into three stages of a problem, pre-conflict, manifest conflict and post-conflict, using IMS criteria. All three stages of problem are represented in the data, with manifest conflict (10) as the modal category. Six (6) countries or regions are reported to be in the pre-conflict phase and eight (8) in the post-conflict phase. Several cases are difficult to accurately place in the conflict or post-conflict category because the intervention may cover a time span in which the overall situation changes. In other cases, like the Horn of Africa, the countries included entail both manifest conflict and post-conflict. In other words, only 25 per cent of cases represent the potential conflict phase, which implies that the possibility

There were some problems in the classification exercise due to the fact that in one case IMS operates with a region, Horn of Africa, as both an entity and as interventions in three different countries, Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan. In another case a region is referred to as entity for intervention and not as separate countries, Central Asia. Thus The Horn of Africa is not included in the classification exercise, while Central Asia is.

As we have pointed out in Section 2, we are not happy with the classification of conflict in a linear three-stage model. We would have preferred a classification that was multidimensional that we have also suggested. However, as IMS utilised the three-stage model we have used this in our classification exercise. But we have also inserted the interventions in the two-by-two and the three-by-three table proposed in Section 2.
of de-escalating conflict has only been tested out in relatively few cases. Clearly, IMS acts when the conflict is overt or is headed towards resolution.

The type of medium supported is mostly the private print and TV/radio. In a few cases also government owned media receive or are planned to receive support. Online media are also included in the interventions (Burma and Colombia). As could be expected, private media dominate, as they are more vulnerable to oppression than state media.

In all cases the target of the IMS activity is journalists and other media workers. A few interventions also focus on the readers and public at large.

The modes of intervention most frequently applied are assessment (12) and training (12), followed by organisational support (10) and content transformation (9), monitoring (8), direct/indirect funding to a media outlet (8) and safety (8). The remaining modes of intervention are only applied in 10 – 15 per cent of the cases. Training is clearly the most common type of intervention, which is not unexpected.

Two dimensions of the data, stage of problem and type of intervention, offer an opportunity for cross tabulation and further analysis.

The two most applied interventions, assessment and training, are both primarily applied in the manifest conflict and post-conflict phases, 10 and 11 (out of 12) cases, respectively. The 10 instances of organisational support are more equally distributed on the stages of conflict variable, with 4 in the in pre-conflict and 3 each in the manifest conflict and post-conflict stages.

Content transformation is predominantly applied in the manifest conflict stage. Interventions entailing safety training are likewise mostly applied in the manifest conflict stage. This again underlines our observation that these types of intervention are used when the conflict is all too apparent. Both assessment and content transformation may be instruments for heading off potential full-blown conflict by timely interventions, but the data, though limited, seem to tell us that these interventions occur too late in general for deescalating the conflict, e.g. Ivory Coast.

Monitoring and direct/indirect funding interventions are spread over all the stages of the conflict.

Finally, we have compiled data on cases where (a) other organisations have taken over IMS initial interventions (at least 10 out of 24) and (b) IMS has followed up with a second intervention (at least 7 out of 24). We do think that 10/24 is a very good achievement in terms of IMS objectives.

Below are the results of our assessments when we fill in the two tables discussed in section 2.2 with the concrete IMS operations.

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14 In the classification schemes digital media and new information systems are classified as electronic media.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Media Threat</th>
<th>Conflict</th>
<th>Armed conflict</th>
<th>Not armed conflict</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Media threatened</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Haiti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Israel-Palestine</td>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Central Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ivory Coast</td>
<td>Burma</td>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>Nepal</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Liberia</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Chechnya</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Burma</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media not threatened</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3 IMS interventions by media threat and armed conflict

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage of conflict</th>
<th>Escalation/intensification</th>
<th>Full-blown armed conflict</th>
<th>Reduction/resolution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Media Threat</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All media threatened</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Israel-Palestine</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ivory Coast</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chechnya</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some media threatened</td>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Angola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>Burma</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Central Asia</td>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media not threatened</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4 IMS interventions by degree of media threat and stage of conflict
Based on budget data, we have noted that in eight of our 23 interventions, there was expenditure well beyond the DKK 200,000 (approximately USD27,500) ceiling:

- Afghanistan 69,913
- Sri Lanka 31,474
- Nepal 50,025
- Middle East 38,652
- Sierra Leone 37,147
- Liberia 31,694
- Sudan 33,296
- Central Asia 49,149

This would seem to indicate that budget ceilings in general are too low when actual expenditure is higher in one-third of all interventions.

Findings in Relation to the Project Portfolio

- Sometimes IMS seems to be engaged countries, which may be characterised as very high profile and thus often also targeted by other organisations and initiatives (Nepal, Sri Lanka, Afghanistan, Israel/Palestine, Chechnya). It is a factor that always should be assessed in relation to where to intervene. But it is also important to bear in mind that the form of support that IMS provides is often not of a high profile character.
- IMS is willing to take risks, and be experimental and creative. This is a great asset.
- In the documents on the different interventions it is in many cases not possible to find out where the idea for intervention originated.
- In the Sri Lankan case, the reason for intervention is not media threat as such, but specific aspects of the post-conflict situation, related to content transformation. It is the only case of an intervention where the media is not threatened.

5.2 Case studies

Before the team reports on the cases that have been identified for closer study, there is one observation regarding the planning procedures for interventions that we would like to make. The authors of reports or the consultants have been engaged in the preparatory work are usually not named in the reports, nor their affiliations. This makes it difficult to assess what background the consultants have, but it is also hides what their perspectives on and interests in the interventions may be. Consequently we strongly recommend that names and affiliations of the authors of reports and other consultants should be clearly identified at the beginning of the report. This should also be the case when the report has been written by IMS staff.

5.2.1 West Africa (Sierra Leone, Liberia, Ivory Coast)

Rationale for involvement

IMS involvement in West Africa is complex. It is linked to the close association that exists between IMS and the Media Foundation for West Africa (MFWA) and its Director Professor Kwame Karikari. The three countries where IMS has had activities in West-Africa have all been identified by MFWA as in need of support after they
either are emerging out of conflicts of extreme violence - Sierra Leone, Liberia; where there exists oppression of the media and particularly journalists are under threat of being arrested, tortured, killed – Liberia, or where a civil war is going on – The Ivory Coast. In addition to the cooperation with MFWA, other IMS partners have been involved in the region – IFEX; CAF; MAI; IFJ.

**MFWA**

MFWA is in a minor way to West Africa what MISA is to Southern Africa. However, it is organised differently. It does not have national chapters, but rather relies on a network of regional correspondents that act as media monitors on media abuses in the region. It also has a regional Board of Directors, who seems to be very dedicated. A meeting of the MFWA correspondents and the MFWA board members took place in ACCRA in March 2003, and it gave the impression of an organisation that was consolidating and expanding.

MFWA cooperates with the national press unions that are representative bodies, and exist in almost all West Africa countries. The journalist associations are of very varied influence and strength, and the West African Journalist association was not regarded as a very strong organisation. It was among other described as partly dormant, but we have had no way of confirming this.

The Ford Foundation funds MFWA with USD500,000 over a four-year period and USD150,000 over a two-year period from IBIS. In addition there are some small funds coming from other sources e.g. IFEX, IMS for special programmes. IBIS supports the regional correspondents, MFWA regional programmes of media law reforms, and organisation building.

MFWA is building a network of media lawyers, and is trying to establish a legal defence fund.

MFWA is going to undertake a regional study of the labour rights of the journalists in the region. The journalists’ association do not function as unions, but rather as clubs. This is one of the reasons why MFWA cooperates with the press unions, which are seen as more representative than the journalists’ associations.

MFWA is going to be admitted to IFEX as a full member. Currently the cooperation with IFEX is channelled through MISA. And it seems that MFWA is paying IFEX USD2000 for having its Liberia alerts disseminated through the IFEX network.15

**SIERRA LEONE**

IMS has supported a workshop for journalists in reporting on the activities of the country’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission in October 2002. Two South African consultants with substantial experience from the work of the South African TRC and with long experience in working with media in conflict areas conducted the training. It is, however, difficult to say whether the project has had any real impact. There is, however, a serious need for training in basic journalistic skills. There seems to be a

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15 The evaluation team is to put it mildly a bit surprised that IMS funds provided to MFWA for its Liberia campaign is being claimed by IFEX as a contribution to what should be a core activity of IFEX.
rather high degree of enthusiasm and hope for improvement in the country, but the obstacles seem to be formidable.

LIBERIA
IMS involvement in Liberia started with support for a workshop in July 2002 on the situation in Liberia organised by MFWA and the production of booklet on Human Rights Violations in the country from 1997 – 2002, which represented a start of the Liberia campaign by MFWA. This continued in the organising by MFWA of a programme of media monitoring in Liberia by MFWA, that took off with a workshop in Accra in March 2003. Furthermore the project comprises a legal defence fund and a safe haven for Liberian journalists in Ghana that have been forced into exile and been tortured. The project is financed by IMS with USD20,000 and by CAF with USD17,500. This is not sufficient for the implementation of the project. The situation for the exiled journalists is particularly critical, and the funds for media monitoring are too limited if the project is to continue into the planned election period at the end of 2003, when violence is expected to increase.

The support for the monitors from MFWA is limited. There is a very small budget for their work, mainly in the form of covering communication costs and other very limited forms of support. It is the dedication of the correspondents that must be the driving force behind this exercise, and I was impressed by the dedication of the participants in the workshop. MFWA is very straightforward in emphasising that the work expected of the correspondents was not one, from which they could expect any remuneration, but must be based on their commitment to the cause. They receive a very small stipend to cover costs, but their living expenses are to be covered by their ordinary journalistic activities. IMS might, however, consider supporting the activities of the local Liberian monitors. The other “official” monitors in the other countries receive for instance support from IBIS in the form of laptops and other forms of input.

There is no money set aside for the correspondents in the case of an emergency.

One of the most difficult challenges in relation to the Liberia situation is the need for a safe haven for torture victims, and their rehabilitation. This sort of work is very intensive and costly and it also must be followed in relation to securing asylum and refugee status etc.

Currently at least ten Liberian journalists are in exile in Ghana, without refugee status and a proper residence permit. They have difficulties in finding means of supporting themselves and their families. They have not been recognised by the Ghanaian Journalists’ Association. Their situation obviously is difficult, and there is a need for them to obtain formal rights in Ghana and also to manage to find some sort of work. MFWA has plans for a six months’ project with a newsletter aimed at the 35,000 Liberian refugees in the country. But this is obviously not sufficient.

Due to the constraints of the ceiling on IMS interventions it is not possible to provide more funding for the Liberian campaign though it is clearly needed, and it is difficult to find funding for the Liberian activities elsewhere. The situation in Liberia is a very forceful argument for raising the IMS ceiling in special circumstances.
The Monitoring Workshop

The monitoring project started with a three-day workshop on media monitoring that were conducted by Nick Fillmore of IFEX, and Zoe Titus of MISA. In addition to the Liberian journalists two Somali partners of IMS and MFWA also attended the workshop. Thus the situation in both Liberia and Somalia was treated in a comparative perspective. The workshop on Liberia on Somalia focused on concrete matters of how to report, security, modes of work and communication, and experiences of the participants from their work. The participants came up with many interesting points in the discussions of the experiences and the situations in the two countries.

The workshop itself, however, was not properly prepared. The schedule and progress for the work was not sufficiently planned. There was too little of a structure to the exercise, and much repetition of the issues. There was no prepared material, and experiences from media monitoring elsewhere were not utilised properly. Thus one must characterise the workshop as more of a seminar where various points were being discussed rather than a well structured learning exercise. If this workshop is representative of the quality of the workshops conducted by IFEX, it is necessary for IMS to enter into serious discussions with IFEX on how to improve the quality of their media monitoring training.

IVORY COAST

The programme in the Ivory Coast was a joint programme between IMS, IFJ, CAF, and MAI. It comprises three inter-linking components: a safety training course, journalism and conflict seminars, and the facilitation of production and publication resources for independent print media. It was financed so that IMS and CAF together provided the bulk of the funding. The main implementers of the programme were IFJ (safety training), CAF (assessment and various logistics), and MAI (assessment and seminar facilitation).

The evaluation team appreciates the urgency of the situation in the Ivory Coast. The tension is constant, and there is a situation of a subdued civil war. One of the main problems is that the media were all in some degree linked to the different political factions and that the situation was steadily being politicised. Some analysts contend that the rise in hate speech was reaching proportions experienced in Rwanda during the period leading to the genocide. Since the onslaught of the civil war, one radio station had been burned down and several newspapers have voluntarily shut down because their staff are unable to work independently and ethically in the current environment. With mainly biased media operating, media is contributing rather than easing the tensions that seem to fuel the crisis.

IMS set out to offer support and encouragement to the silenced, independent media. The reports from and about the interventions of IMS may indicate that they were undertaken without proper and thorough assessment of an extremely complicated situation. IMS admits that the intervention was not as successful as they had hoped. They were somewhat disappointed with the training programme offered by the Media

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16 The media monitoring training in Liberia was discussed with Jesper Højbjerg after the fieldwork. He had just come back from a similar exercise in Central Asia, and he had made the same observations on the quality of the monitoring workshop conducted by IFEX on that occasion.
Action International consultant and aspects of the agreement with CAF were not implemented as agreed to and planned. Furthermore, according to a post-intervention report prepared by CAF, the safety training course did not take the local situation sufficiently into consideration.\(^{17}\)

In this case, IMS might not have identified the right partners to work with. Some organisations that have good insight into the country, such as PANOS West Africa for example which has been implementing a project for the last two years addressing ethical journalistic issues, could have been consulted. This intervention raises the question of what the relatively limited activities that IMS and its partners undertake can contribute in an over conflict situation and what sorts of interventions are most appropriate during this stage of a conflict.

**Findings**

- MFWA is an important and professional partner organisation for IMS. The contact should be strengthened.
- It is difficult to assess the impact of the Sierra Leone intervention. There is a need for evaluation.
- Liberia is a country where there is a critical need for the kind of support that IMS is supposed to provide. The project there is a forceful argument for raising the ceiling on IMS interventions.
- IMS must conduct a proper evaluation of the workshops that it lets partner organisations undertake. In this case IFEX.
- The partners chosen for the Ivory Coast intervention did not perform to IMS’ satisfaction. The lack of consultation with other organisations with a history of involvement in the Ivory Coast may have also weakened the planning and design of the IMS intervention. The lack of clarity around impact of the IMS intervention in the Ivory Coast raises the question of what effect IMS has had on the media situation there and what interventions are best suited for an overt conflict stage.

**5.2.2 The Horn of Africa (Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan)**

**ETHIOPIA**

*Rationale for involvement*

IFJ and IFEX asked IMS to consider providing bridge funding to one of its members, the Ethiopian Free Press Journalists Association (EFPJA), until IFEX was able to raise additional finance for the organisation. Lack of funding threatened the closure of EFPJA’s newly established offices. IMS agreed to provide this support following Jesper Højberg’s meeting with the EFPJA’s President, Kifle Mulat, at an IFEX meeting in Dakar in 2002. Subsequently, IMS has become better acquainted with the organisation through Martin Breum’s visit to Ethiopia in December 2002.

\(^{17}\) The IFJ safety training has been similarly criticized in Israel/Palestine and IFJ and IMS have taken some steps to better adapt the interventions to the local context.
Activity
IMS provided USD5000 to the EFPJA to cover rent, utilities, and salaries for a six-month period. The funds were not earmarked for any particular activity.

Sustainability
IFEX has raised USD16.000 which will enable the EFPJA to continue its activities and maintain its office space. The fact that IFEX has been able to step in with funds once IMS’ funds dry out assures the survival of EFPJA and the continuation of IMS’ investment at least in the immediate future.

SOMALIA

Rationale for involvement
IMS’ involvement in Somalia was prompted by its interest in developing a regional programme for the Horn of Africa along with the MFWA, following an IMS mission in Sudan in June 2002 (see Sudan section below). IMS justifies its involvement in Somalia because it is a “low profile” country that receives little foreign aid and little international media attention. It is a country in a stage of conflict that is difficult to describe aptly with a relatively vibrant independent media, which work in difficult circumstances due to threats from various armed groups and occasional repression from the transitional government (namely its attempt to pass a repressive law last year).

IMS’ activities in Somalia
IMS’ overall objective in Somalia is to develop and support “protective” measures for independent media enterprises and journalists given the anarchic environment in Somalia. The activities’ primary targets are independent media organisations through support to the East African Media Institute – Somali chapter (hereafter referred to as EAMI-S).

IMS has engaged in the following activities. To date, the total amount of funds they have invested in activities in Somalia total USD10.974. The fact-finding mission to Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia totalled USD13.763.

A general assessment of the media environment.
Martin Breum and Professor Kwame Karikari travelled to Mogadisho in December 2002 along with Abdulahi Haider of NOVIB’s Somalia programme. This assessment was part of a broader regional mission to Ethiopia and Sudan with the goal of identifying “options for short-term support for national initiatives to promote independent journalism and for related professional exchanges between media communities in the Horn of Africa”.

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18 Professor Kwame Karikari, MFWA’s Director, has a long time interest in the situation on the Horn of Africa. This interest has resulted in good contacts with important actors in all the countries of the Horn.
19 IMS’ partners in Somalia view the situation in their country as “an anarchic state of peace” rather than an overt conflict.
20 The East African Media Institute has chapters in several East African countries. The regional entity was established several years ago primarily with UNESCO funding. EAMI is largely inactive as a regional body though some of its chapters, such as the one in Somalia, are active.
Support to EAMI-S
At the start of the year, IMS provided about USD9180 to EAMI-S which covered mainly activity-related costs for the following:

- **Lobbying for constitutional reforms**
  IMS supported the initial steps of a lobbying campaign by EAMI-S at the Somali peace talks (taking place in Kenya) for the inclusion of a media clause on freedom of the press and freedom of expression to be included in a future provisional charter for Somalia’s transitional administration.

  Two EAMI representatives spent a month (from early February to early March 2003) at the peace talks in Nairobi and distributed a draft media clause to many key Somali and international delegates, including the chair of the IGAD Secretariat which is hosting the talks. This draft clause was prepared by EAMI-S with the help of the Somali Bar Association and ARTICLE 19. EAMI-S also lobbied, with the support of the IFJ, the chair of IGAD to grant EAMI-S delegate status, which they have yet to receive.

- **Media monitoring activities**
  IMS supported the attendance of Mr. Abdulkadir Walayo, EAMI-S’s coordinator, and Mr. Ahmed Abdisalam, owner of Horn Afric Radio and TV and member of EAMI-S, at a media monitoring training programme in Accra, funded by IMS and organized by MFWA (see section on West Africa for more details). This support is part of IMS’ broader objective to help EAMI-S develop a media monitoring mechanism in Mogadisho. IMS will consider funding a follow-up proposal for continued lobbying activities at the peace talks and for media monitoring activities. EAMI-S plans to organize two workshops on how to report violations and distribute alerts and to strengthen its network of monitors and correspondents throughout the country, including Puntland and Somaliland.

  IMS has been closely monitoring developments with EAMI’s activities through regular telephone contact and frequent updates via email. An EAMI-S activity report will serve as a main evaluation tool for this project.

Sustainability
Both NOVIB and UNESCO are supportive of IMS’ current activities in Somalia and have agreed to consider support to a second phase of EAMI-S’s activities. Following their mission to Somalia, IMS drafted a memorandum of understanding with NOVIB, which spells out the terms for a partnership between the two organisations, which has gone unanswered.

Despite their show of interest, the possibility of funding from NOVIB and UNESCO remain very tentative because press freedom issues are not explicitly part of their programme objectives in Somalia.

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21 IGAD stands for the Intergovernment Authority on Development, a regional organisations comprising of Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda.

22 Horn Afric is the more established independent radio and television station in Somalia.
There is a discussion underway to involve EAMI-S in a multi-year, EUR1.5 million BBC training programme. Their involvement in this project has been prompted by IMS’ contact with the BBC and the Danish Embassy in Nairobi, which has pledged funds for the project.

SUDAN

IMS’ rationale for involvement
IMS decided to get involved in the Sudan because of signs that the peace process was beginning to produce some positive results. The media, especially in northern Sudan, operate under the control of an authoritarian regime and in general, little attention has been given to media development in the country by international organisations. The willingness of an IMS partner, Dan Church Aid, to facilitate an IMS mission last year created a perfect opportunity for a first assessment.

IMS’ activities
The overriding immediate objective of IMS in Sudan is to create links between Sudanese media and the broader freedom of expression community in order to embolden and strengthen local efforts to defend media rights issues. With the encouragement of its local partners, IMS has undertaken an assessment to propose short and long-term media development strategies for the country’s peace-building phase.

In total IMS has invested about USD14.589 in the following activities:

Association Building
Last year IMS recommended assistance for the development of an association of newspapers in northern Sudan. Through the World Association of Newspapers, IMS identified a consultant who could provide input on association building to relevant Sudanese partners. This project is on hold until plans for the association come to fruition. Despite the interests of well-respected Sudanese editors to launch this initiative, the continued lack of commitment of the majority of Khartoum-based newspaper owners to participate in such an association has frustrated its development.

Enhancing capacity for monitoring abuses against the press
In November 2002, IMS provided funds for Mr. Kamel Labidi, a freelance journalist and media rights activist based in Cairo, to develop a three-day media monitoring training programme in cooperation with the Khartoum Centre for Human Rights and Environmental Development (hereafter referred to as the Khartoum Centre), a leading human rights organisation linked to the London-based Sudanese Organisation Against Torture (SOAT). The participants consisted of members of the Centre’s informal network of young journalists, called “Journalists for Human Rights,” concerned with human rights and journalistic issues.

From IMS’ perspective, the central aim of the activity was to widen the circle of individuals who have the capacity to monitor abuses against the media with the aim of strengthening the Centre’s existing network. IMS prioritised this activity because of the belief that the most effective tool currently available to protect and defend the media in Sudan is to bring international pressure to bear on the current government to change its treatment of the media. IMS argues that reliable and consistent information
about abuses against the press shared with the wider international freedom of expression and human rights community will help garner this external pressure.

According to the Kamel Labidi and Faisal Elbagir, the Khartoum Centre’s media officer, the training was significant because it was the first time the Centre organised a meeting focusing specifically on media issues, instead of broad human rights issues. The workshop exposed the journalists to the international network of freedom of expression organisations. It also gave the rare opportunity for senior Sudanese journalists who fought for media rights in the 1960s and 1970s, to share their experiences with their junior counterparts.

IMS evaluated this activity via follow-up conversations with participants as well as reporting from Kamel Labidi.

Promoting reporting from the conflict zones

Northern-based media have little to no access to conflict zones in Sudan’s southern and western regions due to government restrictions and the danger involved in travelling to these areas. Most of the information about developments with the war and the humanitarian situation in the conflict zones come almost exclusively from official press releases.

In late 2002, the British Council’s Khartoum office and an independent consultant, Steve Negus (identified and contracted by IMS), organised and conducted a two-and-a-half day training programme for 9 northern journalists (working for the independent print media including the Armed Forces newspaper) with the support of IMS. The training consisted of training in “techniques for constructive conflict reporting, humanitarian issues and personal safety measures”. This programme was to be followed by a trip to a garrison town in the South from where journalists would produce articles and establish lasting contacts for their publications for future reporting.

The trip to the South did not take place because, at the eleventh hour, the government refused the group access to the area despite the Press Council’s (a governmental body) support for the activity and willingness to cover accommodation costs for the participants during their stay in the South.

Immediate post-conflict media assessment

At the time of writing, an assessment of short and long-term media development needs in northern and southern Sudan is being drafted by a team of consultants and a reference group made up of Sudanese media professionals, academics and human rights activists from both the North and the South of the country. The USD50,000 assessment is being funded almost entirely by a consortium of other donors, including Dan Church Aid and Pax Christi, who have a keen interest in media development in the Sudan in the longer-term but do not specialize in this area.

While IMS’ target group is mainly independent print and broadcast media and its journalists, in the case of Southern Sudan, where there is little to no established media, IMS has rightly taken into consideration other types of communication mechanisms such as theatre, NGO structures, traditional information mechanisms, etc.
Sustainability
IFEX has agreed to offer support to the Khartoum Centre as part of its “outreach programme”. The specifics of that support have not yet been determined.

Regional Initiative
Kwame Karikari has developed a proposal for a regional conference on media law reform and other freedom of the press and freedom of expression issues in the Horn of Africa. The conference would be organized by the MFWA in conjunction with a local organisation and would include representatives of national media organisations in the region, individuals and representatives of media rights organisations from elsewhere in Africa and internationally. The proposal is currently under consideration by IMS.

IMS partners from Somalia and Sudan that were interviewed maintained that it might be too early for a regional conference on the media. They argued the initiative should rather come from the ground when local organisations felt that this would be useful rather than as an outside initiative. They emphasised that the situation in the three countries were very different, and that the relationship between Somalia and Ethiopia, for example, was difficult.

IMS and Professor Karikari admitted that the interest in such a meeting on the ground was lukewarm. On the other hand they argue that there was need for some sort of universal perspective to be brought into the situation in the region and that creating links with international experts on these issues would be valuable to national organisations, whether or not they decide to work as a network in the future.

Sustainability
IMS admits that it would be hazardous to conduct a regional workshop unless some donors showed interest at the planning stage of such an event.

Overall Findings for IMS activities in the Horn of Africa

- Rapid response
IMS has shown that its ability to act quickly with a mixture of fresh ideas, risk-taking, and funds is invaluable. The value of the support to the association of journalists in Ethiopia, for example, was that IMS was able to release funds swiftly as a “stop gap” measure, even though IMS concedes that “a smart fundraiser may have been able to find money elsewhere”. Furthermore, the fact that IMS follows up its missions with concrete commitments and activities, and quickly, increases its credibility with its partners.

In Sudan, IMS designed a provocative programme (given the political context), which proposed to bring journalists from North to report on the situation in the South of the country. Though the entire programme was not able to go forward as planned, the British Council applauds IMS for coming up with the idea and for being willing to “push the barrier”. The fact that the Press Council and the military in the South initially gave IMS and the British Council permission to hold this seminar “was an achievement in itself.”
• **Broadening of IMS’ mandate**
IMS’ involvement in the Horn of Africa exemplifies how IMS has broadened its interpretation of its mandate to include post-conflict scenarios, such as the Sudan, and areas where media are being oppressed, whether or not there is an overt organized armed conflict taking place such as Somalia and Ethiopia. According to IMS, for Ethiopia, “the media oppression angle weighed more heavily than the post conflict issue”.

This said IMS also deems it important to be engaged in Ethiopia because of the important and detrimental role its government plays in several conflicts in the Horn, notably in Eritrea, Sudan and Somalia. According to IMS, “support to the media in Ethiopia can have a direct impact on the potential violent conflict in the Horn of Africa”. However, the activities IMS has chosen to pursue in Ethiopia to date do not necessarily address that objective.

• **Relevance and effectiveness of the activities**
The activities IMS has pursued in the Horn have undoubtedly been relevant to the needs expressed by journalists there and to IMS’ broad mandate. The on-going assessment of media development needs in Northern and Southern Sudan is crucial, unique and timely. An announcement of the report, which was widely circulated at a donors meeting for the Sudan held in the Hague in April, raised a great deal of interest and media support was tabled as an issue of discussion.23

However, it is not always clear from IMS’ documents what the organisation’s overall objective is in each country, beyond responding to a large spectrum of problems faced by the media, and on what basis it believes it can have an impact on a particular identified problem, especially concerning the role of media in conflict.

• **Catalyst and networker**
It can be safely said that IMS’ activities in Somalia and the Sudan have been unique and catalytic. Their work in the Horn exemplifies the important catalytic role IMS can play in “low profile” countries.

IMS’ success also comes from its ability to rapidly link local organisations such as EAMI-S and the Khartoum Centre, to international groups such as IFEX, IFJ and ARTICLE 19. These linkages have already resulted in concrete partnerships. Kwame Karikari’s involvement in the Horn mission was also considered significant because, throughout the trip, he was able to share his experiences with others and offer constructive advice, which was greatly appreciated.

• **Alternative communication mechanisms**
In some instances, such as in southern Sudan, it is important to take into consideration that communication is more than conventional journalism. In relation to media and conflicts, it is necessary to take into consideration a broad

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23 A Danish MFA representative explained that such a report may have had even more influence with donors had it been prepared in time for the start of the donors discussions on support to the Sudan, which took place in January of this year.
definition of communication and information strategies, and particularly consider how to reach different target groups and audiences.

- **Impact**
  In general, it is very difficult to gauge the impact of many of the activities IMS has supported to date in the Horn because the evaluators have no basis on which to evaluate them. For the most part, outputs are clear but criteria for success have not been developed by either IMS or its partners. Furthermore, IMS largely relies on reports from its consultants and partner organisations to assess activities it has not directly been involved with. Of course, impact is also hard to gauge when many activities are still on-going. Finally, the longer-term effect of many of IMS activities will depend entirely on whether they continue beyond IMS’ engagement.

In the Sudan, most of the recommendations proposed during the Khartoum Centre workshop were not followed-up. Now that IFEX has committed funds to the Centre through its outreach programme, it is more hopeful that some follow-up will be taking place. Given the lack of donors in Somalia and the Sudan, unless IMS stay engaged in their activities there, their actions may never reap tangible benefits in the longer-term.

Here are just two examples of how some of the activities in the Horn could be better evaluated:

- In the case of the media monitoring training for the Khartoum Centre, it would have been useful to request a detailed report from the Centre and not just the trainer. Furthermore, IMS should build into the project provisions for the consultant, IMS staff or another relevant individual to make contact with the Khartoum Centre and some participants of the training programme to understand what has happened since the activity took place. This could be done via telephone interviews and via email. Also, in order to ensure that the activity meets its objectives, it is important that prior to an activity, IMS develop in partnership with an implementing organisation criteria for its success. If the workshop does not meet these criteria it would be important to understand why and perhaps how to do it differently in the future.

- In the case of the large assessment on the Sudan, it would be useful for IMS to assess whether it will have achieved the aims it set out for itself. In order to understand what impact such a report had, it would be important to record from both Sudanese sources and the international community what impact this report had in official circles in Sudan and among donors and NGOs. It would also be important to get qualitative feedback from the consultants and reference group members why they felt the mission was strong or weak. Martin Breum should also record what he thinks made the assessment a success and what could have been improved on. Since IMS is considering replicating this activity elsewhere, the impressions from all these angles are vital for IMS to learn how to do what they do better.
Short term vs. long term involvement
This need for continued engagement raises the issue of how long IMS should stay involved in a given country and how many resources it should invest in a given country over time. While the answer should ideally be based on a case-by-case analysis, stronger consideration for the necessary conditions to enable IMS to exit should be given at the start of an activity.

Budgetary issues
IMS has spent a total of US$ 39.326 in the Horn of Africa. The total value of investments comes to about US$ 95.534 if one includes the funding they have received from other donors, in particular for the ongoing assessment in the Sudan. (IMS was able to raise US$ 56.127, almost the entire amount for the on-going Sudan assessment.) Of the total amount, about US$ 20.748 was spent on missions, and about US$ 18.579 on concrete activities on the ground and US$ 60.458 for the grand Sudan assessment.

While it is admirable that IMS has achieved “so much with so little,” in our view, IMS could, in some instances, consider increasing its grants to local organisations. This is especially true here, where IMS’ investments in missions almost equals its investments in concrete activities. The scale should tip more in the direction of concrete activities.

In the case of EAMI-S and EFPJA in Somalia and Ethiopia, respectively, a slightly larger budget would have given them more “breathing space” and some ability to take on activities as the need arises. IMS has limited its support in the interest of caution but also due to the budget ceiling currently in place by its donors. It is not only important for this budget ceiling to be reviewed but for IMS to plan and budget its interventions in a different manner in order to make available more funds for concrete activities on the ground.

5.2.3 South Asia (Nepal, Sri Lanka)

NEPAL

Reasons for involvement
The initial entry point of IMS in Nepal is the mission by the Chairman of the IMS Board, Torben Krogh, carried out between February 20 and March 2 2002. At the time, there was an emergency in Nepal, declared in November 2001 and only lifted at the end of August 2002. The major contention, also for the media, was the ongoing conflict between the government and the Maoist rebels. The declaration of a state of emergency implied the suspension of most basic human rights and also a clampdown on publications propagating the Maoist cause or thought or suspected of doing so. Although the mainstream media were assured by the Government not to be adversely impacted by the emergency, it may be well be that a measure of self-censorship was exercised in order to avoid undue attention from the government side. In the event, a number of journalists were detained for more or less plausible reasons, registered by the monitoring apparatus of the Federation of Nepalese Journalists (and by the Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Studies – CEHURDES).
**Investigative reporting and content analysis**

Accordingly, one of the lines of action suggested by the Krogh mission report was to intensify and improve the monitoring mechanisms, to initiate investigative reporting into the conditions of the media during the emergency and to seek a dialogue with the government and other state organs on better transparency in public affairs. Of the three suggestions, the second was followed up fairly soon afterwards with the Centre for Investigative Journalism at the Himal Association.

The ensuing investigative stories, which were not primarily on the effects on the media of the emergency, but on the public at large, were published both in the vernacular as well as in the English-language press. Nepal Times published “The East is Red”, a story from the Sankhuwasabha district of Eastern Nepal, “Unfriendly fire”, a story of the killing of 17 young men working on an airport runway in Kalikot in Western Nepal ostensibly for being Maoist sympathisers. A longer version of the same story was also published in the Himal Khabarpatrika, which is a monthly magazine of Himal Media. Nepal Times carried further stories later in the year with “Famine by February” on the deplorable state of living conditions in Western Nepal aggravated by the food embargos and plundering by the warring parties and “Our descendants are doomed”, a case of “friendly fire” whereby villagers of an anti-Maoist resistance group erroneously were shot dead by the security forces. All of these stories were written by Mohan Mainali of the Centre, and he also developed the Kalikot story into a documentary (The Living of Jogimara) which was subsequently shown at the Kathmandu International Mountain Festival. Interestingly, during the showing the narrative dropped mysteriously out for 20 seconds, at the spot when it was said that the army has opened fire on airfield construction workers. Officially, this was a pure technical error though it undoubtedly appeared odd to the spectators at the festival. These stories and the accompanying documentary were done under the Emergency Watch project with IMS funding. Mainali has more recently, under alternative funding, produced another documentary entitled “The Silent Emergency” which is also an outgrowth and extension of a newspaper story from the Nepali Times briefly mentioned above.

The stories were one leg of the Emergency Watch, the other being a slightly different type of media monitoring, not of transgressions against media or journalists, but of the actual content of daily newspapers. Emergency Watch was fully funded by IMS. Binod Bhattarai, currently in an executive position at Kantipur TV, undertook a content analysis of Nepalese dailies during the emergency, covering the period of November 2001 – June 2002.²⁴ Space does not allow a discussion of methodology and findings, but suffice it to say that this type of media monitoring has an important role to play in assessing potential changes in media coverage and attributing such changes to identifiable factors, though inherently difficult. The main findings were as follows:

(a) Biases in reporting improved somewhat in the period under review, though qualitative lapses remained throughout; (b) there were some improvements in the use of biased terminology in the period, but none of the papers could be said to fulfil an emergency watchdog function though some tried as the emergency wore on; (c) noticeable lack of “people” stories and if such appeared, they were one-sided; (d)...

deficits in reporting on human rights abuses and inadequate care given to protection of witnesses and giving the victims a voice; (e) general lack of understanding of the root causes of the conflict and to experiences derived from conflict resolution and peace-building; (f) gradual shift from support of government actions towards a more critical stance; (g) op-ed writers generally followed the editorial line but often opinions were not attributed to identifiable writers.

**Monitoring of freedom of expression**

Another recommendation in the Krogh report, to intensify and improve monitoring mechanisms (in the other sense of documenting violations against media and individual journalists) was followed up by the preparation of a project document by the Federation of Nepalese Journalists. The Federation is more than a trade union as trade unions in Nepal tend to be organised along party lines. It engages in media policy and lobbying on behalf of the profession and it provides welfare services through the Welfare Fund to journalists and to dependants in the case of work-related death. The project document, submitted to IMS, aims to do monitoring through its Press Freedom Monitoring cell as well as advocacy through district-wise interactions with concerned journalists as well as nationally. The project is likely to be approved with an appropriately scaled-down budget. It should be added that the Federation is not the only entity to monitor press freedom or freedom of expression more generally. The Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Studies (CEHURDES) publishes an annual report on the state of freedom of expression in Nepal, but the president of FNJ claimed that their source material often was found at FNJ.

**Safety training**

The next set of activities commenced in September with the organisation of two training projects, both of which was with the Nepal Press Institute. One was the Nepal Journalists Safety Training on 20-21 September. It was conducted by AKE, a company specialising in safety training in conflict zones and whose services had been used on a previous occasion for Palestinian journalists in the West Bank and Gaza and in Ivory Coast, then also co-organised by the International Federation of Journalists (IFJ) and IMS. According to a report available to the evaluation team, the participants responded with a “resounding yes” to the question whether they had learnt anything new and relevant during the course. The participants were reportedly “enthusiastic, took numerous notes, asked pertinent questions and showed their appreciation. The information delivered was succinct, relevant and timely”. The team did not have the opportunity to meet with participants individually so we have no independent assessments of how the training was received. The report was written by Sarah de Jong of IFJ who is a board member of IMS.  

**Conflict-conscious journalism**

The other training course was on so-called conflict-conscious journalism implemented over three days and divided into separate sessions for editors and senior and mid-career journalists. The de Jong report provides no information on how the course was received which is understandable considering she was co-organising the other aforementioned course. There is no mention of this topic or the actual course in the

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25 The assessments of the safety training exercises that IMS has been involved in through IFJ (Ivory Coast, Nepal, Palestine, Afghanistan) point out that the training did not sufficiently take into consideration local conditions and circumstances.
earlier Krogh report. However, in Sri Lanka a training course was organised on the same topic and with the same consultant, Ross Howard of the Canadian IMPACS, some months before and also with IMS funding. Howard filed a report with IMS on the training course, which provides some insight into the proceedings. The report found that four days of advance preparation time were sufficient to gain familiarisation with the conflict in Nepal, leading to the observation that the current conflict is “largely ideologically driven rather than based on ethnic and religious motivations”. The report lists various speakers (and co-organisers) without actually naming (all but one of) them, which might have been helpful. Some length is given to issues of inadequate and untimely translation of course material and inadequate mastering of the English language by local participants. The actual content of the workshop was found to be appropriate, however. Some logistical problems were encountered in coordinating the proceedings with the national counterpart, the Nepal Press Institute. In the course of 2002, the NPI organised a total of 51 training courses in the capital or outside, of which the conflict-conscious training course was one, which might explain why the NPI representatives were occasionally absent. No info is given in the report on how the training was received or any thought given as to what impact it might have had.

Team reporting

The follow-up, funded by the Danish Embassy in Nepal, was conceived as a team reporting exercise whereby teams would combine urban and rural perspectives and different political perspectives and in the course of the exercise manage to rise above partisan divisions of various kinds. As the conflict was deemed to be ideological rather than based on ethnicity and caste, according to Howard, the teams should include members from the rural, peripheral areas and not reflect the ethnic diversity of the country. The editors were not entirely sold on the idea of team reporting, though a couple of editors of smaller publications expressed an interest, enough for the idea to be taken further by the NPI. The composition of the teams would include foreign correspondents based in Nepal, journalists in national, Kathmandu-based media and journalists outside the capital working in media with a provincial/regional reach. This composition would provide the right balance between international professional skills and local knowledge. The topic to be considered should, however, not be too local unless there is an important story which warrants national attention. Further, there might be some scepticism among editors and publishers against having the same story in several papers at once and one way around this hurdle might be to target publications with the minimum degree of overlap. A further progress report was produced by Ross Howard in early January 2003 which went a little further in specifying themes and identifying potential team leaders. Substantively, the ensuing stories are to “intentionally avoid extensive reporting of political aspects, and to not intentionally pursue so-called investigative exposés” and instead seek general human interest or a basis for identification and empathy.

As it happened, the teams, which were supposed to have completed their work by the end of February 2003, had not got started at the time of the field mission. A major reason may have been that with the conclusion of the ceasefire and with the agreement on a code of conduct for initiating negotiations for a lasting peace, the

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26 One member of the evaluation team knows the Nepalese situation very well and is a bit surprised that it is possible to gain sufficient understanding of the complex issues involved after only four days.
topics had to be reconsidered. A suggested topic for the first team was the displacement of a village population in the Eastern Region by an ethnic rebel group sympathetic to the Maoists or alternatively, the mental travails of a suspected Maoist having to report to the District Administrative Office on a daily basis. The potential topics for team two were not decided at the time of the mission as that team had yet to meet but suggestions by the designated team leader were for long-term injuries to people damaged by the conflict or alternatively the children/orphans of Maoists or civilians affected by the conflict. As the work is yet to be done, it is of course premature to pass any judgement on the outcome and its potential impact. However, as this report is being finalised, we were informed that the first team has had their story published in a number of media outlets. The story was on the displacement issue.

News management seminar
The latest planned intervention in Nepal is similarly in the works and was scheduled originally to take place at the time of the field mission, but was pushed back until the first weekend of April. This exercise is to target senior media management in Nepal on conflict-conscious news management by drawing on the experience of media in Sri Lanka, a country, which also had concluded a ceasefire agreement and had embarked on a negotiation process towards a more permanent settlement. The one-day seminar will draw in expertise from Sri Lanka (representatives of the Centre for Policy Alternatives and the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission) and engage spokesmen on the Nepali side from both the government side and the Maoists. However, the documentation does not give any indication that actually practicing editors or publishers from Sri Lanka are being invited or which editors and publishers in Nepal are being specifically targeted for this exercise. In the planning of the seminar, the Nepal Press Institute, which was the national counterpart for earlier IMS interventions, appears to have been replaced by PANOS South Asia and Media Services International, which is an NGO run by Bhorat Koirala, a member of the IMS board. PANOS has also prepared a concept note that bears interesting similarities, but also some differences to the IMS seminar. Whereas in the IMS seminar, senior media persons are brought in from Sri Lanka to Nepal, the PANOS note foresees the reverse route whereby senior media persons from Nepal are brought to Sri Lanka for a workshop on pretty much the same topic, the role of media in conflict transformation. However, the PANOS note adds other components, including training in digital radio technology and a series of radio productions on various aspects of the current political process. At the time of finalising this report, the seminar has been held as reported briefly in the Kathmandu Post.

Findings
- The IMS programme in Nepal is still an on-going concern with both the team reporting underway and the editors’ meeting just completed. However, in any intervention that has the objective of effecting changes in the way armed conflict and post-conflict developments are reported, monitoring mechanisms have to be in place to judge whether the intervention has any noticeable effect on media reporting. Reliable reporting may not be the only factor of importance. In Nepal, weeklies are in many cases no more than political tracts, yet may have noticeable effect on popular perceptions. A regular programme of monitoring of content should be in place to assess effects and to target later interventions better.
Another more general point emerging from discussions is the need to seek the media most effective in the local context. In Nepal, radio reaches more people than any other media, including print, due to the topographical peculiarities of the country. Even though capital media are of importance, local media may be as important if capital media have limited distribution.

Expenditure in Nepal has drastically exceeded the ceiling of DKK200,000. IMS has been good at following-up interventions, but has so far not handed over to another organisation for continuing the work though there are certain prospects of Panos South Asia doing so.

The news management seminar would probably have benefited from the inclusion of actually practicing editors and managers from the Sri Lankan media side so as to make it a genuine collegial two-way seminar.

All meetings and training have taken place without the IMS secretariat attending. As activities are implemented by external consultants, the possibility for first-hand experience and learning is foregone.

Nepal is a high-profile country with extensive aid coming in, including Danida which funds most of the training activities of the Nepal Press Institute. It is conceivable that the outputs may have been achieved under regular Danida funding.

**SRI LANKA**

*Reasons for intervention*

The activities of IMS in Sri Lanka are closely tied in with those in Nepal in that the seminars and workshops on conflict-conscious news reporting in summer 2002 appear to have provided a source of inspiration for launching a similar initiative in Nepal. These meetings are at the time of writing the only completed activities in Sri Lanka. An assessment of the media situation in the North and East is at the planning stage and the Centre of Policy Alternatives, the main partner of IMS in Sri Lanka, expects to dispatch four persons to this part of the country in the course of April, including two of their own staff.

The initial IMS intervention in Sri Lanka was an assessment made by IMS consultant Thomas Hughes in April 2002. The assessment gives a detailed account of general political developments including the change of government and the conclusion of the ceasefire agreement, the media landscape and the state of laws and legislative reforms, training opportunities and professional standards and imposed constraints on reporting. The assessment ends up recommending focusing on sub-editors as these often exercise a gate-keeping function in deciding what gets printed and what does not. The consultant recommends IMS to go ahead with the existing project proposal on “Promoting Conflict Conscious Coverage of the Ceasefire in Sri Lanka”. A training-of-trainer component is recommended as an add-on to ensure sustainability and a Canadian NGO, IMPACS, is mentioned as an agency for a longer-term engagement following on from the IMS intervention. The actual project document came out of preparatory work by the IMS secretariat with a visit to Norway to talk to the chief facilitator Erik Solheim.

*Conflict-conscious journalism*

There are two reports on the implementation of the workshops, by Ross Howard, an associate with the Canadian IMPACS, and Thomas Hughes, consultant with IMS.
One of the activities was a two-day workshop at a resort outside Colombo for sub-editors/gatekeepers. Another was three separate half-day sessions for print media at the Renuka Hotel in Colombo and a fourth was added on, at the newsroom of Rupavahini Television. A third was a brief training of trainers’ session involving two persons from CPA and two from the Centre for Counter-Conflict Journalism. Finally, a brief presentation was given to a gathering of media people and civil society associations. The Howard report says that the IMS mission was the “first to directly address media coverage of the conflict, and of the peace process”. That may not be entirely correct as the Centre for Counter-Conflict Journalism arranged a workshop as early as February 23, shortly after the signing of the MOU, on the ceasefire with participation from the Tamil Media Alliance from the North and the East, a military spokesman and Anita Pratap, an Indian journalist with experience from conflict reporting for CNN/Time magazine. The Centre, furthermore, arranged a study tour for Tamil journalists from the North to visit media institutions in the South. However, it can be argued that these interventions were not specifically focused on media coverage of the conflict, but part of an overall familiarisation process involving journalists from both parts of the country in an effort to identify and deal with common problems. Both of these activities were jointly funded by EU and the Norwegian Embassy. Thirdly, the EU funded a study tour of editors from the South to meet the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) leadership in Vanni in the North in July 2002 and also with the objective of having editors familiarise themselves with living conditions in the North and report on how “the other half” lives. One of the editors interviewed in Sri Lanka found the study tour highly useful.

The Howard report gives an outline of the various components of the training and some observations and assessments of the outcome. Some press coverage was generated with editorials ranging from those that could echo “precisely the conflict analysis and conflict resolution themes” (i.e. the Daily News) to those “castigating peace journalism” (Daily Mirror and the Island). It should be added that the Daily News is government-owned and should thus be expected to be favourable to the IMS intervention and the peace process in general. Howard notes that “a diversity of Sinhala-speaking reporters from several newspapers rather than one progressive papers” would have been an advantage. The paper in question, Ravaya, is in favour of the peace process, to judge from the interview conducted with its editor, so the danger of “preaching to the converted” is of course there unless a true cross-section of opinion can be mobilised for the training workshops. So is also the case for the broadcast media, which is, as far as news coverage is concerned, also state-owned and thus in favour of the government position on major issues.

Among the recommendations, there is a suggestion for an assessment mission to the North and the East, which will be carried out by CPA, as mentioned above. However, there have been extensive contacts with Tamil journalists already, as documented, so any assessment should build upon the contacts already established. Another recommendation concerns the IMPACS plans. Following the workshops, Howard did an assessment for them, but as far as is known, including a telephone conversation of the team with Howard, no follow-up action is as yet in place. Assessments were also made by Hughes for IMS, as already mentioned, and we know of similar exercises done for Swedish SIDA followed up by a seminar for journalists in Colombo. In any “high-profile” countries, there may be a danger of crowding of actors. A third recommendation concerns the funding of CCCJ to produce a handbook of conflict-
sensitive reporting based on the proceedings of the workshops. In the event, a general handbook has been produced, as an IMS publication, to be translated into Sinhala and Tamil, courtesy of CPA. Finally, there is a recommendation for liaison with Thomas Oommen regarding inputs on curricula and other tasks for the planned Journalism Training Institute. According to information received from B. Padmakumara of Daily News and the Editor’s Guild, there is a Sri Lanka Press Institute in place, at least in the sense of a physical building and work is underway on employing staff. The institute will comprise both a training centre and a press complaints commission and a code of ethics is accordingly high on the agenda of the Editors’ Guild.

**Evaluation**

Hughes, who made the IMS assessment, also did an elaborate on-the-spot evaluation of the conflict-conscious training for IMS. With regard to relevancy, the evaluation found the design to be relevant and timely, noting that the prospective media training institute might provide an opportunity for future IMS engagement. Regarding efficiency, the verdict is overall positive, though “the overly attentive approach should be tempered by an enhanced understanding of the situation on the ground in Sri Lanka”. We are not sure what is meant by “overly attentive”. Concerning effectiveness, there was an overall satisfaction with the contents and presentations, though some objections to the structure and to problems of translations and English-speaking capabilities of some of the vernacular-language journalists. Furthermore, attendance was not as high as planned, and the date had to be shifted once as a number of potential participants were on a familiarisation visit to Norway and secondly, the selected date collided with a similar exercise organised by the Ministry of Mass Communication in the North, reducing the attendance from those areas. Possibly of more consequence, the targeting of news managers did not succeed as planned as a number of senior editors and freelance journalists attended as well. Hence, the observation that “the In-House Seminars were a more effective structure in which to address journalists than the News Managers Seminar”, due to “the more informal atmosphere” and “presence of entire newsrooms and editorial structures” might give some important pointers for future exercises of this kind. One impression gathered during the mission is that editorial commitment is highly important. Editorial commitment may even in some cases not even be sufficient as editorial independence might be significantly constrained by the owners and publishers themselves. Finally, regarding impact, the evaluation recommended a discussion forum to meet regularly, further in-house seminars and, as mentioned, the production of a brochure of the proceedings. A point not touched in the recommendations is whether media monitoring capacities are in place, allowing future interventions to be better targeted at potential bottlenecks.

**Follow-up**

Regarding follow-up, there have not been any further in-house seminars, including MTV as envisaged. There has not been much contact between CPA and CCCJ (confirmed by both independently). However, both have separately continued activities with the CPA taking part in a conflict transformation workshop, organised by Academy of Education and Development and funded by US Aid, with the objective of publishing a newspaper supplement to be inserted in newspapers in all three languages. CCCJ is on the other hand planning a workshop in the North/East with working journalists from the South and also considering proposing a vote ceremony to the Editors’ Guild for best peace journalist of the year.
There will, however, be a follow-up of a similar kind. IMS is convening a one-day seminar in Kathmandu to draw parallels with the Sri Lankan situation, in particular the cease-fire and the ongoing peace process. The press officer of the Sri Lankan Monitoring Mission will attend, as will two persons from CPA. Unfortunately, no actually practising editors from the Sri Lankan side are reported to attend which might have created a sort of peer review of similarities and differences on the media side. While there may be spokesmen from both the government and Maoist side on the Nepalese side, there does not appear to be a similar representation on the Sri Lankan side.

The IMS programme appears to be in limbo with no discernable follow-up in sight. It might be hoped that the Canadian IMPACS might pick up the slack in the future. The Sri Lankan media scene may also a bit crowded as many donors and agencies rush in to take part in the post-war phase. There is a certainly a need for a wide educational campaign to explain and clear up misunderstandings related to the negotiations and the possible outcomes of the peace process. None of those interviewed left any doubt about that and the government should take a forceful lead in that regard. It was the impression of the SLMM that some trust in their impartiality had been generated in the course of their operations, but that some organs will still pick and choose from their press releases whatever is favourable to them and disregard the rest.

**Findings**

- Sri Lanka represents a case for intervention built solely on the merits of conflict-conscious journalism. In contrast to many other countries, media and journalists are not under threat, at least not in South of the country where activities are concentrated. For sure, censorship and lack of access to information are constraints for media outlets, but they do not constitute threats as normally understood.
- There is no built-in monitoring of media content in order to focus attention on the forces stacked against this type of intervention. Most media targeted were friendly disposed towards the training, which knowledgeable observers would have known in advance by looking at the list of invitees.
- Targeting was not fully realised for the training workshops with freelance journalists and senior editors attending alongside the “gate keepers”. In-house workshops appear better suited to training of this type. Targeting seems to have shifted over time with more attention turning to editors and publishers. This may reflect a weakness in project design concerning which level or stratum of an organisational hierarchy is the best target for achieving project objectives.
- There is no discernable follow-up in sight, which leaves the programme in a state of limbo. IMPACS was presumed to take over, but there are no activities as of yet.
- Sri Lanka is yet another high-profile country with many actors and donors interested in media activities, including its role in conflict transformation. Both IMS partners have separate projects with other donors so the rationale for IMS intervention rests on the presumed uniqueness of their contribution.
5.2.4 Afghanistan

Rationale for involvement
IMS engagement in Afghanistan started with a mission to Pakistan October 26 – November 9 2002, fielded jointly with Article 19 and Baltic Media Centre. The purpose of the mission was twofold; first, to do an assessment for an Afghan radio project proposed by the Baltic Media Centre, and second, to do a wider assessment of Afghan media in Afghanistan and Pakistan in order to identify possibilities for intervention. The mission built on a previous meeting in Geneva organised by Media Action International on humanitarian information and media development. The reason for engagement was thus partly to do an assessment for a highly specific project and partly to explore an opening for IMS intervention in a longer-term media development perspective.

It is possible to question whether the timing of the intervention was a bit premature based on the presumption that the war would go on much longer than what happened. There also seems to be a problem with the identification of Afghanistan as a post-conflict stage, as there clearly is a limited war going on, and thus our description as a situation heading towards a reduction of violence is more apt than “post-conflict”.

Assessments and safety training
The report provides an overview of the media landscape, which, due to the ongoing war and to Taliban-imposed restrictions previously, was more active and lively across the border in Peshawar, Pakistan. Among project ideas, the need for providing humanitarian information was identified as the most crucial undertaking, including the training of journalists to qualify them for this type of reporting. However, the Baltic Media Centre, which took part in the mission, had their own plans for a radio broadcaster in the Afghan community in Pakistan to be relocated to Afghanistan when conditions would make this possible. The report does not give any further information on progress on this project. Instead, the report foresees a role for IMS and Article 19 in post-conflict advocacy and media development activities, in conjunction with locally based organisations and other international partners.

One such initiative came from AINA, a Paris-based media organisation, which received favourable response from the Afghan government to their proposal to set up an independent media resource centre in Kabul. The next IMS report, based on Martin Breum’s observations in January 2002, sees a role for IMS in pursuing a common Afghan platform for future media developments in the country. In the meantime, IMS had co-funded with UNESCO a series of safety training seminars in co-operation with International Federation of Journalists, which was conducted by AKE, a British firm specialising in this type of training. For safety reasons, the seminars were held in Peshawar. Seven one-day sessions were held, and the evaluation admitted that the tight format taxed the concentration of the participants as the sessions were held as class-room lectures allowing little room for interactions between teacher and students and only to a limited degree drawing upon the real-life experiences of the participating journalists. The inadequate adaptation of the course to local conditions was seen as a weakness and the course would probably have benefited from the services of an instructor familiar with the local setting. Nonetheless, the participants felt the safety training to have been useful and the report recommended further safety training inside Afghanistan, possibly to be combined with conflict management.
training. As far as is known, no further training sessions of this kind have been conducted or funded by IMS and their partners.

Organising for media development
The next phase of IMS engagement appears to be focused on broader matters of media development. A project document, co-authored with Article 19, aims at generally promoting “Freedom of expression and civil society impact on media development in Afghanistan”. The purpose is “providing a forum for professional exchanges leading to the articulation of common goals” by “an international programme of advocacy and technical support”, the common goals being, inter alia, “a self-regulatory system and a code of ethics”, presumably something along the lines of a press council/complaints commission administered by respected members of the profession. More specifically (or less generally), objectives include (1) advocacy aimed at reforms of media policy and laws in consonance with freedom of expression; (2) the setting of a network for media development and policy and (3) a media council for the afore-mentioned self-regulatory code. The project is to last for one year and to be implemented by IMS and Article 19. The second objective foresees a roundtable of about 15 and a more fully-fledged conference within the overall frame of about 4 months, which is supposed to lead into a Media Council and the drafting of a code of ethics for the profession. The budget for the entire exercise was estimated at over £120,000, of which about 60 per cent was to be funded from British sources and the remainder from Danish MFA. The IMS Annual Report for 2001 – 2002 tells us (p. 33) that IMS/Article 19 did not secure funding from Danish sources and that the “core” of the project will be implemented by Article 19, presumably from British sources. Which “non-core” parts fell out, we do not know. How the project has fared, we have not found out as yet, except to note that there is now an Afghan Media and Culture Centre. According to information received from Article 19, the project has also managed to put together an association or a forum for advancing the legal and organisational objectives.

Overall, IMS finds that the Afghanistan intervention “created an opportunity for IMS to engage in organisational synchronization and information sharing” and the project proposal was timely as there was no other international organisation addressing directly the issue of “the need for strong involvement of the Afghan media community in the shaping of a post-Taliban media environment”. That point might be debatable as there certainly were a number of international organisations involved in media development (as listed in the joint IMS/Article 19 proposal) and secondly, without a number of actors on the scene, there would, it might be thought, be less of a need for “organisational synchronization”. IMS did contribute some minor funding to AINA and the Institute for War and Peace Reporting, but only at a fraction of the costs of the assessments.

The minutes of the IMS Board meeting of April 22 – 23 2002 record that DKK 489,391 has been spent on IMS interventions in Afghanistan/Pakistan which is considerably above the ceiling of DKK 20,000 for IMS interventions. This is, according to the minutes, justified by “the special situation caused by 11th September 2001”, meaning presumably the war in Afghanistan. A large part of the expenditure went for the joint Baltic Media Centre/Radio Afghanistan project, more precisely the cost of the assessment for this specific intervention. The breakdown of the expenditure indicates that about one-third of total expenditure was spent on this
part of the assessment, twice as much as the other part of the assessment. The outcome is that there is now a programme called “Good Morning Afghanistan” running on Radio Afghanistan. Indications are that this has been a very important media initiative in Afghanistan. It has now been extended into an afternoon programme as well and it seems to have set an example for other free media initiatives in the country. Thus this experience illustrates on the one hand the value of the IMS flexible approach and the success it may entail. On the other hand it also illustrates the need for caution when involving board members in establishing projects through IMS initiatives. In this case it was a success, but one should bear in mind that BMC is one of the founding members of IMS and thus has a permanent place on the board. It might be considered a conflict of interest that permanent board members utilise the resources of the organisation of which they are board members for their own projects. However, the minutes of the Board do not give any indication that this relationship might be considered problematic. The minutes of September 24 – 25 2001 Board meeting, discussing possible avenues for IMS intervention in Afghanistan, do not mention this specific project, though IMS should be on the look out for “emergent media initiatives”.

Findings

- The IMS role in Afghanistan appears to be one of “being there at the right time” with the possibility of funding “emergent media initiatives”. Whether these initiatives would have happened in the absence of IMS or happened more slowly is a debatable point. The IMS role appears to have been to provide some seed money for the formulation of longer-term activities on media development and on effecting changes in media policy and laws and to get disparate groups to work together for a common purpose. Afghanistan, being at the time a “high profile” country and thus attracting a number of media actors, might have been irresistible for some timely IMS interventions, but we are not sure whether these interventions were crucial to developing the media scene there.

- The Afghanistan case also raises the question of a conflict of interest, as the team has understood that the Baltic Media Centre assessment was used to developing a project about which there was not full knowledge and awareness among other mission members and hence may have led to misunderstandings and misgivings. However, the radio programme which was the output of the project is reportedly a success and Radio Afghanistan’s “Good morning Afghanistan” now has a “good afternoon” extension.

5.2.5 Central Asia (Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan)

Central Asia is a region that is a central concern of IMS. The activities have comprised several initiatives and actions in more than one part of the region. The activities started with a Fact Finding/Identification Mission Report. The report has been characterised by our expert on the region in the Reference Group – Vibeke Sperling - as a “brilliant paper”, and she adds that it

(…) in an edited form could be published as a valuable introduction for a broader public to an area, which due to the developments in Afghanistan have gained in
strategic importance, but unfortunately has not yet obtained the appropriate international attention.

The report identifies most of the international and local organisations already engaged in assistance to and monitoring of the media in the region, and it also outlines several possible and very relevant interventions. The report furthermore emphasises convincingly why it is so important to intervene in Central Asia because of the very substantial threats to freedom of expression and democracy that exist in several countries.

The region is a difficult one for organisations such as IMS to engage in. There are many actors there—international as well as local ones. It is not easy to identify credible local partners. Many of them are more interested in pursuing private interests than common goals. And it is difficult to create the basis for long-term strategies. In Central Asia and other regions of the former Soviet Union there have over the past decade been many seminars and workshops concentrated on topics that in themselves are important enough and useful: e.g. "Quality Journalism" and "Financial viability". A journalist from the area has expressed the problem in the following way: “They are seminaring us to death”.

The results of the fact finding mission so far seem to have been the attempt to establish a Central Asian Media Retreat whose activities according to the project paper will consist of among others a seminar to be organised early 2003 to be followed up by further activities concentrating around the following broad themes: quality journalism; financial viability, web publishing, safety, project funding.

One workshop was organised in Moscow February 17 – 20 2003, and the participants were mainly Uzbek journalists. Another was conducted in Baku in March 20 - 22, organised by Open Society Institute. The workshops involved the cooperation and participation of, and input from, other organisations such as IFEX, Open Society Institute, Centre for Journalists in Extreme Situations. The general theme of the workshops was media monitoring in a broad sense of the word.

The results of these workshops have been assessed by the evaluation team based on reports by the Danish journalist, Michael Andersen, who served as a consultant for the Uzbek project, as well input to IMS from IFEX, and discussions with the IMS staff. It is nevertheless not entirely clear from the papers that the evaluation team has had access to, what the operational side of the two workshops that IMS was involved in, really consisted of, and how they differed from other similar arrangements.

IMS’ activities are to be followed up by FRESTA in more long-term projects. The Central Asia intervention is thus a good example of how IMS may serve as both an initiator and a catalyst for further activities.

Findings

- While workshops and seminars are important, they also have limited importance if they are not followed up by concrete long-term projects. These kinds of initiatives have somewhat unkindly at times been described as “parachute engagements”, and it is a question of whether the money spent is in proportion with the practical results. Thus it is important to move from the
seminar stage to a more long-term strategic stage, and it is in this connection that IMS ought to employ its potential as a catalyst for the bringing in of long-term projects. And it seems that it is this direction that the project is moving, and it is thus a good example of an IMS project in progress.

• In depth training in media monitoring issues must consist of more than what can be achieved at short workshops, and it is particularly important that this training takes into consideration local and national circumstances and institutions, e.g. the legal situation and the need for legal awareness. It is our impression that it is not sufficient to rely on the more general training framework used by e.g. IFEX. Training in legal issues related to journalism and monitoring must be the basis for the work. And it must be detailed and based on expertise knowledge of the local background.

• It is difficult to identify the most relevant cooperating partners in the region. It seems that often the same participants go from one seminar organised by one international organisation to another arranged by yet another NGO. This is of course a problem that also exists in other parts of the world, but it may be particularly acute in this region. It partly is the result of limited knowledge by Western organisations. Lack of proper language competence is of course also an issue. Furthermore it is easier for international actors to work with groups and people who already are part of a known circuit and already have international contacts. At the same time it appears as if there particularly in this region exists a certain group of people who use their contacts to further their particular interests rather than the course of democracy and press freedom.

• If the IMS initiative in the Central Asian region is to have any lasting effect it must be followed by further interventions that are more focused than the more general and short workshops that have so far come out of the excellent report. This implies for instance that a series of interrelated media monitoring projects need to be initiated. And furthermore a concrete project of journalistic cooperation in the Ferghana Valley could be both innovative and of great importance. This is an area where IMS is trying to establish follow up activities.

• There is a need for coordination and information sharing among the Western donors working in the area. It seems that the presence of several uncoordinated and even competing donors and outside actors leads to unnecessary duplication of initiatives as well as jealousies and competition between actors who should ideally have been cooperating. According to the reports that the team has received, this is the case in more than one instance in the region. According to IMS this is a problem they are aware of and that they are trying to address, and which they feel they by not being in the business of providing long-time assistance may have a tactical advantage in being able to solve. It seems, however, in order for IMS to be able to do so there is a need for long-time engagement in some form of other in the region as such.

• The IMS support to the re-launching of the exiled Tajik newspaper Charogi Ruz is an excellent project with a very appropriate partner.

• The Media Retreat planned in Kyrgyzstan seems to be a good idea. It presupposes very active and dedicated local and regional partners, and a follow-up from international partners that also may serve as coordinators of the project.
• In Central Asia as well as in several other areas where IMS has been engaged, the background work seems very thorough and useful. In this case it appears to have been of an extraordinary quality.
• The partners that IMS has been able to cooperate with particularly from Russia and other areas e.g. CJES, seem to have been very capable and their input have been of great importance.
• It appears that IMS has an ability to identify good local cooperating expertise.
• There is a need for a more thorough discussion and evaluation of the impacts of the interventions – workshops, and how they can be followed up by IMS or by other actors.

5.2.6 Chechnya

The initial fact finding report gives a very realistic and solid assessment of the media situation in Chechnya, but some of the conclusions drawn for IMS support for the Chechen media community are questionable, apparently due to the basis defined for IMS engagement in the area. IMS seems too overly concerned with having its "apolitical status” reflected in its work. That is that IMS is wary of not promoting any political positions in the current war in Chechnya. This points to a principle problem in relation to media interventions in overt conflict situations, where gross oppression occurs. It is possible to be “apolitical or neutral” in such circumstances? Freedom of speech is a political issue. To support the right of the Chechens to free speech is to take side against the Russian authorities that deny them that right. Neutrality in under such circumstances is impossible if the aim is to support freedom of speech for the Chechen population (both of Chechen and Russian origin). Russian authorities will interpret neutrality as acceptance of their behaviour. It is therefore necessary for IMS to cooperate with the few journalists, who have continuously and at great risk reported critically on Chechnya, e.g. Anna Politkovskaya.

In many ways the situation in Chechnya illustrates the dilemmas inherent in the double mandate of IMS as both working for using the media to de-escalate conflicts on the one hand and to support the struggle for freedom of expression on the other. In the case of Chechnya there exists an overt armed conflict, but on the other hand the violence is used as pretext by the Russian authorities to censor and harass both foreign and Russian media in Chechnya. The existing practice of self-censorship about the conflict in the Russian press is a result of this harassment. Strong international criticism of Russian authorities is needed, and IMS should support this and promote the principle of freedom of expression in this context.

The other side to the official restrictions and harassments are the attacks from Chechen criminals on freedom of speech e.g. the taking journalists as hostages etc. Both practices threaten freedom of expression and should be condemned.

The projects that IMS suggests to support are on the one hand worthwhile and may contribute in a small scale to improve the situation, but it is a question whether they must not be focused more in a clear direction in order to avoid the dilemma of neutrality as described above.
Journal for Chechen women

One of the IMS proposals is to provide support for journal for Chechen women. It is good idea to establish such a journal. As the consultant notes there is “no periodical at all addressed to Chechens, written by Chechens”. In this void there is, as noted by the consultant, a great possibility that such a journal will be read also by men. It can furthermore support the very secularized traditions among Chechen women and thus be an antidote to the imposing of sharia laws.

It is stated in the report that: “The journal should not be offensive towards Russians”. But the Russian authorities will interpret all critical reporting and the uncovering of oppression as offensive. The journal shall of course contribute to dialogue by avoiding hate speech. It should address the population in Chechnya (ethnic Chechens and Russians alike) with open and honest reporting on their problems in respect for the professional rules of the game, without being influenced by what authorities might find provocative.

The mission report states, that one success-criterion would be that Russian women in Chechnya would read it as well. They will probably be open to that, as they share the problems of daily life with the Chechen women. A special problem for the Russians (by the way a good subject for the journal) is the strong scepticism towards them from Russian soldiers, who do not trust them, because many of them have lived - some of them their whole life - in harmony with Chechens.

It is correct, as stated in the report, that the knowledge of written Chechen has been undermined by lack of training, but estimated 750,000 (the big majority of the Chechens) speak their own language much more than Russian in the daily communication. It will no doubt raise the interest of the journal also amongst Chechens with difficulties reading their own language, if the journal contributes to do something for written Chechen with for instance the title of the journal and all articles in both languages and articles also in Chechen.

The editorial office should not be in Moscow, but in Nazran, the capital of Ingushetia with the declared aim to move into Chechnya as soon as possible. A Moscow-based magazine will primarily appeal to the Chechen diaspora in the Russian capital, while its opening in Nazran will give a strong signal to the population in Chechnya that this is a journal for them. And of course the proximity will also mean to be near to the real stories and give much better opportunities for local journalists to contribute. To base the journal in Moscow will of course make a lot of things much easier, but it will make the ways to promoting local trust and dialogue so much more difficult.

After the initial report was written a new IMS project document has been written (March 2003) where the project is moving in the direction of basing the publication of the journal in Nazran through the cooperation with the weekly paper Groznensky Rabocii. The IMS activity would consist of a capacity building seminar in Moscow and assist in fundraising activities. The evaluation team will emphasise the importance of securing long term funding for such an initiative.

Information to Russian media.

In the initial report the work of the Russian Chechen Friendship Society (RCFS) is being highlighted, and it is certainly worth supporting the organisation. It currently
receives considerable support for its activities from among other The National Endowment for Democracy and Open Society. IMS is planning to support the professionalisation of RCFS activities and the possible establishment of a news service on the situation in Chechnya. This will initially be done through a seminar organised in Moscow in April 2003 in close cooperation with Russian partners e.g. CJES.

Findings

- The initial assessment of IMS activities in Chechnya seems to have been marred by the dilemmas inherent in IMS double mandate, and this has resulted in a rather skewed early appraisal of how IMS might intervene. The Project Document of March 2003 goes a long way in the reconsideration of the initial problematic attitudes and comes up with two very worthwhile projects.
- This dilemma points to a principle problem in relation to media interventions in overt conflict situations, where gross oppression occurs. It is possible to be “apolitical or neutral” in such circumstances? Freedom of speech is in itself a political issue.

5.2.7 Byelorussia

The project document is titled *Problems of Information Law Byelorussia/Russia*. Byelorussia, which is an openly authoritarian country, and where rights of the media and journalists are systematically being violated, in spite of the fact that the country has signed international treaties regarding freedom expression and information. It is therefore understandable that the project focuses on Byelorussia, where the situation is particularly serious, and the country falls within the framework for IMS interventions. It should, however, be borne in mind that there are regions in Russia where conditions for free media are no better than in Byelorussia, and that the title of the project thus is an indication of a broader concern.

The project consists of support for the journal *Media Expert*, which will monitor and publicise violation of press freedom in particularly Byelorussia. Apart from The Centre for Journalism in Extreme Situation, which is part of the project, RSF, CPJ and many others are engaged in monitoring of the media in the country. There is a need of coordination and monitoring of the monitors to check discrepancies in their reporting. However, it seems that based on the implementation of the plans that this challenge may have been solved and the first issue of *Media Expert* has been published. The intervention is being followed up by The Danish Journalists’ Union and other IMS partners through a project of cooperation with journalists in Byelorussia.

In relation to the situation in Byelorussia it is important to bear in mind that too many international media projects focus on the capitals in transition societies such as Byelorussia and Russia and thus forget the provinces, where assistance is most needed. While media based in capitals and other bigger cities have more access to legal assistance and international attention, it is not the fact in the regions. In most areas of the former Soviet Union local power exercise soviet like control with the media, although this is more systematic in Byelorussia than in Russia.
Findings

- The support for the journal *Media Expert* is a valuable project.
- There is a need to coordinate and observe the activities of the monitors to check discrepancies in their reporting.
- There are regions in Russia where conditions for free media are no better than in Byelorussia. This is a finding that has implications also outside this region as provincial media easily are being overlooked.

5.2.8 Ukraine

The aim of the IMS project in Ukraine is to create “Support Structures for Investigative Journalism”. It has as its great advantage that it seems to be a project that moves a step beyond existing programmes in the Ukraine, as none of the existing media programmes “actually foresee the active support for the production of investigative stories”. On the other hand there are and have been several training programmes in the country (by among others Ukraine Open Society Foundation and Regional Media Programme and Internews Ukraine) involving production of articles and broadcast programmes. It is not clear from the project papers how and if these experiences have been taken into consideration.

The project aims to create mechanisms to overcome or minimise obstacles to investigative journalism. Journalistic, juridical, technical and economic support structures are planned. May be the most difficult aspect of conducting investigative and independent journalism in the Ukraine is the safety of journalists. In this context it is important to reflect on the importance of having constant international attention being given to the situation in the country. Ukraine is vulnerable to outside criticism, and international alarm mechanisms and monitoring is extremely important here. It should be mentioned that the Council of Europe among others has done a lot to raise international awareness of the dangers for journalists in Ukraine. About selection criteria it is in this context stated: “The investigation will not produce unacceptable risks to the media practitioners and institutions involved”. This is an important consideration and is one, where it is necessary for IMS to rely on its local partners to make the right judgment.

The projects documents call attention to the fact that a lot of solid investigative journalism on issues of concern to the public, and in the interest of transparency has been carried out in the country (even in the papers controlled by the oligarchy). Networks of professionals in the field do exist. These should be targeted. The murdered editor Georgi Gongadze’s paper *Ukrainskaja Pravda* is one of them.

There is a need to choose between quantity and quality when it comes to supporting investigative journalism in Ukraine. To target all on the impressive long list of provincial newspapers is in danger of wasting a lot of efforts. There are only a few really independent newspapers in the country, around which the efforts in the first place ought to be concentrated. One ought to choose a select number of newspapers with experience and clear willingness to engage in investigative journalism. There seems to be an awareness of this fact as the project document states that there exists "an excessive number of outlets in the media market".
After the consultancy report was delivered and follow-up activities had been undertaken IMS signed a Memorandum of Understanding with The Danish Association of Investigative Journalism with the aim of developing a more substantial project. This seems to be a practical and sensible way of implementing the intentions of the project.

**Findings**

- There are many organisations that have been active in Ukraine in relation to democracy building and supporting free media. It is important that efforts in a country such as this are being co-ordinated and that previous and simultaneous experiences by other organisations are taken into consideration by IMS.
- It is probably even more important in a country such as Ukraine where there are more actors than elsewhere, that projects are clearly focused and targeted.
- The cooperation with The Danish Association of Investigative Journalism seems sensible.

**Conclusion concerning IMS’s activities in Byelorussia and the Ukraine**

In relation to the intervention in Byelorussia as well as in Ukraine there were discussions in the Board of IMS as well as among cooperating partners whether these projects were not bordering on what should within IMS’s sphere of activity. While there are clear examples of media oppression, possibly more so in Byelorussia than in Ukraine, there is no violent conflict, and there is no reason to believe that the society is moving in such a direction. Nevertheless the evaluation team feels that the interventions may be seen as being within the remit of IMS, because they take place in FRESTA countries, and they address two focused and limited issues, and the projects will be taken over by other partners so that IMS’s role as catalyst has been demonstrated.

**5.2.9 Haiti**

The mission to Haiti, conducted by the IMS Chair Mr. Torben Krogh in February 2003 was carried out at the suggestion of Mr. Jørgen Leth, a Danish author and film director, who lives in Haiti. He thought IMS would be in a position to provide help for journalists and media outlets who are under extreme pressure from mainly powerful armed forces that have direct and indirect links to the ruling party and other political forces in the country. IMS thought it was appropriate to consider involvement in Haiti because “we are responding to media under threat, which we consider to be an indicator of conflict”.

The mission report listed several recommendations that are in the course of being implemented by IMS:

**Assistance to Radio Haiti-Inter**

Radio is by far the most important media in the country and Radio Haiti-Inter is the only private radio station broadcasting nationally. Its owner (and a well-known journalist in his own right), Jean Dominique, was assassinated in 2000 allegedly by a group of henchmen linked to an armed wing of the ruling party. His wife, Michele Montas, took over the management of the radio station following his murder. She and the radio station’s staff have experienced acute threats allegedly from the people who wanted her husband dead. The threats got so bad that she was forced into temporary
exile last year. The physical and psychological pressure on the radio’s staff are so grave that Montas decided in late February to temporarily suspend broadcasting for two to three months, as has been done in the past.

In order to maintain the radio’s programme production services for a number of community radio stations and to provide some financial security for the radio station and its staff (the radio lives off advertising for its survival), IMS has agreed to provide funds to cover programme production costs and salaries during the period of suspension.

*Haitian Journalists Association (AJH)*

Given the number of physical attacks and legal prosecutions for defamation and slander against journalists and the need for journalists to flee the country in order to save their lives, IMS proposes to offer support to the AJH in order to provide medical and legal assistance to journalists under attack. With its meagre resources, AJH, which represents both print and radio journalists, has been providing (as best it can) these types of services on an ad hoc basis. IMS will be assisting AJH to develop a proposal for a media support fund. IMS will be funding it and are lobbying for co-funding from other donors, which has already gained some interest.

**Findings**

- These two interventions are a clear example of how and what IMS can do best. They have identified two very practical and substantial avenues for providing emergency support to a broad base of Haitian journalists as well as one of Haiti’s most important media outlets. The initial interest of other donors in supporting a Journalists Association’s legal and medical fund shows promise for the sustainability of what IMS will have initiated.

### 5.3 Findings in relation to projects

- Names and affiliations of the authors of reports and other consultants should be clearly identified at the beginning of the report.
- Sometimes IMS seems to be engaged in countries, which may be characterised as very high profile and thus often also targeted by other organisations and initiatives (Nepal, Sri Lanka, Afghanistan, Israel/Palestine, Chechnya). It is a factor that always should be assessed in relation to where to intervene. But it is also important to bear in mind that the form of support that IMS provides is often not of a high profile character.
- IMS has shown that its ability to act quickly with a mixture of fresh ideas, risk-taking, and funds is invaluable.
- In the documents on the different interventions it is in many cases not possible to find out where the idea for intervention originated.
- IMS must conduct a proper evaluation of the quality of the workshops and training that it lets partner organisations undertake.
- It is necessary with very thorough preparations for and identification of suitable partners particularly in situations of violent conflict.
- The fact that IMS follows up its missions with rapid concrete commitments and activities increases its credibility with its partners.
• IMS’ involvement in the Horn of Africa exemplifies how IMS has broadened its interpretation of its mandate to include post-conflict scenarios. Sri Lanka and most recently Nepal are other examples of these types of intervention.

• It is not always clear from IMS’ documents what the organisation’s overall objective is in each country, beyond responding to a large spectrum of problems faced by the media, and on what basis it believes it can have an impact on a particular identified problem, especially concerning the role of media in conflict.

• It can be safely said that IMS’ activities in several of the “case study”-countries have been unique and catalytic.

• IMS’ success comes from its ability to rapidly link local organisations to international groups.

• In general, it is very difficult to gauge the impact of many of the activities IMS has supported to date. For the most part, outputs are clear but criteria for success have not been developed by neither IMS nor by its partners. Furthermore, IMS largely relies on reports from its consultants and partner organisations to assess activities it has not directly been involved with.

• The longer-term effect of many of IMS activities will depend entirely on whether they continue beyond IMS’ engagement. Fortunately, IMS has been largely successful at garnering ongoing support for the activities it initiates, at the least in the immediate term.

• There is a need for continued assessment of how long IMS should stay involved in a given country and how many resources it should invest in a given country over time. Some countries register excess expenditure, due to a string of IMS activities in these countries, while others feature interventions that may be too brief to have much of an effect. While the answer should ideally be based on a case-by-case analysis, stronger consideration for the necessary conditions to enable IMS to exit should be given at the start of an activity. Exit points are as important as entry points.

• IMS could, in some instances, consider increasing its grants to local organisations. This is especially true here, where IMS’ investments in missions almost equals its investments in concrete activities. The scale should tip more in the direction of concrete activities.

• In interventions in conflict zones, it is important to target media most effective in the local context. In general, provincial and local media are easily overlooked. Furthermore, in some countries, there is some uncertainty about which groups to target within a media enterprise (publishers, editors or journalists), creating possible problems for the effectiveness of the intervention.

• The IMS secretariat should where possible seek to attend workshops and training (especially of organisations they regularly rely on) in order to observe the work of their external consultants and partner organisations, and gain first-hand experience and learning.

• While workshops and seminars are important, they also have limited importance if they are not followed up by concrete long-term projects.

• In depth training in media monitoring issues must consist of more than what can be achieved at short workshops, and it is particularly important that this training takes into consideration local and national circumstances and institutions, e.g. the legal situation and the need for legal awareness.
- Provincial and local media are easily overlooked.
- In some countries, there is some uncertainty about which groups to target (publishers, editors or journalists), creating possible problems for the effectiveness of the intervention.
6 Overall conclusions and recommendations

The most important conclusion that we want to draw from our work evaluating IMS is that we are very impressed with what the organisation and particularly the small and dedicated staff has managed to achieve over less than two years. The number of interventions is impressive. The quality of the work is in general very good. The ability to cooperate with partners is fine. The enthusiasm for the project is great both among the staff and the board. Obviously with a project such as IMS not everything that has been undertaken is beyond problems and criticism, and we have tried to point that out, but the critical points should be read in the context of our very positive attitude to the project.

6.1 Overall findings

Below are listed the most important findings of the evaluation exercise. There are more detailed findings in each section of the report. But the team would like to, referring to the general activities and operations of IMS, highlight the 44 findings that are listed below. They follow the structure of report

Findings in Relation to IMS Organisational Setup

1. There is a measure of confusion as to the exact role of the generally assembly in relation to the board on the election of members.
2. More diversified funding may imply changes in the composition of the board.
3. The board seems to act generally in an advisory way and the Advisory Council, which formally should have that role, does not exist as such.
4. Board members, who are said to sit in their personal capacity, perceive themselves as representing institutions. The only regular participant, except for the Chair, meeting in a personal capacity, is not a full member of the board.
5. Conflict of interest issues are framed in terms of personal gains and do not speak of organisational gains accruing from board membership.
6. Regular staff is too steeped in project management to allow room for monitoring and evaluation and forward-looking planning. The secretariat is overworked and do not have time to sit down to assess and plan in relation to the situation of IMS. There is a need for making strategic decisions and planning.
7. Work performance is highly regarded by the board, and this is confirmed by the observations by the evaluation team through our interactions with the staff.
8. There is a request from board members for more regular information on IMS activities between meetings.
9. Consultants “represent” IMS, but it is not clear whether consultants thereby are entitled to speak on behalf on IMS.
10. Job descriptions for the regular staff are still non-existent.
11. Minutes of board meetings read more like narratives of what was being said than digests of decisions.

12. There is a need for more office space. It is, however, a great advantage for IMS to be housed together with The Centre for Human Rights.

**Findings related to IMS’ implementation modalities**

1. IMS has aptly and justifiably used its pilot phase to explore its options within its mandate. This has resulted in a broad interpretation of its overall mandate to include interventions in situations where media are threatened whether or not organised armed conflict is taking place.

2. There seems to be a certain inability to assess overall impact of interventions and how to utilise lessons to be learned for further interventions. There are certain difficulties in accumulating experiences and in developing organisational knowledge, which impacts on IMS’ choices of models and tools.

3. The overall ratio between administrative and project expenditures is good. Activities and consultants take up more than the double of what is spent on administration, and of this a quarter more is spent on consultant rather than on activities, but since the operations consist of many small projects this is also a good ratio.

4. Though IMS has some mechanism in place for monitoring and evaluating its activities, they remain weak and inconclusive.

5. IMS is very good at raising co-funding and at getting others to take over/continue activities: At least 7 countries where IMS has supported a second phase of an activity; at least 10 projects where there has been a commitment by another party to take up the activity either through funding or operational manners. Among the latter, there are at least six a firm yes, four interested, but without binding insurance.

6. With regard to networking, the list of IMS partners is impressive and indicative of IMS’ commitment and ability to work symbiotically with others. Its networking function, arguably its most important, has enabled it to achieve much more than would be expected from a three-person organisation in such a short period of time.

7. The IMS partners that were interviewed unanimously praised IMS for coming onto the press freedom/media development scene without “stepping on anyone else’s toes”. They have been complemented for being creative, flexible and rapid in their actions, having funding available with few strings attached and successfully connecting and forging relationships with and between existing organisations. Its comparative advantage over other like-minded organisations is clear.

8. The budget ceiling is too low.

9. IMS’ double role of donor and implementer risks hindering the organisation’s ability to learn from its activities. As a donor, it does not benefit from having hands-on involvement and therefore first hand learning in order to develop and re-adjust its approaches. Unless its evaluation mechanisms are strengthened, it is not able to learn from the projects it is helping implement.

10. The annual reports seem to confuse outputs with impacts, and there is no real assessment in the reports of what impacts (criteria of success) have been the results of the IMS interventions. It is early to get a sense of
impacts, but they have not built in proper evaluation practices that determine impacts. Financial resources may have to be dedicated to this end.

*Findings in Relation to Projects*

1. The assessment reports are generally of a good quality.
2. Names and affiliations of the authors of reports and other consultants should be clearly identified at the beginning of the report.
3. The criteria of low-profile and high-profile do not seem to be particularly useful.
4. IMS is willing to take risks and to be experimental and creative. And this is a great asset.
5. In the documents on the different interventions it is in many cases not possible to find out where the idea for intervention originated.
6. There is need for proper evaluation of the quality of the workshops and training that it lets partner organisations undertake.
7. It is necessary with very thorough preparations for and identification of suitable partners, particularly in situations of violent conflict.
8. The fact that IMS follows up its missions with concrete commitments and activities, and quickly, increases its credibility with its partners.
9. IMS’ involvement in the Horn of Africa exemplifies how IMS has broadened its interpretation of its mandate to include post-conflict scenarios.
10. It is not always clear from IMS’ documents what the organisation’s overall objective is in each country, beyond responding to a large spectrum of problems faced by the media, and on what basis it believes it can have an impact on a particular identified problem, especially concerning the role of media in conflict.
11. It can be safely said that IMS’ activities in several of the “case studies-countries” have been unique and catalytic.
12. IMS’ success also comes from its ability to rapidly link local organisations to international groups.
13. In general, it is very difficult to gauge the impact of many of the activities IMS has supported to date. For the most part, outputs are clear but criteria for success have not been developed by neither IMS or by its partners. Furthermore, IMS largely relies on reports from its consultants and partner organisations to assess activities it has not directly been involved with.
14. The longer-term effect of many of IMS activities will depend entirely on whether they continue beyond IMS’ engagement.
15. It would be important to get qualitative feedback from the consultants and reference group members why they felt the mission was strong or weak.
16. There is a need for continued assessment of how long IMS should stay involved in a given country and how many resources it should invest in a given country over time. Some countries register excess expenditure, due to a string of IMS activities in these countries, while others feature interventions that may be too brief to have much of an effect. While the answer should ideally be based on a case-by-case analysis, stronger consideration for the necessary conditions to enable IMS to exit should be given at the start of an activity. Exit points are as important as entry points.
17. IMS could, in some instances, consider increasing its grants to local organisations. This is especially true here, where IMS’ investments in missions almost equals its investments in concrete activities. The scale should tip more in the direction of concrete activities.

18. In interventions in conflicts zones it is important to seek the media most effective in the local context.

19. The IMS secretariat should where possible seek to attend workshops and training in order to observe the work of external consultants, and gain first-hand experience and learning.

20. In depth training in media monitoring issues must consist of more than what can be achieved at short workshops, and it is particularly important that this training takes into consideration local and national circumstances and institutions, e.g. the legal situation and the need for legal awareness.

21. Provincial and local media are easily overlooked.

22. In some countries, there is some uncertainty about which groups to target (publishers, editors or journalists), creating possible problems for the effectiveness of the intervention.

6.2 Overall recommendations

Below the 17 recommendations of the team have been listed in two sections. The first deals with organisational issues. The second concerns programmatic topics.

Overall recommendations on IMS’ Organisational Setup

1. **Clarify IMS’ organisational structure.** IMS should develop a policy document that describes IMS’ organisational structure of IMS and that records all important procedural principles of the Association. This document should also define the role and responsibility of the General Assembly, the Board of Directors, the Advisory Council (if applicable) and the Executive Director. It should also present clear policies regarding criteria for the composition of the General Assembly and the Board, as well as the selection and rotation policies for each.

2. **Define processes for dealing with conflict of interest issues.** IMS should develop a working definition of conflict of interest and put in place procedures for dealing with conflict of interest issues when they arise. We recommend that a small committee made up of the IMS Chair and one or two other board members serve as the decision-making body whenever a conflict of interest issue should arise. This will absolve the Executive Director from taking responsibility for decisions on such matters. Decisions taken by this committee should be recorded and signed by the IMS Chair.

3. **Improve communication with board members.** In between meetings, board members should receive short notices on upcoming interventions, assessment missions or other IMS activities in order for them to be able to comment and provide input before an activity is undertaken.

4. **Improve record keeping of the organisation’s decisions.** Minute taking should become an administrative responsibility and accurately describe decisions that are taken at meetings. Minutes from the previous meeting should be reviewed at each board meeting, amendments noted, and signed off by the IMS Chair.
5. *Hire additional programme and administrative staff.* The Executive Director should be released from some of his programme responsibilities in order to take on a more “strategic thinking” role within the organisation. A programme officer, recruited on the basis of an open and international competition, should be hired in the very near future. This position should include a half-time evaluation/impact assessment function. Additional secretarial and bookkeeping support should also be recruited in the near future.

6. **Develop detailed job descriptions.** Detailed job descriptions should be prepared for all staff members.

**Overall recommendations on Programmatic Issues**

7. **Second phase.** The second phase of IMS should be extended to a 3 –5 years period.

8. **Redefine and raise the ceiling for funding.** There should be increased funding for IMS in order for the organisation to be able to (a) raise the funding for certain select projects, and (b) expand certain select projects into a medium-term framework, and (c) in certain cases enter a second phase of special projects.

9. **Design a project management cycle.** IMS might consider separating its interventions into a planning and an implementation phase in order to be able to commit larger amounts of funds to interventions that require them. A guideline for expenditure could be set for a planning phase, which usually includes assessments missions, and for a first and any subsequent phases of interventions.

10. **Strategic planning.** An annual strategic planning session, aided by an external facilitator, should be held once a year or every two years, as needed. Such a meeting should be held over several days and include board members, staff and selected IMS consultants and other relevant resource persons.

11. **Improve evaluation procedures.** As much as possible, IMS should work evaluation mechanisms into its projects and, when necessary, provide for an external evaluation process. Evaluation tools will have to be determined on a case-by-case basis. If IMS is to take evaluation seriously, it will have to dedicate resources to it.

12. **Training partners.** IMS needs to follow up their training partners, particularly the international training partners to whom they outsource training assignments. Use local partners more, couple international and local training expertise. Ask for proper training plans before the workshop is being implemented.

13. **Criteria for interventions.** IMS needs to re-examine and refine its criteria for interventions and its definitions of stages of conflict. As part of a learning exercise, IMS should try to assess which types of intervention work best under which type of circumstances, i.e. conflict phase (escalation phase, armed conflict, reduction phase).

14. **Create a platform for emergency assistance/safety mechanisms.** IMS should take a lead in bringing together organisations that manage emergency assistance funds or are involved in safety issues (safety training, safe havens etc.) in order to improve their coordination and develop overall strategies for this area of work.

15. **Initiate a working group on conflict conscious journalism and peace building media projects.** IMS could bring together groups working on conflict
conscious reporting and peace building media projects in order to discuss methodologies and evaluation issues. The latter has been identified by some practitioners as an area in serious need of development.

16. *Documentation of activities*. Documents should more consistently state its author. The origination of the intervention should be more clearly stipulated along with the objective for an intervention.

17. *Greater cooperation with organisations involved with conflict analysis*. IMS’s work would benefit from greater cooperation with peace and conflict research institutes as well as governmental bodies in order to sharpen their analysis and methodologies in conflict situations and, in the longer term, strengthen the choices of their activities in overt armed conflict areas. The question of the role of media in peace building exercises is complex, and IMS should consider working out indicators for how media and media support initiatives might contribute to peace building.
List of select documents consulted


IMS Project Documents related to planning, reporting and interventions. In relation to the overall IMS strategies particularly: *Helping Media Affected by Conflict, IMS Intervention Processes*.


Nyheim, David, Leonhardt, Manuela, Gailgals, Cynthia: *Development in Conflict. A Seven Step Tool for Planners*.


Thompson, Mark: “Notes for Paris Talk”.


Thompson. Mark: *Forging War: The Media in Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina*, University of Luton Press. 1999

*Working with the Media in Conflicts and Other Emergencies*. DFID, August 2000
8 Annexes

1 Terms of reference
2 Inception note
3 People interviewed
4 List of IMS partners
5 Statistical tables
6 Spreadsheet summary of classifications
   (separate file attached)
7 Classification schemes
   (separate file attached)
Annex 1 – Terms of Reference

Copenhagen, 20 January 2003

TERMS OF REFERENCE
FOR
EVALUATION OF INTERNATIONAL MEDIA SUPPORT

1. Background
In 2001, a preparatory group of Danish actors involved in international media issues – prominent Danish Journalists and representatives of the Danish School of Journalism, the Danish Union of Journalists, Baltic Media Centre and the Danish Centre for Human Rights – established the new international independent NGO International Media Support (IMS) in co-operation with international media stakeholders.

IMS was established as a response to a recognized need for an emergency mechanism, which could channel observed needs of media in potential or actual conflict areas into short-term, timely and effective action. The overall objective of the IMS is stated in the project document of April 2001 as: “Peace, stability, democracy and freedom of expression and pluralism of the press in conflict and conflict threatened areas enhanced through emergency assistance to media practitioners/journalists and media institutions/associations in situations of potential or manifest conflict”. Important aspects of the work of IMS comprise interaction with other international media actors in its activities and a long-term perspective in the short-term interventions.

The IMS initiative was based on a number of observations and assumptions regarding media and violent conflicts. Thus, the IMS project proposal of 30 April 2001 observes that restrictions on the editorial freedom of the press, including suppression of freedom of expression and the emergence of conflict-inciting journalism, is often among the first signs of an escalating conflict. Furthermore, it assumes, that media can play not only a negative, conflict-igniting role but also a positive, countering and constructive role in situations of latent or manifest violent conflict. As such media support activities should form an integral part of any conflict prevention and peace building effort.

The need for an emergency mechanism was discussed and confirmed at an international conference on emergency media assistance in Copenhagen in January 2001. A broad group of Danish, international and regional media organisations were present at the conference.
For the pilot phase 2001-2003, IMS receives Danida-support and FRESTA-support at the amount of 11.5 mill. DKK, cf. the appropriation document (aktstykke) no. 221 of 15 May 2001). This support can be viewed as initial funding, enabling IMS to gradually seek other additional sources of funding.

It is stipulated in the appropriation document that an external evaluation of the pilot phase should be carried out in the beginning of 2003 with a view to creating a basis for a renewed appropriation to the IMS project. Consequently, the evaluation will form an integral part of the process of establishing the basis for informed decisions regarding the future of IMS (next project phase and funding). As a consequence hereof, the drafting and completion of the IMS project document for the next project phase is also expected closely interrelated with the evaluation process.

As the IMS pilot phase ends in the summer 2003, the evaluation report should at the latest be available by 1 May 2003.

2. Objectives
The main objectives are to obtain an assessment of the quality of the performance of IMS, primarily understood as the relevance and the effectiveness of the activities undertaken by IMS through its pilot phase 2001-2003, and to obtain recommendations regarding the mandate, the networking and the activities.

3. Scope of work and main issues of the evaluation
The evaluation should address both general and specific aspects of the performance of IMS and of its activities. Three main issues are identified as subjects for the evaluation in order to fulfil the objectives of the evaluation. The evaluation team should carry out the evaluation with due attention to the five evaluation criteria outlined in Evaluation Guidelines, Danida, February 1999 – relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact, sustainability – yet with main emphasis on the first two criteria. The evaluation should comprise but not necessarily be limited to the following issues:

1) Overall approach of IMS in accordance with its mandate.
2) Organisational capacity of IMS and method development
3) The operational arm: Performance of specific media assistance activities

1. Overall approach of IMS in accordance with its mandate
IMS was established as a new initiative mandated to fill a specific gap within the international field of media assistance to local media in potential or actual violent conflict areas and to interact in its activities with other local, regional and international media organisations. Furthermore, the project document emphasise “that the success of IMS will be determined by its ability to operate and in practice prove its uniqueness” (p.17). Against this background, the first evaluation of IMS should address the relevance and timeliness of the overall approach of IMS. Key aspects include, but are not limited to the following:

- How does IMS manage to prioritise its resources and focus its range of actions in accordance with its specific mandate? This includes which considerations the selected conflict areas for intervention are based on.
- The IMS role on the international media (assistance) community: To what degree and how does IMS interact and network with other international organisations/actors in the institutional context of "international media assistance". Important actors are obviously other international and Danish media NGOs and institutions including both media monitoring and media development organisations. The latter should often be taking over from the short-term IMS interventions. Key questions: the comparative advantages of IMS, IMS ability to attract partners for action, synergy of actions in partnerships, etc.
- The interaction of IMS with regional and international governmental organisations, such as the EU and UN, e.g. use of information resources for selecting ‘conflict areas’ of particular relevance for IMS intervention and mobilisation of additional human and financial resources from the international organisations.
- A final aspect is how IMS interacts with donors, incl. the Danish MFA (FRESTA, Danida) and the mobilisation of other donors?

2. Organisational capacity of IMS and method development
The evaluation should touch upon issues of organisational capacity – while however bearing the short life span of IMS in mind – and of method development, e.g. the development of methods in relation experiences gained.
Key aspects comprises:
- The performance of and working relationship of the IMS Secretariat and the IMS board? This aspect should also reflect on the appropriateness of the internal division of labour in the organisation/ the roles of the Secretariat and the board as well as their access to and legitimacy vis-à-vis key people at various levels in other organisations.
- The role of the annual international advisory board meeting and the membership structure in relation to interaction between IMS and the advisory board.
- The selection, development and application of process tools and specific IMS tools in light of lessons learned.

3. The operational arm: Performance of specific media assistance activities
The evaluation should examine a number of country or region specific interventions with a view to assess the relevance and value of the activities and the relationship with local media in the conflict area, the co-operation with other international media organisations and international organisations, and regarding the impact of the activities.
Key aspects of this issue include but are not limited to:
- The relevance of the activity carried out in relation to the political context in the conflict area.
- The relevance of the specific short-term IMS intervention with regard to the long-term strategic perspective, i.e. securing a long time-perspective in the short-term IMS activity.
- The ability of IMS to identify local, regional or international actors/partners who can take over from/ follow-up to the short-term IMS activity. This and the abovementioned aspect would be expected to be crucial features of the sustainability of the in country activities of IMS.
- A fourth aspect is how and to what extent IMS interact/interrelate to other international media actors with activities in the specific conflict area and – to the extent possible or feasible – with other selected international actors implementing conflict prevention/peace building activities in the conflict area.

4. Method of work

Due to the process-oriented nature of conflict prevention and peace building interventions, into which category the media assistance activities of IMS falls, the evaluation should focus primarily on the processes of work of IMS, entailing a focus on qualitative dimensions rather than on quantitative issues. The main method employed will be that of inter-subjective validation, including substantive dialogues and interviews with stakeholders – local and regional actors in conflict areas, Danish, regional and international media organisations and partners. The detailed outline of methodology and the selection of case studies to be undertaken will be established by the team and presented in the inception note (ref. below).

- Consult with IMS and the Danish MFA in selecting the relevant organisations and country studies. For this purpose, an inception meeting with the evaluation team the Danish MFA and the IMS-staff will be held on the 31 January 2003. At the meeting the methods and choices of issues to be covered by the evaluation, including the country studies should be endorsed. The evaluation team should prepare a brief inception note (1-3 pages) based on the discussions and conclusions of the meeting.
- Study the project document, the activity reports, conference reports and other relevant material prepared by the IMS and IMS consultants.
- Dialogue with a representative number of the advisory board members and partner organisations and journalists. A meeting/seminar, which could bring a number (10-15) of such actors together and give them a chance to discuss with the team the subject matter/IMS, should be held in Copenhagen.
- Consult with selected partner organisations and independent consultants assisting IMS in conducting a specific activity. Partners/consultants, who have worked in the countries selected for a visit by the team, should be included in this group.
- Select information from other relevant Danish, regional and international media actors in the media field on their view of IMS and its activities.
- Visit three to five countries and carry out a field study of IMS interventions. The case studies should represent different conflict phases (immediate pre-violent conflict phase, manifest violent conflict phase; post-ceasefire/peace agreement phase), different geographical regions (Africa, Asia, Europe) and different types of intervention with different degrees of success, i.e. a weaker and a stronger project. If the lower number of case studies is carried out, it could be considered to hold a workshop with a representative of a local implementing organisation and of the international/external partner organisation, which assisted in carrying out the activity, the IMS and the team.

5. Reporting/Outputs

The evaluation team shall prepare the outputs stated below. All reports should be made available to major stakeholders and approved by the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The reports should be produced in English.
- **Inception note.** A brief inception note (1-3 pages) should be delivered to the Danish MFA no later than one week after the inception meeting.
- **Draft evaluation report.** A draft report should be submitted to the Danish MFA no later than 11 April. The Danish MFA will circulate the draft report to IMS for their comments.
- **Final evaluation report.** The final report should be submitted to the Danish MFA for approval no later than 30 April 2003. The final report will be distributed to IMS, IMS partners and other major stakeholders, and also be available to the general public on request.

### 6. Composition of team
The evaluation will require a balanced team, comprising consultants with expertise within evaluation, the media sector, and emergency and/or development assistance to the geographical regions, where IMS operates.

The evaluation team should be composed of:

- A team leader with several years of experience in media activities, media research and evaluation in Africa and/or other developing countries and/or conflict areas.
- One consultant with several years of experience and skills in evaluation and development assistance.
- One consultant with experience in media activities and project design and implementation in Africa and/or other developing countries and/or conflict areas.

A reference group representing solid expertise on evaluation, emergency and development assistance activities and relevant geographical regions will be established.

### 7. Work plan/ Schedule
The evaluation shall be carried out in the months of February, March and April. There will be considerable room for flexibility as regards the scheduling of steps in the evaluation process. The evaluation team should decide upon the detailed schedule.

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<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Evaluation team</th>
<th>Danish MFA</th>
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<td><strong>January</strong></td>
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<td>31/1</td>
<td>1st joint meeting: team, IMS, MFA</td>
<td>Contracts finalised</td>
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<td><strong>February</strong></td>
<td>Team works: desk studies, seminar(s), field studies, etc.</td>
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<td><strong>April</strong></td>
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<td>11/4</td>
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<td>22/4</td>
<td>2nd joint meeting: team, IMS, MFA re. draft report - do</td>
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<td>28/4</td>
<td>Final evaluation report submitted to MFA</td>
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<tr>
<td>30/4</td>
<td>Approval of final evaluation report</td>
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8. Key documents
- Draft Project Proposal, Danish International Media Support, April 2001 [30/04/01]
- Annual Report, International Media Support, 1 September 2001 – 1 September 2002
- IMS report of the 1st Copenhagen Conference on Emergency Assistance to Media, including list of participants.
- IMS report of the 2nd Copenhagen Conference on Emergency Assistance to Media 6-7 October 2002, including list of participants.
- Minutes of IMS Board-meetings: 24-25 September 2001; 22-23 April 2002; 5 October 2002
- Regulations [vedtægter] for International Media Support.
Annex 2 – Inception note

INCEPTION NOTE FOR
EVALUATION OF INTERNATIONAL MEDIA SUPPORT

I. INTERPRETATION OF THE TERMS OF REFERENCE

The present phase of IMS should be regarded as a pilot phase for the organization. The evaluation should take into consideration that it coincides with the planning of the next phase of IMS’s work.

Consequently the evaluation is to be seen as:

- A “learning document” for both IMS and its funders that will provide a) an input to the further work of IMS (i.e. suggestions for areas for IMS to continue working in, possible expansion of or further focusing of its field of operations); b) a critical analysis of IMS’s activities; and c) suggestions for improvement of its performance.

- An overall assessment of the relevance and effectiveness of IMS’s interventions to date in relationship to its mission and mandate, i.e. to what extent has IMS been able to fulfill its intended role.

The evaluation is not to evaluate the appropriateness of the mandate as such and the assumptions on which is based only so far as it relates to the recommendations for future action. The evaluators are not to be preoccupied with future funding considerations for IMS and propose whatever recommendations they see fit.

II. METHODOLOGY

The evaluation should have an overall comparative perspective both in relation to comparisons between different projects supported by IMS and in relation to the organization’s role compared to other media support initiatives and organizations.

The evaluators suggest the following methods:

Document review
Relevant documents on the operations and activities of IMS will be reviewed by the evaluators.

Case studies
The evaluation will provide a detailed analysis of a selected number of projects and interventions. The case studies chosen should:

- Reflect the different roles IMS plays and its methods of work: catalyst (initiates an activity which is then taken on by another organization), facilitator (involving several parties from the start), etc.
• Comprise of cases in pre-conflict, conflict and post-conflict situations
• Reflect the various types of interventions IMS has been involved with to date:
  - media coverage of conflict (investigative journalism and conflict conscious reporting)
  - media defence (media monitoring, legal assistance, etc.)
  - direct support to media and media support organizations (equipment, running costs)
  - safety (safety training, safe havens, etc.)
  - interventions with a regional perspective

The case studies will be conducted through a variety of methods: in-country visits, telephone interviews, and questionnaires with both local and international implementing partners as well as consultants who have been involved in determining recommendations for interventions. At the time of writing, it has been decided that the team will travel to Nepal/Sri Lanka, Kenya and Sudan, and Ghana.

Check list to be used for interviews
The evaluation team will develop a checklist of questions and issues that will be raised with informants of various kinds, in order to ensure that relevant issues are being covered in the interviews and consultations the team will undertake.

Consultative workshop
This workshop is still tentative as its purpose has not yet been determined.

Reference Group
A Reference Group consisting of the following proposed members will serve as sounding boards and advisors to the evaluation team on key analytical issues: Vibeke Sperling, former Foreign Editor, Politiken, Guest Professor University of Oslo, specialist on Eastern Europe and central Asia; Astrid Suhrke, Senior Researcher CMI, specialist in international conflict research; and Gunnar Sørbø, Director of CMI.

III. MAIN EVALUATION QUESTIONS

4. What are the strengths and weaknesses of IMS’ organizational structure?

Special attention should be given to the following questions for staff, board of directors and international advisory board respectively:

• From where does a project idea come and who receives it?
• What comments are made to a nascent project idea?
• What decisions are made about a project, at what stage, by whom and for what reasons?
• What reasons are given for intervention and what reasons are given for non-intervention, i.e. scrapping the project?
• Who is responsible for committing of resources, how much and for what reasons?
• What are working procedures during project implementation?
• What are the working procedures after a project’s conclusion, i.e. reporting, evaluation, etc.
• What is conflict of interest for IMS? How is it dealt with?

5. What processes have IMS used to design and implement its interventions/activities? What has been the IMS’ interventions’ contribution to achieving its mandate, promoting peace and stability, and to meeting IMS’ target groups’ needs? What lessons have been drawn for improving future interventions?

Special attention should be given to the following issues:

**Mandate**

6. What was the reasoning behind the setting up of IMS?
7. Which interests were involved in determining its mandate?
8. What is the role of media in conflicts?
9. What is an emergency? And what is the role of media in relation to an emergency?
10. What does the professionalisation of media entail in a crisis situation?

**IMS’ methodologies**

• What is the relevance of IMS activities to the political context of the countries they intervene in?
• How are IMS’ short–term activities relevant to the organization’s long-term strategic perspective?
• What is the relationship between emergency media assistance, short-term media development, and long term media development work in IMS’ perspective?
• How are methods of intervention developed, selected and applied?
• Are the methods of intervention appropriate in light of the lessons learned so far?
• Which are the sources that IMS base their judgments on?
• What are “high profile” countries? Those of the most interest to the international media community, not necessarily those with most media exposure.
• What are “core” and “grey” areas of work in relation to IMS’ priorities? Analyze the reasoning behind choice of areas for intervention.
• What is the reasoning behind the division of activities between pre-conflict, conflict, and post-conflict areas? How has IMS arrived at the typology for where to place its interventions?
• What are IMS’ target groups in the situations where they intervene?
• What is the relationship between media development and media monitoring in IMS’ work?
• What is the relevance of training projects? And what is IMS special contribution in regard to this?
• What feedback exists from the various projects? How does IMS evaluate its projects?
• What is IMS’ definition of sustainability?
3. To what extent has IMS been able to network and partner with other organizations to ensure the sustainability of its interventions?

Special attention should be given to the following questions:
- What is the relationship between IMS and its various partners?
- Are some partners more relevant and better suited to cooperation partners than others?
- What is IMS’ target group in terms of their international “audience” and in terms of gaining legitimacy among its peers?
- How and to what extent does IMS interact/work together with other international media actors who are active in the specific country or area of activity?
  - How does IMS interact with its current and prospective donors?
  - What is IMS’ ability to identify local, regional or international partners who are able to carry a short-term activity into the long-term?
  - How does the IMS take advantage of regional and international governmental organizations, such as the EU and the UN, in:
    - deciding what country to intervene in?
    - in mobilising human resources
    - in mobilising financial resources

5. What comparative advantage does IMS have over other media support organizations? What is unique about IMS?

IV. TIMETABLE
- Evaluators meet in Copenhagen on evening of February 12 to finalize a working framework for the evaluation
- Meeting between evaluators, IMS staff and IMS board chair on Thursday, February 13 and possibly Friday February 14.
- Hugo travels to Sri Lanka and Nepal in late February/early March
- Kim travels to Kenya and Sudan in late February.
- Helge travels to Ghana in mid-March
- Tentative consultative meeting to be held in Copenhagen on March 24, 25.
- Evaluators meet with donors on March 26 (if consultative meeting takes place) Alternative meeting with donors is April 4 or 5.
- Evaluators to meet in Copenhagen to work on draft conclusions of report on Friday April 4
- Evaluators to meet with IMS board members on Saturday, April 5
- Evaluators to attend IMS board meeting on Sunday April 6
- Draft evaluation due April 11
- Meeting with IMS, donors and evaluation team to discuss draft report on April 22
- Final evaluation report due April 28.

Kim Brice
Helge Rønning
Hugo Stokke

February 6, 2003
Annex 3 - List of individuals interviewed:

Adan, Ahmed Abdisalam, HornAfrik, Somalia
Ahmed, Hassan Mohamoud, Editor-in-Chief, Sunday Independent, Mogadisho
Andrade, Rosamelia, International Programs, IMPACS
Atem, Yaak Atem, Deputy Director of Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission
Aznar, Alonso, Communication Adviser for Eastern Africa, UNESCO, Nairobi

Barker, John, A19, Johannesburg office
Bhattarai, Binod, Kantipur TV, Nepal
Bjerregård, Mogens Blicher, Chairman, Danish Union of Journalists
Blau, Bjorn, Head of Section, Nepal, Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Breum, Martin, Deputy Director, IMS

Chipare, Luckson, Regional Director, MISA
Coudray, Silvie, Programme Specialist, Division for Freedom pf Expression, Democracy and Peace, UNESCO

Dahal, Tara Nath, President, Federation of Nepalese Journalists
Dal, Ebbe, Danish Daily Newspapers Publishers Association
Davis, Alan, IWPR
De Jong, Sarah, Coordinator, Safety Program, IFJ
Dellem, Dr. Edmund N., African Commission of Health and Human Rights
Deshapriya, Sunandra, Convenor, Free Media Movement and associate of CPA, Sri Lanka
Dijkstra, Bart, Director, CAF
Dixit, Kanak Mani, Editor, Himal South Asia, Nepal
Doubleday, Paul, British Council, Khartoum
Dyreborg, Helle, FRESTA

El Bagir, Faisal – Information and Media Officer, Khartoum Center for Human Rights and Environmental Development
Fernando, Upul Joseph, journalist, Lanka Deepa and member of CCCJ, Sri Lanka
Fillmore, Nick, IFEX
Frandsen, Kjeld, FRESTA

Geevon-Smith, Wellington, MFWA
Ghimire, Pradip, Secretary, Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Studies, Nepal
Grollo, Celine, Solidarity Fund, RSF

Hækkerup, Susanne Rumohr, FRESTA
Haider, Abdulay, Program Officer for Somalia, Novib, Nairobi
Hallberg, Marianne, Regional Representative, Dan Churchaid, Nairobi
Hattatuwa, Sanjana, Research Associate, CPA, Sri Lanka
Højberg, Jesper, Executive Director, IMS
Holmberg, Simon, Director, Baltic Media Centre
Hoppe, Thierry, Head of Section, Horn of Africa, Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Howard, Ross, independent consultant, IMPACS Associate
Hummaida, Ofman, Director, Sudanese Organisation Against Torture
Hussain, Saneeya, Director, Panos South Asia, Nepal

Iwan, Victor, Editor, Ravaya and member of Editors Guild, Sri Lanka

Jayasekera, Rohan, Web Editor and special projects, Index on Censorship
John, Aruni, Deputy Director, Panos South Asia, Nepal

Karikari, Kwame, Media Foundation for West Africa (MFWA)
Khanal, Chiranji, Director of Training, Nepal Press Institute
Kharal, P., Media Advisor, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Nepal
Koirala, Bharat D., Chairman, Media Services International, Nepal
Krogh, Torben, Journalist, Chairman of IMS

Labidi, Kamel, Independent consultant/journalist
Lægreid, Oddvar, Minister Counselor, Norwegian Embassy, Sri Lanka
Leepile, Methaetsile, Executive Director, Samdef
Lindsay, Birgit, Deputy Director, Danish Center for Human Rights
Locussol, Virginie, Researcher, RSF
Lugala, Victor, Communications Officer, The New Sudan Council of Churches
Lush, David, consultant on Sudan mission

Machon, Lotte, FRESTA
Maiga, Maitre Soyata, Chairperson MFWA, Mali
Mainali, Mohan, Director, Centre for Investigative Journalism, Nepal
Markiewicz, Edouard, Media Action International
McGill, Stanley, The News, Liberia
McIvor, Michael, independent consultant on Sudan mission
Meinecke, Geert, Minister Counsellor, Danish Embassy, Nepal
Mendel, Toby, Legal Officer, A19
Møller, Lars, Journalist, Head of IMS Advisory Council
Mørch, Joseph, Representative, UNICEF Somalia

Negus, Steve, independent consultant/journalist
Nimley, Augustus, Liberia National Democracy Monitors

Ojo, Edetaen, Media Rights Agenda, Nigeria
Okeny, Albino, Panos East Africa
Okwaci, Rebecca, BBC monitoring service (member of Sudan mission reference group based in Nairobi)

Padmakamura, Bandula, Director Editorial, Lake House Newspapers, Sri Lanka
Palakidnar, Ananth, journalist, Sunday Observer and member of CCCJ, Sri Lanka
Phiri, Sam, Media Programme Officer, OSISA
Ponnie, J. Lyndon, Liberia National Democracy Monitors
Puddephatt, Andrew, Executive Director of A19 and IMS board member

Rasmussen, Tine, Administrator, IMS
Ringaard, Jørgen, Danish School of Journalism
Savarananmuttu, Dr. Pasiliasothy, Director, Centre for Policy Alternatives, Sri Lanka
Schmidt, Mogens, Assistant Director General, WAN
Senghor, Diana, Panos Institute for West Africa
Skau, Nanna Skrumsager, Danida
Sperling, Vibeke, Guest Professor, University of Oslo
Swaray, Abdual Rahman, West Africa Magazine Correspondent, Sierra Leone

Thompson, Mark, Independent consultant
Titus, Zoe. Media Institute Southern Africa. (MISA)
Tola, Atanfu, Program Coordinator for Somalia, UNESCO
Torkelsson, Teitur, Press officer, Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission

Wagtmann, Michael, Ambassador, FRESTA
Walayo, Abdulkadir, coordinator of the East African Media Institute, Mogadisho chapter
Walayo, Abulkadir Mahmoud, Eastern Africa Media Institute Somalia Chapter
Warnock, Kitty, Panos London
Wesley, Antonio Y, Press Union of Liberia
Wesseh, Conmay, Centre for Democratic Empowerment, (CEDE) Abidjan
White, Aidan, Secretary General, IFJ

Ørnm, Anders, Danida
Annex 4 – List of IMS partners

International organisations

_ARTICLE 19 (A19)._ A19 is named after Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and works in over 30 countries around the world. It monitors, researches, publishes, lobbies, campaigns and litigates on freedom of expression issues and develops legal and other standards to advance media freedom. It is best known for its work on freedom of expression policy and legal reform issues.

Mr. Andrew Puddephatt, A19’s Executive Director, is Vice Chair of IMS’ board of directors. A19 has partnered with IMS on several initiatives. They have participated in joined missions (paid for by the IMS), developed a joint proposal for Afghanistan and implemented a project, the Journalists’ Safe Haven project for Zimbabwe, with IMS funds. IMS planted the seed for the safe haven project, which A19 took on board and implemented.

IMS has linked several of its partners to A19 that, in turn, has provided valuable policy advice. IMS is appreciated because it “has been established without anyone getting resentful…. It plays a unique role because it is a disinterested party”.

_The Baltic Media Centre (BMC)_

The BMC, based in Denmark provides training to media professionals, provides training for media professionals, initiates international co-productions, provides legal advice and expert consultancies among other services for radio, television, print media and independent production companies all over the world.

The BMC’s Director is a permanent member of the IMS board. The organization has participated in two IMS missions, in Pakistan (in relationship to Afghanistan) and India, which were in relationship with existing BMC projects.

_Index on Censorship (Index)_

Index publishes a well-established journal, entitled Index, which publishes analysis, reportage and interviews on censorship issues from all over the world and a country-by-country list of free speech violations. _The Index on Censorship_ office provides space for a Centre for Exiled Journalists, which is run by an RSF correspondent who works out of Index’s office.

In addition to the journal, Index conducts occasional special projects. For example, it has developed a proposal for “Direct Emergency Support for Banned or Excluded Publications”, in partnership with former staff of the Freedom Forum in Europe and the Guardian Foundation, from experience they gained with a Sierra Leonean publication several years ago. The project largely remains an idea on paper since it has to raise funds on a case-by-case basis.

Index and IMS regularly share information and ideas. For example, IMS has provided Index with advice and input into the support for banned publications project. Index has successfully sought support from IMS for one of its partner organizations. For Index, IMS “took up the challenge of working in partnerships” and has succeeded. Index explained that it often works hard and unsuccessfully at trying to get funding
for small, practical projects on the ground. IMS helps fill this funding gap because “they are able to act quickly, and without an agenda, removing some of the obstacles for quick action”.

*International Freedom of Expression Exchange (IFEX)*

IFEX runs an international urgent alerts network that ensures the rapid dissemination of information about abuses against freedom of expression to its 40 member organizations and other interested organizations. IFEX also runs an “outreach” program which consists of training in monitoring attacks against the media, small grants to member organizations, and ICT equipment provision among other activities. IFEX’s sister organization, the Canadian Journalists for Free Expression (CJFE), disburses about USD20,000 a year through its “Journalists in Distress Fund,” which consist of grants ranging from USD500 to USD2000 for medical, relocation and/or living costs as well as occasional legal fees for journalists under threat.

IFEX and IMS share information regularly and has helped IFEX initiate activities that they did not have the ability to launch due to lack of funding. IMS has commissioned IFEX to provide training programs in media monitoring. In at least one instance, IMS provided bridge funding to cover the running costs of an IFEX member, until IFEX was successfully able to raise longer-term funding. IFEX has also been helpful to IMS in identifying appropriate consultants for implementing various projects.

IFEX commended IMS’ role as a catalyst for initiatives in relation to crisis situations. They are impressed with IMS’ network of consultants around the world, and its ability to build partnerships.

*Institute for Media, Policy and Civil Society (IMPACS)*

Impacs runs an International Media Program which conducts research and policy development, conflict mediation and journalist training. They have worked in Cambodia, Guyana, and South Asia to date.

IMPACS and IMS have co-funded (IMS covering the lion’s share of the costs) conflict sensitive reporting projects in Sri Lanka and Nepal (see section on Sri Lanka and Nepal below for more details) and have co-published a practical training manual entitled *Conflict Sensitive Journalism*.

IMPACS is a significant partner for IMS. Mr. Ross Howard, an IMPACS associate, has conducted a series of training programs in Nepal and Sri Lanka and has written the training manual they have just published. Mr. Howard also wrote *An operational framework for media and peacebuilding* (published by IMPACS) which has inspired some of IMS’ criteria for its interventions.

IMPACS view is that there is need for an organization like IMS because it usually takes too long for organizations to take action: “The advantage of IMS is that it spends more time doing something than thinking about it”.

*Institute for War and Peace Reporting (IWPR)*

IWPR seeks to strengthen local journalism in areas of conflict by training reporters, facilitating dialogue and providing reliable information via its award-winning website,
www.iwpr.net, and electronic publications in nine languages. IWPR is best known for its work in Eastern Europe, and especially the Balkans.

IMS and IWPR regularly exchange information and seek mutual advice. IMS has supported some IWPR activities, namely in Afghanistan, and IMS has engaged IWPR staff to conduct assessments on their behalf. From IWPR’s perspective, IMS’ approach is “fresh. They are here to facilitate and complement. They bring creative thinking to the table and are efficient. Because of their attitude and vision, they were able to play a sheep dog role in Afghanistan by bringing the various groups working on similar issues to speak with each other”.

*International Federation of Journalists (IFJ)*

IFJ, with headquarters in Brussels, is the world's largest organization of journalists with 450,000 members in more than 100 countries. The IFJ promotes international action to defend press freedom and social justice through strong, free and independent trade unions of journalists. The IFJ manages a Safety Fund, with a budget of about USD750,000, which provides emergency cash to journalists and their families in circumstances where medical or legal aid is needed or situations where journalists must go into hiding. On average, they provide no more than USD1000 to one individual.

Sarah de Jong, who is in charge of IFJ’s safety program, is an IMS board member. IMS has provided financial support for the IFJ to implement safety training courses in Pakistan (for Afghan journalists), Palestine, Ivory Coast, and others. The two organizations share ideas about how to address journalists’ safety issues and are developing a concept of combining technical safety training with broader professional issues such as conflict reporting, investigative journalism and broader human rights considerations for example. IMS has also brought IFJ in contact with some of its newer partners.

IFJ says IMS “helped pick up the momentum of what we had started” in the safety training area…. IMS has been a breath of fresh air because it has been innovative and are bringing to the mainstream certain fast tracked activities…. IMS support has helped shift the perception that safety of journalists is more than just groups being able to monitor attacks against the press”. IMS has also “added texture to the range of partners we draw from”.

*Media Action International (MAI)*

MAI “promotes the effective use of credible, independent media for the benefit of vulnerable populations in crisis and post-crisis situations”. It sponsors and implements media content development projects in countries in crisis.

IMS have funded MAI to conduct a conflict sensitive reporting training in the Ivory Coast and is funding inputs into a follow-up conference which is being organized by MAI. MAI is also participating on an assessment mission to Angola with IMS funding.

For MAI, “IMS is one of our best collaborators. They create the process for putting media projects in place and leave it up to others to take it on board. They help us initiate projects which then will help us get support from others”.
Reporters Sans Frontieres (RSF)
RSF researches, denounces and publicizes press freedom violations. The organization works with “correspondents” in various countries around the world that provide up to date information on freedom of expression issues. RSF manages a Solidarity Fund which offers support to individual journalists, journalists associations and private media enterprises that are in need of emergency assistance whether financial, legal or medical. The Fund has an annual budget of about EUR100,000.

RSF called upon IMS last year to consider offering support to a struggling, opposition newspaper in Tunisia. IMS consults with RSF in areas of mutual interest. For example, RSF is grateful for IMS having facilitated the identification of a correspondent for the Sudan.

The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)
Among other areas, UNESCO oversees a communications and information program which has a freedom of expression component. They have co-funded a number of safety training activities with IMS namely in Pakistan (for Afghan journalists) and in Palestine.

IMS and UNESCO regularly share information and seek mutual advice. UNESCO finds IMS’ reports “professional, of a high quality and useful since we are not able to go into countries as quickly as they are”. IMS is especially relevant for UNESCO because “we are not able to operate in conflict areas due to our more bureaucratic nature”.

World Association of Newspapers (WAN)
WAN represents 71 national newspaper associations, individual newspaper executives in 100 nations, 13 news agencies, and nine regional press organizations. Mr. Morgen Schmidt, WAN’s assistant Director General and the Chair of the Danish Union of Journalists, serves on the IMS board of directors.

IMS attended a meeting in Colombia co-organized by WAN which led to IMS’ support to several projects there. IMS also contracted, via WAN’s network, a consultant who could help offer advice to a fledgling Sudanese newspapers association.

Regional Organizations

Media Institute for Southern Africa
Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA) is a non-governmental organization with member organizations in 11 of the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) countries. It engages in advocacy, a news exchange project, and capacity building for its members and the independent media.

MISA represents an important source of information for IMS on matters in southern Africa and represents an important model of a successful regional media association. IMS provided support to MISA for various activities related to media law reform in Zimbabwe as well as for participation in an assessment mission to Angola. MISA has also delivered media monitoring training in West Africa with support from IMS.
For MISA, “IMS is more than a donor because they get involved with the issues and bring ideas to the table. Their quick turn around time is appreciated because they enable you to do what you need to do, when you need to do it”.

**Media Foundation for West Africa (MFWA)**

MFWA defends and promotes the rights of the media throughout West Africa through advocacy, monitoring, alerting and publicizing violations of and attacks on freedom of expression, training to build media capacity and facilitating debates on relevant issues. MFWA relies on a network of regional correspondents that act as media monitors on media abuses in the region. It also cooperates with the national press unions throughout the West African region.

MFWA is a key IMS partner in West Africa. Given IMS’s interest in promoting learning across borders and the MFWA Director’s knowledge and contacts in the Horn of Africa, MFWA has participated in an IMS assessment in the Horn of Africa. A proposal developed by MFWA for the Horn of Africa is under consideration. IMS has also supported several stages of MFWA’s activities in Liberia as well as a training course in Sierra Leone (see section on West Africa and the Horn of Africa for more details).

MFWA “appreciates IMS’ professionalism, competency and expediency”.

**Panos Institute in East Africa and South Asia**

The Panos Institutes work to ensure that information is effectively used to foster public debate, pluralism and democracy. In South Asia, Panos prioritizes its work on media pluralism, public health, the environment and conflict issues. In East Africa, one of its components is a “Media for Peace” Program.

Panos and IMS have collaborated with Panos South Asia on its activities in Sri Lanka and Nepal and with Panos East Africa on an assessment of media development needs for northern and southern Sudan. Panos East Africa considers IMS’ work in the Sudan “very brave” because many groups have postponed activities due to the political situation in the country. “They promised to the media community in Sudan that they would do something and they have”. The first IMS Sudan assessment helped Panos define its own strategies and activities in the Sudan.

**Donor organizations**

**Communications Assistance Foundation/Stichting Communicatie Ontwikkelingssamenwerking (CAF/SCO)**

CAF was founded by the Netherlands Association of Journalists; the Society of Chief Editors; and the Dutch Newspaper Association and is entirely funded by the Dutch Government. CAF supports independent media development in developing countries around the world, including Africa, Latin America and Asia.

CAF manages an emergency assistance fund that provides “emergency relief” for media emanating from a natural disaster or a conflict situation. They dispose of
EUR150,000 a year which is made available in grants of about EUR20,000 each for journalists, media enterprises or journalists associations in need. They also make use of the Dutch Journalists Union fund which provides computers (laptops for about €2,000 each) for journalists on an emergency basis. If CAF does not have sufficient funds available to respond to an emergency, they can make applications to the Dutch Government for additional support.

CAF co-funded and implemented an activity in Ivory Coast. CAF welcomes this “donor coordination in media support”.

Danida
Danida funds 40 per cent of IMS’ budget. As a matter of course, IMS meets with Danida representatives in the local embassies and, on occasion, interacts with the country officers in Copenhagen. IMS has managed to successfully raise funds from several Danish Embassies for their partner’s activities. IMS tried to raise funds from Danida for an activity in Afghanistan, unsuccessfully.

FRESTA
FRESTA funds 60 per cent of IMS’ current budget. They have a dynamic and symbiotic relationship. IMS and FRESTA conducted a joint mission to Central Asia in order to identify opportunities for short and long-term media support. FRESTA turn to IMS to provide input on certain proposals they receive and, on occasion, IMS forwards proposals from its partner organizations to FRESTA for possible funding. IMS is currently supporting an array of activities in Central Asia that they plan to develop into a proposal to be submitted to FRESTA for possible funding.

The Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa (OSISA)
OSISA is a private non-profit foundation that is part of the Open Society network of foundations established by George Soros. OSISA supports, among other areas, projects that enhance freedom of expression and the development of independent media throughout the southern Africa region.

To date, the IMS and OSISA have co-funded a safe haven project in Zimbabwe and an assessment of media development needs in Angola. For OSISA, the IMS has “taken the lead in bringing organizations groups together in order to work together. In the case of the Angola assessment, if they had not speeded up the process, it would have never taken place”.

The Open Society Institute’s Regional Media Program (OSI)
OSI is a network of private, non-profit foundations that support the development of a more open society mainly in Eastern and Central Europe and the Caucasus. The regional media program works in cooperation with Open Society’s national foundations to support a wide array of freedom of expression and media development projects.

OSI has called upon IMS to provide emergency support to one of its partners in Georgia. OSI has also co-funded activities with IMS in Eastern and Central Europe and have an ongoing dialogue about activities in the Caucasus.
Annex 5 - Statistical tables

5.1 Frequency tables

Note: The frequency tables give a percentage breakdown of those entries in the classification schemes that could be easily quantified.

<table>
<thead>
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Security threat to journalists

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## Financial constraints

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## Restricted access to information

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## STAGE OF PROBLEM

Note: This table uses IMS terminology, but elsewhere in the report we have suggested alternative terms

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## TYPE OF MEDIUM SUPPORTED

### Private print

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</table>
### Private TV/radio

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<th>Percent</th>
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<td>NO</td>
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### State print

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### State TV/radio

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### Electronic media

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### TARGET OF IMS ACTIVITY

#### Journalists and other media workers

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#### Readers/public at large

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## TYPE OF INTERVENTION

### Assessment

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### Monitoring

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<td>65,2</td>
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### Training

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<td>47,8</td>
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### Content transformation

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<tr>
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### Organisational support

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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equipment/infrastructure</td>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>Percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>---------</td>
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<tr>
<td>YES</td>
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<td>17.4</td>
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<table>
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<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Direct/indirect funding</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
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<td>65.2</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Advocacy/lobbying</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
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<td>65.2</td>
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5.2 Crosstabulations: Stage of problem by type of intervention

Note: We were interested in finding out how the type of intervention was distributed across the three stages of conflict, using IMS terminology. The tables below set out the results.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>v17 Assessment * v9 STAGE OF PROBLEM</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>Pre-conflict</td>
<td>manifest conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<table>
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<table>
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<td>--------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
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<tr>
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<td>manifest conflict</td>
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### v25 Direct/indirect funding * v9 STAGE OF PROBLEM

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### v26 Advocacy/lobbying * v9 STAGE OF PROBLEM

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</tr>
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<tr>
<td><strong>NO</strong></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Final note**: The information in the tables in Annex 5.1 and 5.2 is based on qualitative entries into the classification schemes which are appended as a separate text file to the report. The statistical tables, compiled using SPSS software, have been extracted from an Excel spreadsheet file, also separately appended to this report.
Summary

The report was commissioned by the Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and a team was put together comprising Helge Rønning and Kim Brice as external consultants and Hugo Stokke from CMI. International Media Support is an international NGO, based in Copenhagen, which provides support to media in conflict. The mandate covers media reporting on conflict situations, in particular armed conflict. Threatened media organisations are also covered by the mandate. The evaluation credited IMS for being experimental, innovative and willing to take risks in an often uncertain environment. Among critical points, there were uncertainties about the criteria for intervention, the organisational setup of IMS and their monitoring and evaluational capacity. The evaluation team concluded positively that IMS should be extended with additional funding and made a number of specific recommendations.
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