Trade Unions in Processes of Democratisation
A Study of Party Labour Relations in Zambia

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Summary:
This report assesses the role of labour in the recent transition to multi-party rule in Zambia. The main question considered is to what extent labour, through its policy-making organ the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), effected policy changes at the national level in a democratic direction. The report analyses Zambian industrial relations in the post-colonial period with particular emphasis on the period of one-party rule (The Second Republic 1973). The case study concludes that the trade union movement was established in a pluralist setting and has remained autonomous from the state despite strong efforts to incorporate the union movement into the party/state. The organisational autonomy of the union movement is one of the main reasons why the trade union movement spearheaded the transition to multiparty democracy in October 1991.

Sammendrag:

Indexing terms: Stikkord:
Democracy Demokrati
Democratisation Demokratisering
Trade Unions Fagbevegelse
Zambia Zambia

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Fantoft
December 1992
Zambian key facts and figures

Official Name: Republic of Zambia
Form of State: Unitary republic
Date of Independence: October 24, 1964
    Third Republic (1991-): Multiparty Democracy
President: Dr. Kenneth Kaunda (1964-1991)
    Mr. Frederick Chiluba (1991-)
    Movement for Multiparty Democracy (1991-)
Official languages: English, Nyanga, Bemba, Tonga, Lozi
Area: 753,000 square km
Population: 7.79 mn (1990)
Percentage of Population in Urban Areas: 51.3 (1990)
Life Expectancy at Birth: 54 years
Gross domestic product (GDP): USD 1,960 mn
GDP per capita: USD 390
Principal export earning: Copper (92 per cent)
National debt: USD 7,146 mn
Total labour force: 3.86 mn (1990)
Percentage of total labour force in formal employment: 9.8 (1990)

List of abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAC</td>
<td>Anglo American Corporation</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
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<tr>
<td>BSAC</td>
<td>British South Africa Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Central Statistical Office (Lusaka)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIPD</td>
<td>Department of Industrial Participatory Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EIU</td>
<td>Economist Intelligence Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<tr>
<td>GNP</td>
<td>Gross National Product</td>
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<tr>
<td>GRZ</td>
<td>Government of the Republic of Zambia</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICFTU</td>
<td>International Confederation of Free Trade Unions</td>
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<tr>
<td>IFCTU</td>
<td>International Federation of Christian Trade Unions</td>
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<tr>
<td>IFI</td>
<td>International Financial Institutions</td>
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<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>INDECO</td>
<td>Industrial Development Cooperation</td>
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<td>IR 1971</td>
<td>Industrial Relations Act 1971</td>
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<tr>
<td>MMD</td>
<td>Movement for Multiparty Democracy</td>
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<tr>
<td>MUZ</td>
<td>Mine Workers Union of Zambia</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCIWU</td>
<td>National Commercial and Industrial Workers’ Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non Governmental Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NUBEGW</td>
<td>National Union of Building, Engineering and General Workers</td>
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<tr>
<td>NRAMU</td>
<td>Northern Rhodesia African Mine Workers’ Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>NRMWU</td>
<td>Northern Rhodesian Mine Workers’ Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>NRTUC</td>
<td>Northern Rhodesia Trade Union Congress</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organisation for African Unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RRAWU</td>
<td>Rhodesia Railways African Workers’ Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAP</td>
<td>Structural Adjustment Programmes</td>
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<tr>
<td>TUC</td>
<td>Trade Union Congress</td>
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<tr>
<td>UFP</td>
<td>United Federal Party (European)</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNIP</td>
<td>United National Independence Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNZA</td>
<td>University of Zambia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>UP</td>
<td>United Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>UPP</td>
<td>United Progressive Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WFTU</td>
<td>World Federation of Trade Unions</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZANC</td>
<td>Zambia African National Congress</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZCCM</td>
<td>Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZCTU</td>
<td>Zambia Congress of Trade Unions</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZFE</td>
<td>Zambia Federation of Employers</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZIMCO</td>
<td>Zambia Industrial and Mining Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZTUC</td>
<td>Zambia Trade Union Congress</td>
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Chapter 1: Democracy and the role of civil society in Africa

In a period when democratisation is gaining ground in the developing world, the question of how organised labour can contribute to this process is increasingly being put on the public agenda. In approaching these questions, Western theories of state and civil society may help provide an understanding and will therefore serve as the theoretical framework of this analysis.

The focal point of this study concerns the relationship between the Zambian labour movement and the governing party (UNIP); in particular, to what extent the labour movement, through its central association, the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions, effected policy changes at the national level in a democratic direction. The central issue in this connection is why the trade union movement in 1990 broke its long alliance with UNIP, an alliance which had been in place since 1961. After the break, the labour congress became a central force in the opposition to the one-party rule. The main question guiding the analysis is this: Which factors can account for the changes in party labour relations manifested in the political events of the 1990s? The emphasis is put on the political developments of the second republic, or the one-party state (1973-1991), but relevant historical events will also be considered.

In December 1989, Frederick Chiluba, the Chairman-General of the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) announced that the trade union movement would work for constitutional changes in order to bring an end to the one-party rule which had lasted since 1973. Forces from the trade union movement, the churches, parliamentary dissidents, business elites and students formed a coalition movement under the name Movement for Multiparty Democracy and Frederick Chiluba was elected president. On October 25, 1991, after an election process characterised by international observers as free and fair, Chiluba became the new president of the Republic of Zambia, by winning an overwhelming majority of the votes (80 per cent) and the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) formed the new government.
By analysing the relationship between the ruling party UNIP and ZCTU during the one-party system of government, I wish to shed light on the political and economic factors which may explain the trade union involvement in the political struggle. The aim is to portray what role the trade union movement perceives for itself in the Zambian society. An understanding of the relationship between UNIP and the trade union movement is important in a number of ways.

Firstly, very little is known of the nature and actions of African civil society organisations as the scholarly debate has focused predominantly on the role of the state. In order to understand the new development trends in the region it is therefore necessary to undertake research concerning forces outside the state structures. Secondly, an analysis of the role of labour and how it perceives its role is instrumental for an assessment of the new democracy in Zambia. The MMD government was given overwhelming support from the urban working community and the trade union movement. However, what is the basis of the trade unions’ support of MMD and the struggle for democratisation? Was the support and the subsequent break with UNIP a sign of a genuine quest for democracy on the part of the unions, or was it merely an indication of a growing disillusionment with the economic policies of UNIP? A deeper understanding of the processes involved and the self-perceptions of the trade union movement may therefore give an indication of the sustainability of the newly won democracy in Zambia.

Developing nations, and African nations in particular, have since independence been characterised by authoritarian rather than democratic regimes. A large scholarly debate has been devoted to the question under what conditions transitions from authoritarian to democratic regimes may occur. The theories have focused on socio-economic, institutional and cultural conditions (Lipset 1959 and 1981, Almond and Verba 1965, Diamond et al. 1990). However, despite a vast body of theoretical work, history seems to take its own course without regard to the predictions of political scientists. Although it was commonly held by most African observers and leading political scientists that the political and economic development in Sub-Saharan Africa had not proceeded far enough to expect democratic changes (Huntington 1984), countries in this region have experienced significant changes of a democratising nature in recent years. In fact, few countries on the African continent remain untouched by the

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1 The term Sub-Saharan Africa refers to Africa south of the Sahara desert, commonly known as the non-Arab part of Africa. When referring to Africa in the analysis, I am referring to Africa south of Sahara.
political events which have swept the continent over the past two-three years. But democratisation in Africa has occurred in an economic context quite different from the one predicted by scholars, as most countries on the African continent have experienced serious economic recessions since 1980. In other words, in Africa the economic crisis has so far created conditions for transition from authoritarian and largely corrupt regimes to democratic regimes and thus reversed the causal links often assumed in the literature concerning preconditions for democracy.

Presenting a somewhat different interpretation, a number of scholars have preferred to emphasise external or international factors in order to understand the current changes on the African continent (Legum 1990). With the demise of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe, a number of scholars and observers have argued that the recent wave of democratisation in Africa should be understood in the context of the changes in Eastern Europe; as a “diffusion” of democratic ideas. Another group of scholars emphasising the external dimension have in particular emphasised the strong pressures from the international donor community (Gibbon 1990, Callaghy 1990). Since 1989 the lending agencies have included principles of good governance and respect for human rights as conditions for their loans. With the deepening of the economic crisis of most African countries the conditionalities of the international donors are bound to impact. Nevertheless, while these external factors certainly are very important and to a large extent have provided a political “opening” in which changes can take place on the African continent, they fail to offer an adequate explanation of the differences between the various countries. In order to understand why a country like Zambia recently held democratic elections, why changes have taken much longer time in Kenya, not taken place at all in Malawi and been very violent in Zaire, it is necessary to place emphasis on internal factors.

This observation illustrates that macro level theories about preconditions for development and democracy must be supplemented with knowledge about national characteristics of the country studied. Hence, political theory should serve as general guidelines or as a conceptual framework for an empirical analysis. In order to fully comprehend the process of political reform, the role of civil society or the voluntary associations outside the realm of the state, must be analysed. It is evident, judging from the recent political events both in Africa and Eastern Europe, that popular movements have put pressure on the elites and been instrumental in the transition process. However, in the African context, research on civil society and its role in the political process has been limited until now. In particular, little
research has been carried out on the role of trade unions in processes of democratisation or their relationship with the state in general.

The limited interest in civil society in comparison to the state and state structures, must partly be understood against the background of the authoritarian regimes that emerged in Africa in the post-colonial period. Shortly after independence, the liberal democratic constitutions inherited from the colonial powers were replaced by various forms of authoritarian rule in all but a few of the former colonies in Africa. These changes affected the scholarly interest as well. Following political instabilities, ethnic rivalries, civil wars and limited economic development in many developing areas, theoretical approaches emerged in the late 1960s which perceived unchecked participation to be an obstacle to economic development (Huntington 1968). From an emphasis on liberal democracy, the scholarly debate shifted to a consideration of “the strong state”. State society relations were by many conceived of as a relationship in which ruling elites had to subjugate social groups and increased participation in order to achieve economic growth (Kesselman 1973). Within the African scholarly debate, weakness of the state in terms of steering capacities became a main concern (Jackson and Rosberg 1984).

As the economic recession in Africa gathered momentum and approached crisis-levels, it became evident for most observers outside and within Africa that centralised state structures had not generated economic development. On the contrary, the state monopolies had in many instances opened up for a political culture of corruption, unaccountability and fraud. Stronger emphasis on corruption and bad governance from an emerging domestic opposition and from the donor community during the 1980s brought issues of participation, good governance and civil society back into the African scholarly debate (World Bank 1989, Bratton 1989, Sklar 1982, Diamond, Linz and Lipset 1988). As the emerging opposition in country after country related the issue of bad governance to the economic decline, one regime after the other began to crumble. In order to analyse the processes involved, attention was again directed to the social forces outside the state domain. Within the political science debate, studies of voluntary associations have in particular been linked to regulation of state society relations and to profound processes of political change (Bratton 1989, Diamond et al. 1990).

1.1 Trade unions in processes of democratisation
The term “civil society” has been present in Western political discourse for at least two centuries, and it has been given so many interpretations and connotations that it is not possible to give one definition which can be
agreed to by all. However, some core notions can be deduced from the historical writings. Firstly, civil society should be understood as the realm between the family and the state comprising the network of voluntary associations working toward or interacting with the state, yet being financially and organisationally autonomous from the state. In other words, the issue of concern to this analysis relates to the ability of associations at the intermediate level to bring about policy changes at the national political level. How then, can the demands for political change from civil society be conceptualised? And more specifically, what is the role of trade unions in these processes?

The literature concerning transition from authoritarian regimes to democracy, drawing on the experiences in Latin America, Southern Europe and most recently Eastern Europe, has indicated that trade unions as leading associations of civil society are often instrumental in the process of regime transition (O’Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead 1986, Przeworski 1989, Valenzuela 1989). Due to their central position in the economy, trade unions can damage the economy through work stoppages. Further, trade unions have a continuous organisational base and the workplace is one of the few places in authoritarian political settings where people can organise without police interference. In addition to the general democratising potential of the trade unions, membership and participation in trade unions introduce citizens to democratic procedures which again may induce people to participate in national economic policies (Fenwich and Olson 1986, Pateman 1970).

Despite the prima facie importance of trade unions both in terms of their value orientation and as agents for democratisation, trade unions have been given little attention in the scholarly debate on development and democratisation (Bates 1971, Sklar 1982). However, while this fact may point to a weakness of the scholarly debate, it also suggests that civil society, and trade union movements in particular, in many third world societies have been too weak to have an impact on the national political development. The strength of a trade union movement is often associated with its numerical base and with the level of industrialisation, which again may explain the limited focus on trade unions in largely peasant-based third world societies. Nevertheless, studies of trade union movements in developing nations have indicated that in countries where workers are organised in industries of great importance to the economy as a whole, their numerical strength may be of less significance (Valenzuela 1989). According to Valenzuela, the level of union density and the organisational strength of a union movement may therefore be more appropriate indicators of union strength than their numerical proportion of the labour force as a
whole (Valenzuela 1989). Considering the Zambian mine workers, this observation is of relevance because it is evident that their influence on Zambian political development cannot be attributed to their numerical strength vis à vis the total labour force.

1.2 The case of Zambia

It has often been stated that modern Zambian history begins with the discovery of copper in the last century as the copper mining industry in twenty years transformed the economic basis of the territory from an agrarian to an industrial economy. Indeed, the copper industry has made Zambia a very special case in Africa. Industrialisation created by copper lead to a high level of urbanisation and by 1990 more than 50 per cent of the population was located in urban areas, which leaves Zambia with one of the highest urbanisation rates on the African continent. The level of urbanisation also affected the trade union movement. Due to the central location of Zambia’s major industries, along the rail-road from the capital Lusaka to the border of Zaire, the Zambian trade union movement had from an early stage a large, and in an African context, strong union organisation.

The history of the Zambian labour movement goes back to the time when industrial action originated in the mines. The first major protest of African workers occurred in 1935 after an increase in the poll-tax for African mine workers in the Copperbelt. It sparked off the first strikes in the history of industrial relations in Zambia. However, it took more than ten years before the Colonial Office recommended the formation of a collective bargaining machinery to Africans. The Trade Union and Trade Disputes Ordinance was passed in 1949 and it legalised the formation of African trade unions. From 1947 to 1957 African trade unions were formed in most areas of production (Bates 1971, Meebelo 1986).

The Mine Workers Union (MUZ) has been the strongest union through most of the post-colonial period due to the importance attached to copper in the national economy. Judging from the organisational network, level of education and strength vis à vis the governing authorities, it can be argued that the Zambian trade union movement is one of the most powerful union movements on the African continent, arguably, with the exception of the South African trade union movement. Another important factor which can account for the strength of the Zambian labour movement, is the relative absence of ethnic divisions. A number of studies carried out on the Zambian labour movement have pointed to the fact that the Zambian labour movement has developed a working class consciousness which limits the
utility of the term ethnicity in studies of Zambian labour relations (Epstein 1958, Gertzel 1979).

In the modern history of Zambia, trade unions have played a significant role in the political and economic development of the nation. First of all, the trade union movement was a major force in the struggle for national independence. A large part of the emergent black leadership was recruited from the labour movement and the organisational network of the trade unions was utilised in the mobilisation efforts in the struggle for independence. However, the issue of involvement in political matters split the trade union movement and as the analysis will point to, the division between politically and economically oriented trade unionists has been a major source of conflict within the union movement.

The main focus of this analysis is placed on the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) as disputes concerning industrial policies since 1980 have involved UNIP and the Congress. ZCTU was created by an act of parliament in 1964 and was intended by the UNIP government to be a channel for communicating UNIP's policies to the workers. ZCTU was therefore initially considered an agent of the government and given considerable financial and organisational resources. As a result of the close ties between the party and the labour congress, the relationship between ZCTU, the leadership of the national unions and the rank and file has varied considerably in the period since independence. In the following analysis, the question of who controls the central political organ of the trade union movement (ZCTU) will be discussed at length. Beyond doubt, ZCTU is today the most powerful non-state association in Zambia as it embraces all nineteen national unions in the country. ZCTU membership comprises more than 80 per cent of the total workforce in the formal sector employment and the membership is today around 350,000. The Congress is financed by contributions from the affiliated unions and the national unions are required by the 1971 Industrial Relations Act to contribute 30 per cent of their membership contributions to the Congress.

Political developments in post-colonial Zambia

As in most other African post-colonial regimes, the parliamentary system of government inherited from the British colonial powers in Zambia was replaced by a one-party regime by the new national elites. The introduction

2 See appendix I for a list of the unions affiliated to ZCTU in 1991, and their membership-figures.
of the "One-Party Participatory Democracy" in 1973 marked the beginning of the "Second Republic", which lasted until October 1991, when the "Third Republic" was inaugurated which re-introduced pluralist democracy in Zambia. The one-party constitution of 1973 placed the governing party, UNIP, constitutionally above the national assembly, the judiciary and the government as indicated by the use of the term "the Party and its Government". The process of political centralisation represented by the introduction of a one-party state, was followed by an increasingly stronger state dominance of the economic sector. Aiming for rapid development ideologically anchored in the philosophy of "Humanism", major industries and mining companies were nationalised in the latter part of the 1960s. By 1970, a majority of the industries were state-owned and administered by politically appointed leaders. As only a marginal part of Zambian industries are privately owned, it is the relationship between the state, represented by the main policy-making organ UNIP, and the unions that has been of importance for industrial relations in the second republic of Zambia.

In terms of economic prospects, Zambia was considered to be in a very good position after independence in 1964. Due to high incomes generated from the copper industry, Zambia was one of the wealthiest nations on the African continent. However, the strong dependence on copper resulted in one of the worst economic recessions in Africa as a consequence of the fall in copper prices and diminishing output. Contrary to the stated objectives of the political leadership to diversify the economy, Zambia's dependence on one single commodity continued to increase in the post-colonial period. When the copper prices on the world market began to fall in 1973, Zambia was caught in a debt trap as imports exceeded exports. The political developments in Zambia in the latter part of the 1980s must therefore be understood against the background of the economic crisis which lead to food shortages, high rates of unemployment and soaring rates of inflation.

The development of industrial relations in post-colonial Zambia reflects in many ways a general African trend. Pluralist political structures were replaced by one-party systems of government in most African countries and the former autonomous trade unions (and civil society associations) were incorporated into the party hierarchy as "mass-wings" of the party. Due to the post-colonial policy of cooptation, a number of scholars have doubted whether trade unions in post-colonial Africa can be considered as autonomous associations with a potential to effect policy changes in a democratic direction (Kraus 1976, Nyang’oro and Shaw 1989). Despite organisational strength, a central position in the economy and even numerical strength, the democratising potential of African trade unions has been called into question due to their close connection to the state. Does
this criticism apply to the trade union movement in Zambia and its role in the struggle for democratisation in the 1990s? In order to conceptualise the role of the Zambian trade union movement and its democratising potential, alternative theoretical perspectives and hypotheses are considered.

1.3 Theoretical perspectives and hypotheses

Theoretically, the analysis focuses on the process of transition from authoritarian to democratic regimes. In other words, the main concern is not the sustainability of democracy per se, but the process of political change, or the period of transition. As evident from the above description, the concepts of democracy and civil society are instrumental in the analysis. Democracy at the national level is here understood as a system of government which guarantees free elections at regular intervals between competing parties, freedom of association and rule of law (Dahl 1971, Diamond, Linz and Lipset 1990). In the African scholarly debate the liberal notion of democracy, often referred to as formal democracy, is often criticised for being too limited and not taking into account the need for social justice and economic redistribution (Beckman 1990, Nyang’o 1987). However, while formal democracy as guaranteed by political democracy may not be sufficient to secure a just social system, both the critics of formal democracy and the proponents of the liberal democratic school agree that political democracy is a necessary component of democracy. As my scope is limited to the establishment of democracy, I believe the focus on formal democracy can be justified.3

The concept of democracy can be studied at many levels. This analysis focuses on the role of one agent of civil society (trade unions) in relation to the governing structures and in processes of political reform. As a result of this, the analysis will mainly concentrate on the political role of trade unions towards the party and the state at the macro level. However, as the analysis focuses on the role of trade unions in the process of democratisation, the organisational (meso) level must be related to the study of policy changes. A trade union movement has a more complicated organisational structure than many other formal organisations because a union is both a movement and a formal organisation (Marks 1989). Furthermore, trade union movements are not composed of one organisation

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3 The terms “formal democracy”, “liberal democracy” and “political democracy”, as opposed to “economic” and “social” democracy, are often used interchangeably in the literature and refers to a system of governance at the national level characterised by institutional guarantees for elections etc (see definition above).
but of a set of relatively autonomous organisations that are only incompletely coordinated by a higher order peak association. This issue is of particular relevance to an analysis of the Zambian labour movement as the Congress (ZCTU) was originally created by the governing party. The relationship between the various levels of the organisation and the legitimacy of the Congress vis à vis the affiliated unions will therefore be addressed.

In order to assess why the trade union movement became a central part of the opposition against the UNIP regime, two alternative theoretical perspectives will be considered, namely pluralist and neo-corporatist theories. Within a pluralist framework, trade unions, like other civil society associations organising around economic, political or cultural interests, are seen as autonomous groups, competing for power and resources for the benefits of their members. In this perspective, the goals of trade unions are understood as mainly economic, geared towards improving the economic welfare of its members. In a pluralist perspective, autonomy from the state is considered essential for trade unions in order to function effectively in the interests of their members. However, while the interests of trade unions in pluralist theory are regarded as narrow and economic rather than political, trade unions are assigned an important political role in processes of democratisation. In authoritarian regimes where the political space of interest aggregation is limited, trade unions are seen to engage in struggles for democratisation. Within a pluralist perspective then, trade unions change towards a political orientation temporarily in defence of their long term economic interests. Implicit in the pluralist argument is the assumption that a free market or capitalist economy is better suited for trade unionism and workers than socialism (Perlman 1928, Martin 1988).

Applying a pluralist perspective to trade unions and their democratising potential in Zambia, it can be argued that the economic decline has weakened the legitimacy of the regime and thus widened the autonomous space of civil society and the labour movement in particular. Due to the authoritarian mechanisms of the state, the Zambian labour movement has not been able to mobilise collectively against the regime before. In order to characterise the Zambian trade union movement as a civil society association in a pluralist perspective, the following conditions must be met: Firstly, it should be possible to conclude that when initiating the process of

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4 The term “neo-corporatism” is often used synonymously with “corporatism”, but “neo” is added to distinguish this school of thought emerging in the 1970s from the pre- World War II corporatism associated with Fascist Italy. In this analysis however, the two terms will be applied interchangeably, referring to the post-World War II type.
democratisation, the trade union congress was financially and organisationally autonomous from UNIP. Secondly, in order to be considered as a civil society association and not as an alternative party, the union movement must work closely with other civil associations in the transition from authoritarianism to democracy. Lastly, it should be possible to distinguish the trade union movement from the governing party along lines of ideology. Political or ideological differences cannot be considered general indicators of autonomy as an organisation can share the political objectives of a state or governing party and still be autonomous. However, throughout the post-colonial period UNIP has represented policies detrimental to pluralist objectives. If the trade union movement is to be considered as an interest group in a pluralist sense, it should be possible to trace a line of political opposition to the policies of the governing party.

Against the pluralist theory, neo corporatist scholars have argued that interest groups (employers associations and trade unions in particular), rather than competing on a “free market” of resources and power, have tied their interests to the state through institutional agreements on wage issues and other welfare issues. Trade unions are therefore not autonomous from the state and the relationship is characterised by harmony rather than conflict. Although the corporatist argument is developed in the context of Western European politics, it has been applied quite extensively to analyses of trade unions in third world and African settings (Schmitter 1979, Nyang’oro and Shaw 1989, Kraus 1988). Whereas Western European corporatism is perceived as a process initiated at the level of interest groups (societal corporatism), corporatism in authoritarian regimes is understood as a process initiated at the state level. State corporatism implies that the state, through a combination of coercion and distribution of benefits, has managed to coopt civil associations, most notably workers’ associations. Within this perspective and with reference to African politics, some authors have argued that due to their close ties to the state, trade unions are part of the state-structures (‘political society’) rather than of civil society. Rather than being agents of change and democratisation, trade unions are seen as brakes on change (Shivji 1975, Kraus 1976).

Within a corporatist perspective, then, the end of the alliance between UNIP and ZCTU should not be understood as a quest for autonomy and democracy on the part of the trade union movement. Rather, it must be understood as a response to the present economic recession in Zambia. The economic decline and the increasingly stronger presence of and pressures from external actors such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank towards transforming the economic policies has broken the post-colonial contract between the state and civil society. This contract was
based on a promise of economic development and redistribution. As the state no longer is able to deliver its economic promises, the legitimacy of the regime is seriously questioned. From working closely together and having mutual interests in, among other things, subsidising the cost of living for urban workers, the union movement is now openly contesting the legitimacy of the UNIP regime. Implicit in this hypothesis is the assumption that prior to the economic crisis, the labour movement was satisfied with the structure of state-union relations. In other words, substantial ideological differences were not present and the trade union movement was closely tied to the state structures both administratively and financially.

To depict the motives behind political actions of an association is very complicated as motives may be short-term or long-term, official or unofficial. In order to shed light on the nature and ideology of a given association it is therefore necessary to develop a "conceptual map", or some theoretical indicators which can guide the empirical analysis. Consequently, the analysis centres around the concepts of pluralism and corporatism, in order to assess whether any of the two concepts can capture the nature of the Zambian trade union movement, and most notably ZCTU. Based on the theoretical framework, two hypotheses can be generated and then applied to the empirical material. While the hypotheses may not be mutually exclusive, they are analytically distinct and will therefore serve as a guideline for the following empirical analysis.

1. The trade union movement leadership perceives the organisation in a pluralist framework and sees as its main interest the economic well-being of its members. In other words, the trade union movement has no national political objectives. In order to function as an interest group or pressure group for the interests of the members, they see autonomy from the political system as essential. The trade union movement took on a national political role as an opposition force against the regime to defend its autonomous position.

2. The trade union movement has been tied to the state through various institutional agreements since independence. State-union relations in Zambia are therefore best perceived of in a corporatist perspective, where the state through a combination of coercion and lucrative benefits have coopted the trade union movement. The break of the alliance with the UNIP regime was in other words not motivated by ideological differences. Rather, their involvement should be understood against the background of the economic collapse and subsequent break of the "social-contract" between labour and state based on redistribution of benefits.
As mentioned above, civil society is usually referred to in relation to the state. Having stated that the concept of civil society will be central to the analysis, how can an analysis of ZCTU’s relationship to the governing party only be justified? Clearly, an analysis of the relationship between the bureaucracy, the national assembly, the government and party (UNIP) is required in order to speak of “the state”. However, industrial policies in Zambia are determined in negotiations between the trade union movement and the party, UNIP. Most importantly, the one-party structure of government has placed the party above the government and the national assembly. Furthermore, in one-party structures as in Zambia, the distinctions between the party, the bureaucracy, government and national assembly are very unclear due to the stated objective of the party to be the main policy-formulating organ. In light of the importance attached to the party and the unclear divisions between the various policy-making bodies of the state-structures, I find the theoretical literature concerning state civil society relations to be of great relevance to the analysis of the relationship between ZCTU and UNIP.

1.4 On the methodology

The analysis inquires into the relationship between two organisations, the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) and the United National Independence Party (UNIP) over a relatively long period. The main emphasis of the analysis concerns the one-party state (1972-91) and the reintroduction of multiparty politics in 1991. However, in order to understand the relationship between the two associations under the one-party state system, it is necessary to take the earlier history into consideration as well. Thus, the historical material, both primary and secondary sources, is of great importance to the analysis.

As the analysis focuses on the relationship between two organisations over a relatively long period, a qualitative analysis applying methods of historical comparison is most applicable. The empirical findings will be analysed in view of theoretical literature concerning the role of civil society associations in the process of democratisation. The presentation of two alternative theoretical frameworks and the question of their applicability to the Zambian reality opens up for a structured, focused comparison (George 1979). This again implies that history is treated selectively in the sense that certain aspects related to the case study is emphasised in the analysis, namely the role of labour unions and their role in the post-colonial political and economic development.
In terms of design, the analysis can be characterised as a single case study. The question of whether a single case study can be generalised to cover a wider universe, has been frequently debated among scholars (Lijphart 1971, George 1979, Kohn, 1989, Nowak 1989). Relating the general debate to this analysis, the question is whether a historical analysis of the Zambian democratisation process and the relationship between the state and the union movement can contribute to, or alter, general theoretical positions. The answer must here be qualified. The main value of the current analysis is that it presents historical data and archival sources in an area which to a large degree has been neglected in the third world and African scholarly debate. The case study further contributes to the theoretical debate in that it provides a test of the applicability of theories developed in a European context to a third world setting. Hence, the case study analysis of the Zambian labour movement will be regarded as implicitly comparative and comparative methodology will be applied.

The analysis is based on a combination of secondary and primary sources. For the time period covering the colonial era and the First Republic (1964-1972), I have relied mostly on secondary sources, as this is the time period which is best covered in the existing literature. Due to the fact that the events took place in recent time, and the fact that civil society has been devoted little attention in research on the one-party state-structures in Africa, the time period between 1972 and 1991 is not extensively covered in the literature. As a consequence, I have concentrated my data collection on this period. The primary sources can be divided into two main categories. Among written primary sources, the archival material from the ZCTU Secretariat in Kitwe was consulted extensively. In addition, the National Archives and the UNIP Research Bureau were consulted. As a supplement to the written primary sources and newspaper-articles of the time, I conducted a series of interviews with labour union leaders, UNIP officials engaged in industrial relations and resource persons in the field.5 The interviews with key informants were largely exploratory. Twenty-five personal, open ended interviews were conducted in Harare, Lusaka and Kitwe between August 19 and October 10, 1991.6 The interviews lasted for approximately 90 minutes. A flexible interview guide was prepared opening up for new issues to be raised by the respondent, but approximately ten standard questions were answered by all the respondents. The remaining

5 See bibliography for a list of periodicals and newspapers consulted.
6 See Appendix II for the names and positions of the respondents.
questions were related to the respondents’ particular position and frame of reference.⁷

Data collection in Africa is a complicated venture. Due to limited resources, archives are usually incomplete, and statistical material is often of a low quality. As a result, statistical data will be presented in the analysis as an illustration of trends rather than as actual “evidence”. Similarly, the information gathered from the interviews will only be applied to the extent that it can be supported by other sources. These limitations, in addition to the relatively limited research on trade unionism in Africa, must naturally have a bearing on the nature of the conclusions presented.

**Interview data and validity**

When evaluating the validity of qualitative interview data, *time* is a crucial issue as the memory of the respondents may vary. Another related problem concerns the fact that the respondents are often *selective* in what they choose to say in interviews. As my question covered the period between 1972 and 1990, the time constraint was a relevant problem. I therefore used control questions in order to reduce the problem of memory constraint.

Another problem of memory is that it tends to be “bias” toward the current political position of the respondents. As an example, a large number of the respondents claimed to have been against the introduction of the one-party state in 1973, yet studying newspapers and written documentation of the time (1972-1973), I was unable to find substantial documentation to back these statements. This again relates to a more general problem-area of studying political views and ideologies over a long period of time, namely that the perceptions of the individual are greatly affected by the “ideological time” and the political climate at any given time. This is particularly relevant in a one-party system of government. During the one-party era, the trade union movement was at least officially committed to socialism, as this was established in the constitution of 1973. To find written statements from the time denouncing this policy should therefore not be expected, as it would have been illegal. This again means that one to a large degree must rely on interviews, which again must be regarded with caution as they may be coloured by current perceptions.

Selectivity does not only relate to what the informants choose to say, it is also a matter of their willingness to be interviewed. Upon arriving in Lusaka I had been warned that it might prove difficult to get access to the

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⁷ See Appendix III for the standard interview guide applied in the interviews.
top level leadership both within the government and party as labour relations were extremely sensitive due to the forthcoming elections and the position of ZCTU within the Movement for Multi-party Democracy (MMD). However, this proved not to be a problem. At the time of my field work, the different opposition groups had reached an agreement with UNIP on a new constitution, and the procedures for the forthcoming elections were agreed upon. I therefore arrived in the midst of an active election campaign and the political process was entirely open. As one person said; “there is no turning back, we are now entering a new era regardless of the election outcome”. This feeling of inevitable change greatly affected the whole society during the time of my research. From the young man operating the lifts in a hotel, to the taxi drivers and the women in the markets to the bureaucrats, the society was highly politicised and concerned with the forthcoming elections. The openness and the emphasis on bringing everything out in public, or as one informant put it the “true democratic spirit”, really opened my way and as such, I think the time was very appropriate. As a result I did not experience any refusal concerning my requests for interview appointments.

The same spirit of openness also enabled the informants to talk frankly and selective answering did not strike me as a problem in my interviews. Of course it is difficult to assess openness, but I had a general feeling of frankness in all the interviews. I did not experience any reluctance to answer my questions and the general atmosphere in the interview situation was very good. The political situation at the time before the first multiparty election in 17 years must however, also be assessed with caution. In this excitement, the unity of the opposition and in particular within the labour movement appeared absolute, judging from the papers, the opposition rallies and the majority of the population adopting the new sign of greeting indicating the time with their right hand, reflecting the slogan of the opposition party; “The Hour has Come”. This excitement must be expected to fall in the months after the election and the enthusiasm will most probably shift if the experiences of Eastern Europe is any indication. The time frame of the study must therefore be treated with caution, and as a result, the issue of unity of the movement will not be brought to a conclusion here. My field work should therefore be regarded as a “snapshot” of the Zambian reality. It was real, but very special.
1.5 The structure of the analysis

Following this introduction, the analysis is divided into six chapters: 

*Chapter two* aims at developing a theoretical framework from which the relationship between the trade union movement and UNIP can be conceptualised. Starting with a general discussion of the concept of democracy and the state-civil society debate, the discussion proceeds to the concept of transition to democracy emphasising the role of trade unions in processes of democratisation. In order to assess the relevance of the theoretical perspectives, civil society relations in post-colonial Africa are discussed against the general theoretical framework.

In the course of the research, it became evident that the Zambian trade union movement and its relationship to UNIP could not be understood on the basis of the events in the second republic alone. Hence, the analysis of trade union party relations in Zambia will also bring in the previous party-trade union history. As a result, the analysis is presented in four chapters, according to the time sequences.

In *chapter three*, the role of the trade union movement in the recent political reforms is discussed in order to “set the scene” and place the analysis in the context of the current political reforms. Turning to the reasons why the trade union movement broke the alliance with UNIP in 1990, the UNIP trade union relations is considered at various historical periods.

*Chapter four* brings the discussion back in time as it compares the role of the trade unions in the process of transition to multiparty democracy in the 1990s to the struggle for national independence in the 1960s. What are the similarities? Can the early history of the trade union movement provide an understanding of the nature of the trade union movement in the 1990s? The industrial relations of the First Republic (1964-1972) will also be assessed. To what extent did the cooptative attempts of UNIP succeed and did the trade union movement become part and parcel of the party during this period?

In *chapter five* the effects of the legislative changes, resulting from the introduction of the Industrial Relations Act of 1971 and the “One-Party Participatory Democracy” constitution in 1973, on trade union-UNIP relations are considered. Through the 1971 Industrial Relations Act, ZCTU acquired a strong financial and organisational position. Did the new legislation tie the union movement closer to UNIP or did it strengthen the organisational autonomy of the union movement?

*Chapter six* covers the period from 1980-1981 when the relationship between UNIP and ZCTU changed and became openly conflictual. Which factors can explain the changes in the relationship? What were the main
areas of conflict? And, finally, can an analysis of the conflicts provide an understanding of the nature of Zambian trade union movement?

*Chapter seven* summarises the main findings in relation to the theoretical perspectives.
Chapter 2: 
Trade unions, agents of democratisation or opportunistic followers? Developing a theoretical framework

This chapter aims to develop a theoretical framework in which the Zambian trade union movement can be understood both in relation to the governing party, UNIP, and to the recent process of democratisation. In order to acquire an understanding of the processes involved, the chapter begins with a discussion of the concepts of democracy and democratisation. The discussion then proceeds to the concept of civil society and the role of civil society in the transition from authoritarian rule to democracy. Turning to a discussion of the role of trade unions in processes of democratisation, two theoretical perceptions are considered: Pluralist and corporatist theories. The general theoretical frameworks derived from a Western European context will then be discussed in relation to the post-colonial political and economic development in Africa.

2.1 Democracy and democratisation

Democracy simply means the rule of the people. Yet this definition hardly provides political scientists and others with a tool for distinguishing between democracy and other systems of government. Herbert Tingsten once stated that the concept of democracy had become synonymous with a “supra ideology” (Tingsten 1961:42). This statement seems more accurate today than ever before, as few political leaders in the world today would not to some extent characterise their system of governance as democratic. According to Diamond et al.,

While there is often disagreement on whether capitalism is good or bad and on the virtues of socialism or communism, there seems to be universal consensus that democracy is good and dictatorship is bad (Diamond et al. 1990: 448).
In the following analysis, democracy will generally be understood as a procedure for reaching a decision. At the national level of politics, democracy is often referred to as political democracy. The term political democracy is usually applied to the level of national politics, and the definition most often referred to is Robert A. Dahl’s polyarchy. Following his definition, a democracy (polyarchy) signifies a political system of governance which meets three basic criteria, firstly competition among individuals and groups for all effective positions of government, secondly, a highly inclusive level of political participation and finally, civil and political liberties, including freedom of speech, association and press (Dahl 1971: 3-20). Dahl’s concept of polyarchy, which again resembles Schumpeter’s definition (1976), has also been applied by scholars working within a liberal democratic framework to the African context (Sklar 1982, Diamond, Linz and Lipset 1988, Bratton 1989).

Within a liberal democratic framework, which has also been labelled formal democracy, the institutional aspects of democracy are stressed. This implies that the emphasis is placed on the institutional elements of democracy and aspects of social justice and economic redistribution are not included in the definition of democracy. Within the African debate, some scholars have criticised the liberal concept of democracy for being “minimalist” as it does not take the social and economic aspects of democracy into consideration. Alternatively, they have shown preference for terms like “popular democracy”, where political democracy is seen as a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for democracy. Within this theoretical perspective, scholars have argued that factors like economic redistribution should be included as additional criteria in definitions of democracy (Oyugi and Gitonga 1987, Nyang’o 1987, Beckman 1989).

In the Western European debate, the liberal notion of democracy has been criticised by some scholars for being too elitist. The Western radical critique of the concept of liberal democracy has argued that as the focus is put solely on the elite and elite transactions, the aspect of participation is neglected. Carol Pateman claims that representative organs at the national level do not represent opportunities for democratic practice for the majority of the citizens, and as a result, she suggests a focus on the level of participation in workplace democracy and “participatory democracy” (Pateman 1970).

In an attempt to meet the criticism of the liberal democratic theory for being elitist and minimalist, Agnes Heller argues that the endurance of Western democracies is due precisely to their formal (and minimalist) character (Heller 1988: 130). In her view, formal democracy contains a guarantee for civil liberties, the system of contract, and the principle of
representation which in turn guarantees the citizens their basic political rights. Moving from the European to the African context, Howard has applied the same argument. According to Howard:

The economic right to development cannot be effectively implemented unless those affected by development policy have the chance to influence decisions and criticise results. The centralization of power into the hands of a ruling class cannot be challenged by ordinary peasants, workers, women, unless they have the right to freedom of expression and association and can express their views in an organized manner (Howard 1986: 119).

Howard, like Heller, finds that the formal character of democracy secures the political basis from which organised groups and individuals can fight for their economic and social rights. In order to do so, the right to organise is a fundamental condition which is stressed in both radical and liberal theories of democracy. The statements above indicate that both liberal democratic theories and scholars applying definitions of democracy which in addition take economic rights into consideration, stress the importance of political rights such as competition for political positions, participation and political liberties. Discussing democracy at the national level, the difference is that some argue that formal democracy is not sufficient. Hence, they argue for the inclusion of economic and social rights. In essence, the question relates to whether economic equality should be part of the definition of democracy or whether democracy should be considered as a means to reach the goal of economic and social equality.

In order to distinguish between various concepts of democracy, Dankwart Rustow proposed two different perspectives on democracy; the genetic versus the functional element of democracy. The genetic element concerns the question; under which conditions are democracies established, whereas the functional element of democracy concentrates on the question of what makes democracy function and thrive once it has been established. (Rustow, 1970: 339). Based on Rustow’s distinctions, it can be argued that economic conditions and the issue of equal distribution of social and economic benefits are of importance when considering the functional element of democracy, which could also be labelled the “consolidating phase”. As the interest of this analysis lies in the transition phase or the establishment of democratic rule, it is the first aspect, the genesis of democracy, that is of greatest interest to this analysis. Thus, having limited the scope of the analysis to the phase of establishing democratic rule it can be held that the debate between a liberal and popular concept of democracy is of limited importance to the proceeding discussion. For the purposes of the analysis,
democracy at the national level of politics will be understood as the outcome of a political process involving actors from within and outside the political structure where constitutional agreements are reached which guarantee elections at regular intervals, with meaningful competition, a highly inclusive level of participation and political liberties such as freedom of press, association and speech.

So far the discussion has centred around democracy at the macro level, or the national political level in considering the outcome of the process of democratisation. Before turning to the main topic of the analysis, the role of civil society in the process of democratisation, the question of linkage between the meso level (organisation) and macro level (national polity) is discussed in relation to the concept of legitimacy.

2.2 Democracy at the national and organisational levels

The relationship between democracy at national level and the level of organisations is complicated and the definitions are not necessarily identical. At the national level, democracy is usually referred to in terms of competition for political positions as well as competition between associations for resources. Democracy at the level of organisations, on the other hand, does not necessarily relate to competition between associations as it is usually defined in relation to the internal decision-making process in a given organisation. Meso-level democracy is therefore often defined as decision-making based on majority consent and organisational structures characterised by the rotation of leadership positions (Schattschneider 1960, Michels 1962).

In his study of the German social democratic party (SPD), Robert Michels argued for a causal link between the meso- and macro-levels of democracy. In his analysis of the decision-making structures of SPD, he found that instead of decisions depending on the consent of the members, they were largely an outcome of the views of leadership. From this important study, he developed the concept of “the iron law of oligarchy”. The term implied that the party bureaucracy and leadership had become far removed from the voters and lower rank members and therefore had different goals and values than the rank-and-file membership (Michels 1962). From his dismal conclusion of organisational democracy in Germany’s leading party, he concluded that Germany could not be democratic. In other words, he assumed a causal link between the two levels of analysis; when democracy at meso level was largely absent, the political system at macro level could not be considered democratic.
However, the causal relationship established by Michels has been challenged by a number of organisation studies in later years. These studies have suggested that the relationship between democracy at macro and meso levels is far more complicated than hitherto presumed. Lipset’s study of the International Typographical Union (ITU), the New York Printers union found, contrary to Michels’ “iron law of oligarchy”, that the ITU had a flourishing system of two partyism and participant democracy (Lipset et al. 1956).

Similarly, just as organisations characterised by hierarchical structures not necessarily are undemocratic, Kitschelt’s study of The Green Party in Belgium and West Germany indicates that flat organisational structures may not be a guarantee of democracy. In his analysis, Kitschelt found that within the leadership informal structures developed which had unprecedented power over the formal decision-making structures (Kitschelt 1989). It can therefore be argued that democracy can be interpreted differently at the meso- and macro-levels of political organisation and that the relationship between these organisational levels is more complicated than previously presumed. Consequently, it cannot be held that a study of the internal decision-making procedures will determine the democratising potential of an organisation at the national political level.

Despite these limitations, a number of scholars have pointed to the fact that organisations characterised by democratic decision-making structures can indirectly promote a democratisation process at the national level through influencing the values of the members and the pattern of participation (Mann 1973, Sklar 1982). With regard to the aspect of learning, there is a close relationship between the two levels of analysis. Theories of democratic learning emphasise that political learning in one arena can contribute to participation in other arenas, such as national level politics (Pateman 1970). As an example, participation in trade union politics at the workplace may increase the knowledge of, and interest in, politics at the national level. Further, a number of scholars have argued that through their internal structure organisations function as a training ground for democracy (Mann 1973). Organisational participation may increase the efficiency and capacity of the citizens and the organisations and thus provide an arena for recruiting new political leaders. It is also evident that membership at the organisational level can stimulate political participation in the larger political system and enhance citizens commitment to democracy (Fenwich and Olson 1986).

Despite the fact that democracy at the level of organisations cannot be causally linked to the national level, the nature of decision-making at the one level of organisation has a clear impact on the other level. In particular,
this connection is evident when considering the legitimacy of a given regime and an organisation. Generally, it can be argued that as a regime’s legitimacy depends on consent from the ruled, expressed through organisations, the legitimacy of an organisation is again dependent on the consent of its membership or rank and file.

2.3 Democracy and legitimacy

Legitimacy is commonly understood as justification of power or the consent of the population for central political institutions and rules. Weber defined legitimacy in modern, bureaucratic regimes as the ability of the rulers to implement their policies on the ruled based on a shared belief of the regime’s constitutional right to implement their policies (Weber 1982: 5-7). However, the concept of legitimacy may also be regarded as the ability of a given regime to impose policies upon their subjects which in the short run will have negative effects. To be able to so, the ruled must have faith in the long terms goals prescribed and the commitment of the regime to reach these goals.

The issue of legitimacy of a given regime is stressed in a great number of the volumes that have emerged within the political science debate concerning the process of democratisation and transition to democracy (Almond and Verba 1965, Diamond, Lipset 1981, Linz and Lipset 1990). According to Diamond et al., democratic systems of government are unique from other regimes in that their stability depends on consent of a majority of those governed (Diamond, Linz and Lipset 1986: 9). Legitimacy is tied to performance in several aspects, especially to effectiveness providing what people want — economic development, political order, freedom, justice and regulation of conflict. Yet at the same time, the greater the legitimacy of the regime, the more effective it is likely to be in responding to crisis and challenges. Regimes that lack legitimacy depend more precariously on current performance and are vulnerable to collapse in periods of economic and social distress (Lipset 1981: 64-70). Following Diamond et al., one of the primary reasons for the instability of regimes in the third world has been the combination and interaction of low legitimacy and low effectiveness (Diamond, Linz and Lipset 1986: 10). This aspect of legitimacy is also emphasised in Huntington’s concept of “institutionalization” (Huntington 1968).

In terms of state trade union relations, legitimacy is an essential concept. The strength of the union movement depends on its legitimacy vis à vis the rank and file members. Furthermore, the steering capacity of a given state
will to a large degree depend on whether vital interest groups in society regard its power-base as legitimate. Deutsch argues that

...the limits of the effective domain of the state are thus the limits of its probability of finding popular obedience, both in regard to the territory where its writs run with effect, and to the set of persons who are likely to obey it (Deutsch 1981: 53).

Despite the importance attached to the concept of legitimacy, Przeworski questions the theories postulating that a regime’s loss of legitimacy will lead to regime transformation. Przeworski argues that whereas legitimacy may be an additional explanation for regime collapse, it is not a sufficient explanation (Przeworski 1986: 50). According to him, what matters for the stability of any regime is not the legitimacy of the particular system of dominance, but the presence or absence of preferable alternatives. Yet, Przeworski does observe the importance of legitimacy, or rather crumbling legitimacy, as a signal to the possibility of change. While Przeworski is stressing an important limitation to the general explanatory power of the concept of legitimacy, it is evident that the use of coercion or illegitimate rule is an option that is not open for all regimes and to all leaders at all times. The limitation on the use of force is in particular evident if a given regime prescribes to an ideology stressing the values of participation and anti-authoritarian values. If a given regime attaches importance to its international standing as a defender of human rights, it puts certain limits on the internal use of repression without risking the loss of international “status”. This point is of relevance when considering the ideology of UNIP referred to by the term “Humanism” which placed great emphasis on the concept of “participatory democracy” as well as anti-racial politics.

Whereas the legitimacy of a given regime depends on the consent of the people expressed through organised groups, the same organisations depend precariously on their own membership base. As the raison d’être for most civil society organisations depend on support and following from their membership, certain limitations are placed on their relationship with the ruling elites. If an organisation moves too closely to the political leadership and is seen by the membership as representing other interests than those of the rank and file membership, the organisation is left as a “castle in the air” without a base in civil society. However, while the concept of legitimacy referred to here applies to organisations operating in democratic systems of government, is the concept of legitimacy relevant in non-democratic societies? In authoritarian regimes, where state society relations are regulated and controlled by a state not accountable to popular consent, it
can be argued that organisational legitimacy depends on the state or party in power rather than the membership. This point is of particular relevance if the organisation is directly funded by, and organisationally tied, to the state. In order to analyse state-society relations it is therefore necessary to study the autonomy of the associations vis à vis the state.

So far the discussion has moved from the concepts of democracy and democratisation at the regime level to the organisational level of democracy. The discussion of legitimacy has pointed to the intimate relationship between the state, or the political level, and civil society, but the concept of civil society has not yet been defined. In turning to the concept of civil society, two questions are of importance; how is civil society conceptualised and what is the relationship between the state and civil society?

2.4 The concept of civil society

The term civil society is sometimes used interchangeably with the network of voluntary associations existing outside the sphere of the state. In the literature concerning civil society, the distinction is usually set between the state, with its military, policing, legal, administrative and cultural organs, and civil society understood as a market regulated, privately controlled or voluntary organised set of associations (Keane 1988:3). Scholars concerned with the intermediate structure apply different terms such as “associational life” (Diamond, Linz and Lipset 1990), “non governmental organisations” (Bratton 1989), “voluntary associations” (Hyden 1983) or simply “civil society” (Bayart 1986, Hyden 1983) to describe the nature of organisations seen as “mediators” between the family sphere and the political sphere. However, the notion of civil society as a broker between society and the state is only one definition of civil society. One of the most controversial topics in the debate relates precisely to civil society and its relations to the state, or political society.

According to Keane, in classical political thought and in theories based on natural law, civil society was indistinguishable from the state (Keane 1988: 35-36). Both concepts referred to a type of political association which governed social conflict though the imposition of rules to retrain citizens from harming each other. From Aristotle’s polis through Rousseau’s etat, the state simply meant the civil form of society.

By the late eighteenth century, liberal philosophers began to distinguish a form of civil society with quite a different rationale. Far from defining the nature of the state, civil society came to be seen as a defense against political abuse by political leaders. Keane traces the emergence of this
distinction between state and civil society through influential political texts written between 1750 and 1850, a period of intense democratic tumult in Europe. Here Thomas Paine’s *Rights of Man* (1792) and Adam Ferguson’s *Essays of the History of Civil Society* (1764) can be mentioned. However, the perhaps most articulate exponent of civil society of the era, and maybe the author of greatest significance in this respect through history, is Alexis de Tocqueville whose *Democracy in America* (1835-1840) drew attention to new types of state despotism implicit in democratic rule.

De Tocqueville was concerned not only with the potential tyranny of the majority but with the inherent contradictions among democratic principles of freedom and equality. In pursuit of equality, citizens empowered the state to undertake the widespread provisions of public goods. But in doing so, they inadvertently surrendered their liberty and allowed the “administrative suffocation of civil society” and their own descent into relations of political dependence (Keane 1988: 58). According to De Tocqueville, these constraints must be supplemented with civil society oversight through the “independent eye of society”. He argued that autonomous intermediate associations provided the ultimate guarantee that the state would be unable to arrogate itself any more power than an active citizenry was willing to grant (Keane 1988: 61). De Tocqueville’s civil society therefore comprised of a “plurality of interacting, self organised and constantly vigilant civil associations” whose functions were to nurture basic rights, to advocate popular claims, and to educate citizens in democratic arts of tolerance and accommodation (Keane 1988: 61).

The ideas of the liberal thinkers were contested by theorists using historicist approaches. Hegel’s *Philosophy of Right* (1821) differentiated civil society from the state, but did not assume it to represent a natural or harmonious human condition. Rather, civil society was the modern product of a long historical transformation by which the bourgeoisie established a sphere of market relations regulated by civil law (Keane 1988: 50-51). Located between the family and state, civil society contained not only economic transactions but also voluntary forms of organisation, such as business cooperations, professional associations and the trade unions. For Hegel, civil society was internally divided because the private interests of social classes were competitive and conflictual. For this reason, universal selfishness

.....turns civil society into a blind and unstable field of economic competition...Civil society cannot remain “civil” unless it is ordered politically and subjected to the higher surveillance of the state (Quoted in Keane 1988: 52).
Consequently, according to the thinking of Hegel only the state could represent the unity of society and further the freedom of its citizens. In comparison to De Tocqueville, it is evident that Hegel had a largely negative view of civil society and its role vis-à-vis the state.

Building on Hegel’s method but not substance, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels placed civil society in the material conditions of life. In the *German Ideology* (1848) Marx and Engels saw civil society as the historical product of the evolution of property relations under capitalism. Civil society was described as a set of commodity production and exchange institutions which tilted contractual relations in favour of capitalist entrepreneurs. In this realm of economic relations, civil society was equalled to the socio-economic base, as opposed to the state which was a mere political superstructure. In other words, Marx reversed Hegel’s notion of state-society relations seeing the state as the subordinate in its relations with civil society, its performance conditioned by the interests of the dominant social class.

Antonio Gramsci has been seen as the leading twentieth century writer on civil society. He used Marxist categories but arrived at new conclusions. In his *Prisoners’ Notebook* (1929-37) civil society is a key concept. According to Bobbio, Gramsci separates civil society from the state by means that depart from Marx (Bobbio 1988). In Gramsci’s definition, there are two major super-structural entities: political society (state) which rules directly through the coercive and juridical instruments of domination and civil society, which promotes ethical values among the populace through the exercise of ideological and cultural hegemony. Moreover, Gramsci reversed Marx by granting primacy to ideological factors over institutional within the superstructure. For Gramsci, ideas and values no longer served simply to justify an existing power structure but were formative forces capable of disrupting and redistributing power itself.

This brief overview of the intellectual perspectives on civil society indicates that there has been much controversy with regard to application of the concept. Whereas De Tocqueville and Gramsci both assign civil society a positive role, Hegel and Marx see the role of civil society as largely negative. Without claiming to arrive at a conclusion that everyone will find acceptable, thinkers from diverse intellectual traditions nevertheless appear to share a concern to restore civic action and state legitimacy to the centre of our accounts of politics.

Based on the theoretical discussions, it is evident that some core notions about the nature of civil society and its relationship with the state can be developed. Firstly, most scholars place civil society in the public realm between the state and the family. Secondly, although attributing different values to the divorce, civil society is within most theoretical schools
distinguished from political society. A third common notion shared by the various thinkers is that civil society is a theoretical rather than empirical concept. Fourthly, although state and civil society are considered distinct concepts they are complementary and lastly; civil society is the source of the legitimation of state power.¹

The notion of civil society acting as a buffer against the state and the abuse of state power as derived from de Tocqueville, is the concept of civil society emphasised within liberal democratic theories today and also reflected in the African scholarly debate (Sklar 1982, Bratton 1989, Diamond et al. 1990). The idea of civil society as a buffer against the state takes for granted that the relationship between state and civil society will always be conflictual. However, in order to analyse state civil society relations empirically, it is necessary to leave room for engagement between state and society that may be consensual as well as conflictual. To analyse empirically the relations in any given geographical situation, a neutral definition of civil society which does not prejudge the nature of state-society relations, but which fulfils the core notions of civil society as put forward above, might be more useful to the following analysis. Alfred Stepan’s definition, derived from the contemporary context of political liberalisation and democratisation in Latin America may offer an alternative:

Civil society is an arena where manifold social movements... and civic organizations from all classes... attempt to constitute themselves in an ensemble of arrangements so that they can express themselves and advance their interests (Stepan 1988: 3-4).

Stepan distinguishes the institutions of civil society (religious groupings, women’s associations, cultural and ethnic organisations) from institutions of political society (political parties, elections, legislatures), in which the polity contests for state power. In authoritarian regimes, political society is frequently absorbed into the state, but civil society has characteristically at least some spheres of autonomy (Stepan 1988: 4). It is evident that Stepan’s definition excludes political parties as they are located in the political system and remote religious and family-based (kinship) organisations as they are located outside the political system. Within this definition, where

should trade unions be located? I will argue that labour unions belong to, and must be defined as part of civil society, but this depends on their degree of autonomy from the political system, as will become evident in the discussion of the theoretical concepts in an African context. For trade unions to function as democratic channels, they must therefore be considered as autonomous from the political or governing system. This question can only be resolved empirically by analysing the trade union movement and its relations with the political system in the countries in question.

However, the term “autonomy” must also be qualified. In this discussion, autonomy has been referred to in terms of organisational independence and funding. Yet, does this indicate that if political parties rely mainly on state subsidies for their income they cannot be considered as autonomous from the state? I will argue that the concept of autonomy must be related to the utilisation of the funding and the organisational base. If a trade union is organisationally tied to the party or the state to the extent that independent political action is not possible or if the state or party determines the uses of its funding, there is clearly no basis for autonomous action.

Having established this understanding of the concept of civil society and its role vis à vis the political system, the question remains: what role does civil society play in processes of democratisation? In discussing this issue, it will be assumed that the concept of civil society covers the spectre of voluntary associations operating in the realm between the political system and the family, acting in relation to the state but as autonomous entities.

2.5 The role of civil society in processes of transition to democracy

Civil society or the presence of a wide array of autonomous associations operating via à vis the state, is part and parcel of most definitions of democracy. According to Robert A. Dahl:

Independent organisations are highly desirable in a democracy, at least in a large scale democracy. Whenever democratic processes are employed on a scale as large as a nation-state, autonomous organisations are bound to come into existence. They are more however, than a direct consequence of democratizing the government of the nation-state. They are also necessary to the functioning of the democratic process itself, to minimizing government coercion, to political liberty, and to human well-being (Dahl 1982: 1).
According to Dahl’s definition, the concept of pluralist democracy has two components: polyarchy (or what has been previously referred to as formal democracy) and the existence of voluntary organisations operating relatively autonomously from the state structures. Hence, all democratic countries are pluralist democracies according to Dahl (Dahl 1982: 5). Pluralism is essentially the civil society aspect of democracy.

A number of scholars have, through theoretical and empirical work, been concerned with the issue of how societies can move from authoritarian systems of government toward democracy (Almond and Verba 1965, Dahl 1971, Linz 1978, Lipset 1981, Diamond et al. 1990). All the theoretical contributions referred to here stress, to a varying degree, the important role of civil society in the process of democratisation. A strong and autonomous array of voluntary associations serve as a check on the expansion and abuse of state power. This is important as they encourage state accountability and responsiveness, foster democratic values, provide experience with democratic practices and recruit democratic leaders (Diamond et al. 1990: 234). This concept comes, as we have seen, very close to the ideas of De Tocqueville. Furthermore, it has been argued that as voluntary associations constitute alternative channels for articulating interests, they make demands upon the government. The roles prescribed to civil society associations are naturally of even greater importance when oppositional parties are banned.

Arguably the most comprehensive analysis of the process of transition from authoritarian rule has been carried out in the four volume work of O’Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead: Transition from Authoritarian Rule. Prospects for Democracy (O’Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead 1986). From case studies of twenty-nine different countries which have moved from autocracy to democracy since 1974, the authors developed a theoretical framework of the functioning of transition processes. According to O’Donnell et al., transition refers to the interval between one political regime and another. The onset of a transition from authoritarian rule is marked when incumbent leaders permit an increase in civil rights enjoyed by individuals or groups. The process of extending rights is usually referred to as liberalisation (Schmitter, O’Donnell and Whitehead Vol 4, 1986: 7).

O’Donnell et al. claim that all transitions from autocracy that have occurred since 1974 are part of the same process. There is a kind of contagion-effect in an increasingly interdependent world; what happens in one country affects others, especially in the same region. The features of the transition process strongly effect the social system which emerges. They proceed to distinguish between four different categories of transition: Transition imposed from above by controlling elites that feel the need to
liberalise, secondly, (peaceful) reform forced on the regime by pressure from below, thirdly, revolution brought on by mass-mobilisation and lastly, negotiated transition in which the regime and its opponents having reached a deadlock negotiate a series of pacts by which they agree on the grounds of future contestation (O'Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead 1986).

One of the main criticisms of the regime transition literature (O'Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead; Malloy and Seligson 1987; Collier and Collier 1991), to which the work of O'Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead is only a partial exception, is the strong emphasis on the importance of the elite and elite pacts rather than popular initiatives. O'Donnell et al. use the concept of “the popular upsurge” when referring to reform brought on by pressure from below (O'Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead Vol 4, 1986). They identify “the layers of an explosive society” that constitute sources of resistance to an authoritarian regime. According to O'Donnell et al., the greatest challenge to authoritarian rule is likely to come from the new or revived identities and the capacities of collective action by the working class (O'Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead Vol 4, 1986: 52). Unlike the other mass sectors, the working class has usually not been neglected by state elites, but targeted for corporatist cooptation, either through the receipt of special benefits or the imposition of limits to collective bargaining. According to the authors, much depends on the workers’ perception of their well-being. If, as is commonly the case, the net impact of the policies of a given regime has been to undermine the real wages and social benefits, then workers are readily mobilised for civic action. This may take different forms, from industrial action in support of better pay or better working conditions or an explicit demand for freedom of association and the right to strike.

To follow the analysis of O'Donnell et al. further, at some point during the transition, the diverse layers of society may come together in what they call “the popular upsurge” (O'Donnell and Schmitter Vol 4, 1986: 54). The popular upsurge refers to a set of events in which the divergent interests of various social classes are momentarily suspended in favour of a common goal of removing a particular regime. However, in discussing the timing of elite concessions in relation to the “popular upsurge” it is evident that O'Donnell et al. emphasise the role of the elites:

Once something has happened — once the soft-liners have prevailed over the hard-liners, begun to extend guarantees for individuals and some rights of contestation, and started to negotiate with selected regime opponents — a generalized mobilization is likely to occur, which we choose to describe as the “resurrection of civil society (O'Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead Vol 4, 1986: 48).
In their view, the elite dispositions, calculations and pacts largely determine whether a (political) opening will occur at all and set important parameters on the extent of possible liberalisation. They seem to find political change to originate in disputes between “hardliners” and “softliners” within the governing coalition. Only after state elites have made initial concessions by relaxing restrictions on political contestation a general mobilisation of political groups within society can occur. The sequence of events is seen as follows:

...once the government signals that it is lowering the costs of engaging in collective action...(then) former political identities reemerge and others appear...to expand, beyond anyone’s expectations, the public spaces the rulers decide to tolerate at the beginning of the transition (O’Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead Vol 4, 1986: 49).

The singular emphasis on the actions of the elite and the conflicts within the state-elites are problematic for at least two reasons. Firstly, the focus on the elite depictions the relations of civil society to the state as very passive and reactive. On the contrary, civic action, especially in the form of mass political protest, very often comes first, preceding splits within the ruling group. The scope of analysis should be widened beyond inter-elite relations to focus on state-society relations. The second problem regarding the formulations of O’Donnell et al. seen in relation to Africa, is that the notion of elite dominance presupposes a strong state and state elite vis-à-vis society as a whole. Strength is here often considered as the ability of the state to impose policies on society and being able to withstand the immediate demands of the population (Huntington 1968, Callaghy 1984). As the discussion of African state civil society relations will indicate, this presumption is not embedded in African “reality”.

So far, the discussion has centred around the more general concept of civil society which includes a wide array of voluntary associations as autonomous from the state but acting in relation to it. In turning to a discussion of the trade union movement, pluralist perceptions of trade unionism and the role of trade union movements in processes of democratisation will be assessed.

2.6 Trade unions in a pluralist perspective

Within a pluralist perspective, trade unions are considered as important associations within the realm of civil society. Their primary functions as autonomous organisations are geared toward the improvement of the
economic welfare of their members. According to Martin, pluralists, along with Marxists, regard conflict as the central feature of societies with market-economies and liberal democratic political systems. But here the agreement ends. While the marxist identifies the crucial source of conflict as social classes, the pluralist pins it down as sectional interests that may or may not cut across classes. Pluralists therefore attribute fundamental significance to open competition among organised groups, especially those concerned with economic interest (Martin 1989: 14).

Arguably, the best known definition of trade unions and their purpose has been put forward by the Webbs’ in 1894. Sidney and Beatrice Webb argued that: “A trade union as we understand the term, is a continuous association of wage earners for the purpose of maintaining or improving the conditions of their employment” (Webb and Webb: 1894: 1). This definition is usually interpreted as an economic definition, in other words, trade unions are perceived of as having largely economic goals for their activities. Another well known author writing on trade unionism within the pluralist school is Selig Perlman (Perlman 1928). His comparative research of trade unionism in the United States, Germany, Great Britain and the Soviet Union was based on the hypothesis that: “....working people in the country felt an urge toward collective control of their employment opportunities, but hardly toward similar control of industry” (Perlman 1958: viii).

In Perlman’s assessment the real goal of trade unions is often obscured and distorted by outsiders (non-workers) who impute purposes which reflect their own ideological positions rather than the concern of union members. In his opinion, the worker’s desire for solidarity is motivated by the need to protect the employment opportunities of members, to promote equal security and future earning power and to raise and safeguard the standard of living (Perlman 1928: 243). The workers have no desire to control the enterprise in which they work or the government:

the typical wage earner, when he can express himself through his trade union....seldom dreams of shouldering the risk of management. Ordinarily he traces the origin of his opportunity not much farther back than where it materialises in jobs, and will grasp and support only such union policies as will enable or force employers to offer more jobs, equally available to all fellow craftsmen, and upon improved terms (Perlman 1928: 247).

Perlman found the problem to be that the ambitions of intellectuals for trade unionism far exceeded those of union members. He found that intellectuals associated with labour all shared a passion for committing labour unions to causes that were not as important to the members of those unions. The result was a continuing conflict within the labour movement.
between the ambitions of the intellectuals and the interests of rank and file trade unionists (Martin 1989: 16). Perlman's interpretation of trade union functions being separate from political action is maybe the best known characteristic of so called “Western trade unionism”, or to use a wider and more general term, pluralist trade unionism. Flanders is another often quoted author within the pluralist school of trade union research. As Perlman, he sees the foremost responsibility of all free trade unions to be the welfare of their own members. In other words, their primary commitment is not to a firm, not to an industry and not to a nation (Flanders 1975: 40). Both interpretations emphasise the importance attached to the economic and social situation of the members.

From this short review of pluralist perceptions of trade unionism, it is evident that in a pluralist framework, trade unions are considered as an interest group for the economic interests of their members. Within this perspective, autonomy vis à vis the political system and state is seen as essential, as trade unions engage in an open competition among organised groups for the distribution of economic benefits (Martin 1989: 14). Given the emphasis on the economic functions of trade unions in a pluralist perspective, why do trade unions engage in political activities and processes of democratisation? Considering the works of Perlman, politically active trade unions could possibly be considered as “coopted” by outside forces. Can trade unions then be considered pluralist and still take on political roles in addition to their economic concerns?

Przeworski, basing his argument on the experiences in Poland (and the role of Solidarity 1980-81), finds that the impetus toward democratisation originated from the workers (Przeworski 1989). Reacting against economic conditions and the economic decisions of the authoritarian government, workers sought to defend their collective interests by organising autonomous self-governing unions. Their original vision of reforms was both narrowly economic and absentist, the principal demand was for union autonomy. Nevertheless, it soon became clear that autonomous organisations were not possible without some political liberties, and therefore the union movement became politicised. Politicised is here understood as setting political goals over economic interests (Przeworski 1989: 76-77). Even if Przeworski considered the main goals of the (Polish) trade union movement to be economic, he found it to take on a more political role in order to achieve political freedom.

It can be argued that in democratic settings where trade unions are autonomous from the state and free to bargain on behalf of their members, they concentrate mainly on issues related to the economic situation of their members. However, in authoritarian systems, trade unions have often taken
on largely political roles in defence of their long-term economic interests. Przeworski is here emphasising an important factor, namely that civil society associations are not static neither in their actions nor goals. Trade union movements along with other civil society associations act in relation to the governing systems present. During the process of political transition, civil society itself is often transformed. This is particularly true in the early stages of democratisation as trade unions often are instrumental in the creation of political alternatives to the authoritarian regime in place. When elections are announced, civil society acquires a largely political role and once new political parties are available to promote partisan politics, civil associations can regain their truly civic roles. Consequently, in a pluralist perspective the role of civil society in political transition is considered to be temporary, from the time immediately before the “opening” to the introduction of competitive elections.

Why then, are trade unions regarded as particularly important as “agents of democratisation”? A number of scholars have emphasised the importance of trade unions in processes of democratisation. Przeworski finds autonomous trade unions to be playing a vital part in the mobilisation of social forces for democratisation:

Workers are typically the first and largest force to organize autonomously. This was true in Western Europe at the turn of the century as well as in Spain (Comisiones Obreras) Brazil (ABC unions) and Poland (Solidarnosc). This fact is not accidental. First, places of work are along with markets (the bazaar) the only places where people can meet naturally without police supervision. Secondly, political rights are necessary for the workers if they are to be able to struggle for their economic interests. Thus workers organize autonomous unions and the unions embrace political demands that put them in the forefront of the struggle for democracy (Przeworski 1989: 73).

In addition to the importance attached to the work-place, labour movements possess an organisational network which can coordinate demonstrations and protest through the labour unions. Regarding this point, maybe the most important aspect is the continuity of trade unions, as they are not established for the purpose of democratisation. Labour unions can furthermore instigate serious economic disturbances through strikes while negotiations about salaries open up for regular and formal contacts between the unions and their economic and public partners (Valenzuela 1989: 447). Based on the African colonial history in particular, Beckman and Bangura find that as workers historically were at the forefront of the anti-colonial struggle, they have a history of fighting against authoritarian or oppressive
regimes (Beckman and Bangura 1989: 27). Another point which is relevant not only to the African context, is that in one-party regimes labour unions sometimes serve as the only platform for opposition against the regime. Valenzuela states that:

Given labour’s position in the economy of both nation and firm, authoritarian regimes devote a great deal of attention to it, which in turn ultimately heightens the significance of labour during the transition (Valenzuela 1989: 447).

The discussion of pluralist theory has indicated that pluralists assign great importance to the role of voluntary associations or interest groups in the functioning of a democracy at the national political level. Furthermore, voluntary associations are considered to be instrumental in processes of democratisation and regime transition. Within this perspective, trade unions have in particular been emphasised due to their continuous organisational base, their central location in the economy and their often high membership density. Shifting the perspective from the role of trade unions as agents at the national level of politics to the roles and functions of trade unions as voluntary associations, it has been emphasised that within the pluralist trade union tradition, the economic and social well-being of the membership is considered the main responsibility of a union. Within pluralist theory therefore, the political actions of trade unions in processes of democratisation are considered to be temporary.

However, despite the importance attached to trade unions in processes of political reform, a number of scholars have questioned the assumption of labour unions being the main initiators of change and transformation. Generally, Valenzuela states, if labour unions are weak, there is a possibility of the unions having little feeling of unity with the emerging opposition leaders. A weak labour movement, torn by inner divisions between radical and moderates, can create a new basis for anti-system parties (Valenzuela 1989: 452). Furthermore, the reform-potential of a trade union movement depends on membership density and thus, its position vis-à-vis other groups in society. While Valenzuela is here pointing to important limitations, the significance of a trade union movement cannot be determined solely on the basis of membership figures, a fact Valenzuela also acknowledges (ibid.). Unionised workers may constitute a marginal proportion of the population as a whole, but if they are centrally located and control an important national economic sector the trade union movement may nevertheless be a significant actor. The mine-workers in both Chile and Zambia illustrate this point. However, Valenzuela points
to another possible limitation concerning the reform potential of trade union movements, namely that corporative arrangements between an authoritarian regime and an accepted union can function as a brake on social change. In this case, the labour movement has no legitimacy for representing common social interests.

The discussion has focused on the role of interest groups, and more specifically labour unions, as potential channels for mobilisation and change. In pluralist theory labour unions are ascribed a strong mobilising and in this context, democratic potential. This again presupposes that the labour unions are organisationally and financially autonomous and stand apart from the governing authorities in terms of goals and ideology. Nevertheless, the autonomy of trade unions vis à vis the state is often seriously questioned. Through various means of coercion and distribution of benefits, trade unions are in many instances coopted into the state structures. Given this situation, does the pluralist perspective provide an adequate understanding of the empirical realities? Turning to the theoretical discussion of the concept of neo-corporatism, the democratic and transforming potential of trade union movements will be challenged.

2.7 Corporatism: An alternative interpretation of trade unionism

Questioning the assumption of the pluralists concerning the free and even competition for power, a new body of theory emerged in the mid 1970s, which was labelled neo-corporatism. Corporatist scholars sought to draw up an alternative model to that of the pluralists by questioning to what extent interest associations perform a purely representative role. In general terms, corporatists have taken a less benign view of the democratic credentials of group politics than the pluralists. Corporatism sees socio-economic inequalities reflected in, and indeed reinforced by, the politics of organised interests to an extent not adequately explored in pluralist discussions. They devote considerable attention to the role corporatist arrangements can play in ensuring the maintenance of political stability, or governability, in liberal democracies and in improving the effectiveness of interventionist politics (Williamson 1989: 3).

Phillippe Schmitter’s article, “Still the Century of Corporatism?” is by many seen as the first and most influential statement of the school of corporatism which emerged in the 1970s (Schmitter 1974). Given the importance of Schmitter’s definition for the further development of the concept of corporatism it should be quoted:
Corporatism can be defined as a system of interest representation in which the constituent units are organised into a limited number of singularly, compulsory, non-competitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated categories, recognised or licensed (if not created) by the state and granted a deliberate representational monopoly within their respective categories in exchange for observing certain controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of demands and supports (Schmitter 1979: 13).

Schmitter identifies corporatism by a number of characteristics (Schmitter 1982: 260-1). Institutionally, corporatism implies that competition among interest associations is no longer open; these associations are to some degree institutionally dependent on the state and, consequently, have to check their behaviour; the membership of associations is significantly wedded to the organisation through pressures to join and the lack of alternative channels; the associations are no longer purely private but quasi-public in their functions and group politics are mediated through hierarchies of authority rather than structures based on the sovereignty of the members. Corporatism regards interest associations as acting not simply as institutions of pressure on the member’s behalf, but taking account of other and wider interests. Based on this, it can be argued that in corporative settings organisations have left the original emphasis on the membership and their interests and shifted to a broader emphasis on national interests.

Scholars often point to three characteristics of corporatism (Schmitter 1979, Williamson 1989): The monopoly or near monopoly position of interest associations, secondly, the formal hierarchial and specialised nature of the bureaucracies of modern interest associations; and thirdly, when association becomes licensed by the state, the state supplies public status to an interest association which results in associations being less dependent on the membership and increasingly dependent upon the state.

Classically, corporatism is characterised by a division of society into three basic groups, namely the state, the employers and the employees. Within this definition, corporatism as a political phenomenon can apply only to societies in which private ownership of the means of production is permitted (Howard 1986: 241). As already mentioned, the theory of neo-corporatism emerged as a critique of the pluralist notion of Western European capitalist societies. Further, it can be argued that the definition of corporatism presupposes a highly institutionalised society characterised by a network of specialised voluntary associations. The issues raised here suggest certain limitations of the usage of the concept of corporatism. First, many authoritarian regimes are not characterised by private ownership as
the state in many instances controls the economy. Second, third world societies, in Africa in particular, do not have a strong civil society network, on the contrary, the associational life is often not very well entrenched in society. Given the definition put forward here, can corporatism be applied to largely authoritarian third world political regimes?

Despite the fact that the corporatist critique of pluralist theory is based on the Western European experience (Schattschneider 1960, Bachrach and Baratz 1962, Schmitter 1979, Berger 1981) and the limitations referred to above, the perspective has been applied to a third world setting. According to the definitions of Schmitter, corporatism can exist in both democracies and non-democracies but there are major differences in the processes which produce such structures (Williamson 1989: 11). Schmitter finds that corporatism can be imposed from above by the state or it can emerge voluntarily from below under certain pressures to establish some sort of order. Schmitter labels these two sub-types state corporatism and societal corporatism (Williamson 1989: 11). In the classical definition and in a Western European context corporatist scholars are referring to societal corporatism. It is here assumed that organisations argue from a point of strength in negotiations with the state. However, the country of interest in this study belongs to a category of regimes neither characterised by democratic decision-making procedures in terms of organisational freedom (pluralism) nor institutional liberties (polyarchy) prior to 1991. Furthermore, the empirical analysis will indicate that Zambia cannot be characterised as a political culture identified by a strong network of voluntary associations. Based on these limitations, the concept of state corporatism or corporatism from above should be applied when discussing the concept of corporatism in relation to the transition from authoritarian to democratic regime forms.

According to Diamond et al., a typical characteristic of state corporatist arrangements in relation to trade unions is where the labour movement is concentrated in one dominating union, or central confederation which in turn is crafted into the central or only political party. In these settings labour has been incorporated and granted benefits from the party and the state more than being independently organised for the exercise of their rights (Diamond, Lipset and Linz 1990:142). If the relationship between the state and labour is characterised by corporatism in the sense that the

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2 Whether corporatism, in the sense of societal corporatism offers an alternative theory to the pluralist theory, is an often debated issue as most authors within the pluralist school acknowledge the skewed distribution of resources (Dahl 1982). However, as this analysis will be concerned with state corporatism only, this debate is largely irrelevant for the discussion here.
state through a combination of repression and distribution of benefits, has managed to subordinate the workers’ association to the state or party, the trade union movement cannot be characterised as an autonomous association. This implies that the democratising potential of the union movement as discussed above must be called into question.

The concept of state corporatism put forward by Schmitter and others have mainly been developed in a context of Latin-American authoritarian regimes and it is assumed that the state is operating from a point of strength vis à vis civil society and that the state has been able to control society through the use of coercion. To what extent can the concept of (state) corporatism be of relevance to this analysis? First of all, the concept of corporatism is suggested as an alternative theoretical hypothesis to the pluralist theory concerning the Zambian labour movements’ potential for democratic reform. Rather than regarding trade unions as autonomous actors opposing the authoritarian regimes in defence of democracy, the relationship between organised interest and the state is within a corporatist perspective understood to be institutionalised through a regulatory system. Thus, the labour-state alliance will in many instances function as a brake rather than an initiator of social change. If the relationship between the trade union movement and the state in Zambia is found to resemble a corporatist setting, the pluralist and democratising potential of the trade union movement should be questioned. As argued in the introduction, this may again have an impact on the relationship between the trade union movement and the governing authorities in the next phase, the consolidating phase of democratic development.

Until now, a number of theoretical positions and concepts have been referred to. All the theories which have been discussed are derived from a European context and have later been applied to new areas. This poses an important question; to what extent are the general theories and the various problems discussed here of relevance to the African context? In order to evaluate the theoretical frameworks discussed here, a discussion of state civil society relations in post-colonial Africa is required.

2.8 State civil society relations in post-colonial Africa: Assessing the relevance of theory

Following the transfer of power in the 1960s, the new elites in many of the African countries accepted for a limited period of time the democratic or parliamentary systems of government inherited from the colonial regimes. However, in comparison to the colonial regimes, the new African leaders
showed a strong preference for state-directed political and economic development (Migdal 1988).

Politically, the expansion of the state and the power of the new elites became manifest in the creation of one-party state systems which sought to control increasingly larger parts of society. Due to the arbitrary state borders which meant that the new states in most cases came to include a large number of nationalities, language groups and cultures, ethnic rivalries gave way to political violence and an increasing political pressure on the new political elites. The newly independent states were to a large extent more legal entities than nations in the European interpretation of nation-building (Jackson and Rosberg 1984). In order to create national identities, most African leaders saw one-party states as the best vehicle of nation building (Ravenhill 1986, Jackson and Rosberg 1982).

Although the ideological justifications varied from country to country, it was largely believed that liberal democratic political systems were alien to the African culture. This notion was emphasised in an influential school of thought which postulated a need “to create an African personality and African socialism” (Mboya 1963: 249). One-party states emerged in country after country on the African continent, ideologically built on the conviction that African political culture prior to colonialism was founded on consensus rather than competition. In the one-party states, the party was constitutionally placed above the government and the national assembly and all aspects of social life were placed under party rule. Civil associations such as women’s organisations, youth organisations and trade unions were in many instances incorporated as mass-organisations of the party. Based on the discussion of state corporatism referred to above, it can be argued that the aims of the new national elites in post-colonial Africa to a large extent fit the concept of state corporatism.

The emerging national political elites sought to consolidate their own power-base by subordinating potential political opposition from voluntary associations to the party. Furthermore, the new elites took steps to control the economic sector through nationalisation of major industries. In order to reach the desired goal of rapid economic development, most sectors of the economy were nationalised. According to Anyang’ N’yong’o, government officials “appeared to have adopted a rather Hegelian stance regarding the role of the state in Africa’s development....[as the] state was expected to build schools, roads, industries, airlines and armies” (Anyang’ N’yong’o 1991: 2-3). Thus, with great public expectations, the state elite responded

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3 Tom Mboya was a major trade union official who became a leading member of the government of independent Kenya until he was murdered in 1969.
through the only channel it perceived to be readily available, the state and its para-statal organisations (Migdal 1988:10-24).

The political and economic crisis which affected most of the African nations by the end of 1970 have by most scholars been ascribed to the national economic policies of this first decade of independence. Scholars have applied various terms and characteristics in order to describe the post-colonial development such as "swollen state", "weak state" and "patrimonial state" (Callaghy 1988, Jackson and Rosberg 1984, Sklar 1982, Rotchild 1988). A notion of a political and economic culture in which the road to personal wealth to a large extent has come through a political office is common to all the descriptions. According to some scholars, the state dominance of the economy turned politics into a "zero sum game" where loss of political office also meant loss of economic opportunities (Sklar 1982, Callaghy 1988).

Thomas Callaghy refers to the state formations and economic policies of the independent African states as "the Syndrome", and describes it in the following way:

As independence came to Africa, beginning in the late 1950s, political rather than economic logic prevailed. Despite their diversity most of the new countries developed a deeply rooted syndrome of quite common political and economic characteristics, which has dominated much of the last thirty years...From the beginning, their [the states] primary concerns were political — how to stay in power and build a base for themselves and their allies (Callaghy 1990: 257).

Callaghy leaves little faith in the "good intentions" of the policies or the ideologies on which the nationalist policies were funded. The analysis of the post-colonial political economy offered by Bratton among others is perhaps more flattering for African leaders (Bratton 1989, Gibbon 1990). According to Bratton, the state in post-colonial Africa seized power on a promise of economic growth and welfare distribution. The expansion of state dominance in the economic sector must therefore be understood against the background of the high popular expectations of economic development along with the nationalist leaders aims of reaching an economic standard similar to the developed world. When the state was no longer able to fulfil its economic promises of growth and redistribution, its legitimacy crumbled. The scholars referred to here do not challenge the analysis of the state expressed by Callaghy above because they also regard the political logic of state subsidies and clientilist network to be based on patrimonial considerations. However, they see the developments as based
on a social-contract between state and society, rather than elite-corruption per se.\(^4\)

A number of scholars have pointed to the fact that organised and unorganised groups made competing demands on the state which, in post-colonial Africa, was not only the major employer but also the source of a vast array of social welfare services especially in health, education, transportation and food subsidies (Beckman 1988). At the beginning of the 1980s, when economic constraints meant that the state could no longer deliver the “goods” demanded by societal groups because of severe constraints on its financial and administrative capabilities, the economic crisis turned into a political crisis (Ravenhill 1986). This meant that the policies of cooptation of the voluntary sector through distribution of benefits, in other words the corporatist policies, could no longer be sustained.

Even though the Gross National Product is a somewhat crude indicator of development, the decline in GNP per capita in the post-colonial period in Africa is illustrative of the grave economic crisis facing the continent by the beginning of the 1980s. During the first twenty-five years of independence, steadily rising populations and declining rates of annual growth resulted in a decline in GNP per capita from 3.7 per cent in 1963-73 to 0.7 per cent in 1973-1980. By 1980-1984 the figure was negative, at -4.9 (IBRD 1988: 87). General indicators of the economic crisis are: Declining and negative growth rates, stagnant and falling per capita incomes, decline in agricultural production, decaying of socio-economic infrastructure, sharp fall in commodity export prices and worsening terms of trade, lack of foreign capital investment, decline in aid levels and the simultaneous rise of parallel or “illegal” economies as formal markets decline. These different, but interrelated symptoms of economic decline indicate that the states’ revenue base has been so seriously depleted that the state’s financial capabilities to fulfil its budgetary responsibilities in society is seriously weakened.

According to Rotchild, the economic deterioration contributed to an increasing inability of the state to regulate society and implement public policies. A gap between expectations and performance developed which

\(^4\) In the scholarly debate on Africa, the concept of “patrimonialism” is frequently used to describe a system of governance based personal rule secured through a system of clientilism. This usage again reflects the definition of Max Weber: “The patrimonial office lacks above all the bureaucratic separation of the private and official sphere. For the political administration, too, is treated as a purely personal affair of the ruler” ... (Quoted in Jackson and Rosberg 1982: 121).
lead to a weakening of links between the state and society, causing the state to assume authoritative powers while in fact exerting less and less control over society. As the state failed to meet public demands, its legitimacy eroded and the public began to perceive of the state as an alien institution (Rotchild 1988). In the beginning of the 1980s, it was clear that the centralised and overextended state had become severely weakened, in some instances at the point of near collapse. The state sought to impose itself on virtually every aspect of social life, but effectively did so almost nowhere. The point, made by Ravenhill, refers to the more general statements of Diamond et al. above concerning the close connection between the terms legitimacy and efficacy. As the new nations became increasingly more authoritarian in the period following independence, legitimacy depended more and more on their economic performance. With the economic decline, legitimacy eroded.

The discussion of post-colonial political and economic developments has indicated that the policy aims of the emerging nationalist elites resemble the concept of corporatism presented in the general theoretical discussion. In turning to the domain outside the state structures, the concept of civil society in the African post-colonial context will be explored. Based on the post-colonial state developments in Africa, does it make sense to speak of a civil society or are all organisations either incorporated into the state or withdrawn from contact with the state?

**Civil society in post-colonial Africa**

With few exceptions the first decades of African independence were accompanied by a reorganisation of associational life on the continent. The cooptative tendencies were pronounced in socialist as well as more Western-oriented regimes and lead to a system of patronage, which institutionalised patron-client relations as a means of securing support for ruling coalitions and provided a personalistic funnel for communication and extraction (Bates 1981, Ravenhill 1986).

Based on the political developments in post-colonial Africa, the application of the concept of civil society to the study of regime transition in Africa poses a number of challenges. One challenge originates in the historical conditions in which the African state developed. Due to the fact that territorial and social boundaries in many cases did not overlap, a disjuncture between state and society was created in most African countries which became a major source of political instability after independence (Ravenhill 1986). This suggests limitations to the applicability of the concept of civil society as segments of associational life in Africa are
disattached from the political centre and the state. Whether one refers to village-based self-help groups, kinship-based groups or religious societies, it is evident that not all voluntary associations in the African setting interact with the state in any form (Hyden 1983).

A second challenge concerning the application of the concept of civil society to Africa is the fact that it is often difficult to distinguish its boundaries from those of the state. The discussion above indicated that the independent governments sought to control civil society by subjugating the associations to the state or creating new organisations controlled by the state. As a result, a number of "voluntary" associations exist within the boundaries of the state which make it difficult to determine whether regime transition is generated from civil society or from within the state. Contrary to the European context, voluntary associations cannot automatically be considered part of civil society, if civil society is defined in terms of its autonomy from the state and interaction with the state.

A brief look at the historical development of the associational terrain in Africa illuminates the complexity of social organisation and the problems inherent in identifying the groups which constitute the nucleus of civil society. Modern organisations (not based on kinship or traditional ethnic lines) which are usually associated with the term civil society, were established in the mid-colonial period. Most of these groups were based in the urban areas and initially formed by incipient elites. Many of these groups also constituted the kernel of the anti-colonial movements in Africa. Although many intermediate groups persisted after the transfer of power, their relative salience declined with the proliferation of grassroots associations locally and government-controlled organisations at the national level. With a basis in African historical developments Naomi Chazan distinguishes between two main types of non-formal participation in Africa (Chazan 1982: 172-174): Firstly, voluntary associations of an interest group type such as trade unions, women's associations, sport clubs and military groups. Their common nature lies in the voluntary membership, specific common interest and the fairly democratic nature of decision making and rotation of leadership. According to Chazan, these organisations are generally located in urban areas, and they are ethnically cross-cutting in their composition. As the secondly category, Chazan depicts the ascriptive, primary associations such as ethnic associations, traditional political units and kinship associations. Common to these organisations are their ascriptive geographically defined definition of membership and the authoritarian leadership pattern established by tradition and the homogenous ethnic base.

Combining Chazan's characterisation of African voluntary associations with the definition of civil society as voluntary, autonomous association, yet
acting in relation to the state, African voluntary associations can be divided into four categories as illustrated in Figure 1. The first category refers to organisations which operate separately from the state with the aim to take over the state. Sub-ethnic movements, some fundamental religious movements and radical ideological groups can be placed in this category. Despite their autonomous base, these organisations should not be considered as part of civil society because their aspiration is to enter the political domain. For the sake of simplicity, these organisations are here labelled “alternative political regimes”.

The second group consists of those associations which clearly stand apart from the state and shun all contact with it. Remote community organisations, kinship groups, some religious societies and self-help groups located in rural communities can be placed in this category. They are autonomous from the state but cannot be regarded as part of civil society as they do not interact with the state. Placed outside the civil society domain, I have labelled these organisations “non-interacting groups”.

On the opposite side of the associational spectrum, the third category incorporates those social institutions which were created as extensions of the formal apparatus and are considered an integral part of the state. A number of associations can be mentioned; civil servants’ associations, military unions, teachers’ associations, government-backed monolithic trade unions and cooperative societies. Because these organisations depend on the state both for their finances, are tied to the state in terms of organisation and operate within the realm of the state, they are closer to political society than civil society and do not fit the definition of civil society proposed here. In the matrix these associations are referred to as “state-controlled associations”.

The fourth category then, incorporates the organisations which, according to the definition of civil society presented here, constitute the civil society domain as they are considered as autonomous from the state, yet interacting with the state and thus presenting their views on the national political arena. Human rights monitoring groups, law associations, associations of journalists, independent trade unions and groups of public sector employers such as civil servants, which have begun to define their interests separately from the state, are all examples of associations that fit this category.5

5 The categories presented here and the general discussion of civil society in Africa owes a great deal to a seminar paper from the conference “Civil Society in Africa”, Jerusalem January 5 to January 10, 1992 by Naomi Chazan: “The Dynamics of Civil Society in Africa”.

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This attempt to classify the associational “flora” in Africa must be treated with caution and the main point has been to illustrate the variation within associational life on the African continent. The figure may suggest that the position of the various associations and their relationship to the state is static, but just as the political structures are not static, neither should civil society be considered as a static entity. The discussion of civil society in processes of transition to democracy indicated that civil society associations in many instances take on largely political roles. Similarly, it is evident that associations of the third category, the state-controlled associations, may at some stage define their position in opposition to the state, attempt to establish an autonomous position and utilise their organisation and funds in opposition to the state. This being the case, the associations become part of civil society. This again points to the necessity of analysing the concept of civil society in an empirical context, and over a relatively long period of time.

So far the concept of civil society has been discussed in general terms and trade unions have only been referred to briefly. The discussion has revealed that trade unions were often the main “targets” of incorporation of the new regimes in post-colonial Africa. In relation to the clarification of the concept of civil society in the African context above, how should trade unions be perceived? As part of political or civil society? Before turning to a discussion of the applicability of the pluralist and corporatist perspectives on state labour relations in Africa, the role of trade unions in the initial post-colonial period will be discussed briefly.
Trade unions in post-colonial Africa

The achievement of independence created a crisis in government-trade union relations in Africa, according to Lofchie and Rosberg (Lofchie and Rosberg 1968: 3). The major ingredients in the crisis were the belief among African political leaders that unions should now relate themselves to the problems of creating new national societies and the assumption that the national governments should determine what form the relationship should assume. In the words of Lofchie and Rosberg, the problem arose out of the fact that effective union participation in the process of nation building required a more clearly prescribed role for the unions and far closer ties and cooperation between unions and political leadership than was present during the era of nationalism and struggle for independence. Lofchie and Rosberg see the subordination of the trade union movements to the state as a marked contrast to the late colonial period, when trade unions enjoyed a high degree of autonomy from African political movements (Lofchie and Rosberg 1968: 4). Lofchie and Rosberg are here pointing to the attempts of the new national elites of prescribing a nation-building role to the trade unions and to regard the interests of the nation as their responsibility, rather than just the interests of unionised workers.

Considering the historical literature, the mechanisms employed to control trade unions in the various Commonwealth African countries seem very similar. The task of the state was to transform the unions, which originally constituted competing bases of power, into neutralised sycophantic bodies (Southall 1988B: 237). The mechanisms which the state used included registration of all trade unions and imposition of restrictive conditions upon them, the abolition of the right to strike, compulsory membership of all trade unions in state sponsored federations, the cooptation of leadership through inducements or office, and finally, repression (Sandbrook 1982: 203). Thus, it is evident that the post-colonial model of development discouraged the autonomous existence and activities of unions as well as other organised social groups. In the eyes of the national elites, political and societal groups should now work for national reconstruction by concentrating on the establishment of national homogeneity, elimination of vested class interests, work and self-help in order to overcome underdevelopment.

The discussion of the post-colonial state in Africa has pointed to the fact that many African leaders and intellectuals placed emphasis on what they assumed to be particular African aspects of the problems and solutions to development. The thinking of Tom Mboya, a Kenyan trade union leader who turned to politics following independence, became influential for much of the leadership and the intellectual thinking on trade unionism in Africa.
Concerning trade unionism, a commonly held opinion was that the style of trade unionism should be changed from the assertive style which characterised the union movement in the struggle for national independence, to restraint in terms of demands in the post-colonial period (Mboya 1963: 249). Mboya reached back to African traditional life in search of a model for trade unions to follow. In his opinion, the sense of family and community which he found to be part of the African heritage, should be adopted by the trade unions and production should be the primary goals of unions (Mboya 1963: 71). According to Mboya:

...It is possible for trade unions to fulfil two purposes in Africa: they can defend the rights and promote the interests of the workers, and at the same time cooperate with the government in economic reconstruction (Mboya 1963: 178).

The notion of trade unionism in the writings of Mboya is often referred to as “the African model” and it reflects the wider concept of African socialism. However, it does also closely resemble an authoritarian vision of trade unionism. The authoritarian trade union perspective is characterised by an overwhelming emphasis on the role of the state and the ruling party. Trade unions are given a decisively subordinate role and the main goal is perceived to be industrial production (Martin 1989: 70). Because emphasis is put on production, the relationship between unions and the state is not considered in conflictual terms, as the goals are similar for all; production to the benefit of all, not just unionised workers.

Although it can be argued that the policy aims of the national leadership and intellectuals throughout the African continent were similar, the degree of trade union incorporation nevertheless varied. The variation in degrees of incorporation depended on the position of the unions vis à vis the state and on the economic situation in each country. Furthermore, the numerical and organisational strength of the working class and the authoritarian character of the regime were decisive factors. Given an economy heavily dependent on industrial exports, as the copper industry in Zambia, the workers found themselves in a relatively strong bargaining position. On the other hand, the motivations of the state (with state-controlled industries) to control trade unions in such settings were also strong. The level of urbanisation and the geographical location of industry were other decisive factors. Given a high level of urbanisation, and major industries located in specific areas, trade union mobilisation was facilitated and the trade unions had often a strong organisational base, which complicated state attempts at control and cooptation.
What, then, can be concluded from this brief description of state union relations in post-colonial Africa? To what extent do the two theoretical perspectives discussed capture the African post-colonial setting?

**Corporatism and pluralism in the African scholarly debate**

Despite the extensive concern with corporatism in Latin America, there is little in-depth knowledge about the workings of corporatism in Africa. Maybe the main reason for this is that the concept of state corporatism presupposes a strong state and a relatively autonomous state vis à vis society. Referring to the inabilities many African states have shown in terms of imposing their policies on society, some scholars have argued that even though many African states demonstrate a considerable degree of autonomy, few are powerful enough to manage a corporatist regime (Rotchild 1988). However, despite varying interpretations of the concept, a number of scholars have found it useful for analyses of African politics.

Largely following Schmitter’s concept of state-corporatism, Collier suggests that in the underdeveloped economies of Africa it is perhaps more useful to use corporatism to describe any attempt by the state to bring all possible interest/oppositional groupings under its control (Collier 1979: 400). Collier understands corporatism as a system of interest representation based on non-competing groups that are officially sanctioned by the state. Shaw sees the corporatist imperative expressed in a variety of one-party states which differ in ideological range but share a concern for control and order. In such systems the range of interest groups, like the party itself, is one trade union, one youth association etc (Shaw 1982: 255). Nyang’oro and Shaw see corporatism as quite prevalent in Africa, but their definition is rather broad. They suggest that any effort by the state to exercise hegemony over any social group or economic activity resembles a “corporative tendency” (Nyang’oro and Shaw 1989).

The radical critique of African trade unions which emerged in the 1970s can possibly be placed within the school of corporatism. A group of scholars started to question the revolutionary potential of organised workers in the industrial sector. Because they had acquired a high living standard they had often become part of the bourgeoisie, constituting a “labour union aristocracy” (Kraus 1976, 1988, Crisp 1984). The concept of “labour union aristocracy” mainly referred to the leadership of the trade union movement which was seen to have been coopted by the state. However, by virtue of their incorporation into the party state and their urban location, Jamal and Weeks noted that wage and salary workers were often seen to form part of an urban coalition with extravagant privileges derived from high incomes,
government services and political influence much to the disadvantage of a vast rural population living in poverty (Jamal and Weeks: 1988: 285).

One of the most influential analyses of the relationship between interest groups and state in Africa is Robert Bates’ *Markets and States in Tropical Africa* (1981). According to Bates, domestic industry has managed to ally itself with workers and urban dwellers in general to exploit the small rural producers. The need to extract resources from the agricultural sector to promote industrialisation in Africa has lead to an urban bias. Bates’ analysis can be interpreted within the framework of corporatism, as he emphasises how the strong urban wage earners, and in particular the mine workers’ union, have pressured the state to supply them with public status, in Schmitter’s terms. The strength of the urban unions is derived from their position in the economy, and they have acquired this position at the cost of peasants and rural people. Arguing that the trade unions have entered into institutional agreements with the state from a position of strength, Bates’ argument may seem to fit the classical corporatist argument, or societal corporatism. However, that will neither be a correct observation given the position of the African state vis à vis unions as described above, nor will it do justice to Bates’ analysis. Bates is pointing to the strength of the urbanised interests and workers not vis à vis state, but vis à vis other groups in society, especially peasants. However, Bates’ analysis points to a preoccupation with urban interests which will be further elaborated in analysing Zambia’s political and economic development.

From this discussion, it can be established that the term corporatism has been applied to post-colonial industrial relations in Africa, and that it captures to an extent the policy aims of the new national leadership. Corporatism conceptualised as attempts by the state to control society through cooptation of important associations of civil society may therefore be regarded as a policy aim of the state. The empirical analysis must therefore seek to answer to what extent the Zambian state, expressed through UNIP, succeeded in coopting the trade union movement. Pluralist theories and the concept of civil society may indicate to what extent the trade union movement has been coopted or remained autonomous.

Within the African scholarly debate in the post-colonial period, civil society has not been the focal point of the debate. This is reflected in the limited research carried out on trade union movements. Richard Sklar is one of the few authors within the school of pluralism who explicitly emphasises the role of trade unions in the defence of democracy in developing areas (Sklar 1987). He acknowledges the fact that many studies portray the subordination of docile trade unions, but nevertheless, established labour organisations do represent permanent interests that are often antithetical to
governmental strategies for capital accumulation (Sklar 1987: 700). With particular emphasis on the experiences of Zambia and South Africa, he finds that union autonomy is founded upon a bedrock of union democracy (Sklar 1987: 702).

...the preceding accounts of dissonance between independent trade unionists and potentially domineering political parties or groups are evocative of proletarian predispositions toward pluralist and constitutional democracy since the 19th century (Sklar 1987: 702).

Following the political changes taking place in many African countries in the late 1980s, a number of scholars have gathered an interest in the concept of civil society and most notably the role of the trade union movement (Liatto 1989, Simutanyi 1990, Bratton 1992). In emphasising the important role of the trade union movement, they have pointed to its continuous organisational base, its important position in the economy and the level of political consciousness in the labour movement.

However, in considering the post-colonial policies of coopting trade union movements into the state structures, does the pluralist concept capture the role of African trade unions? This question cannot be answered in general. The trade union movement must, as already stated, be analysed empirically on a country by country basis in terms of their organisational and financial autonomy vis-à-vis the party (state) and their values and ideology vis-à-vis the ruling party. Furthermore, it must be established whether their aim in the democratisation process was to take over and create a new government structure, or simply to alter the existing one.

The theoretical discussion has moved from a general discussion of the concepts of democracy, democratisation and civil society to a specific debate of the role of trade unions in African nation-building and in recent processes of democratisation. Before turning to the empirical analysis of the relationship between the United National Independence Party and the Zambian labour movement, the theoretical discussion will be summarised in order to create a conceptual “map” which can be applied to the Zambian political terrain.

2.9 Developing a “Conceptual Map” for analysing party labour relations in Zambia

The changes in Zambia has been specified as a transition from authoritarian to democratic rule. Following Robert A. Dahl’s definition of a pluralist democracy, it has been emphasised that democracy should be considered as both the existence of voluntary associations and free elections to all
political offices (polyarchy). Consequently, the existence of voluntary associations is considered an essential part of a working democracy.

In applying the concept of pluralist democracy as a measure of democracy and democratisation, the concept of civil society becomes central to the analysis. Based on historical usage and an aim to find a concept of civil society that can be analysed in a non-European context, civil society has been defined as *voluntary associations operating in the realm between the family and the state, autonomous, yet interacting with the state*. Within this perspective, the role of trade unions has been considered particularly important due to their central position in the economy, the continuous organisation and the large base of support within the working class.

The discussion of associational life in Africa has emphasised that all voluntary associations in Africa do not necessarily belong to civil society, a notion which is often taken for granted in a Western European setting. Within the African “flora” of associations, remote community associations shunning contact with the state as well as associations controlled by the state must be excluded from the civil society concept which has been applied here. In also excluding associations aiming to overthrow the state and create a political alternative, the concept of civil society incorporates associations operating in the intermediate structure between family and state, organisationally and financially autonomous from the state.

However, this last category is by no means “empty” in Africa, as civil rights groups, human rights monitoring groups, student associations, bar associations, press clubs, farmers’ associations and trade unions often fit this category. During the last few years, a number of civil servants’ associations and teachers’ associations have begun to criticise the governing authorities and taken autonomous positions vis à vis the state. The discussion of civil society in Africa has pointed to some important factors: Firstly, that civil society as a theoretical concept must be empirically grounded in order to assess its applicable value. Secondly, civil society is not a static term as associations can perform various roles at various times and settings. Even if trade union movements may have been weak and docile at one point and therefore prey to state cooptation and control, they may at a later stage appear as autonomous associations independent of the state both in terms of political goals, organisation and finance.

Regarding the democratising potential of the Zambian trade union movement, two alternative theoretical perspectives have been brought forward: In a pluralist context, trade unions are considered to be interest groups working for the economic welfare of their members. In other words, the goals of trade unions are understood to be mainly economic and
narrowly based on the welfare of members and not on regime transformation per se. However, authors working within a pluralist tradition have argued that trade unions and other organisations of civil society can temporarily alter their orientation from an economic and narrow one to a political one. Within a pluralist perspective then, the Zambian trade union movement should be regarded as an agent of democratisation. Its primary goal is the economic welfare of its members. However, as a leading organisation of civil society due to its organisational strength and important position in the economy, the trade union movement becomes a central part of the political struggle for the reintroduction of multiparty democracy.

Against the pluralist perspective and the assumption that trade union movements have a potential for political transformation, theories of *neocorporatism* have been presented. Due to the weak civil-society structures and state-controlled economies, it has been argued that the concept of *state-corporatism* fits the African political situation. Contrary to societal-corporatism, or classical corporatism, state corporatism refers to a strategy from the state and state elites to control important forces in society. If the concept of state corporatism is to be applied to Zambia, it can be argued that the trade union movement is far from autonomous vis-à-vis the state, and the ideological differences are minimal. The break up of the alliance in the recent process of democratisation, is a result of the economic recession. Due to economic decline, the state can no longer afford the cooptative practices as previously applied.

Thus, the theoretical discussion has presented two alternative theoretical concepts in an attempt to answer the question of why trade union party relations in Zambia changed in the 1980s and why the trade union movement as a result became part of the opposition to the one-party rule. In order to assess whether the corporatist or pluralist hypothesis put forward captures trade union party relations, the concepts of civil society, the trade unions' autonomy vis-à-vis the state and their ideological distinctiveness will become central to the analysis.

Time has now come to apply the theoretical framework to the Zambian political situation. However, the question of ideological differences, quest for autonomy and ZCTU's relationship to the national unions and the membership cannot be answered by analysing the conflictual events of the 1980s alone. In order to understand why these events took place, the relationship between the trade union movement and the governing party UNIP will draw on the time period prior to the introduction of the one-party state. Yet, the main emphasis will be placed on the period after 1972 which represents the introduction of the one-party state in Zambia. The analysis will mainly focus on the relationship between ZCTU and UNIP.
Because the question of control over the trade union congress has been a central issue in Zambian industrial relations, the relationship between the labour congress and the affiliated unions will also be considered.

In order to “set the stage” and place the analysis in a current political context, the analysis begins by assessing the involvement of ZCTU in the process of democratisation. The political reforms of 1991 brought an end to the one-party state and a new party into government. The events of 1990-1991 represent a termination of the industrial relations policies of the post-colonial period which involved UNIP and ZCTU as the leading organisation of the labour movement.
Chapter 3:
Party labour relations in transition:
The role of the trade union movement in the process of democratisation (1989-1991)

Based on a definition of democracy at the national level stressing constitutional guarantees, political liberties and competition for political offices, the recent political reforms in Zambia should be characterised as a transition from authoritarian to democratic government. In September 1991 a new constitution was adopted which opened for elections to most political offices. In addition to the legalisation of opposition parties, the new constitution also opened for extended civil liberties such as freedom of speech, associations and the press. Voluntary associations were now free to organise and negotiate with the government and state for influence and power. The new constitution terminated the implied unity between the party (UNIP) and the Zambian state. Consequently, the political system in Zambia in 1991 qualifies as a democracy given a the definition of democrac applied here.

The perceptions of the trade union movement regarding their own role in the recent political reforms are that the return to multiparty politics has been spearheaded and followed through by the trade union movement. During interviews, the labour leaders both of ZCTU and the national unions emphasised that the democratisation process was a labour initiative because the labour movement was the only association with an organisational network outside UNIP that could initiate the changes. However, they all underscored that it was not a struggle they had fought alone; they had cooperated with other democratic forces in society. It was further emphasised that MMD was not a labour party and that the labour

2 For a list of persons interviewed and the questions put, see appendix II and III.
movement as such did not want to be part of neither MMD nor the new government. Their main interest was to ensure that pluralism and accountability was reintroduced to Zambian politics as they perceived this to be in the long-term economic interests of their members. This last emphasis must be seen in relation to the allegations made by President Kaunda and UNIP that MMD was a “sectarian” movement of unionised labour and exclusively a Bemba-organisation.³

According to the trade union leadership, the issue of democratisation was put on the agenda for the first time on December 30, 1989, when the General Council meeting of ZCTU declared its intention to work for the reintroduction of multiparty politics in Zambia. At the same time, they called for other individuals and associations in Zambia with similar objectives to join forces with the trade union movement.⁴ This was the first time the issue of multiparty politics was raised officially in Zambia. Chiluba declared publicly, in a press release at the General Council meeting, that Africa should abandon the one-party system since the founders of that system in Eastern Europe had done so (Times of Zambia, December 31, 1989). At the 8th Quadrennial Conference, October 20-28, 1990, to which all unions sent representatives from various levels of the organisation and according to the size of the union, the reintroduction of multiparty politics was adopted as a political aim of the trade union movement. Here it was declared that

...Strong and independent trade unions provide the most effective protection to the exercise of normal democratic rights in Zambia.⁵

The question of why the trade union movement decided to spearhead the reintroduction of multiparty politics was answered almost unanimously in my interviews with the labour union leadership. The majority of the respondents gave two reasons. Politically, they focused on the fact that trade unionism works better in a competitive political situation. Secondly, they emphasised that the economic policies of UNIP had been detrimental to the interests of labour. Responding to the question of whether their affiliation to MMD contradicted their quest for autonomy, most of the respondents referred to a pre-independence resolution made by the United

³ Main language group in the Copperbelt and in the industrial areas between Lusaka and the Zairian border.
⁵ Ibid.
Trade Union Congress which was later adopted by ZCTU. The resolution was made in 1961 and it stated that: "...the labour movement would remain neutral in politics but reserve the right to support any party with progressive politics". According to the union leaders, this was the original idea of the alliance with UNIP, and this was how the trade unions would cooperate with any political party in the future. The views of the Assistant General Secretary of ZCTU Alec Chirwa, is illustrative of the convictions of the leadership from both ZCTU and the national unions:

As I said, we were not really happy with the one-party state, and when it lead to economic stagnation we saw that the work of the unions would be more and more difficult and we began to cry for more democracy in our country. We felt that people should have room to speak their minds, and our cry became louder as nothing improved. This cry cumulated in a decision in our General Council in December 1989 where we made a resolution stating that Zambia should go back to multipartyism. In reaction to this, UNIP and Kenneth Kaunda convened another convention (March 1990) to discuss pluralism and we (Mr. Chiluba) got to speak first. At the convention we got support from government ministers and other sectors of society, so you can say we have spearheaded the return to political pluralism and we should be given 100 per cent credit for this. By this I do not mean that we should take over government, and we are not going to form a labour party; our aim has been to reintroduce pluralism. We need a new government, because UNIP has failed. When another party forms a government, labour will move back to its normal role of a trade union movement, we may support MMD as we did support UNIP but we will not be a part of it.

The perceptions of the labour leaders alone cannot determine the role of the labour movement in the process of transition to multiparty politics. However, the empirical evidence found in the trade union files indicate that ZCTU played a central role in the process of reintroducing multiparty politics in Zambia. The minutes from the General Council demonstrate that the trade union movement invested its organisational network as well as trade union funds in the struggle for democracy. In August 1990, the Chairman General of ZCTU (Frederick Chiluba) informed the General Council that the secretariat had sought legal advice on the question of whether unions were legally entitled to use trade union funds in the election

7 Personal communication, Mr. A. Chirwa, Assistant General Secretary ZCTU, Lusaka: September 16, 1991.
campaign. Upon the approval of the legal advisors, the General Council then recommended that the district committees of ZCTU should be strengthened in order to constitute an organisational basis for the MMD campaign. It was further held that the chairman of the district committee should be appointed as chairman of the District Multiparty Campaign Committees. Sufficient funds should be distributed to the district committees to enable them to carry out the campaign.8 This resolution indicate that the trade union movement utilised both its funds, organisational network and human resources in the election process.9 In order to understand MMD’s success in terms of reaching large segments of the population and mobilise opposition throughout the country, the role of the trade union movement was very significant. Through the organisational apparatus of ZCTU, the MMD campaign had a network through which it could communicate its policies to large groups of people across the country. The importance of this factor must be understood against the background that only ZCTU, apart from UNIP, possessed such an organisational network. Partly due to the one-party system of government which incorporated most voluntary associations into the party structures, the density of civil society associations in Zambia is extremely low. Considering the fact that until a few months before the elections, UNIP held a near monopoly control over media, the importance of the communication network of ZCTU in the election campaign cannot be stressed strongly enough.

On account of the discussion above it is clear that the trade union movement through its central organisation, ZCTU, invested their resources in the process of transition to democracy. It is also apparent that the trade union movement during this period managed to utilise both its funding and organisational resources autonomously in opposition to UNIP. To what extent did the trade union movement cooperate with other civil society associations in this process? Turning to a discussion of the formation of the Movement for Multiparty Democracy, the alliance between the trade union movement and other opposition forces will be considered.

9 While visiting the ZCTU head-quatres in Kitwe a month before the election, I noticed that the vehicles owned by the union movement were repainted with MMD letters and colours, and they were used in the MMD election campaign.
3.1 Building alliances: The movement for multiparty democracy

ZCTU repeated the plea to return to multiparty politics at the National Convention of UNIP in March 1990, the supreme policy-making organ of the party. The National Convention was summoned in order to discuss democratisation of the political system in response to changes in other parts of the world. At the National Convention, backbenchers and people from the business community as well as the present trade unionists proposed a return to multiparty politics.

However, the calls for reintroducing multiparty politics was unanimously rejected by the UNIP leadership. By this time the political process toward reform had gathered momentum and increasing pressure both from the national opposition and international donors forced the President to put the issue of multiparty elections to a national referendum in May 1990. President Kaunda immediately started campaigning against multiparty politics, claiming that tribalism was too strong in Zambia and that multiparty politics would ruin the national spirit acquired during the time of UNIP rule. Nevertheless, a number of political events in the months that followed to a large extent deprived the President of the political initiative. The first event occurred in June 1990, when the government, upon pressure from IMF, raised the price of mealie-meal\(^\text{10}\) by 100 per cent, a move which resulted in major political unrest. Riots and looting spread from Lusaka to other urban centres. This time the discontent was directed toward the government itself and not against IMF and external forces as before. Twenty-seven people were killed and more than thousand arrested according to estimates.\(^\text{11}\) Shortly after the food riots in the urban areas, a group of soldiers attempted a coup d’etat, which was fought back soon after. But the cheering and jubilation of the thousands in the streets of Lusaka and Kitwe at the break out of the coup seriously weakened Kaunda and gave momentum to the opposition.

With the coup attempt and the riots fresh in the memories of most Zambians, conditions appeared favourable for the emergence of an alternative ruling coalition in Zambia. In June 1990, a national interim committee was created which represented most social classes and ethnic subgroups. Members of the trade union movement, students, academics, the business community and parliamentary back-benchers started to organise an alternative political platform from which they intended to mobilise for the

\(^{10}\) Mealie-meal, or maize, is the main staple food in Zambia.

reintroduction of multiparty politics. According to the initiators of the conference, the catalyst of the initiative was the failure of the UNIP National Convention to create viable alternatives to the political and economic malaise of the one-party regime (Lewanika 1990). According to Mbikusita Lewanika, one of the organisers of the conference, the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions was identified as the most probable ally in the campaign for multiparty democracy and the organising committee therefore contacted the ZCTU leadership to discuss the possibility of launching a campaign (Lewanika 1990: vi). Members of the trade union leadership was invited to join in the organisation of the conference. In the words of Lewanika, it was generally agreed that:

.... The ZCTU, which had been carrying out an open campaign for multiparty democracy, was a critical institution in our struggle for democracy. For one thing, Mr. Chiluba and Mr. Zimba\(^{12}\) had not only vowed to spearhead the multiparty democracy campaign at a time when many citizens were afraid of airing such sentiments, the ZCTU also possessed functional structures across the country which could be very useful in the campaign. Obviously, the ZCTU was an indispensable ingredient in the new democratic struggle (Lewanika 1990: vii).

The statement of Lewanika illustrates that the importance of the trade union movement was acknowledged by other oppositional forces in society. The organisational resources of ZCTU were utilised by oppositional forces outside the trade union movement. It can therefore be argued that, at this point, ZCTU functioned as a leading organisation of civil society in the process of transition from authoritarianism to democracy.

On July 17, 1990, the 17-year old ban on the right to organise opposition groups was lifted and three days later the Movement for Multiparty Democracy was founded as an umbrella organisation of the opposition at the Garden Hotel in Lusaka. The former Minister of Finance, Arthur Wina, was elected interim Chairman of MMD while Frederick Chiluba, the Chairman of ZCTU, became the Vice Chairman. MMD comprised an unusual coalition of middle and working class interests, parliamentary backbenchers, business people, commercial farmers and labour unionists but remained intact throughout the transition period and eventually won a large electoral majority on October 25, 1991. Considering the question of which forces from civil society that were instrumental in this process, it should be noted that the churches were passive in the formation of a coalition

\(^{12}\) General Secretary of ZCTU.
movement opposing the one-party state. A few members of the clergy were present at the conference, but neither the Anglican nor the Catholic church took part in the organisation of the conference nor in the interim committee established during the conference. A week after the conference, the Catholic bishops issued a pastoral statement deploring the lack of accountability between rich political leaders and the increasingly impoverished citizenry (Times of Zambia July 28, 1990). This indicates that the churches were in favour of political reform. However, for a number of reasons they did not take part in the initial political mobilisation against the one-party regime.

Despite the legalisation of civil associations, the ban on political party formation was still in place. During the next months the repeal of Act 4 of the 1973 Constitution, which prohibited the formation of opposition parties, became the main political issue on which MMD campaigned. Facing massive demonstrations and opposition rallies, some gathering as many as 200,000 people, President Kaunda, in an attempt to regain the political initiative, cancelled the proposed referendum and opened for direct multiparty elections. The multiparty decision made by the UNIP National Council meeting on September 24, 1991 was by many seen as a capitulation to the pressures from the multiparty advocates, most notably ZCTU. Shortly after the National Council decision, President Kaunda appointed a National Commission of Inquiry to draw up constitutional recommendations for “the Third Republic”. By the end of February 1991, Article 4 of the 1973 Constitution was repealed. Consequently, seven political parties registered for the 1991 elections. At this point the trade union movement officially vowed to place their support behind MMD in the forthcoming elections because MMD was seen as the most progressive party.

MMD held its first national convention from February 28 to March 2, 1991 and the Chairman of ZCTU, Frederick Chiluba, won the presidential elections of MMD by an absolute majority. (683 votes against 208 for Arthur Wina). As a result, the Chairman of the labour congress became the main opposition candidate against UNIP and President Kaunda. Despite accusations of tribal bias at the conference, the elections were by observers characterised as the fairest ever held in Zambia and the national executive

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13 *Africa Confidential* Vol. 31 No. 20, October 12, 1990.

14 Besides the Movement for Multiparty Democracy, the National Democratic Party (NADA), The Multi-Racial Party (MP), the Theoretical Spiritual Party (TSP), the Peoples Liberation Party (PLP), the Democratic Party (DP) and Movement for Democratic Process (MDP) registered. All of these parties were, however, marginal. Source: *New African* March, 1991.
committee of MMD was seen to represent a cross-section of ethnic groups and backgrounds.\(^{15}\)

The Constitutional Commission appointed by President Kaunda concluded its report in April 1991, and among the most significant proposals was the recommendation of a strong executive president limited to two terms but with the powers to dissolve parliament and declare a state of emergency. The constitutional proposal was rejected in total by the opposition and MMD went as far as claiming that the proposal was a “recipe for another dictator” (*Times of Zambia*, April 20, 1991). The main objection of the opposition was that too much power would be vested in the executive office. President Kaunda rejected the criticism and invited the opposition parties to State House for discussions. However, the invitation was turned down by the main spokes-person of the opposition, the MMD president Mr. Chiluba and by this time, the elections were in serious jeopardy. Progress was made on July 19 when the student associations at the University of Zambia organised a meeting to discuss the election issues. The meeting was attended by both Kaunda and Chiluba and representatives of other political associations. It was finally agreed that Kaunda would meet those opposing the constitutional proposals in order to make alterations before the parliament reconvened. Consequently, on July 23, President Kaunda and Mr. Chiluba met at the Anglican church in Lusaka and agreed that the proposed constitution needed revisions. Among the main amendments made were provisions requiring all cabinet members to be appointed from the ranks of the parliament, the removal of the provisions creating a constitutional court which had given the President power to declare martial law and provisions requiring the President to consult parliament before declaring a state of emergency. During the meeting in the Anglican church it was finally agreed that the presidential and parliamentary elections would take place on October 25, 1991.

At this stage in the process of transition, two other civil society associations had become increasingly more important, namely the students’ associations and the churches. The success of the church in building a bridge between the main opposition group (MMD) and UNIP may be due to the fact that they were not considered part of the political opposition lead by MMD and the trade union movement. Contrary to the trade union movement which were now officially aligned with an opposition party, the churches were perceived to be somewhat neutral. The importance attached to unaligned civil society associations can be seen in their functions as independent election observers.

\(^{15}\) *Africa Confidential* Vol 32 No 5 March 8, 1991.
3.2 The election process

The new constitution was passed by Parliament on August 24, 1991, replacing the 1973 One-Party Constitution. The most important change from the 1973 Constitution relates to the legalisation of opposition parties enshrined in Article 21 which put an end to the implied identity between UNIP and the government. The extensions of the Bill of Rights to specifically include freedom of the press, freedom from discrimination based on sex and marital status, freedom of movement and the protection of young persons from exploitative labour practices are also significant. However, the 1991 Constitution still provides for a strong executive president; the president can appoint the cabinet, dissolve parliament and declare a state of emergency (after consultation). The election system is based on the British model of single member constituencies where the candidate receiving the greatest number of votes wins. The election system does not offer a choice of more than one candidate from each party. This election method, it is commonly held, strongly favours the largest party.

The Zambian elections on October 25 1991 were by international monitors and the international press considered as peaceful, free and fair. The fact that Kenneth Kaunda also immediately accepted the loss of office has contributed to the historical significance of the Zambian elections. For the first time in post-colonial Sub Saharan Africa, a government has been replaced through peaceful democratic elections. In the actual election process, the role of the student organisations and the churches as election monitors covering the polling stations around the country was very significant.16

In view of the strong interest generated by the elections, the voter turnout was surprisingly low. Only 45 per cent, or 1.3 of 2.9 million, registered voters used their right to vote in the multiparty elections, as indicated in Table 1. In contrast, 87 per cent cast their votes in the last multiparty elections held in Zambia in 1968 (Weekly Post October 29-31, 1991). The low voter turnout may have been caused by intimidation and fear of UNIP repercussions. MMD won 126 parliamentary seats, or 72 per cent of the votes cast compared to UNIP’s 24 seats and 23.6 per cent of the votes. Of the 24 seats, 19 were won in the Eastern Province where UNIP acquired all the contested seats. In the Copperbelt, UNIP only won 9.1 per cent of the

voters. None of the seven other registered parties gained any seats in the parliament, which make Zambia a de facto two-party system.

Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>MMD per cent of votes cast</th>
<th>MMD votes cast</th>
<th>UNIP per cent of votes cast</th>
<th>UNIP votes cast</th>
<th>Turnout per cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td>70.4</td>
<td>70,647</td>
<td>25.95</td>
<td>26,039</td>
<td>35.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Copperbelt</td>
<td>87.20</td>
<td>267,047</td>
<td>9.94</td>
<td>30,428</td>
<td>49.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern</td>
<td>24.04</td>
<td>43,743</td>
<td>68.17</td>
<td>123,989</td>
<td>45.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luapula</td>
<td>83.69</td>
<td>72,063</td>
<td>13.32</td>
<td>11,468</td>
<td>41.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lusaka</td>
<td>73.48</td>
<td>130,829</td>
<td>21.91</td>
<td>39,016</td>
<td>43.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern</td>
<td>82.25</td>
<td>119,357</td>
<td>13.43</td>
<td>19,482</td>
<td>42.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North-Western</td>
<td>65.15</td>
<td>43,520</td>
<td>27.48</td>
<td>18,357</td>
<td>40.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern</td>
<td>80.87</td>
<td>125,372</td>
<td>15.30</td>
<td>23,716</td>
<td>42.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western</td>
<td>77.31</td>
<td>73,612</td>
<td>18.66</td>
<td>17,764</td>
<td>39.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>71.96</td>
<td>946,181</td>
<td>23.60</td>
<td>310,259</td>
<td>43.40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


3.3 The Zambia Congress of Trade Unions: The leading association of civil society?

The discussion above has indicated that the trade union movement through its central organisation, ZCTU, was instrumental in the transition from one-party rule to multiparty rule in Zambia in the 1990s. ZCTU was the first organisation to officially express their support for multiparty democracy. Furthermore, the organisational network as well as the financial and human resources of the trade union movement were utilised in the running of the MMD election campaign. The role of ZCTU in the MMD alliance indicates that the organisational resources of ZCTU were employed by opposition forces outside the trade union movement. The significance of ZCTU in the transition to democracy is underscored by the fact that it was the only association apart from UNIP possessing an organisational and
administrative machinery capable of reaching large parts of the population and thus mobilise the opposition.

Based on these observations, it can be argued that ZCTU as the main policy-making organ of the trade union movement has been the leading civil society association in the process of democratisation in Zambia. According to the theoretical indicators developed in chapter three, ZCTU (and the affiliated unions) at this point in time should be characterised as autonomous. Furthermore, the trade union movement interacted in this process with other oppositional groups of civil society and as such did not aim to become an alternative government. During the transition period, ZCTU and the trade union movement became politicised and took on a role of a national opposition movement encompassing interests beyond those of unionised workers. Contrary to the churches and student organisations, the trade unions took part in the formation of a political alternative to UNIP. This closely resembles Przeworski’s analysis of the role of civil society in transition processes in Latin America and Eastern Europe which was discussed in chapter three and illustrates that the nature of civil society changes in processes of transition from authoritarian systems of government to democracy.

To what extent was the political initiative of ZCTU supported by the national unions and the rank and file membership? The General Council of ZCTU comprises representatives from all the national unions represented according to size and it can therefore be assumed that it was supported by the national unions at the level of leadership. My personal interviews with leaders of the national unions indicated an unanimous support of ZCTU and MMD in the process of political reform. The best indication of the support from the rank and file is found in the election results of the 1991 elections which show that MMD won close to 90 per cent of the votes in the industrial areas as indicated in Table 1. The strong current for change in the Zambian society as a whole during this period should not be underestimated. However, the lack of statistical material concerning the opinions of the rank and file membership must also be taken into account. It is therefore not possible to present any definite conclusions, but all information available indicates that ZCTU had strong support from the members at this point.

Based on the available material, it has been argued that the trade union movement played an instrumental role in the process of political reform in Zambia. It is therefore interesting to note that in most of the press summaries of the transition period in Zambia, the role of labour is either not mentioned or mentioned in passing with the churches and other civic
The two most evident reasons for this are, firstly, that the press-reports and the immediate consultancy reports have focused primarily on the actual election process, and by this time (August 1991) other groups had become as important as the trade union movement in the process of safe-guarding free and fair elections. A second reason which may account for the limited focus on the role of the trade union movement is that the observers and journalists seem predominately to have focused on the political elites and bargaining within the elite structures.

Judging from the political events sketched above, it is obvious that the actual transition from authoritarian rule in Zambia began in April 1990 when President Kaunda agreed to hold a referendum on multiparty politics. This decision created the opening in which the opposition could organise political alternatives. Applying the theoretical frameworks of O’Donnell et. al. discussed in chapter three, this opening may be regarded as a result of elite bargaining where UNIP “hard liners” had to give way to “soft liners” (O'Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead 1986). In the terminology of O’Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead, the “popular upsurge” occurred three months later, first articulated through the food riots in the urban areas and later organised at the Garden Hotel in the form of the Movement for Multiparty Democracy.

However, the picture of elite transition only holds if the concessions from the Kaunda regime are kept isolated from the developments in civil society, i.e., if the political incidents leading up to the elite transitions are ignored. While the process of transition to democracy did involve elite concessions, the process was initiated through pressures from below or outside the domain of the UNIP elite and party bureaucracy. The trade union movement was instrumental in the first phases of the transition period in the creation of a political alternative on which the population as a whole could be mobilised.

So far it can be established that ZCTU was instrumental in the creation of the opposition to the Kaunda regime. However, the question of why the trade union movement through ZCTU took on a political role as an opposition force against UNIP has not been properly accounted for. This is indeed a puzzling question considering the fact that ZCTU was created by an act of parliament by UNIP in 1964 as a government agency. The time period here considered did not provide any clear answers concerning the ideological discord between ZCTU and UNIP. Observing the election campaign in Zambian media it must be held that the campaign primarily

\[17\] I am here referring to the coverage in magazines like *Africa Confidential, The New African, Economist Intelligence Unit, African Business* and *Southern African Economist.*
focused on the personalities of the candidates rather than issues. In order to answer the question of why the changes in party labour relations took place, it is therefore necessary to examine the former history of trade union UNIP relations. Now moving from the most contemporary history of Zambian industrial relations, the role of the trade union movement in the struggle for national independence in the 1960s is compared to the events in 1991.
Chapter 4:  
Party labour relations in a historical perspective: Comparing the struggle for independence to the political reforms of the 1990s

The discussion in the previous chapter has indicated that the trade union movement became politicised, or performed a political role in the absence of political parties, in the recent transition from one-party to multi-party rule. Going back to the matrix presented in chapter two (Fig. 1), it can be argued that the trade union congress moved from a position as an autonomous civil society association (category 4) to an alternative political regime (category 1) as the trade union movement provided the organisational basis of MMD.

The recent actions of the trade union movement closely resemble the situation in 1961, when the trade union movement through the United Trade Union Congress (UTUC), vowed to support UNIP in the struggle for national independence as UNIP was considered to be the most progressive party of the time. The trade union congress established that trade unions could no longer stay out of the political process and concern themselves with bread and butter issues only as national political issues were also the concern and responsibility of the unions.

In 1991, the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions on behalf of all 19 affiliated unions in Zambia broke the alliance with UNIP which had been in place since 1961 and vowed to support a new party, MMD, in multiparty elections. The reasons given for supporting MMD was that it was regarded as a more progressive party and more attentive to the interests of labour than UNIP. Again, it is evident that the trade union movement takes on a clearly political role, in active support of a new opposition party after having campaigned against the one-party system of government.

The two political campaigns, the struggle for independence in the 1960s and the process of spearheading the return of multiparty politics in 1990-91, were regarded as the two main national political actions of the trade union
movement by the trade unionists interviewed. During my personal interviews and in the press reports, the labour representatives constantly pointed to the historical analogies and their role as "defenders of democracy". They made clear that UNIP had been a progressive party at one time but that it had ceased to function as a democratic party and to serve the interest of the "common man". Thus, it is evident that the trade union leadership often turn to the history of the trade union movement in order to apprehend current political events. What are the similarities between the two political events? And, can the struggle for independence provide an understanding to the current actions of the trade union movement?

The trade union movement in Zambia emerged in close cooperation with European trade unions and under the inspiration and control of British trade union officers. The discovery of copper and the development of the mining industry created a Zambian working class, and the African mine-workers union was one of the first unions to emerge among the African workers. The mining industry also brought the country a small but significant white labour class which in all ways occupied a privileged position vis-à-vis the African workers. The two major strikes by African workers in 1935 and 1940 which were considered as the starting point of unionisation in Zambia, took place after the white workers had conducted strikes. The strikes were in other words modelled on the strikes of the white workers. The importance of Europeans as part of the local labour force meant that trade disputes and industrial relations were dominated by the competitive claims made by European and African labour (Berger 1974). As a result, the formation of the Zambian trade union movement in terms of structure, functions and ideology was greatly influenced by British trade unionism and traditions. According to Gertzel:

The action of the (African) miners more than any other section of workers demonstrated the emergence of an organised labour movement, sustained by men today remembered as true trade unionists. They accepted the system, but sought to change their own position within it.... At the time when there was serious disagreement as to the function of the trade unions in the nationalist movement as a whole, both leaders and rank and file members saw the primary function of the unions as raising wages and the improvement of working conditions through collective bargaining and if necessary strike action. From an early date, the rank and file membership, predominately of the labouring class, assessed the leadership in terms of its ability to achieve benefits for the members (Gertzel 1979: 317).
In her analysis of the early formative stages of Zambian trade unionism, Gertzel finds that the miners regarded the separation of industrial and political action and the independence of unions from party control as a matter of principle. Gertzel’s observations are similar to the findings of both Epstein (1958), Bates (1971) and Berger (1974). Judging from the early actions of the trade union movement and the historical context in which it was formed, it is clear that the first trade unionism to emerge in Zambia resembled a pluralist form of trade unionism. The organising of members started from below, it was funded on “bread and butter issues” and it was not state sponsored. The African workers saw that through collective bargaining the white workers succeeded in bringing about higher wages and they also saw how the white miners used the weapon of strike to their benefit. Trade unionism was therefore organised around economic issues with the economic welfare interest of the members as their main goal. The historical records confirm that the trade union movement operated relatively autonomously from the colonial government.

The formative stages of a trade union movement are of interest to a later analysis of the post-colonial period for a number of reasons. Scoville and Sturmthal discuss the importance of the goals and means of a labour movement, pointing out that the political characteristics of a society seem to influence the orientation of a labour movement (Scoville and Sturmthal 1973: 58-78). They argue that the initial structure of the labour movement exercises a lasting effect upon its orientation, especially in respect to ideology. If the point made by Scoville and Sturmthal is applied to a Zambian context, it could be argued that since the Zambian trade union movement was steeped in a pluralist mode of trade unionism, it has maintained its predominantly economic ambitions and autonomous character. In other words, the role of the trade unions in the 1991 political reforms is a natural consequence of its historical position as an autonomous interest group.

However, the pluralist notion of separating political and economic actions which signified the formative stages of trade unionism in Zambia, changed during the 1950s as the resistance against the federation between Northern and Southern Rhodesia began to form (1953-1963).

The first trade union federation, the Northern Rhodesia Congress of Trade Unions (NRCTU) was created in 1951, and the Congress was committed to the political struggle as early as 1952, when a political action committee was formed following the Government White paper on the Federation. The mine-workers, however, opposed the involvement of trade unions in the struggle for independence from the very beginning. As the mine-workers’ union by far was the strongest and best organised union at
the time and as such played a leading role within the trade union congress, the opposition of one union was very significant. When Lawrence Katilungu, then president of the mine-workers’ union, refused to take the mine-workers out in an anti-federation strike in 1954, it created the first deep conflict between the politically oriented trade unionists, supporting the nationalist party, the African National Congress (ANC) and the “traditional” trade unionists, mainly in the mine-workers’ union.

The militant trade unionists emerging in the 1950s and the radical political line of the NRTUC soon set the organisation on collision course with ANC whose political position was more centrist. In 1958 ANC split into two different parties, ANC and the Zambia African National Congress which later became UNIP. Inevitably, this split was reflected in the trade union congress (NRTUC). In 1957, Lawrence Katilungu of the mine workers union was reelected as president of NRTUC, and as he was a member of ANC as well, the congress was faced with the problem of which of the two nationalist parties to support. Katilungu choose ANC which put him on collision course with much of the leadership of NRTUC. When Katilungu in 1960 accepted to sit on the Monckton Commission to regard the future of the Federation, the trade union congress split. All the affiliated unions except the three mine unions left NRTUC and formed an alternative congress, the Reformed Trade Union Congress (RTUC) (Meebelo 1986:422). The new congress adopted a militant position and identified closely with the splinter political party, UNIP. In 1960 the General Council of the breakaway congress resolved to support UNIP as the most progressive party. Thus, the trade union movement was split along lines of party alliances and the two competing congresses supported either ANC or UNIP.

In 1961 the trade union congress was reunified under the name the United Trade Union Congress (UTUC) and Lawrence Katilungu was dismissed as president of the mine workers’ union. The UTUC then repeated the policy statement by the former Reformed Trade Union Congress and vowed to support UNIP as the most progressive party. UTUC resolved that the concept of separating trade unionism from political affairs was outmoded as any concept of trade unionism that did not take into account the problems of the people and their role in achieving national freedom was doomed to a complete failure. An article in the Workers Voice illustrates the position: “Gone are the days when unionism existed for

employer-employee problems only. Common justice demands a widening of the concept itself" (Workers Voice, Vol 1, No 3, November 1961).

By 1961, the ideal of separation between political and economic action was largely left behind by the trade union movement and it aligned itself closely to UNIP in the struggle for national independence. When the United Trade Union Congress on behalf of the affiliated unions (at this time the mine workers as well) pledged to support UNIP in the struggle for independence, they made clear that the goals of the trade unions incorporated broader interests than those of the workers; they saw nationalism to be a goal of the nation as a whole and the trade union movement to have a role to play outside industrial relations.

The theoretical discussion in chapter two emphasised that a civil society association may take on a national political role in defence of its democratic rights. Within a pluralist perspective, such a transformation is perceived of as temporary and it does not necessarily mean that the emphasis on the economic welfare of the membership is left out. In line with this argument, Scoville and Sturmthal argue that in largely repressive political settings and in developing nations, trade union movements tend to take on political roles in addition to the economic roles in order to protect the democratic rights the trade union movements have won for themselves (Scoville and Sturmthal 1973: 65). Relating this point to the struggle for independence in Zambia, it can be held that the trade union leadership increasingly became aware of the fact that the interest of the workers could not be effectively protected under colonial administration; with the colour bar in the mining industry protecting the white workers from African competition.

Both in the 1960s and the 1990s the trade union movement took on a political role and became instrumental in the creation of a political alternative to the ruling forces. Furthermore, the rationale for taking on a political role is somewhat similar. Just as the trade union council saw UNIP as a progressive party and found it to be in the interest of workers to remove the colonial powers, so did ZCTU and its affiliated unions see MMD as a more progressive party than UNIP in 1990.

However, the differences are also very visible. For one thing, the affiliation to MMD is more limited than the relationship to UNIP in the 1960s. For a long time the trade union movement debated among themselves over the affiliation to MMD. It was pointed out in the interviews and press reports that the trade unionists that had become members of MMD did so as individuals and not as trade unionists. On the other hand, it was only Frederick Chiluba who (temporarily) left his post as ZCTU Chairman General during the election campaign. Newstead Zimba
and others both from ZCTU leadership and the leadership of the national unions remained in their union positions although campaigning full time as MMD candidates. During the election campaign, the functions of trade unionists and party candidates overlapped, but the trade union leadership unanimously emphasised that this was a temporary agreement. After Zambia had returned to multipartyism and a new government was in place, the unions would return to their role as autonomous interest groups working mainly for the economic interests of their members. If MMD were to become the new government, the trade union movement would be supportive to the extent that their policies were seen as “progressive”.

The term progressive was in this respect never clearly defined, but it was expected that MMD would revoke the Industrial Relations Act implemented in 1990, and create employment opportunities. These views were expressed by all the labour representatives interviewed.

The main issue of the conflict in the struggle for independence revolved around the subordination of the labour movement to the party (UNIP). On the one hand, militant unionists advocated political action and acceptance of the trade union movement as the political wing of the party. On the other hand, AMWU and the railway-workers union, the two strongest unions, rejected this principle and although they re-affiliated within the reconstituted United Trade Union Congress in 1964 they remained essentially aloof from the rest (Gertzel 1979: 320). This conflict was absent in the 1990s as there were no forces in the union movement who argued for subordination or indeed close affiliation, to any party in the “Third Republic”. On the contrary, it was always emphasised that the trade unions supported MMD but saw themselves as an autonomous force which in the post-election period would decide which party to support. In speeches and in interviews, the trade union leadership emphasised the pluralist orientation and functions of the trade union movement and they strongly denied the claims of the trade union movement turning into a political party. Considering the role of the mine-workers’ union, it was largely negative toward the political involvement in the 1960s. In the 1990s however, the mine-workers union supported the political initiative of ZCTU to spearhead the return to multiparty politics, and the miners also gave their support to MMD.

The repeated stress on trade union autonomy and on the temporary nature of the affiliation to MMD in 1991, must be seen in relation to the historical record. Despite its pluralist origins, there were strong elements within the trade union leadership who did not foresee the political role of the trade union movement to be temporary. Rather, the politically oriented leadership
of the union movement envisioned a close alliance between labour and the party in the independence period.

Table 2
Strikes 1964 to 1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>No. of strikes</th>
<th>No. of workers involved</th>
<th>No. of striker days recorded</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>31,000</td>
<td>22,493</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>10,149</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>307,167</td>
<td>579,406</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>24,006</td>
<td>46,088</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>30,770</td>
<td>65,898</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>17,040</td>
<td>21,069</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>32,251</td>
<td>122,951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>14,986</td>
<td>18,894</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>10,453</td>
<td>20,874</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>6,951</td>
<td>5,663</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>7,380</td>
<td>38,650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>17,039</td>
<td>51,007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>5,619</td>
<td>6,527</td>
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<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>10,717</td>
<td>19,585</td>
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<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>43,051</td>
<td>301,562</td>
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<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>35,200</td>
<td>42,916</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>28,007</td>
<td>880,191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>76,783</td>
<td>555,998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>3,896</td>
<td>6,715</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>9,217</td>
<td>8,170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>23,215</td>
<td>95,062</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985 (Aug.)</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>28,834</td>
<td>62,885</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>Na</td>
<td>Na</td>
<td>Na</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>Na</td>
<td>Na</td>
<td>Na</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>9,794</td>
<td>38,939</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>19,963</td>
<td>32,173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>51,606</td>
<td>219,375</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


4.1 Industrial relations in the First Republic: Corporatism from above?

According to Bates, the Zambian government’s labour policy in the immediate post-colonial period was characterised by two main elements. Firstly, a distinctive development policy and secondly a policy of social justice (Bates 1971: 35). In order to implement its policy of rapid development and social justice, defined as redistribution of the national wealth, the UNIP government found it imperative that the labour unions be transformed from units of consumption, emphasising the interest of members to units of production, in which labour was considered to be a partner to the government in its struggle for rapid economic development benefitting the nation as a whole. In other words, the new national leadership envisioned the labour unions as allies in the attainment of national development and redistribution of benefits (Bates 1971: 2).

To reach the desired goals and to communicate their policy aims to the workers, UNIP created the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions through the Trade Unions and Trade Disputes Act of 1964. In the first period, ZCTU was thus a government agency, expressing the views of UNIP through the trade union channels to the workers. In this sense, Zambia’s post-colonial industrial relations policies followed a general pattern of developing nations. However, the goals of incorporating the unions in Zambia were attempted through pressure rather than force. Contrary to a number of other developing countries, and particularly African post-colonial regimes, coercion was largely absent in the First Republic of Zambia and industrial relations were still to a large extent based on the principle of voluntarism (Bates 1971, Gertzel 1975, Liatto 1989 and Kalula 1988). At this point, the politically oriented trade unionists saw the incorporation of the unions to the party structure as positive and they shared the government’s labour policy. It was conceived that trade unions would no longer function as pluralist interest groups for the interest of the members, but rather as associations of production, sharing the goals of the party (UNIP) for national economic development.

However, considering the responses of the national unions and rank and file to UNIP’s policies, the results were dismal. Most researchers have pointed to the fact that ZCTU in this period lacked legitimacy understood as the ability to implement policies which may cause temporary negative results for some groups, but which are expected to bring positive outcomes in the future. The continued unwillingness of the largest unions to delegate authority and to contribute funding to ZCTU may be regarded as one
example of the workers' lack of faith in the new organisation. Furthermore, the large number of strikes despite the continued calls for industrial peace from ZCTU, is a further indication of the limited legitimacy of the labour congress. The lack of legitimacy is underscored by the fact that formally, through the Trade Union and Trade Disputes Act of 1964, the unions were required to have the consent of ZCTU before calling a strike. Most analyses and my own interviews with labour leaders have indicated that the main reason for ZCTU's limited legitimacy and ability to impose its policy related to the fact that the Congress was regarded as an agency of the government and not a genuine representative of the labour movement.

Using statistics on industrial unrest, productivity and wage issues as indicators of the success of UNIP's developmental policies in the first period of independence, the conclusion presents itself that UNIP's policy of transforming the trade union movement and turning it into a productionist unit failed in this first period. Table 2 indicates that the number of industrial strikes increased in the first period after independence despite the stated objectives of the UNIP government and ZCTU to increase production through industrial harmony. The interests of the members continued to occupy the unions more than the national political objectives of the UNIP government. Although a large number of the workers, especially in the mines, supported UNIP and even were members of the party, they strongly objected to union candidates that had been "picked" by UNIP, as shown by Bates' analysis of the 1965 mine workers election (Bates 1971). These issues are all signs of a distinctive unwillingness on behalf of the unions to be subordinated to party control.

In conclusion, the industrial relations policies of UNIP and ZCTU failed to reach the desired goals, namely to convince the trade union movement of the necessity of industrial peace and the need to adhere to the interests of the nation rather than those of the unionised workers. UNIP failed to convince the workers of the values of their policy and lacked the strength to implement the policies because urban organised groups found their immediate interests to be threatened.

How do these observations relate to the overall question raised initially; did the trade union movement transform from a pluralist to a corporatist association during the first period of independence? If the analysis is limited to the role of the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions, the answer to the question should be positive. The former trade union congresses were suspended and ZCTU was created in their place as a government agency. The creation of ZCTU as a channel for the government's policy to the working people fits the model of state-corporatism discussed in chapter two (2.7). According to Stephan's distinction between the political and civil
society, it can be argued that the central body of the trade union movement was closer to political society or the state than to civil society. ZCTU was ideologically tied to UNIP and the executive leadership of the Congress supported UNIP’s policy line to subordinate the unions to the party. In this period, ZCTU repeated the decision to support the “most progressive party” of 1961 and became affiliated to UNIP.

However, the review of the relationship between ZCTU and the member unions has indicated that ZCTU cannot be understood as a reflection of the union movement as a whole during the period in question. Studies conducted of the mine- and railway workers’ unions indicate that the stronger unions fought against the attempts to incorporate the unions into the party and defended their autonomous position. The continued emphasis on collective bargaining procedures and the use of the strike weapon further indicate that the unions continued to regard the interest of their members as the main objective of trade union action.

In order to determine whether the concept of state corporatism, or cooptation from above, captures industrial relations in Zambia during the first years of independence, it is necessary to distinguish between the intentions of UNIP, the strategies applied to reach the desired goals and the outcome or results. There is no doubt that UNIP sought to incorporate the trade union movement and transform it from being an association working in defence of consumer interests of its membership to units of production in line with the overall development objectives of the new government. However, regarding the strategies applied, I would hesitate to characterise the policies of UNIP during this first period as state-corporatist. State-corporatism as defined in chapter two refers to a strong state applying coercive powers as well as incentive schemes in order to bring trade unions and other associations of civil society under government control. Yet, contrary to many other post-colonial regimes, the industrial relations policies of UNIP were not characterised by force and coercion during this period. Rather, the new national elites sought to incorporate and transform the trade union movement through incentive structures and voluntary mechanisms. The creation of ZCTU is here an excellent example. The aim was to transform the trade union movement through its own people, who were politically oriented and in line with UNIP policies.

One of the main reasons why the UNIP government failed to reach its goals during the First Republic was that the major unions had acquired organisational strength and an autonomous position prior to independence. The trade unions maintained to a large extent their organisational autonomy in the first period of independence, while remaining faithful to pluralist principles of adhering to the economic and social interests of their
members, despite the attempts to transform the trade unions into developmental units of the party. The uncompromising attitudes of the branch-level officers and rank and file toward the union leadership’s closeness to the political leadership, is probably one of the main reasons for the continued pluralist orientation. The remarks by one observer on Zambian industrial relations in the First Republic is here exemplary:

The labour movement’s continued preoccupation with its members’ interests, may therefore be considered as the clearest response by unions to the governments strategy of incorporation (Kalula 1988: 242-243).

To conclude the discussion, the trade union movement functioned as an autonomous interest group in the processes of political reform in 1990-1991. This corresponds to the nature of the first trade union movement which developed in Zambia in the 1940s and 1950s. However, during the struggle for national independence a new trade union leadership emerged who argued that in order to build a nation-state, trade unions should be subordinated to the nationalist party. This policy created conflicts within the trade union movement and weakened it as an independent force. However, the transformation of industrial relations from conflict to harmony as envisioned by the new national leadership did not succeed mainly because the stronger national unions opposed the policies. While it can be argued that the relationship between ZCTU and UNIP at this point resembled state corporatist arrangements because the Congress was so closely tied to UNIP, it cannot be concluded that the trade union movement as a whole was incorporated into the state. ZCTU’s lack of legitimacy vis à vis the national unions and the continued strikes are indications of the continued autonomy of the unions.

The specific nature and causes of industrial action varied a great deal during the first ten years of independence, but the underlying cause was the existence of serious labour grievances and expectations after independence combined with the growing power of wage labour in urban areas (Kalula 1988: 159). A number of scholars have pointed to the fact that workers’ expectations toward higher wages and better working conditions were raised by the introduction of self-government. The expectations were particularly strong in the mining industry which had protected European workers with a policy of “colour bar” in the colonial period. Alarmed by the failure of its labour programme, the government requested the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to conduct a study of wages, productivity and economic development in post-colonial Zambia. The UNDP employed H. A. Turner, a professor of industrial relations at
Cambridge University, to conduct the report. Turner's report was truly distressing. According to the report, less than a quarter of the increase in the GDP which had taken place since independence in Zambia was due to increase in production: more than half was the result of the increase in copper prices. Turner found that average productivity had decreased by 12 per cent since independence, despite vast increases in capital investments. Additionally, industrial discipline had broken down and wages had risen. In the assessment of Bates, the overall conclusion of the report was that the workers had failed to contribute their share to Zambia's development effort (Bates 1971: 218).

By 1970, the UNIP government had come to realise that its attempts to incorporate the trade union movement through voluntary measures had largely failed. Two radical departures in the policies of the government were then implemented which profoundly altered industrial relations and the relationship between the unions and UNIP; the introduction of the Industrial Relations Act of 1971 and the declaration of the "One-Party Participatory Democracy" in 1973. The motives of UNIP and the reactions from the labour movement to the combined impact of these legislative changes will be assessed in next chapter.
Chapter 5: Incorporation of the trade union movement through legislation: The Industrial Relations Act 1971 and the One-Party Constitution

The Industrial Relations Act of 1971 (IR 1975) was enacted as a means to achieve the goals of the UNIP government in terms of labour relations. The Act was seen as a radical departure in the industrial relations policies as it sought to introduce workers’ participation as a solution to industrial unrest and bring industry more in line with humanist principles. The new act went into effect in 1974 and introduced three new institutions, Works Councils, an Industrial Relations Court and Party Committees at the workplace as the institutional bases for workers’ participation (Fincham and Zulu 1979: 218-220).

In many respects, the 1971 Act did away with the principle of voluntarism that previously had guided Zambian industrial relations. The new act put in legislative form the policy goal of UNIP of “one union one industry”. Under the new legislation, a union could only represent workers who were not already represented by other unions. Through the Act, trade unions were further required to be affiliated to ZCTU to be able to represent workers (IR 1971, section 15). The Act also created a prominent position for ZCTU and determined that ZCTU would be the central regulatory agency for trade union affairs in Zambia. The Act empowered ZCTU to examine the validity of the changes in the constitution of the affiliated unions (IR 1971, section 28). According to the new Act, the unions were required to consult with the leaders of ZCTU before declaring a dispute with the employers or going on strike.

The type of activities trade unions were to engage in were further specified. Among other things, the new Industrial Relations Act specifically

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required all unions to state in their constitutions that worker’s education was a main purpose of trade unionism to which trade union funds would be spent. The Industrial Relations Act of 1971 also greatly extended the powers of the Labour Commissioner. The Commissioner was granted extensive powers in supervising trade union activities, such as being entitled to cancel the registration certificate of a union if a trade union “had ceased to exist or has ceased truly and effectively to represent the interest of its members” (Industrial Relations Act 1971: 16). Through the new Industrial Relations Act, the Labour Commissioner was furthermore empowered to appoint an accountant for the national unions and the Congress.

The works councils which were introduced through the Industrial Relations Act of 1971 were established to reduce the rate of exploitation of workers and give them a sense of participation. This was the official intention expressed by President Kaunda when he endorsed the idea in August 1969. As such, the introduction of works councils could be interpreted as an attempt by the government to overcome the communication gap experienced in industrial relations in the First Republic by bypassing the unions. Through the introduction of works councils, UNIP intended to incorporate workers directly from the shop floor up rather than trying to reach workers through the labour unions, and particularly ZCTU.

The works councils were introduced to industries employing 100 people or more as an avenue for introducing democracy to Zambian private and state-owned industry. The functions of the councils were, among other things, to present information from the management on financial control to the workers and on the appointment of senior officers in the industry; secondly, works councils were entitled to be consulted on all matters relating to the health and welfare of workers; and thirdly, the management was required to receive approval from the works councils on policy decisions pertaining to personnel management and industrial relations such as recruitment of personnel, disciplinary actions and redundancies. The Act in itself was silent on the relationship between the works councils and the trade unions. Judging from the stated objectives of the Department of Industrial Participatory Democracy (DIPD), which was to establish and monitor the development of the works councils, it can be argued that the UNIP officials at DIPD foresaw a future without trade unions (Fincham 1980, Machungwa 1989).

Arguably the most significant change in industrial relations related to the regulatory powers of the government enshrined in the new Industrial Relations Act. With the new Act conciliation procedures became mandatory and procedures for dispute settlements laid down in law (Gertzel 1979: 324). If conciliation between employers and workers with the assistance of the Labour Commissioner were unsuccessful, the parties were required to bring the case to the Industrial Relations Court where a final decision was made. The Court was given power to resolve industrial disputes and no collective agreement could, according to the law, be acted upon until it had been approved by the Court. The arbitration procedure effectively made strikes illegal as workers could not go on strike until the lengthy procedure was exhausted. The right to strike was further restricted by the fact that a number of professions became classified as “necessary services” implying that the workers in certain industries could not strike due to reasons of national security. However, the Industrial Relations Act of 1971 did not define necessary services, and subsequently a service became necessary when so declared by the President under the Preservation of Public Security Act (IR Act 1971: 16). The cumbersome mechanisms and the provisions of “necessary services” made one observer claim that striking in Zambia was legal from a “de jure” point of view but “de facto” illegal.3

The third mechanism introduced at the place of work, the party committees, was clearly designed to neutralise the power of organised labour. The aim of the party committees was to mobilise workers as party members, instill in them the spirit of patriotism, create awareness of national economic interests and guard against economic sabotage (Liatto 1989: 121). The party committees were also intended to bring to workers a sense of discipline to improve productivity. The result of all this was that the industrial relations scene in Zambia at the beginning of the Second Republic became crammed with trade unions, party committees and work councils at the workplace. Although in theory they were allocated different tasks, in practice the boundaries became fluid, which in many instances lead to conflicts.

The strong emphasis on education and the educational responsibilities of trade unions under the new Industrial Relations Act can be regarded as an attempt of the UNIP government to reach beyond the union leadership. UNIP acknowledged that the failure of its former labour policies to a large degree related to its inability to induce the rank and file workers and branch-level unionists to support its developmental policies. As a result,

many of the new educational schemes aimed at the branch-level officers. Through the President's Citizenship College, workers were being schooled in the government's labour policy and the implications of industrial militancy for the national economy (Bates 1971). The stress on education was in part an attempt to instill in the workers and unions a broader perspective on the role of labour in the nation. In this respect, the Industrial Relations Act of 1971 was a culmination of a long process of search for appropriate industrial relation policies.

According to some observers, the introduction of the 1971 Industrial Relations Act represented a watershed in the development of the government's labour policies, as it represented an attempt to shift from the former voluntary model to the active incorporation of the labour unions. According to Fincham et al., the new labour law provided for a complete intervention by the state in industrial relations (Fincham and Zulu 1979: 217). Others have described the Act as the most comprehensive and radical industrial relations act in Africa (Damachi 1979). Gertzel, however, finds the 1971 Act to be less radical than claimed and rather a consolidation of the former industrial relations policies initially formulated by the colonial powers (Gertzel 1979: 323).

Regarding the Industrial Relations Act of 1971 as a whole, it is evident that it strengthened the powers of the government and party in industrial relations. The regulation of strikes and the introduction of the Industrial Relations Court and the necessary services are the most important elements. The introduction of the party committees and works councils as well as the increasing powers of the Labour Commissioner all point in one direction.

Yet, despite the clear elements of control present in the new legislation, a number of scholars have argued that the Act was introduced with "good intentions" as UNIP still aimed at building a strong trade union movement. Examples often pointed to in this respect are the mandatory affiliation to ZCTU and the policy of "one industry one union" both measures intended to create a unified trade union structure. The automatic check-off facilities also greatly strengthened the financial and organisational situation of the national unions and ZCTU (Kalula 1988, Liatto 1989, Simutanyi 1990). While this may be correct, it is nevertheless obvious that UNIP sought to control the trade union movement. In other words, the intention was not to support a strong and autonomous trade union movement.

Considering the question of whether the new Industrial Relations Act was a radical departure from former legislation or just a consolidation of previously stated objectives, it is clear that in some instances the new act reinforced previous tendencies. The policy of declaring some services essential and thus exempt from the right to strike is one example. However,
I find that whereas there are some consistencies in the political aims of the UNIP government and thus similarities in the 1964 and the 1971 Acts, the introduction of works councils and an industrial relations court meant great changes to industrial relations in Zambia. The principle of voluntarism, although seriously under threat in the first independence period as well, was now completely done away with. Because the new Industrial Relations Act was introduced and carried out simultaneously with the work of changing the constitution of Zambia from a multiparty system of government to a one-party state, it must be concluded that voluntarism and the principle of pluralism was replaced by a system where the party became supreme over government, the national assembly and all civil society associations.

Reactions from the labour unions to the Industrial Relations Act

Considering that ZCTU at this time was lead by a politically oriented leadership and UNIP supporters, it is not surprising that the ZCTU leadership only to a limited degree reacted to the new Industrial Relations Act. However, while the lack of opposition must be related to the political orientation of the leadership, it is also evident that the Industrial Relations Act strengthened the trade union movement in a number of ways. Partly due to the conflicts arising over the political orientation of the trade union movement during the 1960s, the trade union movement was seriously weakened and fragmented by the time of independence. The mandatory affiliation to one central congress and the enforcement of the policy of one industry-one union granted the unions organisational monopoly which contributed to the unification of the union movement as a whole. The Act also strengthened the financial position of the central Congress as the automatic check-off procedures increased the subscription fee to ZCTU from 20 to 30 per cent of the national unions' subscriptions.

Some scholars have argued that the national unions indicated an acceptance of the political regulation of trade unionism in general and of the new system of industrial relations in particular (Gupta 1974, Kalula 1988). They point to the fact that even though affiliation to ZCTU remained voluntary until 1974 (when the 1971 Act was implemented), none of the unions refused affiliation or opted for withdrawal of affiliation. However, this point should not be overestimated, considering the strong incentives tied to ZCTU affiliation even prior to the new Act in terms of financial security. Secondly, as the previous discussion has indicated, the government also applied various mechanisms of intimidation and cooptation to secure union cooperation. However, the lack of reactions to the measures of incorporation should mainly be charged to the weak position of the trade
unions at the time. Nevertheless, according to Kalula, the willingness of the national unions’ to cooperate with ZCTU after the 1971 Act was amended is particularly evident in the field of education (Kalula 1988: 135), a point which was seconded by some of the national union leaders in personal communications.

The introduction of the works councils, was met with scepticism from the trade union leadership. The main reason for the scepticism was that the works councils were given responsibilities which trade unions had felt belonged to their domain. Works councils were regarded as means of weakening the trade union movement. As a result of confusion regarding the role of the works councils, both employers and workers associations initially opposed the introduction of works councils which delayed the implementation of the Industrial Relations Act until 1974 (Liatto 1989: 120). The first works council was, however, only established in 1976 (Machungwa 1989). During my interviews with industrial relations officers from UNIP and union leaders, it was clear that the functions of the work councils and unions overlapped and there was a considerable amount of confusion as to the role of the two. According to the General Secretary of ZCTU, Mr. Zimba, ZCTU at the time was hostile toward the introduction of works councils because they were seen as an attempt of the government to alienate the rank and file from the labour leadership. Fincham has, however, argued that considering the rank and file of the time, they were initially enthusiastic to the introduction of works councils because they saw them as a possible better channel for articulating personal and collective grievances than the unions (Fincham 1980). Nevertheless, later studies of the performance of the works councils, according to their stated objectives, have concluded that the works councils to a large extent failed due to the low level of education of councillors, short term of office, lack of formal powers designated to the councils and the overlap of duties between the unions and the works councils (Machungwa 1989: 34-40).

To some extent the unions accepted the regulatory mechanisms imposed by the government. This must be understood in light of the close connection between the political leadership and the leadership of labour unions at the time, particularly ZCTU. However, a number of the people interviewed were also of the opinion that the 1971 Industrial Relations Act

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4 Personal communication, Mr. Alec Chirwa, assistant General Secretary of ZCTU, Lusaka: September 16 1991.

5 Personal communication, Mr. Newstead Zimba, General Secretary of ZCTU, Kitwe: September 18, 1991.
was very progressive and constructive to the labour movement as a whole. Despite the fact that the Industrial Relations Act increased the powers of UNIP and marked an end to the independence of the trade unions, the Act also strengthened the national unions and the labour movement as a whole. The new Act granted the trade unions an organisational monopoly which facilitated trade union operations considerably and imposed a sense of unity to the trade unions. Furthermore, the introduction of the automatic check-off facilities, which meant that if 60 per cent of the workers in a given enterprise were union members the employer would automatically deduct union funds from all employees in the enterprise, also strengthened the financial situation of the unions. Through this mechanism, the unions were secured finances without having to be very well organised or effective, and without having to spend time collecting the dues. This policy did away with one of the greatest problems of the Zambian trade union movement since before independence, the financial situation. However, this point can also be given a less benign interpretation, as this collection procedure also greatly reduced the ability of rank and file to control the leadership of the union movement through withdrawal of funds.

5.1 The “One-Party Participatory Democracy”

As mentioned above, the regulatory aims of the UNIP government expressed through the introduction of the Industrial Relations Act should be seen in connection with the introduction of the One-Party State. The constitutional changes in 1973 must also be understood against the background of the threat posed by the newly formed United Progressive Party (UPP) as a potential alternative party of the urban classes in the Copperbelt.

By the time of independence, UNIP was overwhelmingly dominant both in terms of parliamentary control and density of participation throughout the country. However, due to factional conflicts within UNIP in the latter part of the 1960s, a new party emerged, named the United People’s Party (UPP). Although UPP only gained a small segment of the votes from UNIP and as a result was soundly defeated in the 1971 by-elections, UPP was regarded as a critical threat to UNIP due to its position in the

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6 Personal communications with Mr. V. Banda, Deputy Chairman of the Communication Workers Union, Ndola, September 19, 1991.

7 For a good description of the intra-party conflicts and the creation of UPP, see Burdette 1988.
Copperbelt. UPP won one seat in the 1971 elections, in Mufilira in the Copperbelt. Shortly after the party was banned and its leadership detained. The critical issue was that the populist appeal of UPP provided an alternative leadership to an urban labour force whose grievances were essentially economic (Gertzel 1979: 332). Soon after the banning of UPP, President Kaunda and UNIP established a commission to prepare the grounds for a one-party state and a new constitution outlawing all other parties. Faced with an opposition party with a potential appeal to the urban work force, UNIP and President Kaunda departed from the former stand of introducing one-party politics through voluntary mechanisms. The one-party state in Zambia was instituted in spite of considerable resistance from the well entrenched and growing opposition parties. Contrary to many other African countries which introduced “de jure” one-party states in the absence of any organised party opposition, in Zambia an opposition existed but was banned in 1973.

How did these radical changes effect the trade union movement as a whole? To what extent did the trade union movement react or show any signs of opposition to the new policies?

Apart from the UPP seat gained by Kapwepwe, the election results indicate that labour only to a marginal degree identified with UPP at the time as their loyalty to UNIP and the government remained strong (Gertzel 1979: 332). Yet, as the unions repeatedly reaffirmed their loyalties to UNIP, a number of mine workers who had joined the short-lived UPP were detained for activity in UPP. It is evident that there were elements of force involved despite the generally strong support for UNIP. On the whole, there are few indications of the labour movement attempting to break its alliance with UNIP and shift party of support during this period. It should be pointed out that it is very difficult in retrospect to determine the reactions from the labour movement. On the one hand, archival research and studies of the newspapers at the time of introducing the one-party state give no indication of the trade union movement opposing the one-party state. On the contrary, most of the major unions sent letters of congratulations to Freedom House (UNIP’s head quarters) on the day of announcing the “One-Party Participatory Democracy of Zambia” (Times of Zambia December 15, 1972). However, these official stands cannot be taken as a direct approval, they must be related to the political climate of the time. Personal communications in 1991 provide an equally ambivalent picture of the judgement of the trade union leadership in 1972. In 1991, coloured by the process of political reform, or the “ideological time of 1991”, most trade union leaders stated that they had been against the introduction of the one-party state in 1972. Nevertheless, the archives of ZCTU offered no
support for this statement. This leads me to believe that the statement of the General Secretary of one of the larger unions is a valid description:

There was no real opposition (to the one party state) from labour, as we were not effectively organised. We were sceptical, but yet our opposition was minimal.⁸

Concerning the mine workers’ union, the strongest union, the documentation available did not indicate any official criticism of the decision to introduce a one-party system of government. However, there is one issue on which the trade unions opposed the one-party constitution relating to the position of the trade union movement vis à vis the party. The Chona Commission, appointed by Kaunda to make recommendations to the establishment of the one-party state, initially envisioned the trade union movement to become part of UNIP as a “mass organisation”, similar to the youth and women’s organisation. To this recommendation, the labour movement leadership and branch level officers objected strongly. The objections from the labour unions were included in the report presented to the government and parliament.⁹ Here the matter was partially solved as UNIP accepted that the trade union leadership attended National Council Meetings of UNIP without this affecting the autonomy of the unions.¹⁰

According to Newstead Zimba:

There was never a policy stand by the trade unions to subordinate to UNIP. The only policy was to support the most progressive party. Independence did in other words not bridge the union movement with the party. The new one party constitution was designed to take over the trade unions as a political wing of the party, like in the Eastern block. To this we objected strongly, and we were asked to draft how we would like our position as trade unions to appear in the new constitution. We were in other words given a chance to write out the wording we preferred. And regarding the role of the trade unions, we made two additions a) there shall be a ZCTU representing the trade unions in the country and b) each national union shall affiliate to ZCTU. This was accepted at the last minute, but from 1972 the role of the trade unions became to maintain its

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⁸ Personal Communication, Mr. J. C. Moonde, Deputy General Secretary Civil Servants Union of Zambia, September 30, 1991.
autonomous status and to take a critical stand at the decisions that interfered with the interests of the workers.\textsuperscript{11}

The statement above indicates that while all voluntary associations were regarded as mass associations according to the 1973 Constitution, the trade union leadership interpreted the law to exclude trade unions and to treat them separately as affiliated associations.\textsuperscript{12} The preceding discussion will show that the issue of the status of the trade union movement vis à vis UNIP was only partially solved at this point, as UNIP later at numerous occasions has sought to bring the trade unions under party-control as a mass-organisation under the leadership of UNIP. However, the issue of concern here is that the trade unions at this point succeeded in preserving some degree of organisational autonomy. This indicates that despite the trade union movement being controlled by a politically motivated trade union leadership, the trade unionists indicated a preference for maintaining their independence. It should be noted that the Chona-Commission report was based on interviews with trade unionists at different levels of the organisational hierarchy.

5.2 Industrial relations in the Second Republic: Incorporation or autonomy?

By 1974, two major political developments had greatly altered the conditions of industrial relations in Zambia. The new Industrial Relations Act of 1971, which came into force in 1974, limited the independence of the trade union movement in a number of ways. Affiliation to ZCTU became mandatory and the powers of the central body were increased. The new legislation made strike action de facto illegal and as such the new act represented an attempt on behalf of the government to regulate and control the trade union movement. During the same period, the pluralist multiparty constitution of the first Zambian republic was exchanged for a system of one-party government. In order to hold trade union office or vote in an election, it was necessary to be member of UNIP. The party also became the supreme organ of government and the trade unions had thus to abide by

\textsuperscript{11} Personal communication, Mr. Newstead Zimba, General Secretary ZCTU, Kitwe: September 18, 1991.

the party constitution. Even though the trade unions kept its organisational autonomy, the unions were still bound by the party-constitution. Consequently, the role of the trade unions was drastically changed during this period. To what extent can the Zambian Second Republic be characterised as a state-corporatist system?

Going back to the definitions of corporatism presented in chapter two, emphasising the organisation of interest groups in singularly, compulsory, non-competitive hierarchically ordered structures, doubtless the mandatory affiliation to ZCTU places Zambia in a corporatist framework. The trade unions were granted monopoly of representation in exchange for certain restrictions on the articulation of demands and the right to strike. As the policy regulations were introduced through the 1971 Act, the incorporation should be characterised as state-corporatism. The Industrial Relations Act of 1971 represents a continuation of the former policy aims of UNIP, but the strategy has changed toward increasingly stronger emphasis on incorporation and control.

To what extent did the UNIP government succeed in its attempts to coopt and thus control the trade union movement during this period? It is evident that the autonomy of the trade union movement was greatly reduced and that UNIP met some of its industrial relations targets in this period. However, although the strike activity declined in this period, illegal, or wildcat strikes, continued to effect industrial relations. Furthermore, the works councils which were introduced as a mechanism for reaching the workers directly and thus bypassing the trade unions, failed largely to meet the intended objectives. Lack of workers’ discipline and limited trust in the new institutions may of course be a sign of weakness of the trade union leadership as well as opposition to the UNIP aims of incorporating the union movement as a whole. Nevertheless, these factors suggest that the trade union movement despite restrictions and attempts of incorporation to a certain extent still acted in an autonomous manner.

The clearest sign of the unions’ continued defence of their autonomy is found in the reactions to the proposals to the One-Party Constitution. The trade union movement did not oppose the One-Party Constitution as a whole and the UNIP support was still strong. However, the trade unionists at various levels in the organisational hierarchy refused to accept the incorporation of the union movement into the party structures as a mass-movement of the party. Whereas the Constitution depicted civil society associations as mass-organisations of the party, an exemption was included for industrial associations which instead were characterised as “affiliates” of the party.
Nevertheless, the strategies of incorporation brought the unions under closer control of ZCTU and the government during this period. The financial control granted the union leadership is an important issue. In terms of the civil society “matrix” presented in chapter two, it is evident that ZCTU fits the category of “state-controlled associations”. However, while the trade union movement as a whole clearly is brought closer to this position, it cannot be held that ZCTU (and UNIP) fully controlled the trade unions at this point.

Despite the strong elements of control imposed on the trade union movement through the legislative changes, it must be concluded that the trade unions maintained some degree of organisational independence. While the introduction of the One-Party Constitution and the Industrial Relations Act of 1971 brings Zambian labour relations close to a state-corporative system, the significance of the continued organisational autonomy of the trade unions is demonstrated in the conflicts arising between the trade union movement and UNIP in 1980 over the issue of introducing of a new Local Government Act.

My personal communications with labour leaders and UNIP officials indicate that until 1981 the UNIP-regime succeeded reasonably well in utilising ZCTU as a channel for communication of its policies to the unions, at least in the sense that the Congress advocated UNIP’s policy goals. However, at the beginning of the 1980s, the respondents all point to a change in the relationship between ZCTU and UNIP. From having been a government agency and communicating the policies of UNIP, ZCTU increasingly became the focus of resistance to the government policies. The sources consulted in the discussion above also seem to arrive at the conclusion that from about 1981, the relationship between ZCTU and UNIP became one of manifest conflict. What can explain the change in the relationship, and what are the main causes of change?
Chapter 6:
Signs of change:
Assessing the conflicts between UNIP and ZCTU in the Second Republic

The discussion in the previous chapter focused on the legislative changes in Zambia in the 1970s with the introduction of the One-Party State and the new Industrial Relations Act. The increasing regulatory powers of UNIP over the labour unions as a result of these changes were emphasised. However, the legislative changes also strengthened the trade union movement. The automatic check-off facilities reduced the financial problems that had troubled the trade unions since before independence. The policy of one-industry-one-union also imposed as sense of unity on the labour movement which further strengthened the organisation. The financial and organisational strengthening of the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions therefore placed ZCTU in a stronger bargaining position vis à vis the authorities. Due to the strength of the Congress, various forces sought to control it. Consequently, the struggle for the control of ZCTU between UNIP and independent trade unionists became a major issue conflict in the late 1970s. However, from 1980 the relationship between UNIP and ZCTU changed character from one of cooperation and harmony to one of contention. The main issues of conflict between ZCTU and UNIP, based on the assessments of labour leaders and UNIP officials, will be considered in this section.

By an analysis of the issues of conflicts the aim is to assess whether the resulting controversies can shed light on the nature of the trade union movement and thus its ideological position vis à vis UNIP. As the discussion of the 1991 election campaign indicated (ch. 3), the campaign was centred around personalities rather than issues. Both MMD (and the trade unions) and UNIP advocated free market politics at this point and few ideological differences could be distinguished. By assessing the conflicts of the 1980s it may therefore be possible to trace a line in the policies of ZCTU and the trade union movement which may give an answer to the question of why the trade union movement broke the alliance with UNIP.
During my interviews with labour leaders and UNIP officials the question was asked: "What have been the main areas of conflict between UNIP and ZCTU/the trade union movement in the Second Republic?". Based on the responses, four issues were distinguished because they were mentioned by a majority of the respondents.\(^1\) This information was further checked by going through the newspapers of the time. Before turning to an analysis of the issues of conflict, an assessment of the changes in the relationship between UNIP and ZCTU emerging in the latter 1970s is in order.

### 6.1 Signs of change (1974-1980)

The second election to the ZCTU executive leadership positions was conducted in 1971. Among the new leadership, there were still strong UNIP supporters such as Kabwe, Mulimba and Mwila. However, for the first time the Congress also elected someone who had been restricted by the government for strikes in his national union, namely Newstead Zimba from the teachers' union (ZNUT). When Zimba declared officially that ZCTU would fight for the right to strike it indicated a distinctive turn from previous statements of the ZCTU executives on the issue of strike (Zambia Daily Mail April 27, 1972). The ZCTU leaders had in previous years supported UNIP and regarded strikes as disruptive to national economic development. Three years later, in 1974, Frederick Chiluba was elected President of ZCTU. This election gave rise to a heated debate as he defeated a UNIP supporter from the mine-workers union, Mr. D. Mwila. Mwila's defeat angered both the MUZ as well as the politically oriented trade unionists and the UNIP leadership. MUZ was angered as they felt that their large subscription to ZCTU should be recognised by giving them the presidency (Sunday Times of Zambia December 1, 1974).

The elections of Zimba and later on Chiluba mark a beginning to the struggle for the control of leadership positions within ZCTU. With the removal of the politically oriented leaders from the Presidency of ZCTU, organised labour was slowly but definitely moving toward a new type of trade union leadership that cherished an independent labour movement which could act as an interest group and broker with respect to the balance of power. Since the mid-seventies the leadership of organised labour has shifted from the control of politically motivated pro-UNIP trade unionists into the hands of independent minded trade union leaders (Kalula 1988, Liatto 1989).

\(^1\) See appendix IV for a list of responses to this question.
A number of observers of Zambian industrial relations as well as the respondents in my personal interviews have related the changes in party labour relations to the alterations in leadership of ZCTU. Senior UNIP officials also claimed that the policy of coopting the leadership from the trade union movement into the political structures had left a gap in the trade union hierarchy. This gap was filled by a young and inexperienced generation of leaders who did not share the socialist policy aims of UNIP. The fact that Chiluba was only 30 years old when he entered the highest trade union position, illustrates this point. However, while the changes in the top leadership is of great importance to the policy-changes of the Congress, it does not offer a sufficient explanation. Two other factors are of great significance when assessing the shifting tides in the relationship between UNIP and the leading organisation of the trade union movement, ZCTU.

First of all, the deteriorating economy and its effect on industrial relations is of significance. Zambia was at the time of independence one of the most prosperous nations on the African continent, mainly because of its mineral wealth. The UNIP government assigned great importance to the copper industry and despite the stated intentions of diversifying the economy from its dependence on copper, Zambia remained reliant on copper for approximately 90 per cent of its foreign exchange earnings. The Zambian economy was greatly affected by the fall in the world market copper prices in 1974-75. In the period after 1975 the economic situation has continued to decline. The economic recession has of course affected the workers and thus the relationship between the labour unions and the UNIP regime.

The question is how the economic decline has affected the relationship. According to one observer, the economic crisis had the effect of closing the ranks between the rank and file and the leadership of the union movement and in a sense strengthened the unity of the trade union movement against the government (Liatto 1989: 220). In chapter two it was suggested that the new African elites legitimised their rule with reference to a “social contract” based on promises of economic growth and redistribution. When the recession set in, in the late 1970s, the trade union movement, frustrated with diminishing returns, turned away from UNIP. On the other hand, the economic recession can be understood as an ultimate, or causal, variable in the sense that the economic recession provided an opening on which oppositional forces could capitalise and agitate for political change. The assumption that political opposition existed prior to the economic crisis is implicitly made. Based on the two alternative interpretations suggested here, it can be argued that the significance of the economic recession must be
seen in relation to the overall relationship between the trade unions and UNIP.

In order to comprehend the shifting tides and the arising conflict between ZCTU and UNIP, a third factor must also be considered; the organisational and financial strengthening of ZCTU and the union movement as a whole due to the legislative changes. The Industrial Relations Act of 1971 contributed to the creation of a unified union structure as it prohibited splinter unions. Furthermore, it secured the financial position of the unions through the automatic check-off system. The emphasis placed on education of the workforce also increased workers’ awareness of trade unionism and their own position in the national economy. However, whereas the stress on education was intended to bring the workers to a closer understanding of UNIP’s policy aims, it is evident that education rather fostered independent thinking and thus a basis for opposition against UNIP rule. Consequently, it can be argued that the Industrial Relations Act of 1971 produced some “unintended consequences”. A number of the UNIP officials interviewed pointed to this fact and saw the legislation to have been a great mistake of UNIP.2. By strengthening ZCTU, the new industrial relations Act created a “monster” in the eyes of one UNIP official:

The party succeeded in creating a constitution which provided for unionship at all levels, and the number of unions were reduced to 19 which made it possible to group people into districts, which again became the nucleus of the ZCTU structure. This was the aim of UNIP, to create a strong and unified union movement and now, this is the base for MMD3.

In official speech, the leadership of the trade union movement was closely aligned with the UNIP government in the first years following the introduction of the One-Party State. In 1975 the new President of ZCTU, Frederick Chiluba, appealed to the government not to regard the Congress as a pressure group as the labour movement was committed both to the party and the government. However, as the workers’ mouthpiece, ZCTU had the right to criticise authorities on matters concerning workers and their interests (Times of Zambia September 29, 1975). Five years later in September 1980, Chiluba stated that the ZCTU leadership has a duty to its

2 Personal communication, Mr. Nyrienda, Assistant Labour Commissioner (Lusaka: October 7 1991) and Mr. Punabantu, political advisor to President Kaunda (Lusaka: October 4 1991).

3 Personal communication Dr. K. J. Ngwisha, Director of the UNIP Research Bureau, Freedom House Lusaka: September 12, 1991.
members to monitor progress and performance of the government machinery and to alert the people. This indicated a shift in the attitudes of the leadership of ZCTU toward perceiving its own role in society as an interest group in a pluralist sense. Nevertheless, until 1980-81, there is no indication of open conflict or diverging interests between the trade union Congress and UNIP. This changes dramatically in 1980 as the UNIP government introduced a bill to decentralise the local government structure. On behalf of the national unions, ZCTU launched a campaign against the UNIP policies. The conflicts arising over this issue had clear consequences for the relationship between ZCTU and UNIP in the period after 1981 and will therefore be examined here.

6.2 The issue of decentralisation (The Local Government Act)

Of the twenty-five interviews that I conducted a majority of the respondents (19) stated that the issue of the Local Administration Act, or the decentralisation Act, changed the nature of the relationship between the union movement and the party from a cordial to a contentious one. Most of the respondents in effect regarded this issue as the first of a series of conflictual events which eventually lead to the historical decision of the trade union movement to spearhead the reintroduction of multi-party politics in 1989.

After independence UNIP sought to implement a system of political and administrative decentralisation. Until 1981, when the Local Government Act was enacted, the structure of government consisted of two parallel and largely competing hierarchies. The new Act was envisaged to eliminate the duplication and coordination problems by incorporating the party, the local administrations and the ministers and departments into one local government hierarchy (Pausewang 1986: 14). Before this Act was introduced there were various semi-independent authorities in a district. The powers were vested in municipal councils and, as an inheritance from the colonial government, the mining townships were administered by the mining companies. Due to the strength of the mining industry, the mining companies provided better services to the employees than the services offered to the residents in the government townships. The Local Government Act of 1980 was intended to change this practice by bringing the mining townships under the District Councils.

President Kaunda indicated that the type of decentralisation he envisaged was "decentralised centralism". It implied a system where most of the party and government activities would be decentralised while the party and government machinery at the national level still retained effective control in order to ensure unity. The purpose of the Local Administration Act was therefore to establish the district as the grassroots centre of economic and political development under the control of UNIP. Furthermore, the Act incorporated the powers and responsibilities of the municipal townships, mine townships and rural councils into the District Councils.

The official rationale of the decentralisation Act was that the government at the local level should have a similar structure to the national level. Instead of having a mayor who was a government official and another person who as party leader was performing parallel functions, one party official would perform all functions. However, the Local Government Bill implied that the power of UNIP would be greatly extended as party control would penetrate the local level of politics as well. As a result, the Bill was met with strong resistance in Parliament which apparently came as a surprise to the UNIP government (Mijere 1986). Some members of Parliament claimed that the Local Administration Bill would deprive the majority of the residents of the district of their democratic right to participate in the process of decision-making as now only party members were eligible to vote in local elections. Because of the opposition in Parliament the Bill was postponed until a National Council meeting of UNIP could be conducted.

The labour movement led by the national leaders of ZCTU and the Mine-Workers Union (MUZ) started a vigorous campaign against the Local Administration Bill after it was postponed in Parliament. The position of the labour movement on the Local Administration Bill was announced at the end of a seminar on economic and political administration initiated by ZCTU. At the end of the seminar ZCTU resolved to send a petition to the Secretary General of UNIP indicating the position of the union movement. The petition raised three main issues of opposition to the proposed Local Government Bill. On political grounds, the Congress argued that citizenship rights should be above party membership. If implemented, the new system would violate the fundamental rights and any freedom of individuals granted by the Constitution. Furthermore, it was argued that restricting the

5 According to one member: "In this country we are running away from true democracy. We are thinning down the structure of elections to suit particular purposes....From 1978 to 1983 we will go down in history as a group of people who legalized the disenfranchisement of the Zambian people" (Parliamentary debates: 1980: 105).
voting rights to party membership and ".....particularly to officials alone, defeats in its entirety the widely preached concept of bringing power to the people". Trade union leaders also pointed to the fact that politics and administration played different roles in society and were of the opinion that the Party and the government branches of policy-making should be separated from their administrative and executive branches.

The second reason given for rejecting the decentralisation and integrated system was based on economic considerations. The labour leaders wrote in their petition to the Secretary General of the Party:

ZCTU seriously believes that the Zambian economy, as reflected in its revenues through their national budget which cannot even sustain the present operations, will certainly be further handicapped and incapable of managing the proposed local government administration whose costs will be heavy.

Concern with industrial development was the third basic reason why ZCTU opposed the Local Administration Bill. The Bill proposed that the District Governor and the councillors would not only be responsible for the political and social administration of the district, but would also oversee the parastatal companies. The national labour leaders envisioned that the intrusion of the party administration in commercial, semi-commercial and non-commercial institutions would cause the breakdown of industrial relations. They perceived that the move by the government and the party would eventually curtail the freedom of the labour movement from party-control:

Industrial relations at the work place is a joint effort by both management and trade unions. The intended powers of the District Councils under the Party leadership is intended to take away the responsibilities and rights of the trade unions and management.

Evaluating the petition from ZCTU, it is evident that independence of the union movement as a whole is a central theme. The political reasons given for opposing the Bill can also be understood as an implicit criticism of the one-party system as it focuses on the liberal democratic concept of separating powers. The criticisms concerning the monopolisation of power and the lack of distinction between politics and administration, or in

7 Ibid., p. 5.
8 Ibid., p. 8.
Weberian terms between the polity and the bureaucracy, can be interpreted as a general critique of the one-party system as a whole. While these conclusions should not be taken too far, it nevertheless seems clear that ZCTU in their criticisms focused on issues which also could apply more generally to the one-party system of government. The petition was sent by ZCTU to the General Secretary of UNIP after a seminar where all national unions were represented. At this point ZCTU is taking a clear stand against UNIP, from which it was created. This marks a great contrast to the first independence period, and indeed the time up until 1980. To what extent is ZCTU supported by the national unions in this stand?

The mine workers’ union (MUZ) held its Bi-annual Conference, the supreme authoritative body of the union, the day after ZCTU seminar on economic and political administration. At this conference, it was decided that the MUZ would second the petition of ZCTU. The Local Government Act intended to abolish the Mine Townships Act of 1933 through which the mining companies were authorised to provide services such as health, electricity, water and houses to the mining townships. The reaction of the miners was therefore not surprising and they saw decentralisation as a strategy of the party to penetrate the mine townships and break the union power (Mijere 1988: 252). In addition to support ZCTU’s petition, a resolution was passed at the Bi-annual Conference stating that any MUZ leader contesting for leadership in the local UNIP elections should either withdraw or resign from leadership positions in the union. Sixteen shop stewards were then dismissed from their union positions because they took part in party contests. The message from the union was clear: Miners should not mix trade unionism and party politics.9

The resolutions of the MUZ conference indicate that the mine-workers at this point acted in agreement with ZCTU. The strong reactions from UNIP to the coherent criticism from the Congress and the MUZ must be understood against the importance attached to the mining industry and the mine workers from the government. Initially, the government confronted only to a limited degree the criticism of the union movement by maintaining that there were checks and balances in the new system. The party did not give a direct reply to the issues raised by the opposition against the Local Government Bill.10 However, the UNIP leadership attacked ZCTU for commenting on the law proposal as the Congress had no cause to dispute the introduction of the new decentralised system of

10 Ibid.
local administration. Only MUZ had a good cause deriving from the possible loss of facilities enjoyed, it was argued by party officials.\(^{11}\)

President Kaunda called for an emergency National Council of the Party in October 1980 in response to the opposition generated by the issue of the Local Government Bill and the ZCTU leaders attended the meeting. In a response to the opposition in Parliament and in an attempt to bring the mine workers from opposing the Local Government Bill, the 15th UNIP National Council meeting decided to pass an amendment to the Bill which implied that the status quo of the mine townships and the miners union were guaranteed.\(^{12}\) The labour union leadership was then called upon to rescind its decision concerning decentralisation and the national assembly was ordered to convene immediately and pass the Bill without amendments. The Bill was then passed with a few amendments, the most important concerning the mining townships.\(^{13}\)

However, the partial victory of the mine workers did not radically change their attitude to the new system as both MUZ and ZCTU continued to agitate against the Act. Responding to the criticism from UNIP concerning their involvement in the conflict, the leadership of ZCTU stated that the Local Government Act was a central issue for the trade union movement as a whole and therefore a responsibility of ZCTU. Hence, the wrangle over decentralisation should not be carried out between MUZ and the party but with ZCTU. This was communicated to the government in a statement from the Executive Committee of ZCTU stating that the Congress took full responsibility for the decentralisation issue.\(^{14}\) After the Bill had become law the trade union movement upheld its opposition to the Act. The Executive Committee of ZCTU resolved that in light of the fact that the Local Government Act had become law, the ZCTU stand should be adjusted to confirm with the new law as failure to do so would be tantamount to contravening the law. However, it was emphasised that the position against the Act was still valid.\(^{15}\) The General Council made a

\(^{11}\) UNIP communicated its frustration over ZCTU’s involvement in this conflict in a consultative meeting between UNIP and ZCTU on March 21 1983. Zambia Congress of Trade Unions, Kitwe: ZCTU Secretariat Archives 1983.


\(^{13}\) Zambia Congress of Trade Unions: Report of the Secretary General to the 6th Quadrennial Congress, Kitwe: ZCTU 1982.


\(^{15}\) Ibid.

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resolution to the effect that ZCTU reaffirmed its support to UNIP, but upheld its stand against decentralisation and repeated that labour leaders would not take part in the new decentralised government.\textsuperscript{16}

The resolution was met by letters of disciplinary action from the President on January 9 1981 to 17 labour leaders, nine leaders of MUZ and eight from ZCTU. The 17 leaders were further expelled from UNIP after a Central Committee decision January 19 1981. The Central Committee indicated that it was displeased with the statement made by the union leaders that they would not take part in the running of the new local government system despite the fact that The Act was now passed by Parliament, and regarded it as anti-party activism.

The suspension of the union leaders created considerable amount of fear and anger within the union movement as suspension meant that the leaders no longer could represent workers at policy making meetings of the party (Mijere 1988: 263). This provoked strike action all over the country and industrial unrest in all sectors. To break the impasse, the branch leaders of MUZ decided to go on strike. The whole mine division at Nkana was almost brought to a standstill as 5,000 miners laid down their tools, and the strike spread to the other copper mines until 50,000 miners had joined the strike in order to force the government to clarify the position of the national officers of ZCTU and MUZ. The wild cat strikes spread to most parts of the country and created serious unrest throughout the nation. The regime of Kaunda appeared to be under strong pressure (\textit{Wall Street Journal}, October 21 1981). Due to the important role of the copper industry in the Zambian economy the country could not afford a prolonged industrial action by the miners. UNIP therefore put ZCTU under considerable pressure and allowed a General Council meeting of ZCTU in February 1981. At this meeting, most of the earlier decisions were revoked and participation in the Local Government Act was accepted.\textsuperscript{17} The leadership of the national unions urged the workers to go back to work.

By February 1981, the conflicts seemed to have reached a conclusion and in April, the UNIP government readmitted the union officials to the party. But the relations between the party and the labour movement had deteriorated and the trust eroded. As a sign of the lack of trust and cooperation, the Minister of Labour and Social Services, Mr. B. Kabwe, in


\textsuperscript{17} Zambia Congress of Trade Unions: Report of the General Secretary to the 6th Quadrennial Congress, Kitwe: ZCTU 1982: 49.
April 1981 banned the ZCTU leaders from travelling abroad. The conflicts and resulting labour unrest returned in an even more disruptive form in May 1981. Due to a deteriorating economy, the Copperbelt experienced a shortage of mealie-meal and miners went on strike again to demand equal pay for equal work with the expatriate counterparts. As a result of a series of events, one being the stoning of a minister's car by angry workers in the Copperbelt, seven union officials from the mine workers union and ZCTU were detained in July 1981 on grounds of anti-government activity. Among the detained were the President of ZCTU, Frederick Chiluba and General Secretary Newstead Zimba. The leaders were released in October-November 1981. Commenting on the state of the affairs between the unions and the governing party at this time, the Quadrennial Congress report states that:

Having gone through all this difficult period of trail, ZCTU historically and as a matter of fact and paramount importance remain an all weather ally of UNIP... We will continue to resist the ideas of party control over unions and we will remain an autonomous organisation in the interest of the workers and the country... In spite of this autonomy, ZCTU has reminded and will remain an unequivocal supporter and ally of the party UNIP where and when necessary.

The conflict arising over the issue of the Local Government Act, was the first major conflict between the trade union movement and UNIP. As the review above has indicated, the introduction of the Local Government Act served to a large extent to break the trust between the trade union movement and the party. It should be acknowledged that this conflict concerned larger issues than local government rule; it concerned the independence of the trade union movement and ultimately the UNIP power-monopoly. Furthermore, the economic problems which was aggravated by the shortage of mealie meal in the Copperbelt contributed to the heated situation. The outcome of the dispute over the Local Government Act also greatly shaped the relationship between the party and labour unions in the period to come.

The fact that the union movement, ZCTU and the mine workers in particular, acted in unison all through this conflict is one of the most significant features of the controversy. Although the Bill was amended to protect the mining communities and to maintain the status quo of the miner's union, MUZ and other trade unions continued to reject the establishment of the decentralisation system. The fundamental reason was

18 Ibid: 55.
that the opposition was being lead by ZCTU and not by a single trade union and that the issue involved more than the economic situation of the miners. How can the changes in this relationship be accounted for? Mijere concludes his research of the labour unions’ opposition to the 1980 Act by stating that they opposed the Act because they belong to a very privileged class of society, the labour union aristocracy (Mijere 1986). But as I see it, this conclusion fails to answer some fundamental questions: If the miners’ main reason for opposing the Bill was a concern for their own economic returns, why did they continue to reject the Act after the amendment to protect the status quo of the mine townships was included? And what was the objective of ZCTU’s involvement? Why was this opposition lead by ZCTU and not by MUZ? UNIP reacted very negatively to ZCTU’s involvement in the issue of the Local Government Act as it perceived the mine workers to be the only trade union body to have a direct economic interest in the issue. Due to the strength of the bargaining power of MUZ, the party and government sought to shelter the mine-workers from the alleged depravations of the new Act. This indicates that UNIP allowed intervention from the unions if their direct interests were involved. However, they did not see it as appropriate for the unions and ZCTU in particular to raise an opinion relating to the national economic situation or national politics.

I believe the basic reason for ZCTU to reject this act was that this would widen the power base of UNIP and politicise local politics which again would reduce the powers of the labour organisations. In other words, this conflict mainly concerns the autonomy of the union movement in industrial relations. In this conflict, ZCTU expressed different political and economic policy goals than the party. Possibly the most important aspect of the conflict was that it demonstrated that the supremacy of UNIP and the one-party rule could be challenged. Furthermore, the conflict unified the labour union movement. For the first time ZCTU and affiliated unions lead by MUZ took unified action in opposition to the regime. According to the Assistant Labour Commissioner:

19 This term has commonly been applied by radical critics of trade unions in developing nations, and in Africa in particular. Trade unions are here considered to be part of the governing elites or bourgeoisie and as such organised labour is not considered to contain a “revolutionary potential”. See Kraus 1976, Beckman 1988.

I tend to think that the events of 1980 really changed the nature of industrial relations in Zambia as by the actions against the Local Administration Act, the labour movement took on a role of an opposition party. The further detention of the labour leaders made it quite clear that the labour leadership was worlds apart from the government/party.\textsuperscript{21}

The fact that the opposition from the trade unions was overruled and the Act pushed through is another interesting departure from former policies. This marks a distinctive change from 1973 when the trade union movement opposed the inclusion of trade unions as part of UNIP which was accepted. Furthermore, it is interesting to note that following the events of 1980, ZCTU effectively became the main centre of opposition against UNIP. The events of 1980-1981, which climaxed with the detention of the labour leaders from ZCTU and MUZ, mark the beginning of a new development in Zambian industrial relations. According to my personal communications with union leaders, review of newspapers and secondary sources, there have been no major conflicts concerning the role of ZCTU as the policy-formulating organ of the union movement in national economic policy questions after 1980. Analysing the role of the union movement at the national political level, it therefore seems justified to regard ZCTU as an organ for the autonomous forces of the labour movement from 1980.

The relationship between ZCTU and UNIP changed significantly as a result of the conflicts arising over the decentralisation Act. Because UNIP now regarded ZCTU as an opposition force, the need to control and weaken the labour congress gathered momentum. Whereas the former legislative and educational reforms had aimed at strengthening the central body of the labour unions, attempts were now made to weaken the labour union movement as a whole. As a result of UNIP's continuous efforts in the period following 1980 to control the union movement, the main areas of conflict related to the efforts to alter the 1971 Industrial Relations Act and in particular the autonomous position of the labour movement. To what extent did UNIP succeed in its attempts to incorporate the trade unions?

\textbf{6.3 Efforts to make trade unions “mass organisations” of the party}

The first attempts by the UNIP government to alter the position of the union movement came as early as 1977-1978 when the Constitution of

\textsuperscript{21} Personal communication, Mr. Nyrienda, Assistant Labour Commissioner, Lusaka October 10 1991.
UNIP (an appendix to the national constitution) was attempted altered in order to include the trade union movement as a mass-organisation of the party. This time (1978) the trade unions managed to include a clause in the constitution which accommodated the labour movement in the party system without loosing its organisational autonomy. As a result, the UNIP constitution of 1978 article 59 (1), designated the Youth League, the Women’s league and any other organisation so designated by the Central Committee as mass organisations. The trade union movement was, however, distinguished from the mass-movements in section one and referred to under section 2 as:

...industrial workers organisations which shall be affiliated to ZCTU and they shall participate in the political and national affairs of the country.22

At this point in time UNIP appeared to have accepted that the trade unions would remain organisationally autonomous while at the same time taking part in the National Council of UNIP. This is how the labour unions have interpreted the matter and this decision has therefore been referred to when the government has attempted to alter the position of the labour unions.

The second major attempt to incorporate the trade union movement into the party structure came in 1982, following the turbulence arising from the conflict over the Local Government Act and the detention of labour leaders. “We came to realise that the labour movement was “spoon-fed” too much”, as one UNIP official put it.23 At the 18th National Council Meeting of UNIP in 1982, following increasing industrial unrest and criticism of the UNIP government, proposals to amend article 59 of the party-constitution was presented. The proposal was again to alter the current position of the trade unions and turn them into a mass organisation of UNIP in line with the women’s organisation and the Youth-League.

Due to the efforts of ZCTU the issue was postponed at the National Council meeting and referred for discussion in “appropriate organs of UNIP”.24 The General Council of ZCTU issued a statement in the form

22 The extractions from the law is found in letter to the General Secretary of the Party from ZCTU August 30 1978, Kitwe: ZCTU Secretariat Archives, 1978.
23 Personal Communication, Mr. Nyrienda, assistant labour commissioner, Lusaka, October 10, 1991.
of a General Council resolution presenting the reasons why the labour Congress opposed the proposed amendment. Here the decision to "support the most progressive party" which was made by the trade union movement in 1961 was repeated. It was further argued that the relationship between UNIP and the trade union movement was defined in the Industrial Relations Act of 1971, which also included sufficient mechanisms of control by the Government over the unions.

Our stand...still remains in that the character and the nature of trade unions are those of interest groups which makes it impossible to lump the labour movement with the Youth and Women leagues.  

In the same statement, ZCTU repeated that it had no intention of becoming an opposition party:

We are not and will never be a political party since there is only one political party in the country to which all our leaders faithfully belong.

In 1984 the issue of incorporation of the trade union movement to the party again reemerged. This time it appeared in the form of amendments to the Industrial Relations Act. However, the policy aims of the government appear to be similar to the previous proposals. Among the proposals, the issue of transforming the trade union movement into a mass-organisation of UNIP is again presented:

The constitution of every trade union shall declare that the trade union shall be a mass-movement of the Party and as such shall accept the declared policies, objectives, aspirations and programmes of the party and that no person shall be qualified to be elected or appointed to any office in the trade union unless he is a member of the party.  

The 1984 document also included provisions for extending the powers of the Minister of Labour over the trade unions. The Minister was, among other things, to have the power to dissolve trade unions and to appoint other persons in place of elected officers. Furthermore, the proposed amendments suggested increased ministerial powers in terms of supervision

over union financial affairs.27 In a press release responding to the proposed amendments to the Industrial Relations Act, the acting General Secretary of ZCTU attacked the new attempts of UNIP to weaken the trade union movement:

This is a shrewd method to reintroduce the issue of including trade unions to a mass-organisation of the party. The authoritarian pattern designed to incorporate trade unions and ZCTU into the party system can be linked to Italian fascism. But the Zambian labour movement believes in becoming an independent partner in the running of the country’s social, political and economic system. The new provisions depicting that trade unions and ZCTU as mass organisations and that the union leaders must be members of the party before they are elected to their posts is unconstitutional as it is in direct conflict with part 3 of the republican constitution.28

In their efforts to oppose the introduction of the new legislation, ZCTU called upon the advice of the International Labour Office (ILO). It is difficult to assess whether the proposal was dismissed as a result of the reported “scepticism” of ILO or the strong pressures and industrial actions of the workers. But in any case, the draft proposal never surfaced as a new law, and the proposal of turning the trade union movement into a mass organisation of the party was again withdrawn (Kalula 1988). At this point, the attempts to incorporate the trade union into the party structures through legislation were abandoned. When the issue of controlling the trade union movement reemerged the following year it had taken a completely different form.

In 1985 the government introduced a set of statutory instruments which implied that Article 20 of the Industrial Relations Act of 1971 concerning the compulsory check-off system would be revoked. This implied that the “due shop order”, or automatic check-off facility, would be cancelled if a union or members of a union went on strike, whether official or

27 The document referred to here is entitled “The Industrial Relations Act 1984”, Ministry of Legal Affairs, 1983. However it never became enacted and the industrial relations act of 1971 remained until 1990, when a new legislation for industrial relations was introduced.

This action by the UNIP government followed a conflict between UNIP and the trade unions over a drastic increase in prices of the staple food, mealie meal in 1984. The strikes that followed the price increases were regarded by the UNIP leadership as sabotage in view of the fragile economy.

According to the ZCTU leadership’s own assessment, the move by the government came as a complete surprise, and the reactions from the labour movement were, as can be expected, negative. The General Council of ZCTU issued a statement condemning the policy proposals, claiming that:

Having studied the proposed amendments to the IR act 36, 1971 and realizing that the only intention of the Party and its Government is to destroy the present independent position and democratic nature and structure of trade unions in Zambia, we totally and vehemently reject the proposals as has been the case in the past. We call for a revoking of the statutory instrument No. 6 1985 in the interest of continued industrial peace.

With the introduction of the Statutory Instrument No 6, the UNIP government had introduced a mechanism which increased its control over the economic situation of the trade unions. The government realised that the complete transformation of the trade union movement into a mass organisation of the Party could not be accomplished through ideological appeals. The introduction of the statutory instruments of 1985 indicates a change in the political strategies of UNIP toward increasing reliance on regulation and force. In the face of massive demonstrations of workers demonstrating against the incorporation measures, President Kaunda in his 1986 May Day speech said that the issue of total incorporation of the trade union movement was no longer valid.

In a speech to the 7th Quadrennial Congress of ZCTU in October 1986, President Kaunda officially restored the automatic check-off facilities to the unions which had been affected by the Statutory Instrument no. 6 (1985). However, “the stick-element” was kept as the statutory instruments were not revoked, they were just not applied to the unions in question due to the hard pressures on the UNIP regime in terms of strikes and demonstrations initiated by workers.

It has been suggested that one of the reasons why UNIP abandoned this issue was related to the negative reactions from ILO with whom the UNIP regime had worked closely on other issues (Kalula 256). This factor may partially explain the departure in the policies of UNIP because the “internal” and “external” causes are closely linked. The main reason is that the trade unions unanimously fought against the cooptative policies of UNIP. The aims of UNIP could only be accomplished through force or repression, both unattractive mechanisms due to the stress in humanist philosophy on participation and consensus. President Kaunda’s high international profile as a defender of human rights further limited the possibilities of the regime to solve internal conflicts through the use of force. President Kaunda advocated a moral leadership and respect of human rights and strongly condemned the racial regime in South Africa. It was therefore widely believed that breaches with the ILO and the OAU charter on Human and Peoples rights would have been a serious blow to both his personal and UNIP’s international standing.31 Thus, it may be argued that in a situation where the control of the labour movement more than before depended on the use of force due to the lack of legitimacy of the UNIP rule, the option of repression was infeasible due to the emphasis put on the “international image” of the regime.

So far two politically motivated conflicts of the 1980s have been studied. According to the views of the labour leadership and UNIP officials, these issues were the main political conflicts between UNIP and ZCTU until the multiparty question emerged in the late 1980s.32 The conflicts arising from the issue of decentralisation in particular, point to the fact that ZCTU during the 1980s emerged as a political opposition in the one-party state, focusing on national political issues. A number of reports in the international press at the time clearly indicated that ZCTU by this time was considered as a potential political alternative to UNIP.33 First and

31 This statement is by no means original, the lack of attraction of repression in face of the “Humanist rhetoric” of President Kaunda is pointed out in most books analyzing Zambian politics. See Bates (1971), Gertzel (1984), Burdette (1988), Kalula (1988) and Liatto (1989).

32 In the file in the ZCTU archive labelled “ZCTU-UNIP conflict”, the issue most elaborated upon apart from the issues described here is the ban imposed on the labour leadership to address workers on the May Day (May 1) which was imposed in 1983 due to the strong criticism raised by the labour leaders against UNIP.

foremost, this conflict indicated that the trade union movement lead by the labour congress was willing, and able, to utilise its organisational structures and finances in opposition to the government. It can therefore be held that at this point the trade union movement and ZCTU were acting as autonomous associations in opposition to the UNIP government. The defence of its organisational autonomy was further reflected in the reactions from the trade union movement toward the attempts to incorporate the unions into the party structures. Both indicated differences of opinion and ideology between the party and the labour movement concerning the role of labour unions in post-colonial politics.

To what extent were these differences reflected in economic policy questions? According to my interview sample, the main economic conflicts between the trade union movement and the party were related to the economic restructuring policies sponsored by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Because the reforms aimed at restructuring the Zambian economy in the direction of privatisation, less involvement of the state in the economy, the removal of consumer subsidies and less reliance on the mining industry, the responses of the labour movement to these issues may give a further indication of the ideology of the labour movement.

6.4 Conflicts concerning national economic policies and the role of the International Monetary Fund

The discussion above indicated that the trade union movement in Zambia emerged as a political opposition force in the 1980s. Further, the trade unions were involved in the political debate far beyond the scope of industrial relations and economic issues. Despite the political orientation of the trade union leadership and ZCTU in particular, both the trade union leadership and rank and file seemed to regard the main function of unions to be to defend the economic interests of the members. Welfare issues and the economic situation of unionised workers were stressed by a majority of the respondents.34 The fact that the major preoccupation of ZCTU concerned the economic well-being of the workers is also reflected in their anxiety over the performance of the Zambian economy as a whole (Liatto 1989: 204).

34 My own personal communications with the labour union leadership clearly indicated this preoccupation with economic issues. Further, the studies of Bates (1971), Gertzel (1979) and Mijere (1986) all indicate that the workers rated the leadership in terms of the economic benefits they manage to achieve for the members.
The economic decline in Zambia by the end of the 1970s made it necessary for the government to call upon the international financial institutions to give further assistance to the in-debted economy. As conditions for the extended lending facilities, the lending agencies sought to impose economic programmes in the form of structural adjustment programmes (SAP) in Zambia. The main period of expansion of the SAP-reforms in Zambia occurred between 1982 and 1987 but the attempts to restructure the economy should probably be traced to the mid-1970s (Gibbon 1990: 1). The Zambian government signed its first agreement with IMF in 1977. In the period between 1975 and 1986 there were no less than seven different stabilisation and/or structural adjustment programmes implemented, but none were able to meet the financial targets (Gibbon 1990: 23). Among the policies, the subsidies on basic food products were attempted removed. Due to the deteriorating economic situation, IMF imposed increasingly stronger conditionalities for their lending facilities. The economic hardships and shortages resulting from the economic restructuring efforts could not be shielded from the articulate urban population which resulted in major uprisings in the urban areas, particularly in the Copperbelt. Partly as a result, the Zambian government decided to break the agreement with IMF and the World Bank in 1987. The UNIP government adopted a “home grown” reform programme, titled the New Economic Reform Programme (NERP) of a distinctly less demanding character (Mwanza 1990: 19). However, the home grown attempt was not to last and due to the high cost of maize subsidies and escalating government subsidies, communication with IMF was reestablished in 1989-1990.

This brief sketch of the major events provides a basic overview of the Zambian “IMF-history”. The question of interest to the present analysis is how the trade union movement has reacted to the IMF sponsored reform programmes, and further, to what extent the policy of ZCTU in respect to the government and IMF can give an indication of the nature and ideology of the trade union movement.

Considering the issues of conflict between ZCTU and UNIP in the Second Republic, it is clear that in the period after 1984 the political conflicts have been dominated by the UNIP government’s management of the economy. The discussion in chapter three revealed that the leadership of ZCTU and the national unions spoke in favour of a continued agreement

with IMF during the 1991 election campaign. They indicated their support to the restructuring of the economy based on privatisation, the cutting of food subsidies and a reduction of public sector employment. This view was again reflected in my personal communications with the labour leadership and in various press reports. The picture emerging in 1991 corresponds with the analysis of Gibbon stating that:

The most important political feature of the Zambian situation over the past decade has been the manner in which adjustment has created the conditions for the powerful opposition movement to arise, despite the fact that this movement has been more consistently pro-adjustment than UNIP. UNIP, on the other hand, has become increasingly political unpopular whether it has supported adjustment or opposed it. The cornerstone of the Zambian opposition movement has been the trade union federation, ZCTU. ZCTU has from the 1970s articulated a position that could be regarded as “business unionist” (Gibbon 1990).

Gibbon’s analysis reflects a view often expressed in international press reports of Zambia, namely that the trade union movement in Zambia has opposed the socialist policies of UNIP and advocated economic policies in favour of liberalism and privatisation. As will be seen from the discussion below on the ideology of the trade union movement, this view was largely shared by the trade union leadership as well as UNIP officials in 1991. However, while I agree with Gibbon when he states that structural adjustment policies have been the main issue of conflict between the UNIP government and the trade union movement since the mid 1980s, I do not think the issue of adjustment has created conditions for opposition. The trade union opposition to UNIP was present before the introduction of SAP became a main issue of concern as the discussion of the decentralisation issue above has pointed to. However, a further and maybe more pressing difficulty of Gibbon’s argument relates to his understanding of the role of ZCTU in relation to the structural adjustment policies.

As I was given the opportunity to study ZCTU’s own documents regarding their policy stand on economic issues including IMF and adjustment programmes in the 1980s, I would rather argue that throughout the 1980s the trade union movement has been the most outspoken opponent of the IMF measures. In fact, both ZCTU’s own documents and secondary sources show that the trade union movement was quite instrumental in the processes leading up to President Kaunda breaking the agreement with IMF in 1987, reducing debt servicing to 10 per cent of their net foreign
exchange earnings and launch a "home grown" National Economic Recovery Programme.

The Secretary General's report to the ZCTU Quadrennial Congress in 1986 reviews the adjustment policies since 1983 and the responses of ZCTU. The report shows that ZCTU strongly disagreed with the devaluation of the currency and the decontrol of prices, both measures part of the restructuring agreement sponsored by IMF. The trade union leadership argued that the wage ceiling either had to be revoked as well or the prices should be controlled. However, the IMF agreement also prescribed a wage ceiling. In the same report, the Secretary General emphasises that the bureaucratic expansion and in particular, the growth of the Party bureaucracy and the local government system of decentralisation, had serious implications for the Zambian economy. This reflects a critical attitude toward the economic policies of UNIP but it does not reveal support of the IMF sponsored reforms.

The trade union movement also strongly objected to the auctioning of the Kwacha, which was introduced in October 1985 as part of the IMF programmes, arguing that this would be disastrous in an open economy such as the Zambian. In his report to the Quadrennial Congress the Secretary General appears critical to the privatisation measures of IMF:

... ZCTU argued that it would be a false assumption that the market forces would stop price increases if only real wages were prevented from increasing "..." Therefore, we (ZCTU) concerted that efforts should now aim at national consensus around a policy of balanced economic growth, giving priority to job creation, price stability and economic growth which was balanced between sectors, improving the living standards of the people (ZCTU 1986: 21).

The statement of the Secretary General seems to point in the direction of a mixed economy approach. While critical of the privatisation efforts of IMF they nevertheless seem to recognise a need for a market-based economy. To a certain extent, the statements support the conclusions of Gibbon. However, as the effects of the adjustment efforts were beginning to seriously affect the living standards of the workers and urban people, the criticisms of the reform programmes from ZCTU became more forthright.

36 This implied that the government would set aside 10 per cent of what was left after the major companies, such as the ZCCM, had been allocated their foreign exchange quotas.
38 Ibid.:20.
In December 1986 the government announced the removal of maize meal subsidies as part of the economic restructuring measures. This decision lead to widespread unrest and riots in the Copperbelt. Workers and the general urban population in Kitwe rioted, destroying property, including Party buildings. The security forces were called in to contain the situation and opened fire which resulted in the killing of 15 people. These events profoundly shook the UNIP government and its immediate response was to restore the subsidies, nationalise the milling companies and blame IMF. But it appeared that this was only the beginning of the reaction to the economic crisis. About a year after the auctioning of the foreign exchange had been introduced (October 1985) as a part of the IMF initiated programme, the workers across Zambia went on strike in what some reports have labelled a “strike wave” (The Guardian April 16, 1987). Workers of all categories went on strike demanding wage increases to off-set the high costs of living. The strike actions started with the teachers’ strike in February, which was followed by the junior doctors, nurses and agricultural workers. From February 5 to April 30 1987, the country was virtually brought to a stand still. Some of the strikes were also coupled with incidents of violence (EIU 1990-1991).

In a response to the strike actions, UNIP accused ZCTU of having initiated the strikes. The government announced tough measures against strikes, one being directives to managers of companies to sack workers involved in strike action. At this point and under hard pressure, the UNIP government appeared to go even further than revoking the check-off facilities (Statutory Instrument No. 6 1985). At a press conference announcing the measures to control the strikes, ZCTU was threatened with dissolution if ... it persisted in misguiding its members and associating with suspicious Western organisations offering undercover funds (Times of Zambia 29 April 1987). Commenting on the strikes and the food riots in the Copperbelt, the labour Congress stated that the causes were the harsh conditions set by the IMF, whereas UNIP seemed to put the burden on the trade union movement. In a press statement on April 15, 1987, Kenneth Kaunda insisted that the strikes of the nurses and the teachers in the Copperbelt were politically motivated by ZCTU. However, it appeared that the pressure on the government caused by the strikes and the riots could not be sustained or controlled. As a result, President Kaunda on May 1st announced the decision to break the agreement with IMF.

40 The incident referred to is the allegation made by the President that ZCTU officials had received funds from the German “Friedrich Ebert Foundation”.

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Relating the events of May 1st to the discussion of legitimacy in chapter two (2.3), it can be argued at the UNIP government was unable to impose the policy measures on the population because it lacked legitimacy. In other words, the government was not able to convince the people of the long term gains of the economic policies. It should, however, be noted that at this point the trade unions, albeit criticising the Party and its Government, appear to regard IMF and the external actors as the main cause of the hardships.

The decision to break with the international finance institutions and limit the debt servicing became a decision of great consequences. It meant that "Zambia had to do it on its own", and it can also be interpreted as a proclamation to abandon the short lived attempt of liberalising the Zambian economy and thus continuing the state-controlled mechanisms. It is interesting to note that ZCTU wholeheartedly supported both the break with IMF and the implementation of the new national economic recovery programme. After President Kaunda had announced the decision to break with IMF, ZCTU responded in a memo intended as information to the trade union leadership of the official standpoint of the Congress. Here, ZCTU states that:

Indeed this is a scenario of general uncertainty. But due to its historical role, ZCTU recognises that through this particular moment, it is not in good terms with the powers that be, it is duty bound to welcome, wholeheartedly, the new economic recovery measures.41

In other words, ZCTU announced that despite its conflictual relationship with UNIP, the break with IMF and the new national recovery programme was supported. In terms of economic policies there was a general agreement between the government and the trade union movement. The reasons given in the same memo were even more interesting in regard of ZCTU’s future stand vis à vis the economic policies (1990). It was argued that ZCTU was against the IMF austerity programmes and therefore supported the decision of UNIP to break the agreement with IMF, because it was not in harmony with the interest of the workers. Further:

ZCTU has never at any given time, past and present, hidden its suspicion of IMF conditionality, it has always said that some of the restrictions

imposed by IMF could be deliberate manoeuvres to destabilise Zambia’s socialist path to development.\textsuperscript{42}

As already mentioned, under the one-party participatory democracy state ZCTU and the trade union movement as a whole were bound by the philosophy of Humanism and the stated objective of Humanism being reached through socialism. Support of socialism in official rhetoric should therefore not be attached too much weight. Nevertheless, based on the strong criticism of IMF and the strong support of the decision to carry out a national reform programme, the trade union movement at this point was very critical to the economic liberalisation efforts. It should also be noted that this document was written for internal use and can therefore be expected to be of a less formal character. In the same document, ZCTU repeated its concern over the cost of the high number of employees in the service sector, and especially the party bureaucracy. It is further emphasised that “the role of ZCTU has always been to remind the Party and its Government to live up to their promises to workers”.\textsuperscript{43}

The New Economic Recovery Programme implemented in 1987 failed, however, to control inflation and halt the deterioration of living standards. As a result of the failure to control the escalating costs of the maize subsidies and the growing bureaucracy, IMF and the international donors which had left Zambia with IMF, were invited back again. In September 1989, the approval of IMF of a policy framework paper was announced and the structural adjustment policies were back in place in Zambia. Commenting on UNIP’s decision to invite IMF back to Zambia and reopen the negotiations, the trade union movement again expressed a distinctly negative attitude to the structural adjustment measures:

In terms of implementation, we could safely say the move is very retrogressive. It will undo the little gains or stability that came with the new Economic Recovery Programme. It will make life unbearable due to the massive social dislocations it will engender.\textsuperscript{44}

The statement concludes by stating that:

\textsuperscript{42} Ibid: 5.
\textsuperscript{43} Ibid: 6.
\textsuperscript{44} Zambia Congress of Trade Unions: “ZCTU’s views on the impending come back of the IMF and structural adjustment with a human face”, Kitwe: ZCTU Secretariat, February 1989: 8.
For those obvious reasons we in ZCTU condemn the move by the authorities to invite IMF to come back and work with us. We know what it means. We recommend that the Party and its Government should join those forces at international fora which are calling for a renewal of the path of development of indebted economies such as the Zambian economy, through debt relief on a massive scale.\textsuperscript{45}

It is evident from the archival sources consulted above that ZCTU opposed IMF-sponsored adjustment programmes as late as 1989. This factor has been greatly overshadowed by the events taking place after 1990 when ZCTU and the trade union movement as a whole broke the near 30-year old alliance with UNIP and gave its support to MMD; a party which clearly advocated a more liberalist market-oriented economic policy than UNIP. Regarding the escalating cost of living of workers and Zambians in general, the reactions to the social effects of the adjustment programmes were not surprising. However, it is very interesting in view of MMD’s and trade union movement’s strong support of IMF and free market policies in the 1991 election campaign.

Confronted with the possible effects of the pro-privatisation stand on the social and economic situation of the workers, the responses in my interview sample varied considerably. Most of the respondents from the trade union leadership argued that the previous objection of ZCTU to IMF policies mainly related to the fact that trade unions were not consulted when the agreements were discussed and signed.\textsuperscript{46} A great majority of the labour leaders of the national unions and ZCTU interviewed appeared to be in favour of privatisation. As stated by one of the respondents: “We do not think privatisation is a very bad thing, as we have seen how badly the para-statals (state owned businesses) have performed”.\textsuperscript{47}

This sentence to a large extent sums up the attitudes expressed by the labour leaders and illustrates the desperately felt need for attempting an alternative economic policy. One leader of a major union pointed to the quest for privatisation by stating that there was a basic need for \textit{change} in Zambia. In order to portray the general feeling among the workers he claimed that: “Whether change will lead to prosperity is besides the point.

\textsuperscript{45} Ibid: 8.
\textsuperscript{46} It is a fact that the discussions between the International Financial Institution and the national governments are kept to a limited number of people, in fact not even all ministers of the government are present in theses negotiations. The complaints raised here by the labour leaders are therefore quite common (Callaghy 1990).
\textsuperscript{47} Personal communication, Mr. C. Sampa, Assistant General Secretary ZCTU, Lusaka: September 5 1991.
Change is the thing”. Many of the respondents appeared to be quite uncertain as to what privatisation and free market economy actually entailed and how it would affect workers. The responses from two members of the Kitwe ZCTU District Committee is illustrative:

To be quite honest, I do not know how privatisation will work and how it will effect the ordinary worker. Our members do not understand this issue sufficiently.

However, his colleague was of a different opinion:

I think privatisation will bring the foreign companies back and all the nice shops and businesses will create employment. And I hope the employers will give us decent accommodation, transport etc. so the workers can be efficient.

When asked to respond to the prospect of increasing redundancies which have often been associated with privatisation, the labour leaders unanimously stated that they opposed this and would fight against any government policy that would lead to increased redundancies. The overall view of the labour union leaders interviewed seemed to be that privatisation was necessary for job creation. But the possible negative effects in terms of redundancies clearly were of to the labour leaders.

Judging from the reactions of ZCTU and the national unions to the economic policies of the UNIP government and the involvement of IMF, it is difficult to identify a clear line in favour of privatisation and against socialist policies as contended by Gibbon and others. The strong reactions against the IMF-sponsored programmes in 1987 and in 1989 and the complete turn-around in 1990 in support of IMF and liberalisation, indicate that the issue of structural adjustment was employed in a rather opportunistic fashion by the trade union leadership against UNIP. However, opportunism can only to a certain degree explain the attitudes of ZCTU. As the above review indicated, the political opposition, the strikes and the riots in 1986 and 1987 were primarily directed at IMF. It was only during the riots and reactions to the scrapping of food subsidies in 1990 that the opposition lead by the trade unions turned their antagonism against UNIP.

48 Personal communication, Mr. F. Kunda, National Chairman of the Mine-Workers Union (MUZ), Kitwe: September 19, 1991.
49 Personal communications, Mr. Morris Nkhata, Chairman Kitwe ZCTU District Committee and Stephen Nyangu, Trustee Kitwe ZCTU District Committee, September 20, 1991.
I believe the immense social costs associated with the implementation of the adjustment programmes made it impossible for the trade unions to support the programme. Again, it is evident that the primary concern of the trade union movement was the interests of its members which were seen to be adversely affected by the SAPs. The statements in the report from the Secretary General in 1986 (ZCTU 1986) indicated that the trade union movement favoured a mixed economy, i.e. a market-economy with state funded “safety nets”. In an interview with the General Secretary of ZCTU, he elaborated upon this and claimed that he envisioned “a Scandinavian model” for the Zambian economy in the Third Republic. However, based on the reactions of labour to the structural adjustment measures reviewed here, it cannot be held that the support of these policies in 1990-1991 was reflected in the former policies of the trade union movement.

So far, three of the major areas of conflict between the trade union movement and UNIP in the 1980s have been discussed. Before turning to the more general question of the overall ideological differences between the two organisations, one last issue of conflict originating in 1990 will be considered as it implicitly touches upon the question of the nature of the trade union movement. The issue in question concerns the introduction of the 1990 Industrial Relations Act which revoked the 1971 Act and many of its corporative mechanisms.

6.5 The Industrial Relations Act 1990

In 1990 the Parliament passed a new Industrial Relations Act which in a number of ways is a drastic departure from the Industrial Relations Act of 1971 which has been the main guiding law of industrial relations in the period under consideration here. In the interpretation of UNIP, the new Act was introduced in the spirit of pluralism. The 1990 Act revokes the mandatory affiliation to ZCTU and opens up for free formation of unions, limited to 100 people (section 14 and 52). Hence, the two principles of mandatory affiliation and one-union-one-industry constructed to ensure a strong and centralised trade union movement are done away with. According to the new Act, a two-thirds majority of the total membership of a union is required in order to affiliate to ZCTU. This majority is also needed if a union wishes to apply trade union funds in political campaigning or in support of a political party (Section 15, 29 and 42). As

a result, a union can no longer use its funding automatically in support of a political party. A fund must be set aside for this purpose and the utilisation of the fund requires the consent of 2/3 of the members.

The 1990 Act was introduced after ZCTU and the affiliated unions had broken its alliance with UNIP and become one of the most important supporters of MMD and the reintroduction of multiparty politics in Zambia. Viewed in this context, it is not surprising that the new Industrial Relations Bill, presented to Parliament in December 1990, was regarded by the trade unions as yet another attempt by UNIP to undermine the power of the union movement. The 1990 Act also included some positive measures for the trade unions as a whole such as the revocation of the clause stating that illegal strike activity can result in detention, the lifting of travel-restrictions imposed on union leaders and a clarification of the functions of works councils vis-à-vis trade unions. Nevertheless, the General Council of ZCTU regarded the 1990 Act as a punishment for the involvement of the trade union movement in the opposition against UNIP. According to a statement by ZCTU:

> The spirit and intention of this law point to Government’s deliberate decision to punish trade unions for the leading role they played and continue to play in the democratic process.\(^{51}\)

The core of the union criticism of the Act has focused on the clauses of voluntary affiliation to ZCTU, the possibility of creating alternative congresses and the restriction of utilising trade union funds for political purposes. According to ZCTU, the main aim of the new Act was to weaken the labour union movement. As result, the new Industrial Relations Act has come under severe attack by the union movement and the main argument against it has been that the 1990 Act is introduced in order to erode the power base of the unions and destroy union independence.

In a joint statement by ZCTU and the Zambia Federation of Employers (ZFE) the 1990 Act is condemned and the two organisations are calling for a reintroduction of the 1971 Act. The statements in section 14 and 52 opening up for voluntary affiliation to ZFE and ZCTU based on the consent of two-thirds of the trade union membership was attacked and it was argued that it would be partially impossible to ballot all union members scattered

\(^{51}\) Zambia Congress of Trade Unions: “Why we fear the elections may not be free and fair”, Kitwe: ZCTU Secretariat, 1991.

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all over the country for the purpose of re-affiliating to ZCTU. According to ZCTU and ZFE, the new Act will definitely erode the independent and democratic nature of the trade unions of Zambia thereby depriving the Zambian worker of their much cherished human and trade union rights. It is also pointed to that the 1990 Act will introduce anarchy and serious unrest in Zambian industrial relations by duplicity of trade unions in each industry which will cause employers untold problems and weakening the relationship between ZCTU and the trade unions on the one hand, and the employers and ZFE on the other.

It is difficult to escape the conclusion of the trade unions that the 1990 Act was a punitive act which revoked the mechanisms of the 1971 Act aimed at strengthening the trade union movement and ZCTU in particular. For one thing, the Act of 1990 stated that ZCTU cannot act in conflicts within an affiliated union unless Congress have been authorised such powers by the union constituency. According to the new Act, ZCTU has no authority over internal union affairs unless unions have referred the matter to the labour Congress. In the interviews, the UNIP officials, though defending the procedures as democratic and in line with the liberalisation of politics, confessed that the new Act contained punitive elements. However, as one respondent argued: “Pluralism must also be introduced to industrial relations and trade unions must collect their own funds”.

Although ZCTU acknowledged the fact that the 1990 Industrial Relations Act is in line with ILO Convention No 87, they warned that liberalisation of the labour unions by UNIP were intended at weakening unions and remove privileges that had made the trade union movement strong.

Based on the criticism voiced by the trade union movement, it is evident that the changes in the 1971 legislation which the trade union movement disputed most strongly, concern the clauses which grant the trade unions monopoly of representation. In other words, the trade unions are strongly objecting to the revocation of some of the corporatist elements of the 1971 Industrial Relations Act. To a certain extent, the observations of Simutanyi are valid:


53 Personal communication, Mr. Phiri Director, Department of Industrial Participatory Democracy, Lusaka: September 11, 1991.

In terms of union democracy, one trade union centre and compulsory affiliation have left the national unions with limited choice over alternative programmes and ideological perspectives. ZCTU has at times behaved in a similar manner to that of a one-party state and although the trade unions have been instrumental in the campaigning for democracy, they have operated in institutions that act as fetter to democracy (Simutanyi 1990:14).

Simutanyi raises an important issue; with the authoritarian one-party structures, the trade union movement has been protected from pluralist competition along with the party. However, as the theoretical discussion in chapter two indicated, democracy at the national level cannot be causally linked to democracy at the level of organisation. The fact that the trade unions have been protected from organisational competition does not necessarily mean that the trade unions have not functioned as democratic organisations. Organisational democracy is usually defined in relation to the internal decision-making procedures of an organisation and the process of leadership selection. Competition between various organisations is therefore not necessarily a reflection of the internal democracy of an association.

Concerning the election procedures in the Zambian trade union movement, it is evident that the membership influences the election of leadership. Thus, despite the organisational monopoly granted the unions during the one-party state, the internal democracy has to a large degree been maintained. Ever since the time before independence the trade union movement has traditionally tended to dismiss union leaders appearing too close to the political centre. This policy tradition was last displayed at the Quadrennial Congress of the mine workers union (MUZ) in March 1990, when the Chairman and the General Secretary failed to get reelected because the conference delegates launched a rigorous campaign against their candidacies. It is widely believed that the leaders of the most powerful and influential trade union movement lost their position due to their position on the UNIP Central Committee. The union members saw the appointments as a typically cunning effort by President Kaunda to weaken the trade unions. "How can they serve two masters" was one of the slogans used against their reelection (Times of Zambia March 20, 1990). At the Quadrennial Congress of ZCTU in October 1990, the incident was repeated. This time, two prominent trade unionists who had been appointed to serve on the Constitutional Commission lost their positions in ZCTU Executive Committee. According to the Times of Zambia, they were ousted amid accusations of being "sell outs" (Times of Zambia November 11, 1990).

The organisational monopoly granted the trade union movement in the one-party state does not necessarily depict it as a corporatist and dependent
association. Furthermore, the trade union leadership's opposition to the new legislation, despite its pluralist nature, cannot be characterised as a defence of corporatism per se. It is evident that the trade union movement defended its organisational autonomy and that the membership has maintained a certain degree of influence of the leadership. However, the conflict relating to the introduction of the 1990 legislation does indicate a lack of consistency in the argumentation of the trade union movement as will be discussed further in the concluding chapter.

The issues of controversy have been elaborated upon in order to shed light on the nature of the trade union movement and what role it perceives for itself in society. Before attempting to summarise these findings in connection to the theoretical framework of the analysis, the trade union movement's own perceptions of its ideological position vis à vis UNIP will be assessed.

6.6 Tracing the ideology of the trade union movement through an assessment of conflict

It was interesting to note that most of the respondents of both UNIP and ZCTU applied labels like “liberal”, “pluralist” or “capitalist” when asked to describe the nature of the Zambian trade union movement. There was further a general agreement among the respondents that the trade union movement had never accepted (or understood) the socialist policy aims of UNIP. The following quotes are illustrative of the perceptions of the trade unionists in 1991:

The main philosophical difference between labour and UNIP is that this country was adopting Soviet Union policies and the eastern block was assisting Zambia. But socialism does not encourage growth in the rural economy or the productive economy........The truth is we (trade unions) were capitalist all the way, you simply cannot have socialism in a country where productivity is as low as here.55

We came to hate the one-party state because the regulations became similar to communism and the rules of the eastern block. All regulations

55 Personal communication Mr. Mudenda, acting General Secretary, Zambia Local Authority Workers Union, Ndola: September 19, 1991.
from the east were introduced here and we were not happy, as we, the labour movement would prefer a capitalist system.\(^56\)

The perspectives of the two labour executives were also supported by the majority of the UNIP officials consulted and it was commonly held that the trade union leadership had not shared (or understood) the socialist policy aims of UNIP. As already stated, the issue of ideology is greatly affected by the time context in which it is expressed. In other words, being capitalist, or "right wing" in the 1991 political climate was regarded as words of tribute. How valid are these descriptions? Are they just a reflection of the "mainstream ideology of the 1990s" or can it be argued that the trade union movement indeed has been ideologically distinct from UNIP which may serve as an explanation of why the trade union broke the alliance with UNIP in 1990?

Going back to the first major issue of conflict between the trade union movement and UNIP in 1980-1981, it is interesting to note that the opposition lead by the trade union movement is characterised as a "right wing opposition" in the international press. A number of the press clippings from the time emphasise that contrary to many other African regimes, the opposition to the Kaunda regime is not funded in marxist critique, but rather in a liberal Western oriented trade union movement.\(^57\) According to New York Times' reporter:

People here are not seeking a further move to the left from Kaunda's "socialism through humanism"....They are right-wing; they want free enterprise to have a freer rein (New York Times, November 1, 1981).

The views expressed in the international press reports are also reflected in Kenneth Kaunda's address to the nation when he comments upon the conflicts between the trade union movement and the party:

I have been astonished by the thinking of the present leaders of ZCTU. I am sure these leaders must be some of the very few trade union leaders in the world that think that capitalism is good for the workers. Yet the

\(^{56}\) Personal communication, Mr. C. Sampa, Assistant General Secretary ZCTU, Lusaka: September 5, 1991.

The sources indicate that the trade union movement for a long time has been portrayed as a pluralist, Western-oriented opposition to the UNIP regime appearing to favour a stronger emphasis on market forces than UNIP. This picture corresponds well with their own perceptions in 1991. These findings are further reflected in a study of Beatrice Liatto based on field work carried out in 1987 (Liatto 1989). Ms. Liatto sought to trace the ideological underpinnings of the Zambian trade union movement vis à vis UNIP. In her personal communications with the leadership of the national unions and ZCTU, the trade union leadership appeared to be highly critical of the one-party state and the socialist policies of UNIP. According to Liatto’s field research, the trade union leaders regarded the Congress as a democratic institution which in the absence of political parties provided the necessary checks and balances on the exercise of government power (Liatto 1989: 121).

In another instance she refers to the Secretary General of a large union blaming the imposition of the IMF conditionality loans on the nature of the country’s political institutions. The Secretary General argued that in a multiparty system IMF conditions would not have been accepted (Liatto: 122). Based on her interviews with Zambian labour officials and a review of primary and secondary sources, she finds that the Zambian labour movement.. “in the true spirit of capitalism claims a right to participate in the affairs of the society as an autonomous interest group” (Liatto 1989: 226). Liatto’s interviews conducted four years before my own and two years before the fall of the Berlin Wall confirms that there was an opposition within Zambia, lead by the trade union movement with pluralist, or multiparty goals, prior to the pressures from the international finance institutions and the changes in Eastern Europe. Consequently, the field work of Liatto and my reading of her communications with the trade union leadership supports the notion that the trade union movement perceived of its role as an interest group in a pluralist sense before 1989-1990.

However, all the sources referred to emphasise the *rhetorical perceptions* of the trade union leadership. To what extent then are the perceptions of the union leadership reflected in their policies? The above discussion has indicated that the relationship between UNIP and ZCTU changed in the

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58 Address to the Nation by his excellency the President Kenneth Kaunda, July 27, 1981, Kitwe: ZCTU Secretariat Archives, 1981.
period between 1975 and 1980 due to the election of new, young and independent leaders to the ZCTU executive leadership. Secondly, the deteriorating economy and the increasing hardships felt by the workers (and Zambians as a whole) added to the gap of interests between the trade union movement and UNIP. Furthermore, it is evident that the trade union movement as a whole and the Congress in particular was strengthened through the 1971 Industrial Relations Act which may explain why it emerged as an opposition force in the absence of party opposition.

The conflicts arising between the trade union movement and UNIP resulting from the introduction of the Local Government Act in 1980-1981 are significant for a number of reasons. It has been suggested here that the trade unions opposed the Act because it would imply an expansion of the UNIP power-monopoly to the local level of government. The conflict related to the larger issues of union autonomy and party control. Possibly the most significant aspect of this controversy relates to the role of ZCTU as the central policy-making organ of the trade union opposition to UNIP.

The reactions from UNIP to the opposition from the trade union movement and Parliament indicate a shift toward greater reliance on repressive mechanisms. This is reflected in the industrial relations strategies of UNIP throughout the 1980s. The main aim of UNIP after 1980 has been to control the trade union movement. However, the numerous attempts throughout the 1980s to incorporate the trade union movement as a mass wing of the party and to alter the Industrial Relations Act of 1971 have only to a limited degree been successful. Throughout the decade the trade union movement has opposed all attempts of incorporation to the party structures and thereby demonstrated its organisational autonomy.

The introduction of the Local Government Act and the issue of incorporating the trade union movement to the party have been among the main issues of political conflict between ZCTU and UNIP during the one-party state. On both issues, the Congress has displayed a strong desire to defend its organisational autonomy. The position of the trade union movement on both these issues seems to confirm the trade unionists’ own perception of their role as an interest group in a pluralist sense.

However, the portrait of the trade union movement as a defender of free market-economy and privatisation in opposition to the socialist aims of UNIP has not been reflected in a support of the IMF-sponsored economic restructuring measures. ZCTU strongly opposed the liberalisation measures adopted by the UNIP government in the 1980s. ZCTU criticised the economic policies of UNIP but until 1990 the opposition has mainly been turned toward IMF and not UNIP in these matters. The advocacy of the free market-economy and ZCTU’s support of the IMF programmes during
the election campaign in 1990-1991 is not reflected in the policies prior to 1990.

The analysis of the relationship between UNIP and ZCTU in the Second Republic and particularly after 1980, indicated that the trade unions constantly fought against any policy mechanism of UNIP that would reduce the organisational autonomy of the trade unions. Furthermore, the trade union movement indicated its preference for pluralism and opposition to one-party politics prior to the 1989-1991 events. However, the reactions of the trade union movement toward the Industrial Relations Act of 1990 also indicated that the trade union movement supported some of the corporatist mechanisms introduced by UNIP in the one-party state. In particular, ZCTU opposed the revocation of the clauses which granted the unions an organisational monopoly.

The discussion has shown that in the absence of political party alternatives, the trade union movement has after 1980-1981 acted as a main opposition force to the one-party state. Based on the historical analysis conducted here, I will argue that the trade union movement since 1980 has utilised its funding and organisational structures as an autonomous association and on a number of issues demonstrated political and ideological differences vis à vis the governing party, UNIP. With reference to the theoretical concepts applied in the analysis, the trade union movement should therefore be regarded as a civil society association in a pluralist sense. Despite the attempts to transform the trade union movement, it has remained an interest group functioning in defence of the economic interests of its membership. There are clear limits to the political actions of the trade union leadership in terms of moving too close to the political centre.

The pluralist nature of the trade union movement has been questioned with regard to its opposition to the structural adjustment policies of IMF and the expressed intention to maintain the organisational monopoly of the trade union movement. However, both the aim to protect its financial situation through the automatic check-off facilities and the opposition to economic measures which would lead to hardships for the member-base places the Zambian trade union movement within a pluralist tradition. Along with most autonomous interest associations, the political actions of the Zambian trade union movement were to a large degree motivated by the demands from its membership. This is an interesting point because even though it can be argued that the trade unions were protected by law in a monopolistic organisational structure similar to the national level, the branch level of the unions have maintained influence over the union
leadership. This fact will be discussed further below in a summary of the main findings in the analysis.
Chapter 7:
The Zambian trade union movement in processes of democratisation

Thematically, the analysis has focused on the question of transition from one-party rule to democracy and the role of civil society in processes of democratisation. Theoretical frameworks mostly generated from a Western European context have been applied to a Zambian setting in order to shed light on the role of the Zambian labour movement in the recent process of political reform. The analysis has focused on the changes in party labour relations. A central question has been why the Zambian trade union movement through its central organ, the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), emerged as an opposition force to the governing party (UNIP) and became instrumental in the transition from one-party politics to plural democracy in 1991. Focusing on the role of ZCTU was particularly interesting as the Congress initially was created by UNIP as a channel for communicating UNIP's policies to the workers.

However, as the work progressed it became apparent that the relationship between ZCTU and UNIP could not be studied on the basis of the events of the one-party state (1973-1991) alone because the developments during this period were closely connected with the previous periods. As a result, I found it necessary to extend the analysis both to the political developments around the time of national independence (1964) and to the first period of independence (1964-1971). It also became clear that ZCTU could not be analysed without regard to the affiliated unions and the relationship between the various organisational levels of the trade union movement. The complexity of the trade union organisational structure was emphasised in the theoretical discussion. It was argued that a labour movement is composed not only of one organisation, but of a set of relatively autonomous unions that are only incompletely coordinated by the umbrella organisation. The complexity of the organisational structure is particularly evident in the case of the Zambian trade union movement because the quest for control of the Congress has been a major issue of conflict in the history of industrial relations. While the relationship at the
national level of politics between ZCTU and UNIP has been the main focus of analysis, the relationship between the various levels of the trade union organisation has also been given consideration.

While introducing the argument, it was argued that a study of the reasons behind the trade unions’ wish for democratic reform was important as this may give an indication as to how the trade unions can be expected to perform in the newly founded plural democracy. If the motives had a basis in a genuine quest for democratic reform it can be expected that the trade unions will serve as important defenders of pluralism in the Third Republic. Conversely, if no such aims can be located and the basis of the involvement appear solely to be connected to the economic recession, the role of the trade union movement as a guardian of the new and fragile pluralist constitution may be put in jeopardy.

The problems related to the study of political motivation were discussed initially. In order to gain an understanding of the relationship between the party and the labour movement, a comparative historical approach was considered to be the most constructive method. In an attempt to develop a “conceptual map” from which state-labour relations in Zambia can be understood, two alternative theoretical hypotheses were put forward, one based on a pluralist concept of state-civil society relations and the other on a concept of state-corporatism.

In a pluralist perspective trade unions regard the interest of their members as best protected in democratic settings where interest groups are free to bargain for benefits of their members. The definition of autonomous interest groups, or civil society, became central to the pluralist argument. The theoretical discussion established that in order to be considered a civil society association, the trade union movement in Zambia should be seen to operate in the intermediate arena between the family and the state and not aim to become an alternative state (or party). Furthermore, it should be interacting with the state yet at the same time be autonomous from the state.

In a pluralist framework, the Zambian trade union movement was therefore conceptualised as a leading interest group of civil society having temporarily adopted a political role in defence of its organisational autonomy. In addition to the indicators provided by the concept of civil society, it was argued that the labour Congress should be distinct from UNIP along lines of ideology in order to fit the pluralist hypothesis. While ideology cannot be considered a necessary condition for “civil society status”, it was held that it should be possible to trace a line of opposition to the government policies because UNIP had sought to introduce labour policies largely detrimental to pluralism in the post-colonial period.
As an alternative to the pluralist perspective, theories of state-corporatism were presented. State-corporatism was defined as a relationship between interest groups and the state where the state, through a combination of benefits and coercion, has managed to coopt interest groups to state structures. Thus, in a corporatist setting interest groups are considered to have left their original emphasis on the interests of the membership and shifted to a broader emphasis on national interests. A typical state corporatist setting of trade unions, it was further held, is found where the labour movement is concentrated in one dominating central confederation which in turn is crafted into the central party or state structures.

Within a state-corporatist perspective, questioning the democratic potential of the Zambian trade union movement and in particular ZCTU, it was argued that UNIP, through a combination of benefits and repression, had tied the trade union movement so closely to the party that the unions were no longer part of civil society but rather part of political society. It was further argued that because the trade unions were organised in singular, compulsory and non-competitive structures, they had been granted representational monopoly. As a result, they were not accountable to their membership but to the party. Consequently, it was not possible to trace a quest for organisational and financial autonomy, or to distinguish the ideological position of the trade unions from that of UNIP. The decision to break the alliance with UNIP, and become part of the struggle for the reintroduction of multiparty democracy, was related to the economic crisis and the resulting deep frustration of the trade unions rather than to a genuine quest for autonomy. This implied that the trade union movement was not acting on the basis of long term interests and objectives.

7.1 Party labour relations 1960-1991

To what extent did the theoretical concepts capture the nature of party labour relations in Zambia? And did the study provide an answer to the question of why the trade unions became a central force in the processes of political reform?

The analysis of party labour relations started with an assessment of the very “end” of history; the role of ZCTU in the process of transition from one-party politics to multiparty democracy in 1990-1991. The analysis indicated that at this point ZCTU functioned as the spearhead of the trade union movement in opposition to the one-party regime. The labour Congress put the question of the return of multiparty politics on the public agenda in 1989 and was instrumental in the creation of the opposition
movement, the Movement for Multiparty Democracy. In the process of political mobilisation, the organisational network, funding and human resources of ZCTU were utilised by the opposition as a whole. It cannot be argued that the trade union movement aimed at becoming an alternative party as it worked in close cooperation with other opposition forces. Furthermore, the role of the trade union movement in the political mobilisation period must be considered as very significant as the Congress was the only organisation in Zambia, apart from the governing party, possessing organisational resources enabling it to reach large segments of the population. Based on the two theoretical hypotheses presented initially, it can be concluded that in the process of transition to democracy the trade union movement through its central Congress acted as an autonomous civil society association in a pluralist sense. However, the question of ideology, or why the trade unions through ZCTU broke its alliance with UNIP, could not be answered on the basis of the events of 1990-91, as the political campaign did not focus on issues, but rather on personalities.

Comparing the role of the trade unions in the 1990-91 processes of reform with the struggle for national independence in the 1960s, there were clear analogies. Both in 1964 and in 1991 the trade unions took on a political role and became the leading association in the creation of a political alternative to the present regime. Furthermore, on both occasions opposition forces outside the trade union structures utilised the organisational resources of the union movement in a political struggle. The main difference between these two main historical events in the trade union history concerns the perception of the transformation of the trade union movement. In the 1960s, a large group of politically oriented trade union leaders envisioned the political orientation of the trade union movement to be permanent. In a new era of national politics they saw an autonomous trade union movement to be largely irrelevant because all Zambians would now work together in the development of the nation. Nevertheless, the issue of subordination of the trade union movement to the party created conflicts within the union movement which obviously weakened it as a force during this period.

In the 1990-91 political campaign, this conflict was absent as no one was arguing for a permanent political role of the trade union movement nor the subordination of the unions to MMD. In 1991, all trade union leaders emphasised that their role in the political process was temporary, and when pluralism was reinstated in Zambia, the trade union movement would return to their responsibility of safeguarding the economic interests of their members. Beyond doubt, the historical events of the 1960s and the relationship between UNIP and the trade unions at that time coloured the
political rhetoric of the 1990s. The trade union leadership was determined not “to commit the same mistakes” as the trade unionists had made in 1960 by subordinating the unions to UNIP.

The historical material indicated that the trade union movement which first developed in Zambia in the 1940s and 1950s evolved in close cooperation with the European Mine Workers’ Union in the Copperbelt. Modelled on British trade union traditions, the movement initially developed as a pluralist interest group seeing the promotion of economic interests of the membership as its main objective. The pluralist nature which became evident in the political reforms of 1990-91 was, in other words, a continuation of the trade union traditions of the first formative period. It was this pluralist nature, emphasising the membership and trade union autonomy vis-à-vis the governing authorities, the new government sought to alter in the first period after independence. The analysis indicated that the policies of the new government were supported by large parts of the trade union leadership at this point. In order to communicate its policy objectives to the workers, UNIP created a trade union congress, ZCTU, which in the first decade after independence was lead by politically oriented trade union leaders.

However, UNIP failed to transform the trade union movement from performing as autonomous interest groups to productionist units sharing the development objectives of the government and ZCTU. The largest and best organised unions, in particular those of the mine workers and the railway workers, consistently opposed attempts at subordination as they had opposed party-control during the struggle for independence. Due to this strong opposition, the trade union movement therefore remained autonomous during this first period of independence. It was, however, at the same time weakened as a force because a large number of the experienced leaders had been offered government positions in the UNIP government.

Another important factor in explaining the failure of cooptation in the first period related to UNIP’s strategies. Whereas the aims of UNIP fit the corporative model because they sought to coopt all important civil society associations, the UNIP strategies cannot be considered corporatist. Contrary to many other developing regimes, the UNIP government sought to transform trade union party relations through voluntarist mechanisms with a strong emphasis on ideology.

The failure of transforming the trade union movement during this period, indicated by the high level of industrial unrest and the unions’ continued emphasis on the economic grievances of their members, persuaded the government to alter their strategies. Two legislative changes seriously affected industrial relations in this period; the introduction of the One-Party
Constitution (1973) and the Industrial Relations Act of 1971 (implemented in 1974). Contrary to many other African nations, the one-party state in Zambia was introduced in a situation where opposition parties not only existed but were growing in terms of support and organisational strength. Nonetheless, the One-Party Participatory Democracy Constitution outlawed all opposition to UNIP and enshrined in law that all civil society associations be affiliated to the party. The 1971 Industrial Relations Act made affiliation to ZCTU mandatory; it increased the powers of the Congress over the national unions; and strike action became de facto illegal. By the time of introducing the one-party state in Zambia, the industrial policies of UNIP resembled state-corporatist policies in aims and strategies. However, considering the results or outcome of the policies, it cannot be concluded that they were altogether successful.

In retrospect, the period between 1973 and 1980 must be considered the closest to state corporatism in the history of Zambian labour relations. Going back to the definitions of corporatism presented in chapter two (2.7), emphasising the organisation of interest groups in singular, compulsory, non-competitive, hierarchically ordered structures, the mandatory affiliation to ZCTU places to an extent Zambia in a corporatist framework. Through the Industrial Relations Act and the one-party structure, both UNIP and the trade union movement with ZCTU as the central organisation were organised in singular, hierarchical orders, protected from competition by law. Furthermore, it can be argued that the trade union movement to a large extent appeared to accept the legislative changes. In particular, the educational strengthening was welcomed. It should here be recognised that the trade union movement at this point was lead by a UNIP supportive leadership, which may explain why it opposed the legislative changes only to a limited extent.

Nevertheless, the analysis indicated that the trade unions did not accept all the legislative changes introduced. The most important exemption here relates to their refusal to be incorporated into the party as mass-organisations through the one-party Constitution. Because UNIP at the time accepted the continued organisational autonomy of the unions, it must be concluded that while the trade unions at this point are tied to the state more closely than before, they maintained their autonomy in one important respect: The trade unions still continued to rely on collective bargaining instead of the works councils and the industrial relations court and despite the prohibition on strike activity, industrial strikes continued.

The importance of the preserved organisational autonomy was apparent in 1980 when the first conflict between ZCTU and UNIP came to the surface. Considering the questions put initially of whether the legislative
changes tied the unions closer to UNIP or whether they instead strengthened the organisational basis of the union movement, it is evident that the answer is yes in respect to both. The incorporation of the union movement increased in this period and the autonomy of the labour movement was reduced. But, beyond doubt, the legislative changes in a number of ways also strengthened the union movement through the emphasis on education and the unity “imposed” through the policy of mandatory affiliation to the Congress and the policy of one-industry-one-union.

The relationship between ZCTU and UNIP changed in this first period after the introduction of the one-party state and the changes in the leadership of the trade union congress is important here. As a result of UNIP’s policy of coopting the trade union leaders into party positions, a leadership gap emerged in the trade union movement. Contrary to the politically oriented trade union leaders, the new generation of leaders preferred the union movement to be independent from the party. The strategies of UNIP failed, as it produced results quite detrimental to the intended objectives. UNIP invested large resources in educational facilities for union members in order to increase their understanding of their national responsibilities. Instead, the education strengthened the trade unions’ and workers’ knowledge of their rights and opportunities. When the leadership and the workers at different levels of the union movement started to advocate for more trade union autonomy, the trade union movement and its central policy making organ, ZCTU, became a “monster” in the eyes of the UNIP leadership. ZCTU, originally intended as a locomotive of the workers in Zambia’s socialist development, was transformed in the period between 1973 and 1980 and became a vehicle for opposition against the UNIP regime.

The conflicts between UNIP and ZCTU became manifest for the first time in 1980 over the introduction of the Local Government Act, or the issue of decentralisation. The conflicts emerging from this issue related not only to the control of local government, but to the more fundamental issue of party control at all levels in society and to the question of trade union autonomy in industrial relations. The campaign against the Act was lead and largely initiated by the Congress and supported by the affiliated unions, most notably the mine workers and the local authority workers. From 1980 onwards ZCTU defined itself as a lead organisation of an independent trade union movement against the policies of UNIP. This was also evident in the issues of conflict emerging after 1981, such as the attempts to turn the trade unions into mass-associations of the party, the introduction of structural adjustment policies, the role of IMF and the 1990 Industrial Relations Act.
7.2 Union politics and pluralist traditions

The trade union movement which emerged in Zambia was founded on pluralist principles and it was autonomous vis-à-vis the colonial powers. Its autonomous nature was, however, challenged when the struggle for national independence gathered momentum and a group of politically oriented trade unionists argued for the subordination of the unions to the party. Despite the strong attempts to alter the pluralist nature of the trade union movement, it nonetheless maintained an element of organisational autonomy throughout the post-colonial period, and became a main opposition-force to UNIP from 1980 and onwards.

Based on this historical analysis of trade union party relations, it can be argued that the trade union movement as a whole never altered its form or purpose since its formation in the 1950s. Rather, it was the role of the central leadership, and most importantly ZCTU, that changed. From having functioned as a government agency and communicated the policy aims of UNIP to the workers, ZCTU has after 1980 defined itself as the central association of an autonomous trade union movement. As a central civil society association, ZCTU sought to influence the policy decisions of UNIP. Considering the question of ideological distinctiveness of the trade unions vis-à-vis UNIP, two issues in particular created a conflict throughout the period considered.

First, the trade union movement has continuously defended its organisational autonomy vis-à-vis the party and state. This issue created conflicts in the 1960s, and it has consistently been a source of friction in trade union party relations. After introducing the one-party state in 1973, the trade union movement objected to the subordination of the union movement and this was also reflected in the policy stand of the trade union movement in the 1980-1981 conflicts over the issue of decentralisation. The attempts to turn the trade unions into a mass-organisation under the control of the party after 1982 was consistently opposed by the trade unions in defence of their organisational autonomy.

Besides the continued demand for organisational autonomy, emphasis on the members and the social and economic conditions of unionised workers is a second consistent feature throughout the history of Zambian trade unionism. It was probably in this respect that the industrial relations policies of UNIP in the post-colonial period were least successful. The union leadership has always been under strong pressure from its rank and file and branch level membership. This is reflected in the long tradition of abandoning labour leaders who were judged to be too close to the government. This factor is emphasised in numerous studies conducted of
the trade union movement in Zambia and it indicates that there is considerable power and influence at the branch level. As a result, it can be held that the union leadership has been pushed into two conflicting directions in the post-colonial period as they also have been under strong pressure from UNIP to alter the structure and culture of the trade union movement.

Considering the two hypotheses proposed initially it can therefore be argued that the trade union movement, in opposing the one-party rule, was autonomous vis à vis UNIP and acting in close cooperation with other opposition forces. They opposed the one-party system in order to defend their own autonomous position and pluralist basis. It can therefore be held that the corporatist aims of UNIP failed because the trade union movement defended its traditional role as an interest group in a pluralist sense. The reasons for the labour movement’s continued opposition to the attempts of incorporation must be sought in its organisational strength which were consolidated before the emergence of the national government. Furthermore, the pluralist tradition and close contact with British trade unionism have influenced Zambian labour throughout the post-colonial period. This indicates that the argument posed by Scoville and Sturmthal (1973) concerning the importance of the ideological position of trade unions in the formative stages to its ideology at later stages, to a large extent is confirmed in the case of Zambia.

However, in considering why the state-corporatist policies of the UNIP regime failed, two other factors which relate to the strength and nature of the regime itself must be considered. The policy aims of UNIP did not diverge from most developing nations aiming at rapid economic development through industrialisation and with a minimum of opposition to its own policies. However, contrary to many other developing nations, the Zambian regime never developed as an overtly repressive authoritarian state. While it is evident that elements of force and repression were present and that opposition forces were threatened, the UNIP regime cannot be compared to many Latin American authoritarian regimes. This relates to the weakness of the state vis à vis civil society forces and most notably the trade union movement. Judging from the mass-strike actions following the detention of the labour leaders in 1981, the food riots in 1985, 1987 and 1990 succeeding the implementation of the structural adjustment measures, it is evident that the UNIP regime lacked the strength to implement policies which were regarded as detrimental to the immediate interests of its large urban population. It must further be acknowledged that the philosophy of Humanism rendered the use of repression largely unattractive. Since humanist philosophy strongly stressed the value of participation and
harmony, the labour opposition capitalised upon the inconsistencies in the use of repression versus the stated objectives of Humanism. It can further be held that extensive use of force would have weakened the international standing of the Kaunda regime which strongly emphasised its international position as a defender of human rights. These factors indicate that the term state-corporatism can capture the Zambian post-colonial political developments only to a limited degree.

Considering the pluralist perspective, did the hypotheses put forward initially capture Zambian industrial relations and provide an answer to the question of why the trade unions broke its alliance with UNIP? To an extent, the answer to this question must be positive. It is obvious that the trade union movement in Zambia has been autonomous from UNIP both in terms of the utilisation of funds and organisational resources. It is evident that there are clear ideological differences concerning the role of the state and interest groups in society and that the contrasting views have contributed to the decision to break the alliance with UNIP. However, it is not possible to explain the role of trade unions in opposition to UNIP without regard to the economic crisis. Considering the fact that the wages of a Zambian mine worker in real terms have been cut in half between 1975 and 1990, it becomes clear that the economic situation more than anything has accentuated the need for change in Zambia. The trade unions' support of MMD and the policies of privatisation advocated by this party, must be understood against the desire for change. The trade union support of the economic restructuring measures proposed by IMF expressed in the election campaign, was clearly not present in the policy platform of the trade union movement prior to 1990-91.

The significance of the economic recession in understanding changes in party labour relations illustrate a point raised initially, namely that the two concepts of (state) corporatism and pluralism are not mutually exclusive. It is obvious that the economic crisis has altered the relationship between UNIP and the trade unions. The fact that UNIP no longer could "buy support" from the union movement by offering wage increases and food subsidies aggravated the conflict. Yet, it is also apparent that the contention between the trade union movement and UNIP cannot be reduced to the economic conflict as the sole explanatory factor. The analysis has indicated that the ideological dissension has been present for a long time and that the trade union movement never accepted UNIP's policies of incorporation. Consequently, it must be concluded that while the two hypotheses put forward were analytically distinctive and therefore exposed the distinctions between the ideology of UNIP and the labour movement, it is evident that
in reality the economic and political factors contributing to the changes in party labour relations are closely linked.

7.3 The role of civil society and trade unions in the process of sustaining democracy

The analysis has mainly emphasised the relationship between the trade union movement and the party at the national level of politics. The role of ZCTU was emphasised because the Congress was the main policy-formulating organ of the labour movement and instrumental in the process of return to multiparty democracy. However, as the analysis has made evident, the relationship between the Congress and the affiliated national unions has been a main issue of conflict throughout the history of trade unionism in Zambia. The study has further indicated that despite strong efforts to transform the labour movement through the cooptation of its leadership, it has remained a pluralist association. This, in my opinion, emphasises the strength of the lower levels of the trade union organisation. It demonstrates that an analysis of the internal decision-making procedures is required in addition to studies of leadership decisions and policy changes at the macro level of politics.

To fully assess why the conflicts between the labour movement and UNIP have taken place in the 1980s and how the trade union can be expected to act in future, it will be necessary to conduct studies of the internal structure of decision making in the trade union movement. Questions relating to the influence of the branch-level on issues such as economic liberalism and market economy cannot be properly answered in this study. It can therefore be argued that this analysis has generated new hypotheses regarding the importance of internal democracy in the Zambian trade union movement and its influence on policy-outcomes at the national level.

Regarding the future role of the trade union movement in the new multiparty democracy, obviously the performance of the trade union movement and its relationship with MMD cannot be determined at this stage. Only new analyses of industrial relations in the Third Republic can provide a coherent answer to this question. However, based on the findings in this analysis, I believe it is possible to provide some tentative answers to the question.

In general terms, it can be held that as a pluralist interest group functioning primarily in defence of the economic and social interests of its members, the Zambian trade union movement has for the second time in
history adopted a political role and become an instrumental force in national political reforms. The labour movement can therefore be expected to continue its role as an autonomous interest group working primarily for the interest of its members. As such, the trade union movement will function as an important civil society association acting as a check against the abuse of state power. Considering the organisational strength of Zambian labour, its pluralist tradition and long history in defence of its autonomous position, it can be expected to remain a vital civil society force. The trade union movement and ZCTU will therefore constitute an important factor in the defence of the pluralist democratic constitution.

However, the continued reliance on the support of its membership and the preoccupation with their economic welfare puts certain restrictions on the role of the trade union movement as defenders of the new and fragile democracy in Zambia. In particular, its support of MMD may be short-term. During the election campaign, the trade union leadership defended the decision to support MMD by arguing that it was a more progressive party than UNIP and more responsive to the needs of labour. The same term was applied in the 1960s when the trade union leaders at that time decided to align with UNIP. With regard to MMD the term progressive was never clearly defined in 1990, but the labour leadership expected the new government to be accountable to their electorate, eradicate fraud and corruption and create job opportunities. However, the trade union leaders would only support MMD and their efforts to privatise the economy as long as these policy measures did not lead to increasing redundancies, which very likely will be the result in a short term perspective.

Herein lies the greatest challenge and obstacle to the sustainability of the new system: In order to establish a functioning democracy based on sound economic policies, MMD needs time to restructure the economy and to consolidate its power-base. In this process, the government needs support from civil society. However, the support from the trade unions depends on the achievement of economic results perceived from the perspective of unionised workers. It may not be possible for the trade union movement to accept immediate hardships for a future positive outcome. If the current downward spiral of increasing unemployment and declining standards of living continues, the trade union movement’s support of the new government may therefore prove short-lived. In spite of this, the workers’ support for Chiluba and the other former highly respected labour leaders in the government may prove to be decisive because they may be able to induce a sense of discipline in the trade union movement. Nevertheless, based on the history and tradition of the Zambian trade union movement,
the support of MMD will most likely depend on the economic behaviour of the government.

A further issue of uncertainty relates to the question of whether the multiparty system will provide any alternative alliance partners to the trade union movement. MMD won an overwhelming majority in the 1991 elections, and it is evident that the parliamentary opposition is weak. This is yet another challenge to the new democracy, to create pluralism in terms of plausible alternative parties. This obviously points to the importance of civil society, since the sustainability of the new democracy depends on a wide array of civic associations in addition to the trade union movement.

The analysis has portrayed the role of one civil society association in the process of political reform. Yet, despite the fact that the trade union movement due to its organisational strength has emerged as the most significant opposition force to the UNIP government in the 1980s, it is by no means the only civil society association in Zambia and not the only organisation to have opposed UNIP’s policies. The churches, for example, have been an outspoken opposition force on issues ranging from the introduction of the humanist ideology and scientific socialism to the school curriculum. On a number of issues the churches and the trade unions have cooperated in opposition to UNIP. Considering the importance attached to civil society associations in consolidation of democracy, research on and support to a wide array of civil society associations in Zambia is called for. This thesis has therefore only covered a fraction, albeit a very significant one, of Zambian civil society.

The study of the Zambian trade union movement and its role in the process of transition to democracy has indicated that trade unions due to their organisational strength, position in the economy and ability to put pressure on the regime through work-stoppages, are significant associations in processes of transition from authoritarian to democratic regimes. It can be concluded that the case of Zambia to a large extent has confirmed the theories of democratisation generated from a European and Latin American context.

To what extent can the study of Zambian party labour relations and the role of the trade union movement in the process of democratisation be generalised to Africa as a whole? Can trade unions be expected to play similar roles in Kenya, Malawi and Zaire? I believe the general applicability of the Zambian experience may be limited concerning the role of the trade union movement. As emphasised initially, the labour movement in Zambia is remarkable in an African context, due to its organisational strength, union density and the strength of the Zambian industrial sector. Different civil society associations are, however, playing significant roles.
in the processes of political reforms in most African countries. Future comparative research should consider which other civil society associations can perform similar functions to the ones of the Zambian trade unions. It should also address issues like the relative advantages and disadvantages of a church led opposition vis à vis a trade union opposition.

The importance of civil society and voluntary associations in terms of economic and political development is increasing in Africa. Beyond doubt, the significance of civil society associations will also be reflected in the scholarly research in the years to come. In this respect, the necessity of empirically based studies of the history, nature and functions of civil society associations cannot be stressed enough.
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**Primary Sources**


## Appendix I

Unions affiliated to the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (1991) and their membership

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Union membership</th>
<th>1982</th>
<th>1986</th>
<th>1990</th>
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<tr>
<td>1. Airways and Allied Workers Union of Zambia</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>10,243</td>
<td>8,858</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Civil Servants Union of Zambia (CSUZ)</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>33,000</td>
<td>28,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Guards Unions of Zambia (GUZ)</td>
<td>7,543</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>13,128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Hotel and Catering Workers Union of Zambia</td>
<td>3,022</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>7,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Mine-workers Union of Zambia (MUZ)</td>
<td>54,570</td>
<td>45,186</td>
<td>58,808</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. National Union of Building, Engineering and General Workers (NUBEGW)</td>
<td>25,887</td>
<td>35,000</td>
<td>25,084</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. National Union of Commercial and Industrial Workers (NUCIW)</td>
<td>67,000</td>
<td>28,000</td>
<td>27,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. National Union of Communication Workers (NUCW)</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>6,319</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. National Union of Plantation and Agricultural Workers (NUPAW)</td>
<td>11,340</td>
<td>10,143</td>
<td>16,674</td>
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<tr>
<td>10. National Union of Public Service Workers</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>82,025</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. National Union of Transport and Allied Workers</td>
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<td>9,000</td>
<td>7,592</td>
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<td>12. Railway Workers Union of Zambia (RWUZ)</td>
<td>11,161</td>
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<td>2,434</td>
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<td>15. Zambia Electricity Workers Union (ZEWU)</td>
<td>4,538</td>
<td>4,200</td>
<td>6,600</td>
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<td>16. Zambia National Union of Health and Allied Workers</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,219</td>
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<td>17. Zambia National Union of Teachers (ZNUT)</td>
<td>26,000</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>36,230</td>
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<td>18. Zambia Union of Financial Institutions and Allied Workers (ZUFIAW)</td>
<td>8,200</td>
<td>7,100</td>
<td>11,754</td>
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<tr>
<td>19. Zambia United Local Authorities Workers Union (ZULAWU)</td>
<td>25,649</td>
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<td>25,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total membership</td>
<td>327,301</td>
<td>340,818</td>
<td>352,900</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Appendix II

Names and occupations of the respondents

1. Labour representatives

* Mr. C. Sampa, Assistant General Secretary, Zambia Congress of Trade Unions, Lusaka, September 5, 1991.
* Mr. Alec Chirwa, Assistant General Secretary, Zambia Congress of Trade Unions, Lusaka, September 16, 1991.
* Mr. N. Zimba, General Secretary Zambia Congress of Trade Unions, Kitwe September 18, 1991.
* Mr. I. Makandawirw, Chairman of The Hotel and Catering Workers Union, Kitwe, September 18, 1991.
* Mr. Mudenda, acting General Secretary Zambian Local Authorities Workers Union (ZLAWU) and Mr. Muempol and Mr. Mufuluua, Secretary of Finance and Education, Ndola, September 19, 1991.
* Mr. V. Banda, Deputy Chairman, Communication Workers Union, Ndola, September 19, 1991.
* Mr. F. Kunda, National Chairman Mine Workers Union of Zambia (MUZ), Kitwe, September 19, 1991.
* Mr. Morris Nkhata, Chairman ZCTU District Committee, Kitwe and Stephen Nyangu, Trustee ZCTU District Committee, Kitwe, Kitwe September 20 1991.
* Mr. A. Mukupa, Research Department Zambian Congress of Trade Unions, Kitwe September, 25, 1991.
* Rev. P. Mulenga, National Chairman of Zambia Union of Financial Institutions and Allied Workers (ZUFIAW) and Mr. Geofrey Alikipo, General Secretary of ZUFIAW, Lusaka September 30, 1991.
* Mr. J.C. Moonde, Deputy General Secretary, Civil Servants Union of Zambia, Lusaka, September 30, 1991.

2. Employers (private)

* Mr. Chuboa, National Chairman, Zambian Federation of Employers (ZFE), Kitwe, September 22, 1991.
* Mr. Sanyambe, economist, Zambian Federation of Employers (ZFE), Lusaka September 11, 1991.

3. Representatives of the party and government UNIP

* Mr. K. J. Ngwisha, Principal Advisor and Director of UNIP Research Bureau, Lusaka, September 12, 1991.
* Mr. Phiri, Director, Department of Industrial Participatory Democracy, Lusaka, September 11, 1991.
* Mr. Nyrienda, Assistant Labour Commissioner, October 7 1991, Lusaka.
* Mr. Punabantu, Senior Political Advisor to Kenneth Kaunda, State House, Lusaka October 4, 1991.

4. Other resource persons

* Dr. A. Mwanza, economist, SAPES, Harare, August 26, 1991.
* Dr. B. Katundu (formerly Liatto), Department of African Development Studies, University of Zambia, Lusaka, September 9, 1991.
* Dr. B. Kamwanga, School of Law, University of Zambia, Lusaka, September 11, 1991.
Appendix III

The interview guide

A) Questions put to labour representatives

1. Personal information, how long have you served in the labour movement?
2. By the introduction of the one-party state in 1972, how would you describe the relationship between the labour movement and UNIP?
3. What in your opinion have been the main areas of conflict between the labour movement and UNIP during the one-party state?
4. When would you say the relationship changed from cordial to conflictual if that is your opinion?
5. What are the main philosophical differences between the trade union movement and UNIP?
6. The International Relations Act of 1971 introduced various schemes of workers participation in addition to collective bargaining such as works councils, participation on boards of directors and self management. How would you regard these measures in terms of usefulness for workers and trade unions as a whole?
7. How would you assess the role of the Zambian labour movement in the economic development of Zambia?
8a. How would you describe the relationship between the ZCTU and the affiliated unions?
8b. How would you describe the relationship between your union and the ZCTU?
9. On what issues have your union disagreed with the ZCTU?
10. To what extent and how has the trade union movement been part of the process of reintroducing multiparty politics?
11. What was the main objectives of the trade union movement for entering the political struggle for reform?
12. Would it be correct to assume that the trade union movement has changed strategy in the late 1980s from autonomy to affiliation with the opposition party MMD?
13. How do you envision the role of the trade union movement and the ZCTU in the third republic?

14. What are the main areas of difference between the Industrial Relations Act of 1971 and 1990?

15. What are the main reasons for opposing the 1990 Industrial Relations Act?

16. The ZCTU has never launched a national wide strike, is this a sign of weakness?

17. Who do the unions speak on behalf of?

18. Who does the MMD speak on behalf of?

17. You are now supporting a party proposing harsh measures of privatisation which will probably lead to redundancies. How can you defend this to the members of your union?

18. To what extent is productivity and decline of such, a responsibility of labour?

19. Labour leaders in Zambia have a long history of participating in politics, to what extent has the political roles been a gain to the labour movement?

20. How do you regard the alliance between the ZCTU and the MMD?

21. What is your opinion on the success of tripartite negotiations in Zambia?

B) Questions put to UNIP officials

1. How long have you held your present occupation and what is your background?

2. What were the main aims of UNIP’s post-independence industrial relations policies?

3. Does it make sense to talk of a union movement in the sense of a united trade union movement?

4. It is commonly held that the Industrial Relations Act of 1971 served to strengthen the trade union movement. What was the motivation of UNIP for introducing this act?

5. What are the main issues of disagreement between the ZCTU and UNIP?

6. To what extent was the UNIP strategy of transforming the labour into cooperation for economic goals a success or a failure?

7. What would you describe as the main philosophical differences between the ZCTU and UNIP?

8. Would you defend the one-party state in 1972, and in 1991?
10. Where in your opinion, did the quest for multiparty democracy originate?
11. How do you see the role of labour in this situation?
12. How do you regard the alliance between the MMD and the ZCTU?
13. How do you envision state labour relations in the Third Republic?
14. How do you regard the 1990 Industrial Relations Act?
15. To what extent has UNIP been a labour party catering to the interests of the workers?
Appendix IV

The issues where UNIP and the trade unions have differed according to the respondents.

**Political issues of dispute**

The introduction of the Local Government Act, or the issue of decentralisation (1980) (19 responses).
The issue of turning the trade unions into a mass-organisation of the party (6 responses).
UNIP’s policies of Humanism and socialism (6 responses).
The introduction of the 1990 Industrial Relations Act (3 responses).
Chiluba’s refusal to accept a position in the UNIP Central Committee (1980) (1 response).
The role of Zambia in the liberation struggle of the neighbouring countries (1 response).
The introduction of the Set of Statutory Instruments no 6 1985 (1 response).

**Economic issues of dispute**

The introduction of the IMF sponsored structural adjustment programmes (SAP) (10 responses).
The high taxation of workers in the formal sector (4 responses).
The issue of introducing a Poverty Datum Line (2 responses).
The introduction of free medical care and education to all citizens of Zambia (2 responses).
The reintroduction of SAP in 1989 (1 response)
The cut of subsidies on basic foods (mealie meal), part of IMF programme (1 response).
(Number of respondents answering coherently to this question: 20)
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