From Peace Dove to Hawk
Norway's participation in international military operations after the Cold War

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Jannicke Fiskvik, May 2013
Abbreviations

Ap  Arbeiderpartiet [the Labour Party]
AU  African Union
DUUUFK  Den utvidede utenriks- og forsvarskomité [the Enlarged Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee]
DUUK  Den utvidede utenrikskomité [the Enlarged Foreign Affairs Committee]
FrP  Fremskrittspartiet [the Progress Party]
H  Høyre [the Conservative Party]
ISAF  International Stability Assistance Force
KrF  Kristelig Folkeparti [the Christian People’s Party]
MoD  Ministry of Defence
MFA  Ministry of Foreign Affairs
NAC  North Atlantic Council
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NOK  Norwegian Kroner
NRK  Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation
OAF  Operation Allied Force
OEF  Operation Enduring Freedom
OSCE  Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PRT  Provincial Reconstruction Team
ROEs  Rules of engagement
Sp  Senterpartiet [the Centre Party]
SV  Sosialistisk Venstreparti [the Socialist Left Party]
UK  United Kingdom
UN  United Nations
UNPROFOR  United Nations Protection Force
UNSC  United Nations Security Council
US  United States of America
V  Venstre [the Liberal party]
WMD  Weapons of Mass Destruction
WWI  World War I
WWII  World War II
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1 Introduction

Shortly after the terrorist attack against a gas facility in Algeria on January 16th 2013, the Norwegian Foreign Minister, Espen Barth Eide, opened up for a possible Norwegian military contribution to the French Mali intervention – emphasising the need to stop extreme Islamists from getting a hold of Northern Mali (Andreassen 2013). How did it come to that Norway, a small country in the periphery of Europe, so quickly considered intervening in a region far away from its borders and strategic interests? The present thesis is an analysis of Norway’s participation in international military operations after the Cold War. By applying the two-level games of Robert Putnam (1988), the analysis addresses the interaction between international and domestic factors, as to examine the Norwegian Government’s constraints and options regarding the decision of participation. The main aim of the study is to investigate whether there has been a development in Norwegian use of force under international auspices, by examining the cases of Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya.

The post-Cold War geopolitical context has produced a security climate in which the perceptions of security threats are diffuse. There has been an increased amount of international operations, with the aim of both peace-keeping and military interventions. Since the small contribution in the Gulf War in 1991, Norway has participated in several international military operations, including the dropping of the first Norwegian bombs since World War II (WWII) in Afghanistan in 2003. In 2011, Norway contributed to the intervention in Libya, in which Norwegian F-16 fighter aircrafts delivered almost 600 bombs during the air campaign – a contribution that surprised the international community. With the demise of the Soviet Union, Norway has lost its strategic relevance to NATO. Consequently, the Defence has gone through major changes, and the gradual shift of focus from territorial defence to participation in international operations is evident.

The decision to deploy armed forces is one of the most important ones taken in all political systems. What is the rationale for Norway’s participation? Which factors were decisive in determining the specific Norwegian contributions? And, is there a growing tendency that Norway, i.e. politicians, military personnel and the public opinion, is becoming more accustomed to Norwegian armed forces participating in sharp missions far away from Norwegian borders?

1.1 Research questions

International military operations are complex and involve many different actors and phases. The present thesis does not aim to give an account of and discuss each operation, but to focus
on the political decisions made prior. Accordingly, two main questions will be addressed in the analysis: 1) Why did Norway decide to join (or not join) the operation, and 2) Why did Norway contribute in the way it did? These questions are closely related. However, it is useful to distinguish between the two as better to clarify the rationale for participation, and divide between politics and policy. A central point of departure of the thesis is that the analysis needs to include both international and domestic factors for the purpose of fully understanding the decision of participation, and the specific contributions provided in each operation.

The Norwegian Government will be central in the analysis as the main actor that is represented both on the international, and the domestic arena. With the first question, I seek to investigate how much leeway the Norwegian Government has in its foreign policy when facing international expectations and domestic demands. In terms of the second question, it is a recurring problem within NATO that the member states have different rules of engagement (ROEs) for their national forces in the operations they partake in (Saideman & Auerswald 2011). ROEs can be defined as internal instructions concerning when, where and how to use force (Dahl 2008, p. 397). Restrictions a state poses in addition to the ROEs of the mission, is in the analysis defined as ‘national caveats’. While some states are more liberal regarding the latter, others are more restrictive, which in the next round may hinder cooperation between the different national forces (Morelli & Belkin 2009). Hence, it is interesting to investigate which factors are decisive in the question of contributions, as states have different conditions for the use of its forces. This is supported by Frost-Nielsen (2011), who points out that military participation in an international operation is not only a question of whether or not to participate; it also concerns the conditions of the participation.

1.2 Previous research

1.2.1 Norway’s security and defence policy

The end of the Cold War and the subsequently changed geopolitical context is a recurring theme in recent studies on Norwegian security and defence policy. Considering the topic of the present thesis, this section seeks to identify the main foci of relevant literature1.

Numerous studies highlight the evident dualism of realpolitik and idealpolitik in Norwegian foreign policy2 (Østerud 2006; Toje 2010; Harviken & Skjælsbæk 2010; Haug 2012). Neumann (2012) points out that a central premise in the debate on Norwegian foreign policy has been that realpolitik opposes idealpolitik. However, in a more complex and

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1 Note that the present subdivision of the literature involves closely related issues, and that they are not mutually exclusive.
2 This will be thoroughly discussed in chapter 3.
unpredictable international situation, it is argued that idealpolitik, as a combination of self-interest and altruism, has become more integrated in Norway’s foreign policy as to stabilise the present world order (Berger 2006; Knutsen 2007; Skånland 2009; Svenbalrud 2012). Espenes and Haug (2012) argue that Norway will be more willing to participate in international operations when it can be justified in terms of both idealpolitik and realpolitik.

With the end of the Cold War, the Soviet threat against Norway’s security dissolved. A large body of the literature investigates the significance of the changed security climate, and how Norway is adjusting its security and defence policy to the new threat image. The main argument is that the diffused perceptions of threats and the lost strategic relevance in NATO have formed a need for change in the policy. Consequently, the Norwegian Defence has changed from having a territorial focus, to pursuing niche capabilities and moveable forces, along with participation in international missions (Matlary & Østerud 2005; Græger & Leira 2005; Haaland 2007; Rottem 2007; Heier 2011).

Another subject is the domestic power distribution between central actors in Norwegian foreign policy. It is argued that the role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is increasingly challenged, and that the Ministry of Defence and the Prime Minister’s office are becoming more involved in security issues (Græger & Neumann 2006; Udgaard 2006; Græger 2010). Nustad and Thune (2003) argue that the political consensus and the lack of debate on deploying military personnel abroad, indicates that the balance of power between parliament and the executive is unlikely to change. However, Matlary and Halvorsen (2006) point out that the line between foreign and domestic policy has become more blurry, and argue that political parties have a new window of influence in foreign policy issues.

Lastly, other authors address more specifically the use of force in international operations, and discuss the relationship between military power and the policy through which it functions. The main observation is that Norway contributes militarily for political influence and political effect (Fossum 2000; Rottem 2005; Toje 2012). With the case of Libya, Henriksen (2013a) challenges the conventional domestic view of the use of force, where the rationale for participation is for political effect, and argues that this should change to a focus on the military results the contributions may generate.

1.2.2 Military alliances

A common feature of most of the abovementioned studies is NATO – the cornerstone of Norwegian security and defence policy since Norway’s accession in 1949. It is emphasised that participation in an alliance entails obligations that limits the leeway of action and political
independency (Fermann 2007, p. 44). Hence, it is necessary to consider, in the present analysis, how NATO membership affects Norway in the question of using military force.

A considerable amount of literature has been published on military alliances. Many scholars address several aspects of alliances in their studies, and it is not always easy to place the different works in distinctive categories. Nonetheless, four broad subjects in the literature can be identified. These are alliance formation; alliance configuration; the effects of alliances on military conflict; and the economics of alliances.

Works on alliance formation concern why states choose to ally. A dominating part of this literature has a realpolitik perspective and stresses the importance of power in the pursuit of security, and as a motivation to commit to an alliance. It is underlined that the primary interest of states is to survive and to maintain security against attack (Morgenthau 1967; Liska 1968; Altfeld 1984; Walt 1987; Christensen & Snyder 1990). It is, however, suggested that shared values, preferences and institutions may play a role in alliance formation (Russett 1968; Siverson & Emmons 1991).

The second category examines alliance configuration. The focus lies on the different types of military alliances, and investigates alliance characteristics such as background and formation, integration, duration and termination (Singer & Small 1966; Russett 1971; Walt 1997; Snyder 1997; Leeds et al. 2002). Tertrais (2004) differentiates between formal alliances, informal alliances, and strategic partnership. He furthermore questions the use of alliance as a strategic concept, observing that trends from Afghanistan and Iraq confirm the growing tendency of ad hoc and bilateral alliances, over permanent and multilateral alliances. This point applies to the present analysis, as the case studies involve a mixture of NATO members and non-NATO countries. Hence, which factors can explain why some allies participate, while others abstain?

A third category investigates the effects of alliances on war, and to which extent alliances prevent or provoke military conflicts. Some studies suggest that alliances raise threat perceptions and hostility levels, and thus provoke rather than prevent war (Levy 1981; Vasquez 1993). A good example for this argument is the tension between the Triple Entente and the Triple Alliance on the eve of World War I (WWI), where the increasing rigidity of the alliance systems is argued to have been a contributing factor for the break out of the war (Nye 2009). Others find that alliances can both encourage and prevent military conflict, depending on the attributes of the alliance in question (Singer & Small 1968; Siverson & King 1980; Snyder 1984; Gibler 2000). Is Norway’s participation in international military operations after the Cold War thus a consequence of its NATO membership?
The fourth, and last category, concerns the economics of alliances. This category refers to the collective-goods theory of alliances, in which the security provided by an alliance is viewed as a public good. In this aspect the issue of burden-sharing is central. In the case of NATO, this has been a recurring theme since its foundation (see Hartley & Sandler 1999; Lindley-French 2007). Olson & Zeckhauser (1966) argue that larger powers contribute more to an alliance than the smaller powers, which gives the latter an incentive to free-ride on the former. The argumentation builds on the premise that once goods are provided, they are available to everyone. Drawing on the work by Olson and Zeckhauser, Conybeare, Murdoch and Sandler (1994) argue that the deterrence offered by an alliance is not only a purely public good, but that the defence activity can lead to country-specific benefits. Following a joint product model, it is indicated that the incentive for free-riding is curbed, as it opens up for an ally to spend more on defence so as to secure more private benefits which can only come from its own spending (Conybeare 1994; Sandler & Hartley 2001). Considering Norway’s argued loss of importance in NATO, the changes in the Norwegian Defence after the Cold War could be explained as efforts to secure private benefits (i.e. allied interest in coming to Norway’s aid), by proving Norway’s relevance to the Alliance.

1.3 Justification of the study

The present thesis is justified on three grounds. The first concerns the case of Norway. Much is written on the different operations, naturally with the exception of the fairly recent operation in Libya, though only a few scholars address the more general aspects of Norway’s participation in international military operations (Rottem 2007; Haaland 2007). Evaluating Kosovo, Afghanistan and Libya, Espenes and Haug (2012) provide an historical perspective, arguing that Norway has become more accustomed to the use of force. By going deeper into the topic and addressing the cases, including Iraq, systematically in a theoretical perspective, the present thesis can provide further insight into whether Libya is an exception to the rule, or if there has been a change in the Norwegian use of force under international auspices.

Secondly, the present thesis is interesting as it seeks to address the literature gap on alliances. To a broad extent, the literature looks at alliances in general, and does not explain why states might provide diverging levels of support. One observer has already drawn attention to this point; Auerswald notes that the writings on burden-sharing come closest in explaining the diverging levels, but do so by documenting inequalities in peacetime defence spending among NATO allies (2004, p. 632). NATO has been involved in all of the four case
studies in the present thesis. By examining Norway’s room for action in NATO, the analysis can further the understanding of state behaviour in military alliances.

Lastly, the thesis is justified with regards to theory. The theoretical approaches most often used to explain a state’s foreign policy are based on structural explanations, where the decisive factor is the anarchic conditions of the international system. Such an approach overlooks the influence of domestic factors, which I argue is important to consider when analysing low-intensity conflicts; since state survival is not at risk, there is arguably more room for manoeuvre in international relations. Studies that go beyond the state as a ‘black box’ are fewer and more studies are needed. By using a theoretical approach which includes both domestic and international factors, the study can provide insight into how the Norwegian Government faces pressure from both levels in its foreign policy.

1.4 Approach and sources
The present thesis will be a qualitative study based on a broad approach, in which the empirical framework includes four cases: the international military operations in Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya. By including all four operations, the examination of a possible development in Norway’s participation is strengthened. Although Norway did not participate in the intervention in Iraq, this case is just as interesting as it can shed light on reasons and possibilities for not participating. Norway has in the other cases provided different types of contributions, from humanitarian aid to armed forces. However, the prime focus of the analysis lies on the main military contribution.

The theoretical framework applied to the analysis is the two-level games, which addresses the international and the domestic arena. Regarding the former, the analysis needs to address the broader context of each operation and the international negotiation environment. NATO will be central in the analysis, both as a forum and as an actor. Moreover, the member states often initiate dialogue outside the framework of NATO. In this regard, the US is an important actor as the major power in the Alliance, and also considering the value Norway puts on the special relationship the two states have.

At the domestic level the analysis needs to clarified the institutional structure and the distribution of power between central actors in Norwegian security and defence policy. This includes an examination of preferences and views of the Government, the Parliament, the media, and the public opinion. There have been several changes of government during the

3 See chapter 3 for further elaboration.
4 The present analysis does not aim to distinguish among the newspapers, as they have become more moderate ideologically.
period in question, i.e. from Kosovo in 1999 to Libya in 2011\(^5\). The specific party constellation of each Government will be important to take into account, as well as that of central actors, i.e. the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister and the Defence Minister.

The analysis is based on a variety of sources in order to strengthen the interpretation of the findings\(^6\). The objective is to examine the decision-making process and the domestic negotiations on participation. The broad scope of sources supports the aim of moving beyond rhetoric used to the factual rationale of the decisions made. Dealing with security issues limits the access to primary sources as much information is sensitive and thus classified. In addition, the analysis involves recent cases, which makes it even more difficult to get insight into primary sources. The formal contact between the Norwegian Government and the Parliament goes through the Enlarged Committee for Foreign Affairs and Defence (DUUFK)\(^7\). The negotiations are secret, and the minutes from the meetings are first made public after 30 years. An examination of parliamentary proceedings has therefore been essential, as they indicate the position of the Parliament and the Government regarding the issues in question. In addition, official Government documents and statements have been used to examine the position of the Norwegian Government. UN documents and the NATO handbook have been important for the purpose of examining international responses and the framework of NATO. A thorough investigation of the views on Norway of the other allies is not viewed as feasible for the scope of the present thesis. It is, however, believed that the perception and statements of the Norwegian Government on NATO negotiations will be sufficient for the analysis.

With the limited access to primary sources, the analysis is to a large degree supplemented by media sources. Although media is a secondary source, and thus gives an additional interpretation, it indicates attitudes of central actors and dilemmas that were present. It is also a good source for examining the public sentiment. Considering the broad aim of the thesis, to investigate whether there has been a development in Norwegian use of force, academic literature has provided insight into the premises for Norwegian security and defence policy and additional perspectives on the subject.

Additionally, the analysis is based on information acquired through four interviews\(^8\). The interviews were conducted with Sigurd Frisvold, Sverre Diesen, Morten Høglund and Dag Henriksen. Sigurd Frisvold was Norwegian Chief of Defence from 1999 to 2005, succeeded by Sverre Diesen in 2005, who had the position until 2009. Having held the highest position

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\(^5\) See Appendix A for an overview of the Norwegian Governments from 1997 to the present.
\(^6\) All the citations in the present thesis from Norwegian sources are translated to English by the author.
\(^7\) The Committee of Foreign Affairs (DUUK) and the Committee of Defence was in 2009 merged into DUUFK.
\(^8\) See Appendix B for interview guide
of the Norwegian Defence Establishment, they have been able to provide highly relevant information to the thesis. Moreover, they cover a large part of the period examined in the analysis, and have as such given insight into the question of a development in Norwegian participation. Morten Høglund is a parliamentarian from the Progress Party, who has been a member in DUUK/DUUFK since 2001 until present. Covering almost the entire period in question, Høglund is a central source from the Parliament, who has provided insight into the political aspect of Norway’s participation in international operations. Høglund’s party affiliation may affect the information. However, considering the political consensus that characterises Norwegian security policy, he is believed to provide information that to a large extent reflects the Parliament’s point of view. Dag Henriksen is interviewed first and foremost as a scholar. I have chosen to interview Henriksen as he has done research on several of the conflicts examined in the thesis, and he has in the interview been able to provide useful insight to aspects important to the analysis. Despite the restricted access to primary sources, the broad scope of sources is believed to provide the analysis with the essential information needed to answer the research questions.

1.5 Thesis outline

The thesis is divided into six chapters. Chapter 2 lays out the theoretical dimensions of the research, and looks at how domestic factors can influence a state’s foreign policy. Lastly, it presents the two-level games of Putnam (1988), as the theoretical framework of the analysis. Chapter 3 provides a basis for the analysis, with the purpose of getting a clearer understanding of distinctive features of Norwegian security and defence policy. Central in the thesis is the dualism of realpolitik and idealpolitik, which will be assessed accordingly in the two first sections. The third section outlines the institutional framework for Norway’s foreign policy, followed by a brief account of NATO. Chapter 4 examines the four cases of the thesis. The argument presented is that Norway’s participation in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Libya can to a great extent be explained by international factors. However, one needs to address the domestic level to find a plausible explanation to the level of contributions and the Norwegian response in the case of Iraq. Chapter 5 brings the analysis one step further by applying the two-level games to the empirics. The main argument is that there has been a development in Norway’s participation in international military operations, from a ‘dovish’ attitude towards the use of force in Kosovo, to a more ‘hawkish’ and forward leaning attitude in Libya. Chapter 6 sums up the empirical analysis, followed by two general reflections into the development of Norwegian use of force internationally, grounded in Norway’s realpolitik and idealpolitik.
2 Theoretical framework

This chapter evaluates the theoretical framework of the analysis. The purpose of theory is that it provides us with the means to go beyond mere descriptions and enables us to explain why events happen, and to understand continuities as well as changes (Hyde-Price 2007, p. 7; Nye 2009, p. 9). To strengthen the analysis, a theoretical framework will therefore be used in order to frame the empirics in a larger context, and to support the investigation of a possible development in the Norwegian use of force under international auspices.

The first part of the chapter considers neo-realism and its main tenets, and the neo-realist account of NATO. The value of neo-realism for the broad picture of international relations is acknowledged. However, a central premise in the present thesis is that the case studies in question concern low-intensity conflicts, as they do not present an imminent threat to Norway and its allies; arguably the leeway in foreign policy actions of the Governments is greater, compared to situations in which state security is threatened. Hence, I argue that the unitary actor approach of neo-realism does not provide a sufficient framework for the analysis. More focus on domestic politics is needed, and part two presents the two-level games of Putnam (1988) which will be the theoretical framework applied to the empirics.

2.1 Neo-realism: a systemic theory of international politics

Neo-realism is a systemic theory that provides theoretical explanations to the ‘big questions’ in international politics, such as the causes of war, the use of force and the conditions of peace. According to neo-realists, it is a state’s position in the international system that determines its national interests and predicts its foreign policies (Hyde-Price 2007). They further argue that because changes in the principal units (i.e. states) do not match the similarity in outcomes, unit-level variation is irrelevant in explaining international politics. The importance of structure-level effects is emphasised in the aim of explaining and understanding the continuities of international outcomes (Waltz 1979). Security policy is viewed as the primary concern of states, as international politics is played out in a self-help system in which states’ survival is at risk.

Power (defined by capabilities) gives a state a place or position in the international system, which in turn defines the structure of the system and furthermore shapes the behaviour of states. In explaining the latter, the balance of power theory is central in neo-

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9 Neo-realist writing can be divided into offensive and defensive realism. Offensive realism argues that systemic factors are always the dominant factor, while defensive realism states that systemic factors drive some kinds of state behaviour but not others (see e.g. Rose 1998, p. 146; Hyde-Price 2007). The present account of neo-realism draws primarily on defensive realism.
realism. Waltz (1979) stresses that the theory does not predict uniformity or the necessity of states resorting to this behaviour, but it rather predicts the tendency of states resolving to this behaviour when it needs to. In the anarchic international system, states are concerned about their position relative to their main rivals and potential enemies. However, since weaker states have limited capabilities, they need to rely on the capabilities of allies (Waltz 1979, p. 168). This is exemplified by Norway and the German invasion in 1940, which revealed Norway’s limited capabilities. Consequently, it tied itself to NATO after the war, which provided a security guarantee.

On the subject of alliance formation, neo-realism provides a strong explanation for the incentives to join NATO. At the time of its founding, WWII had just ended, and the Soviet Union and the US emerged as the two major powers in the international system. In efforts to provide for their own security, the Western European states had an interest in keeping an American presence on the continent. For the US, the involvement in Europe centred on strategic balance against the Soviet Union. Hence, the bipolar structure provided structural preconditions which opened up for an institutionalisation of US and West European security cooperation (Hyde-Price 2007).

During the Cold War, no military operations were carried out by NATO. Following neo-realism, the bipolar structure of this era provided predictability due to the simplification of calculations, and the fear of retaliation between the two power blocks (Waltz 1979, p. 118). Hence, the chief objective was effective war-prevention, not war-fighting capabilities (Yost 2007, p. 47). With the demise of the Soviet Union the distribution of capabilities changed, and the US became a unipolar power. Consequently, the future of NATO soon became a focal point for theorists of international relations, and many realists predicted its demise in the new geopolitical environment (Mearsheimer 1990; Waltz 1993, 2000). The Alliance is still operational, however, and is not likely to be dissolved in the near future. Indeed, it has been more active now than during the Cold War. Arguably, a more nuanced theoretical approach than neo-realism is needed in explaining the international operations undertaken by NATO post-1990.

2.2 Domestic factors in international politics

Domestic politics, foreign policy, and international politics are inextricably linked. We cannot make sense of international relations without considering all three (Bueno de Mesquita 2006, p. xviii).

Bueno de Mesquita challenges the traditional view of the state as a ‘black box’ – indicating that a structural approach is not sufficient in order to explain international relations.
Numerous authors have argued that there is an influence of domestic politics in international relations, which should be taken into account to fully understand the behaviour of states in the international system (Allison 1969; Putnam 1988; Milner 1992; Moravcsik 1997; Allison & Zelikow 1999; Carlsnaes 2008). One reason for the recent attention to the links between domestic and international politics is the end of the Cold War, and the perception by many that domestic politics now play an increasingly important part in foreign policy matters (Pahre & Papayoanou 1997). This is the basic assumption of the present analysis.

In neo-realist eyes, national interest are relatively clear, as politics first and foremost are a question of self-interest and survival, not moral, rights and duties. The liberal approach of Moravcsik (1997, 2010), an author drawing on the work by Robert Putnam, is less focused on power struggle and gives more attention to domestic politics. Moravcsik stresses that it is the social pressure, transmitted through domestic political institutions, that defines state preferences and motivates its foreign policy. He continues by arguing that each state seeks to realise distinct interests under constraints imposed by the different interests of other states (Moravcsik 2010). Subsequently, this indicates a study of both domestic and international factors in addressing states’ foreign policy.

With regards to NATO, studies on alliance behaviour post-Cold War indicate that it is the mix of structural incentives and constraints, and domestic concerns and attitudes, that can explain the relative autonomy of NATO members (Brawley & Martin 2000; Auerswald 2004). In contrast to the Cold War era and the overarching Soviet threat, there is more uncertainty connected to the new security climate and what constitutes a threat to state security. In terms of countries that do not face an imminent security threat, it is indicated that there is greater leeway to use decisions in the security policy for other purposes than the protection against armed attacks on state territory (Skogan 2007, p. 138). States can thus direct its security policy towards other, though related, aims (e.g. reputation or normative perceptions). Consequently there will often be rivalry on what represents ‘state interest’, in which political differences, governance, and organisational conditions affect how national interests are formed internally and executed externally (Østerud 2007, p. 92).

2.2.1 Two-level games: a theory of international bargaining

Robert Putnam’s two-level games is a theory of international bargaining. It analyses how and when domestic and international politics interact, emphasising that processes at one level may affect the other. Putnam (1988) argues that the second image (domestic causes and international effects) and second image reversed (international causes and domestic effects)
are processes that need to be accounted for simultaneously, as central decision-makers strive to reconcile domestic and international imperatives at one and the same time.

Using a metaphor of two tables, the international table (Level I) constitute the negotiation phase where key players negotiate a tentative agreement. The domestic table (Level II) involves a ratification phase, including separate discussions within each group of domestic constituents on whether or not to ratify the agreement (Putnam 1988, p. 436). Although Putnam divides the process of negotiation into two stages, this is for expository purposes and he emphasises that in practice games on the respective levels can occur simultaneously, where “expectational effects will be quite important” (Putnam 1988, p. 436).

The national political leader appearing at both tables, Level I and Level II, is termed the ‘chief negotiator’. At the international table the chief negotiator, accompanied by diplomats and international advisers, faces his or hers foreign counterparts. The domestic table involves party and parliamentary figures, spokespersons for domestic agencies, representatives of key interest groups, and the leader’s own political advisers. The chief negotiator in the present analysis is the Norwegian Cabinet.

Facing both domestic and international pressures, the autonomy and bargaining power of the chief negotiator is constrained by what Putnam terms the ‘win-set’. The win-set is defined as the set of Level I agreements that would pass through domestic ratification (Putnam 1988, p. 437). It is determined by Level II preferences and coalitions, Level II institutions, and lastly, the chief negotiator’s strategies. Accordingly, the win-set concerns the actors’ political influence and assessment of the relative costs and benefits of negotiated alternatives to the status quo (i.e. no agreement). The greater the autonomy of the chief negotiator, the larger the win-set will be. However, the larger perceived win-set of a negotiator, the more he can be ‘pushed’ around by other Level I negotiators, while a small domestic win-set can be a bargaining advantage (Putnam 1988, p. 440).

Stressing that the two phases are intertwined and simultaneous, the model takes considerations of domestic factors influencing international bargaining, and that international factors may reverberate in domestic politics, thus altering domestic perceptions and preferences. Situated at both tables, the chief negotiator seeks to maximise the ability to satisfy domestic pressures and at the same time minimise the adverse consequences of foreign development (Putnam 1988, p. 434). Consequently, statesmen in this predicament face both distinctive strategic opportunities and strategic dilemmas (Putnam 1988, p. 459). In this regard, Putnam underlines the importance of the strategies of the chief negotiator, as a two-level game is viewed as costly and risky for statesmen in this position (1988, p. 456). Putnam
outlines three motives of the chief negotiator: 1) Enhance his standing in the Level II game by increasing his political resources or by minimising potential losses; 2) shift the balance of power at Level II in favour of domestic policies that he prefers for exogenous reasons; 3) pursue own conception of the national interest in the international context (1988, p. 457).

Following his or her preferences it may be in the interest of the chief negotiator to expand the win-set by using side payments in order to facilitate an agreement. Side payments can come from unrelated domestic sources, or they may be received as part of the international negotiation (Putnam 1988, p. 450). In this scenario, ROEs and national caveats can be a useful tool for decision-makers seeking to form their win-set in the question of deploying armed forces in international operations (Frost-Nielsen 2013). The set of arrangements preferred by the chief negotiator can be termed ‘acceptability-set’. Furthermore, cases with coalition governments, and accordingly possible different views on the perception of ‘national interests’, preclude an overlap of government officials acceptability-sets\(^{10}\) (Putnam 1988, p. 438). With the exclusive power to negotiate internationally, the chief negotiator also has a veto over possible agreements. As Putnam points out: “Even if a proposed deal lies within his [the chief negotiator’s] Level II win-set, that deal is unlikely to be struck if he opposes it” (Putnam 1988, p. 457).

When it comes to the size of the win-set and ratification procedures (dependent on the institutional setting), even small groups can have an effective veto power (Putnam 1988, p. 448). We can speak of domestic veto players not just in formal ratification, but also in informal ratification. In the latter case, domestic veto players are those actors who have no formal say in a decision but whose support is critical for a government’s political survival (Mo 1995; Bosold & Oppermann 2006, p. 7). Consequently, involuntary defection may occur, which reflects the behaviour of the chief negotiator’s inability to deliver on a promise due to failed ratification, as opposed to voluntary defection which refers to intentionally failing to carry out a promise or commitment (Putnam 1988, p. 438). In the present analysis the ratification phase is informal as national security issues are viewed as a prerogative to the Norwegian Government\(^{11}\). However, being a liberal democracy, the Norwegian Government is always subject to votes of confidence (Mingst 2003, p. 66). The ratification as such thus stems from the Cabinet being accountable to the Parliament and the electorate. Moreover, when the electorate’s power to ratify an agreement is indirect, Trumbore (1998) emphasises

\(^{10}\) Note that all Norwegian governments after the Cold War, apart from the Stoltenberg I minority Government, have been coalition governments.

\(^{11}\) See chapter 3 for further elaboration.
that the possibility of public preferences acting as a constraint on decision-makers, depends on the intensity of the issue and if it is regarded as important enough in the public opinion.

Finally, it is important to note the differentiation Putnam makes between homogenous and heterogeneous issues. The latter involve more complex games, in which there can be domestic opposition both from those who think the Level I agreement goes too far, and from those who think it does not go far enough (Putnam 1988, p. 443). On issues, where the interests of the Level II constituents are relatively homogeneous, the most significant cleavage is likely to be between ‘hawks’ and ‘doves’, depending on the constituencies’ willingness to risk a strike (Putnam 1988, p. 443).

2.2.2 The relevance of two-level games

Since Putnam’s initial article, the two-level-games approach has been applied to a range of studies (Lehman & McCoy 1992; Avery 1998; Hug & König 2002). In a follow-up project, different cases were addressed, involving security issues, economic disputes, and non-Western countries. This, in an effort to address the arguably bias of Putnam’s initial work, as it only focused on economic issues negotiated by Western democracies (Evans et al. 1993). Through the different contributions, the project shows a better fit of the model for economic issues. Other studies on two-level games and security issues, however, find that the approach applies well to their analysis, strengthening the argument that an understanding of domestic factors and dilemmas of the chief negotiator are essential in foreign policy – also when security issues are concerned (Carment & James 1996; LeoGrande 1998; Bosold & Oppermann 2006; Oma 2011).

In aspect of the present analysis, the NATO negotiations did not concern an imminent threat against one of the allies, but whether NATO was to intervene or not in conflicts outside alliance territory. As such it can be termed low-intensity conflict. Moreover, NATO as an organisation reflects a high degree of transparency, as the force planning process requires the member states to provide each other with detailed information about their existing and planned force structures (Duffield 1992, p. 843). Taking this into account, I argue that the theoretical framework of two-level games is well suited for the purpose of explaining allied member behaviour, despite dealing with security issues.

Meeting the criticism of the two-level-game approach being more a metaphor than a theory, Moravcsik emphasises that it is important to specify the preferences and constraints of

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12 Although Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan was a response to the 9/11 attack on the US, this was not an attack in the traditional sense where foreign forces invaded the country.
the major actors – this through a specification of domestic politics, the international negotiation environment (international constraints), and the preferences of the chief negotiator, who in turn is constrained by the win-set (1993, p. 23). Putnam’s model has also been criticised for being too simplistic, and that the relationship between the negotiator’s domestic constraints and the bargaining outcome is more complex (Ilda 1993; Knopf 1993; Mo 1994). Concerning the win-set, national institutions and a specification of domestic politics are included in the model, but Putnam gives most attention to the third determinant of the win-set, namely the chief negotiator’s strategies. Taking the criticism into consideration, I will in the present analysis devote more attention to the other determinants than was done in Putnam’s initial article. It should be noted, however, that the prerogative the Norwegian Government has in foreign policy\textsuperscript{13}, implicates that much attention nonetheless must be given to the preferences of the chief negotiator.

The next chapter provides a basis for the present analysis by presenting a brief outline of the history of Norwegian security and defence policy. Taking the two-level-games model into account, the last section of chapter 3 is devoted to a more elaborate specification of domestic politics regarding security issues in Norway, and NATO as the institutional negotiation environment.

\textsuperscript{13} See chapter 3, section 3.3.1 for further elaboration.
3 The Norwegian security and defence policy

In White Paper no. 15 (2008-9), the dichotomy of realpolitik and idealpolitik in Norway’s foreign policy is stated explicitly (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2009). Realpolitik is evident through the projections of national interests and especially through Norway’s membership in NATO after WWII. Additionally, since Norway’s independence, idealism has been an important part of Norwegian foreign policy (Riste 2001) – reflecting the self-perception of Norway as a small state, seeking neutrality and peace.

The two first sections of this chapter give a brief historical account of Norway’s security and defence policy. The first one addresses the realpolitik aspect with a special emphasis on NATO, while the second highlights Norway as a promoter of peace and the idealpolitik of its foreign policy. Then, the last section firstly reviews the institutional context and domestic politics in Norwegian foreign policy matters. Secondly, it addresses the framework of NATO.

3.1 Realpolitik – securing national interests

3.1.1 Policy of neutrality

Norway’s foreign relations in the period from 1905 until WWI are classified as ‘classic neutralism’. The main aim of Norwegian foreign policy at the time was to keep out of great power politics and to secure Norway’s foreign trade and shipping interests (Fure 1996). Norway managed to maintain its neutrality during this period, but had at the time also amassed the fourth largest merchant navy in the world, and as such the country was dependent on external trade. Consequently, the policy of neutrality was challenged as Norway was caught between its trade relations with Britain and Germany. Not formally written but through meetings ‘off the record’ and tacit assumptions (not without extensive British pressure), Norway implicitly became Britain’s ‘neutral ally’ (Riste 2001, p. 95).

In the inter-war period, Norway joined the League of Nations in 1920, a decision which was massively supported by the Parliament (Fure 1996, p. 184). The League of Nations and the prospects of a society emphasising international law and collective security, was viewed as beneficial in the eyes of the Norwegians – seeing that it could curb the incentives for great power politics and wars (see Haug 2012). However, the evident inability of the organisation becoming an effective instrument for collective security reinforced Norway’s traditional distrust in great power politics (Fure 1996, pp. 191-210). Hence, neutralism became Norway’s realpolitik.
3.1.2 Alliance integration and self-imposed restrictions

The German invasion in 1940 proved to Norway that the policy of neutrality had its limits, and led to the perception that allies were needed to provide for its security (Eriksen & Pharo 1997). The participation in power politics during WWII was generally viewed as a positive experience, and Norway aimed for a more active internationalism after the war (Riste 2001). It became an eager contributor to a strong United Nations and assumed the role as a bridge-builder; an aspect of its foreign policy which will be addressed in section two. During the first years after 1945, Norway sought a Scandinavian alternative to ensure state security. However, due to the rapidly intensified Cold War, Norway signed the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949.

NATO membership marked a shift in Norway’s foreign relations, as the country entered a peace time military cooperation based on solidarity and collective defence (Eriksen & Pharo 1997). The decision of membership, however, did not come easily. In the parliamentary debates on Norway’s accession to NATO, the Communists and a few Labour Party politicians opposed a membership, emphasising friendly relations with the Soviet Union and the Norwegian foreign policy tradition of supporting the UN (Stortinget 1949b). It also met opposition among national conservatives, most strongly represented in the Farmer’s Party and the Conservative Party, aiming to prevent or limit the integration in the Alliance so as to reduce foreign influence (Eriksen & Pharo 1997, pp. 80-82). A Scandinavian defence league was not viewed as strong enough to solve the security problem, and the UN was doubted as an effective instrument for maintaining peace and security in the world (Stortinget 1949a). Hence, Norway’s geopolitically sensitive position generated a strong political consensus on the necessity of alliance membership (Græger 2005a, p. 221).

Scholars of Norwegian foreign policy history picture a clear dualism in the Norwegian security and defence policy throughout the Cold War (Eriksen & Pharo 1997; Tamnes 1997). This dualism reflects the dilemma regarding NATO membership: on the one hand there was a fear of too much foreign influence and lack of national control, and most importantly the membership was perceived as a potential security threat as it could provoke the Soviet Union. On the other hand, NATO was deemed essential to Norway’s security. However, despite the security guarantee, there was considerable concern about the Western willingness and ability to come to Norway’s aid. Already from 1949 it was clear to both Norwegian politicians and

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14 Note that there are those who argue for the opposite, emphasising that Norway implicitly has had security guarantee from the West since 1905, and thus the NATO membership does not represent a major shift in the Norwegian foreign and security policy (Riste 1991; Nyhamar 2007).

15 The proposition from the Special Foreign Affairs Committee on the accession of the Atlantic Treaty was amended with 130 votes against 13 (Stortinget 1949b).
military personnel that Central Europe was the main focus in the Alliance. Consequently, a proactive engagement was viewed as essential in order to convince allies of the importance of the Northern flank, and to promote Norwegian interests within NATO (Riste 2001, p. 211). The apparent diverging national interests were separately addressed through the ‘invitation policy’ and the ‘integration restriction policy’.

With the invitation policy Norway put great efforts on keeping the great powers in NATO tightly bound to the Norwegian defence through cooperation and integration (Tamnes 1997, pp. 61-89). The establishment of the Northern Command in Norway in 1951 was in this regard important to the Government. Moreover, considering Norway’s weak military position in Europe, its defence capability needed to be strengthened in order to withstand an invasion until allies could mobilise and come to the rescue.

The policy of integration restrictions was aimed at reassuring the Russians; restrict alliance presence in Norway; and to ensure national control of allied activity. The policy was expressed through several self-imposed restrictions: among them a policy of no foreign military bases, and no stationing of nuclear weapons on Norwegian soil in peace time; restrictions on allied training activities; and a demand for Norwegian control with intelligence collection and surveillance in the northern areas (Tamnes 1997, pp. 100-111). Furthermore, the policy was a political tool to cushion public opposition to NATO. It is important to note that the opposition to the established security policy was mainly concerned with the material content of the cooperation, as the membership itself was not contested (Tamnes 1997, p. 92).

The US was of great importance to Norway both in terms of military aid to the modernisation of the Norwegian defence, and its ability to defend the country. The American interest in Norway grew strong quite quickly, especially regarding Norway as a platform for intelligence collection and surveillance (Riste 2001, p. 217). Although the US was annoyed with Norway on several occasions, the relationship was overall characterised as good and well-working. Following Tamnes, this special relationship justifies the term ‘an alliance within the alliance’ (1997, p. 61).

Throughout the 1970s there was a period of détente and better dialogue between the East and the West. But, with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and the intensified arms race between the two super-powers, the Cold War heightened in the 1980s. The invasion of Afghanistan, another neighbouring country of the Soviet Union, sharpened Norwegian perceptions of the Soviet threat. The strengthened presence of US naval units and more forces designated for Norway in the 1980s were thus welcomed, and even encouraged by both the Norwegian Government and the public (Riste 2001, p. 226). Nonetheless, an arrangement in
January 1981 to pre-position heavy equipment in Northern Norway caused a clash between the invitation policy and the integration restriction policy – exemplifying the interaction of international and domestic factors in the negotiations of an agreement.

The issue fuelled an intense political debate which went on throughout the decade. Critical voices, mainly from the labour movement, feared that the arrangement would tie Norway more strongly to the US’ global strategy and urged for a revision. Prime Minister Odvar Nordli, on the other hand, was convinced of the necessity of meeting allied requests and did not want to risk the cornerstone in Norwegian security policy. Hence, the main content of the arrangement was retained. In order to meet domestic concern the Nordli Government harmonised the initial arrangement with the integration restriction policy by changing the location from Northern to Central Norway (Tamnes 1997, pp. 108-111).

3.1.3 From Cold War to international operations

With the end of the Cold War a new geopolitical context emerged, and the US became a unipolar power. It was a particular game changer for NATO as its foremost enemy was no more. In Norway, however, a long-term uncertainty of how Russia would evolve remained. The Government continued its invitation policy in efforts to turn allied attention to the challenges in the north, but often to no avail. There was a reduction in allied forces earmarked to the defence of the Northern Flank, fewer allied exercises on Norwegian soil, and NATO’s command and control system was changed (Tamnes 1997, p. 141).

While most Western countries adjusted their traditional priorities, doctrines and operational concepts, Norwegian armed forces were still concentrated in the north with anti-invasion as their primary task (Græger 2005b). In the debates on the future role of NATO, Norway was among the countries not wishing for an expanded role for the Alliance (Willersrud 1999). Starting with the Gulf War in 1991, the Norwegian reluctance to go out of area was challenged (Børresen et al. 2004, pp. 189-92). Moreover, the participation in the conflicts during the 1990s and NATO reforms became catalysts in Norway, altering the political defence strategies, and starting a considerable downsizing and re-structuring of the defence establishment (Græger 2005b; Haaland 2007, p. 499).

Concerning the increased number of international operations since the end of the 1980s, Børresen et al. (2004) point to four intertwined conditions that can explain the development: First of all the end of the Cold War and bipolarity led to several civil wars, and furthermore gave the UN an opportunity to take action with a Security Council that could unite on common grounds. Secondly, several organisations were now looking for new tasks that could
justify their existence. A third condition was a stronger moral imperative in the West to promote democracy and intervene when human rights were breached. Fourth and lastly, global terrorism materialised as one of the main threats to state security, and terrorism was placed high on states’ foreign and security agendas, especially after 9/11.

White Paper no. 14 (1992-3) was the first since 1964 which systematically addressed the Norwegian engagement abroad (Børresen et al. 2004, p. 196). One of the aims presented was to secure an effective alliance, and to compensate for the diminishing strategic relevance of Norway through ‘troops for influence’ (Græger 2005a). The challenges of the new international climate were further addressed in the first strategic concept for the Norwegian Defence; an element standing out is that it opens up for intervention in international crises, though such intervention needs to be firmly anchored in international law and have a broad international support (Ministry of Defence 2004). The concept furthermore underlines the importance of NATO, the necessity of securing the Northern areas, and the need to contribute to peace, stability and further development of the international legal system – issues that can be identified as important in Norwegian security and defence policy since the end of WWII.

As this section shows, there is a strong continuity in the basis and argumentation for Norway’s security and defence policy since 1949. However, the additional focus that is presented in the 2004 strategic concept and in my analysis in the following chapters indicates that there is a change in the method of promoting Norwegian interests.

3.2 Idealpolitik – the Norwegian quest for peace

As NATO is the cornerstone in Norwegian security and defence policy, the UN and its efforts in contributing to a safer and more just world order became a cornerstone for Norwegian diplomacy in the post-war period (Tamnes 1997, p. 411). The idealpolitik is reflected in the perception of Norway as a peace nation, promoting democracy and human rights, based on size and tradition. The expressed moralism that can be noted in Norwegian foreign policy has deep roots in the Norwegian mentality. According to Leira (2005), a liberal peace discourse was established already in the period of 1890 to 1905, and became a foundation for the foreign policy at the time. A broad alliance between the Labour Party and left socialist parties with an emphasis on social democratic internationalism, and the centre parties with their bourgeois tradition of Christian values and moralism, ensured a central position of an active idealpolitik in Norway’s foreign relations (Fermann 1997, p. 208; Tamnes 1997, p. 344).

With the new internationalism after WWII, peace-making was deemed a Norwegian speciality with the perception of Norway having a special role to play in leading the world
towards a peace based on international justice and humanitarian values (Riste 2001, p. 225; Græger & Leira 2005, p. 48). In the cold international climate Norway sought a third way between the two superpowers, and assumed a bridge-building role between the East and the West. This was based on the perception that small powers have an advantage in international diplomacy due to absence of great power interests in conflicts. In this regard, Norway aimed at solving international disputes in the role as a mediator. The many efforts reached a high point with the Oslo Agreement of 1993, where it played an important part in the negotiations between the Israelis and the Palestinians, and the 2002 ceasefire agreement for Sri Lanka. Although the Oslo Agreement did not lead to peace in the Middle East and the Sri Lanka civil war resumed, mediation has provided Norway access to important decision-makers (e.g. the US) and led to increased interest for Norwegian efforts (Skogan 2007, p. 153).

Norway also became a critical voice in international politics. Without a history of colonisation, Norway remained critical of many of its allies in the decolonisation process, despite often meeting sharp reactions (Eriksen & Pharo 1997). It also criticised the authoritarian regimes of Greece, Spain and Portugal, opposed the US warfare in Vietnam, and became involved in the events in Latin America by supporting radical socialist movements. The critical line was not without costs, however. The involvement in Latin America, and especially the acknowledgement of North Vietnam in 1971 by the Bratteli Government, was not well received by the US (Tamnes 1997, pp. 356-357).

As an ardent supporter of the UN and collective security, the political backing has been strengthened by a number of contributions to UN peace-keeping forces, in which the Scandinavian countries are among the largest contributors (Damrosch 2003, p. 53). The efforts and the willingness to provide monitoring troops while compromises are negotiated, reflect the political culture in Norway, which is grounded in the idea that conflict and violence can be prevented (Mingst 2003, p. 63).

In the framework of the UN, Norway became a Western pioneer for development aid. In the efforts of promoting human rights and democracy, the development aid policy emerged in the late 1940s and was broadened throughout the 1960s. In the 1980s, however, it became evident that not all was evergreen concerning the Norwegian efforts. Many projects failed due to a lack of understanding of the local conditions and diverging goals. Moreover, the policy proved to by cost-ineffective and created an unhealthy dependency on development aid in the recipient countries (Tamnes 1997, pp. 404-5). The policy was revaluated during the 1980s and obtained a new direction; most notably there were now demands directed towards the
countries receiving aid, and Norwegian local businesses became more involved, reflecting motives of self-interests (Sørbo 1997).

As the Cold War ended, the Norwegian international engagement blossomed. This can be explained by three factors: 1) the states faced new security threats; 2) triumphs like the Oslo Process and the Brundtland Commission on Environment and Development of 1987 strengthened the belief that Norway could make a difference; 3) Norway’s strong oil-based economy made it possible to finance the burdens that follow such engagement (Tamnes 1997 pp. 443-4). The different elements were brought together in the 1990s in what is often termed ‘engagement policy’ (Leira 2005, p. 152). Development aid and peace-building in conflict areas were highly prioritised and the ‘Norwegian model’ for peace work was formed, merging the efforts of voluntary organisations, research milieus, and the state (Tamnes 1997, p. 445). The involvement of the Norwegian society had increased dramatically from the 1980s, and together with the Government there was, and still is, a strong interest in promoting the policy (Tamnes 1997, p. 388). Moreover, there is a belief in the public that Norway can solve world problems, and the engagement policy is noted to have a remarkably strong support in the Norwegian population (Leira 2005, p. 135).

The notion of Norway as a peace-nation is arguably a poor match with the increased military engagement outside Norwegian borders since the 1990s. The participation has been presented as a prolongation of the active peace policy. As such, the traditional peace policy and the military engagement were defended both in terms of being a good in itself, and as a contribution granting Norway access to important actors and significant political capital (Leira 2005, p. 153). This is further outlined in White Paper no. 15 (2008-9):

> Competence within development policy or international institutional development becomes useful in realpolitik, while military efforts can also have an important ideal political dimension. [...] Traditional divisions between the 'soft' idealpolitik and the 'hard' realpolitik are today less meaningful (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2009, pp. 20, 85).

Accordingly, the Norwegian contributions to a world order based on international law also reflect realpolitik, as small powers benefit from a regulated international system (Nustad & Thune 2003, p. 172). It is argued that the strong Norwegian support for the UN to a great extent can be explained by that it is within the UN it has been possible for Norway to unite self-interest and ideal motives (Fermann 1997, p. 209; Nyhamar 2007 p. 150). Consequently, seeing the emphasis Norway places on the UN and the engagement policy, I argue that this puts pressure on Norway to continue this path faithfully and respond readily when the UN Security Council (UNSC) amends resolutions.
3.3 Domestic politics and the international negotiation environment

3.3.1 Level II: Norway

Foreign policy, therein security and defence policy, differs from other policy areas, as the Constitution gives the Norwegian Cabinet a prerogative in this regard. Under § 25 of the Norwegian Constitution, the king is the Commander-in-Chief, and as such has the authority to deploy military forces outside Norway. However, it is the Norwegian Cabinet that exercises the king’s authority, and in practice the prerogative of the king lies with the Cabinet.

In terms of participation in international military operations, the Constitution § 25 provides certain constraints: armed forces are not to be transferred to the service of foreign powers, and forces belonging to the territorial defence shall never be deployed abroad without the consent of the Parliament. Nevertheless, as stated in White Paper no. 14 (1992-3): “The provision is not meant to cut the king’s access to delegate authority of command to non-Norwegian organs or persons, as it would prohibit any Norwegian participation in international missions” (Ministry of Defence 1993, p. 27). Furthermore, it is argued that the historical basis for these provisions needs to be taken into account in the interpretation16 (Andenæs 1964). Accordingly, through new constitutional practice, the provisions have not been interpreted as a constraint on participation in a collective military operation17.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) has the overall responsibility for managing national interests in NATO and other multilateral organisations, while the Ministry of Defence (MoD) maintains and coordinates Norway’s political relations regarding defence. In the Cold War era the defence policy was viewed as subordinate to security policy. With the changed security climate, however, the MFA has had a loss of functions as the line between domestic and foreign policy is less clear (Græger & Neumann 2006). Moreover, there has been a shift in the delegation of power between the two ministries, as the MoD has become an important actor in the framing of security policy (Tamnes 1997, p. 65). The Prime Minister’s office is the final point of power exertion and the last organ in the government apparatus. It is argued to be large in power, both formal and informal, and to have an important role in regard to the other ministries – especially when the Prime Minister is engaged directly and takes personal initiative in single issues (Udgaard 2006, p. 48).

The Norwegian Parliament, the Storting, has a consultative role when it comes to security and defence policy. It is not supposed to exercise constitutional control with the Government,

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16 The constraint on transferring and deploying armed forces were to prevent business with mercenaries, and to prevent the country from being rendered defenceless in the time of the union with Sweden.

17 Note that this has been criticised, see Nustad & Thune (2003) and Holmøyvik (2012).
but rather support its main course of foreign policy. This is drawn from the perception that disagreement is viewed as a strategic problem and thus a threat to Norway’s role in the world (Sjaastad 2006, p. 20). Consequently, there are no sharp political divisions regarding foreign policy matters in Norwegian politics. The political consensus on foreign policy issues is reflected in a tradition for a good and constructive dialogue between the subsequent governments and the opposition parties, in which the Storting has seldom found it necessary to challenge the Government; compared to major European democracies, Norwegian post-WWII politics is argued to have stayed reasonably consensual (Heidar 2004, p. 58).

The formal contact between the Government and the Storting goes through the Enlarged Committee for Foreign Affairs and Defence (DUUFK)\(^\text{18}\). The Committee of Foreign Affairs (DUUK) and the Committee of Defence were merged into DUUFK in 2009 – underlining the unclear division between security and defence policy. Despite having a consultative role, it is noted that the Storting have a strong position in the framing of Norway’s foreign policy (Eriksen & Pharo 1997, p. 42).

### 3.3.2 Level I: NATO

NATO was founded on April 4\(^{th}\) 1949 by the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in Washington. Its creation was a reaction to Soviet expansionist policies and Western concern of Kremlin’s intent to maintain its military forces at full strength. Article 5 thus became a crucial premise, in which “the parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all” (North Atlantic Treaty 1949). Article 5 and providing for the immediate defence and security of its member states is still defined as the Alliance’s core task (NATO 2006). Facing the new security climate post-1990, however, the main focus has been expanded to include non-Article 5 missions, by which NATO has gone from being a territorial defence alliance to become a politico-military instrument with a global reach (see Lindley-French 2007).

NATO is an intergovernmental organisation, as all decisions are taken on the basis of unanimity and consensus – a principle that is applied at every level of the organisation. As outlined by NATO: “Each member country participates fully in the decision-making process on the basis of equality, irrespective of its size or political, military and economic strength” (NATO 2006, p. 15). The most important decision-making body is the North Atlantic Council (NAC), which assembles representatives from all the member states at the level of

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\(^{18}\) The Committee is made up of members of the Standing Committee for Foreign Affairs and Defence, the president and vice president of the parliament, the chairman of the Defence Committee and up to eleven members appointed by the Elections Committee.
ambassadors, ministers or heads of state and government. The Secretary General is the head of the NAC, and is always a European. The Military Committee constitutes the link between the political decision-making process within NATO and the integrated command structures. It is headed by the Supreme Allied Commander of Europe, who is always an American.

NATO’s first strategic concept from 1991 differs substantially from preceding documents. It combines the fundamental purpose of the Alliance with the obligation to work towards improved and expanded security for Europe as a whole through partnership and cooperation with former adversaries (NATO 2006, p. 18). The concept was revised in 2002, committing the member states to the peace and stability of the wider Euro-Atlantic area to confront new threats and meet new challenges. The military command structure was reorganised, which facilitated a transformation of military capabilities adapted to the new commitments and tasks – “reflecting a fundamental shift in Alliance thinking” (NATO 2006, p. 21).

After enforcing its first missions since the establishment in the events of the Yugoslav Wars in the 1990s, there has been an increased scope of military operations undertaken by NATO. The nature of the decision-making process in NATO allows for constructive abstention (i.e. political support without participation), and the operations have been undertaken through different coalitions within the Alliance, and with varying contributions from each member (if any at all). Moreover, the international operations have proposed little or no risk to own national territories and populations; the justification has been, as NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer expressed it: “Either we tackle these problems when and where they emerge, or they will end up on our doorstep” (Scheffer 2004).

The cooperation within NATO can be said to be well-working and the organisation has ‘survived’ the demise predicted by scholars. Since its foundation there have been, however, heavy debates concerning burden-sharing, and with the later operations, especially in Afghanistan, the focus has shifted from resources to body bags (Saideman & Auerswald 2011). Much of the debates are related to the European states’ dependency on the military power of the US and the evident capabilities-gap (Lindley-French 2007). On the subject of military operations undertaken by NATO, there is room for manoeuvre in the decision-making process, but at the same time the alliance membership, based on solidarity, entails obligations and pressure to contribute, which in the next round limit the leeway of action. Moreover, there is the iterative nature of NATO, whereby states will consider its reputation in the alliance in the anticipation of the game being repeated (Eichenberg 1993, p. 73). With this chapter as a basis, the next chapter addresses the four cases of Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya, by examining Norway’s decision of participation and the main military contributions.
From Operation Allied Force to Operation Unified Protector

Compared to the rather modest contribution to Operation Allied Force in Kosovo 1999, the extensive Norwegian role in Operation Unified Protector in Libya 2011 indicates a significant development in a short period of time. The present chapter analyses Norway’s participation in Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya accordingly. The aim of the first section in each case is shortly to assess the international issues of debate prior to the operations and the actions taken by the international community. The picture of each operation is complex with different coalitions, main actors, and organisations involved, but despite these variations, NATO has been central in each case, both as a forum and an actor, and is given attention. The second section of each case addresses the debates in Norway, examining firstly the argumentation for participation, and secondly the contributions.

4.1 Kosovo: a humanitarian intervention

Shortly after the end of the Cold War, conflicts broke out in the Balkans as several regions declared their independence from Yugoslavia in 1991. Despite US reluctance to get involved in the area, the escalating crisis and the failure of the UNPROFOR peacekeepers, drew the US and NATO into the conflicts (Sloan 2005).

The leader of Yugoslavia, Slobodan Milosevic, had in 1989 removed Kosovo’s former autonomy, with plans for the region to become a Serbian national project (Smith 2003, p. 98). Kosovo, mainly inhabited by ethnic Albanians, had at first attempted a more peaceful way to regain their independence. However, in the Dayton Accords of 1995, ending the Bosnian war, which broke out in 1992, there was no mentioning of Kosovo. Hence, the Kosovars realised that more forceful means were needed in order to get the attention from the international community (Henriksen 2007, p. 124). During 1998 there was an open conflict between the Serbian military forces and the Kosovo Liberation Army in Kosovo, which resulted in the deaths of 1,500 ethnic Albanians, and more than 400,000 were driven from their homes (Sloan 2005, p. 103).

When NATO began Operation Allied Force (OAF) on March 24th 1999, it was after lengthy debates within the Alliance. The humanitarian crisis that evolved in the backyard of Western Europe was daily broadcasted in the media, and many voiced the need to take action. There was also fear within NATO for the security in the region as the situation could spiral to involve Albania and Macedonia (Smith 2003, p. 98). From the autumn of 1998, Milosevic faced a NATO ultimatum to either end his brutal offensive in Kosovo or to expect airstrikes. The threats, however, lost their credibility as NATO members were unable to agree on the
political objectives for Kosovo (Pharo 2000). Moreover, the disagreement concerned the lack of a UN mandate for an intervention\(^{19}\); the confrontation with Russia, which argued that the intervention breached international law; and the issue of deploying ground forces (Henriksen 2007). The US was a constant driving force for using military means. President Clinton faced stiff domestic opposition, but managed to turn the Senate and Congress in favour of a military operation, and was in March able to take command of a NATO intervention (Thurmann-Nielsen 1999; Sloan 2005).

When the Rambouillet peace negotiations\(^{20}\) collapsed in March 1999, NATO consented to the necessity of air strikes. The discussions within the Alliance, however, continued almost up until the air campaign was authorised on March 23\(^{rd}\), after an emergency meeting in NAC (NTB 1999a). Some allies preferred to continue the diplomatic approach, but Washington eventually stated quite clearly that time for negotiations was over (Aftenposten 1999a). In order to maintain alliance unity, strong political control was imposed on the air campaign, which was to be executed through three phases with each phase to be approved by NAC (Henriksen 2007).

The OAF lacked a clear UN mandate. The UNSC could not agree on a new resolution, as China and Russia made it clear that they would not support the use of force against Serbia (Sloan 2005, p. 109). Nevertheless, NATO justified the intervention by the need to stop the atrocities and to prevent a destabilisation of the region (Rottem 2007). This led to an international debate on the limits of the sovereignty principle, the international community’s obligations and rights, and the possibility for and limits of third parties’ ability to prevent wars and humanitarian crisis (Eide 2000)\(^{21}\). Kosovo outlined in many ways the difference between legality and legitimacy; legality presupposes a formal pertinence to international law (i.e. the UN Charter) and a resolution in the UNSC, while legitimacy concerns the moral imperative. Accordingly, NATO members judged the use of force as consistent with the purposes of the UN despite the lack of a UN mandate (Sloan 2005, p. 104). In other words, everything legal is legitimate, but issues which are perceived as legitimate, are not always legal.

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\(^{19}\) The UN Resolution 1199 was not explicit – it confirmed that the situation was serious and a potential threat to international peace and security (Pharo 2000, p. 11).

\(^{20}\) The proposed settlement called for a ceasefire, the withdrawal of the Yugoslav forces from Kosovo, and the presence of a NATO stability force to supervise the situation (see Henriksen 2007, chapter 8).

\(^{21}\) Several contributions have been published on this topic; see Simma (1999); Schnabel & Thakur (2000); Ku & Jackobson (2003).
4.1.1 Norway’s difficult way to Kosovo

The decision of the Bondevik I Government\textsuperscript{22} to participate in OAF, breached with previous policies as the intervention lacked a UN mandate – a legal justification, which until now had been an expressed precondition for Norway’s participation in international operations (Nustad & Thune 2003). The events in Bosnia were a pre-warning to Norway of the new security environment post-Cold War, and signalled the need to rethink the role of the Defence and its prevailing territorial focus (Espenes & Haug 2012). Still, Kosovo came rather as a shock, both militarily and politically.

Norway sought for a long time a political solution to the crisis through diplomacy rather than through the use of military force – reflecting the Norwegian political culture as a small state and the emphasis on diplomacy and the belief in political solutions. The Norwegian efforts were furthermore strengthened by the set-up of temporary diplomatic stations in Albania and Macedonia in March 1999 (Bonde 1999). Moreover, in 1999 Norway had the chairmanship in the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), bringing the country right into the centre of the conflict as the OSCE had observers in the region. Knut Vollebæk (KrF), Norwegian Foreign Minister and Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE, was engaged in several international meetings, seeking a political solution. The meetings with Slobodan Milosevic, however, ended in humiliation. According to sources directly involved in the negotiations, Milosevic clearly stated that he did not have respect for the Norwegian Foreign Minister and the OSCE Chairman, accusing him and the OSCE of running errands for the Americans (Lund 1999). These episodes underline Norway’s role as a small state and the lack of influence for the OSCE as an organisation\textsuperscript{23}.

With its strong emphasis on diplomacy, Norway was reluctant to an intervention, underlining a UN mandate as a condition for the use of force (Pharo 2000, p. 8). However, in March 1999, when it became clear that the negotiations would not lead to a political solution and NATO became more determined to use military force, this seems to have turned the Norwegian Government around. In the media, Vollebæk said that the starting point should be to avoid war, but then asked rhetorically whether one should refrain from taking action – stating that the use of force could be justified but that it has to be grounded in international law (Nymoen 1999). The shift in the Government’s attitude is confirmed in an official report on the Kosovo crisis by the MoD, emphasising that “in this situation NATO was the only

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\textsuperscript{22} A coalition government consisting of the Christian People’s Party (KrF), the Liberal Party (V) and the Centre Party (Sp) (see Appendix A).

\textsuperscript{23} For further elaboration see Galbreath (2007), who addresses the role of OSCE in European security policy.
alternative” (Ministry of Defence 2001, p. 4). The Government defended the NATO actions with formal juridical arguments based on the UN Charter, arguing that both the UNSC and the General Secretary, Kofi Annan, declared the situation to be severe for the population (NTB 1999b; Pharo 2000)\(^{24}\). Nevertheless, the Norwegian hope for a diplomatic solution lingered as the OAF went on. While President Clinton urged for intensified action, Vollebæk urged for negotiations (Thomassen & Thurmann-Nielsen 1999).

In the Storting there was remarkably little opposition. In the debate, which followed a report by Prime Minister Bondevik (KrF), the Storting unanimously authorised Norway’s participation (Stortinget 1999). Although the situation was termed a moral dilemma, the speakers in the debate emphasised the ‘principle of necessity’ and that international law should not get in the way of human rights. Even Sosialistisk Venstreparti\(^{25}\) (SV) – a party founded on opposition to NATO membership and usually critical to all use of force – supported an intervention. Erik Solheim (SV) stated that “we are accepting NATO bombing and NATO warfare in the Balkans only because the alternative to this is even worse” (cited in Stortinget 1999, p. 2529). The case suggests that also SV had to put realpolitik and the use of force before idealpolitik.

A clear majority of the public opinion supported the intervention and the Norwegian participation (Mosveen et al. 1999; Børresen et al. 2004, p. 222). While tens of thousands demonstrated against NATO’s bombing in Europe and in the US (Aftenposten 1999c), the small demonstrations in Norway consisted of political parties and organisations from the far left political wing (Bergens Tidende 1999). Hence, this indicates that the Government’s decision to contribute met little opposition in the Norwegian population.

There was expressed criticism to the bombing of Kosovo in editorials of the major Norwegian newspapers (NTB 1999c), but for the most part the media coverage gave neutral reports on events and on the parliamentary debates at the time. The Bondevik I Government, evaluating the Norwegian media coverage of Kosovo, perceived an all-party consensus concerning NATO, and that this consensus significantly eased the Government’s handling internally, both with regard to the Storting and to the public opinion (Ministry of Defence 2001, p. 6).

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\(^{24}\) Note that the political and legal justification of Norwegian participation in international military operations has been questioned (see Pharo 2000; Nustad & Thune 2003), but that this discussion will not be addressed in the present thesis.

\(^{25}\) The Socialist Left Party.
4.1.2 Badly prepared and lack of experience

The Norwegian engagement in the Kosovo crisis consisted of different contributions by different actors, in which the most important was the contribution of ground- and air forces (Børresen et al. 2004, p. 223). The participation with air forces was historical as it was the first sharp mission for Norwegian fighter aircraft pilots since WWII.

As the situation escalated in February 1999, it became probable that Norwegian special forces would get involved in the assistance of NATO in a possible evacuation of OSCE personnel (Børresen et al. 2004, p. 225). In the initial phase the Telemark Battalion turned out to be badly prepared as they were not sufficiently trained and lacked experience with sharp missions (Børresen et al. 2004, p. 227). Consequently, it used four months in the set-up of the unit with necessary personnel, materiel and education. The delay was allegedly commented by the British, who asked if the Norwegians had walked to the Balkans (Diesen 2013).

In OAF Norway contributed with six F-16 fighter aircrafts. According to Foreign Minister Vollebæk the contribution was what NATO had requested, and that it was comparable to the contributions given by other small powers in the Alliance (Hansen & Austenå 1999). Their use, however, was constrained by the inability to operate at night time as the Norwegian fighter aircrafts’ system was not able to distinguish between enemy and allied fighter aircrafts; nor did they have air-to-ground capacity. Moreover, the deployment was also delayed due to large shortages in materiel, which raised eye-brows from other allies seeing that the squadron had been assigned to the Initial Reaction Force the previous year (Børresen et al. 2004, p. 224).

Operational it was problematic that the squadron, to which the fighter aircrafts belonged, was organised for Article 5 missions, and as such not prepared for out-of-area operations (Børresen et al. 2004, p. 223). Furthermore, for the Norwegian personnel deployed, it was viewed as problematic that the political and military leadership did not, to a very large degree, publicly emphasise the significance and the gravity of the situation. The Government consistently sought to avoid the term ‘war’ and had a need to underline the concept of humanitarian intervention (NTB 1999b; Rottem 2007, p. 626). Seemingly it was uncomfortable in the new situation and with the use of force.

It is interesting to note that prior to OAF there was internal disagreement between the ministries in Oslo. The MoD called for NATO to work out a report on alternative military options, therein the possibility for deploying ground forces; whereas, the MFA, while

26 The Telemark Battalion, the special task force established in 1993, was already stationed in Macedonia as a part of the UN Preventive Deployment Force established on March 31st 1995.
consenting to the military evaluation by the MoD, stated that for political reasons it would be unwise for Norway to voice this in NATO, considering the political sensitivity of the issue and the cohesion of the Alliance. MFA’s point of view prevailed, concluding that Norway should not give the impression of being a driving force for such an option (Ministry of Defence 2001). In other words, although it was viewed as military strategically wise to consider ground forces, political reasons weighed more – indicating a subordination of the operation to NATO cohesion. Consequently, Norway remained opposed to deploying ground forces to OAF (Aftenposten 1999b; NTB 1999d).

Underlining Norwegian reluctance to the use of force, Norway was among the forerunners to pose ROEs on the choice of bomb targets. This, however, proved difficult, and Norway struggled within NATO to get acceptance for such restrictions (Børresen et al. 2004, p. 221). It is noted that important choices, such as decisions taken on bomb targets, were made by the leaders of the US, Britain and France, which all demanded greater input to the operation (Henriksen 2007, p. 21). This implies that the preferences of little Norway was subordinate the interests of the greater powers.

Overall, both the Norwegian politicians and the military seem to have been satisfied with the military contribution. Dag Henriksen is not aware of any broad coordinated push for a stronger military contribution from neither politicians nor the military establishment: “It was the first war in the history of NATO, it was the first use of Norwegian fighters in war since WWII, and without a clear UN mandate it appeared to be relative consensus regarding our politically visible but military limited contribution” (Henriksen 2013c). An interesting comparison is the Netherlands, who chose to speed up their technological development and was in short time able to provide modernised F-16s and KDC-10 tanker aircraft (Government of the Netherlands 2000). It would seem that there was a greater willingness to contribute more heavily to the operation in the Netherlands, despite being a small power.

Norway’s double engagement of idealpolitik and realpolitik became evident in Kosovo. In the period between 1991 to 1998, the humanitarian aid to the Balkans reached 2.2 billion Norwegian kroner (NOK), while in 1999 alone one billion NOK was given in humanitarian aid and 0.8 billion NOK the year after (Børresen et al. 2004, p. 220). Both idealpolitik and realpolitik can furthermore be noted in the justification of the participation in Kosovo: on the one hand there was the humanitarian justification; on the other hand the engagement was defended as a way of securing Norwegian national interests and Norwegian society (Nustad & Thune 2003). However, the Norwegian reluctance considered, I argue that realpolitik and the
pressure following NATO membership was decisive for Norwegian participation in OAF. It seems that when push comes to shove, realpolitik prevails.

### 4.2 Afghanistan: aiding an ally

On September 11th, 2001, the US was attacked by the terrorist network al-Qaeda. As a response, Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) was launched on October 7th, 2001 to eliminate al-Qaeda, and to end the Taliban regime, perceived as providing a safe haven for terrorists (Conetta 2002; Bowman & Dale 2009). The character of terrorism implicates an enemy hiding within a state, and we are thus not speaking of traditional warfare. Consequently, the OEF ‘dragged’ the Taliban regime and Afghanistan into war. Nevertheless, there was a broad international agreement that the US had the proviso for the attack on Afghanistan (UN Security Council 2001a).

In the events of 9/11 Article 5 was invoked for the first time in NATO’s history, whereby all NATO members condemned the attack on the US. However, NATO officials emphasised that this was a political declaration and no military decision (Hellstrøm 2001). Several allies, among them France and Germany, were vary and warned against a hasty act of revenge after NATO’s historical decision (Idås 2001a). The Alliance was thus waiting for Washington, stating that it would contribute to a military operation should the US ask for it, but that each NATO member state could decide whether it wanted to participate militarily or not (Idås 2001b) – underlining the nature of NATO as an organisation. The US never asked for a joint action by the Alliance, and it was quite clear that it intended to go it alone – marking its unipolar position in the international system. Apart from a few, rather modest, requests, NATO was offered a very limited role with no command or control of the military operation.

As the American and British troops succeeded in removing the Taliban regime, the UN called for a stability force to be stationed in Kabul before December 22nd, 2001, the date of the entry of the Afghan interim government (Aftenposten 2001d). Accordingly, the International Stability Assistance Force (ISAF) was established by the UNSC on December 20th, 2001 (UN Security Council 2001b). The UK agreed to take the command of ISAF as no country immediately offered to do so (NTB-Reuters 2001).

The option of NATO taking command was at this point not feasible as it had political and geographical restrictions on where it could and should engage itself. With the revised strategic concept from 2002 – which opened for NATO engagement in securing peace and stability in the wider Euro-Atlantic area – NATO took command of ISAF on August 11th, 2003. That same year the UNSC expanded ISAF’s mandate, which until then was limited to the
boundaries of Kabul, opening for an expansion of the mission across the country. Consequently, NATO extended its area of responsibility to the north in December 2003, and west in February 2005. Furthermore, in July 2006, NATO assumed command of the southern region of Afghanistan from US-led Coalition forces, and in October 2006 NATO took responsibility for the entire country by taking command of the international military forces in eastern Afghanistan (ISAF n.d.).

Many allies contributed troops on the premise that ISAF’s focus would be on post-conflict stability operations (Bowman & Dale 2009, p. 14). By late 2006, however, as violence escalated and ISAF extended its responsibilities, the allies began to realise that ISAF in reality was at war and that the mission would have to change (Morelli & Belkin 2009, p. 10). Since NATO assumed command of ISAF there has been a continuous challenge to get its members to address the need for resources in the south, and one of the key issues has been to overcome national caveats on the contributions (Saideman & Auerswald 2011). The cohesiveness of NATO is consequently under pressure as an increasing division is evident between those member states willing to accept more risk and those who do not (Raitasalo 2008, p. 99). Accordingly, it seems fair to presume that the pressure to contribute was extensive. Among the allies with many caveats is Norway, which for one thing has not permitted its troops to be deployed to anywhere else than the northern region27.

4.2.1 Norway out of area

When the US and the UK attacked Afghanistan on October 7th 2001, the intervention had broad political support in Norway. Although the Stoltenberg I Government28 was not informed of the attack, Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg (Ap) said that it was expected and that it in any case was an important political signal that Norway, as other NATO countries, was willing to contribute militarily (Rønning 2001). After the change of government in October 2001, we see the same attitude in the Bondevik II Government29. The new Foreign Minister, Jan Petersen (H), expressed that there would not be a shift in the line of foreign policy, and that the bombing of Afghanistan was “the right thing to do” (cited in NTB 2001b).

As Petersen was to meet his counterpart, Colin Powell, in the US in November, domestic pressure followed on the issue of cluster bombs. When it became known that the US used

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27 The Special Forces were among the first Norwegian forces to be deployed to Afghanistan in 2001. Until present they have been in Afghanistan for four periods, and are to be stationed in Kabul until the end of 2014, the year the ISAF operation is to be concluded (see Ministry of Defence 2013a).

28 A minority government consisting of the Labour Party (see Appendix A).

29 A coalition government consisting of the Christian People’s Party, the Conservative Party and the Liberal Party (see Appendix A).
such bombs in Afghanistan – weapons which Norway internationally sought to ban – Kristelig Folkeparti\(^{30}\) (KrF) and SV pressured Petersen to discuss the issue with the US. This was a promise he was not willing to give, arguing that “if I had presented this as the view of Norway, we would immediately have lost the attention of the Americans” (cited in Sønstelie 2001). It was clearly more important to keep the good will of the US, rather than to abide the wishes of the political parties back home – including the government party KrF.

Though political support was given to the US, no requests were initially directed to Norway, and the Norwegian Government had a rather passive attitude. Defence Minister Kristin Krohn Devold (H) stated that it was a possibility for Norway to contribute in many areas, but that one needed to wait and see what was being asked of it (Johnsen 2001). Later, in the Storting on December 5\(^{th}\) 2001, Foreign Minister Petersen informed that Norway had been requested by Washington to provide military assistance to the UN’s humanitarian efforts. Moreover, US military authorities had notified the Norwegian Government of a request for direct military contributions to the OEF, to which it was set to respond quickly and positively (Petersen in Stortinget 2001). As Krohn Devold stated:

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\text{[I]t is now about time to give the political declarations of support a real content. […] In addition to our self-interest in participation in the fight against terrorism, it is most central for Norway to demonstrate that we have the ability and willingness to fulfil our collective defence obligations set out in the Atlantic Treaty Article 5, and the expectations that follows our long-term and long-lasting security policy cooperation with the US (Stortinget 2001, p. 600).}
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Hence, the argumentation for Norwegian participation centred on solidarity with the US – Norway’s close ally – and to prove Norway’s relevance within NATO. In other words, an argumentation based on realpolitik.

The issue had been addressed in DUUK on November 30\(^{th}\), and the statements by the two ministers were not an initiative by the Government. Indeed, it was a rather unusual alliance between two parties from opposite sides of the ideological party line, Fremskrittspartiet\(^{31}\) (FrP) and SV, which led to a discussion of the issue in the Storting. FrP and SV had voted to have an open debate on Norway’s contribution, though for different reasons; FrP was concerned of the funding for a possible Norwegian contribution, while SV found it meaningless that Norway should contribute with F-16s when humanitarian aid was what the population needed, urging the Government to wait for a political solution (Stortinget 2001).

The Constitution § 25 was thoroughly discussed as both SV and FrP proposed that the Storting made a formal adoption on the contribution to the OEF. SV proposed that the Storting

\(^{30}\) The Christian People’s Party

\(^{31}\) The Progress Party
does not consent to place Norwegian armed forces under US-command in Afghanistan, while *FrP’s* proposition was to support Norwegian participation in OEF, in accordance with Constitution § 25. The other political parties, however, emphasised the prerogative of Norwegian Governments in foreign policy and none of the proposals were amended\(^{32}\). Moreover, the military contribution presented by the Government was supported by a majority of the Storting, with SV as an exception, even though it was viewed as unlikely that the US would make use of the contribution (Aftenposten 2001b). Hence, the interjections by *FrP* and SV were turned down and the prerogative of the Norwegian Government underlined. Nonetheless, one could argue that a crack in the established political consensus in Norway’s foreign policy can be noted within this issue.

In 2005, there was another change of government. While the Bondevik II Government supported OEF, the Stoltenberg II Government\(^ {33}\) withdrew the Norwegian forces from the OEF and channelized all forces to support the NATO-led ISAF (Frost-Nielsen 2011, p. 360). Prime Minister Stoltenberg emphasised that the Government wished for a strong UN, and to show a will to contribute to this: “Norway shall be a significant peace nation. Norway will not contribute to a preventive attack which is not authorised by the UN” (cited in NTB 2005b). Arguably, with the new Government, idealpolitik was brought to the forefront.

Commenting on the shift in Norwegian contributions, Sverre Diesen, Chief of Defence from 2005 to 2009, said he spent some time explaining to the other NATO Chiefs of Defence that the new Norwegian position – which one perhaps would not expect – was due to the special constellation of government, which included, for the first time, a far left party [i.e. SV]. Hence, it was not a shift of line in foreign policy as such, but rather an effort to keep the coalition together (Diesen 2013). According to Diesen this was understood and accepted by allies, but that NATO would periodically ask for Norwegian special forces to be deployed to the southern region, which in return was, as a routine, declined by the Norwegian Government (2013). Accordingly, one can assume that the Norwegian withdrawal came as a surprise to the allies, and that the pressure to contribute, and to ease Norwegian caveats, was upheld.

In a survey from October 2001, less than half of the Norwegians questioned supported the attack on Afghanistan by the UK and the US. The survey also showed that Norwegians were more hesitant in their support for the intervention in Afghanistan, than they were regarding NATO’s intervention in Kosovo in 1999 (NTB 2001a). Prime Minister Bondevik expressed

\(^{32}\) SV’s proposition was rejected by 96 against 15 votes; *FrP’s* proposition was rejected by 96 against 15 votes (Stortinget 2001).

\(^{33}\) A coalition government consisting of the Labour Party, the Centre Party and the Socialist Left Party (see Appendix A).
understanding for the concern in the public, emphasising that the bombing was an ethical dilemma. However, he remained firm in the belief that it was the right thing to do (Christensen 2001a). Bondevik furthermore refrained from saying that Norway was at war with Afghanistan and underlined his emphasis on humanitarian aid and human rights, though since “most other countries have declared war against terrorism – Norway must be solidary” (cited in Lynau 2001). Accordingly, the rhetoric used suggests idealpolitik, but underlying one can identify realpolitik in the argumentation.

The public opinion changed to be more supportive of the bombing in Afghanistan, and in December 2001 a majority of the population supported the Norwegian offer to send voluntary military personnel to Afghanistan (Aftenposten 2001c). Although it is noted that the participation has been controversial in the public opinion (Narud et al. 2010), it would seem that it was not strong enough to be an obstacle to the decision of Norwegian participation.

4.2.2 The first Norwegian bombs – a political awakening

The Norwegian military contribution to Afghanistan is a challenging case as it has not been a homogenous long-term one, but a combination of smaller and larger contributions from different actors. Moreover, in January 2002, Norway became head of the Afghanistan Support Group and as such responsible for coordinating the efforts of aid-contributing countries. Norway has in this regard contributed 5.4 billion NOK in the period of 2001 to 2011 to Afghanistan, making the country one of the largest recipients of Norwegian development aid (Norad 2012). Considering the scope of the present thesis, I focus on the first years of the participation, complied with the consequences of the government change in 2005 for the Norwegian contribution to Afghanistan.

In November 2001, Norway received an invitation from the US to send Norwegian officers to the central command of the OEF in Florida. At first the Bondevik II Government was somewhat hesitant, but decided to have a permanent representation at the American headquarters, where the officers would be central in further discussions on a possible Norwegian contribution (Christensen 2001b). In December 2001 Norway offered six F-16 air fighters, four Bell helicopters and a special task force consisting of 100 soldiers to OEF, as a response to the abovementioned American requests.

In 2002 the six F-16 fighter aircrafts were deployed to OEF, marking that for the first time since WWII, Norwegian pilots would participate in operations which could lead to bombing of ground targets (Christensen 2002a). As opposed to what was the case in Kosovo, the

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34 For an overview of the different Norwegian contributions to present date, see Ministry of Defence (2013a).
Norwegian F-16s were now upgraded with air-to-ground capacity and were thus able to drop bombs. Considering that the Norwegian fighter aircrafts in OEF was under US command, it was not given that the Norwegian Government would have the same influence on decisions compared to operations under NATO command, in which the principle of consensus applies to all levels within the Alliance. Consequently, the fighter aircraft support in OEF was conditioned on the Government being in control of the use of the Norwegian F-16s. Norwegian ROE’s were also subordinate to the principle of self-defence, there were specific demands to the information that could verify ground targets the fighter aircrafts were asked to be engaged in, and their use was geographically restricted to Afghanistan (Frost-Nielsen 2011, pp. 362-3). Moreover, according to the MoD it was accepted by the US that Norwegian F-16s could not be given missions that breached Norwegian law or Norway’s international obligations (Christensen 2002a).

Although the contribution of F-16 fighter aircrafts had been given majority support in the Storting, the first bombings executed by Norwegian pilots in January 2003 came as a shock. Reactions both within the Government and the Storting were that “this was not what we were supposed to do”, and SV demanded a report from the Defence Minister on why Norwegian air fighters had participated in the bombing and not used the right to reserve from participation (Espenes & Haug 2012, p. 28). According to Sigurd Frisvold (2013), Chief of Defence from 1999 to 2005, there were some politicians, most notably from SV, who believed that the Norwegian F-16s would ‘fly in circle’ as they did in Kosovo (i.e. air-to-air operations). It seems that the participation suddenly became more ‘real’, shaking up the political milieu back home.

As mentioned, there was a shift in Norway’s contribution to Afghanistan with the government change in 2005. All forces were withdrawn from OEF and the contributions were channelized to NATO and ISAF. Accordingly, in August 2005 Norway increased its contribution to ISAF and assumed command as the leading nation of the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Meymaneh, in North Afghanistan. The geographical restriction to the northern region was maintained (Stortinget 2005a). Consequently, Norway refrained from sending special forces to South Afghanistan in October 2006 after further requests from NATO (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2006; Haaland 2007, p. 499). The Stoltenberg II Government decided, however, to send four F-16 fighter aircrafts that same year. According to Defence Minister Anne-Grete Strøm-Erichsen (Ap), this was a response to a request from NATO, which was in need of air support due to the expansion of ISAF’s mission to new provinces (Stortinget 2005a). The fact that Norway refused some requests but
accepted others indicates the need to address the domestic level in order to be able to explain the differing Norwegian responses.

In the debates concerning Norwegian contributions to Afghanistan, the obligations that Norway has as a NATO member and the need to show solidarity with the US are repeated. Externally, however, the emphasis was on how the Norwegian military participation contributed to rebuilding and securing Afghanistan. In a press release by Foreign Minister Petersen, the significance of the Norwegian contributions for the Afghan society is underlined, stating that the Government makes “a great effort in significant areas such as human rights, women’s rights and democratisation” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2001). This line of argumentation is pursued in the succeeding government, with Prime Minister Stoltenberg outlining three purposes for the Norwegian contributions:

- We are there to stabilise and contribute to security. […] We are there to give the [Afghan] population schools, health care and other basic services. […] We are there to give the whole country better governance and well-working institutions (Stoltenberg 2007).

The importance of Norwegian forces in this regard was based on the argument that when Norwegian soldiers patrol in the north they contribute to the stability necessary for a local society to rebuild itself. This was also the justification of the Norwegian bombing in 2003, to which Defence Minister Krohn Devold stated that the force contributes to a “stabilisation of the security situation in Afghanistan” (cited in Johnsen 2003). Chief for the PRT Meymaneh the first six months of 2009, Colonel Ivar Knotten, however, was under the impression that initially, the most important issue politically was to join the operation, and thereby be visible (cited in Henriksen 2013b, p. 10). Furthermore, it is indicated that no overall military strategy or clearly defined objectives for what the Norwegian forces were to achieve is to be found for the Norwegian participation in Afghanistan (Henriksen 2013b). It would seem, as in the case of Kosovo, that Norway participated in solidarity with the US and NATO rather than the aim to have a real impact on the result.

The OEF and ISAF were supported by Norway. Nevertheless, it was important to retain national control and restrict the use of Norwegian forces through the many national caveats. Considering the pressure for contributions to the more fight intense regions and that a cohesive NATO is essential for Norwegian security, an explanation to the national caveats must arguably come from the domestic level.
4.3 Iraq: the Norwegian ‘no’

Operation Iraqi Freedom was launched on March 20th 2003, by a US-led coalition. The argument for an invasion was allegedly the fear of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) being used by the Hussein regime or coming into the hands of terrorists – which would be too large a security threat for the US to let happen (Bush 2002).

After a speech by Bush, calling on the UN to enforce previous resolutions against Iraq, UN Resolution 1441 was amended in the UNSC on November 8th 2002 (Nye 2009, p. 194). It stated that Iraq had not complied with UN resolutions adopted after the Gulf War in 1991, but which could be rectified if Iraq allowed unrestricted inspections of its facilities (UN Security Council 2002). Accordingly, several inspections were carried out in the country by UN inspectors, but lack of willingness from Baghdad did not lead to any conclusive reports on the possibility of Iraq being in possession of WMD (UN 2003). In this regard US Foreign Minister Colin Powell presented on February 5th 2003 evidence on the account of Saddam Hussein being in possession of WMD. The trustworthiness of the evidence, however, was considered with scepticism by many in the UN. The UNSC was unable to agree on another resolution authorising an attack against Iraq, yet the US went to war – its unipolar position becoming even clearer.

The case of Iraq caused a deep split in NATO, in which there was strong opposition to an intervention, first and foremost voiced by France and Germany (Lindley-French 2007, pp. 13-15). The US used every chance available to secure international support for an intervention in Iraq; the NATO summit in Prague, December 2002, was dominated by Bush and his efforts to get support for overthrowing Hussein, overshadowing the actual agenda, which among other issues concerned a new NATO enlargement (Lund 2002). The American view was that NATO had a moral duty to help the US in a war against Iraq, and presented a list of contributions which Alliance members could provide, should there be an attack on Iraq (NTB 2002). Despite the lack of a UN mandate, several states interpreted the situation as to give provision for an invasion based on the fact that Iraq had not complied with UN Resolution 1441. This was the conclusion of Denmark and the Czech Republic, which were among the first NATO allies to give a positive response to the American request for support.

4.3.1 The UN, public opinion and US pressure

In 2002 Norway had a seat in the UNSC and Norwegian diplomats played a key role in the wording of UN Resolution 1441 (Sønstelie et al. 2003). During the period in which the US pressured for international support and the issue of Iraq was discussed in the UNSC, the
Bondevik II Government remained expectant on the UN and refused to comment on what would happen should the UNSC fail to reach an agreement on the situation (Johnsen 2002a).

The American ambassador to Norway, John Doyle Ong, stated that the US expected a “significant Norwegian war effort”, and should there be an invasion, the US would request more or less the same contribution as was given in Afghanistan (cited in Selmer 2002). In February 2003, a request for a contribution of special forces was directed to Norway. The Norwegian capability was, according to the US, needed as few special soldiers had the required training that was necessary for an effective effort in Iraq (Røhne 2003). Despite the American pressure – which clearly was present – Norway decided not to support the intervention in Iraq. Facing US pressure, it seems reasonable to presume that it was easier not to support the intervention, as France and Germany voiced such a strong opposition.

The issue led to an internal struggle in the Government. KrF and Venstre\(^{35}\) opposed the war, while Høyre\(^{36}\) and Foreign Minister Petersen were much more inclined to support the US (Skjeseth 2003). As mentioned, the Government awaited the process in the UNSC. But, doubts regarding its Iraq policy arose as Prime Minister Bondevik stated in the media that “Norway do not necessarily support an attack on Iraq, even with a new resolution from the UN Security Council” (cited in Stavanger Aftenblad 2003). The Government’s position was, however, soon clarified in the media by State Secretary Vidar Helgesen (\(H\)) from the MFA:

> Norway is obliged by international law to give political support to the UN resolution if the Security Council provides a mandate for a military action in Iraq. There should be no doubt (cited in Mosveen & Næsfeldt 2003 [my emphasis]).

Bondevik was clearly in a tight spot, expressing that “to weigh for or against a war is a painful dilemma both to me and other heads of governments” (cited in Ellingsen 2003).

The now clarified UN line of the Bondevik II Government was supported by a majority in the Storting on January 30\(^{th}\), with an exception of Senterpartiet\(^{37}\) (Sp) and \(SV\). The two opposition parties criticised the Government for being too passive regarding the increased danger of the US going to war against Iraq (Litland & Werner 2003). In a feature article on February 21\(^{st}\), Bondevik argued that single countries cannot choose side tracks that undermine the UN strategy, and warned against “pre-conclusions that removes the pressure that needs to exist in order to get Saddam Hussein to cooperate” (Bondevik 2003). It would seem that the previous concern was removed and that the position was set. As US President Bush called to ask for support, Prime Minister Bondevik could give a clear no. Bush allegedly accepted the

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\(^{35}\) The Liberal Party

\(^{36}\) The Conservative Party

\(^{37}\) The Centre Party (former Farmer’s Party)
reference to ethical and Christian values, and the opposition in the public (Græger 2005b, p. 99).

In the Storting on March 21st, a majority of the parliamentarians gave consent to Norway’s position. The only interjection came from Frp, who argued that the Government had failed Norway’s friends by not giving assent to the resolution proposition from the US, the UK and Spain (Stortinget 2003). Bondevik underlined that as opposed to Kosovo there was an alternative in continued weapon inspections, emphasising that it was not a question of choosing side; “we are to lay down our policy and follow it consistently, and that is what we have done” (cited in Stortinget 2003, p. 2303).

The intervention in Iraq met strong opposition in the public opinion. The resistance followed the same pattern as in many other countries across the globe. On February 15th 2003, demonstrations against a war in Iraq were arranged in up to 60 countries, in which millions of people took part in marches and rallies (BBC 2003). The demonstrations in Norway this day were the largest in Norway’s history. 120 000 demonstrated country-wide, of them 60 000 gathered in Oslo (Olsen & Henriksen 2003); making it the largest in Scandinavia (Klassekampen 2003). With the demonstrations, criticism towards the Government’s UN ‘track’ followed, accusing it for being too passive in regard to the US (Olsen & Henriksen 2003; Moe et al. 2003).

Although Norway did not support the intervention in Iraq, it contributed in the aftermath. The Norwegian participation in the NATO-led stability forces in Iraq has been interpreted as an effort to repair the relationship with the US and as compensation for not participating in the actual Iraq war (Græger 2005b). On the question of Iraq, Morten Høglund (2013) noted that officially, Norway’s lack of support was accepted but that there was some grumbling from allies. Moreover, he maintained that Denmark was politically rewarded for its support and enjoyed a better position with the Americans, at least for some time. This underlines that when it comes to possible adverse consequences, pressure from the international community and close allies must at all times be a part of the evaluation of a government in terms of its foreign policy.

4.4 Libya: little Norway flexes muscles

In 2011, civil war broke out in Libya between forces loyal to Muammar Gaddafi’s regime and Libyan rebellion forces. The brutal actions taken by Gaddafi against Benghazi were condemned by the international community, and in February the UNSC amended Resolution

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38A parliamentarian from the Progress Party, and member in DUUK/DUUFK since 2001 until present.
1970, posing sanctions, an arms embargo, and an asset freeze against the Libyan regime (UN Security Council 2011a). Moreover, the African Union (AU) and the Arab League were strongly critical to the actions taken by the Gaddafi regime, and the latter suspended Libya from its sessions and called for a no-fly zone (Daalder & Stavridis 2012).

A new resolution was adopted on March 17th, after a proposal by France, Lebanon and the UK; UN Resolution 1973 gave a broad mandate, authorising “all necessary measures” to protect civilians in Libya, including a no-fly zone (UN Security Council 2011b)³⁹. The resolution is viewed as historical as it connected the use of military force to the UN clause Responsibility to Protect – a principle which came into the UN resolutions in 2005, calling for the international community to intervene when governments fail to prevent and halt mass atrocities and genocide of own civilians (UN n.d.). The Arab League played an important part in the formulation of the UN Resolution 1973, and for the Western countries it was crucial to include the whole region as to avoid ‘the West against the rest’ (NTB 2011a).

The follow-up of UN Resolution 1973 was discussed on March 19th in a summit in Paris, initiated by Britain and France. Although the two countries encouraged an intervention, they let Lebanon be the driving force in the UNSC (Dagbladet 2011). While the US took preliminary command of the military intervention, which was launched in March 19th as Operation Odyssey Dawn, they wanted to reduce their role in the military campaign and to ensure that the burden of enforcing the UN resolution was shared (BBC 2011b).

There were intense discussions in NAC on the role of the Alliance. According to diplomatic sources in NATO, Turkey blocked an agreement on NATO enforcing the no-fly zone (Dagsavisen 2011), joined by Germany in making it difficult for the Alliance to agree on a common strategy. US President Obama, wishing for a limited part, urged NATO to play a co-ordinating role (BBC 2011b). However, as France and Turkey opposed NATO taking the lead, the Alliance could not command the operation from the outset as the consent of all 28 members is required. The French reluctance was based on the Arab League not wanting the operation to be entirely placed under NATO responsibility⁴⁰, but French Foreign Minister Juppé eventually accepted that a NATO role was necessary (Marcus 2011).

NATO later reached an agreement to take on the whole operation, whereby NATO General Secretary Rasmussen stated that the Alliance would enforce all aspects of the UN

³⁹ The 15-member UN Security council voted 10-0 in favour, with five abstentions; For: France, UK, Lebanon, US, South Africa, Bosnia-Hercegovina, Colombia, Portugal, Nigeria, Gabon; Abstentions: China, Russia, Brazil, India, Germany (BBC 2011a).

⁴⁰ Note that this perception is challenged by Etienne de Durand (2012), arguing that France wanted to prove its position as a military power and feared that NATO would limit it both politically and operationally.
resolution, “nothing more, nothing less” (cited in BBC 2011c). Operation Unified Protector was launched on March 27th, involving 18 nations: 14 NATO member states and four partner countries. It seems that US reluctance and pressure, led to agreement in the Alliance; with the US seeking a limited role, NATO was the next ‘obvious’ candidate for a complex multinational mission like the Libyan operation (Marcus 2011). Several NATO members did not contribute directly in the operation, some due to lack of resources, but also others with available capabilities, e.g. Germany and Poland, abstained from participating (Daalder & Stavridis 2012). Norway, on the other hand, was soon to be in the front line.

4.4.1 Yes by SMS

The process that led to Norway’s participation in Libya happened remarkably fast. There was little time for a discussion in the Storting, and the public debate on the intervention was rather limited when considering the gravity of the situation and the possible implications. Due to the urgency in the Libyan situation, Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Støre (Ap) contacted the parliamentarian leaders of the opposition parties on March 18th by telephone. Supposedly circumstances made it difficult to gather the parliamentarians for a meeting (Johansen 2011a). Nonetheless, according to Støre the telephone conversations revealed broad support for the Government’s decision (Støre 2011). Later, in an interview with the Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation (NRK), the leader of Venstre, Trine Skei Grande, could not recall speaking with Støre and had allegedly only received an SMS regarding the matter (NRK 2013).

Before UN Resolution 1973, Norway was rather reluctant, but once a resolution was adopted, it was among the first in line for an intervention (Dagbladet 2011). Støre underlined that Norway wished to be in front in the follow-up of the resolution – “in terms of humanitarian aid, as well as politically and militarily” (cited in NTB 2011c). Prime Minister Stoltenberg emphasised the urgency of the matters – enforced by the reports and photos from the situation in Benghazi – and that it was critical to take military action as quickly as possible (Sæbø 2011). The significance of having the support of the Arab League and the AU was also deemed important in Norway, and decisive for the legitimacy of the operation (NTB 2011d; Søreide 2012).

Only a day prior to the adoption of UN Resolution 1973 there was a debate in the Storting, in which the Stoltenberg II Government was criticised for leading an unclear policy regarding Libya and the prospects of a no-fly zone. The criticism was rejected by Stoltenberg, stating that Norway’s attitude had been clear and consistent the whole time and that “the use of military force presupposes a resolution in the Security Council” (cited in NTB 2011b).
Morten Høglund (2013) pointed out that it would have been unreasonable for the Storting to oppose the Government at that point, considering that it earlier had demanded action in regard to Libya. Concerning the rapid involvement, he stated that the political parties did have the possibility to pull the breaks and ask for the issue to be discussed in an extraordinary meeting in the Storting (Høglund 2013). Ine Eriksen Søreide (H), leader of DUUFK, underlines that between March 21st and March 25th, the issue of Libya was discussed in two open parliamentary sessions and three meetings in DUUFK (2012); although debates in the aftermath indicates opposition to the decision, Søreide emphasises that in reality there was no disagreement in the Storting at the time:

There was a unison political agreement that it was important and decisive that Norway responded to the request of the UN when the UN in the end managed to agree on the principle to protect civilians (Søreide 2012, p. 87).

Norway’s participation in the Libyan intervention proved to be divisive for SV. The leadership was criticised within the party, whereby Ivar Johansen, the party’s international leader, argued that the bombing was the wrong thing to do, while Bård Solhjell, parliamentarian leader to SV, argued that it was important to support the UN, but also to stay strict to the UN mandate given (Vegstein 2011). Hence, it was the party leadership and the politicians in government who were the driving forces for the support of Norwegian participation in SV.

In the media it was commented that Norway’s support of the intervention was important and rightful, considering the UN mandate (Aftenposten 2011; Nationen 2011; Fædrelandsvennen 2011). The issue of the Norwegian participation being approved by telephone has later been hotly debated in the media and among politicians. However, the fact that Norwegian fighter aircrafts delivered 569 bombs (Forsvaret 2012), has received less attention (Espenes & Haug 2012). This is arguably an indication that Norway has become more accustomed to the use of military force.

4.4.2 World class F-16

On March 18th it was said that Norway was awaiting the process within NATO regarding the Norwegian contribution, but that air forces was most relevant (NTB 2011b). Shortly after the Paris summit it was announced from government sources that Norway was sending six F-16 fighter aircrafts (Bondevik 2011). Normally it takes a few months to work out the orders and prepare for deployment, but within only 100 hours the F-16s could take off from Norway (Lunde 2012).
Due to the rapid development of the situation in Libya and the on-going discussion on the role of NATO, the structure of command was not elucidated at the time Norway confirmed its contribution. Thus, as the F-16s left Norway it was unclear which base they would operate from, which tasks they would perform, and under which command (Iversen 2011). The uncertainty regarding commando structure was not viewed by the Government as problematic; Defence Minister Grete Faremo (Ap) ensured that the Norwegian forces would not be put into action before the structure of command was established, emphasising that an effective commando and clear access to the procedure was important in order to ensure that Norwegian military force was under national control (Kruhaug & Bondevik 2011).

Apart from staying strict to the UN mandate given for the intervention, Norway did not pose national caveats in addition to NATO’s concept of operation and ROEs (Lunde 2012, p. 95). Consequently, Norwegian F-16 fighter aircrafts flew missions to which other countries had made reservations, and was as such in front-line of the operation. Compared to the cases of Kosovo and Afghanistan, the reluctance of using force seems to be reduced to a significant degree. This is underlined by the fact that the Norwegian contribution has been presented with pride by the Government in the aftermath (NRK 2011; Johansen 2011b). The Norwegian effort has also received praise internationally, among others from US President Obama, NATO General Secretary Rasmussen, and Commander of NATO’s mission in Libya, General Bouchard (Eide 2012, p. 18).

Sverre Diesen and Morten Høglund both emphasised that the case of Libya stands out in terms of the time frame, and that it is likely that Norway in future intervention will be more restrictive with its contributions (Diesen 2013; Høglund 2013). Nevertheless, considering the urgency of the matter, and Høglund’s statement that it would have been unnatural for the Storting to pull the breaks, this does not explain the large contribution Norway decided to give. Indeed, Dag Henriksen pointed out that a more limited support would rather be the norm, given the fact that Norway up until then had dropped seven bombs since WWII. “Thus, it would be fair to assume that Norway surprised itself, as well as its allies, by contributing as forcefully as it did” (Henriksen 2013c).

Commenting on the Norwegian use of force in Libya, Diesen (2013) argued that this has less to do with the political will to do things others were reluctant to do, rather than the fact that Norwegian pilots are among the best when it comes to precision bombing. He admitted, however, that it is interesting that Norway did not use the same restrictions as in Afghanistan: “had there been a political unwillingness for a more aggressive operation in Libya, Norway could have claimed that this is too difficult” (Diesen 2013). The arguably changed Norwegian
attitude is further strengthened by the surprised reactions of the international community; the expectations were not there internationally, and there are therefore reasons to look for answers domestically.

4.5 From reluctance to the front line

The analysis of the four case studies indicates that there is a development in Norway’s participation in international military operations. Of course one should keep in mind that the situation and context of each case impacts the outcome. Nevertheless, in addition to the technological development that is exemplified by the changed capacity of the F-16’s in Kosovo to Libya, there also seems to be a changed attitude in Norway concerning the use of force under international auspices. Moreover, some questions remain unanswered; how can the many caveats in Afghanistan be explained, and the lack thereof in Libya? And, considering the evident Norwegian reluctance in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq, why was Norway suddenly in front-line in Libya? The following chapter seeks to address these questions by applying the two-level-games model to the empirics, as well as further investigating my argument that a development in ability and willingness can be noted through the four case studies of the present thesis.
5 The two-level games of Norway’s decision of participation

The present chapter applies the two-level games to the empirics. The purpose is to shed light on similarities or trends that can be identified in the four case studies. As indicated in the analysis above, there are decisions to which an explanation cannot be found on the structural level. Hence, neo-realism is not sufficient to explain the whole picture of the Norwegian participation and the contributions, and we need to open the ‘black box’ of the Norwegian state.

The model of two-level games emphasises that the international and the domestic levels are intertwined. I have, however, as Putnam, divided the analysis according to the two levels due to expository purposes. The first section assesses the international level (Level I) with a particular focus on the dualism of realpolitik and idealpolitik in Norwegian foreign policy. The second section addresses Level II and the ratification of Norway’s participation and of the Norwegian contributions, with Level I constraints taken into consideration. The last section of the chapter reflects on the argued development of Norway’s participation in international military operations.

5.1 Level I: expectations and allied pressure

Regarding the use of military force on the international stage, Norway has never been in the forefront. It is noted that domestic decision-makers and societal actors consider international pressures when addressing the decision to use or support the use of force (Mingst 2007, p. 77). Moreover, according to neo-realism, Norway is dependent on stronger states and their actions when it comes to foreign policy. This is underlined with the Norwegian membership in NATO, which was a result of externally induced pressure.

While NATO became a basis for realpolitik, idealpolitik is reflected in Norway’s emphasis on the UN and the aim of constructing a world order based on international law. Accordingly, Norway emphasises both NATO and the UN as cornerstones in its foreign policy. This dualism arguably leads to two different Level I induced expectations faced by Norwegian governments. Consequently, it can produce strategic dilemmas for the Government when the two are incompatible but also open up for strategic opportunities when they coincide, as will be addressed in the following analysis.

The events in Yugoslavia became a test for NATO and its existence. It is argued that it was not given that NATO was to be the dominant actor in the Kosovo crisis. However, the continuous threats of using NATO forces against Milosevic by leading Alliance members, tied NATO, as an alliance, to the US approach of using coercive diplomacy (Eide 2000, p.
Hence, the pressure for member countries to participate was quite strong; it was a “to be or not to be” for NATO, and for Norway this was quite serious seeing the high value it puts on the Alliance in its security and defence policy.\footnote{Some argue that after the demise of the Soviet Union, the value put on NATO has declined and that it is less important to member states with regard to security (Brawley & Martin 2000). However, in the case of Norway, NATO continues to be important as Russia is still regarded as a possible threat (see chapter 3).}

That the intervention in Kosovo lacked UN authorisation and Norway nonetheless decided to participate, demonstrates the significance of, and the pressure within NATO. Kosovo came as a shock to Norway but politicians realised that a more active role was needed to improve Norway’s military reputation in the Alliance (Haaland 2007, p. 497). Hence, as the diplomatic efforts failed, the expectations following Norway’s realpolitik were perceived as stronger than the expectations due to its idealpolitik – reflecting the tension of what Norway wants and what Norway needs to do to ensure state security.

In the case of Afghanistan, Article 5 was invoked and a UN authorisation was provided. Thus, considering the situation, the Norwegian support of the intervention is not that surprising with both NATO and the UN consenting to the operation. Political support was expressed instantly, but at the same time Norway remained rather hesitant in regard to contributions. In a two-level game, however, expectational effects are important (Putnam 1988, p. 436), and the Bondevik II Government clearly felt the expectation of contributing.

In the Storting on December 5th 2001, Defence Minister Krohn Devold (H) argued that it was important to offer Norwegian contributions directly to the US, as already done by other coalition countries. She further emphasised that “Norway is the only allied country which is represented in the American headquarters in Florida, and has not yet clarified a specific military contribution” (cited in Stortinget 2001, p. 600). Moreover, the importance of demonstrating capability, and honour collective defence obligations within NATO was explicitly underlined by Krohn Devold and Foreign Minister Petersen (H) (Stortinget 2001).

What is interesting, is the different Norwegian contributions in Afghanistan and the national caveats which followed. As pointed out, NATO has struggled with overcoming the different national restrictions, as they pose problems for the commanders regarding the utility of the forces at hand (Morelli & Belkin 2009, p. 10). In this regard the US has continuously pressed ISAF troop contributors to drop or ease national caveats (NTB 2005a; Bowman & Dale 2009, p. 59). Moreover, in 2005, Norway was under heavy pressure from NATO, and Britain in particular, to do more in Afghanistan, especially in the south (Frost-Nielsen 2013, p. 9). Nonetheless, the Norwegian Level II (national) caveats were applied despite Level I
(international) pressure. A suggested explanation for these will be addressed in the examination of Level II in the following section.

During the period of the Bondevik II Government, Norwegian contributions to UN peace-keeping operations declined and more focus was given to the operation in Afghanistan. As Foreign Minister Petersen stated: “the most important is what we do, not whether we have a UN helmet or not” (cited in Johnsen 2002c). The Norwegian cuts occurred despite strong encouragement by the UN of rich countries to bear a greater burden of UN peace operations (Johnsen 2002b). The Norwegian Government thus faced Level I pressure from two directions: on the one hand the UN and on the other the US and NATO. MFA officials expressed concern about the symbolic effect of the withdrawal, arguing that it could weaken Norway’s credibility in the UN (Johnsen 2002b). Evaluating the two Level I expectations and considering the outcome, an interpretation is that it was viewed as more beneficial to national interest to support the US in Afghanistan, in light of the security guarantee, rather than contributing to the UN.

In the case of Iraq there was extensive US pressure for support and contributions. A feature of bargaining in the two-level context is that leaders attempt to manipulate the domestic situations of their counterparts during the negotiation process (Putnam 1988, p. 454; Eichenberg 1993, p. 67). Accordingly, US President Bush made several attempts at convincing allies to support an intervention in Iraq. Moreover, the case by US Foreign Minister Colin Powell in February 2003, was arguably a strong attempt to turn unconvinced countries. Regarding the stiff opposition in the Norwegian public opinion, US ambassador John Doyle Ong, reminded the Norwegian population of the long cooperation with the US:

Let us not forget the solid basis of goodwill that exists between our countries, and which assents from historical ties, family relations and positive experiences from exchanges, tourist visits and studies in each other’s countries (cited in Fyhn 2002b).

Hence, the US ambassador tried to alter the perceptions of the costs of no-agreement (i.e. no support); by not supporting the US, Norway challenged the good relationship, and implicitly the security guarantee it provided. Despite US pressure, however, Norway chose not to support the intervention of Iraq, although it led to more chilled relations with the US – indicating importance of domestic factors.

Libya was a counter regime operation with a broad UN mandate. A surprise to all, Norway was in the forefront – contributing to an extent that was not expected among allies (Henriksen 2013a, p. 32). Implicitly, the expectations on Level I are in the case of Libya not significantly strong enough in order to explain the heavy Norwegian contribution. Although
initially hesitant, the Stoltenberg II Government responded quickly when UN Resolution 1973 was amended. Arguably, the more a state emphasises the UN and values a world order based on international law for the state’s security, the stronger the obligation is felt among policy makers to follow up on UN resolutions. In the statement on the Libya intervention to the Storting on March 29th 2011, Prime Minister Stoltenberg (Ap) stated that:

Our engagement [in Libya] builds upon a long line in Norwegian foreign policy, namely the support of a UN-led world order, in which the use of force is regulated by the UN pact and Security Council resolutions (cited in Stortinget 2011, pp. 3133-4).

The importance of supporting the UN in the case of Libya is also confirmed by Morten Høglund (2013). However, the question remains: why did Norway contribute to such an extent?

As we have seen there are international factors that can explain Norway’s participation in international military operations. Especially in the case of Kosovo, international factors give a strong explanation to the Norwegian decision to participate. Nevertheless, they cannot explain all aspects of the different contributions in Afghanistan, the position of the Norwegian Government regarding the US and the war in Iraq, nor the heavy contribution in Libya. Hence, the following analysis addresses Level II and the domestic win-sets, which provides further understanding for the decisions to participate or not to participate.

5.2 Level II: the ratification phase
In all political systems, decisions to deploy and use military forces are among the most important that can be taken. As outlined in chapter 3, the Norwegian Government have a prerogative in this regard but the gravity that follows such decisions implies that support from Level II constituents is important. This section will firstly address the public opinion and the media, thereafter the different win-sets, and lastly the chief negotiator.

5.2.1 Public opinion and the role of the media
In terms of security issues and international affairs, it is argued that the public opinion does not have a significant constraint on the governments’ win-sets, but that it can play a central role in sensitive security policy decisions when it is perceived as important (Trumbore 1998).

As pointed out, the cases in the present analysis concern low-intensity conflicts and do not present an imminent threat against the Norwegian territory or population. The operations have taken place far away from Norwegian borders, and are presumably harder to relate to than other domestic issues as they do not affect the everyday life of common Norwegians. Moreover, in Iraq and Libya there were no Norwegian casualties, one soldier died serving
KFOR in Kosovo, while in Afghanistan, from 2001 to present date, there have been ten casualties (Soldat/Veteran Portalen n.d). Presumably, had there been a greater risk for Norwegian casualties, the attention and resistance to Norwegian participation in international military operations would have been greater.

With the increased military participation, the justification by Norwegian governments has to a large extent been drawn on the peace discourse (Græger & Leira 2005). Arguably the rhetoric used by the politicians, to prevent violations on human rights, securing democracy and stability, has been to defend the participation to the public in forms of idealpolitik. The different pronouncement by the politicians can be seen as an effort to address concerns in the Norwegian population and reminding them of why Norwegian soldiers participate. Arguably this has been especially important in the case of the participation in Afghanistan, which is now in its twelfth year. Moreover, consistently the subsequent Norwegian governments have argued, in all cases, that Norway is not at war in the traditional sense. In an interview related to the four casualties in Afghanistan in 2010, Prime Minister Stoltenberg underlined this: “We participate in war-like actions, but from an international law perspective we are not at war” (cited in Olsen et al. 2010).

In the above analysis of Kosovo, Afghanistan and Libya there is no indication of the decision to participate were taken as a response to public opinion. Accordingly, I argue that the public opinion did not affect the domestic win-sets of the operations to a significant degree. But as argued above, Norwegian governments still consider the view of the public. According to Høglund, the public opinion is not unimportant in this regard. He underlines, however, that there are other political questions that get far more attention and generate more reactions, such as drilling for oil in Lofoten and electricity grids across the Hardanger fjord, which mobilise the population to a much greater extent (Høglund 2013).

The case of Iraq is another matter. The fact that the national gathering in February 2003 was the largest in Norwegian history at the time is arguably not something a government can refuse to listen to. An interesting indication on the opposite is Foreign Minister Petersen. According to sources close to Petersen, he was not particularly affected by the demonstrations – it was his duty as foreign minister to secure the cornerstone in Norwegian security and defence policy, and that a disturbance at the home was tolerable (Gjerde 2008a). One could thus argue that a strong opposition in the public opinion needs to be convincing to the

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42 Note that the list of Norwegian casualties during military service is not official, but compared to sources I have looked into suggest that the list is accurate. Furthermore, the reader should be aware of that the list also includes casualties under military training in Norway.
decision-makers in order to have an impact on the win-set. This seems to be the case for Prime Minister Bondevik (KrF).

A war against Iraq was heavily criticised by the Church, which directed its pressure towards the Christian Prime Minister (Løkeland-Stai 2003). Bondevik used a lot of time to ensure the public that he was against war (Narum 2003), and his statement of not supporting the UN, indicates that he was very much affected by the public sentiment. Bondevik proved to be decisive for the Iraq win-set, which will be addressed below, and the public opinion arguably played a central, but not a key role in this case; although two thirds of Norwegians opposed the war, regardless of the outcome in the UNSC (Narum 2003), the Government stayed on its UN ‘track’.

As with the public opinion, the empirics in the four case studies do not suggest that media has been an important factor in the domestic win-sets. It is argued that the Norwegian media is not an autonomous political actor, but rather a communicative prolongation of the consensus in Norwegian foreign policy, and as such an integrated part of the Norwegian foreign policy culture (Thune et al. 2006). This view is supported in the four case studies of the present thesis. An example is the editorial comment by Aftenposten to the hesitant attitude of Norway after 9/11: “Right at this moment, clumsy statements ruin decades of efforts to build goodwill for Norway in the US” (Aftenposten 2001a). Moreover, although critical to the approval of Norway’s participation in Libya per telephone, the media was supportive of the Norwegian participation. There may be a shift, however. NRK broadcasted in March 2013 a documentary seeking to shed new light on the Norwegian participation in Libya. It questioned the heavy contribution and the broad national support without a formal debate in the Storting (NRK 2013). Then again, apart from being commented in some editorials and feature articles (see Aftenposten 2013, Morgenbladet 2013; Dagsavisen 2013; Gjerdåker 2013; Lodgaard 2013) the debate in the media has not been extensive after the documentary43.

5.2.2 The size of the win-sets

In the case of Kosovo I argue that the fact that the future of NATO was tied to the operation was decisive for the domestic win-set. The Bondevik I Government long remained reluctant to an intervention and sought as long as possible to work for a political solution to the crisis. As the situation escalated, however, the Government was given unanimously consent from all the political parties in the Storting – even from the ‘war critical socialists’. The limiting factor

43 I make this argument after a search in Atekat, a Nordic media archive, for ‘Libya’ in all Norwegian newspaper from 12 March 2013, the date of the NRK documentary on Libya, to the present.
on the win-set (i.e. the need for a UN mandate) was thus removed by emphasising the ‘principle of necessity’. Consequently the domestic win-set was expanded, making it possible to ratify Norwegian participation as the prospect of status quo (i.e. not participating) was not evaluated by the decision makers to be in the interest of the state (i.e. realpolitik). Hence, as outlined in chapter four, although both idealpolitik and realpolitik are evident in the justification of the participation, the Level I expectation following Norway’s NATO membership provides the strongest explanation for Norway’s participation in Kosovo.

Compared to Kosovo the participation in Afghanistan met more domestic opposition, especially from SV. However, with Article 5 invoked and a UN mandate amended, there was a wide win-set for participating in Afghanistan – underlined by the broad political consensus in the Storting. Norwegian participation in OEF was justified by the need to show alliance solidarity and making Norway relevant within NATO. As the US called for the use of the six F-16s in 2002, the contribution was viewed by Defence Minister Krohn Devold as “good foreign policy”, enabling Norway to demonstrate its relevance as an ally (cited in Frost-Nielsen 2011, p. 367).

Despite a broad Afghanistan win-set, there was concern internally in the Bondevik II Government regarding the F-16 contribution. The F-16s were now upgraded and could thus make a greater contribution than in Kosovo. Consequently, there were some in the Government who feared an escalation of the intensity in international contributions (Frost-Nielsen 2011, p. 371). The opposition party SV argued that the chance for ‘friendly-fire incidents’ striking civilians was great and that Norway should withdraw from the OEF and rather focus on ISAF (Christensen 2002b). In order to address domestic concern, the Government posed national caveats on the contribution. The importance of this is underlined by the repeated statements by Government officials that the Norwegian F-16s were under national control (see Christensen 2002a; Huus-Hansen 2002; Tjønn 2002). Hence, with these conditions the Government was able to enhance own ability to satisfy domestic pressure and at the same time meet Level I expectations to contribute.

The case of Iraq proved to be a very difficult issue for the Bondevik II Government. As mentioned, KrF and Venstre were strongly opposed to the war (Skjeseth 2003). Høyre, on the other hand, was willing to go much further in the support of the US, despite the risk of overstretch considering the Norwegian participation in Afghanistan (Fyhn 2002a; Udgaard 2006, p. 62). In a two-level game, in which central actors have diverging views on what is ‘national interests’, acceptability-sets need to overlap in order to make a ratification feasible (Putnam 1988, p. 438). In the Iraq win-set I argue that two related strategic dilemmas were
present, to which the acceptability-sets of the different coalition parties in the Government needed to overlap. The first concerns idealpolitik and the need to guard Norwegian attitudes and actions in international law as expressed through UN resolutions; the second entails an evaluation of the consequences by breaking with one of the cornerstones in Norwegian foreign policy – the good relationship with the US.

Considering the idealpolitik dilemma, there was a dispute in the Government due to different perceptions on what the UN ‘track’ entailed. KrF and Venstre awaited a clear UN resolution, while their coalition partner Høyre perceived the interpretation of the existing UN Resolution 1441 as sufficient basis for an intervention (Ulstein & Nielsen 2003). As stated by Foreign Minister Petersen: “To put it this way, [the British interpretation] is not bad reasoning” (cited in Simonsen 2003). Despite the position fronted by Petersen, there was also disagreement within Høyre, as central politicians from the party had marked their opposition to the US, creating hope for a solution to the internal struggle in the Government. US Foreign Secretary Powell’s case in the UNSC on February 5th made an impression however, and the argumentation of Petersen received renewed attention within the party (Gjerde 2008a). As such, Powell’s presentation had a reverberating effect on the Iraq win-set. Consequently, there was new uncertainty in the Government on what the point of view would be from Høyre, and consequently uncertainty with regard to a possible ratification of Norway’s position.

The win-set was further complicated by Prime Minister Bondevik, who was stuck between a rock and a hard place. The Bondevik II Government, however, settled the dispute regarding the UN, confirming that Norway will support a war against Iraq if there is a new UN resolution. Hence, the obligations following Norway’s emphasis on a UN-led world order was decisive in this matter. As commented by Stoltenberg (Ap):

> It is a basic advantage that there is a broad consensus in difficult foreign policy issues. To conclude already now would implicitly weaken the UN. We cannot only respect the UN resolutions we like (cited in Johnsen & Mathismoen 2003).

The other dilemma still remained: what will be the position of Norway, if the US goes to war without a clear UN mandate? Foreign Minister Petersen guarded the relationship with the US, and was of the opinion that Norway could not afford being at odds with the US, considering the loss of strategic significance to the US and NATO after the Cold War (Gjerde 2008a). In order to minimise the adverse consequences of not supporting the US, Norway’s closest ally, and to ensure an overlap of the acceptability-sets within the Government, the Norwegian Government settled for a ‘middle way’: not supporting Washington in its war
against Iraq but at the same time moderating the criticism of the US, as opposed to Germany, France and Sweden, which were much more critical.

Hence, as US President Bush asked for support, Prime Minister Bondevik could remain firm in his answer. Following two-level games, a small win-set can be a bargaining advantage in the international negotiations and the smaller the win-set, the less the chief negotiator can be ‘pushed’ around by other Level I negotiators (Putnam 1988, p. 440). Now that the position was ratified in the Government, Bondevik could justify Norway’s position on the lack of a UN mandate. Moreover, the public opinion played an important role in the Iraq win-set, as Bondevik could exploit the public sentiment as a reason for not supporting the American intervention, and thereby narrowing his win-set further.

However, the US-Norway relations were still very important to the Bondevik II Government – as it has been for all Norwegian governments since 1949. Hence, this can explain why Norway contributed with troops to the UN peace-keeping mission in Iraq after the intervention. The same argument can be made in the case of the Stoltenberg II Government withdrawing Norwegian forces from Iraq, followed by an increase in the contribution to ISAF and the second-period deployment of F-16s in 2006. The desire to stay on good terms with the US has always been strong in Norwegian foreign policy, and if this relationship is threatened, Norwegian politicians make great effort in restoring the balance.

The change of governments in 2005 had several implications for the Norwegian participation in international operations. Norwegian forces were drawn from the US-led OEF, and there was a complete withdrawal of the contribution in Iraq. In addition, the participation in UN missions was once again given attention (Stoltenberg II Government 2005). The Stoltenberg II Government included for the first time in Norwegian government history, a radical left party, SV. After the 2001 parliamentary election, in which SV did the best election in its history, the party was eager to get into government position as quickly as possible (Rossavik 2011, p. 415). In an effort to approach the two possible coalition partners, Ap and Sp, the political leadership of SV took a step away from an active opposition to NATO in 2004, with the argument that NATO no longer was a tool but rather a liability to the Americans, avoiding a commotion within the party (Rossavik 2011, p. 430). Although the political leadership of SV approached Ap and Sp on the question of NATO, they remained critical to the US. Consequently, with the 2005 government change, the Afghanistan win-set changed with it.

The diverging views of the three parties regarding the Norwegian contributions in Afghanistan were evident in 2001; while SV voted against Norwegian contributions to the
OEF, Ap and Sp gave their full support. Thus, side payments were arguably needed in order to get an overlap of the acceptability-sets of SV on the one hand, and Ap and Sp on the other. The withdrawal of the Norwegian contribution in Iraq was seemingly not a big side payment given to SV, as Ap had already in December 2003 stated that the party did not wish to renew the engagement in Iraq (Nybakk in Stortinget 2005b). The decision to withdraw from the OEF was, on the other hand, not easy for Ap and Sp to swallow (Rossavik 2011, p. 458). However, the US-led OEF, in which the aim was to remove terrorists from Afghanistan, was incompatible with the standpoint of SV. ISAF, established by the UN and its purpose of reconstructing Afghanistan, was more acceptable – as “the thought of Norway as a peace nation and the use of aid as a foreign policy instrument is in the spirit of the party” (Rossavik 2011, p. 430). By withdrawing from the OEF but at the same time increasing the Norwegian efforts in ISAF and assuming command of the PRT in Meymaneh, the Government had a domestic win-set in which the acceptability-sets were overlapping. Hence, by moving away from the realpolitik cornerstone towards the idealpolitik cornerstone, the win-set complied with Level I pressure of contributing, as well as addressing domestic demands in SV.

The Government chose to make these decisions despite the pressure within NATO and criticism from the domestic opposition parties. In the Storting KrF viewed it as unwise to withdraw from Iraq, and Høyre and Frp feared that as a consequence of the withdrawal from Iraq and OEF, this would negatively affect allied interest in coming to Norway’s aid (Stortinget 2005b). However, clearly the interest in holding the new coalition together was deemed as more important, and the case exemplifies the autonomy that the Norwegian governments have in foreign policy and underlines the consultative role of the Storting. Nevertheless, as the two-level-games model helps to picture how the cleavages between the domestic and international spheres are intertwined and mutually affecting each other, the case of Afghanistan shows that despite the autonomy, the Storting and the international pressure within NATO could not be neglected entirely.

Ap, with Foreign Minister Støre as the driving force in the Government, wished to send more troops, as well as special forces to South Afghanistan. Kristin Halvorsen (SV) strongly opposed sending Norwegian soldiers to the south, and won the internal battle in the Government in the autumn of 2006, and no new troops were sent (Rossavik 2001, p. 470). Accordingly, with the strong opposition in SV, the Afghanistan win-set was narrowed and the autonomy of the Government was constrained in the negotiations in NATO. However, when a new request came in the winter of 2007, the Ap cabinet members increased the pressure within the Government, and as a compromise 150 special soldiers were sent to Kabul
(Rossavik 2011, p. 470). This issue indicates a strong Level I pressure felt in the Government. The involuntary defection of withdrawing from OEF, by which the Stoltenberg II Government could not ratify an agreement with allies due to a narrow win-set, arguably led to a need to contribute more in other areas as compensation.

There was also the issue of contributing with F-16s for a second period in 2006 in Afghanistan. The opposition to bombing was, as pointed out above, strong within SV. However, seeing that the previous Bondevik II Government already had proposed to send F-16 fighter aircrafts arguably created expectation of a contribution in NATO. Hence, to avoid another involuntary defection – which presumably would have weakened Norway’s reputation among allies – this needed to be resolved within the Government. The option chosen was to expand the win-set by setting national caveats on the F-16 contribution, in which Norwegian F-16s were to be under the command of the ISAF operation and not OEF (Stortinget 2005a; Frost-Nielsen 2013).

In the case of Libya the domestic win-set appear to have been broad, and thus the autonomy of the chief negotiator. This is underlined as Prime Minister Stoltenberg already at the Paris summit on March 19th 2011 could announce Norwegian participation with six F-16 fighter aircrafts. Considering the importance of the UN in Norwegian foreign policy and the above analysis, the broad UN mandate for the operation was a decisive factor for the size of the Libya win-set. Foreign Minister Støre was long reluctant to a Norwegian participation, but as UN Resolution 1973 was passed, this changed his attitude. Hence, the UN mandate expanded the win-set and as such facilitated agreement within the Government. The importance of the UN mandate is perhaps most strongly underlined as SV, the party long and most critical to bombing and the use of force, did not oppose the Norwegian participation with one word44. That the approval of the Storting and the political parties was sought per telephone strengthens this perception. Despite that this way of collecting support was criticised at a later point, the Norwegian participation had full support in the Storting. As stated by Stoltenberg in the parliamentary debate on March 29th 2011:

It has been a while since we have had so unreserved, so concurring and such a clear agreement in the Storting regarding the complete support of all parts, of the organisation of the military operations and of Norway’s contribution (cited in Stortinget 2011, p. 3140).

There was considerable political risk connected to such a heavy contribution. In this regard Putnam underlines the importance of the strategies of the chief negotiator (1988, p.

44 It should be noted that the political leadership has met heavy criticism within the party afterwards.
Considering the rapid decision, it points to a significance of the motives of Prime Minister Stoltenberg, which will be addressed in the following section.

5.2.3 The Chief Negotiator

Foreign policy differs from other policy areas as the Storting is not supposed to exercise constitutional control with the Government, but to support the Government’s main line in foreign policy. Consequently, the autonomy of the Norwegian Government as chief negotiator is broad. As previously stressed, however, the case studies in the present analysis concern low-intensity conflicts, and as such do not represent an imminent threat to the survival of the Norwegian state. Arguably this opens up for an increased influence of domestic constituents in security policy matters, as coordination and consensus is not as important compared to the Cold War era with the overarching Soviet threat. More open debates concerning Norway’s participation in international military operations indicate that the need for consensus is not as strong as it previously has been, and which arguably weakens the autonomy of the Norwegian Government to negotiate on Level I.

In the case of Kosovo, the established political consensus in Norwegian foreign policy seemed to be stronger than ever, considering that even war-critical SV gave full consent to the intervention and Norwegian participation. In the case of Afghanistan, however the prerogative of the Norwegian Government (i.e. autonomy of chief negotiator) was on more occasions challenged by opposition parties. As mentioned, in 2001, FrP and SV voted in DUUK for an open debate regarding the contribution to Afghanistan. Carl I. Hagen (FrP) repeatedly referred to § 25 of the Constitution, emphasising the need of consent of the Parliament (Hagen in Stortinget 2001). On the question of whether FrP had changed attitude since Kosovo – in which the issue of the Constitution had not been addressed – Hagen responded that “we have felt that the Enlarged Foreign Affairs Committee, which is a consultative body, may have been used too much” (cited in Stortinget 2001, 607).

Then in 2002, a coalition of Frp, Sp and SV ensured that the discussions of central questions in DUUK with regard to Norwegian participation in international military operations were to be debated in the Storting (Leer-Salvesen 2002). Much of the argumentation centred on the issue of sending Norwegian military personnel to conflicts far away, and as such needed to be discussed in the public room. Accordingly the autonomy of the Norwegian Government vis-à-vis the Storting is increasingly challenged and one could thus argue that we are seeing a crack in foreign policy consensus. Nonetheless, this point should not be exaggerated as the prerogative has been defended by a majority in the Storting.
Furthermore, there are indications that point to that the Prime Minister as chief negotiator still has a broad autonomy. As mentioned in chapter 3, the Prime Minister’s office is the final point of power exertion, and it is argued that when the Norwegian Prime Minister is engaged personally, the Prime Minister’s office has large power (Udgaard 2006).

In the case of Iraq, Prime Minister Bondevik was, as mentioned, in a though dilemma. Personally he was against war and faced domestic pressure to take a tougher stand against the US. As Prime Minister, however, he had to consider the adverse consequences of foreign development by criticising the US. In the position between the two levels, one motive for the chief negotiator is to enhance his/her standing in the Level II game by minimising potential losses (Putnam 1988, p. 457). It is later revealed that a preliminary memorandum from the legal department in the MFA stated that UN Resolution 1441 gave a justified foundation for an invasion in terms of international law (Gjerde 2008b). It was to be the basis for Norway’s position regarding the intervention in Iraq, and implicitly gave political support to the US and the UK. This solution was, however, not acceptable to Bondevik, who pressured for a new memorandum. The new version explicitly expressed that there was no pertaining to international law for the invasion unless a new resolution was amended, but that UN Resolution 1441 under certain circumstances could legitimise use of force (Gjerde 2008b). Hence, in his strategic dilemma, Bondevik used his veto power to change the content and thus ensure an outcome that consolidated domestic opposition to the US, while at the same time presented a mild criticism of the action taken by Washington and London.

In the case of Libya, Prime Minister Stoltenberg arguably played a key role as the driving force of the quick decision to deploy the Norwegian fighter aircrafts. Foreign Minister Støre was initially sceptical to a NATO-led operation in Libya and Norwegian participation, and argued that it was better for Norway if the US, Britain and France, in cooperation with Arab countries executed the operation (Hopperstad et. al 2011). On the one hand, considering that a broad UN mandate was amended, it was reasonable that Norway would participate. Furthermore, UN resolution 1973 changed the attitude of Foreign Minister Støre, and the decision received full support in the Storting. On the other hand, however, the UN mandate did not necessarily imply that Norway had to respond so quickly and participate to such an extent. Allegedly the urgency of having a decision regarding the F-16 contribution clarified was due to Stoltenberg wanting to have an offer to put on the table at the summit in Paris on 19th March 2011. This perception is outlined by Kristin Halvorsen (SV), stating that “it went down too quickly because the Prime Minister wanted a quick decision” (cited in Gjerde 2012). During the short period between the UN Resolution was amended and the Paris
summit, it became clear to Halvorsen that Stoltenberg did not want to come to Paris empty handed, and the Prime Minister did not leave much room for alternatives (Sølhusvik 2012, pp. 376-378). In terms of the two-level game this indicates the third motive for Stoltenberg. That is, to pursue own conception of national interest in the international context. Having the relevant capability and a broad UN mandate for the participation, Stoltenberg arguably had a wide win-set with which he could follow own strategies and motives in the interest of Norway.

5.3 The willingness to risk a strike
In two-level games, Putnam distinguish between heterogeneous and homogenous issues (1988, p. 443), where in the latter the most significant cleavage is likely to be between ‘hawks’ and ‘doves’, depending on the constituencies’ willingness to risk a strike. In a comparison of the four case studies, I argue that these conceptions apply well to Norway’s participation in the operations, taking Level I pressures resulting from the dualism in Norwegian foreign policy into consideration.

The cases of Afghanistan and Iraq were heterogeneous, as there were domestic opposition both from those who thought the Level I agreement went too far, e.g. SV in the Afghanistan win-set and KrF/Sp in the Iraq win-set; and from those who thought it did not go far enough, e.g. Ap/Sp in the Afghanistan win-set, and H/FrP in the Iraq win-set. Hence, the win-sets were much more complicated, and consequently constraining on the autonomy of the Norwegian Government. In the cases of Kosovo and Libya, the interests of the domestic constituents were homogenous, as a result of considerations of the adverse consequences of foreign development in NATO and the UN. In the Kosovo win-set, the Bondevik I Government, finding itself in an unaccustomed situation and without relevant capabilities, had a ‘dovish’ attitude – contribute with what we must, nothing more. In the Libya win-set there was no tension between the two cornerstones of Norwegian foreign policy. The concurrence of idealpolitik and realpolitik gave a broader win-set and thus strong autonomy of the chief negotiator, than the three other cases. Consequently, I argue that the Stoltenberg II Government could assume a ‘hawkish’ position, and with a relevant capability, was able to contribute to such an extent in Libya.
6 Norway’s participation in international military operations post-Cold War

This chapter extracts the essence of the empirical findings and evaluates the application of the two-level games. The primary aim of the present thesis was to evaluate whether there has been a development in the Norwegian use of force under international auspices. Accordingly, the following two sections elaborate further on two aspects of the indicated development.

Returning to the research questions, the analysis has shown that Norway’s decision to participate in the operations can, to a great extent, be explained by international factors. The findings underline that Norway’s NATO membership was decisive for the participation in Kosovo and Afghanistan. Considering Norway’s ‘dovish’ attitude, one could argue that participation in these two cases would have been evaded if it were not for its membership in the Alliance. In the case of Libya, there was no reluctance once the broad UN mandate was on the table. An argued implication of Norway’s emphasis on idealpolitik and realpolitik is that it creates international expectations, which consequently increases the pressure on the Norwegian Government to contribute. This finding is consistent with that of Espenes and Haug (2012), and suggests that when realpolitik and idealpolitik coincide, as in the case of Libya, the possibility for Norway to participate more willingly is greater and that the Government can assume a more ‘hawkish’ role.

Despite the international pressure, there is evidently also room for manoeuvre for small states in the decision to deploy armed forces to low-intensity conflicts – perhaps best exemplified by the case of Iraq. The leeway is also evident in the other cases but not as clearly as in that case, in which Norway refrained from supporting the intervention, despite intense US pressure. Although there was not a clear UN mandate, some states interpreted the existing UN Resolution in a way that justified the intervention. Hence, as the analysis has shown, domestic factors were essential in explaining the outcome in the case of Iraq.

Domestic factors are more clearly evident regarding the second research question: why did Norway contribute in the way it did. By posing national caveats on the contributions, the subsequent Norwegian Governments have been able to secure national control and meet domestic demands, while facing international pressure to contribute. Hence, whereas the decision to participate is explained by international factors, the nature of the contributions is explained by domestic factors. The findings furthermore indicate that there is more leeway for political parties to influence Norwegian foreign policy – compared to the era in which the Soviet threat loomed and consensus was deemed highly important – both in terms of more
open debate on the decision to deploy armed forces, and the significance of SV in government position. The latter point has arguably led the Norwegian Government to be more restrictive in the participation in international military operations. At the same time, the government position has also changed SV, at least the party leadership, to be more approving to the use of force.

The public opinion and the media have not played a significant role in the four cases. However, if the issue is perceived as important enough, they can have a stronger effect on future operations. And, although not decisive in the case of Iraq, the public opinion affected the outcome. In the case of the extensive bombing of Libya, one could presume that reactions had been stronger if the operation had prolonged in time or had there been many ‘friendly-fire incidents’ with the participation of Norwegian F-16s – not to mention if there had been Norwegian casualties. Lately, there also seems to have been paid more attention to this case in the media.

Turning to the theoretical framework, the two-level-games model has allowed an investigation into Norwegian participation and contributions, and better clarified how decisions of deploying armed forces to international operations evidently are affected by domestic, as well as international factors. While the model was initially applied to economic issues, the two-level-game approach has proved to be useful also in the case of analysing security issues. As Putnam was criticised for paying too much attention to the chief negotiator’s strategies, the analysis has shown the importance of devoting more consideration to the other determinants of the win-set – underlining the complexity of a two-level game.

6.1 Technological development – the ability
From Norway’s participation in Kosovo to Libya, there has been an extensive development in the Norwegian ability to contribute in international military operations. The Norwegian F-16’s, which have participated in all three cases, have gone from not having air-to-ground capabilities at the time of Kosovo, dropping seven bombs during the two periods in Afghanistan, to dropping 569 bombs in Libya – a profound development over only 14 years. Moreover, the Norwegian Special Forces has become a sought after capability in NATO and an important niche instrument in Norwegian foreign policy (Kohte-Næss 2001; Græger & Leira 2005, p. 57). This is confirmed by Sverre Diesen (2013), who explained that Norway’s allies know very well what Norwegian forces are good at when it comes to contributing to sharp missions. He also pointed to how allies frequently request specific contributions, such as air forces or the Telemark Battalion.
During the first years after the Cold War, changes to the Norwegian Defence came slowly. Since 1999, however, there have been several defence reforms. As outlined in the 2004 strategic concept for the Defence:

The Defence is to be developed as a modern, flexible and alliance adapted security political tool, aiming at a balance between the Defence’s tasks, structure and supply of resources. [...] The focus is to secure and promote Norwegian interests, through being able to handle a broad spectre of challenges, both national and international (Ministry of Defence 2004, p. 68).

Hence, facing a new international security environment, the Norwegian Defence is to be a political tool in the goal of promoting national interests. Moreover, as Norway has lost the strategic relevance it had during the Cold War, changes have been necessary as to make Norway relevant within NATO, and to face the new security challenges. As stated by former Defence Minister Bjørn Tore Godal (Ap): “if we cannot contribute abroad, then we cannot expect help from abroad should we need it” (cited in Græger & Leira 2005, p. 55).

The ability of Norwegian armed forces in international operations has been affected by caveats. The fact that the contributions in Afghanistan had more national caveats than the contributions in Kosovo and Libya can be explained by the nature of the operations. In the latter two the contributions consisted of F-16s, while the operations in Afghanistan also included ground forces; as noted by Saideman and Auerswald (2011), more caveats are given when the risk is greater45. The Norwegian contribution in Libya did not have particular caveats, though this can to a large extent be explained by the technological development as the Norwegian F-16s are among the best at precision bombing (Henriksen 2013a, pp. 32-3). According to Frisvold (2013), Kosovo has been decisive for the development of the Norwegian Defence, stating that without the experiences from Kosovo and Afghanistan, Norway could not have executed its part in the operation in Libya as it did.

Although Norwegian participation in future missions may be more restrictive regarding the use of force, an important point is that having new and improved capabilities increases the expectations among allies; as Sverre Diesen pointed out: “Having a capability always creates expectations” (2013). The Norwegian Government is now in the process of acquiring up to 52 new F-35 fighter aircrafts, in which four are to be received by the end of 2017 (Ministry of Defence 2013b). Presumably this capability will increase international expectations to contribute in the future.

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45 Naturally there is significant risk for the pilots in the F-16s as well, but it differs from the risk that ground forces are exposed to.
6.2 Use of force – the willingness

A ‘dovish’ attitude to the use of force is evident in Kosovo and Afghanistan, but the increased efforts in the latter case and the Norwegian participation in Libya 2011 indicate a change. In 2001, Foreign Minister Petersen viewed it as unlikely that Norway would lead an international stabilisation force in Afghanistan (NTB 2001c). However, in 2005 this is precisely what Norway did, and the reluctance to do more than others had arguably disappeared with the Norwegian participation in Libya. Another point that strengthens this perception is that the party that has voiced most strongly against military operations, SV, approved Norway’s participation in Libya.

According to neo-realists a change in the polarity of the international system takes time for states to comprehend, and they often have an awaiting attitude (Waltz 2000). The understanding of the role of Norway in the new security climate is, arguably slowly, changing following the experiences of increased participation in international military operations. One could argue that the Cold War-era was a better situation for Norway as support from the US was guaranteed. Post-1990, however, the security picture is much more diffused, as well as Norway’s closest ally is shifting its focus away from Europe (Daalder 2003). The case of Libya, in which the US wished for a reduced role, implies that Norway has to give more internationally in order to gain something back – and that it is this that now has become clearer among Norwegian politicians.

Through the case studies we can note to some extent adjustment and familiarisation to the use of force. There were strong reactions after the first Norwegians bombs in Afghanistan in 2003, though there seems to be an awakening among politicians regarding the implications of Norway’s participation in international military operations. The reality in Afghanistan proved to be something other than the political stability and peace rhetoric conveyed by the politicians. Diesen (2013) pointed out that for the soldiers on the ground the reality was fights and war, but that he noted a shift in 2006/2007 among the politicians in this regard. This is supported by Frisvold (2013), who is of the opinion that there has been a changed attitude among politicians concerning what they are sending Norwegian forces into. Moreover, considering the large Norwegian effort in Libya compared to that in previous operations in which Norway had a supportive role, this fact has received relatively little attention; it appears that Norway being in the forefront concerning the use of force, is no longer viewed as unnatural, neither for the politicians, the public opinion or the media.

In summary, the focus on diplomacy and political solutions can be identified in all four cases, and the term ‘act of war’ has consequently been avoided. Nevertheless, it seems to be
an increased realisation among politicians that the use of force is a necessary component in order to achieve political solutions; as von Clausewitz wrote: “war is a mere continuation of policy by other means” (2007, p. 26). In an interview in the NRK documentary concerning Norway’s participation in Libya, Foreign Minister Støre stated that

> [t]he foundation for leading a dialogue is that one is also prepared to use force. The difficult question is if one is ready to use force when it is needed. This is without doubt Norway’s point of view, and we are good at both (Støre in NRK 2013).

Diesen (2013) maintained that the Norwegian contribution has never been meant to be decisive. The empirical findings from Kosovo and Afghanistan support this. With Libya, on the other hand, the contribution did have an impact on the result. Nevertheless, one should be careful to view the case of Libya as the new standard of Norwegian participation in international military operations, or that this is how Norway will contribute in future operations. As stressed in the analysis, each case is formed by its context, and it is probable that Norway will be more restrictive regarding the use of force, e.g. if the grounds for justification are more contested, as in the current conflict in Syria. Then again, the Norwegian participation in Libya may initiate an exercise of thought among politicians on the goals to be achieved by using military force, seeing that Norway, though small, can actually play an important part when it comes to the result. Moreover, the fact that Foreign Minister Barth Eide so quickly announced the possibility of Norwegian participation in the Mali intervention, underlines the willingness of Norway to use its military force internationally.

### 6.3 Concluding remarks

Norway still remains dependent on greater powers and the international community. The findings of the present thesis suggest that the strong emphasis on NATO and the UN has been decisive for the decision-making process in the four cases. Nevertheless, there is also leeway for Norway to operate independently, which furthermore opens up for more involvement of domestic actors. The limited access to primary sources prevents the answers from being conclusive. Nonetheless, we can conclude that there is no longer a party in the Storting that in principle is against Norwegian participation in international military operations. From being reluctant and clinging to the hope for diplomacy in Kosovo, to the rapid decision to use force without national caveats in Libya, there seems to be a new orientation among politicians regarding the use of force, through which they will use it increasingly.
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Appendix A: Norwegian governments from 1997 to present

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Government</th>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>Prime Minister</th>
<th>Foreign Minister</th>
<th>Defence Minister</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

*Høyre* (H) – the Conservative Party

*Venstre* (V) – the Liberal Party

*Kristelig Folkeparti* (KrF) – the Christian People’s Party

*Senterpartiet* (Sp) – the Centre Party (former Farmer’s Party)

*Arbeiderpartiet* (Ap) – the Labour Party

*Sosialistisk Venstreparti* (SV) – the Socialist Left Party
Appendix B: Interview guide

*Interview at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, January 29th 2013*

**Sverre Diesen** – former Chief of Defence from 2005 to 2009

1) Etter din vurdering, har det vært en utvikling i norsk deltakelse i internasjonale operasjoner?
   a) Med hensyn til prosessene frem mot en avgjørelse om norsk deltakelse.
   b) Med hensyn til det norske bidraget i henholdsvis Kosovo, Afghanistan og Libya.

2) Kan du si noe om Forsvarets rolle i forhold til departementene og politikere?
   a) Med tanke på en norsk deltakelse i internasjonale operasjoner.
   b) Med tanke på hvilken måte Norge bidrar i internasjonale operasjoner.

3) Hvilke tanker gjør du deg om evnen og viljen til innsats i Forsvaret?
   a) Har det vært en slitasje i viljen til å bidra?

4) USA og NATO
   a) Hvordan vurderer du Norges handlingsrom i forhold til USA og innad i NATO?
   b) Hvilken betydning har et stadig mer integrert fellesforsvar for Norges handlingsrom?
   c) Hvilke tanker gjør du deg om hvordan Norge oppfattes av allierte i NATO?

5) I St.meld. nr. 15 (2008-2009), *Interesser, ansvar og muligheter*, settes det ord på idealpolitikk og realpolitikk i norsk utenrikspolitikk. Hvordan vurderer du styrkeforholdet mellom disse i begrunnelsene for norsk deltakelse i de ulike operasjonene?
Sigurd Frisvold – former Chief of Defence from 1999 to 2005

1) Kosovo
   a) Hvordan oppfattet du Norges holdning til situasjonen i Kosovo?
   b) Hvilke erfaringer vil du trekke fram som viktige fra Operation Allied Force?
   c) Etter din oppfatning, kunne Norge ha bidratt mer i Kosovo om det hadde vært vilje for det?

2) Afghanistan
   a) Betydningen av erfaringene fra Kosovo
   b) Hvordan vurderer du utviklingen i Norges bidrag i Afghanistan?

3) USA og NATO
   a) Hvordan vurderer du Norges handlingsrom i forhold til USA og innad i NATO?
   b) Hvilke tanker gjør du deg om hvordan Norge oppfattes av allierte i NATO?
      i) Har det endret seg?

4) Hvilke tanker gjør du deg om evnen og viljen til innsats i Forsvaret?

5) I St.meld nr. 15 (2008-2009), Interesser, ansvar og muligheter, settes det ord på idealpolitikk og realpolitikk i norsk utenrikspolitikk. Hvordan vurderer du styrkeforholdet mellom disse i begrunnelsene for norsk deltakelse i de ulike operasjonene?

6) Etter din vurdering, har det vært en utvikling i norsk deltakelse i internasjonale operasjoner?
   a) Med hensyn til prosessene frem mot en avgjørelse om norsk deltakelse.
   b) Med hensyn til det norske bidraget i henholdsvis Kosovo, Afghanistan og Libya.
Morten Høglund – parliamentarian from the Progress Party, and member in DUUK/DUUFK from 2001 until present

1) Etter din vurdering, har det vært en utvikling i norsk deltagelse i internasjonale operasjoner?
   a) Med hensyn til prosessene frem mot en avgjørelse om norsk deltagelse.
   b) Med hensyn til det norske bidraget i henholdsvis Kosovo, Afghanistan og Libya.

2) Hvilke tanker gjør du deg om hvordan Norge oppfattes av allierte i NATO?

3) Hva er Stortingets rolle i vurderingen av en norsk deltagelse i internasjonale operasjoner?
   a) Opplever du at det er en økt grad av debatt rundt norsk deltagelse i Stortinget?

4) Folkeopinionens innflytelse
   a) Hvor stor påvirkning har folkeopinonen vedrørende en norsk deltagelse?
   b) Vil du si at det har vært en utvikling i tankegangen rundt norske militæres bidrag internasjonalt?

5) Uavhengig av partier, hvilke tanker gjør du deg om kontinuiteten i Norges forsvars- og sikkerhetspolitikk?
   a) Med et økt antall internasjonale operasjoner, oppfatter du at forholdet mellom de norske aktørene i forsvars- og sikkerhetspolitikken har endret seg?
   b) Dersom det blir et regjeringsskifte i år, vil dette være av betydning for norsk deltagelse i internasjonale operasjoner?

6) I St.meld. nr. 15 (2008-2009), Interesser, ansvar og muligheter, settes det ord på idealpolitikk og realpolitikk i norsk utenrikspolitikk. Hvordan vurderer du styrkeforholdet mellom disse i begrunnelsene for norsk deltagelse i de ulike operasjonene?