Kenya’s Foreign Policy Towards Somalia, 2011-2016; A Contribution to Insecurity.

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International Relations.
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DECLARATION
I, Okwany, Clifford Collins Omondi, declare that this thesis is a result of my research investigations and findings. Sources of information other than my own have been acknowledged and a reference list has been appended. This work has not been previously submitted to any other university for award of any type of academic degree.

Signature

Date…12th August 2016……..

This proposal has been submitted for approval to the supervisor named below.

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Abstract
The study seeks to explain and give an understanding of Kenya’s foreign policy towards Somalia. In order to understand the increased security situation; it explains how Kenyan government decisions lead to more al-Shabaab attacks. The study shows how the Kenyan government miscalculation and reactions towards al-Shabaab attacks leads to radicalization. It also gives an understanding on how the increased insecurity contributes to the sabotage of Kenya’s tourism industry.

The study therefore applies qualitative methodology in order to give an explanation of increased insecurity in Kenya. The concepts hereby emphasised are operation linda nchi, extrajudicial killings, nyumba kumi, operation usalama watch, radicalization, Westgate siege, Mpeketoni, Mandera, Garissa and El-Ade attacks and al-Shabaab. Kenyan’s foreign policy towards Somalia from 2011 to 2016; a contribution to insecurity will be explain in reference to identities and interest proponent. In order to explain and give an understanding of Kenyan foreign policy towards Somalia, in relation to the resent increased security; the study opens the ‘black box’ to give a deeper meaning of insecurity.
Map of Kenya and Somalia

Source: (Economists, 2011)
Table of Contents

DECLARATION.................................................................................................................................................... ii
Acknowledgement................................................................................................................................................ iii
Abstract................................................................................................................................................................ iv
Map of Kenya and Somalia ........................................................................................................................................ v

CHAPTER I ......................................................................................................................................................... 1
1.0 INTRODUCTION/ BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY ............................................................................. 1
1.3 Statement of the problem .......................................................................................................................... 4
1.4 Objectives/Aims of the study ..................................................................................................................... 4
1.5.0 Research Questions ............................................................................................................................... 4
1.5.1 Main research question ....................................................................................................................... 4
1.5.2 Sub research questions ....................................................................................................................... 4
1.6 Scope and limitations of the study ........................................................................................................ 5

CHAPTER II ...................................................................................................................................................... 6
2.0 Literature review ............................................................................................................................................... 6
2.1 Conceptual/Theoretical framework. ......................................................................................................... 16

CHAPTER III ..................................................................................................................................................... 21
3.0 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY ............................................................................................................... 21
3.2 Sampling and data collection procedures .............................................................................................. 22
3.3 Analysis of data .......................................................................................................................................... 26
3.4 Strength and weaknesses of the methods ................................................................................................. 27

CHAPTER IV ..................................................................................................................................................... 29
4.0 DECISION-MAKING PROCESS AND IT’S CONTRIBUTION TO INSECURITY ......................... 29
4.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................................................. 29
4.2 Kenya involvement in the Jubaland politics and Self-Defence ............................................................... 30
4.3 Diplomatic Crisis ....................................................................................................................................... 34
4.4 Increase of the Sporadic Attacks .............................................................................................................. 39
4.5 Explaining the Westgate Siege ................................................................................................................. 40
4.6 Mpeketoni Attacks; Not yet a lesson to learn ......................................................................................... 44
4.7 Mandera Massacres .................................................................................................................................. 48
4.8 Garissa attack; a repeated of Westgate ..................................................................................................... 49
4.9 El-Ade attacks .......................................................................................................................................... 51

CHAPTER V ......................................................................................................................................................... 55
5.0 GOVERNMENT’S MISCALCULATIONS AND REACTIONS; A CONTRIBUTION TO INSECURITY ......................................................................................................................... 55
5.1 Introduction................................................................................................................................................. 55
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5.2 Miscalculated internal threats</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3 Al-Shabaab radicalization in Kenya</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.4 Extrajudicial killing of high-profile Muslim clerics</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.4 Policing the police; hard-line strategy despite constitutional framework on community policing</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.6 Nyumba Kumi initiative; a parallel law to the constitutional framework</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.7 Usamala watch; a social construction against the Somali community and the Islam faith</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.7 Tourism Sabotage and boost</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER VI</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.0 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>References</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix I</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix II</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix III</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER I

1.0 INTRODUCTION/ BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY.

On the 14th day of October 2011, Kenya entered into Somalia through the lower Juba region, Southern Somalia to fight and contain the militia Al-Shabaab in an operation coded *Linda Nchi*\(^1\) (GoK, 2013, Migue et al., 2014). The operation marks the beginning of Kenya intervening another state and a shift of Kenya’s foreign policy. *Linda nchi* has put Kenya at war with Al-Shabaab; though it could be predicted, the exact timing of the decision to intervene in Somalia was unexpected and the objective behind it is far from being achieved (Lind et al., 2015, Anderson and McKnight, 2015, Group, 2012). The reported aim of the intervention was the protection of the territorial integrity of Kenya from foreign aggression (Birkett, 2013). This was according to then Internal Security Minister Prof. George Saitoti. Regardless, the intervention was rushed, it was done without notification or discussions with the TGF\(^2\) of Somalia at the time. (Miyandazi, 2012).

*Linda nchi* is a critical, dynamic and sensitive foreign policy decision which affects Kenya domestically due to the shared borders and the link with some segment of the population both in Kenya and Somalia. Policymakers, however, miscalculated the possible outcomes. Kenya rushed for international support from different states with some denied, other states approved and others being a sceptic of Kenya’s involvement due to historical relationships. Kenya’s internal framework responsible for foreign policy decision was divided over the intervention. Prior to the intervention, Kenya tried to create a divide in Jubaland which failed; leading to KDF\(^3\) dealing with proxy wars in the North-eastern Kenya. Even with this failure, *linda nchi* went on with the aim to create a buffer zone along the borders. The buffer zone strategy rather changed drastically when the policymakers declared ten days later that the operation was timeless until Kenya was safe (Group, 2012).

With the failure to divide Jubaland, al-Shabaab\(^4\) went ahead to effect Kenya’s political and socio-economic sectors. This brought action-reaction between the Kenyan government and al-Shabaab. The al-Mujahidin targeted western interests (Lind et al., 2015, Atta-Asamoah, 2015a, Williams, 2013). Despite the Juba land failure; Kenyan policymakers went ahead to

\(^1\)A Swahili word meaning protect the country.
\(^2\)Transitional Federal Government
\(^3\)Kenya Defence Forces
\(^4\)Also known as Harakat al-Mujahidin or “the Youth” is a global and jihadist organization, emerged from the Sharia Courts in Somalia in 2006 and affiliated to Al-Qaeda. HANSEN, S. J. 2013. *Al-Shabaab in Somalia: The History and Ideology of a Militant Islamist Group*, Oxford University Press.
use the tourism industry as a scapegoat to intervene in Somalia by claiming self-help to save the foreign exchange earner (Migue et al., 2014, Birkett, 2013).

The match of KDF into Somalia and a shift to occupational force only meant Kenyan military losing control over northeastern Kenya to al-Shabaab. KDF occupying al-Shabaab strong financial hub the city of Kismayo, Somalia, ignited a reaction from the al-Mujahidin to bring the war into Kenya. Al-Shabaab had a great network within some parts of Eastleigh suburbs and Majengo in the capital city Nairobi, including Mombasa, Lamu, Mandera, Garissa, Wajir county (Anderson and McKnight, 2015).

In winning the hearts and minds of some specific segment of the populace in Kenya, al-Shabaab takes advantage of the nurture of ethnic politics in Kenya and marginalization. Despite the history of terror and extremism in the country, a few number of Kenyan policymakers accept the problem with those in the top decision-making offices operating in denial or having misplaced policies and politicizing security; hence misreading internal threats to external ones (Anderson and McKnight, 2015, Hansen, 2013, Botha, 2014b, Lind et al., 2015).

More al-Shabaab’s sporadic attacks within Kenya started to increase when linda nchi was launched. There have been 133 attacks which killed 264 and 923 injuries within Kenya. These are all related to al-Mujahidin. These attacks happened between the launch of linda nchi to the year 2014. The first big attack took place in Nairobi’s Westgate mall on the 21st September 2013. Westgate siege came on a surprise and pointed a disjuncture within the Kenyan security sector, showing a lack of coordination within the government (GoK, 2013, KPS, 2014, KNCHR, 2014).

Al-Shabaab reactionary attacks attracted the attention of international media and confusion to the Kenyan security fraternity (Anderson and McKnight, 2015). These attacks only saw the Kenyan government reacting to a mosquito bite with a hummer. The government dismissed some of the intelligence information. Rights projected by the constitution were infringed, the executive powers tightened by changing different laws and individuals holding office at the highest security offices were either shuffled, fired or retired willingly (Lind et al., 2015).

More al-Shabaab attacks came in the year 2015 and 2016, despite the changing of the laws and increase of executive powers (GoK, 2015c). The hard-line strategies by the Kenyan government slightly reduced the attacks in the year 2015 as compared with 2014, however, the attacks were still more compared to pre-operation linda nchi (Richardson, 2016). Indeed,
the war with al-Shabaab is far from over; it is evident that despite KDF strength in Somalia, Kenya’s internal security has deteriorated due to the government’s miscalculated policies and reactionary initiatives to the attacks. Kenya’s decision to intervene in Somalia has brought a blowback to her internal security from the year 2011 to 2016. Al-Shabaab strength and capability cannot be underestimated (Hansen et al., 2016, Hansen, 2014). Due to the mentioned miscalculation and reaction from the Kenyan government; more al-Shabaab attacks are highly likely to happen.

It is important to understand the security implications which came with operation linda nchi. Understanding why the policymakers chose operation linda nchi as a priority policy is also vital. Understanding Kenya’s security and misplaced external decision is also a contribution of knowledge in the field of International Relations. The study seeks to fill existing gaps of policy formulation and conduct. It investigates and brings an understanding to the sporadic attacks by al-Mujahidin in Kenya; seeking the root cause of the escalation of the terror attacks. In order to explain and bring an understanding of insecurity, the study explains al-Shabaab’s radicalization and recruitment in Kenya. Despite the long history of radicalisation (Botha, 2014b), a relatively limited academic work has been done; it is important to spell out radicalization which is a contribution to insecurity in Kenya. An in-depth grasp of insecurity in Kenya can be explained and understood through direct experience; having a direct feeling about the situation is vital. Social order is best experienced through interaction. There is nothing like a real world out there; the reality of the world is socially constructed. Everyday life interaction gives deeper meaning of foreign policy decision and insecurity situation since the investigator is a native Kenyan; having worked in influential policy positions in Kenya.

The debate of insecurity poses challenges in the study. It also can be an advantage to explore operation linda inch; hence a deeper meaning. Security studies allow room for more research for the concept security is contested; one’s security is another’s insecurity. This leads to ‘absence of threat’ verses ‘absence of fear’ (Booth, 2005, Buzan, 2008). Therefore, for the Kenyan policymakers, ‘absence of threat’ is true; and for the al-Mujahidin the reverse apply (Anderson and McKnight, 2015).

In order to attain foreign policy objectives like linda nchi, offices related to security, foreign relations, and the presidency are vital (GoK, 2014). The study, therefore, is interested in individuals holding such offices. In showing reasons that made decision-making failure and the manner in which the intervention contributed to insecurity, the study doesn’t demonstrate
whether the intervention was justified. It shows the ways in which the policy gaps bring about consequences since the launch of *linda nchi*. In addition, the study’s gives reasons why insecurity in Kenya contributes to tourism sabotage. Appreciating proportions of constructivists theory; the study used identity and interest proponent to draw an explanation and understanding.

1.3 Statement of the problem
*Operation linda nchi* took place despite Somalia government disapproval of KDF into southern Somalia and Kenya’s involvement and failure in Jubaland policy. Since *Linda Nchi*, there have been al-Shabaab attacks in Nairobi, Lamu, Mandera, Garissa, Wajir, Tana River and Mombasa counties in Kenya. Kenya’s internal affairs have changed dramatically, there has been increased cases of deaths of police, extrajudicial killings of prominent cleric and reorganization the security fraternity; these includes, *Nyumba kumi*\(^5\) initiative, discriminating policies like *operation usalama watch*\(^6\), amendment of security law, and increasing executive powers to handle insecurity. In addition, prison for extremists and initiatives to boost the affected tourism industry. Despite these security changes, insecurity and radicalization have increased in comparison to pre-operation *linda nchi*.

1.4 Objectives/Aims of the study
The study seeks to explain and give an understanding of Kenya’s foreign policy towards Somalia. Its shows the manner and give a reason *linda nchi* has a contribution to insecurity within Kenya. It covers a period of 2011 to 2016. In re-think the concept *operation linda nchi*. The study describes the manner in which Kenyan government miscalculated and reacted to al-Shabaab sporadic attacks and radicalization in Kenya. Including how al-Mujahidin’s actions are successful. The study also gives the reason increased insecurity in Kenya contribute to the sabotage of her tourism industry.

1.5.0 Research Questions

1.5.1 Main research question
- How does Kenya’s intervention in Somalia contribute to her domestic insecurity?

1.5.2 Sub research questions
- Why does Kenyan government’s decision-making failures lead to al-Shabaab attacks?

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\(^5\) Ten cluster of houses.
\(^6\) Operation security watch
• How does the Kenyan government miscalculated and reactional policies make al-Shabaab sporadic attacks and radicalization in Kenya successful?
• Why does the increased insecurity in Kenya contribute to the sabotage of her tourism industry?

1.6 Scope and limitations of the study
The study focuses on Kenya’s foreign policy towards Somalia, covering a period of 2011-2016. Describing policy formulation and conduct. The study seeks to understand the relation between Kenya’s intervention in Somalia and insecurity within Kenya’s territory. The time frame is shaped by different consideration. First, a description of the study through proportions of the constructive theory, Secondly, a road map of how the findings were arrived at. Thirdly, the decision-making process of Kenyan foreign policy and the increased insecurity brought by operation *linda nchi*. The fourth section shows miscalculations and reactions of the Kenya government. lastly a summary of the whole issue and conclusion.

The studies approach is complicated, time consuming and expensive. Suitable informants to be interviewed are a challenge to the study; since the study focuses on the policy makers and implementers, these individuals are not readily available to be interviewed. The focus of the study is sensitive and contemporary, therefore, some of the issues are very sensitive to the interviewees. The study is carried out in Nairobi, Mombasa, Mandera, Wajir, Garissa, Lamu counties in Kenya by interviewing different individuals from government officials, civil society and different members from the mentioned counties. The study was conducted between 2014 to 2016.
CHAPTER II

2.0 Literature review

The official KDF book writes about “Operation Linda Nchi”. They indicate that linda nchi, a Swahili word meaning protect the country, was a policy directive to intervene in Somalia. The policy was launched on the 14th of October 2011. The book uses a top-down approach in analysing foreign policy decision; it uses power and institutions in explaining linda nchi. It ignores and assumes miscalculations from the Kenyan governments. It also assumes the reactions that come with operation linda nchi. Claiming “Just a bellum” and jus in bello the book projects the rationalists thinking of self-help. It claims how Kenya used her diplomatic instrument to meet support for linda nchi. It also claims how the Kenyan military has been observing human rights prior to and during linda nchi. The book demonstrates that the intervention was publicized. It also shows how the Kenyan citizens sanctioned linda nchi. The book shows how linda nchi has brought security; both in Somalia and North-eastern Kenya. Pointing clan identity, the book claim Somali are divided (Migue et al., 2014). However, the reverse of the claims is true.

Lind, Mutahi, and Oosterom (2015) “Al-Shabaab and Political Volatility in Kenya” indicate the Kenyan government failed to deal with the al-Shabaab presence in Kenya but rather widened its military engagements in Somalia. They show that operation linda nchi has brought back multiple al-Shabaab attacks in Kenya. They give an analysis of how the situation in Somalia affects Kenya domestically; something they call internal versus external stress. The Kenyan government has been hesitant to address internal insecurity. The writing indicates a change of Kenyan foreign policy in 2011; Kenya’s intervention in Somalia. Despite the intervention being a big foreign policy decision, the commander in chief did not take the leading role but the internal security minister. Security has been politicized. Al-Shabaab knows Kenyan’s internal politics and plays the game. This contributes to insecurity in Kenya. The Shabaab successes in Kenya come with policy gaps from the Kenyan government making linda nchi a trigger for the sporadic attacks.

The intelligence of the possibility of the al-Mujahidin attacks was given by the NIS but the Police did not take it seriously; After the attacks, all the police officer denied the allegation of having been given information. In the Mpeketoni attack for instance; the Shabaab countered the narrative of the Kenyan government. Al-Mujahidin claimed responsibility and there was

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7 Just war
8 Justice in war
evidence of most of the attacker to be of Somalia origin. The government, however, continued saying Mpeketoni was not an Al-Shabaab attack. Insecurity in the north-eastern Kenya has become rather normal due to government negligence of the area. (Lind et al., 2015).

Citing the United Security Council report (2010), Lind, Mutahi and Oosterom (2015) indicate how the external stress leads to operation linda nchi. They indicate the failed Jubaland initiative/policy which leads to more insecurity in Kenya; such initiative predicted operation linda nchi way before its launch and the claim by the Kenyan government to secure the affected tourism industry was a trigger to intervene in Somalia. By applying a separatist policy, Jubaland initiative only came to hit north-eastern Kenya due to the identity of Somalis; this explains the sceptic Somalia president during the launch of linda nchi. The decision to launch linda nchi was politicised and did not meet total agreement from the grand coalition government. Despite the policy miscalculations and disagreement of the grand coalition government, the newly elected government of 2013 went ahead with the reactionary policies like tightening the refugees administrative control, introducing repatriation, changing of individuals in security offices and security laws in order to add more executive powers and control, misplaced policies of policing the Kenyan-Somali and Kenya Muslim community. The Kenyan government focus of external stress and old strategies of hard power ignoring the soft power. This is only fuels more insecurity. The deployment of the troops has put Kenya into a tough position since withdrawal will not mean al-Shabaab will withdraw their localised Jihad in Kenya and it will not mean attacks will reduce in Kenya.

Lind, Mutahi, and Oosterom (2015) quote the joint parliamentary report stating that Muslim youths in Kenya are becoming more vulnerable to radicalization, they say though Somalia provided a safe haven for the extremists, the Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda depends on Kenyan youth to carry out attacks in the country and most of these terror incidences in Kenya are carried out by Kenyan nationals. The recruitment of Al-Shabaab by MYC at Pumwani Riyadh Mosque and the emergence or MYC as AL Hijra in 2012 is highly documented. Many of the attackers in the Mpeketoni attack spoke Kiswahili. Referring to the two works of Anneli Botha (2014), Lind, Mutahi, and Oosterom (2015) says, Al-Shabaab reads the internal politics and takes advantage of marginalization and historical injustices and use it to win the hearts and minds of the Kenyan youth. The Kenyan coast is attractive due to their religious identity while the north eastern is attractive due to their identity of both ethnic belonging and
religion. However, Lind, Mutahi, and Oosterom show that Al-Shabaab has also attracted other ethnic tribe, they show the mastermind of the Tana River and Lamu counties attack in June and July 2014 as Idris Kamau who is a Kenyan from the Kikuyu ethnic tribe.

Atta-Asamoah (2015) “The nature and drivers of insecurity in Kenya” and “The response to insecurity in Kenya” shows the poor security strategies of the Kenyan government and how insecurity has increased since linda nchi. Kenyan decision makers miscalculate policies and react to al-Shabaab attacks. Kenya has been in the international news due to the al-Shabaab attacks within the country. Despite al-Shabaab attacks in Kenya, insecurity in the country is highly increasing due to the miscalculations and reactions of policymakers making the Kenyan government the major driver of insecurity; the number of Al-Shabaab operations in Kenya brought new features of insecurity.

Al-Shabaab changed their tactic of targeting western interests to the Kenyan populace; their guerrilla tactic is new to the Kenyan security sector which makes al-Mujahidin activities successful. Al-Shabaab aims and destroys soft targets with a high profile in order to cause much harm. Al-Mujahidin attacks have increased insecurity since the launch of operation linda nchi. The alliances the Kenyan government choose are in away a faulty, Kenya tried to create a buffer zone in Jubaland area which later failed and worked in the favour of al-Shabaab. This has contributed to insecurity (Atta-Asamoah, 2015a, Atta-Asamoah, 2015b).

Kenya policymakers have reacted to al-Shabaab attacks by initiatives such as Operation Usalama watch, NyumbaKumi initiative and amendment of the security laws. Despite the political will to address insecurity. The hard-line policies have reduced the insecurity in the recent years. However, these responses have a great limitation due to political rhetoric and policy miscalculations from the policy makers. Insecurity has been the talk in all engagements in Kenya like diplomatic, political and economic. The government has tried different initiatives to solve the crisis. President Uhuru Kenyatta blamed the current insecurity in the country by pointing the past three regimes for not investing in security equipment. The Jubilee regime has heavily invested in security sector(Atta-Asamoah, 2015b, Atta-Asamoah, 2015a).

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9 Operation Security watch.
10 Ten cluster of houses.
The al-Mujahidin attacks targeted public places like hotels, pubs, churches and nightclubs in the coastal region; this led to an effect on the Kenyan tourism industry. During the Lamu and Tana River attacks, Shabaab started the attacks in Mpeketoni and proceeded to Tana River county the following week. Despite the Kenyan government having intelligence information on the possible attack, the attacks indicated well-armed and planned attackers. These attackers targeted non-Muslim and other ethnic groups; bringing confusion to the Kenyan policymakers. Kenyan executive misunderstood the attacks and blame it on internal politics specifically the minority party, CORD\textsuperscript{11} leader. The attackers were organised, they had time to separate their victims. They claimed responsibility for the attacks and blamed the Kenyan government on subjecting the Muslims and Somalis on a xenophobic act of \textit{usalama watch}. The Kenyan Security forces mistreated the populace in the coastal and Northeastern Kenya; torturing and beating residence and victimising them as terrorists. Both the ATPU\textsuperscript{12} and KDF have been implicated in targeting Muslim clerics. Kenyan security has been politicized. A section of the public led by the minority party leader Raila Odinga demanding a withdrawal from Somalia; another section of the public lead by the president Uhuru Kenyatta demand to stay in Somalia and fight al-Shabaab. This divide cause insecurity; a section of the Kenya public does not trust the government and its security forces leading to a gap in gathering intelligence information (HRW, 2015).

MUHURI\textsuperscript{13} and open society Foundation (2013) writes about how the ATPU abuses human rights in the Kenyan coast. They say due to the increased insecurity in Kenya, the government's security forces are highly present in the coastal region. The report indicates how this presence is a contribution to insecurity. The government’s high presence in the coast is due to the reaction of protecting the tourist industry which is affected by insecurity. The report indicates extrajudicial killings. It demonstrates how the ATPU claim to be tired of taking the terror victims and suspects to court due to corruption within the corridor of justice. There have been many reported cases of killing of high-profile Muslim clerics; leading to the perception of Kenyan government being at war with Islam. This has increased tension in the coastal province, hence, the sabotage of the tourists’ industry from 2011 to 2013. This perception of Islam being subjected by the Kenyan government has led to protests, burning properties and even killing of government security forces by the hungry coastal youth (MUHURI and OSF, 2013).

\textsuperscript{11} Coalition for Reforms and Democracy
\textsuperscript{12} Anti-Terror Police Unit
\textsuperscript{13} Muslims for Human Rights
The Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (2015) published an economic survey indication how the tourism sector has been affected since the year 2011 to 2014. It shows how the government of Kenya has used tactics to boost the sector for it is one to the foreign exchange earners. The report indicated that the tourism sector has been affected by terror threats and travel advisories from different foreign countries. It indicates that the sector experienced rapidly low income due to reduced and increased international arrivals departures respectively.

The departure destinations were recorded to be European countries with Germany, United Kingdom, and the Scandinavia destinations recording a high increase of departures from Kenyan international airports. However, the report indicates that a low departure was recorded from destinations in France and Switzerland. A high increase of local tourism was recorded due to governmental policies like tax reduction in the tourism sector. A decrease of business in national parks, game reserves, museums, snake parks and hotels which are high attractions of tourism in Kenya. The heavy affected region was the Coastal regions. Insecurity in the coastal region has highly influenced the sector leading to Kenya government heavy investment in security (KNBS, 2015).

Hassan Mwakimako and Justin Willis (2014) writes about “Islam, politics, and violence in Kenya coast”. They explain how Kenya’s domestic situation and the possibility drivers of insecurity by identifying ethnicity historical grievances brought by marginalization and the struggle for Islam. In emphasising on insecurity in Kenya, the writing explains the nature and purposes of Mpeketoni attacks. Ethnic politics and land issues as a driver of insecurity in Kenya which played as an advantage to the Al-Shabaab during the attacks. Kenyan government ‘s weaknesses provide an advantageous environment for terror. Kenyan security response has been rather a confrontation and not well calculated. The response has a history of poor investigation and handling crime; Cleric suspects of radicalization have been killed and cleric sported to be on the police side have also been killed by the hungry youth leading to demonstrations and counter-murders, which brought harsh policies from the government side. The writing indicates the unpreparedness and misconception of internal security of the Kenya government. it shows how the al-Shabaab planned their activities in Kenya while the government reacts tactically to the activities; while al-Shabaab is aware of the Kenya politics and using historical grievances and marginalization of resource allocations in their recruitment and attacks, policymakers keep on misunderstanding insecurity and politicize it.
Kenyan Government has subjected the Muslim population in both North-eastern and the Kenyan Coastal province. They Identify different ethnic belonging and different school of thoughts within the in Kenya Muslims; despite the segments of within the Muslims community, Muslims in Kenya build a collective identity due to political marginalization. Radicals clerics can assess different prayer places due to limited bureaucratic leadership in the mosques. There was evidence of radicalization even before operation *linda nchi*; a good number of youths have been taken to Somalia for training and back to Eastleigh, North Eastern, and The Kenyan Coast. Decision makers have failed to address these issues of marginalization while addressing external threats; this leads to insecurity (Mwakimako and Willis, 2014).

Anneli Botha (2014) writes about “Radicalization in Kenya” and “Political socialization and terrorists, radicalization among individuals who joined al-Shabaab in Kenya”. Kenyan government hard-line strategies on counter-radicalization and countering terror leading to al-Shabaab’s advantage and attacks in Kenya. Due to Kenyan government collective punishment like *operation usamala watch*, Al-Shabaab took advantage of locals Kenyan youth who are marginalized and recruited them to fight against their countrymen. Ethnic politics in Kenya and subjecting other groups within the state makes it easier for external actors like al-Shabaab to recruit individual within the state. Appreciating Ioannis Gatsiounis (2013) work ‘After Al-Shabaab’, Botha (2014) shows that the fact that outsiders dominate the Kenyan coastal economy easily creates grievances the locals within the Coastal province leading to affecting the dominated tourism attraction in the province. Botha identifies al-Shabaab projection of religious identity in the recruitment of fighters in the Kenyan Coast and expanding in other parts of Kenya. Botha identifies different radical groups in the coast projecting ethnic segregation when it comes to national resources; however, the Kenyan security forces projects injustices by collectively punishing individuals from the Muslims community; these leads to collective identity among the Muslim community and working for al-Shabaab’s successful recruitment and attacks in Kenya.

The radicalization of individuals takes time, despite the fact that it is an individual choice to join extremism, there is a close link between political socialization and radicalization. Some institution of socialization plays much role in socializing the individual than others. Religion playing a major role in inducing individuals to join radicalization due to the Kenyan government subjecting Islam and treating Muslims as second class citizens; leading to collective identity. Most individuals joining extremism recently converted to Islam as
compared to those who are nurtured in the religion while young. Despite Extremist addressing the issues of corruption, land grievance, a skewed distribution of resources, bad governance, and poverty, individuals joining Extremism are rather highly motivated by the mistreatment of their religion other than poverty. The majority of the group which joins al-Shabaab are young people between 20 to 34 years of age. Kenyan government counter-radicalization brings about collective discrimination and punishment, racial profiling putting Kenya Muslims and Somali as second class citizens. these strategies are counterproductive and only divides the Kenyan populace and leads to al-Shabaab attacks (Botha, 2014b, Botha, 2014a).

Botha (2014) shows that peer group influences individuals joining extremism more than family institution but in some groups depending on the motivation, the family played a major role in informing the individual to join the group. Education plays a role in radicalization for most of the individuals joining extremism had primary education as compared to those with a tertiary level of education. The majority of the radicalized view the government as an enemy of Islam and they do not trust the Kenyan political system which they say protects a few ethnic groups. This leads to the government shooting its own feet for al-Shabaab recruits local Kenyans to carry out the attack in the country.

Referring to the United Nation Global-Terrorism Strategy, Botha indicates the “push factor” of counterterrorism like human rights abuse, economic and political circumstances, poor governance lack of civil liberty, ethnic and religious discriminations and political exclusion which leads to radicalization. Al-Shabaab provides an alternative to fighting the enemy even though they have a different Islamic school of thought as compared to the majority Kenyan Muslims. Referring also to 2011 report of the United Nation Monitoring group for Somalia, Botha mentions that way back before operation linda nchi, al-Shabaab had already started recruiting Kenyan nationals who are non-Somalis (Botha, 2014a).

Stig Jarle Hansen (2013) writes about the al-Shabaab in Somalia. He shows how the different Kenyan communities are important to al-Shabaab recruitment in Kenya, the ethnic Somalis channelled money and was a logistic centre into Somalia; later the other ethnic communities in Kenya later became important. This leads to al-Shabaab attacks hence more insecurity within the Kenya. Other ethnic communities’ importance was due to increased tension of religious politics of Muslims versus the Christian-dominated government of Kenya; the religious tension started coming up when Kenya supported the Global War on Terror. Al-
Mujahidin had way back in 2002 made recruitments in Kenya. Due to the corruption inside the Kenyan police, security is at stake. al-Mujahidin took advantage of corruption within the police to operate inside Kenya; this security policy gap has led to insecurity in Kenya.

By 2012, the al-Shabaab an affiliate of Al-Qaeda were losing ground in some parts of Somalia and gaining ground in Kenya, “A Lose some win some game” (Hansen, 2013, Pg. 121). Radical clerics have been operating in Kenya way before operation linda nchi. “Sheikh Aboud Rogo Muhamed, a radical cleric based in Mombasa, was alleged to have used funds from Haramain to aid Al-Qaeda in East Africa’s attempt to attack targets in Kenya in 2002”(Hansen, 2013, Pg 127). Al-Shabaab took advantage of the harsh conditions the ummah is facing in Kenya like the killing of clerics by the Kenyan police, corruption and global marginalization of Islam to project their propaganda in Kenya. The earlier attacks of al-Shabaab after the launch of linda nchi indicated the al-Mujahidin’s capability to increase insecurity in Kenya (Hansen, 2013).

The Crisis groups (2012) reports about Kenyan military intervention in Somalia, they say that since independence, this intervention is the biggest security gamble Kenya has ever made. The report indicated policy miscalculations; individuals responsible for formulation and conduct hoped the intervention would be a quick operation, these policy makers assumed the consequences which could come with the intervention. In addition, it indicates the Jubaland policy, the refugee’s crisis, the rush to launch linda nchi, and diplomatic faux pas, including Kenya-Somalia porous border. The report shows that operation linda nchi was launched in a rush without the political, military and diplomatic preparedness; this made it easier for al-Shabaab to launch its guerrilla war strategies in Kenya. The report also indicates that, Kenyan foreign policy towards Somalia has some domestic political implications in Kenya due to the Kenyan-Somali population in north-eastern and the Muslim in Kenya; the ethnicity in Kenya brings a limitation to the social cohesion creating grievances and a blowback of internal insecurity in Kenya, this works as al-Shabaab advantage to win a segment of the populations support and bringing the war back to the country.

Inducing history from past academic work on Kenya foreign policy, Maumo Leonard Oluoch (2009) writes about Kenya’s foreign policy towards Israel. Using the realists’ ‘national interest’ approach and appreciating its weaknesses, He points out Kenya’s foreign policy objective as being citizen protection, national integrity, territorial integrity and enhancing national security, Kenya economic position which boosts military capacity; showing how
these concepts are related to ‘national interest’, Oluoch does not sustain the argument of the theory he applies. He breaks the realists ‘black box’ to make a clear understanding and explanation of Kenya foreign policy from within; mentioning the relations and different interests of different institutions and people such as the presidency and the president respectively and other relevant offices in foreign policy making. Just as Hansen (2013), Oluoch points out how the Muslim community projected collective identity towards opposing the GWoT\(^{14}\) leading to subjecting national interest. The relation of Somalia and the Gulf countries has a great impact on Kenya’s relation with Somalia (Oluoch, 2009).

Kenyan foreign policy towards Somalia has been written by many, KatateOrwa indicates in Walter Oyugi (1994) work that, the population in the North-eastern Kenya plays a major role in Kenya’s external relation towards Somalia; this population is in the interest of this study. Additionally, Orwa says, Kenya’s foreign policy has been a personal matter where the executive and especially the president plays the central role in Kenya’s external behaviour. What he calls personal diplomacy. Noting the personal rule, Orwa however, treats Kenya foreign policy as a permanent institution which behaves in a particular nature and never changes despite the change of social dynamics, interaction, and relationships (Oyugi, 1994).

The writings of Lind, Mutahi and Oosterom (2015) and that of Anderson and Mcknight (2015) both indicates that Kenya Defence forces crossed into the Somalia border on the 16\(^{th}\) of October 2011 which was the day of the government spokesperson Alfred Mutua announced the intervention, however, the operation was started two days ago according to the KDF account. The two writings point out that Kenya’s foreign policy has a link with domestic policy and giving a blind eye on one will affect both. Kenya had tried to persuade the United States for support to invade Somalia but was quickly refused, this shows the intervention in 2011 was not a surprise but the exact time was unknown. 

\textit{Linda nchi} has brought insecurity in Kenyan by pointing the al-Shabaab sporadic attacks. Major attacks like Westgate Siege and Mpeketoni attacks have brought reactions towards al-Shabaab attacks in Kenya. The Kenyan government does not have a strategy towards stopping the al-Shabaab attacks. The militia is skilful in reading local politics differences to make their attacks successful. This has brought a ‘blowback’; \textit{operation linda nchi} has been countered by \textit{operation linda uislamu}\(^{15}\) The intervention is now having an impact on Kenya’s

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\begin{center}
14 Global War on Terror \\
15 Operation protect Islam
\end{center}
troubled internal politics. Al-Shabaab has knowledge on the internal divide like religion. Kenyan government came up with a xenophobic act *operation usalama watch* as a reaction to insecurity. The sporadic attacks have affected the tourism industry. The gap between policy formulation and conduct has brought corruption, refugees crisis, porous borders lead to al-Shabaab successes. (Lind et al., 2015, Anderson and McKnight, 2015). Lind, Mutahi, and Oosterom (2015) emphasises that Mpeketoni attacks killed 67 and the outbreak clashes in Mandera and Wajir which left 60 people dead and 75,000 displaced in the same month of June 2014; however, Mpeketoni received high attention including president Kenyatta visiting Lamu but Wajir response was slow.

Both writings, Anderson and Mcnight (2015) and Lind, Mutahi and Oosterom (2015), point out the unfolding story of the disjuncture of the Kenyan security. It was evidence that the siege was not under control despite its first days’ projection that the government was on top of things as far as the security was a concern. Anderson and Mcknight points that, Kenyan security fraternity disconnect started to unfold when the elite police called the RECCE\(^{16}\) unit and the KDF were not coordinated leading to the KDF shooting a member of the RECCE unity in a close range. The RECCE team had cornered in one place the four gunmen involved in the attack but lost the advantage due to poor coordination when the KDF came inside the Westgate mall. The battle between the two security bodies also saw three KDF soldiers’ dead. The battle was due to RECCE unit blocking the KDF soldiers from looting properties inside the Westgate mole. To justify the KDF stealing at the mall, “Traders at Gilgil, adjacent to Kenya’s largest army barracks, were later arrested for possession of property taken from the mall” (Anderson and McKnight, 2015, Pg. 16).

Citing different United Nation Security Council’s Monitoring Group reports, Anderson and Mcknight (2015) and Stig Jarle Hansen (2013) also emphasises what Lind, Mutahi and Oosterom (2015) confirmed on al-Shabaab recruitment in Kenya. The two writings point out that Previously 2012, a Nairobi Muslim Youth Centre (MYC) leader Sheikh Ahmed Iman was appointed the head of Al-Kata’ib Leaders Foundation, he was seen in a video released by the foundation. Ahmed Iman said in the video that all Muslims everywhere should raise and fight the enemy around them. These foundations role was released earlier by the United Nation in 2011. The foundation has since advanced the war in Kenya. This followed Al-

\(^{16}\) A Kenyan Police paramilitary wing/GSU elite and Special force unit; trained to handle terror.
Shabaab addressing the Kenyan *Ummah* in a Kenyan national language Swahili by means of videos. The al-Shabaab provided support in organizations like Muslims Youth Centre MYC where Amir Ahmed Iman Ali Abu Usama a former member of Pumwani Riyadh Mosque Committee (PRMC) was a regular supplier of funds. Ahmed Iman today is one of the al-Shabaab leader and spokesmen. This is a clear picture of the al-Shabaab tactics, Al-Hijra was associated by the Kenyan Pumwani famous mosques, The Riyadh Mosque; an evidence of the relationship between Al-Hijra and MYC. However, the Mosque leadership did quite passionately deny the claims. The Kenyan security recognised that Riyadh most a risk zone and a potential al-Shabaab recruitment base. The Mosques is situated Majengo slums close Gikomba market, a market in Pumwani and not far from Eastleigh suburbs in Nairobi.

David Anderson (2014) writes about why Mpeketoni matters; an al-Shabaab violence in Kenya. Just as Mwakimako and Willis (2014), Anderson also says that Al-Shabaab learned the Kenyan politics and took advantage of it, he points how the Local residence in Lamu are skeptic about the outsiders who were brought in Lamu and resettled under the government scheme in the 1970s; Lamu natives have the perception that due to the huge economic development coming in Lamu like the LAPSSET\(^\text{17}\), their land and property is at risk. Anderson points out the limitation of the Kenyan government security in some parts of the country, he says the large number of Refugees, the KDF losing control of Madera county and al-Shabaab controlling two-thirds of Garissa county is evidence of limited governmental security in the Northeastern Kenya, he also points out Kenyan police corruption which is creating a gap in the security policies in Kenya. According to Anderson, Kenya is winning the war in Somalia but losing the war in Kenya; al-Shabaab losing territory in Somalia and gaining some in Kenya.

Both Leonard MaumoOluoch (2009) and Anneli Botha (2014) points out the concern of ethnic divide in Kenya. Oluoch says despite the number of Muslim population in Kenya, they have been subjected to the government decision-making processes. This is also emphasized by Anneli Botha (2014) who says Kenyan politics has central power from Nairobi which is largely Christian dominated.

### 2.1 Conceptual/Theoretical framework.

A theory is important in this study for it provides an explanation, understanding, prediction, and description of a phenomenon. It provides a framework within which a study can be

\(^{17}\) Lamu Port Southern Sudan-Ethiopia Transport Corridor.
interpreted (Bryman, 2012, Pg. 20). Bruce and Berg emphasised that “Social scientists usually define theory as a system of logical statements or propositions that explain the relationship between two or more objects, concepts, phenomena, or characteristics of human” (Bruce and Berg, 2001, Pg. 15). In order to explain and give an understanding of the study, some proponents of the constructivist paradigm\textsuperscript{18} are hereby appreciated; the appreciation is due to the political and social setting in Kenyan.

Drawing from Kuhn (2012) definition of a paradigm, the study adopts “Identity, interest and logics of action” (Smith et al., 2012, Pg. 85-86) propositions in order to analyse the topic being studied and come up with informed conclusions; these propositions are also emphasised in viewing security studies (Williams, 2012, Booth, 2005). These past works shall dominate the study in giving an understanding from within.

It is important to note that constructivism is not a theory of security, rather is it not a theory of international politics but the theory analyses security and politics from within (Booth, 2005 Pg, 272, Wendt, 1999). Constructivists provide a debate by opening the closed ‘black-box’ and gives an understanding and explanation of foreign policy decision and security from within the structures of power, influence, and interest. (Smith et al., 2012, Williams, 2012, Booth, 2005).

\textit{Operation linda nchi}. was a foreign policy decision which was launched during the intervention in Somalia (Group, 2012, Lind et al., 2015, Anderson and McKnight, 2015). The operation being a miscalculation lead to more governmental reaction in Kenya to the threats brought by al-Shabaab; al-Shabaab, a youth movement, and a Somalia al-Mujahidin has changed some of their territories from Somalia to Mandera, Garissa, Wajir, Nairobi and Mombasa counties in Kenya; al-Mujahidin are indoctrinating the Kenyan youth to carry out attacks within the country (Hansen, 2013, Anderson and McKnight, 2015, Botha, 2014b).

Booth (2005) says identities and differences are not brought by natural forces but it comes through the politic, it is the product of struggles which creates ethnicity, nations or race. Rationalists look at the state homogeneously. They project security as a collective interest, however, the reverse can apply. Rationalists project the problem-solving theory; they assume the state’s internal security. Rationalists prescribe the state rather than describing it; this makes them narrow-minded and assumes security of the state. The concept security is a

\textsuperscript{18} A paradigm is a set of principles or patterns of observations or “methods, problem-field, and standards of solutions accepted by any mature scientific community at any given time” KUHN, T. S. 2012. \textit{The structure of scientific revolutions}, University of Chicago press. P.g 103.
contested concept. Security for one is an insecurity for another. This makes the definition of security a theory dependent concept. The concept highly depends on “Its relation with politics, people, and process” (Booth, 2005, Pg. 28).

Security is defined in many ways. Some define it militarily or in the interest of the state. They define it as the absence of threat (Buzan et al., 1998). Others define it by adding the concept people, economic and societies. This brings the contestation of the concept. Security, therefore, can mean the absence of fear or absence of threat (Buzan, 2008). For the Kenyan government, the absence of threat is true but for the al-Mujahidin absence of fear applies (Anderson and McKnight, 2015, Lind et al., 2015). Operation linda nchi has been countered by operation linda uislamu. A counter-narrative to wage a retaliation to the intervention. These counter-narratives brought an action-reaction between the Kenyan government and al-Shabaab (Anderson and McKnight, 2015).

Operation Linda nchi is assumed to be a collective security. The intervention in Somalia was justified by the claim of self-defence and saving the sabotaged tourism sector (Anderson and McKnight, 2015, Migue et al., 2014, Birkett, 2013). Explaining Kenya’s foreign policy towards Somali with this kind of view is myopic. For it is the protection of the interest of the political class. Policymakers handle Kenya’s security in their own interests. They intersubjective policies is a contribution to insecurity; al-Shabaab is aware of this kind of politics and taking advantage of it (Anderson and McKnight, 2015, Hansen, 2013, Botha, 2014b). Kenyan security is politicised due to ethnic politics. This creates more insecurity within the country (Mwakimako and Willis, 2014). Prior to operation linda nchi, the Kenyan government securities has been initiating torture and abuse to the Muslim and Somali-Kenyan community (TJRC, 2013, HRW, 2015). The operation has increased threats and uncertainty in Kenya due to al-Shabaab attacks like Westgate siege, Mpeketoni, Mandera and Garissa attacks (Lind et al., 2015, Anderson and McKnight, 2015, Mwakimako and Willis, 2014). The initiatives by the Kenya government to create a divide in the Southern Somalia saw the launch of operation linda nchi creating a divide within the policymakers leading to a hastiness and diplomatic faux pas (Group, 2012). The hastiness and diplomatic faux pas brought different group-thinks. The Kenyan government has been divided over the intervention; the minority party has been claiming a strategic withdrawal from Somalia while the majority party insisting on staying in Somalia to fight al-Shabaab (Lind et al., 2015, Anderson and McKnight, 2015).
Due to the al-Shabaab actions within the country, the Kenyan government went ahead to react on xenophobic act coded operation usalama watch by subjecting the Muslim and Somali community including extrajudicial killings of the clerics Muslim (Botha, 2014b, Horowitz, 2013). Unrealized initiatives such as the amendment of the security laws in order to give more powers to the executive wing of government and Nyumba Kumi a community-policing which is parallel to the CoK\textsuperscript{19} also came up as a reaction to the al-Mujahidin attacks (Atta-Asamoah, 2015b, Lind et al., 2015).

Intersubjective application of policy brings a gap between intelligence and policy (Lowenthal, 2014). The Kenyan government tried to implement an intelligent policy Nyumba Kumi. The policy is a community policing concept to gather intelligence from the community. It has been applied to fit the interest of the government and security forces. Nyumba Kumi has created a gap between the security fraternity and the community (Atta-Asamoah, 2015b).

Understanding radicalization can be grabbed from its relation with political socialization. There is a great deal of connection between radicalization and socialization. Radicalization takes a gradual process (Neumann, 2008, Pg. 4, Horgan and Taylor, 2001). Hyman Herbert says “political socialization is conceptualized in three dimensions namely; conservative or radical goals, participation or involvement in politics and authoritarian or democratic forms”. In analyzing different institutions such as family, sex, education, peer group and class differences, Hyman says that such institutions shape one’s political life (Hyman, 1959, Pg. 17).

Anthony Giddens (2008) identify agents of socialization such as family, sex, and gender, school, religion, media, organization and networks. He further identifies socialization in two different faced which are primary and secondary socializations; the latter is in the interest of this study in explaining radicalization.

“Secondary socialization takes place in the later age and maturity; agents such as the school, peer group, organizations such as workplace and religion, and the media become the socializing force for individuals, interactions in these contexts help people learn the values, norms, beliefs that make up the pattern of their culture” (Giddens, 2008, Pg. 166).

\textsuperscript{19} Constitution of Kenya
Radicalization process differs from individual to another; however, it happens in different integrated part of political environments such as the terror groups, the state, and groups choosing different political constituencies. Most of the youth who joined al-Shabaab were influenced by friends as compared with their family members. This is due to their age getting more active in political affairs in the society. The Kenyan government’s intersubjective way of law application leads a segment of youth mistrusting the government and joining al-Shabaab. Radicalization, therefore, is created from the agenda-setting power of the institution. Some institutions playing a much bigger role than the others. To discover the numbers and the reason for radicalization. The majority of individuals who were radicalized to join extremism had experienced conservative leadership and hardline power strategies at a vulnerable age (Botha, 2014b, Botha, 2014a).
CHAPTER III

3.0 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
This study appreciates qualitative approach due to the method’s inductive nature of generating knowledge research, examining, understanding and describing through participating. The study relied on library research and accompanied interviews; to make credible logic of knowledge. Data from different credible institutions were also appreciated. The data collection method used included informant interviews, textual analyses of other researched articles and materials; Key informants were important to the study due to their knowledge-based information, profession, and their beliefs. these vast strategies in collecting and analysing data meet the nature of qualitative approach (Bruce and Berg, 2001, Berg and Lune, 2012, Bryman, 2012).

Qualitative method is suitable for it gives a deeper understanding of the real world and avoids assumptions; values of individuals are hereby appreciated and therefore the localness is important to understand insecurity in Kenya. Taking a qualitative study will open up the unseen scenarios and gives the light to see more real life reality for the ‘naked eye’ assumes a lot. Qualitative studies focus on community involvement, it tries to understand the way of a people and how things are in a real situation (Golafshani, 2003).

Due to the time frame and the theory used, the study appreciates the explanatory type of case study in order justify the findings. Explanatory cases are useful in complex and causal studies; they helped in pattern-matching which is “A situation in which several pieces of information from the same case may be related to some theoretical proposition; each piece has its place in the overall pattern” (Berg and Lune, 2012, Pg. 337).

Direct experiences and cases from secondary data justified the occurrence of events and situations while theory helped to explain these events and situations and predict further occurrences. A case study is, “A method involving systematic gathering enough information about a particular person, social setting, event, or group to permit the researcher to effectively understand how the subject operates or functions” (Berg and Lune, 2012, 325). Case studies were used since qualitative investigation appreciate cases as a guide to research. Interacting with individual, community and institutional cases give more credible finding which other studies might ignore. Emphasis on combining case studies and theory is due to ‘think describe’ individuals tries to relate with what they see and hear in order to stimulate sense in a phenomenon (Berg and Lune, 2012). These cases from different levels were identified from the interviews, secondary data, and personal experiences in order to explain and bring
credible understanding to the study. The road map of how the study data is collected and thereafter a justification of it shall be discussed in details below.

3.2 Sampling and data collection procedures
Sampling is a “Systematic way of selecting a representative segment of the population being studied; in order to investigate; the aim of sampling is to be able to get information from the selected population, investigate and generalize the finding”(Bryman, 2012, Pg. 187). The study considers the non-probability type of sampling which is a subjective way of sampling(Bryman, 2012).

The investigator’s networks, information in the geographical areas and institutions were attractive to the study objective. His experiences, networks, and prior information were used to get readily available and accessible informants. However, in order to have more credible and scientific justification, purposive sampling was conducted.

Due to the stratification and the nurture of Kenyan politics, individuals and groups with a different perspective like religious affiliation and political party were categorised in order to answer the research question and meet representativeness of different opinions. Purposive sampling was used to meet different perspective from unique informants. A subjective selection of individuals, groups and institutions were done in reference to the research question; this is referred to as purposive sampling (Bryman, 2012, Berg and Lune, 2012). The study aimed at getting informants such as those who are aware of Kenya’s security. Individuals who have been part of or subject to governmental reactionary initiatives towards countering terror are important in the study. Individual who have been subject to al-Shabaab attacks and/or recruitment will in a better understanding of insecurity in Kenya. Kenyan security forces who are handling security situation are important for they are involved in conducting security policies. Interviews with policymakers helped the study to understand the formulation and conduct of security policy.

In order to meet the generalization aspects in sampling, different purposive criteria were used. Informants with knowledge related to the research questions were selected in order to identify if their experience falls within the line of the study. Some of the individuals are selected by asking the already selected informants to identify individuals who were also made participants. Other participants were selected during the process of the data collection for they became relevant to the study as more knowledge unfolds leading to opportunistic selection. Some of the opportunistic selection lead to a conference related to the study. Some
of the Participants who had a variety of opinions were also selected in order to have a
diversity and maximize information which is relevant to the study while deviant cases were
also necessary to identify variation within the study in order to justify the outcome of the
study.

The investigator also collects information from various informants in the three arms of
government. First, officers from the executive arm of government like the ministry of foreign
affairs and international trade, the ministry of defence, ministry of interior and coordination
of national government are sampled. Secondly, Parliamentary committees like Budgetary and
Appropriations Committee, Defence and Foreign Relations committee, Administration and
National Security committee, Justice and Legal Affairs committee and Public Accounts
committee and last but not least, the judiciary is also considered. The mentioned
governmental institutions are in the frontline when it comes to security policies. Relevant
organization to Kenya’s security like Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), Community
Based Organizations (CBOs), mosques, churches, and vigilante groups which also plays a
major role when it comes to Kenya’s security were sampled. See the number of these selected
organizations in the appendix.

The study focuses on the population within five counties which are Nairobi, Mombasa,
Garissa, Mandera, and Lamu. The areas are selected because they are high profiled areas by
the Kenyan government. Kenya was selected since al-Shabaab uses Kenya as a demonstration
to the international community on their capability and strength (Anderson and McKnight,
2015, Lind et al., 2015).

Al-Shabaab radicalization cases have also been reported in these areas and great successful
attacks have happened in four of this counties. Nairobi suburbs such as Eastleigh, Majengo,
and Mathare are hereby considered important districts for data collection due to the
heightened insecurity issues in the suburbs; the Kenyan government has also had reactional
initiatives towards al-Shabaab radicalization and attacks in these areas(Botha, 2014a, Lind et
al., 2015, Mwakimako and Willis, 2014, GoK, 2015c). Nairobi is a key target county since it
is a city where most of the governmental offices are located and the study targets individuals
from these offices who are formulating and conducting governmental policies. Most of the
informants with expertise relating to the study are selected from Nairobi and Mombasa due to
their operations taking place in these counties. Eastleigh is considered due to most of its
population are individuals from the north-eastern Kenya which are attractive to the study; the
suburb has connections with parts of Somalia in terms of businesses and porous Kenya-
Somalia borders. Therefore, the selection is done due to its suitability towards the research
question.

In terms of participants, a sample of 61 participants was selected and interviewed between the
period of 10th September 2015 to 26 February 2016 with follow up interviews through phone
and Skype calls between 4th of April and 15th of June 2016. The selection of this informants
was to their uniqueness towards the research question. Some were selected due to the
researcher’s network leading to convenient sampling. Others were selected purposively. The
sample number was considered relevant after the collected texts indicated a particular pattern
and relationship which was relevant to the study. A reasonable number not less than 20 senior
security officials and individuals who have unique knowledge and shapes policy formulation
and conduct were identified in order to get an in-depth understanding of the policy decisions
and insecurity in Kenya. The availability and willingness of such informants are limited due
to the sensitivity of insecurity in Kenya. Therefore, the large sample of this unique
individuals was affected by the sensitivity. Security in Kenya has secrecy and particular the
current situation puts the informants at risks. Twelve intended informants declined to be
interviewed; seven of them being top governmental officials involved in foreign policy and
security in Kenya.

The study considered government documents, newspapers, magazines, reports, and data from
various institutions. In order to create validity in the study, triangulation was applied. These
data were used to back up the claims from the interviews in order to meet the study objective.
A sampling plan was done to the secondary data by identifying their credibility, their sources,
and relevance to the theme and concepts of the study. Berg and Lune (2012) says, “When
examining other forms of messages, researchers may use any of the preceding levels or may
sample at other conceptual levels more appropriate to the specific message” (Berg and Lune,
2012, Pg. 357); this created the validity of the data analysed.

Validity refers to “the issue of whether an indicator or a number of indicators that is devised
to gauge a concept really measures that concept” (Bryman, 2012, Pg. 171). Appreciating
different types of validity, Internal validity involves causality; external validity involves
generalization while ecological validity refers to whether the study relates to general social
science and social setting (Bryman, 2012). To meet internal validity, the study carried out
credible and different analyses by looking at the relationship between the intervention in
Somalia to the increased insecurity in Kenya. External validity is carried out in the different sampling strategies in order to meet credible generalization while ecological validity was done by direct and personal contacts/experiences; involving different theories to test the study. These cross-examining procedures give a clearer sight of reality, a richer and grounded finding. These cross-examination/multiple techniques of sights are referred to as triangulation (Berg and Lune, 2012). Triangulation increases validity in the study, it challenges different theories and identify different perspectives, it reveals some unique findings from the different perspectives; however, triangulation is time-consuming, it can create disharmony within the study due to multiple perspectives, it assumes both secondary and primary data to be corresponding and it also assumes only one truth (Thurmond, 2001, Pg 254-256).

The study explores informants’ perceptions and experiences through interviews and observations; this is what Berg and Lune (2012) call interpretive approach. The approach, “Treats social and human activities as texts” (Berg and Lune, 2012, Pg. 351). The interviews and observations helped to understand and experience social relations in order to answer the research questions. Using data from credible institutions also helps to give an exploratory information. To be specific, semi-structured interviews are used. The investigator has knowledge about the trends of Kenya security situation through past experience in policy formulation and conduct within the within the Directorate of East African affairs at the Kenyan Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. The investigator is also a native of Nairobi’s Majengo, Eastleigh and Mathare suburbs which are attractive geographical areas for the study. In addition, the investigator has networks, prior information, and contacts from the above-mentioned places. This might have created a subjective investigation, however, as already mentioned, these interviews were triangulated by other secondary data in order to make the interviews valid.

The investigator, develops interview guide or fair topic to be covered while picking up some question within the understanding from the interviews (Bryman, 2012). Documents like videos were used; the subjectivity that came with this information gave some insight into the subject, the information also helped in identifying data which could not be captured by the sampling technique used to polish the semi-structured questions (Berg and Lune, 2012). This is what Bryman (2012) call flexibility in semi-structured interviews.
Semi-structured interviews give rich data and experience. It helped in gathering essential data for the technique allowed the interviewer to ask a more credible question and made an observation from the response. Asking questions and allowing the respondent to speak their mind helps to get rich data and a follow-up question is indeed relevant for it helps keep the focus of the study’s research question. The study also uses observation and recordings to make the research data essential; participants observation helps to identify interactions and learning of behaviours in the social setting directly (Bryman, 2012). The interviews highly focused on the informant’s perception on al-Shabaab attacks since 2011 and if operation linda nchi is a contribution to insecurity in Kenya. The designed semi-structured questions can be found in the appendix.

As already explained in the sampling technique, Key Information Interviews (KII) was also relevant to the data collection. KII gave in-depth information, it was suitable for sensitive information, it gave diverse information from different walks of life or experts, it helped in understanding the community believes in the issue being addressed (UCLA, 2016). KII, therefore, was important in understanding Kenya’s security and policy gaps. Due to the nature of the study, some of the information was very sensitive, private and it was important to get a wider range of opinion from all walks of life. Specific experts were hereby interviewed. Interviewing these individuals can create a top-down approach leaving credible information from the general public. The study, therefore, considered participants from the already mentioned areas.

3.3 Analysis of data
In order to actualize credibility, critical analyses of the information gathered were done to understand the complexity of insecurity contributed by al-Shabaab and make an informed guess by looking at the texts from interviews and mentioned statistics; primary and secondary data are used to form the basis of the analysis the study.

Reliability refers to “consistency of a measure of a concept” (Bryman, 2012, Pg. 169) it involves factors like inter-observer consistency, stability, and internal reliability. If different observers and analysts are involved in observation and analysing, the context of their observation or analysis will differ leading to a lack of consistency; this implies to the limitation of inter-observer consistency. Stability or external reliability implies to a measure not changing when used over different times while internal reliability refers to whether a measure is consistent within itself.
Themes, concepts, and questions related to the study were identified from interviews and documents and a follow-up confirmation of new and/or the same interviews and documents was done to meet the inter-observer consistency, internal consistency and stability. Multiple sources were used in order to identify a higher degree of agreement in the concepts used in the study. Due to the current development of insecurity in Kenya, some of the concepts used in the study were sensitive and related to the social setting. This called for personal experience and understanding making empirical analysis important; these concepts were tested and retested from different perceptions. Thereafter the concepts were categorised and tested within themselves; the interconnectedness of the concepts was identified to avoid contradictions. This process of measuring concepts is referred to operationalization (Bryman, 2012, Pg. 161). Putting more emphasis on operationalization and conceptualization, Berg and Lune (2012) says, concepts need to be understood by providing some criteria of measuring the empirical existence of that concept.

Interaction analysis is a way of examining words through personal experiences, this analysis involves topic people talk about in relation to the study, their reactions in relation to some words or phrases and their meaning to these words and phrases. Therefore it is important to identify different messages’ functional nature during the interactions, relating these interactions and words to other similar words and interaction settings (Frey et al., 2000, Pg. 243). Berg and Lune refer to this approach as a social anthropological approach (Berg and Lune, 2012, Pg. 351).

Both context and interaction analyses are done exclusively and exhaustively to the interviews, documents, and other statistics in order to be transcribed and entered into chronological, thematic coding including words with the same and related meaning. The collected data are analysed on the basis of repeated occurrence of certain events and wording, phrases or issues within and across various categories of respondents. These analyses methods helped to draw a conclusion to the study’s objective. Such analysis is important for it will judge the credibility, trustworthy and rigor of the study (Patton, 2005). The coded themes and words can be seen in the appendix.

3.4 Strength and weaknesses of the methods.
Studying Kenya’s security is complex and sensitive, therefore, the qualitative method makes it suitable to explain and bring the meaning of the situation. The different levels of analysis are key in order to give a deeper understanding of insecurity in Kenya. The study uses exploration procedures and this is the nature of qualitative methods. The approach helps to
understand the real world rather than assuming, it promotes personal experience in order to understand and describe what is; It uses cases to vividly show how the situation is, this can be understood from making observations (Bryman, 2012).

In order to limit these biases and make a more credible exploration, the study considers multiple data collections, theoretical perspectives, and data analyses. As already indicated in the above sampling procedure, data collection and analysis, different techniques were considered to meet reliability and validity in the study. It is important to note that using reliability and validity in qualitative studies is complicated. However, multiple and diverse reality that the informants have in their mind is valid as credible information and the one conducting the study is the instrument of validity and reliability (Patton, 2005, Golafshani, 2003). Therefore, as already explained, the study brought out the trustworthiness and rigor by appreciating operationalization and triangulation.
CHAPTER IV
4.0 DECISION-MAKING PROCESS AND IT’S CONTRIBUTION TO INSECURITY.
4.1 Introduction
Kenya took a military decision for the first time since she got independence in 1963 to intervene in Somalia. KDF entered “through Elwak in sub-sector North, Liboi in Central sub-sector and Ras Kiamboni in sub-sector South in Low Juba region along Kenya-Somalia border” (Migue et al., 2014, Pg. 2). The military went into Somalia to create a 100 Kilometres buffer zone (Mukinda, 2011). The idea to create a 100kilometer buffer zone was quickly withdrawn. General Julius Karangi,²⁰ the chief defence forces stated that linda nchi had no time-bound; the statement came approximately a week and a half after the operation had started. The aim was to capture Kismayo, a town where al-Shabaab depend on economically. The occupational decision only waited for a blowback within the Kenyan territory for al-Shabaab had networked in areas such as Nairobi Suburbs like Majengo and Eastleigh in Nairobi (Anderson and McKnight, 2015, Group, 2012).

Operation linda nchi was estimated to have started on the 14th October 2011. Immediately after its launch; Kenya experienced 27 terror attacks by 2013 September (GoK, 2013). By the year 2014, there were about 133 terror attacks in Kenya which brought the death-counts to 264 people and about 923 injured with regions like Nairobi county, Coastal region Mombasa and Mpeketoni in Lamu, North-eastern Garissa, Wajir and Mandera Counties experiencing most of the attacks. The nature of the attacks is related to grenades, guns, machete, and improved explosive devices. These attacks happened between 2011 and 2014 and are al-Shabaab-related (KPS, 2014, KNCHR, 2014).

Linda nchi has multiplied the al-Shabaab attacks in Kenya and apart from few attacks most of the attacks and threats are home-grown (Botha, 2014b, Botha, 2014a). Prior to linda nchi Kenya had been engaged in secessionist initiatives in the Jubaland region which failed; leading to more insecurity in Mandera, Garissa and Wajir counties in the North-eastern Kenya. Pre-operation linda nchi saw a rush from the Kenyan government use her political and diplomatic instruments in her foreign policy and security engagement. Due to policy gaps between formulation and conduct, al-Shabaab has used these gap to radicalize young Kenyans who are caring attacks within the country (Lind et al., 2015, Botha, 2014a, Atta-Asamoah, 2015b).

²⁰ the chair of Kenya Airport Authority and a retired General/ Chief of Kenya Defence Forces and Currently.
4.2 Kenya involvement in the Jubaland politics and Self-Defence.
The previous projects lead by the Kenyan government to support some leaders within Jubaland in order to create a divide in Southern Somalia failed and only resulted in affecting Kenya's security negatively. Through a ‘Jubaland policy’, a secessionist initiative to create a separate state in Southern Somalia was countered by clan identities. Somalia politics is highly influenced by clannism. Clan politics highly works for al-Shabaab’s advantage when it comes to recruitment (Hansen, 2013). Kenya supported Mohamed Abdi alias Gandhi, former Azania president and also a defence minister of the TFG under Somalia president Sheikh Sharif (Atta-Asamoah, 2015a). Gandhi was given support by Kenyan government by recruiting and training between 2500 to 3000 youth from both Somalia and northeastern Kenya including the Dadaab camp in Garissa; the recruits were trained in Kenya’s Isiolo and Kenya Wildlife Service camp in Manyani. Kenya The recruitment and training had irregularities and internal division like false promises of financial wage, underage recruitment, and clan division (UNSC, 2010).

This failure of Jubaland policy led the KDF to deal with proxy forces Kenya created in Southern Somalia. The fragmented 2500 soldiers which Kenya created before operation linda nchi are now fighting the Kenyan soldiers in southern Somalia due to clan identity. It is important to note the Jubaland policy created and/or worked with about six forces in Somalia, this are Ras Kambooni, Azania administration or Gandhi forces, the TGF forces, Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jama’a, TGF Isiolo militia and other Gedo region clan militia; this forces are fragmented with some within the forces identify with their clan leaders or the individual commander. Operation linda nchi could have been predicted to be impacted by clan identity and politics in Somalia. This identity led to the failure of Jubaland secession policy; prior to the intervention, Al-Shabaab had warned to attack Kenya due to the Jubaland secessionist initiative. The strategy of supporting Gandhi failed and Kenya supported the militia of Ras Kambooni Brigade, Ahmed Madore which also failed and some of the militia joined Al-Shabaab. Kenya took part in the divide of these two men’s forces. Gandhi got more support from Kenya and was close to Kenya’s influential individuals like former defence minister Yusuf Mohamed Haji and Aden Duale (Group, 2012); these two individual Duale and Haji are influential in Kenyan politics and North Eastern Kenya to be specific. Both Duale and Haji are from the Ogaden clan of Somali; they are also members of the majority coalition in government which is Jubilee alliance. Yusuf Haji is now the Garissa Senator while Aden

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21 Transition Federal Government
Duale is the leader of the majority and ruling coalition party Jubilee alliance at the National assembly. However, Duale was a member of ODM\textsuperscript{22}.

Kenya trying to take sides in the Jubaland policy/initiative lead to its failure and some of the trained youth joined extremists and reacted back to launch attacks in Kenya due to the false promises\textsuperscript{(Lind et al., 2015)}. Individuals and groups in Somalia are loyal to their clans and sub-clans which they trace from their common ancestors on the paternal side; through the projection of collective identity, al-Shabaab dismisses the clan division and recruit members (Hansen, 2013). This clannism fragmentation is also common in the northeastern region. North-eastern Kenya has Degodia, Gurreh, Ogaden, Murale, and Ajuran. Some of these clans like Ogaden are larger than others if clustered within Kenya while others are large within Somalia and small in Kenya. Clannism among the Somali community brings the sense of discrimination; some clans are perceived as greater than others\textsuperscript{23}. The majority of the al-Shabaab attacks which took place in the North-eastern Kenya are carried out by the individual from the minority clans. These individuals find justice within the al-Mujahidin which creates a collective identity of the Somali community. Jubaland policy failed due to fragmentation of within clans and individuals identify with their clans\textsuperscript{24}. Since the Jubaland initiative, there has been tension within North-eastern Kenya along the borders between the Kenyan security forces and al-Mujahideen (Angira, 2011). It is important to understand that Kenya’s relation with Somalia has a bigger impact within Kenya due to the Kenya-Somali populations in the Northeastern Kenya (Oyugi, 1994). Jubaland secessionism only extended Kenyan corruption to southern Somalia\textsuperscript{25}

In claiming \textit{just ad bellum}\textsuperscript{26}, Kenya subjectively selected article 51 of the UN charter and pointing self-help of security. Security in the case of \textit{linda nchi} only meant the absence of threat which affected the exchange earner (Migue et al., 2014). The motivation of these claim were her foreign exchange earner (tourism sector) which was at stake and the transport corridor, the LAPSSET project which is intended to pass the North-eastern province(Anderson and McKnight, 2015, Anderson, 2014).The policymakers omitted to respect Somalia as a sovereign state despite the Somalia president Shariff Sheikh Ahmed
denying the intervention (Lind et al., 2015, Group, 2012). The intervention projected intersubjective nature of selecting norms and rule to fit the policymakers’ interests. The principle Kenya projected; “Provides a social basis for the individual and security of the state” (Wendt, 1992, Pg. 412) This principle of self-help; “Existed only in the Virtue of certain intersubjective understanding and expectations” (ibid). Kenya projected the ‘we against them’ by claiming UN article 51 and omitting the purpose and principle of article 1 and 2 which talks about respect of territorial integrity, human rights, and culture, cooperation, taking collective measures when it comes to elimination of threats to peace (UN, 1945). Applying intersubjective projection of the international law, The internal security permanent minister Francis Kimemia said,

“Now we can’t wait for the TFG or Amisom. Article 51 of the UN charter allows us to pursue them. It allows you to hit anybody who hits you or is planning to hit you and also allows you to pursue those who have hit and ran away”(Mukinda, 2011).

More so, Kenya omitted the United Nation Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1725 which also called for respect for territorial integrity of Somalia, collective dialogue, action and cooperation with the Transitional Federal Institutions and Union of Islamic Court. The resolution endorsed African Union (AU) and Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) to deploy military forces in Somalia, however, the resolution declared that countries bordering Somalia like Kenya were not allowed to deploy their troops in Somalia(UNSC, 2006).

Even after Kenya claimed self-help to protect her foreign exchange earners, the sporadic terror attacks in post-operation linda nchi escalated (Anderson and McKnight, 2015). Linda nchi has led to much economic harm to Kenya’s tourism sector, “As a consequence, the tourism earnings decreased by 7.3 percent from KSh 94.0 billion in 2013 to KSh 87.1 billion in 2014. This was attributed to a decrease of 11.1 percent in the number of international visitor arrivals over the same period mainly due to adverse negative travel advisories by key source markets”(KNBS, 2015, Pg. 211).

The Kenyan populace did not understand the country was at war with al-Shabaab until the internal security George Kinuthia Saitoti (deceased) alongside the Defence Minister Mohamed Yusuf Haji (Currently Garissa County Senator) on the 15th of October 2011 announced after the KDF were already inside Somalia; being the first time the country was
making a big decision to invade another, former President and leader of Party of National Unity (PNU) Mwai Kibaki, hesitated to announce until the fourth day after the intervention (Lind et al., 2015, Group, 2015).

In accusing Al-Shabaab, foreign policymakers projected a group-think to the subject and create al-Mujahidin as a threat despite the rejection by the Somalia authority. The Kenya’s Internal Security Minister George Saitoti conceptualized the threats, Saitoti noted that due to porous borders, Kenya was going to start a detailed screening of the refugees for not all of them were in Kenya legally. He added;

"Our territorial integrity is threatened with serious security threats of terrorism; we cannot allow this to happen at all... It means we are now going to pursue the enemy, who are the Al Shabaab, to wherever they will be, even in their country... We have closed the border with Somalia and we have no apology to make... This influx of refugees crossing over from Somalia is putting our country at risk, and we can't sit back and watch," (AFP, 2011).

Just like Internal Security Minister, The Defence Minister Yusuf Mohammed Haji pointed external threats while assuming Kenya’s previous failure had been involved in, an example of the Jubaland policy which created proxy wars within North-Eastern Kenya. In addition to Saitoti’s words, Haji added;

“If you are attacked by an enemy, you are allowed to pursue that enemy until where you get him... We will force them far away from our border.” (ibid)

Both Saitoti and Haji shared authoritative power in their decision; they used this kind of power to create al-Shabaab as the threat and put the Kenyan populace in a national mood while forgetting the internal threat.

The CoK provides a check and balance of power in the three arms of government. Article 131 and 132 indicates that, the president who is the commander in chief and the chair of the National Security Council should take the front stage when it comes to security issues and announces when the country goes to war; in connection with this articles, when the country declares war the president ought to get approval from parliament as stated by article 95 (6) and 132 (4, e) of the constitution. This was not done27. The Kenyan parliament was informed by Owra Ojode who was then Assistant Minister for Interior Ministry; Noting the internal

27Interview with Eric Mutua, the former Kenyan Law Society Chair.
threats, Orwa pointed the rooted link between Mogadishu and Nairobi Eastleigh suburbs (Lind et al., 2015, Group, 2012).

Announcing the decisions in Parliament, Ojode got much opposition from Members of Parliament from the North-eastern Kenya who projected that *linda nchi* has come with corruption and discriminatory; specifically, subjecting the Kenyan-Somali community. Ojode said;

“This is a big animal with its head in Eastleigh, Nairobi and the tail in Somalia...We will do a massive operation to get rid of Al Shabaab and Al Qaeda here in Nairobi and I request that the police be supported so that Kenyans are safe... I know Kenyans might be uncomfortable with this, but after two weeks, things will be okay”(Opiyo and Githinji, 2011).

Ojode was also opposed by MP for Dujis constituency, Aden Duale. Duale is now the leaders of majority and ruling party in the National assembly. The ruling party Jubilee continues with discriminative act Duale was subjecting;the thinking of al-Shabaab as an easy target and discrimination of the Kenyan-Somali community later came to hunt Kenya for a segment of the youth in the country saw it as subjective towards their community.

4.3 Diplomatic Crisis

In order to attain Kenyan foreign policy and security objective, some offices and individuals holding those offices are vital; the offices have authoritative power invested in them. the offices are “The Presidency, the Cabinet, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, relevant ministries, departments, agencies, Parliament, County governments, Offices of Retired Heads of State/Government and other Statesmen, and any other relevant institutions, offices, and instrument” (GoK, 2014). However, Kenyan foreign policy instrument and security have always been influenced by the interest of the executive especially the presidency; this has always brought personalizing security. (Ocharo, 2012, Oluoch, 2009, Oyugi, 1994). The trend of the president controlling and taking the front role in foreign policy decision and security is still evidence.

Kenya used the relevant offices like Office of the president, ministry of foreign affairs and defence ministry before *operation linda inchi*. this engagement, however, started after

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28Citizen TV News; 19th October 2011 available at <https://youtu.be/1Pctpcfn4cl>
29See in Chapter V; Operation Usalama Watch.
30Consultation with Mr. Leonard Oluoch Maumo and Prof Philip Nying’uro Lecturers at the Political Science department, University of Nairobi
operation linda nchi. The engagements had a sign of retaliation from the militia on the same day. When the Defence Minister, Haji and Foreign Affair Minister, Moses Wetangula visited their counterparts in Mogadishu, an explosion from the car with suicide bomb demonstrated that the two Kenyan ministers were not welcome (Migue et al., 2014).

A faux pas of diplomacy was projected when President Kibaki announced on the 18th of October 2011 that Kenya was fighting al-Shabaab in Somalia and on the same day the Somalia President Sheikh Shalif Ahmed announced that Kenyan military was not welcome to invade Somalia. This came after the Kenyan diplomats lead by foreign affairs minister Moses Wetangula (now the senator for Bungoma County) and Mohamed Yusuf Haji defence minister had a diplomatic meeting on the invasion in the capital of southern Somalia Mogadishu, Ahmed, and his Prime Minister Abdiweli Mohamed Ali claimed the diplomatic agreement was only on logistics issues to unite Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and KDF to work together on fighting al-Shabaab (Group, 2012). This scepticism from the Somalia diplomats was due to the past ‘Jubaland policy’ and fear of the grass root rejection.

It was evidence that al-Shabaab would bring back the war into Kenya (Hansen, 2013). Al-Shabaab published magazines by the name Gaidi Mtaani meaning ‘terror on the streets’ to reach out the Kenyan Ummah. Gaidi Mtaani was published in Swahili, a Kenyan national language. the first issue Operation Linda Uislamu projected a counter-narrative to the operation linda nchi.

The rush to invade Somalia, diplomatic crisis and a later lobbying for diplomatic support from neighbouring countries such as Ethiopia, Burundi and Uganda brought questions of whether Kenya understood the full situation of operation linda nchi. This rush only triggered al-Mujahidin to change their battlefield to Kenya. A late diplomatic rush was seen from the Kenyan diplomats to meet AU Commission chairperson and the President of Ethiopian Mele Zenawi (Group, 2012). The IGAD’s 41st Extra-Ordinary meeting was held on the 21st October 2011; the Kenyan delegates on the 41st meeting led Foreign Affairs Minister Moses Wetangula and Minister for Defence Yujuf Haji were assured support on linda nchi by IGAD (Migue et al., 2014, IGAD, 2011). These assurance did not yield much diplomatic fruit. The diplomatic rush indicated miscalculation of policy conduct. Ethiopia shares the

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31 Interview with a participant working at the Kenyan Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade.
32 Populace.
33 See Gaidi Mtaani, Available at: http://jihadology.net/category/gaidi-mtaani/
34 African Union
35 Intergovernmental Authority on Development
same southern Somalia border especially the Gedo region; this is critical for Ethiopian soldiers have been operating in the region\textsuperscript{36}. The rush later came to haunt KDF camp in El-Ade along Gedo region.

Despite Kenya waged war with al-Shabaab, the grand coalition government under President Mwai Kibaki; from the Kikuyu ethnic tribe and Prime Minister Raila Odinga; from the Luo tribe, was divided on how to manage \textit{linda nchi} (Lind et al., 2015). Slightly two weeks after the launch of operation \textit{linda nchi}, the defence minister Yusuf Haji; a supporter of the Kibaki team differed with Richard Onyonka; a supporter of Raila’s team who was the assistant minister of foreign affairs at that time. The two differed on whether to negotiate with al-Shabaab leadership or not\textsuperscript{37}. This divide and politicization of security became evident after the general election of 2013. Raila Odinga and his new team of CORD\textsuperscript{38} leaders, Kalonzo Musyoka\textsuperscript{39} and Moses Wetangula\textsuperscript{40} changed their thoughts on \textit{linda nchi} to proclaimed a strategic withdrawal of KDF from Somalia; this was due to the increases al-Shabaab attacks within the country. The new government defended the intervention and the stay of KDF in Somalia (Adow, 2016b, Otieno, 2014b, Nyassy and Mwabege, 2015).

The launch of the \textit{linda nchi} brought a divide between President Mwai Kibaki and Prime Minister Raila Odinga; indicating a lack of coordination and competition within the government. The promising support from Israel saw a divide within Kenya’s Grand Coalition government, the defence minister Mohamed Yusuf Haji said the meeting between Raila and Israel Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was personal and not the strategy laid by the Kenyan government in seeking international assistance, however the Prime minister insisted the two premiers meeting was to strengthen homeland security and not external threats which are defence forces mandate (Nation, 2011).

Operation \textit{linda nchi} being a sensitive matter projected that whoever Kenya engages with for support, may bring a divide internally. The ethnic and religious groups within Kenya seek collective identity with Somali; this leads to al-Shabaab advantage and semi territory regions like north-eastern Kenya (Hansen et al., 2016). The more diplomatic crisis was encountered when both President Kibaki and the Prime Minister Raila Odinga rushed to Israel and the gulf

\textsuperscript{36}Interview with a security expert in Nairobi.
\textsuperscript{37}Kenyan Citizen TVnews at 21:00hour on 28\textsuperscript{th} October 2011
\textsuperscript{38}Coalition for Democracy and Reforms is the coalition is the minority party and second largest coalition party after the ruling party Jubilee alliance; it is a coalition of three main parties namely ODM, WDP and FORD Kenya
\textsuperscript{39}The CORD Co-principle and former Vice president during the launch of \textit{linda nchi}.
\textsuperscript{40}The CORD Co-principle and former Minister of Foreign Affair during the \textit{linda nchi}
States respectively for support, with Israel promising and the Gulf States muted the support (Group, 2012). Evidence of this kind of relationship can be traced in the past relationships. Israel and Kenya have had some good relations in the past while Arab states support Somalia unification due to its religious identity and Somalia’s relation with the Arab League (Oluoch, 2009).

The sensitivity of Kenya-Israel diplomatic relations is due to historical misunderstandings and the stand which Kenya took on GWoT⁴¹ (Oluoch, 2009, Pg. 86). The Extremists perceived the government submission to the United States demands to Kenyan government interest. Muslim organizations like Kenya Muslim Advisory Council, MUHURI⁴², and CIPK⁴³ differed with Israel involvement in operation Linda nchi (Ochieng, 2011, Oluoch, 2009, Botha, 2014a). The past Kenya’s relationships with Israel brought sour relations with Muslims in Kenya could have informed the diplomats on the sensitivity of the matter both internally and externally. This past saw SUPKEM⁴⁴ calling for an end of Kenya’s relation with Israel (Oluoch, 2009). This divide has worked well on al-Shabaab politics in winning the heart and minds of the Kenyan Muslims. Al-Shabaab projected operation linda uislamu when Kenya engage with Israel.⁴⁵

The extremists do find both the Kenyan government and international community projecting double standards when it comes to counter-violence extremism narrative; Raila’s diplomatic meetings with Israel immediately after operation linda nchi projected ‘double standard’ on fighting counter-violence narrative on extremism bringing a bad feeling to the Muslim community in Kenya⁴⁶; an advantage to al-Shabaab to wage war on MaKafiri.⁴⁷ The al-Shabaab projected the Israel-Palestine conflict against the international community in their Magazine Gaidi Mtaani⁴⁸ issue number 2; addressing the Kenyan Ummah in a Kenyan national language Swahili, the magazine addressed that KDF capturing Kismayo was only the beginning of war. Al-Mujahidin said that the Kenyan government was one of the Makafiri, therefore, operation linda nchi was tagged ‘Operation Linda Ukariri’.⁴⁹ The magazine addressed the need to counter Operation Linda Ukariri with a counter-narrative of Operation

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⁴¹ Global war on Terror
⁴² Muslim for Human Rights
⁴³ Council for Imams and Preachers of Kenya
⁴⁴ Supreme Council for Muslims in Kenya
⁴⁵ See operation linda uislamu. Available from <http://jihadology.net/2012/04/05/issue-1-of-a-new-swaahili-magazine-gaidi-mtaani/>
⁴⁶ Interview with SUPKEM Deputy Secretary General Hassan Ole Naado
⁴⁷ Disbelievers
⁴⁸ Local terrorist
⁴⁹ Operation Protect disbelievers.
Linda Uislamu. Al-Mujahidin counternarrative has made KDF soldiers to be *gaidi mtaani*. This later impacted heavily on KDF killing more than 200 KDF soldiers in El-Ade. By referring to the *Miraa* business, Al-Shabaab also addressed in the magazine that Kenyan government was doomed to fail in the war due to the nature of corruption within the Kenyan government. Despite all this evidence and possibilities of revenge, KDF marched towards al-Shabaab’s stronghold Kismayo, leading the al-Mujahidin occupying North-eastern Kenya (Gatsiounis, 2013, Hansen, 2013, Anderson and McKnight, 2015). Al-Shabaab declared hitting the Kenyan capital since they had the networks within Nairobi.

Another face of seeking support from Israel was projected on the 24th February 2016. President Uhuru Kenyatta visited Israel and held bilateral talks with President Reuven Rivlin and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to increase level of cooperation on security concern and intelligence sharing. The meeting was positive and the two countries agreed to cooperate countering terror (Presidency, 2016, PSCU, 2016a). A segment of Muslims Led by Yusuf Haji and Aden Duale in North-eastern Kenya supported President Uhuru Kenyatta and Deputy President William Ruto’s moves on Security. The move by the President and his Deputy to gang these support from North-eastern Kenya was highly reported by the Kenyan media.

Raila Odinga visited Israel one week later after the president’s visit and was welcomed by the Israel officials led by Benjamin Netanyahu. Raila Oginda had earlier rushing for Israel support was now polluting Uhuru Kenyatta bilateral efforts, Raila indicated in his speech that governance is the main issue affecting security. He said that poor governance is affecting institutionalism, therefore, institutions like the judiciary, parliament, and anti-corruption institutions are paralysed leading to crippling security, accountability and media freedom (Odinga, 2016). Regardless of Raila’s pollution of Kenya’s bilateral talks with Israel; Benjamin Netanyahu honoured a follow-up meeting to Nairobi on the 5th of July 2016 and signed an agreement to help Kenya fight terror (Namunane, 2016). The Netanyahu’s visit and

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50 Interview with a KDF 3 officers
51 Khat
52 Interviews in Majengo with a Kenyan police man, an administration police, two Muslim clerics, 3 people from a youth group, and three women whose children Joined Al-Shabaab.
53 The Former Kenyan Defence Minister and currently the Garissa Senator
54 The leader of Majority Party in the National Assembly and a former member of ODM party
55 Interview with a Security expert from Nairobi and a member of parliament from Garissa.
56 Kenya Citizen TV 19th May, 201; *Rais Kenyatta azuru Mandera, Wajir na Garissa* [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ADQ6uLyhxKE]
57 The leaders of the minority party Coalition for Reforms and Democracy, CORD.
agreement with Uhuru Kenyatta brought scepticism to the Muslim community in Kenya leading to their opposition of Kenya-Israel Relations.\textsuperscript{58}

The diplomatic crisis and gamble within the government gave al-Shabaab an advantage to reach a certain segment of Kenyan population to project their agenda. The first issue of \textit{Gaidi Mtaani} magazine projected that Kenya was seeking support from Israel who was part of the Palestinian suffering’, al-Shabaab declaring that security shall only be a dream to the Kenyans. Al-Mujahidin added to the Kenyan \textit{ummah} to wake up for the enemy was the Kenyan government.\textsuperscript{59} The al-Shabaab’s strategy projected a way to win the support of the extremists in Kenya. The \textit{Mpeketoni} and \textit{Garissa} attacks where evidence of engaging Kenyan citizens to carry out these attacks. Before the unfolding of the major al-Shabaab attacks, the government seemed to give the populace confidence on security. Little did they know, the plans for major attacks were under way\textsuperscript{60}. President Kibaki praised operation \textit{linda nchi} in 2012 by urging Kenyans to work close with security forces; claiming that the operation was a success (Nation, 2012a).

\textbf{4.4 Increase of the Sporadic Attacks}

The launch of operation \textit{linda nchi} predicted the sporadic attack by al-Shabaab. The attacks started immediately after the Kenyan diplomats met their counterparts in Mogadishu; insecurity has become a common agenda among the Kenyan populace. The attack varies from minor grenade attacks to major ones like Westgate Siege, Mpeketoni attacks, Mandera massacres, Garissa to El-Adde attacks. Al-Shabaab has been changing strategy from attacking the Kenyan security forces to civilians. Mujahidin targets the high profile and soft targets in order to make a bigger international impact (Ali et al., 2015, GoK, 2013). A period of the first five months saw a great escalation of action and reaction between the al-Mujahidin and the Kenyan government (Zimmerman and Katib, 2012).

Al-Shabaab promised that since KDF intervened in Somalia, the war will be brought back to Kenya. However, the Kenyan government failed to act on this claims and miscalculated the Mujahidin capability. During the initial stages of the intervention, al-Shabaab launched more than twenty sporadic attacks targeting churches, bars, nightclubs. More of this kind of attacks

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{58} KTN News Kenya. Afrika Mashariki 10th July 2016 - Israeli yatafuta nini Afrika Avaliable from \textless https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VrwiDi_lEsA\textgreater \\
  \item \textsuperscript{59} \textit{Gaidi Mtaani} Operation Linda Uislamu. available from <http://jihadology.net/2012/04/05/issue-1-of-a-new-swahili-magazine-gaidi-mtaani/>.
  \item \textsuperscript{60} Interview with Haki Africa Director Hussein Khalid from Mombasa.
\end{itemize}
happening in the north-eastern Kenya targeting security forces. (Group, 2012). The attacks started in the capital city Nairobi and later shifted to the northeastern Kenya. With only one attack claimed by al-Shabaab on January 11th, 2012, north-eastern Kenya had experienced 24 attacks between the launch of *linda nchi* and February 2012 (HRW, 2015).

The earlier attacks in the year 2012 worked on al-Shabaab advantage for they brought a divide within the Kenyan populace. Three attacks happened in Nairobi Eastleigh on the same month of November 2012. The 18th November 2012 attack rose attention; the explosive attack happened on a *Matatu* (minibus) killing 7 people and injuring more than 33 people in Nairobi’s Eastleigh suburb along the second street. This attack saw a number of members of the public attacking the Somali community and a group of young people with crude weapons marched from Mathare slums neighbouring Eastleigh and started looting and attacking traders in Eastleigh (Zadock, 2012).

Eastleigh a highly populated suburb is dominated by Somali community with Businesses moving from the suburb to Mogadishu in Somalia. Al-Shabaab has contributed to 9% of total death which are brought by insecurity in Kenya; the deaths caused by al-Shabaab has risen from 30 in 2010 to 290 in 2014; this is in addition to about 923 injuries in about 133 attacks. All these have been claimed by al-Shabaab (Lind et al., 2015, HRW, 2015).

4.5 Explaining the Westgate Siege

In decision making, there is a difference between tactics and strategy; the former is the means to achieve an aim. The latter is an overall operational plan. Strategy comes with awareness of the choices and consequences in decision making (Lowenthal, 2014). The Westgate siege came to a surprise, it exposed the unpreparedness and disjointedness of the security organs in Kenya; a big win to the al-Mujahidin while a defeat and confusion of the Kenyan government to the international community. At around 11:30 am on the 21st of September 2013, a group of gunmen entered Westgate mall; randomly shot dead more than 67 people and injuring more than 200. Despite the random shooting by the attackers, non-Muslims were singled out. The gunmen contained the mall for three days. The Kenyan government, however, gave misleading information through President Uhuru Kenyatta announcing on the third day that the gunmen were contained by security forces (GoK, 2013, Lind et al., 2015, Anderson and McKnight, 2015).

The heavily armed gunmen were later identified as Ahmed Hassan Abukar, Mohamed Abdi Noor, Mohammed Hassan Dhuwhulow was also known as Abu Baraa Al Sudai and Yahye
Osman Ahmed known as Arab, all being Somalis and the latter individuals identified as having Norwegian citizenship and Arab descent respectively. It is believed that all the four died in the battle with the Kenyan security authorities. Eight police officers got injuries and one died in the siege. The four gunmen were believed to have been accompanied by others; Hussein Mustafa Hassan, Liban Abdule Omar, Adan Abdikarir Adan and Mohamed Ahmed Abdi were arrested, seven others were also charged with terrorism while five others were said to be at large and wanted (Guardian, 2014, GoK, 2013). Samantha Lewthwaite a British woman was also linked to the attack however not in a direct link (Hirsch, 2013).

The Westgate siege hit the world news giving al-Shabaab a great victory and support for future attacks in Kenya. It exposed Kenya’s security gaps indicating the government weakness and limited control of security; it was an indication that the war was becoming huge and the battlefield was brought into the Kenyan territory (Lind et al., 2015, Anderson and McKnight, 2015). The al-Shabaab spokesperson Sheikh Abulaziz Abu Muscab claimed responsibility of attacking the mall and justification of the attack being operation *linda nchi* attack on innocent people in Jubaland region. Sheikh Abulaziz said;

“We have been late in attacking Nairobi. We did not attack before because they were expecting us to attack. Our aim is to attack our enemy when they least expect us to attack. This time, they were not expecting us to attack. We choose when to attack, and the best time to attack. The place we attacked is Westgate shopping mall. It is a place where tourists from across the world come to shop, where diplomats gather. It is a place where Kenya’s decision-makers go to relax and enjoy themselves. Westgate is a place where there are Jewish and American shops. So we have to attack them. If they don’t withdraw, attacks like this will become common in Kenya. It is possible if they don’t withdraw attacks like this will happen in Kenyan cities and towns every day” (Mohamed, 2013).

There was poor coordination among the security organs. The anti-terrorist Police elite team from the GSU\(^{61}\), the RECCE company who are also part of the presidential guard had cornered the attackers. The KDF’s RSF\(^{62}\) later came to replace the RECCE. (Ngirachu, 2014, GoK, 2013, Anderson and McKnight, 2015). The siege revealed challenges within the Kenyan security forces. Article 241 (b) and (c) of the CoK 2010, emphasises coordination between security forces and necessary authorities, it also states that parliament should be

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\(^{61}\) General Service Unit

\(^{62}\) Ranger Strike Force
informed before and given a later report after deployment; this was not the case of Westgate when KDF was deployed to act on the emergency\(^63\)

The conflict of command during the Westgate Siege lead to more killings for the attackers were advantaged and they gained ground. The uncoordinated security led to bad blood between the RECCE team and the KDF leading to one of the RECCE squad being killed at close range by KDF soldier; the battle also left three KDF soldiers dead. It is believed that the rivalry between the KDF and the RECCE team caused the GSU squad to arrive at the scene late; traveling by road and a commercial helicopter, the RECCE team was delayed yet the aerial assets of KDF was available. There was looting by the security forces inside the mall. (UNSC, 2015, GoK, 2013, Anderson and McKnight, 2015). The deputy president also admitted there was looting in the mall and termed it as ‘unfortunate’ (Musau and Mureithi, 2013).

It is believed that the looting was part of the cause of battle between RECCE squad and KDF; for the former was preventing the latter from looting in the mall. Evidence of looted stuff was found in Gilgil were traders close to the largest army barracks were found with items stolen from the mall. Some soldiers were charged in court on allegations of being found with stolen good from the mall and later discharged due to the military police forcing their release (Nation, 2013c, Anderson and McKnight, 2015).

The security forces were given information of a possible attack in Nairobi especially a place where western foreigners frequent. Intelligence information was given in 2011 and 21\(^{st}\) of 2012. The security organs rather did not take any action. The Westgate mall having a connection with Israeli businesses and ownership; Intelligence from the Israeli Embassy in Kenya warned of a possible attack on the premises (Onyango, 2013, Lind et al., 2015, GoK, 2013).

The top security organ in Kenya, NSC\(^64\) had been given accurate warning of possible attacks since January 2013. The warning estimated the dates to be between 13\(^{th}\) and 20\(^{th}\) of September 2013. It was indicated that the failure to work on the intelligence lead to the success on the Westgate siege and negligence of the entire security organs in Kenya (UNSC, 2015, Nation, 2013a). According to article 240 of the Kenyan Constitution 2010 the NSC consist of the President, the Deputy President, Cabinet Secretary for defense, foreign affairs

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\(^{63}\) Interview with a Kenyan Lawyers.

\(^{64}\) National Security Council
and internal security, the Attorney-General, the Chief of Kenya Defence Forces, the Director-General of the National Intelligence Services and the Inspector-General of the National Police Service; with article 131 indicating that the president shall chair of the council. This top security organ had accurate intelligence on a possible attack but it did not act on the intelligence provided (Mutua and Mwaniki, 2013). However, the NIS was blamed for not providing information and the government through the Principal Secretary of the Ministry of Interior Mutea Iringo defended the government position claiming that the security forces had done much to prevent terror attacks and that the Westgate attack was ‘unfortunate’ (Yusuf, 2013).

The conflicting information given by the government security officers brought suspicion leading to a lack of confidence on the government being on top of the security situation. The government had given the death toll number as 67 but some were trapped inside the mall, The collapse of part of the building was due to heavy gun exchange between the attackers and KDF. The government has been playing games by trying to claim a victory of the Westgate siege but unfolding stories like poor coordination and misconduct of the military indicated the government failure (Kegoro, 2013b, Lind et al., 2015, GoK, 2013).

The Westgate siege was supported by a radical cleric Sheikh Abubakar Shariff also known as Makaburi (Sanga and Mwahaga, 2014); an indication of radicalization and al-Shabaab sympathisers in Kenya. The attack was a demonstration to the international community on al-Shabaab’s strength and capabilities (Hansen, 2014).

The attack brought panic and stress to the citizens as they saw the failure of their security organs. It made them realised that they were insecure and the government was not on top of things as it projected. Post-Westgate siege brought a promise by the President to form a commission of inquiry to investigate the Siege but the commission never materialized (Lind et al., 2015, Pg. 38). The Westgate siege brought the proposal of repatriation of refugees from Dadaab and Kakuma back to their countries of origin (GoK, 2013, Pg. 7).

The Westgate attacks, however, saw the Kenya security organs given the benefit of double (Yusuf, 2013). The episode of repeated attacks such as Mpeketoni, Madera Massacres, Garissa and El-Ade attack, including the same kind of pattern of intelligence given and the

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65 Interview with George Kegoro, the Executive director of Kenyan Human Right Commission
negligence of the security organ indicated that al-Shabaab contributed to insecurity in Kenya\textsuperscript{66}.

4.6 Mpeketoni Attacks; Not yet a lesson to learn
Despite Policymakers mistake and noticing the unfortunate incident of Westgate siege, The Mpeketoni attacks took place within two days. The al-Shabaab killed their victims and came back the next day for yet another killing. Just like Westgate siege, the attack got security forces in a surprise despite the prior intelligence given. The attacks could have been a lesson to the Kenyan government on how al-Shabaab have learned the internal division and politics. However, it created more internally insecurity and politicized security\textsuperscript{67}.

A group of heavy gunmen not more than 30 in number, entered Mpeketoni a town at about 2045 hours in Lamu County on the 15\textsuperscript{th} of June 2014. The armed men attacked the town centre, the Police Station and the headquarters of the AP\textsuperscript{68} shooting their victims' head at close range and killing 49 burning about 26 buildings and 44 vehicles within 2 to 3 hours. The death toll marked to 50. Another Reservist Police officer was also killed by the attackers in one of Mpeketoni’s administrative village Kibaoni (IPOA, 2014, Anderson, 2014)

Despite the delay and a later claim of responsibility for the attack by al-Shabaab due to their bureaucracy, the attack saw one of the Members of parliament from Lamu West constituency, Julius Ndegwa Kariukiwho is a Kikuyu and a member of ruling coalition, blamed the local land owners and county governor Issa Timamy who is an Arab. Mr. Timamy was later arrested and accused of being involved in the attacks. The arrest came even after it was clear that the attack was an al-Shabaab activity. The governor was released on a bond and cleared due to invalid evidence. (Mwawasi, 2015, Atta-Asamoah, 2015a, Mwakimako and Willis, 2014).

Monday the next day after the first attack a similar killing took place in Kijijoni village in Kiasari. The deaths were recorded to be 9 with some shot at close range and others having their throats cut. Two other bodies were also found in Pangani by the police two days after the Sunday and the Monday attacks. The ethnic identification of the killed victims indicated that Kikuyu tribe were affected most for the dead were identified in terms of their tribe as, “1 Kisii, 2 Luo, 2 Meru, 3 Kalenjin, 5 Kamba10 Giriama, 37 Kikuyu”, 59 of them being male

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\textsuperscript{66} Interview with Haki Africa Director Hussein Khalid
\textsuperscript{67} Interview with a member of the GSU RECCCE team member.
\textsuperscript{68} Administration Police
and 1 woman” (IPOA, 2014, Pg. 9). None of the victims were from the Bajuni\(^69\) or Kenyan Muslim community (Anderson, 2014).

The politics that Kikuyu’s are a community under siege are the narrative that played in the attacks and it was evidence in President Uhuru Kenyatta’s Speech after the attack. Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for the attacks through their spokesperson Abdulaziz Abu Musab (Atta-Asamoah, 2015a, Mwakimako and Willis, 2014). Kenyatta went ahead to deny and blame local politics claimed that:

“The attack in Lamu was well planned, orchestrated and politically motivated ethnic violence against a Kenyan community, with the intention of profiling and evicting them for political reasons. This, therefore, was not an Al Shabaab terrorist attack” (Group, 2014, Pg. 5, Mwakimako and Willis, 2014, Pg. 20).

The president continued by saying:

“Evidence indicated that local political networks were involved in the planning and execution of a heinous crime” (Lind et al., 2015, Pg. 34).

The CORD leader Raila Odinga termed the statement of the president was unjustified and unfortunate, he called for the reformation of the country’s security structures (Standard, 2014). The Deputy President William Ruto blamed the CORD leader, Raila Odinga for the attacks while Al-Shabaab labelled Mpeketoni as a ‘Christian’ settlement (Mwakimako and Willis, 2014). The interior security minister Joseph Ole Lenku also blamed the minority party leader; Lenku said, “Raila was inciting the public and stoking ethnic tension”(Lind et al., 2015, Pg. 34).

The Mpeketoni attacks heightened politicization of security within the county leading to more insecurity. On the 20 of July 2014, outward vigilante groups opening fire in Likoni, Mombasa injuring ten and killing four people whom apparently were all from the Luo tribe; the vigilante group left messages behind on leaflets saying, the Likoni attack was a revenge for the killings of the Kikuyus in Mpeketoni by the Luos (Group, 2014). Noting that the minority parties CORD coalition enjoy the numbers in the coastal region (Shilundu, 2015); the county commissioner of Mombasa Nelson Marwa, went ahead to blamed one of the parties from the minority coalition ODM, Marwa said, ODM is creating insecurity in the coast. Despite Aden Bare Duale’s\(^70\) rejection on the launch of *linda nchi*; he was now

\(^69\) A tribe in the Kenyan Northern Coast; originally from the Banju Islands situated in the southern coast of Somalia.

\(^70\) Former ODM member now on the Jubilee party.
claiming CORD and al-Shabaab were reading from the same script and having the same strategy for they were both calling for a withdrawal of KDF from Somalia; the minority party reacted strongly calling the blame game as “ill-intentioned baboonery and called the county commissioner scaremonger” (Otieno, 2014a).

The ruling coalition blamed the minority party for the attacks which brought a conspiracy that was believed by a segment of the Kenyan population that CORD and al-Shabaab were partners. President Uhuru shut down CORD claims was shut down and stated that KDF will stay in Somalia until the Job was done (Mbaka, 2014). This demand was a pickup line by the president and his deputy to create an ethnic divide and brand the minority party CORD as terrorists.

Al-Mujahidin celebrated the internal divide between the Luo and the Kikuyu tribe and claimed through their leader Sheikh Mohammed Dulyadeyn. The Mujahidin noticed a potential to divide Kenya further on religious lines. The internal politics pointed out how al-Shabaab has known Kenyan internal affairs and using it to their own advantage. The security discussions blocked the focus of external threats brought by al-Shabaab; igniting an internal political division as the cause of the attacks. This brought a victory for the al-Shabaab and more blunder to the Kenyan government (Lind et al., 2015, Anderson and McKnight, 2015, Mwakimako and Willis, 2014, Group, 2014).

The local conflict of land in Lamu worked as an advantage for al-Shabaab to increase insecurity within the county. The land conflict can be traced back in the 1970s when some parts of land in Mpeketoni was used to on a settlement scheme and most of those who were settled were Kikuyu’s; this has always brought tension between the local and the settled immigrants (Mwakimako and Willis, 2014, Lind et al., 2015). The locals feel the settlers are being given an advantage by the government while the settlers feel threatened by the locals claiming their land back.

The huge transport corridor LAPSSET project which could boost Lamu’s economy ignited tension among the locals Bajuni tribe who feared their interest was at risk. Al-Shabaab used this tension to recruit local Kenyans and carry out attacks within the country (Anderson, 2014).

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71 Interview with two security expert from the Ministry of Foreign affairs and Interior Ministry.
72 Native who are majority Muslims.
73 See the Lamu grievances available at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8JBSnt2VPU&feature=youtu.be>
Mpeketoni attackers pointed that the attack was as a result of revenge of the oppression of the Kenyan government on the Muslim community. Al-Mujahidin claimed the government intimidated and coerced the Muslim community; proclaiming extrajudicial killings being carried out by the government against the Muslim clerics. The attackers had knowledge on Mpeketoni’s geographical area, they targeted specific victims and they used both Swahili and Somali language while their killing operation was going on. The nature of the engagement with the police indicated attacker strategic skills. The attackers were identified as a mix of Mijikenda, Arabs, Somali, and English speaking individuals; some of them even knew the victims with their names (Lind et al., 2015, IPOA, 2014, Group, 2014).

Despite Mpeketoni showing how skilled al-Mujahidin was. The government kept the hardline measures and talked tough. The attack brought confusion within the Kenyan government security forces. There was a lack of coordination within the different units of the Kenya Police Service. Mpeketoni attacks only projected politicization of security leading to al-Shabaab’s advantage and more insecurity in the country. The prior intelligence information on the attacks only saw brought different interest at the National Security Council (IPOA, 2014).

Post-Mpeketoni attack saw President Uhuru Kenyatta asked the National Intelligence Service (NIS) boss Major General Michael Gichangi to resign due to the gaps in security in the country. The former Inspector General of police (IG) David Kimayo and Retired Chief of Defence General Julius Karangi were not working well with NIS boss. General Gichangi and the president had differences over the Mpeketoni issue. The president had the theory that the attack was caused by local politics while the NIS boss projected the Al-Shabaab theory. The executive thought NIS boss gave wrong information during the Westgate Mall and the Mpeketoni attacks. The differences within top security offices are indications that the Jubilee government was keen to form their own security machinery which they could trust. A clean up of the former President Kibaki government security machinery was necessary. Key individuals in the former President Kibaki government like, NIS boss Gichangi, the powerful interior permanent secretary Mutea Iringo, State house Political Advisor Nancy Gitau, and Francis Kimemia were replaced for they held key nerves of the state house. The president complained he was having a parallel government. The Inspector General David Kimayo was on his way out for failure to deliver leadership.

74 Interview with a security expert in Kenya.
The minority party (CORD) leaders complained that the National security advisory committee and the NSC had lacked competence, ethnic and regional balance. Despite the projection of the new constitution on separation of powers; the document requires the parliament to play a major role in approval or key governmental office. The parliament, however, does not play its limited role in the formulation and conduct of security laws. This is due to the limitation of implementation of the Constitution of Kenya CoK (2010). The member of parliament projects the interest of the executive in power (Ocharo, 2012). President Uhuru Kenyatta’s coalition government enjoys the tyranny of numbers in parliament which serves as an advantage for him to control parliament (Ongiri, 2014). This misuse and centralization of interests.

4.7 Mandera Massacres
The month of November 2014 saw yet another al-Shabaab successful attack; a bus travelling to Nairobi from Mandera was taken by surprise by al-Shabaab killing 28 passengers who were on board. The 28 were selected and killed on the basis of their faith and al-Shabaab claimed responsibility saying it was a revenge on the raid of mosques in Mombasa by the Kenyan security force. The Mandera governor Ali Roba warned the security officer on the terrorist threats in the county before the bus attack. Mr. Ali emphasized that he was shocked to learn that the Arabiya military base had been removed weeks before the Mandera attack, calling the decision misguided. The governor proclaimed to have given intelligence to the IG\textsuperscript{75} David Kimaiyo and the Minister for Interior Joseph Ole Lenku. Both the IG and the minister denied intelligence claim on a likelihood of the attack (Lind et al., 2015, Otsialo and Hajir, 2014).

Another attack followed immediately on the 1\textsuperscript{st} of December 2014 in the same county killing 36 workers in a quarry. The attack followed the resignation and sacking of the IG and the Interior Minister respectively; in his announcement, the president admitted the weakness within the Kenya’s security domain. The victims of the attack were non-Muslims and Al-Shabaab claimed the responsibility (Zadock and Otsialo, 2014, Lind et al., 2015, Nation, 2014). Both attacks saw the Shabaab success of infiltration within Kenya; creating a national attention; “the attack omitted Muslims and locals while targeting Christian-labourers, small traders, civil servants and professional from education and health sector, creating a division.

\textsuperscript{75} Inspector General
between Somalis and others” (Group, 2015, Pg. 11). The Mujahidin strategy has been successful in Kenya leading to tension and insecurity in Mandera.

The year 2015 saw a road side attack of a lorry and a bus. The attackers believed to be al-Shabaab, sprayed bullets to both vehicles leaving 3 people dead and three others injured (Ombati, 2016c). Five police officers died in an attack in Mandera on the 21 June 2016. The police were escorting a bus carrying passengers travelling from Mandera to Nairobi. A rocket-propelled grenade hit the police vehicle escorting passages near Kotulo (Otisialo and Hajir, 2016). Another attack happened between Elwark and Wargadud killing six people. Madera attacks have heightened insecurity in the county (Adow, 2016a). Since the KDF crossed over and occupied Somalia, Al-Shabaab has changed some of their territories and occupied some parts of Mandera. Insecurity in the county has become somehow normal (Hansen et al., 2016).

Mandera’s security is wanting, it has fewer police posts which are at a far distance from each other. The attacks in Madera has seen some of the police posts with less than 40 police officers being closed. Many of the civil servants declined to go back to work in the north-eastern province which holds Mandera, Wajir and Garissa counties following the Mandera attacks. About 1000 teachers employed by the government in the north-eastern province refused to report to work in January 2015 due to uncertainty (Group, 2015) The attacks brought a boycott from the civil servants; due to al-Mujahidin’s nature of selecting Christians from Muslims.

4.8 Garissa attack; a repeated of Westgate
On the second of April, 2015, GUC in Garissa County close to the Kenya-Somalia border was under attack by yet another four al-Shabaab gunmen. The attack killed at least one hundred and forty-seven students, two security guards, one Regular Police Officer, One RECCE Company Officer, one RDU Officer and three KDF Officers. The attackers had AK-47 assault rifles and grenades, the attack killed 148 people with many of them being students from other parts of Kenya marking it as the deadliest attack in the country since the attack on the Embassy of the United States in 1998; The victims were kept hostage for a long time.(GoK, 2015c, UNSC, 2015).

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76 Interview with an employee working for Danish Dimining Group in Mandera and native of Mandera
77 Interview with and member of Danish Demining Group who is a resident in Mandera.
78 Garissa University College
79 Rapid Deployment Unit
The government named Mohamed Mohamud also known as ‘long arms’ or Gamadheere as the mastermind of the attack. There were claims that the attack has been masterminded in Dadaab refugee camp, this led the Deputy President to issue a repatriation of refugees from Dadaab within three months’ time. Al-Shabaab takes advantage of the refugee crisis in Kenya. The Mujahidin wins sympathisers who help to planning the attacks within the country. The refugee camp is ungovernable and over populated making it hard to differentiate a suspected militia and refugees, this is due to corruption within the camp and the police making it hard for people to give intelligent information to the police (GoK, 2015c).

Following the Garissa attack, the Somali community in Kenya came out in large numbers and condemned the attack including their leaders; however, post-attack saw the Kenyan government’s hard measures by freezing NGOs accounts with claims they had links with al-Shabaab. Hawala, the Somali money transfer agencies’ licences were withdrawn (Group, 2015). NGOs based in Mombasa, Haki Africa, and MUHURI were in the list of organization gazetted by the Kenyan government as being associated with terrorists and their bank accounts frozen. (GoK, 2015b, Owino-Wamari, 2015). Post-Garissa attack also saw the county Governor’s petitioning the President to allow them to strengthen security within the counties; the Governor referring to the constitutional framework. blamed the National government for sidelining them on taking part on security issues (Namunane, 2014).

Garissa attacks could have been avoided for numerous intelligence reports had been given to County Security Committees (CSC). The CSC intelligent team gave a report on a planned attack on both Garissa university and teachers college. The reports were given in March 2015 and on the 30th of March 2015 (GoK, 2015c, Pg. 17). Information on the possibility of the attack was also given to the national government but ignored (Warah, 2015); two days before the Garissa attack, President Uhuru Kenyatta told off the United Kingdom (UK) Foreign Secretary Philip Hammond. Uhuru told off Hammond for giving travel advisory to UK citizen. Hammond, based the information on the intelligence given two weeks before the attack (Mutambo, 2015). The Kenyan Government admitted their mistake in their slow response to the attack(Wanzala, 2015).The minister of interior Joseph Nkaissery acknowledged that there was intelligence on the possible attack of the university. This information it was ignored due limited coordination within the security response team (Guardian, 2015). Garissa attack saw the Police Elites RECCE team complaining about the lack of incentives from the government which could affect their moral (Cherono, 2015)
The day before the attack, information was given again on a possibility of the attack in a social institution. It was indicated that there were some despatched operative plans by one Abdimalik also known as Abdullahi Ibrahim. Abdullahi Ibrahim was later identified as one of the attackers. He was a student at the University of Nairobi. The security situation has been undermined by the antagonistic relation between the county and national government; corruption, limited cooperation between counties and/or national government. Clan completion gives an advantage to al-Shabaab to operate in the northeastern region. Despite the large geographical area of Garissa, the county has only one administration police and one police station (Group, 2015, UNSC, 2015).

The university college management and the CSC admitted that there were only two policemen in charge of the security in the university prior to the attack. The CSC and Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government were blamed by the parliamentary committee for not providing finances. The ministry was blamed for not providing the needed financial budget to the CSC. The CSC and the university management was blamed for the lack of a proper security survey. The border along Mandera county bordering from Elwak all the way to Bula Hawa is an easy go zone. Many Somalia citizens have entered Kenyan territory through Bula Hawa. Some immigrants have been given Kenyan identification due to corrupt government officials. The borders along Elwak in Somalia have also been used to transport weapons into Mandera. These weapons were used in the Garissa attack; Gedo region which is along Mandera borders was controlled by the Ethiopian soldiers but not active anymore in the region giving al-Shabaab an advantage to operate along this borders (GoK, 2015c).

4.9 El-Ade attacks
On the 15th of January 2016, al-Shabaab attacked the KDF camp in El-Ade80. The attack took place at 04:00hour, where al-Shabaab took control of the camp and killed Kenyan soldier while the Kenyan government denied saying it was propaganda and that the Somali army base was the one attacked. In a statement, the Kenyan army spokesman said: “the SNA81 camp was overrun and the KDF troops under AMISOM counter-attacked in support of SNA” (AlJazeera, 2016).

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80 A town situated in Gedo region in Southern Somalia, bordering Mandera county.  
81 Somali National Army.
Just a day after the attack, al-Mujahidin were on the international attention for their attack on the Kenyan military camp in El-Ade in Gedo region. Condemned by the SRCC\textsuperscript{82}, the UNSC\textsuperscript{83} and UN Secretary General, Ban Ki-moon, the El-Ade attack was said to portray the vile nature of al-Mujahidin and that international support was still necessary despite the already made effort to stop them. The Kenyan government confusion on the attack was evident when the KDF admitted that it was the Kenyan soldiers attacked. However giving a lesser number of the total soldiers killed, other sources exposed the KDF casualty; indicating the casualties were higher than what the Kenyan army was giving (Nation, 2016b).

The confused claims of the attack on SNA camp were confirmed by the Kenya Police Service spokesman Charles Owino. Al-Shabaab spokesman Abulaziz Abu Muscab, however, proclaimed several KDF were killed after a vehicle drove into their camp with explosives\textsuperscript{84}. The lie and denial by Kenyan army were documented further by the Kenyan media saying “KDF was fighting al-Shabaab after attacks on the SNA base” (Nation, 2016a). Despite the Kenyan government denial of the El-Ade, the locals exposed the frustrated KDF soldiers on social media.

The Chief of Defence Forces General Samson Mwathethe admitted six days after the attack. Mwathethe said that the number of the dead soldiers was not clear for some of the bodies were badly damaged. He added that the information of the attack came to Nairobi two hours after it happened because al-Shabaab had hit the KDF communication gadget at the camp. Due to the confrontation by the al-Shabaab, Mwathethe added that the rescue, support came three days later after the attack (Ombati, 2016a).

Some of the survivor soldiers escaped for their lives and walked 100 Kilometres towards Elwak on Kenya-Somalia borders despite prior intelligence given. They could not immediately get help. The El-Ade attack still got the KDF soldiers with a surprise. It indicated that the plans for the attack were assisted by the locals for it was planned days before. (Ombati, 2016b, Standard, 2016). Just like Westgate, Mpeketoni, and Garissa, El-Ade demonstrated Mujahidin’s capacity of waging war in Kenya; leading to more uncertainty. El-Ade saw some of KDF soldier running for their lives and hiding in local residence houses.

\textsuperscript{82}Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Communication.
\textsuperscript{83}United Nation Security Council.
\textsuperscript{84}Reported by K24 TV news on the 15\textsuperscript{th} January 2016.
KDF soldiers were exposed to al-Shabaab by the locals; these were due to the *gaidi mtaani* narrative.\(^{85}\)

The El-Ade attack can explain al-Shabaab’s strategy over the poor tactical response of KDF rescue team and an indication of the uncoordinated Kenyan security forces. It was later admitted by the Somalia President that the number of Kenyan soldiers killed in El-Ade by al-Shabaab was more than 180. Through the military spokesperson David Obonyo, KDF denied the claims while President Uhuru Kenyatta confirming that the Military should be given time to its job (Ombati, 2015, Agutu, 2016).

It is not yet clear up-to-date from the Kenyan government how many soldiers died in El-Ade. About 200 KDF soldiers widely reported to have been killed in the attack, El Ade marks the greatest casualties the Kenya army has ever encountered since the formation of the defence forces; El-Ade attacks indicated the strength and the tactical nature of al-Shabaab leading to their survival for about 30 years or more (McConnel, 2016).

The change of a first objective\(^{86}\) to a second objective\(^{87}\) was now costing the county not only resources but more lives. Internal political divide and a prove to the populace that their government was not serious when it comes to securing Kenya. This second objective is far from being achieved. Calling the al-Shabaab cowards, President Uhuru Kenyatta insisting that KDF will stay in Somalia to fulfil their mission and that Kenya will not be cowed (Mudavadi, 2016, PSCU, 2016b). The President changed his thoughts when EU\(^{88}\) which is one of the huge financial partnership under AMISOM said it will cut out some percentage of the funds by June 2016. The announcement came earlier in January to cut off 20 per cent of 20 million euros EU is giving every month to AMISOM soldiers. The soldiers get approximately 906 euros and the Kenyan government takes 176 euros per every Kenyan soldier for admission purposes leaving the soldiers with 730 euros (Mutambo, 2016). The claim of withdraws or not is due to the calculation of interest for the executive, and especially the National Security Council led by Uhuru Kenyatta has been slow on security reforms but rather project exercise power (Atta-Asamoah, 2015b).

The Al-Shabaab’s media propaganda played well in the El-Ade attacks. Ahmed Imam was seen in the video celebrating the success of the attack while promising more attacks.

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85 Interview with a security expert working for the United Nation Assistant Mission in Somalia and KDF soldiers at Kahawa Barack
86 creating a 100-kilometre buffer zone
87 occupation forces
88 European Union
Despite the widespread use of Al-Shabaab’s quick propaganda and pictures of a dead KDF soldier on social media, the Kenyan government reacted with anger, warning the populace that they will be arrested if they posted such information. The warning led to a number of Kenyan bloggers being arrested and questioned at the Criminal Investigative Department (CID) headquarters due to their posts on social media. One blogger, Yassin Juma, a famous Kenyan blogger, was arrested, detained, and grilled by the police. The arrests of these bloggers were widely aired on Kenyan media. The Interior Cabinet Secretary, Joseph Nkaissery, strongly blamed Yassin Juma for paying to the disadvantage of the government and putting the security organs at the expense of Al-Shabaab. The bloggers were later released after some of the minority party CORD members intervened and bailed the bloggers out. Their arrests were unconstitutional, and their court charges were dismissed.

This kind of unconstitutional arrests has been evidence due to the top Kenyan security organs exercising excessive powers and trying to undermine the constitution (Machuhi and Mukinda, 2012).

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89 A former member of CORD.
90 Kenyan Television Network (KTN) news on the 24th January 2016 at 21:00 hours.
92 Interview with one of the arrested bloggers; Eddy Illa, former political science student at the University of Nairobi.
CHAPTER V
5.0 GOVERNMENT’S MISCALCULATIONS AND REACTIONS; A CONTRIBUTION TO INSECURITY.

5.1 Introduction
The aim of the intervention was triggered by the tourist industry and the LAPSSET project. The industry and the project were affected due to al-Shabaab activities in Kenya leading to Kenya claiming self-defence. al-Shabaab kidnapped two KDF while on duty along Liboi-Wajir route in the northeastern Kenya (Migue et al., 2014, Group, 2012). On the 1st of October 2011, “Marie Dedieu, a disabled French woman was kidnapped from her house near Manda island, Lamu by a suspected al-Shabaab gunmen and she died while in assailants’ custody, two other female Spanish MSF aid workers from Dadaab refugees camp in Kenya were also kidnapped on the 13th of October 2011 and taken to Somalia” (GoK, 2013, Pg. 11).

The government tactics to fight insecurity has increased radicalization within the coastal and the northeastern region making it easier for al-Mujahidin to operate and win the support of the Kenyan youth. Since operation linda nchi Kenyan government has not done much to win the support of the Muslims community in Kenya but projected hard-liners against the community like the killings of about 20 Muslim leaders, including discriminating policies like usalama watch. These miscalculations and reactions from the Kenyan government have increased insecurity within the country (Botha, 2014b, Anderson and McKnight, 2015).

The Mujahidin strategies in Kenya has led the subjective application of the law by the policy makers. These strategies have brought a xenophobic reaction by the Kenyan government; operation usalama watch. The Kenyan policy makers have tried to apply parallel and contradicting laws. Nyumba Kumi is yet to be implemented while security laws amendment only bought more powers to the executive; a negative impact towards security (Atta-Asamoah, 2015b, Lind et al., 2015, HRW, 2015).

The claim of the tourism industry as an affected exchange earner has been further impacted negatively. The coastal Kenya being a tourist attraction, Mujahidin has impacted the area with sporadic attacks. The Kenyan government reacted heavily to these attacks by heightening the coastal region with more presence of security forces. This has led to extrajudicial killings of the Muslim clerics. The action-reaction from al-Mujahidin and the Kenyan government has lead to an increase of insecurity in Kenya (MUHURI and OSF, 2013).

93 Medecins Sans Frontieres
5.2 Miscalculated internal threats
At the center of the failures of the Kenyan authorities in charge of national security are cases of corruption involving security officer. Many of them are paid by terrorists to ignore red flags with regards to immigration issues, transporting of weapons, and money laundering to support extremists’ activities. These are all issues and considerations that should have been brought before the intervention into Somalia (Whittaker, 2014).

The big percentage of Kenyans recruited to al-Shabaab is advantaged by the corruption within the Kenya. The graft is a huge problem in Kenya which leads to insecurity. The Kenyan government immigration officers are being bribed to allow foreigners to get Kenyan identification like passport and identity cards; this gives and advantage to groups such as extremists operate easily within the country (GoK, 2013). Corruption level index went up between 2012 and 2015. The ministry of the interior being one of the most corrupt government institutions. The ministry’s departments such as the KPS and Immigration departments leading in corruption (Karanja, 2016). Al-Shabaab has always taken advantage of the corrupt Kenya police to operate inside Kenya. The corruption is evidence in the North-eastern Kenya; leading to al-Shabaab having semi territories within Kenya(Hansen et al., 2016).

Corruption in the Kenyan military is also evidence since operation linda nchi mission reached port Kismayu in Somalia. KDF quickly pushed Al-Shabaab from their financial city of Kismayo in 2012, the city remains al-Mujahidin financial stronghold (Hansen, 2014). The Charcoal and Sugar business still remained key financial port of Al-Shabaab. Key figures in the Kenya’s Immigration Department and the Ministry of Defence enjoys protection and cooperation of parliament and executive. The two arms of government are also involved in the smuggling racket. KDF takes US Dollars 50 million per years; the illegal charcoal business cashed US Dollars 360-384 million, the profit of this business both benefits al-Shabaab and KDF including other stakeholders (Mccormick, 2015). The KDF trade and corruption has been warned by UNSC. The UN monitoring group reported that when security council could not ban the charcoal trade. Ahmed Madobe’s Ras Kamboni forces and KDF started exporting charcoal from Kismayo port. When al-Shabaab lost Kismayo, Madobe's Ras Kamboni militia and KDF took over. However, al-Shabaab is still benefiting from the

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94 Kenya Police Service
charcoal business (Charbonneau, 2013). Kenyan foreign policy, therefore, is a way of sending corruption abroad.95

According to the Kenyan Government Report (2013), the country has the biggest refugee camp in the world, the conflict in Somalia and the humanitarian crisis is an issue which Kenya cannot avoid for the two countries share the biggest border. Dadaab refugee camp alone which is located in Northeastern part of Kenya, Garissa county has about 474, 000 refugees; the year 2012 in a timeline of eight months recorded more that 5700 new refugees. The increase of refugee crisis is due to the gap between policy formulation and conduct. Kenya and Somalia share the border along southern Somalia Jubaland region. The increase in the numbers of these refugees has brought a challenge of security in Kenya. Some of them are members of the al-Shabaab group. Such group easily find their way to the camps due to corruption within the immigration department and porous borders. The border is a free travel zone. People in the East African region travel into Somalia through Kenya and back. This builds great infrastructure for recruitment, communication, and fundraising among the Somalia populace in Nairobi, Mombasa, and Northeastern province. “The number of refugees seeking asylum in Kenya is estimated to be 630,000” (GoK, 2013, Pg.17).

Apart from the porous borders and corruption, what makes the refugee crisis a bigger challenge is the transnationality; there are difficulties in identification of Somali community in Kenya and the Kenyan-Somali (Atta-Asamoah, 2015a).

The entire region of East Africa and in particular Kenya faces a challenge of SALW96 being profiled in the country. These SALWs are posing a risk of insecurity for one can buy a weapon through the black market in Kenya. These weapons are easily attractive due to “Inter-community violence brought by organised crime, piracy, terrorism activities, drug trafficking, urban robbery, and environmental crime” (GoK, 2013, Pg. 15)

5.3 Al-Shabaab radicalization in Kenya.
It is evidence that Kenyan populace and especially the youth in Kenya are being indoctrinated to extremism, this serves the interest of al-Mujahideen. Prior to operation linda nchi there were concerns raised about Kenyan youth being recruited and sent to Somalia but the Grand Coalition government gave it a blind eye (Messo, 2015). The Kenyan youth being indoctrinated to carry out violent extremism is evidence in the al-Shabaab attacks carried out in Kenya. A safe haven is offered by the al-Mujahideen in Somalia. The extremists are given

95 Interview with a leader at Info Action Kenya.
96 Small Arm and Light Weapons
opportunities and training to fight what both the radicalised youth and al-Shabaab term as a ‘common enemy’ (GoK, 2013).

The Kenyan government admitted that radicalization is indeed a serious issue in Kenya which must be dealt with. However, there is a concentration and loyalty to identity than to the issues and ideas. Kenya’s politic has always been characterised by ethnicity and class (Oyugi, 1994). This trend of ethnic consciousness is still evidence today. Most of and big political parties are formed out of the largest tribes; the parties then coalesce in the ethnic block to grab power and once they climb to the executive powers, “the winner take it all” (Wrong, 2010). The trend of ethnicity forms the basis of marginalization of the losers and the loss of national unity.

Al-Shabaab has over the years taken advantage of the political divide in Kenya. The coastal locals, the majority being Muslims feel sidelined by the government over the national resource allocations. The ethnic politics in Kenya has always raised tensions and threats. The Mujahidin has only contributed to the tension and threat (Botha, 2014b, Mwakimako and Willis, 2014).

The politics of favouritism has attracted al-Shabaab propaganda in the coastal Kenya and northeastern. Al-Shabaab uses the land grievances, police brutality against the people and extrajudicial killings to create ‘two tribes’. The Mujahidin use Islam to in selecting the North-eastern and Coastal Kenya against the other populace whom they term as Christians. The ‘Christian elites’ have been dominating the government in decision-making. This creates the ‘we against them’ hence, tension, violence, and extremism within the country (Hansen et al., 2016).

The recruited individuals who went to al-Shabaab identified the Kenyan government as an enemy and apart from individuals being recruited by friends, religion serves as individual’s collective identity, therefore, leads to radicalization as compared with political, economic, personal, and ethnic identity. The majority of Kenyan Muslims are Sunni who are not conservative in the Islam school of thoughts (Mwakimako and Willis, 2014). Al-Shabaab identifies from a Shura and Salafism school of thought; the latter is much conservative (Hansen, 2013). However, radicalization in Kenya started with individuals who identify with

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97 Speech by Rachael Omomo the Cabinet Secretary of Defence Recorded by The Star Kenya in March 2016. https://soundcloud.com/starvoices
98 Interview with prof. Winnie Mitula, The director and lecture at institute of Development Studies (IDS) at the University of Nairobi.
a Salafists school of thought in particular mosques and this attracted al-Shabaab recruitment from the Kenyan populace. This, therefore, points that radicalization can involve both internal and external influences (Botha, 2014a, Mwakimako and Willis, 2014).

Identifying that not all the Salafists support extremism, the al-Shabaab Salafists have highly influenced some segments in Kenya. The influence has been especially impacted the youth due to the money factor. The Mujahidin provide the youth with incentives which the old Sheikhs cannot provide (Maclean et al., 2012). The division in Majengo Riyadh Mosque in Pumwani\(^\text{99}\) can be identified as the Shafi and the Salafi. The old Sheikhs still maintain the Sunni’s Shafi’i school of thought which practices moderate Islam. The young stars led by one named Ahmed Iman Ali, a student of Sheikh Aboud Rogo who was a radical cleric; heightened the Salafism school of thought. Some of the old Sheikhs were then forced to separate from Riyadh mosque to form small mosques around Majengo Slums in Nairobi\(^\text{100}\).

Radicalization, therefore, is opportunistic in nature and driven by antagonism of distinct ideologies which creates collective identity; it takes advantage of situations like corruption and marginalization\(^\text{101}\)

Al-Shabaab has used the politics of identity in Kenyan to win the hearts and minds of the Muslims. Mujahidin points the ‘Christian dominated’ and corrupt government. Despite Najib Balala\(^\text{102}\) a Muslim coming into top leadership of the government. Kenya has been dominated by Christian leadership at all arm of government making it easier to sell the religious discrimination\(^\text{103}\). As per the latest census, the population of 2009, Muslims in Kenya added up to eleven percent which numbers to 4,304,798 out of the total population of 38,412,088. This population is concentrated in the northeastern, Coast province and some towns in the urban centers like Eastleigh suburb in Nairobi with some small numbers in Christian dominated areas across the country (Botha, 2014b, KNBS, 2010).

Despite these numbers, Muslims in Kenya have been disadvantaged politically to influence government policy processes. The government is highly centralized in Nairobi and dominated by Christians (Botha, 2014b, Oluoch, 2009). Marginalization of certain segments of the Kenyan community leads to an easy rhetoric of Islamism; this is contributed by oppression,

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\(^{99}\) Pumwani district is located in Nairobi Eastland near Eastleigh suburbs.

\(^{100}\) Interview with some of the old Sheikhs in Majengo, Nairobi who were chased out of Riyadha Mosque by the new school of thought.

\(^{101}\) Interview with Sheikh Ibrahim Lethome a Lawyer and religious scholar.

\(^{102}\) The minister of Tourism former member of ODM party.

\(^{103}\) Interview with Professor Hassan Mwakimako, an associate Professor in Islamic Studies at Pwani University.
weak institutions, and corruption within the Kenyan government; with rampant poverty and the perception of the West being against Islam (Gatsiounis, 2013). This, therefore, leads to consciousness which al-Shabaab uses on their propaganda to recruit in Kenya.\footnote{104 Interview with Haki Africa Executive director Hissein Khalid and SUPKEM deputy secretary general Hassan Ol Naado.}

Noting ethnicity in Kenya, the major differences of the Muslims in Kenya are the Kenya-Somali Muslims and Coastal Muslims. However, these communities are further divided into moderates and radicals but grievances and the subjectivity of the Muslim community in Kenya have created a collective identity despite the different segments. Prior to operation, Linda nchi, investigations show that Al-Shabaab had a great network in Kenya linking different Kenyan nationals to their network operations (Mwakimako and Willis, 2014, 9-14).

The UNSC (2011) Al-Mujahidin had built networks of jihadist groups in northeastern Kenya confining their links to the ethnic Somalis. However, the network focus of the ethnic Somali expanded to other non-Somalia which dominated the al-Shabaab group. The MYC\footnote{Muslim Youth Centre} established in the year 2008, operated actively in Kenya as al-Shabaab indigenous group. A number of Kenyan nationals are believed to have gone to Somalia for training and return to al-Shabaab operations with some just taking operational duties like human smuggling and aiding al-Shabaab travelers in Kenya. Mohamed Ali Mohamed, Hussein Hassan Agade, Christopher Magondu, Ahmed Iman Ali, Sylvester Opiyo Osodo (known as Musa), Juma Ayub Otit Were (a taxi driver), Mohamed Juma Rajab (also known as Qa’Qa’), Ramadan Osao ‘Captain’, Wahome Tajir Ali, ‘Abu Jafar’.

Some radical clerics were already having links with al-Shabaab and using the international fund to radicalise a segment of the Kenyan populace. Sheikh Aboud Rogo had links with Al-Qaeda. He openly advocated for al-Qaeda and was suspected to have links with al-Shabaab. MYC was established by Rogo’s Student Ahmed Iman Ali. When Iman later moved to Somalia, Sylvester Opiyo Osodo also a Kenyan, took over and arranged meetings for Sheikh Aboud Rogo to give lectures at MYC. The taxi driver, Juma Ayub Otit Were, organised human smuggling to aid al-Shabaab travels in different hotels like the Royal Hotel in Eastleigh. Aboud Rogo, made travels to Somalia where he was hosted by al-Shabaab (UNSC, 2011).
Kenyan government ought to have made calculations before operation *linda nchi*. al-Shabaab recruitments within the country are evident. For al-Shabaab, operation *linda nchi* only meant losing some territory in Somalia and gaining some in Kenya; a loose some win some game. The year 2013, about 10 percent of 6000 al-Shabaab members were Kenyans (Hansen, 2013). Unknown Kenyan man fighting for al-Shabaab was reported by KDF to have been stoned to death by al-Shabaab in Kismayo on the 10th of January 2012. He was discovered to be coordinating with KDF. Elgiva Bwire a Kenyan was also identified and jailed (Leftie, 2012). Bwire was jailed for life when he confessed in October 2011 that he had carried two grenade attacks in Nairobi (HRW, 2015). The names of these individuals indicate the Nationwide recruitment by al-Shabaab. Kenyan ethnic communities have a system of naming people especially their last name.106

The evidence of al-Shabaab network in Kenya came clearer when they named Ahmed Iman Ali as their lead coordinator in Kenya. Ahmed Iman Ali, a trained engineer from JKUAT;107 a university in Kenya was the founder of MYC in Riyadh mosque in Majengo Pumwani district in Nairobi County. He went to Somalia way before operation *linda nchi* and recruited between 200 to 500 Kenyan to join al-Shabaab in the year 2011. The recruitment earned him leadership position within the al-Shabaab bureaucracy. The big recruitment also saw some other Kenyan elements like Wahome Tajir Ali and Ikrima Mohammed also rising into Al-Shabaab bureaucratic leadership. The al-Mujahidin recruited across Kenya. The recruitment was covered by the Kenyan media; more so, the recruitment was evident when al-Shabaab propaganda was seen in a Kenyan national language, Swahili. (UNSC, 2011, Hansen, 2013, Mohamed, 2016). Ahmed Ali Iman started encouraging MYC members to attack Kenyan institutions and he also urged Kenyan Muslims to stop engaging in national politics speaking in Swahili he urged them to “*Chinja* (cut), *Chonga* (peel) and *Fiyeka* (slash) the throats of the Kenyan; infidels and to hit back, cause blasts [in Kenya] similar to the Kampala bombings”(UNSC, 2011, Pg. 145).

Apart from recruitment, al-Shabaab received financial support from earnings of PRMC.108 The committee taxed land revenue they own and their businesses in Gikomba market109 in Majengo. Previously before operation *linda nchi*, PRMC also received donations of 500,000 and 200,000 Kenya Shillings (KES) from two members of parliament Amina Abdalla and

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106Interview with an anthropologist at the University of Nairobi.
107Jomo Kenyatta University of Agriculture and Technology
108Pumwani Riyadh Mosque Committee
109The largest open air market where second hand clothes are sold.
Najib Balala respectively. The two members of parliament denied allegations of being associated with PRMC, MYC or Al-Shabaab but admitted to supporting the construction of the Riyadha mosque; some of these monies were used by PRMC to aid MYC operations in Somalia. However, the MPs might not have been aware of the use of their donation (UNSC, 2011).

Politicians in Kenya fund different youth groups and vigilantes blindly for political support leading to insecurity in Kenya\textsuperscript{110}. The visibility of Al-Shabaab networks in Kenya came clearer when al-Mujahidin announced the union with MYC. The centre then changed its name to Al-Hijra in 2012. Al-Hijra cooperated with al-Shabaab through financial support, building cells/networks and planning attacks in Kenya (UNSC, 2012).

**5.4 Extrajudicial killing of high-profile Muslim clerics.**

The killings of radical Muslim clerics have created tension and perception of Muslims in Kenya being threatened by the Kenyan Government. This leads to justification of \textit{linda nchi} as a threat to Islam (Star, 2014). The Kenyan police have been suspected of executing Muslim clerics. A Muslim cleric by the name Shamir Hashim Khan was found dead in Tzavo National Park in April 2012. Khan lawyer who happened to be Sheikh Aboud Rogo’s lawyer claimed the police pulled Khan and his colleague Mohammed Bekhit Kassim. Khan’s body was later found badly injured. His friend Kassim’s situation being unclear. While going to the OCPD\textsuperscript{111} to demand why there was a delay of investigation of Khan and Kassim disappearance; an angry Muslim youth roughed up the police officer in command of Mombasa, OCPD Kipkemboi Rop. After a confusion of Kipkemboi blocking youth on the road (Kiarie, 2012, MUHURI and OSF, 2013). The OCPD was later saved by Omar Hassan and Khalid Hussein who are now the Mombasa Senator and executive director of HAKI Africa\textsuperscript{112} respectively\textsuperscript{113}.

Apart from Khan and Kassim, Sheikh Aboud Rogo was banned from traveling by the UNSC. He was associated with al-Qaeda cells in east Africa and funding MYC alias al-Hijra. He was killed close to Bamburi Police Station in Mombasa on August 2012 in his car while with his wife and children. The wife explained how perfect the target was. The sound of the gun seemed of an advanced gun (MUHURI and OSF, 2013, Nation, 2012b).

Before Rogo’s death together with his counterpart Abubakar Sharif Ahmed, the two had been hunted by unknown suspected policemen. After Rogo’s death, a task force formed to

\begin{footnotes}
\item[110] Interview with youths 5 Majengo, 3 Eastleigh and 6 Mathare
\item[111] Officer in Command of Police District
\item[112] HAKI means justice or human right
\item[113] Interview with the Mombasa Senator and Khalid Hussein the Haki Africa Executive Director.
\end{footnotes}
investigate his death found no link of his killers (Nation, 2013b). Arrested after Rogo’s death, Abubakar Shariff claimed Al-Shabaab should be left alone to rule their country Somalia and the West including Israel were supporting the Kenyan governments ‘hit squads’ to target Muslims in Kenya; The death lead to MYC/Al-Hijra calling for a revenge (Gatsiounis, 2013). The formed task force by the Kenyan government public prosecution office consisted LSK, The Commission on Administrative Justice, KCHR, IPOA and the representatives from the public prosecution office; the task force was frustrated by government leading to the resignation of LSK from the assignment (MUHURI and OSF, 2013).

With a number of leading evident, the government was not willing to carry out investigations. However, claiming they rely on eye witnesses who feared the police killer squad. The Killing of Aboud Rogo and other Sheikhs was evidence enough of police using force and killing Muslim clerics. Before Rogo’s killing, he had reported to the police threatening him. His death brought a riot in Mombasa leaving three churches burnt, looting of business, terrorizing of residence, five police and one civilian killed, cars burnt and civilian slashed to death (MUHURI and OSF, 2013, Nation, 2012b).

Around November 2012, the ATPU detention operations were evidence. “The unit beat most of those detained at the point of capture and during questioning; threatened them with violence; took them to various police stations, and denied medical treatment to those who needed it. In many instances, the beatings, which were at times administered to extract information, amounted to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment” (MUHURI and OSF, 2013, Pg. 26). The ATPU hunted Rogo’s 17 year old son and arrested him after a raid and beating people in a wedding of Rogo’s daughter (Kitimo, 2012).

The Police are the biggest threat to the right of life in Kenya. About 1873 Kenyan citizens lost their life in police gun-related violence in Mombasa alone. A total of 3060 people killed in insecurity related cases; 1894 being extrajudicial Killings, 241 cases being terror attacks between 2010 and 2014. The ATPU has committed a number of killings in Mombasa targeting Muslim clerics with no justice realized in court (KNCHR, 2014).

The ATPU is part of the NPS, funded by the United States and the United Kingdom. It is established to “Prevent, detect, disrupt and interdict imminent terrorist activities within the

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114 United States and Britain
115 Law society of Kenya
116 Kenya Commission on Human Rights
117 Independent Policing Oversight Authority
118 Investigation by KTN program Jicho Pevu (Eye witness) on 14th January 2014.
119 Interview with Karuri Abdulahi Mwangi, the Pumwani Riyadh mosque secretary who later disappeared in the month of July 2016; Abdulahi was suspected to be arrested by ATPU.
country; exhaustively investigate all terrorism and terrorism-related cases; take control, secure, and cordon all scenes of terrorist incidents; create profiles for suspected terrorists and establish a databank; share intelligence with other security-related agencies operating within the country; and review and monitor security of foreign missions accredited to Kenya.” (MUHURI and OSF, 2013, Pg. 17).

It has a clandestine nature, the ATPU operates from a powerful central command. It gets directives from the office of the President and has its operative offices in the major cities like Nairobi and Mombasa including northeastern province. It is has been given freedom of operation and never held accountable by either the Judiciary or the executive (Gisesa, 2013, MUHURI and OSF, 2013). There is much tension in Majengo and Eastleigh suburbs of Nairobi. The presence of ATPU is evident in these suburbs; causing tension among residence.

Just like other provinces, the coastal region, though being a predominantly Muslim society have been marginalized from the national resource and the landlessness among the populace injected historical grievances. The CoK (2010) bought devolution which projects the distribution of functions, duties and resource allocation to the counties. This, however, has seen a slow move with the government trying to slow down devolution and projecting centralization. This slow realization of devolution created the re-birth of a secessionists political organization MRC claiming Pwani si Kenya (MUHURI and OSF, 2013, Mwakimako and Willis, 2014).

The general elections of 2013 saw the MRC asking the coastal populace to boycott the general election. This political temperature in the coast worked as an advantage to al-Mujahidin. The boycott of the election was also proclaimed by the al-Mujahidin leadership Ahmed Iman Ali. Such boycott claims from both MRC and the Al-Shabaab creates confusion among the policy makers to tag both groups as terrorists/radicals (Botha, 2014b).

Post-Westgate saw the Kenyan government reaction to terror attacks. The government arrested about 40 suspects including students of a school in Pumwani area in Nairobi (Ombati, 2013). The reaction also brought the continuation of sporadic killings of the Muslim clerics. Sheikh Ibrahim Umar also Known as ‘Rogo’ a cleric at the Musa mosque in Majengo Mombasa together with other two were shot dead after giving lectures in the mosque. Rogo was killed together with Omar Abu Rumeisa, Issa Abdalla, and his brother-in-law Gaddafi.  

120 Interview with 2 Imams from Majeno, 1 from Eastleigh and 1 youth Group from in Majengo.
121 Mombasa Republican Council
122 The Coast is not part of Kenya.
Mohamed while Salim Aboud escaping death by pretending to be dead. The killing happened in the same spot and manner of Sheikh Aboud Rogo’s death. It led to thousands of youth protesting in Mombasa and burning a Christian Salvation Army Worship Centre near Musa mosque. The protest put transport into a halt, school operations paralyzed, leaving several injured and about 4 died (Bocha, 2013) The Westgate attack brought warnings of unreasoned response towards terrorism by the Kenya government (Kegoro, 2013a).

An individual named Swale Abdullah Said, was arrested by the ATPU, beaten, tortured and his house raided before arraigned to court; with Swale complains to beaten by the police and his health, the Court refused to bail him after the police investigation told the court that Swale was a ‘national security threat’ (MUHURI and OSF, 2013).

Another controversial cleric was shot dead on the Kenyan coast. Sheikh Abubakar Sharif, (Also Known As) Makaburi was shot by unknown suspected policemen. Makaburi predicted his death claiming the police wing ATPU was going to kill him. He openly claimed the right of Al-Shabaab protecting their country from evil corrupt foreigners. Makaburi was Sheikh Aboud Rogo’s ally. Just like Rogo, Makaburi was also blacklisted by the UNSC and put on the watch list. The Kenya Deputy President talked tough after Makaburi’s death. William Ruto said the government will deal with the extremists decisively. The death of Makaburi brought tension in the Kenyan coast; the same way there was tension during Aboud Rogo’s death (Star, 2014).

More of this mistreatment and hardline strategies from the ATPU have been tactics of getting information from suspects. The unlawful killings and disappearance mostly started 5 months after the beginning of operation linda nchi. The Police have also confirmed the ATPU killings of suspects in the Kenyan coast. After being picked by ATPU, Titus Nabiswa led the police unit to Omar Faraj. Both Nabiswa and Faraj were shot in the head and died in October 2012. Kassim Omollo and Salim Mohammed Nero alias Suleiman Shauri were killed on the same day on June 17th, 2013 (MUHURI and OSF, 2013).

These killings increased the antagonistic relationship between the community and the Kenyan security forces; for the past indicated that the citizens do not trust the police “due to accusations of impunity, excessive use of force and brutality, disregard for human rights, abuse of due process and malignant corruption” (Ndungu, 2011).

Between the year 2011 and 2014 alone, there have been cases of police torturing citizens in line with law enforcement and security. This is due to victims and suspects forced to confess

123 Available at <http://interactive.aljazeera.com/aje/KenyaDeathSquads/>
124 Interview with a Mombasa resident.
or give information, intimidated and force to give bribe. Since operation *linda nchi* a lot of human rights abuse related cases have been committed by the police and security personnel (IMLU, 2014). About 562 cases with most of them involving the police torture have been reported. These are:—

“278 beatings, 123 fatal shooting, 76 shooting, 33 arbitrary arrests, 11 psychological torture, 8 burnings, 8 sexual violations like rape, sodomy, indecent assault, 8 deaths as a result of beating, 6 cuttings and stabbings, 5 enforced disappearances, 2 suffocations, 2 deaths in custody, 1 drowning and 1 sleep deprivation “(ibid).

Between the year 2014 and 2015, a number of 61 cases of extrajudicial killings have been reported. A combination of other reports totaling the number to be 126 victims in 2015 alone (IMLU, 2015).

The ATPU justification and motivation for these extrajudicial killings are; the difficulties of getting evidence and information in order to prosecute terror suspects. The witnesses or informers fear for their security due to the threats and ethnic closeness (MUHURI and OSF, 2013). The disjuncture and mistrust between the police and the community make it difficult to get intelligence information from the public. This is due to corruption within the police leading to a leakage of the informers. Those arrested find their way back to the community if they happen to bribe the police. About 60 percent of the court cases related to terror suspects does not meet the required evidentiary threshold (KNCHR, 2014).

It is also important to understand that Kenyan judiciary system is responsible for some of the failures of the investigation. This is due to high-level corruption within the Judiciary and the department of Public Prosecution (Mutambo and Zadok, 2016). Despite evidence of investigation on extrajudicial killings, some victims claiming for their lives being in danger and are being targeted by the police. The government through the police spokesman Charles Owino denied such allegations while claiming their commitment to counter-terror. Owino blamed the killings on individual policemen, however, there are no cases of such policemen charged in court.

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125 Interview with a woman from women group in Majengo and two youth from youth organization in Majengo, Nairobi.


127 Citizen TV program: ‘Police gone Rogue’ on the 4th July 2016; interviewing Police spokesman Charles Owino and Irungu Houghton the director of Society for International Development.
The extrajudicial killings of Muslim clerics, torture, mistreatment of worship places, executions, ethnic discriminations and other human rights abuse contribute heavily to radicalization in Kenya. These lead to a certain community and faith dominating the coastal Kenya and North-eastern province getting more involved in joining al-Mujahidin in Somalia. This “push factor” of counterterrorism plays a big role in the radicalization of individuals. The factor leads to a strategy of shooting self into the feet. It is important to understand that the young people recruited to al-Shabaab do not trust the government. Some of them obey their religion more than the state. These individuals see the government as an enemy, thus an advantage to al-Mujahidin. Hardline counter-radicalization strategies only attract more to join al-Shabaab (Botha, 2014a).

The limitation of local communities’ involvement in security, fake promises to the public and uncoordinated government security initiation; lead to the mistrust between the populace and government. Unemployment and poverty are also a contribution to youth radicalization in Kenya. However, the unemployment and poverty are not the only factors leading to radicalization. Individuals joining extremism are highly motivated by ideologies and not necessarily the economic factor. Most of the radicalize individuals in Kenya are influenced by radicals into the religion. Some of them being indoctrinated that their religion is subjected by the state (Botha, 2014a, Botha, 2014b).

Despite the Kenyan government offering amnesty for the returnees; al-Shabaab defectors fear to confess. They fear to work with the government due to mistrust of the Kenyan police. Some of the returnees disappear with no trace even after being given amnesty by the government. This makes them have both Kenya government and al-Shabaab as an enemy.

5.4 Policing the police; hard-line strategy despite constitutional framework on community policing

The philosophy of policing is wanting in Kenya. The police which is one actor in community policing has an antagonistic relationship with the other actor which is the citizens. This brings a gap in security response. Chapter 14 part 4 of the CoK (2010) restructured the KPF to a KPS. The service is supposed to comply with the human rights standards and fundamental freedom, adopt and build relationships with the society, promote accountability.
and transparency in order to prevent corruption. According to the 5th schedule of CoK (2010), the command of the NPS\(^{133}\) came in action after a period of two years after the promulgation of CoK in the year 2010. Legislative efforts have been made to promote security, build safety and the relationship between the police and the citizen. 2011 brought effort in legislations which came up with new security laws. The acts of parliaments like National Police Service, The Independent Police Service, National Intelligence, and National Police Service Commission are evident. However, the implementation of the law has been a challenge due to lack of political will from the executive\(^{134}\).

The NPS is mandated to operate by the National police service Act 2011 and the National Police Commission Act 2011. The police service is divided into the Kenya Police Service KPS, the APS\(^{135}\) and the DCI\(^{136}\) (GoK, 2016). The APS and the KPS, however, has parallel functions when it comes to community policing framework projected by the National Police Act 2011\(^{137}\). These parallel function of community policing becomes a challenge due to the uncoordinated APS and KPS. despite the fact that both services are coordinated by the NPS, the APS is a service under the county commissioners who are also under the presidency while the KPS should be an independent service\(^{138}\).

Despite all these constitutional frameworks on security reforms, the police have continued with its antagonistic character towards the citizen. what has changed is the citizens who are aware of their fundamental rights but the police have remained the same\(^{139}\). The antagonistic relationship between the police and the community is due to limitations. These are technical equipment, skills, attitude and knowledge required by the NPS to implement their function effectively (KNCHR, 2014).

The police professionalism is undermined by the slow political will to allow reforms. The service faces different challenges; these are, poor recruitment strategies, poor working conditions, and terms of references, nepotism, corruption, limited police service due to citizen-police ratio, poor housing and salary of the police (Ransley, 2009). The challenges are the driver of insecurity. The challenges work to the advantage of the al-Shabaab to operate in Kenya (Atta-Asamoah, 2015a).

\(^{133}\) National Police Service
\(^{134}\) Interview with Amos Wako, the Senator of Busia and former attorney general.
\(^{135}\) Administrative Police Service
\(^{136}\) Directorate Criminal Investigation
\(^{137}\) See Nyumba Kumi initiative below in this chapter.
\(^{138}\) Interview with Administration Police in Majengo, A chief in Mathare and a Kenya policeman.
\(^{139}\) Interview with George Kegoro the director of Kenyan Human Rights Commission.
The corruption culture within the security sector in Kenya has made it difficult to enforce law and order. Some police officers are cooperating with the 46 militia groups. These groups include Mujahidin members in Eastleigh and northeastern Kenya. The officers are dealing with human trafficking, marine time piracy, illegal arms trafficking and violence. Some of the illegal immigrants have bribed their way into Kenya by facilitating small money to the immigration and security personnel (KNCHR, 2014). In his speech, president Uhuru Kenyatta admitted that corruption was a threat to National security (PSCU, 2015).

5.6 Nyumba Kumi initiative; a parallel law to the constitutional framework.
Post-Westgate attack saw the government of Kenya coming up with a neighbourhood watch initiative. The initiative, Nyumba Kumi is a form of community policing at the lowest level being the household. It drew about 210,400 clusters of which were mapped in 2015. Nyimba Kumi is a genetic cluster of security; the initiative is meant to strengthen community policing at the household level (GoK, 2015a, Atta-Asamoah, 2015b). Mandera, Wajir, and Garissa counties have been a great challenge to realize the initiative due to insecurity challenges.

Nyumba Kumi was created to enhance article 244 (e) of the CoK (2010). It is, however, a parallel initiative to the CPA as provided in part 6 of the NPS Act 2011. The Act of parliament gives the governors and their county committee a mandate on county security. Part 9 of the same Act project role, structure, function, and procedural matters in community policing forum. The projection is on building a co-operation, partnership, promoting communication and improve transparency between the citizens and police. The projections will then give the citizens a chance to participate in community policing. The same Act of parliament gives the counties mandate to help the national government and article 189 (2) emphasis on cooperation between the county and national level of government.

It is important to note that, national security has been assigned to the national government, this architecture is in article 239, 243 191 C part 1 of the CoK (2010). According to the architecture, the key principle of national security is to protect against internal and external threats, Kenyan people, their property, peace, integrity and their rights. At the national level security is managed by the National Security Council which is chaired by the president. All security organs are subordinate to civilian authority; this means all security organs at county level should be subordinate to civilian authority or the governor at the county level. The NPS Act 2011, modifies power by creating the county policing authority. It is a forum that brings

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140 Interview with an employee of Danish Diminishing Group and a Police reserved from Madera.
141 County Policing Authority
together stakeholders at the county level to discuss security issues at the county level and forwards them to CSC\textsuperscript{142} of experts. The debate between the county and national government managing security is both constitutional and operational; the CPA is a legal form of community policing which indicates that the police should police \textbf{with} the community and not police the community. The agenda of policing is made by the community and the police are supposed to implement the agenda.\textsuperscript{143} However, the reverse is true.

Article 126 of the NPS Act of 2011 give the cabinet secretary of internal security responsibility to provide guidelines, facilitating the public involvement and receiving regular reports from county policing authority. The former Cabinet Secretary for Interior and Coordination of National Government, Joseph Ole Lenku, speech on the 7\textsuperscript{th} of October 2013 referring to the community system in Tanzania introduced the concept \textit{Nyuma Kumi} as a community policing system in Kenya. Ole Lenku undermined the constitutional role of gubernatorial offices in county security\textsuperscript{144}. This speech projected centralization of power. Ole Lenku created a parallel structure of community policing led by the county commissioners. He said;

\begin{quote}
In this regard, the Government has directed that the concept of “Nyumba Kumi” be integrated into community policing to ensure that the current system of villages under a village elder is restructured into “Nyumba Kumi” (ten household units) with a clear leadership structure that will be responsible for the security of the concerned households. As Regional Coordinators and County Commissioners, you should urgently mobilize and sensitize your grass root staff to immediately embark on the implementation of “Nyumba Kumi” concept as a strategy to enhance security in your respective jurisdictions in the phase of the emerging and traditional security challenges”\textsuperscript{145}
\end{quote}

According to President Uhuru Kenyatta, \textit{Nyumba Kumi} philosophy is meant to bring a collaboration between the citizens and the government security in order to strengthen detect threats and enhance intelligent gathering. by owning security citizen is supposed to track threats within their neighbourhood and give information to the security authorities (Atta-
Asamoah, 2015b). This, however, is not possible due to mistrust between the police and the community. Nyumba Kumi’s failure is also due to the public mistrust and suspicion towards the police despite the efforts. Nyumba Kumi is centralized from the office of the president. It gives power to the APS body which is under the presidency. In Counties such as Lamu, Nyumba Kumi has totally failed while nationwide the police have recorded 72490 crime cases (Mukinda, 2016); in comparison to 69736 cases in 2014 (KPS, 2014).

The challenge in the philosophy of community policing is the lack of political will, the executive wing of government controls some functions which should be coordinated by both national and county governments bringing a challenge to security in Kenya. On its infancy stage Nyumba Kumi met a big opposition from the minority party CORD coalition; terming the initiative unconstitutional. The opposition was condemned by one of CORD member, Joseph Nkaissery who is now the Cabinet for interior and national coordination (Githaiga, 2013). The initiative only projected the interest of the executive with less impact on its mandate to gather intelligence.

In the Northeastern province, the police have abused human rights by torturing, using excessive force, raiding people’s houses, subjective detention mistreating those who are detained and even some disappearing without a trace. These abuses are an indication of violation of the law and human rights. The abuse creates distance between Kenya’s security forces and communities (MUHURI and OSF, 2013, HRW, 2015). The use of force reaction by the Kenyan government on counterterrorism is a sign of reacting to a mosquito bite with a hammer and abusing prayer places has made it easy for the al-Mujahidin to win the Muslim populace and especially the youth in Kenya.

5.7 Usamala watch; a social construction against the Somali community and the Islam faith.

Just like president George Bush subjected the Muslims community on GWoT (Oluoch, 2009) and the first Kenyan President Kenyatta subjecting the Kenyan-Somalis in northeastern Kenya (Oyugi, 1994); President Uhuru Kenyatta declared a xenophobic act on the Kenyan-Somali community and Muslim community. On the 2nd day of April 2014, Kenyan government came up with a xenophobic operation, profiling the Somalia community and labelling them terrorists. About 4000 people from the Somali origin and belonging to the

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146 Interview with a Swedish Community Policing expert working with Kenyan Police to enhance the concept
147 Interview with Winnie V. Mitullah, the director of Institute of Development Studies (IDS) University of Nairobi.
148 Interview with a member of a youth group in majengo who is also an Administrative Police.
149 Interview with residence; 1 youth group in Mathare, 1 in Majengo and a priest in Eastleigh
Islamic faith were surrounded and detained by the Kenyan police in the capital city Nairobi County in Kasarani sports centre (IMLU, 2014).

This xenophobic act was tagged operation usalama watch. It indicated a miscalculation and hard-line strategies of the Kenyan government in counter-terror and extremism. This miscalculation and thinking were a way to subject individuals from Somalia who were coming to Kenya illegally. The act led to subjecting the Kenyan-Somali community as “the de facto scapegoat for all the attacks” (Lind et al., 2015, Pg. 25).

Usalama watch operation took one-week. The government later released more than 3000 innocent Kenyans after interrogation. Those who were caught with no identification documents or are in Kenya illegally were instantly deported back to Somalia (Botha, 2014a). The operation was a response to the Nairobi and Mombasa grenade attacks. It demonstrated the poor strategy of the Kenyan government security agencies. The operation disrupted the terror structures in Eastleigh, Nairobi suburbs. The police named the Somalia community ‘terrorists’. The operation lost its Usamala meaning. It brought destruction between the police and the community; leading to loss of intelligence gathering from the community. The arrests were gone indiscriminately and on the basis appearance.

About 6000 police officers were deployed to trace illegal immigrants and terror suspects. This number include both police and KDF officers deployed in Eastleigh. In comparison to linda nchi launch which involved about 4000 soldiers, however, involved 4000 KDF soldiers. This deployment ratio indicated a reaction to a mosquito bite with a hummer (Lind et al., 2015).

Mombasa’s Majengo, Ganjoni and Bondeni areas faced the same operation; leading to the arrest 300 youths suspected. The youths were linked to terror cells. The religious profiling led the Mombasa governor Hassan Joho intervening for their release. In both Mombasa and Eastleigh, Nairobi, the police stormed houses; asked for identification documents of their victims. Some police destroyed the documents in order to get bribe (Atta-Asamoah, 2015b).

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150 Security
151 Interview with interview with 7 Kenya-Somali residence in Eastleigh; 2 of them being community leaders. And 5 common resident.
152 Interview with Kenya army officials; 1 from Department of Defence (DoD) headquarters in Nairobi and 3 from Kahawa barracks.

72
Usalama watch also took place in South C and B suburbs in Nairobi. This area also has majority Kenya-Somali community\textsuperscript{153}

Usalama watch gave an opportunity for the police engage in corruption allegation terming the Kenyan-Somali population as “Human ATMs” (Lind et al., 2015, Pg. 25). The police took a bribe of 1000 Kenya Shillings to 50,000 from their subject by using force. The event also saw some suspected al-Shabaab members returning back after being deported to Somalia. The suspects bribed their way back to Kenya by facilitating some small fee. The fee/bribe was given to security personnel managing roadblocks along Garissa Nairobi highway (KNCHR, 2014).

The police targeted Somali businesses, stealing property in people’s houses. Those who had money could buy their freedom for money was important than legal documents\textsuperscript{154}. A number of Kenyans supported the government’s Usalama Watch initiative tagged the Kenyan-Somali as ‘terrorists’. This only worked to the advantage of al-Shabaab for it was easier for them to get a segment of the Kenyan populace to help in carrying out attacks like Mpeketoni, Mandera, and Garissa\textsuperscript{155}. Mpeketoni attackers indicated that they were waging a revenge the Kenyan government; which they termed ‘corrupt’ (Lind et al., 2015)

Most of the Kenyans who joined al-Shabaab and carried operations in Kenya were non-Somalis. They were not from North-eastern Kenya, but mostly from the Kikuyu, Luo, Luhya, Mijikenda and Bajun tribes (Botha, 2014a). The Kikuyu are from the central Kenya, Luo and Luhya are from the Western Kenya and the Bajun and Mijikenda are from the Coastal Kenya mainly Lamu, Kilifi and some parts of Kwale county. However, most of these western and central Kenya individuals have a strong link with Majengo in Nairobi with some born and bred in Nairobi\textsuperscript{156}.

Politicizing security creates a disconnect with the intelligence community (Lowenthal, 2014). The usalama watch led to a mistrust between the Kenyan government and the Kenya-Somali community; leading to a blockage on intelligence information from the public in north-eastern Kenya and Eastleigh.\textsuperscript{157} The security watch only projected the government force and

\textsuperscript{153} Interview with Eastleigh residence.
\textsuperscript{154} Interview with a residence at 11th street in Eastleigh
\textsuperscript{155} Interview with George Kegoro, The Kenyan Human Right Commission’s Executive Director.
\textsuperscript{156} Interview with 2 women, 2 Muslim Imams, 5 youth in Eastleigh. 1 leader from a women group and 2 from a youth group in Majengo, 2 residences from Mombasa.
\textsuperscript{157} Interview with Hawa Noor, a researcher at the Institute of Security Studies, Kenya. The interview took place at a follow conference on ‘Challenging Radicalization: Youth, Violence, Religion and the State; Nigeria Cameroon and Kenya’ in Nairobi Safari Club on the 29\textsuperscript{th} September 2015.
strength but never solve security. It rather exposed the corrupt security forces. Despite the government’s claims to counter terror by *usalama watch*, the operation rather sabotaged the booming Kenya-Somali businesses in Eastleigh. It ignited a greater divide and a rebellion from the government by the Somali and Muslim community in Kenya; including their leaders within the government. The security watch rather brought the opposite of its aim (Lind et al., 2015).

**Security laws; the means to increase executive powers.**

Following the two al-Shabaab attack in Mandera which killed 28 passengers on a bus and 36 workers in a quarry, a controversial security bill was rushed to parliament and passed on the 18\textsuperscript{th} December 2014. The bill saw a heated debate leading to a physical fight between members of parliament. The parliamentary voting did not follow procedures. The votes were rushed for a signing by the Speaker of the house. Those who supported the bill had an opinion that it is a way to fight terror, protect the lives and property of the Kenyan citizens. The bill came after President Uhuru Kenyatta admitted earlier that insecurity was a bigger challenge. Uhuru Kenyatta added that insecurity was destabilizing the country’s growth. By asking the citizens to help the government to identify crime, the President said he was not ready to break the law or rather infringe on human rights. He said there was a need to take strong measures on the crime and terror issues\textsuperscript{158}.

The bill was an example of Kenya’s Anti-Terrorism bill which was drafted in 2003 in support of the United States’ initiative on Global War on Terror. The Anti-Terrorism bill was then rejected by the Kenyan Muslim lobbyists who claimed, the government was being pressured externally to actualize the bill to law (Oluoch, 2009). Despite the Security Law amendment bill 2014 not meeting standing orders of parliament\textsuperscript{159}, Justin Muturi, the speaker of the national assembly went ahead to sign it. He passed the bill to the president hour after for signing it into law. President Uhuru Kenyatta added that the bill was not against human right. It was a way of fighting terror and other crimes. By exercising their oversite role, the minority coalition CORD proclaimed the law was infringing in the bill of rights. CORD claimed the bill of rights as projected by the CoK (2010). The president termed the fighting in parliament as deplorable. He called those who opposed the bill as oblivious. The minority

\textsuperscript{158} Kenya Television Network (KTN) news on 13\textsuperscript{th} December 2014; President Uhuru Kenyatta’s speech during a joyful women organization celebration in Kasarani sports centre Nairobi.

\textsuperscript{159} Interview with Ababu Namwamba Member of parliament for Budalangi constituency
coalition CORD went ahead to the high court. They claimed that the security laws (amendment act) 2014 was a backward move of the country and unconstitutional. The CORD coalition was enjoined by the civil society and the Law society of Kenya. CORD and these civil societies filled a case to stop the bill in court. The amended law was a violation of the CoK (2010) and international law which Kenya was a signatory. The action of the National Assembly Speaker had been criticized. The amended laws were suspended by the high court; however, the push by the government for the amendment went ahead when the AG^{161} Professor Githu Muigai reinstated the laws at the court of appeal on the 12^{th} January 2015. Muigai stated that suspending the laws was creating policy gap in combating extremism. He added that the high court had no public interest. Appellate judges made their ruling. They stated that the AG had not demonstrated enough. Muigai then reacted by saying the postponement of the amended laws had created a policy vacuum (Nation, 2015).

The AG stated to the three bench judges in the court of appeal to suppress the order to suspend the newly amended security laws, stating that the suspension will only make the country vulnerable to extremists’ acts. Githu Muigai claimed that the matter should be handled by Chief Justice, Willy Mutunga,^{162} Muigai say that Mutunga should appoint judges to investigate if the added laws were constitutional or not. James Orengo a lawyer and a member of the minority party CORD defended the suspension of the eight clauses. Orengo said that high court had raised enough evidence on the ground of violating human rights. The AG’s claims were incompetent, Orengo added. Keriako Tobiko who is the DPP^{163}, supported the AG saying the news amended laws were as a way to fight ‘terrorism’. Tobiko said that the high court judge who suspended the sections was contradicting himself; admitting on fighting terrorism but suspending the eight sections. The KNCHR^{164} differed with the DPP and the AG. The suspension of the new law was of the public interest.(Ogemba, 2015). The AG went ahead to declare to the United Nations Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review. He said that Kenya was not violating human rights but was keen on fighting ‘terrorism.’ This was despite the overwhelming claims by the Human rights organizations that the new law was taking away some freedom-inclined in the CoK 2010^{165}. Such antagonistic claims

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160 Interview with Eric Mutua the LSK chairman.
161 Attorney General
162 Now retired
163 Director of Public Prosecutions
164 Kenya National Commission on Human Rights
165 Interview with an high court lawyer at Milimani High court in Nairobi
between different interests meant security for one is an insecurity for another. The office bearers projected the interest of their office (Booth, 2005).

Section 12 of the Security Laws (Amendment Act) 2014, infringed on media and people’s freedom. Sections 16 and 20 of the same amended laws infringed on the accused person’s rights. It conflicted with the accused person’s right for bail or bond respectively. Section 48 violated both the state constitution and international law by limiting the number of refugees. Kenya is one of the signatories under the UN on protecting refugees’ rights. Subjecting the refugees only meant the policymakers interests. This subjective interest was projected when the international community reduced their refugee funds to Kenya. The refugee repatriation only meant al-Shabaab strategy may lead to al-Shabaab winning more hearts and minds (Noor, 2014). The subjectivity of the repatriation has lately been projected by the government. The Kenya government does not, however, have a strategy on the repatriation. This will impact heavily in the North-eastern Kenya. The Jubaland-Kenyan border is porous. The Al-Shabaab sympathisers will still bribe their way inside Kenyan borders. This was evidence in usalama watch 166

5.7 Tourism Sabotage and boost
“Kenya’s entry into Somalia was informed by a string of cross-border attacks targeting Kenyan Defence Forces, western tourists on the Kenyan coast and aid workers from the refugee camp in Dadaab…” “The two KDF soldiers on resupply duties were kidnapped by Al-Shabaab militants along the Liboi-Wajir route…” “The attacks on tourists meant sabotaging one of the Kenya’s main foreign exchange earners. when several Europeans were seized in Lamu area in September and October 2011. The key tourism industry was hit hard, two Spanish aid workers with Medecins San Frontieres (MSF) were kidnapped in Dadaab refugee camp near Kenya-Somalia borders on the 13th of October 2011” (Migue et al., 2014, Pg. 6-7). These Kidnappings and attacks lead to the travel advisories. The United Kingdom offices in Kenya warned the UK citizens of plans to launch attacks in Kenya. Such advisory escalated the beginning of the tourist industry in Kenya experiencing losses due to insecurity (Group, 2012).

The coastal Kenya is an attraction to tourism which is Kenya’s exchange earner. Al-Mujahidin targeted this in the in the coastal region. Mombasa experiencing attacks against the police and public places like bars. This made the Kenyan government’s ATPU center its

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166 Interview with the high court lawyer
focus in the Kenya coastal province. Nick Named the Killer machine, the ATPU has been accused by Muslim clerics and human rights of man hunting as a way of fighting terrorism; they have been hiring informers inside the mosques to gather information and executing suspects through their HRO.\textsuperscript{167} This is due to lack of evidence and conviction in the court (Gisesa, 2013, MUHURI and OSF, 2013).

By the year 2011, the tourism sector was doing relatively well economically before \textit{operation linda nchi} but a decline was experienced in post-operation \textit{linda nchi}. More decline came in the year 2013 through 2014. The hotel industries in Kenya recorded a 4.8% decrease. Due to fewer visitors and tourists’ attractions such as game reserves and national parks recorded a decrease of 7.4 per cent in the year 2013-2014. Other tourist attractions such as Historical sites, Snake parks, and Museums recorded a decrease of visitors to 10.4% with the snake parks and the National Museum recording a low-performance rate of 59.9 per cent. The museums in Kitale town and Kisumu city in the Western part of Kenya recorded an increase of 19.3 and 45.1 per cent respectively; this is due to the low al-Shabaab attacks in these regions and other factors like devolution. Gede, Fort Jesus, Lamu which is all touristic places in the Kenyan Coast recorded a decrease in 2014 (KNBS, 2015).

A decrease of rivals and an increase of departures from international airports was also recorded in the same years, many departures’ destinations were recorded to be Europe. The United Kingdom and Germany recording the highest number of departures’ destination. The Scandinavian departures recorded an increase of 48.1% while departure to Switzerland and France decreased by 64.9% and 42.2% respectively. The Kenyan coast, Mombasa, Kilifi, Lamu and Malindi recorded huge decline in tourism with sectors such as hotels getting losses as compared to the other parts of Kenya; this was due to travel advisories issued on security concerns. However, the coastal hotels recorded an increase of local tourists and East African residence. These was due to the boost of the tourist's sector by government reducing taxes and introducing measures to attract local tourists and East African (KNBS, 2015).

The government allowed the business and corporate society in Kenya to deduct their taxes. Such revenues deduction were meant to take their employees for a holiday within Kenya. A huge turn up of local tourists in hotels and other touristic places was recorded. The government expanded the Malindi and the Moi international airport in Mombasa. a reduction of 40 per cent landing charges was realised, the VAT\textsuperscript{168} Act of parliament 2013 was revoked

\textsuperscript{167} High Risk Officers
\textsuperscript{168} Value Added Tax
to travel agents in order to provide cheap travel tickets. An attempt to improve the cash flow and liquidity was made by the government directing unsettled income taxes owed by tourism industries be paid by Kenya Revenue Authority. The national parks and game reserve fees were reduced in order to attract both local and international tourists. The control of national treasury circular was revoked to allow public to hold their meetings and conferences in private hotels. The supplementary budget of 2014/15 relocated the foreign travel allowances to local travel allowances; this was also done at the county level in order to sustain employment in the tourism sector (KNBS, 2015).

Regardless of the tactics to boost the tourism industry, the Kenyan government went ahead to invest in security in the coastal region. The presence of increased Kenyan police, Kenyan army and ATPU on the coast is evident of such increase. The damage to the exchange earner had already been done by insecurity brought by al-Shabaab. Therefore, much more efforts need to be done for al-Shabaab presence in Kenya is still real and the internal insecurity is far from over.169

169 Interview with Muslim for Human Rights and Haki Africa.
CHAPTER VI
6.0 CONCLUSION
Insecurity has increased in Kenya since \textit{Linda Nchi}; the increase is due to al-Shabaab attacks which lead to Kenyan security forces tactical reactions. Prior to \textit{linda nchi} terror attacks were evidence but rather increased due to the intervention. The discriminatory actions of the Kenyan government towards insecurity leads to radicalization in Kenya. The grievances in the coastal province indicated how al-Shabaab understand internal politics. Mujahidin uses the politics to win the hearts and minds of the Kenyan youth. The Kenyan security forces acted on al-Shabaab attacks by subjecting the ethnic Somali community and the Muslims in Kenya. Kenyan government has reacted to al-Shabaab attacks by enacting more power to the security forces and mistreated the population in the Coastal province. Despite security reforms in Kenya, there is a great deal of delay action from the executive arm of government. The overall security reforms depend heavily on the President’s administration. The president administration rather introduced reforms which are problematic and only increase executive power.

Operation \textit{linda nchi} has just exposed the weakness of the Kenyan government security situation. This has worked well for the Mujahidin. Mujahidin understand Kenya internal divide and uses it to win the hearts and minds of a section of the Kenyan Populace. Policymaker plays politic in handling security policies; they shift decisions and ideas according to their interest. Decisions are projected intersubjective in order to fit the interest of the office bearer. Kenyan policymakers have been shifting directions on operation \textit{linda nchi} depending on their own interest and identities.

Most of the attacks have been unique and similar in nature. The Kenyan government had intelligence information prior to the attacks. However, they assumed the information given. The policymakers blamed the internal politics which is characterized by ethnicity; hence, heightened insecurity within the country. Despite Kenyan policymakers projecting power and resilience, Westgate Siege, Mpeketoni, Mandera, and El-Ade attacks indicated the strength, capability, strategy and tactics of al-Mujahidin. The attacks demonstrated the confusion and disjuncture of the Kenyan security fraternity. Kenyan policymakers underestimate the Mujahidin. The north eastern Kenya, Mandera, Wajir and Garissa is a semi territory of al-Mujahidin. The government’s centralization of power lead and subjecting county governments in handling security. This increases security challenges in Kenya and especially in the northeastern Kenya where the government presence is limited. Radicalization in Kenya
is a serious issue in the country’s security. The assumption of Mujahidin network in Kenya leads to their success. Policymakers misunderstanding extremism and its cause. The Westgate siege and Garissa attacks involved individuals with the higher background level of education and economic stability. Bringing the unemployment and poverty stimuli of radicalization to question.

A string of the failure could have informed the Kenyan government on the possible consequences brought by *linda nchi*. First, the quick move to intervene in Somalia without involving the neighbouring Ethiopia who shares the lower Jubaland border. Secondly the sceptic Somalia president immediately after the diplomatic engagement with Kenya in Mogadishu. The proxy wars brought by the Jubaland policy was evident enough to understand the nature of the Mujahidin winning the hearts and minds of the Somalis due to the identity of clan politics.

There is poor preparedness within the Kenya government security fraternity. The government lack security strategies and only play reactionary tactics on countering violence extremism. Security forces lack a greater strategy over the emergencies such as terror attacks. al-Shabaab has been moving freely and allowed to operate in Kenya due to ineffective use of intelligence and security capacity. Noting the structure of governing security in Kenya, the president being the chair of National Security Council and has a great influence in the National Police Service; extrajudicial killings, therefore poses questions which lead to these injustices are being protected by the top governmental offices. Most of the police caring out the killings have never been brought to justice and are protected by these top offices due to corruption within the executive and the corridors of the judiciary. *Nyumba Kumi* philosophy is far from being achieved due to government hard-liners like policing the community. The reverse could help in intelligence gathering. The recent repatriation move will only mean al-Mujahidin getting more sympathizers and coming back to Kenya for attacks. Operation *usalama watch* saw the illegal immigrants bribing their way back to Eastleigh suburbs. The concept operation usalama watch has changed to operation *ukosefu wa usalama*170. The war with al-Shabaab is far from over. Al-Shabaab strength can never be undermined. They are still capable of launching attacks in Kenya.

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170 More insecurity.
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## Appendix I

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research question</th>
<th>Context and case</th>
<th>Participant</th>
<th>Coding analysis kit.</th>
<th>Key information interviews KII</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Main question</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>How does Kenya’s intervention in Somalia contribute to insecurity?</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Sub questions</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Why does Kenyan government’s decision-making failures lead to al-Shabaab attacks?</td>
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<tr>
<td>• How does the Kenyan government miscalculated and reactional policies make al-Shabaab sporadic attacks and radicalization in Kenya successful?</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Why does the increased insecurity in Kenya contribute to the sabotage of her tourism industry?</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>More semi-structured questions.</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>• What influences Kenyan when they form an opinion on the security/Kenya-Somalis/extrajudicial killings/police?</td>
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<tr>
<td>• What exactly is the culture between the police and the community?</td>
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<td>• Why does CORD what a withdrawal and why is Jubilee insisting in staying in Somalia?</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Are you aware of radicalization and how does it impact the community?</td>
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<td>• How often do you report cases in the chiefs camp or Pumwani,</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Mombasa</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Government officials</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Wajir</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Al-Shabaab sympathise.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Mandera</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Community members.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Lamu</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>priests.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Majengo</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Lawyers.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Somalia</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>KDF soldiers.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Insecurity</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Security and foreign policy experts.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Shaurimoyo or kamuklunji</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Are there any difference of opinion between and among individuals from different walks of life like religion, tribe, political party, class and education when it comes to government decision and al-shabaab attacks?</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Why do you think there is much heightened security forces in this region?</td>
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<td>- What is your relationship with the Kenya police?</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Do you know of anyone who has been arrested and disappeared?</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Have you heard of Al-Shabaab or ATPU?</td>
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<tr>
<td>- What is the perception of people on <em>linda nehi, linda uslama/usalama watch</em> and <em>nyumba kumi</em>?</td>
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### Appendix II

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution describing informant</th>
<th>No. institutions.</th>
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<td>NGOs</td>
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<tr>
<td>Administrative police</td>
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<td>Reservist Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kenya police</td>
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<tr>
<td>Church</td>
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<td>Youth groups</td>
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<td>Women</td>
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<td>Security experts and foreign policy experts</td>
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<tr>
<td>Government</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vigilante group</td>
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<td>Imams/clerics</td>
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### Appendix III

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<tr>
<th>Place</th>
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<tr>
<td>Eastleigh</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wajir</td>
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<td>Mandera</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mombasa</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lamu</td>
<td>Appointment with Member of parliament failed</td>
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<tr>
<td>Garissa</td>
<td>No interviews</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nairobi</td>
<td>36</td>
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