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Remember Lampedusa

A post-structural discourse analysis of European commemoration in the Mediterranean

Master’s thesis in European studies
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Abstract

This thesis is investigating how European commemorative practices have been a part of constructing European identity, and is questioning to what degree this is present in European commemorative speeches today. The framework is the commemorative response to the tragic accidents at Europe’s coast, where migrants and refugees have lost their lives in an attempt to reach Europe. Through a post-structural discourse analysis this thesis investigates the speeches that commemorate these lives lost and applies an interdisciplinary approach to understand how a practice of commemoration and remembering is an important political tool for social cohesion and legitimization of group identity.
Preface

First of all, a big thank you to my tutor Anette Homlong Storeide whose lectures on Cultural Memory Studies inspired the initial idea of this thesis. Thank you for patiently supporting me while I was writing this thesis part-time. Without your encouragement and dedication over a long period of time this thesis would not have been possible to write.

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## Abbreviations

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AWGI</td>
<td>Ad hoc Working Group on Immigration</td>
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<td>CEAS</td>
<td>Common European Asylum System</td>
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<td>EASO</td>
<td>European Asylum Support Office</td>
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<td>EC</td>
<td>European Community</td>
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<td>ECRE</td>
<td>European Council of Refugees and Exiles</td>
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<td>ECSC</td>
<td>European Coal and Steel Community</td>
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<td>EMSA</td>
<td>European Maritime Safety Agency</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>Europol</td>
<td>European Union Law Enforcement Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>Eurosur</td>
<td>European Border Surveillance System</td>
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<tr>
<td>FRA</td>
<td>European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRONTEX</td>
<td>European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Border</td>
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<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organization for Migration</td>
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<td>MOAS</td>
<td>Migrants Offshore Aid Station</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSSR</td>
<td>Norway’s Society for Search and Rescue</td>
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<td>TFM</td>
<td>Task Force Mediterranean</td>
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1. Introduction

The 3 of October 2013 a boat carrying migrants from the coast of Libya sank outside the Italian island Lampedusa. Reportedly more than 360 people lost their lives in the tragedy. As a consequence EU officials pledged more efficient border control policies, even sharing of the challenge of immigration and more efficient work towards a Common European Asylum System (CEAS). The same officials expressed their compassion to the victims of the accident and commemorated the tragedy through speeches. The year after, the same accident was commemorated again. In the meantime, several ships had sunk and accidents rapidly increased. Since 2000 over 40 000 immigrants are reportedly dead or missing in the sea and already by March 2016, 531 are reported dead or missing. (IOM 2016) The third year in a row, 2015, there was no official commemoration of the accident of Lampedusa.

A closer look at official statements of commemoration reveals certain gaps between the values and norms that the EU stands for, and the policies advocated in the same speeches. It also suggests a difference in commemorating European citizens, and immigrants. Within a European context official commemorations have to a large degree consisted of remembering the Second World War and to reconcile European countries formerly at war with each other and to a degree compensate victims and their families. As such, the rituals of remembering have served as a “founding myth” and promoted the union’s slogan of “never again”. In contrast to compensatory policies of WW2, the survivors of the accident in Lampedusa were not invited to be a part of the commemoration ceremony as it was being held 200km away from the island where they were situated. (Miller 2013) Further, due to Italian immigration law the survivors of the accident were being fined for entering the country illegally and were facing juridical prosecution. In absurd symbolic contrast, the EU granted the victims who lost their lives “post-mortem” citizenship. (Haas 2013) To continue listing or explaining the procedures immigrants are met with at arrival is too large a task for this thesis. What is interesting however, and what this thesis aims to investigate, is how the commemoration of the victims of boat accidents is correlating with EUs own values, understanding these values as profound for EUs existence. It will therefore be investigated how official commemoration by the EU is serving the embodiment of a normatively positive European identity and how there is a discrepancy between the humanitarian “lesson” from WW2 which we find in European self-reflective commemoration, and the commemoration of tragedies many immigrants suffer from today.
This will be shown with the theoretical background of Cultural Memory Studies focusing on the importance of collective memory to awareness of cultural heritage, cohesion and identity making. Post-structural discourse analysis will be used as the method to investigate what narrative EU officials are telling on immigration, and what narratives are hidden or excluded from the official commemorative practices and speeches. An example of such a hidden action is as mentioned above, the “removal” of grieving friends and relatives of the victims from the official commemoration, as well as the absence of the victims language, culture and rituals in the commemorative practices, as well as the way the immigrants are talked or not talked about and referred to by EU officials.

1.1. Relevance and contextualization

From the first boats with migrants started to catch the media's attention and until today in 2016, headlines like *migrant crisis, refugee crisis* and *asylum crisis* have become common words to describe the situation in European press. The Syrian war has in 2016 been lasting for nearly five years and has forced nearly five million people to leave the country as refugees. A majority of these are seeking refuge in neighbouring countries, and around 1 million are seeking refugee in Europe. (Mercyacorps 2016) However, migration to Europe is not a new phenomenon. Although numbers have increased rapidly, the borders and especially the route taken by the sea over the Mediterranean have been subject to a steady and constantly growing number of immigrants. After the accident outside of Lampedusa’s shore the International Organization for Migration (IOM) started the research program “Fatal Journeys” in order to survey and map the situation, as well as offer information to others preparing for this journey. One of the findings is that although many official instances survey borders and collect information on migration, few of them collect information of migrant deaths or those who go missing. This also makes commemoration of those same deaths difficult. (IOM 2014)

The migration politics of the EU and the discourse presented by EU officials is of high political importance, relevance and urgency. Immigration is a complex political question, but nevertheless “has been one of the most active areas of EU policy-making in the last decade” (Hix and Høyland, 2011: 285) Consequently the EU is already cooperating on border control and asylum, and are in constant negotiation on fully implementing the Common European Asylum System (CEAS), originally planned to come in force in 2014. However, already in 2005 scholar Ashkaan Rahimi argues that the increase in immigration has turned the policies within EU to increasingly focus on securitization of asylum seekers and that this area of
politics is no longer seen as one dealing with immigrants as a humanitarian issue, but rather a security one. (Rahimi 2005: 36)

Further Europe finds itself in somewhat of an identity crisis, receiving the Nobel Peace Prize in 2012, but facing internal revolt and lack of economic aid and social solidarity, a conflict on its eastern borders and insecurity in its relationship to Russia. In addition, during the 2014 election for the European Parliament, far rightwing parties advanced in voting results, winning several seats. The common denominator for parties like the French Front National, UK’s Independence party or the Danish People’s Party, apart from being populist and conservative, is their position as “Euro-skeptics”. Meaning that not only are they working for specific policy issues such as stricter immigration policy and border control, but also they are questioning the European project as a whole. (Shoichet and Boulden 2014) Not to mention the ongoing Brexit-discussions, where a referendum on 23 June 2016 will finally decide if Great Britain will exit the EU or not. Although the UK has for a long time openly had an ambivalent and skeptical relationship to the EU, if voted through it will be the first time a member state leaves the union. One of the major arguments for leaving the EU is namely the protection of UK borders, workplaces and stricter immigration control. (Wheeler and Hunt, 2016) The potential exit of the UK has sparked debate in the media on the overall unity of the European Union at the same time as NGO’s and the press are critiquing the treatment of immigrants and the conditions and policies with which they are met. Since escalation of events in 2014 there has been an increase in medias coverage on the topic of both European unity and identity and its immigration policies. (Wilkinson 2010) All of this makes for a investigation of how Europe is dealing with its ongoing and recent history, also the one that portrays Europe negatively and how it is incorporating it into its identity and commemorative policies. I will investigate this through a Cultural Memory studies approach, as it is the best means to analyse questions related to culture and identity. I believe it is a powerful analytical tool in order to investigate how we come to understand ourselves, our own affiliations and how these influence individual and institutional political acts.

1.2. The importance of cultural memory studies as a theoretical approach

The importance of a collective memory to social cohesion, identity, solidarity and harmonic communities, makes it inevitably important to politics. (Meusburger, 2011: 54) Further:
(…) the rise of a self-consciously postmodern, postcolonial, and multicultural society seems to have reanimated memory as a social, cultural, and political force with which to challenge, if not openly reject, the founding myths and historical narratives that have hitherto given shape and meaning to established national and imperial identities.

(Meusberger, 2011: 3)

Within this frame I will use cultural memory studies as a critical tool to question the founding myths of the European union in the meeting with today’s reality. The stories of the people immigrating to Europe, or failing to do so, are as much a part of the European narrative, as are the stories constructed and embedded in European public space to uphold “unity in diversity” and are, for every new casualty a growing trauma in European consciousness. The great narrative of the EU has been based on a “never again” rhetoric, referring back to the atrocities of the WWII, defined as “the hour of truth, after which Europe had realized the need to come together”. (Berger, 2010: 133) Through this frame the EU can be seen as an intended peace project where countries formerly at war with each other, today peacefully coexist within “unity in diversity”, and not merely as the Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) it started off being. Early theoretical approaches to the study of European Integration stressed the origins and development of the ECSC, continuing further to the single market and day-to-day policy making in the EC, followed by the study of the polity of the EU as somewhere between intranational and supranational levels of governance. At the start of the millennium, following deeper and broader enlargement, theoretical approaches are concerned with the boundaries, identities and “meaning” of the EU. (Cowles and Curtis, 2004: 297) Since the 1980’s political efforts have been done to reconcile European diversity, making sure that countries earlier at war with each other would have more than a rational economical reason for not attacking each other – but a cultural, identity and ideologically based one. Especially after the Maastricht treaty granting European citizenship, even more attention was given to the European project as a cultural one, focusing on the fact that Europe needed a common history and culture in order to evoke a greater feeling of belonging on a European level, and thus legitimize the citizenship policies. As a common European backdrop, the atrocities of the WW2 and the commemorations in order to reconcile came into function as what German scholar of memory studies Claes Leggewie identifies as Europe’s “negative foundation myth”. (Leggewie 2011: 123) Italian scholar Andrea Cossu points out that: “the reflections on the problem of commemoration lie within this interest for the social organization of historical continuity, the
building of the force of tradition and the inter-temporal stability of social order." (Cossu, 2010: 38) What European heritage should encompass however, turned out to be complicated:

The origins of the EU lie in its function as a market and as an economic community, so it constantly strives to attain “harmonization.” It is not easy to carry this principle over into political fields as symbolic as European history. The latter is overshadowed by (...) totalitarian experiences that left millions dead or traumatized, with issues of legal and moral “atonement” remaining poisonous today.

(Leggewie, 2011: 127)

The predominant theoretical approach to the early EU integration, that of neo-functionalism, introduced the notion of “spill over”, proposing that integration and “technical expertise in one policy area would overlap and flow into another area, thus allowing the supranational body to assume more political authority”. (Cowles and Curtis, 2004: 299) On the other hand intergovernmental critique pointed to the role of national interests as initiator or hindrance to policymaking and integration, whereas scholars reintroducing historical institutionalism stressed the polity nature of the union and policy making by member states, not nation states. (Cowles and Curtis, 2004: 299)

As space is scarce, this thesis will not elaborate deeply on the theoretical approaches to the EU, but acknowledges the various ways in which one could approach the topic of immigration. When the choice falls on Cultural Memory Studies and post structural analysis, it is because these approaches seek to uncover what today is seemingly natural and given, following a different logic than “spill-over”, state-interests or models of governance. It is not ignoring that policy integration is taking place in various ways and through complex processes, but it is trying to understand what values and cultural identity/ies are present in “harmonization”, “solidarity”, “integration” and terms alike, and how an understanding of speech and discourse influences policy making and at the same time is an expression of identity and cultural understanding. The EU has without doubt come far in integration of policy areas and the CEAS is indeed a result of the need to coordinate immigration policies. But with Leggewies word in mind, the logic of economy is not easily translatable to the understanding of a common history, and so this thesis will examine upon what self-perception the harmonization of immigration policies is taking place.
1.3. Research questions

The question is: how do we tell the stories of contemporary Europe, including the unpleasant ones? What words are taken in use when faced with tragedies with a tense political issue at its core? How has the EU commemorated the tragedy of Lampedusa and other boat accidents so far? Are the boat accidents at all perceived as a “European tragedy” from the point of view of the officials, when the victims were not European citizens? What about the point of view of the victims of the tragedy, have the testimonies of the survivors been given public space? What is the effect of Lampedusa on EU identity and self-perception? More precisely one could ask what self-perception is consenting the current political asylum policy and how is this self-perception created. And finally, what further political actions are or could be the consequences of such framing of immigration? Many of these questions will be addressed and returned to in the chapters on background, theory and method. The starting hypothesis of this thesis is that the speeches on commemoration are lacking a representation of the immigrants, but are rather used for the purpose of the officials and a wanted political outcome. To investigate this my main research questions will be:

a) What values are promoted in the speech acts concerning Lampedusa and boat accidents?

b) How do these values correlate with the EUs self-perception / identity manifested in founding treaties and EUs own commemorational practices?

c) Are these values present in the recent asylum and immigration policies?

These questions will be investigated with empirical and background information in chapter 2 and theoretical approaches in chapter 3, as well as a closer analysis of official statements from the EU in chapter 5. More precisely it is the official statements by the Commissioner for Migration and Home affairs in the aftermath of 3 October 2013, the commemoration of 3 October the following year later in 2014 and a speech commemorating ship accidents in April 2015. This will of course be more precisely presented and elaborated on in the following chapters, but the main purpose of choosing official statements is to look at what values are accepted as official, as representative for the whole of Europe. The post-structuralist approach and discourse analysis presented in chapter 4 will provide a thorough theoretical frame and method of analysis within which the texts will be organized. Together with Cultural Memory Studies my choice of theoretical approaches and method will shed light on the many assumed “truths” of our European cultural existence.
2. Background

To talk about identity, and more specifically European identity, is to relate to an expansive field of study. Identity is often referred to as a person’s conception of themselves and their individuality or group affiliation, but within social and cultural sciences it is a subject of vast and numerous theories, approaches and classifications. Due to the scope of this thesis I will not encompass the various approaches to identity studies that we can find in sociology, cultural studies, psychology, philosophy, gender-studies and other respective fields, but focus on the discursive nature of identities that post-structural approaches to international relations emphasize and relate this to the tradition of cultural memory studies. The choice falls on approaches to International Relations because I will look at identity related to a political community that is operating on individual, national and international level. Having said that, this thesis is not a text on international relations. Rather it places itself in an interdisciplinary tradition, and does not count its arguments as a contribution solely to one field. The use of both theoretical approaches from International Relations and Cultural Memory Studies creates a positive synergy of explanatory power as the two approaches support and complement each other in the investigation of commemoration, identity and politics.

2.1. Definition of identity

The theorization of identity is one of the main contributions of the post-structuralism approach to international relations. Identity in international politics and the study of states relations gained importance with the constructivist turn, arguing against the predominance of fixed international structures and power by material capabilities, advocated by realists. As a reaction Constructivists aimed to explain states and institutions actions based on their norms, values and identities, emphasizing the role of ideas. However, according to Danish scholar Ole Wæver, constructivists fail to develop a general, systematic foreign policy theory as they fail to bridge ideational and material explanation in foreign policies. (Wæver, 2002: 22) Wæver however uses a post-structuralism definition of identity that is attempting to resist the dichotomous construction of idealism-materialism as the only option from which one can explain the world. He stresses that post-structuralism does not imply anti-structuralism, but is rather radicalizing constructivism’s initial idea of norm creation, thus also seeing identity as structured. (Wæver, 2002: 22-24) Within this the aim is to:
(…) affirm the material character of every discursive structure. To argue the opposite is to accept the very classical dichotomy between an objective field constituted outside of any discursive intervention, and a discourse consisting of the pure expression of thought.

(Laclau and Mouffe cited in Wæver, 2002: 22)

This means that any contribution to a given discourse carries the possibility of influencing the material outcome, such as policies and laws. Identity therefore exists within structures, but these, as any conceptual closure and discursive system according to Wæver, are contingent and fragile, arguing that identity must be understood as unstable. This opens up for an understanding of identity as constantly in the progress of being made, further underlying why everyday acts such as speeches and language influence the self-perception of a community. This is supported by German scholar Thomas Diez, who argues that identities

(…) are not simply given, but discursively constructed. To talk about a European identity that somehow needs to find a political expression is therefore not an innocent statement, but a political act that inscribes the notion of a European identity into the political debate.

(Diez, 2010: 321)

Here one assumes that there is such a thing as a European identity, and by uttering it one also creates the image of it or the taken for granted existence of it. When speaking of identity in this thesis, it will therefore always be with the knowledge that identities are constructed, contingent and conditional upon given circumstances. As this thesis progresses I will try to investigate concepts that are being constructed in discourse, and consequently assumed as stable, natural, normal or as naturally given.

In addition to the ongoing creation of identity, it is important to keep in mind the temporal and cumulative aspect of identity. As Diez point out:

(…) dominant constructions are in themselves not stable but vary both synchronically and diachronically. Thus, discourses narrating an uninterrupted, linear history of, say, the ‘English’, impose such a history on a rather more diverse and contested concept at any given point in time, as well as between historical epochs.

(Diez, 2010: 321)
To refer backwards in time, to a common denominator, will be important in the understanding of the creation of European identity. This is in particular important together with the notion of “othering”, namely defining ones own identity in contrast to or different from what one is not:

(…) identities are always constructed against the difference of another. Identity is unthinkable without such a difference: it would make no sense to say ‘I am European’ if this did not imply a difference from being ‘Asian’, ‘African’ or ‘American’.

(Diez, 2010: 321)

Difference as such, Diez argues, is not necessarily disruptive or conflict-prone. However he reminds us that national identities as outlined above are also connected to a territory, which again are prone to violent forms of othering, in order to keep intact a hierarchy and centralization of power. (Diez, 2010: 322) As Europe today operates with common borders, one can classify it as a distinguished territorial entity to which certain functions of the nation state can be applied. The modern nation state was seen as the bearer of the “monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force” to protect and secure its citizens, as well as ensuring them with the rights and freedoms connected to being a “citizen”. (Hix and Høyland, 2011: 273) In pre-industrial times citizenship was granted to land-owners, but due to shared national identity and the prospect of a common national destiny the ruling classes could allow the working forces to acquire citizenship, which led to the creation of the modern welfare state. (Hix and Høyland, 2011: 273) From a discursive point of view, these identities were as much embedded in practices of othering in order to generate difference from the outside and cohesion on the inside, as they were in the citizens policies. (Diez, 2010: 320) Today however the rights and freedoms that were traditionally embedded in the nation state are conducted and in many cases transferred on a transnational European level. Consequently this development has required institutions and security mechanisms on a European level.

2.2. Institutional framework: Maastricht treaty and European citizenship

The 1 November 1993 the treaty of Maastricht entered in to force with the aim to:

(…) strengthen the democratic legitimacy of the institutions, improve the effectiveness of the institutions, establish economic and monetary union, develop the Community social dimension and establish a common foreign and security policy.

(EU 2010)
The treaty brought with it structural changes by moving several policy areas to a supranational level, introducing the European Monetary Union and the Euro, as well as integrating more policy areas into a European framework. One of the major additions was the introduction of a European citizenship, giving every citizen with a citizenship with one of the member states automatically a European citizenship. The EU citizenship would confer several new rights, of which “the right to circulate and reside freely in the Community” (EU 2010) would be of importance to immigration and asylum policies. The new rights were also referred to as introducing a “constitutional identity” of Europe, a legal term pointing to the electorate that makes up an electoral body of a region. (Besselink, 2010: 43) As such, it provided a juridical identity to the citizens of the EU. However, it lacked the cultural aspect that we find present in national identities and a perceived sense of belonging on an emotional level.

The Maastricht treaty further brought with it more power to the elected body of the EU, namely the European Parliament consisting of politicians directly voted for by European citizens. However, the participation in election was unsatisfying low\(^1\), and consequently the trust in and identification with the political union as a whole suffered. (European Parliament 2014) Therefore, to achieve political legitimacy and consensus amongst the people of Europe, identification with a European citizenship was highly needed. Already in 1973 the leaders of the then nine EC member states saw the need to gather Europe also on a more cultural level. On 14 December 1973 at the Copenhagen Summit, the EC published the European Identity Charter, underlying the importance of a common identity and that defining European identity involves:

- Reviewing the common heritage, interests and special obligations of the Nine, as well as the degree of unity so far achieved within the Community,
- Assessing the extent to which the Nine are already acting together in relation to the rest of the world and the responsibilities that result from this.
- Taking into consideration the dynamic nature of European unification.

(EU 2013)

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\(^1\) Since 1979 the European Parliament has experienced a decrease in voters participation, from 69.99% in 1979 to 42.54% in 2014, with an increase of 19 new member states. (EP 2014)
According to leading scholar in the field of EU and cultural policies, Oriane Caligaro, the European institutions do not have and never have had, the political legitimacy to define a clear and precise definition of European Cultural Identity. But the EU has been active in mobilizing a cultural identity, in its first instances by relating and activating European collections through a more classical and conservative notion of art and culture, and later on by encompassing an intercultural dialogue, engaging in the diversity of regions and minorities and in the 2000’s leading to also encompass immigrant identities. (Caligaro, 2014: 27) On the other hand the EU had also been promoting European identity through more instrumental tools, the means of traditional nation-building tools such as a flag, EU day and anthem in a way that was aiming to encompass both the regional and national particularities, as well as embracing a supra-national set of ideas and values, embedded in democracy and the abovementioned European classical cultural heritage. (Shore, 2004: 46-47) The Maastricht treaty now gave these symbols a constitutional frame, where the symbols of belonging also were connected to a charter on citizenship. However, as already mentioned, to “harmonize” culture was far more complicated then to harmonize the market. Attempts in uniting around a common cause were however in high degree done on commemoration of WW2 and the atrocities of the Holocaust as the foundational ground upon which the European “myth” is built. The “negative foundation myth” of a modern Europe that is condemning the crimes against humanity conducted during WW2 created a “never again” rhetoric which is still keeping Europe united today. This points back to Diez’ argument of identity as temporal. In fact he argues that the other for Europe in this phase of identity construction, was not coming from the outside, but “(…) rather Europe’s other is Europe’s own past which should not be allowed to become its future’ (1998, 90).” (Diez, 2010: 325) However, Leggewie argues, it would take decades before the European governments would purposefully admit their own participation in the deportations and arrests of Jews and other minorities marginalized by the Nazi government. Initially European countries would come to remember and commemorate WW2 as victims of the war, resistance fighters or as winners of the right to freedom and national identity, never as partakers in crimes and collaborators with the Nazis. (Eckert, 2011: 167) The importance of WW2 to European cultural memory and my analysis will be elaborated on in chapter 3 on theory. Having said that, during the same epoch Europe also experienced a high degree of immigration and started cooperating on related policies, those that are the background for today's immigration and asylum policies.
2.3. Europe and the development of immigration

After the Second World War most European countries were in need of a cheap and flexible workforce that would help restore the countries’ economies. Though one cannot generalize about the different countries approach to immigration, large economies and prominent players in the ECSC such as France and Germany had a high degree of permissive or even promotional immigration policies in the years after the war. (Huysmans, 2000: 753) With the signing of the 1951 Geneva Refuge Convention and the European Human Rights Convention, and with no major restriction or protest from political or social sources, one can say that Europe had a fairly relaxed and humanitarian approach to immigration as immigrants were largely consisting of skilled and needed workers. (Rahimi, 2005: 7) Due to change in the labour market and the economic need to protect domestic workers, immigration policies became to a greater extent restrictive in the 70’s. The legal status of immigrants did not change much, as they were still considered to be temporary guest workers. However, immigrant demographics continued to rise in numbers due to family reunification and further into the 80’s as a consequence of an increased number of asylum seekers. Up until then the EC had not yielded much legislative attention to migration, as the main political focus was the establishment of the common market. The political discourse on the other hand was at this point linking migrants with public disorder and framing it as a threat to the welfare state. (Huysmans, 2000: 755) Foreign labour programs were shut down, and what used to be a policy area mainly concerned with workers’ rights and movement, was now to a larger degree politicized and restrictive. With certain countries having stricter asylum-regulations, asylum seekers would move to countries where the conditions were better and chances of gaining residency permit would be higher. This however called Europe’s attention to the need to cooperate and harmonize asylum policy in Europe. (Rahimi, 2005: 7)

2.3.1. The Common European Asylum System

The first attempt to cooperate on asylum and immigration was done outside the framework of EC treaties, through the ad hoc working group on immigration (AWGI) and the Schengen Group, both consisting of interior ministers of the members’ states, but not being part of the EC legislation. (Hix & Høyland, 2011: 282-3) To meet with the challenges of immigration an objective of the EU has been to fully implement the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) in all member states. The initiative to what today is outlined as CEAS stems back to
the Schengen agreement in 1985, which opened up internal borders and brought cooperation on external borders and visa rights. (ECRE 2014) The Dublin Convention followed in 1990, with the goal of preventing “asylum shopping” or “refugees in orbit”, addressing the problem of asylum seekers that are being passed from one state to the other, without anyone taking responsibility for them. (Rahimi, 2005: 9) The Dublin Convention thus states that the first country an asylum seeker arrives to or applies for asylum is the one responsible for handling the application. This meaning that if rejected by the initial recipient country, the asylum seeker cannot apply for asylum in other EU member states. Following the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999, the Schengen-agreement became part of the EU acquis, together with the Dublin-regulations which gave member states legally binding instruments in asylum and immigration policies, as well as enforced the Commissions role in initiating legislation on a European level that was formerly restricted to the nation state. However, due to large variations in asylum practices across the EU and the fact that certain countries received notably more asylum seekers than others, the need for a common system and further harmonization was needed. CEAS was legally adopted in 2013, and is currently being implemented and put into practice. (ECRE 2014) The goal of the CEAS is to revise and improve regulations that influence asylum seekers procedures and ensure amongst other things: “that there are humane material reception conditions (such as housing) for asylum seekers across the EU and that the fundamental rights of the concerned persons are fully respected” (EC Factsheet 2014) However, though thorough and idealistic in its outline, Elizabeth Collet, director of the Migration Policy Institute points out the difficulties CEAS is facing:

The past five years of policy development within the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) portfolio have reaffirmed two things: that policies related to mobility are deeply contentious, and consensus is near impossible to find; and that well-crafted migration systems cut across the full range of government interests, from trade and foreign relations to education and social policy.

(Collett, 2014)

Needless to say the current refugee situation asked for quick responses and put pressure on both national and European leaders as migration developed to a matter of life and death in large numbers. This further complicated the agreements on CEAS and consequently it is in the process of being reformed to adapt to the recent challenges Although no countries today are untouched by the refugee crisis, Italy’s geographical position in the Mediterranean Sea,
and with over 8000 km of coastline, makes it one of the most accessible countries for
immigrants to reach by boat. I will shortly look at how Italian national policies dealt with the
challenge of immigrants before I proceed to the European level.

2.4. Current political and structural framework

2.4.1. Italian level

Italy, having experienced increased immigration for the past 20 years and with somewhat 1
million irregular or unregistered immigrants assumedly working underground, public
sentiments have been in favour of political parties that wish to regulate immigration with
stricter means. 11 July 2002 the Italian government passed Law No. 177, known as the
“Bossi-Fini act”. The law was named after the initiative of Gianfranco Fini from the neo-
fascist National Alliance and Umberto Bossi from the xenophobic Lega Nord, both parties
situated far right within politics but solid within government. It aimed to deploy a range of
control mechanisms and enforcements with the ambition to regulate immigration. The law
amends the Italian Immigration Act from 1998 and introduces new clauses, which were
criticized as it opened up for easier deportation and by imposing too many rules, in enhanced
the criminalization of illegal immigrants. As an example the law introduced penalization of
immigrants who do not fulfil the laws’ criteria such as a pre-signed work contract for arrival
in Italy, followed by deportation. It also criminalizes any attempt to aid irregular immigrants
to enter Italy, which in practice would also mean to help immigrants at sea. The Bossi-Fini act
thus received renewed attention and criticism following the Lampedusa tragedy, as the act of
saving lives became a crime under Italian law. (France24 2013)

It soon became clear, that Italy or any European country for that sake, could not deal
with the issue on their own, and that the rise in numbers of immigrants was not an Italian
challenge, but an European one. However, dealing with immigration on a united European
level, proved to be challenging.

2.4.2. European level

The immediate aftermath of the tragedy of 3 October 2013 at Lampedusa, sparked what today
are the mechanisms at force. Straight after the accident a call for action was urged from
European leaders and citizens to responsively deal with the challenges of immigration and
ensuring that such tragedies be prevented in the future. After the Justice and Home Affairs councils meeting, the 7 - 8 October 2013, the Task Force Mediterranean (TFM) was set up. The TFM was to act under the parole to protect and under the principle of solidarity and shared responsibility. The TFM further called for a comprehensive range of measures and long-term solutions, but identified five main actions to complement ongoing activities that would give immediate and practical support:

1. Actions in cooperation with third countries
2. Regional protection, resettlement and reinforced legal avenues to Europe
3. Fight against trafficking, smuggling and organised crime
4. Reinforced border surveillance contributing to enhancing maritime situational picture and to the protection and saving of lives of migrants in the Mediterranean;
5. Assistance and solidarity with Member States dealing with high migration pressure

(EC, 2013: 2-3)

These five areas of action would supplement already existing works of agencies such as FRONTEX, EuroSur, EASO, FRA, Europol and EMSA. This was initially criticized for the overall focus on security measures and the lack of incentives to protect refugees through more humanitarian channels, arguing that it was extensive on security measures but short on asylum seekers rights. (Milevska, 2013) However, as more and more tragic accidents hit European shores it was evident that border control surveillance was needed in order to save lives. The TMF was therefore intensified and a call for evenly shared responsibility between the member states was the agenda of the EU. (Euronews, 2015) As Collet outlines above however, consensus and agreement was hard to find and responsibility even harder to distribute.

### 2.5. Recent developments

Needless to say the recent refugee crisis complicated the European cooperation thoroughly. Currently Operation Triton, led by FRONTEX and at force since 1 November 2014 is the leading joint operation in the Mediterranean. However, this received heavy critique from NGO’s as the budget and operation was criticized to be a lot smaller than that of TFM. The operation budget sponsored by the EU was 4.32 million Euros in comparison to the Italian run operation of Mare Nostrums 9 million Euros per month. Analytics warned that the

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2 For full name of the institutions, see the list of abbreviations.
diminishing resources would cause more accidents, which was sadly confirmed in the following boat accidents in April. The increased media attention and critique aimed at the EUs lack of sponsoring resulted in a new and revised Triton, increasing the budget to 120 million Euros for 2015-2016. In addition, private organizations and NGO’s such as Migrants Offshore Aid Station (MOAS), Médicins Sans Frontières and Sea Watch, as well as countries outside the EU such as Norways society for search and rescue (NSSR) are offering aid by the means of ships, surveillance, volunteers and medical aid on arrival. In addition commercial cargos are often faced with the crisis, and in 2015 over 40 000 immigrants had been rescued by commercial ships. (Østerbø 2015) In very short time the rescue operations in the Mediterranean have gone from being an Italian responsibility, to a European one, to an aid and humanitarian crisis engaging locals and volunteers.

To understand this complex and rapidly changing matter a fair share of contextualization has been useful. Proceeding, this text will now leave policies as such and aim to look at the constructions of identity through Cultural Memory Studies, keeping the policies more as a point of reference. The impact of memory to social cohesion and how identities are enforced through commemoration will be presented. This will be done in order to investigate how and why commemoration can be used as political tool in the context of the refugee crisis.
3. Theoretical approaches

Different theories explain, describe and assess the EU for different purposes and in different ways. My aim is to analyze the official EU commemorative utterances related to the death of immigrants. For this purpose I understand theory as:

(...) a set of interrelated constructs (concepts), definitions, and propositions that presents a systematic view of phenomena by specifying relationships among variables, with the purpose of explaining and predicting phenomena.

(Kerlinger, 1986: 9, in Cowles and Curtis, 2004: 297)

Throughout this chapter I will look at main aspects of the theoretical approach of Cultural Memory Studies and why it is relevant when examining official commemorations. I will introduce key concepts and writers, and also see how this tradition relates to the already mentioned post-structural approach to identity in International Relations, which will further underline the political consequences of commemorations. This does not however make this text a sole contribution to the IR debate, as mentioned in the introduction. The aim is to comment on a complex issue through a multidisciplinary approach and body of thought, and at the same time offer a critique of the use of a commemorative context to advocate certain political standpoints.

3.1. The pillars of Cultural Memory Studies

The recent years memory studies have gained more attention in the study of nationalism, questions of ethnic identity and “politics of recognition”, as well as in the study of memorials and monuments. Memory is given importance, but it is rarely explained how it functions or why it is important to power and politics, or even where and how it takes place. Princeton scholar Jan-Werner Müller argues that one must look for ways that memory can be measured, through carriers and the historical and sociological locations of these moments “or else memory studies are in danger of deteriorating into a mere enumeration of free floating representations of the past which might or might not have relevance for politics.” (Müller, 2002: 3) According to him, the fall of the iron curtain had an immense impact on memory studies and the importance of memory to politics. With the fall of communism memories became “unfrozen”, not to say that some true, pre-representational memory was brought to life, but they were no longer constrained by the imposed “need for state legitimisation and
friend-enemy thinking associated with the Cold-War.” (Müller, 2002: 6) In the post-Cold-War era international relations were released from the straitjacket of the bipolar political world system and policy makers were now searching “in the “grab-bag of history” for viable historical analogies and political orientation.” (Müller, 2002: 7) All of this revived the field of memory studies and Müller outlines five main factors to why memory studies have led to a paradigm change in the humanities and study of history.

Firstly and basically, he points out the technologically accessible data collections, which generate a whole new level of “mnemonic techniques” (Müller, 2002: 13) and occupy more space in our social world. Secondly, with the disappearance of the generations of WW2, the communicative memory based in living oral memory of these individuals, is transforming itself into cultural memory. This has resulted in strong communities of remembrance and has marked a shift from the “history of the victors” to the “history of victims”. Condemnation through remembrance of the victims of Hitler and Stalin has also provided modern societies with “yardsticks against which the advantages of freedom and democracy can be measured.” (Müller, 2002: 13-14) Third, memory plays a role in establishing a historiographical framework for the “short twentieth century” that experienced two total wars. And fourth, modernisation and the disappearance of old rural European traditions renders memory important as remembering something that is no longer taken for granted, (a living rural society), requires explicit effort. Thus arguing that “memory and modernisation (…), are not opposites – they go hand in hand.” (Müller, 2002: 15) Finally, as a fifth point, Müller introduces the importance of multiculturalism and the politics of past injustices upon minority groups and the social recognition of their particular collective experience. In this manner, memory, as identity, becomes power politics as it has a right of claim of political resources and danger of absolute moral and non-negotiable claims over property or soil. With such framing, “culture wars” have the possibility of becoming real wars, as exemplified with the war in former Yugoslavia where “memory” was literally blown up ”as monuments, mosques and other concrete manifestations of collective memory were erased, and mnemonic maps were rewritten as normative maps for an ethnically reconfigured future.” (Müller, 2002: 17) Altogether, these factors attempt to explain why memory has gained importance in social sciences. However, the first to introduce the notion of memory as important to society was French theoretician Maurice Halbwachs, when developing his theory on collective memory.
3.1.1. Maurice Halbwachs and collective memory

One of the main questions of this thesis is how and what collective European values are presented through the commemoration of immigrants and what this implies in its policies. More precisely it is asking how this is done through the use of language in speeches and what the connection is between values and thoughts and the physical actions that they lead to.

This very connection between the thought, as a memory, and the collective societal institution that it serves to uphold is emphasized as an important tool by Maurice Halbwachs:

(...) in order to achieve social solidarity and a correspondence between thoughts, sentiments, and acts, it must accept certain conditions which appear in the form of mechanisms, of mechanical devices. These are what we call "techniques." (...) there is, especially, the general technique of language. Without doubt these techniques imply memory, reasoning, and concepts that are common to the groups that employ them. It was necessary to invent them; and they must be preserved, renewed, and developed.

(Halbwachs, 1939: 819)

In this he is suggesting that memory is an ongoing, activating process which is used to achieve social solidarity. Halbwachs notion of collective memory in a society is based on the premise that memory can be analyzed as a function of social life enabling us to live in communities, and by living in communities we are able to gain a collective memory of that experience. (Assman, 2011: 16-17) He draws on French sociologist Emile Durkheim’s “social facts”³, more specifically explained as social order that “becomes cohesive when it acquires a taken-for-granted symbolic form in the collective Consciousness.” (Middleton and Brown, 2011: 30) One of the main concepts drawn from Halbwachs is that sociality is not deriving from subjective experience; rather sociality is the foundation upon which ones individuality can be built. (Middleton and Brown, 2011: 31) Therefore the reconstruction of memory is a process of mutual elaboration between the individual who strives to recall images and the group of which he or she is a member:

It is not sufficient, in effect, to show that individuals always use social frameworks when they remember. One may say that the individual remembers by placing himself

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³ By “social facts” Durkheim referred to “the social structures and cultural norms and values that are external to, and coercive of, actors.” As a part of social facts, Durkheim lays emphasis on immaterial social facts, those that are not visible to the eye as are institutions, architecture or laws, but immaterial ones, manifested in the complex interaction between individuals. Today sociologists refer to this as norms and values, or even more generally as “culture”. (Ritzer, 2008: 75-78)
in the perspective of the group, but one may also affirm that the memory of the group realizes and manifests itself in individual memories.

(Halbwachs in Middleton and Brown, 2011: 32)

By this Halbwachs is not suggesting that the group or society is an entity with the capacity to remember, nor is it creating memories as such. Rather he suggests, there is a collective framework within which individuals can place themselves and their recollections of the past, creating a collective memory or through societal communication with other members of the framework, creating a social memory. It then: “passes as a common-sense mentality, the shared, taken-for-granted background knowledge that makes a member what he or she is.” (Middleton and Brown, 2011: 34) Further, the communication that enables this is firstly a language-based one: “The primary mechanism involved in localization is linguistic. It is in acts of naming and classifying that individual remembrances become linked to the common framework.” (Middleton and Brown, 2011: 35) As we will see, the way language is used in the EU speeches commemorating immigrants is complex and is operating with several classifications that all carry political implications. Secondly, it is the physiognomy of a collective, in which the territory, space, landscape, practices, system of gestures and so on that a group possesses exteriorly comes to represent their “inner” qualities, memories, identity, history and so on. (Middleton and Brown, 2011: 36-37) Or more precisely in Halbwachs own words:

All phenomena occur as though the thought of the group could not be born, survive, and become aware of itself without relying on certain visible forms in space. That is why it is necessary to study the material manifestations and expressions, to analyze them in all their peculiarities, to relate them to one another, and to follow them in their combinations. (...).

(Halbwachs, 1939: 822)

This is giving the collective identity a special and physical dimension, upon which one can act and manipulate, design and influence “marked by the systems of value, tastes, and desires that arise from the collective frameworks in which people participate.” (Middleton and Brown, 2011: 40) But also one, as Halbwachs points out, one can analyze and come to understand as traits of a group. In doing so, the abstract becomes more concrete, manifested in the groups actions upon the space. French historian Pierre Nora expands this thought further, by focusing on the importance of specific places with inherent importance or as sites of memory. As
Halbwachs, Nora’s writing did to a large degree influence the field of cultural memory studies, as “it reflected a wider disciplinary transformation. Broadly speaking, we can talk of an interpretative shift from “society” to “culture” and “memory”.” (Confino, 2008: 82)

3.1.2. Lieux de memoire

According to Nora “memory is life (...), memory takes root in the concrete, in spaces, gestures, images and objects. One comes to understand these as lieux de mémoire – material, symbolic and functional.” (Nora, 1989: 18) Material as in a graspable, tactile place, physical environment or object, symbolic as in what it represents and functional as in what purpose and whom it serves. It is in the moment of the disappearance of an intimate fund of memory, as exemplified with the disappearance of peasant culture in Nora’s modern France, that lieux de mémoire appears. In other words: “There are lieux de mémoire, sites of memory, because there are no milieu de mémoire, real environments of history”. (Nora, 1989: 7) Further, modern societies and culture are experiencing a disappearance of a living collective memory much due to mass culture and globalization. The disappearance of traditions of ancient cultures is also the disappearance of a living memory. Therefore, according to Nora “the quest for memory is the search for one’s history”. (Nora, 1989: 13) Within this there is a potential conservatism and protection of a specific identity from the outside world. However the two notions of history and memory are far from synonymous. Whereas history is the reconstruction of what no longer is, it will always be problematic in its deficiency. Memory on the other hand is in continuous evolution, made and rendered in civic societies and “open to the dialectic of remembering and forgetting, unconscious of its successive deformations, vulnerable to manipulation and appropriation, susceptible to being long dormant and periodically revived” (Nora, 1989: 8) As such, memory is exposed to political, moral and normative adjustments, as is any lieux de memoire. A certain place can be physically manipulated so that the symbol it carries comes to serve new or other normative or political ideologies. It is in this understanding of Nora that one can use the theoretical approach as a critical examination. On a European level, sites of memory are relevant exactly in the search for one’s common history. Archaeologist and historian Jan Assman relates this to the narrative, to the story of the self, and consequently to the story of Europe.
3.1.3. Communicative memory

Assman identifies a dualistic nature of the past, partly consisting of traces, relics, personal memories and partly as a social construction. This establishes not only internal memory and external symbols representing that memory, but an episodic *narrative* upon which we can build our autobiography. He refers to the human beings as unique in being able to connect the memory of the past and the identity of the present self, built on communication and symbols and hence allows us to orientate ourselves temporarily, as an individual or collective, beyond the bound time of our own birth and death. (Assman, 2011: 15) Assman further distinguishes between:

a) inner personal memory deriving from psychology,
b) social memory deriving from sociology and societal communication (as examined by Halbwachs), and
c) cultural memory deriving from art history and images and cultural objectifications as carriers of memory.

(Assman, 2011: 15)

The three abovementioned fields were until the 1980s not intertwining with each other and were first collected under the same umbrella of “cultural memory studies” by Aleida and Jan Assman. Assman wishes to incorporate culture into the analysis of identity, time and memory as well as preserve Halbwachs theoretical legacy of collective memory. He does so by referring to Halbwachs theory as *communicative memory*, and his own contribution to the field as *cultural memory*, neither expanding nor diluting Halbwachs original theory, but rather distinguishing between them as two separate ways of remembering. (Assman, 2011: 17)

3.1.4. Cultural memory

Cultural memory is according to Assman, disembodied. Unlike communicative memory, which exists in communication between individuals and groups, cultural memory is an institution. It is “exteriorized, objectified and stored away in symbolic forms that, unlike the sounds of words or the appearance of gestures, are stable and situation-transcendent.” (Assman, 2011: 17) Assman argues how rituals, foods, texts, archives and images functions as triggers upon the beholder, participator or audience. Despite the objects and rites themselves not “having a memory” they are reminding the spectators and partakers of their memories
related to that object, image, food, rite etc. therefore, Assman argues, memory exists both in interaction with other human beings, but also outward symbols. (Assman, 2011: 17) Assmans definition of memory is therefore “physical contact between a remembering mind and a reminding object.” (Assman, 2011: 17) More specifically he argues:

(...) it seems obvious that human memory is also embedded in cultural frames, such as the landscape or townscape in which people grew up, the texts they learned, the feasts they celebrated, the churches or synagogues they frequented, the music they listened to, and especially the stories they were told and by and in which they live. This interaction between a remembering mind and a reminding object is why the realm of these things and especially the things meant as reminders (mnemonic institutions) must be included in the concept of memory.

(Assman, 2011: 17-18)

On this note, one must assess what mnemonic institutions are shaping European identity. As mentioned earlier and outlined by Shore (2004), attempts are made in creating institutions that resemble that of a nation-state, such as a flag, coin and anthem. In the analysis I will through the use of language, understanding text and speech as an object, investigate what symbols are referred to, what relationships are made and for the purpose of what memory.

Assman argues that the inherent structure of cultural memory is elitist, and can never strictly be egalitarian. Cultural memory always has its specialists who go under various names such as shamans, poets, priests, teachers, artists, clerks, bards, griots, rabbis and mullahs to name a few. They operate as the carriers of oral traditions and rituals as well as deliverers of the written words and scripts of the community. In that light, my question is who is embodying this role on a supranational European level? In the commemorative practises of war, tragedy and disaster, what ritual-authorities fill the public space of Europe? Not surprisingly these are official representatives, mostly politicians and spokespersons of governmental and organisational institutions. As such, their actions and speeches inherit symbolical cultural power.

To differentiate cultural memory however, from simply “knowledge of the past” Assman states: “Whereas knowledge has no form and is endlessly cumulative, memory involves forgetting. It is only by forgetting what lies outside the horizon of the relevant that it supports identity. “ (Assman, 2011: 19) He elaborates on this notion by referring to the dynamics and the structural boundaries inherent in cultural memory. One example is the transition from communicative memory to cultural memory as a transition from embodied to
mediated form of memory. The other is the shift from the periphery to the centre, or the latency and potentiality to the actualization and manifestation and vice versa. This is what Assman names “working memories” and “storage memories” or “canon” and “archive”. In other words, what is at “display” as the objects we communicate with, and what is hidden or in the rear of our remembrance, and that can eventually and possibly be forgotten. (Assman, 2011: 22) It is in this sense that what is being commemorated at Lampedusa and the current refugee crisis, how and by whom, becomes important. Is this tragedy now a part of the European narrative, understanding narrative in relation to Assmans writing? If so, is that narrative presented by the European leaders? If not, what narrative is? In order to look closer at this, we must first look at how Cultural Memory Studies is important to politics.

3.2. Cultural memory studies and politics

The opportunity and ability to draw public attention to specific issues, persons, objects, historical events, or places and to divert it from others is one of the most fundamental instruments of state power. Like a well-conceived theater set, a successful commemorative landscape spotlights only certain parts of the scene, leaving some actors and events obscure. (Meusberger et.al, 2011: 9)

According to Halbwachs, memory and belonging to a societal framework of that memory is self-regulatory based in communication, meaning that memory enables us to live in communities, and communities enable us to build a memory. But according to Assman, this function is “also a matter of political foundation or fabrication. Both remembering and belonging have normative aspects. If you want to belong, you must remember.” (Assman, 2011: 24) Our question is then, what if the society you are in does not remember with you and for you? Assman points out that some memories are exposed, institutionalized and “active”, whereas others are hidden, and despite a potentiality, they are in the periphery of the public’s attention. Memory thus becomes highly normative, “deciding what, in favour of belonging to a political identity, must never be forgotten”. (Assman, 2011: 23) In the light of normative power, commemoration plays an important role. A commemorative space can be seen as a

(...) part of a nation's rites or the objects of a people's national pilgrimage, they are invested with national soul and memory. For traditionally, the state sponsored memory of a national past aims to affirm the righteousness of a nation's birth, even its divine
election. The matrix of a nation’s monuments employs the story of ennobling events, of triumphs over barbarism, and recalls the martyrdom of those who gave their lives in the struggle for national existence - who, in the martyrological refrain, died so that a country might live.

(Young, 1993: 178)

The dead in this excerpt are to be assumed soldiers, or those who lost their lives as citizens for a country. Turned around, Young’s words become sadly literal in the case of Lampedusa and the current immigration crisis, yet horrifying as it sheds light on “divine election” of what consists a nation and its citizens, and whom it is worth commemorating. In a European context what enabled the Union to develop and exist peacefully, are as mentioned in the introduction the sacrifices and lessons learned from WWII. On the other side, there are few monuments or commemoration that acknowledges the influence immigration has had on EU’s development, though just the sheer economic influence of work immigration has been substantial. There is no symbolic European Ellis Island. Nor is there a representational amount of memorials and commemorations of the colonial period that many EU member states were in charge of. The development of European identity has within this frame hardly questioned its own past, where the European was seen as superior to an inferior “other”.

(Diez, 2010: 332) On the contrary Diez explains:

There is a widespread belief that the European Union (EU) is a novel kind of power not only in its own institutional set-up, but also in its external relations. It is said to rely on civilian rather than military means, and to pursue the spread of particular norms, rather than geographical expansion or military superiority.

(Diez, 2005: 613)

This underlines the fact that the normative power of commemoration makes up a big part of EU’s soft power in terms of what is included and what is excluded in the dominating narrative and identity. It is not the civilian means in themselves that are problematic, but the discourse framing a power as more civilian than others. The term ”Normative Power Europe”, first introduced by Ian Manners in 2002 through the research paper “Normative Power Europe – a contradiction in terms?” at the University of Kent, is often used when referring to this wanted identity and is framed by him as a power that is able to shape the conception of the ”normal”. This is not done through military or economical means, but through norms and ideas. (Diez, 2005: 615-6) One of Manners’ main arguments is that
the EU is committed ‘to placing universal norms and principles at the centre of its relations with its Member States… and the world’. He makes much in this respect of the explicit references to the European Convention of Human Rights and the United Nations Charter in the Treaty on European Union (TEU).

(Diez, 2005: 618)

These norms and ideas are, as shown by cultural memory studies, embedded in Europe’s past of the shared experience of WWII and are today part of European treaties, rules and foundational texts as Manners points out.

On the other hand, according to Thomas Diez, “normative power Europe”, despite its learned lesson from WWII, is also defining itself by its geographical borders, namely its member states and EU-citizens and “the others”, non-EU-citizens. In this sense Europe is defined by something outside of itself. However, the commemorational policies of WWII implied that Europe’s “other” was itself, its own past, stating that the self of the present has come to function because it has learned from its own past self. Diez’ point is important because as the name suggest, the identity of normative power Europe is namely that: power. It is constructing its own identity as normatively favourable, and through this has the power of identifying the “others” as less favourable. Without the necessary, historically bound self-reflexivity of Europe, the EU is allowed to disregard its own shortcomings. (Diez, 2005: 626-7) However, any articulation of identity is infused with power, and the constituting discourse on ”normative power Europe” is not in itself a negative thing. Yet it does exist in a certain context and any power-relation calls for a critical stand towards it. This become highly important in our analysis when I will try to define what these categories of identity are and how they are being used in official EU speeches.

Lastly, the ”Normative Power Europe” is not an objective category, but a practice of discursive representation. (Diez, 2010: 320) As he points out: ”From a discourse analytical point of view, the most interesting question about normative power therefore is not whether Europe is a normative power or not, but how it is constructed as one.” (Diez, 2005: 626) His arguments lead us to the next chapter on method where discourse analysis will be presented as this papers main analytical tool.
4. Methodological approach

Discourse analysis is used in many different theoretical approaches and fields of study. Therefore, “in the analysis of discourse, the meaning of discourse is (…) closely linked to the particular research context and theoretical approach.” (Wodak, 2008: 6) Within the different approaches, concepts and terms of discourse analysis are defined and used differently. It is therefore necessary with preciseness, to provide clear working definitions and to question whether discourse analysis as method makes sense to use together with my theoretical approaches. In the following chapter I will argue for the usefulness of discourse analysis, give brief overview of its main concepts and outline the levels and stages of my analysis.

4.1. Why discourse analysis as method?

As the theoretical chapter has shown, this writer places herself in a post-structural theoretical landscape, informed by cultural memory studies on the importance of memory to politics. Therefore it is desirable to work with a method that equally represents a post-positivist stand. Post-positivist because the theories used are critical to what we can know and do not seek objective generalization, unlike a positivist stand which searches for a scientifically verifiable analysis in the traditional sense. (Bilgic, 2006: 3) If the latter were wanted, this thesis would benefit more from a quantitative research using for example large data samples of national and European surveys on self-perception and opinions on current immigration policies. Though there are many advantages of using large data samples, from which one can more easily make generalizations, I see it as beneficial to go in depth, rather than scope, when dealing with the topic of identity. It is not the aim of this thesis to depict a public opinion, or to do a mass survey of how we perceive ourselves in relation to immigration, rather it is to investigate what official language is used for the same purpose, knowing that perhaps neither receiver nor sender agree or act by the statements and values that are being spoken. It is the official narrative that we are presented to on a day-to-day basis and which is occupying our shared space I am interested in and therefore:

In qualitative research, small numbers of text and documents may be analyzed for a very different purpose. The aim is to understand the participants’ categories and to see how these are used in concrete activities like telling stories.

(Silverman, 2005: 160)
It is namely to understand with what categories the EU is operating and to understand what narrative EU is presenting through this. I am starting with the assumption that certain values are missing from the official commemoration, whereupon I am aware of my inherent subjectivity and the somewhat biased nature of my critical approach. However, it is not my aim to propose a political solution, or to promote a certain political stand to the current situation in the Mediterranean. The theoretical approaches I have chosen to work with certainly do not wish to offer such a concrete alternative. The post-structural approach will however allow me to do a critique and interrogate the self-evidence of mass-mediated European identity embodied in its speeches. I expect to be able to move beyond explanatory analysis and “(…) to de-naturalise or de-familiarise that which other theories and common sense take to be self-evidently true and morally desirable.” (Merlingen 2013) Having said that, discourse analysis does not try to go to the hidden intentions or “secret plans” behind a statement. By staying on the “surface”, on the level of the discourse, the logic of the arguments become much clearer and it is in relationship with actors, policy making and institutions that the discourse manifests itself. (Wæver, 2002: 26) Wæver refers to French post-structuralist Michel Foucault when saying:

Discourses are made up of statements, and what makes for the unity and coherence of a discourse is simply the regularities exhibited by the relations between different statements. This sounds like discourse is only a kind of afterthought, an empirical registration of a coincidental pattern. But Foucault was insistent that discourse is the precondition for statements: a discourse is a system for the formation of statements, and not every statement can be made as rules govern the formation of statements.

(Wæver, 2002: 29-30)

These rules could be what actors are allowed to say or not, or within what “category” an EU official is allowed to speak, compared to for example a national politician, or an activist. But also within what already existing discourse on identity the new statements are taking place.

Though the starting hypothesis is that the commemorative discourse of the EU on the Mediterranean are exclusionist and are leaving certain testimonies out, the methodology must deal first and foremost with what is there. It must examine what is “put on the table” in order to understand the narrative and the following policies. In other words, it is not my aim to try to guess what political actors “really” mean when they speak of immigration. Rather, I must firstly examine the story presented by the EU, secondly how it relates to EUs self-reflexion and thirdly how it is present in EUs policies.
Because discourse analysis “(...) allows the integration of different dimensions of interdisciplinarity and multiple perspectives on the object investigated, (...) discourse analysis must draw on anthropology, history, rhetoric, stylistics, conversation analysis, literary studies, cultural studies, pragmatics, philosophy, sociolinguistics and so forth.” (Wodak, 2008: 2-3) I therefore see it in consistency with my empirical and theoretical underpinnings of cultural memory studies and post-structuralist approaches to International Relations. It would however be beneficial to shortly elaborate on how theory and method come together in post-structural theory, before we move on to choice of material and the set-up and structure of my analysis.

4.2. The post-structuralism in discourse analysis

As the name suggest, post-structuralism is distancing itself from structuralism, however not fully abandoning it. It is not anti-structuralism, but rather consisting of a developing element. As we have seen in the work of cultural memory studies, symbols and rituals play an important part in social cohesion and in the shaping of group norms and identities. However as this thesis draws upon Wævers understanding of identities as unstable and all conceptual closure in discursive systems as contingent and fragile, it is more adequate to apply a post-structural approach. As such, it cannot be in compliance with the founder of structuralism, Ferdinand de Saussure’s stable concepts between signifier and signified.4 (Derrida, 1978 in Wæver, 2002: 23) A post-structuralist will argue against the fixed binary opposition of structuralism aiming to deconstruct them in order to pave way for something third, something not already existing in the logic of the binary opposition. As such it is trying to deconstruct “grand theories”. In our case, we are trying to look at the “grand theory” of European identity. As societies produce regimes of “truth” through abstract signifiers, it is the aim of post-structuralist analysis to ask why we produce certain truths in certain contexts. It does not offer a complete method or even a substitute, but rather specific tools. Further, a post-structuralist analysis has a genealogical orientation, in the sense that that “which seems natural and eternal is historical and impermanent.” (Merlingen 2013) I see it therefore as fitting with cultural memory studies that is investigating how we try to embody history and memory in a society.

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4 Structuralism examined the social systems by putting them in binary oppositions to one another. The hypothesis was that there is a difference between the signifier, meaning the word or sign signifying a certain meaning, and the signified, the actual phenomenon referred to. In order for this approach to be applicable, one must assume that systems are stable and search for a “context-transcending and exact science of signs.” (Merlingen 2013)
Together these two approaches enable me to critically look at what has been said and embodied in the past and why, and to assess my research questions.

4.3. Choice of material

There is no simple step-by-step recipe on how to conduct a discourse analysis of a given political field, and as this thesis has progressed and developments in the field have changed rapidly I have several times re-evaluated my focus area. Initially, I wanted to focus on the short aftermath after 3 October 2013 and the official commemoration of the ship accident at Lampedusa. However, as immigration numbers and causalities have increased, media reports of several thousands of deaths in the Mediterranean and the escalation of a crisis. On a first glance, these deaths are not being met with the same commemorative actions as the ones of 3 October. This raises the question what has changed in the meantime, what are the differences in the utterances, why and where is this leading? This implies that in addition to discourse analysis of the stated research question above, the thesis requires a comparative aspect. I see it as necessary to compare the recent commemorations of immigration at sea in 2015 and in 2013. The theoretical approach and empirical writing of cultural memory studies will serve as a backdrop to the analysis of recent discourses and function as an ongoing comparative and theoretical point of reference throughout the analysis, and the comparative aspect will be included towards the end of the analysis with the following research question:

\[ a) \text{ Is there a difference in the official statements in 2013 and 2015, and what could it imply? } \]

I have chosen to focus on three different texts:

a) Commissioner for Home Affairs Cecilia Malström official statement 3 October 2013 (Attachment 1)

b) Commissioner for Home Affairs Cecilia Malström official statement, 4 October 2014 (Attachment 2)

c) Commissioner for Migration, Home Affairs and Citizenship, Dimitris Avramopoulos, speech, Malta Valletta, 23 April 2015 (Attachment 3)
These texts have the similarity of being official statements from the Commission, and they are all three written in the aftermath of ship accidents or as a commemorative statement, which is why they are chosen instead of texts that are a result of policy negotiation, like statements on the recent European Migration Agenda. Such a choice of material would enable us to better understand the different members states approach to migration, the bargaining and policy negotiations within the EU and what narratives are used by whom and for what purpose. As immigration is a contested subject, both in national and EU policies, an analysis of the arguments and speech strategies used would offer a valuable insight into what narratives and identities are at use when several national members states meet to discuss. The chosen texts however, will in addition to their commemorative context also offer three different temporal views, as well as the point of view of two different commissioners in the same official position, which will be a good base for comparison and allows us to go beyond speculation of the individual stand point, as it is not relevant. Both Commissioners are speaking on the behalf of the Commission and in broader context, on the behalf of the EU, which is also how they will be interpreted.

The three texts will separately be analyzed on three different levels: Firstly, it is the textual level of the discourse looking at what kind of verbs, sentences, adverbs etc. are being used and through these what kind of categories of text are created. Secondly, I will look at the contextual and intertextual level, namely how the text stands in relation to other texts and also what external factors it is possibly affected by, in order to see the links between the discursive and the political and social practice. It will also allow for a temporal, historical contextualization possibly seeing how the discourse has developed over time. (Bilgic, 2006: 9-10) In this phase cultural memory studies will be important, in order to remember that “discursive practices are not purely and simply ways of producing discourse. They are ‘embodied in technical processes, in institutions (…)’” (Foucault, 1988: 200 in Merlingen, 2013) Implicit in this is that there are expectations and criteria that any official EU text must fulfil, serving both the sender and the recipients. Through this the message is already constrained by the very technicalities and institutions that make the EU and the already created identity. Thirdly I will compare the analysis of the texts to look for development over time and through this assess the research questions and offer a critique. A few implications of the comparative aspect are clear, such as the change of commissioner, their different political background and “style”, the possible change of the team working closely with them and how this influences their official language. Different Commissioners will without doubt produce different texts. However, I am looking at the texts as official EU texts, not as personal
utterances from the commissioner on behalf of her or him self. This is as well in compliance with the theory chosen, as we are not looking for what the political figures really mean, but what they put out there as a part of the overall narrative. Personification and stressing the personal can however, as we will see, be used as a rhetorical device.

4.4. Implications

There are several implications in choice of analysis. Today vast number of news agents and the important role of social media enables us sharing and receiving information from several points of views, private and official, through both text and image, and the information that is shared is used differently for different political aims and purposes, making it clear that each story has more sides to it and also blurring an overall picture. Overfilled boats with immigrants can easily be both a threat to the European welfare system, and the fatal consequence of too strict immigration policies, depending on whom you ask. The images become iconic and influence the domestic discourse on immigration, on moral and on “goodness” of the state. On the other hand NGO’s and interest groups are initiating projects such as festivals, art projects, organized commemorations and political protests in front of official buildings and in this way claiming a space and a voice, for which there perhaps is no space in the official EU structure. With this in mind, one has to ask if the narrative I will be analyzing, that of EUs commemoration of death of immigrants, disappears in the abundance of information and narratives available.

The availability of information, and the different approaches to a difficult political issue, which at the end of the day is about saving human lives and what means are the best for this task, has made choosing material a challenging task. However, it is my belief that systematically analyzing official language over time in the frame of commemoration, that material which is constrained by its very genre and context, will allow for a more precise observation of the EU narrative over time, than trying to take in account all different stands on the issue.

In addition, the limitation of this analysis is to a large degree identified by what this thesis is not. It is not dealing with policies as such, the media, or with asylum and immigration politics as the subject of study. Immigration is the area in which this analysis is taking place and a fair amount of background information is necessary, but it is beyond the scope of the thesis to go into detail on policy formation and institutional processes. When dealing with text, it is therefore important to keep in mind:
In paying due attention to such materials, however, one must be quite clear about what they can and cannot be used for. They are “social facts”, in that they are produced, shared and used in socially organized ways. They are not, however, transparent representations of organizational routines, decision-making processes, or professional diagnoses. They construct particular kinds of representations with their own conventions.


It is therefore, as mentioned, not the aim to generalize about EU decision-making or the actors inner motivation. Solidly informed on theory, method and the steps of analysis we will in the following chapter look at the preconditions for the chosen discourse, apply the research questions to the chosen text material and discuss how commemoration is spoken of by the EU and how it correlates with the EU’s wanted identity values.
5. Analysis

I will first present a short factual contextualization of the three texts in order to understand what events they have in common. It will be further elaborated on the context in their individual analysis as they are taking place in three different periods in time.

Firstly the three texts will separately be presented with their macro features, meaning the genre and overall structure of the text. Here different themes that are present in the text will be presented and divided into categories. The categorization of themes will help to get a clearer overview of the texts and its dramaturgy, as well as help see what is emphasized by the producer of the text and as mentioned “the aim is to understand the participants categories and to see how these are used in concrete activities like telling stories.” (Silverman, 2005: 160)

Secondly the micro features will be presented for each text. Here I will have a closer look at the above-mentioned categories, and look at statements within the specific category and how they are addressing the subject. Linguistic features such as grammar, pre-modifiers, proverbs and modalities will be looked at and analyzed, as well as the use of language through allegories, metaphors and similes, and idioms.

Thirdly, the findings above will be analyzed on the levels of language and context. This means that the most distinguished findings will be interpreted and discussed, firstly on what is being said in the text, meaning the language, and secondly, how this relates to the context the text is in, that is other texts and happenings. Lastly the three texts will be compared and I will see to what degree they answer the research questions. For the sake of clarity, this is the set-up of the analysis:

Text a / b / c:

- Macro presentation of text
- Micro presentation of text
- Analysis - Level of language
- Analysis - Level of context
- Comparison of texts a, b and c
- Application of research questions
It is inevitable that the first analysis will inform the two other, and that discussion will also happen continuously, although I will sum up and present the main findings and relate it to theory towards the end of the chapter.

### 5.1. The context and the frame of the three texts

To frame all three texts certain facts and developments need to be presented. All three texts are seen in the light of the facts presented in the chapter on background, however one important note is the change of Commissioner of Home Affairs in the period 2013 to 2015. The two first texts are written and performed by former Commissioner Cecilia Malström, a Swedish MP with political background from the Swedish liberal party, Folkpartiet and regional and national political posts. The current Commissioner Dimitris Avramopolous is the vice-president of the liberal-conservative Greek party New Democracy, former mayor of Athens and recently foreign and national defence minister of Greece. As already elaborated, there is a possible implication when comparing text over time, produced by different people. Further, the number of migrants immigrating arriving by sea in 2013 was 60 000, whereas in 2014 it was 200 000 whereas the number in 2015 was over one million. Needless to say, the situation escalated rapidly. Out of these, it is estimated that 3400 people lost their lives in 2014, and 3700 in 2015. (UNHCR 2014) Meaning that the number of casualties, although increased, did not increase proportionally with the number of immigrants coming to Europe. This suggests that increased surveillance did indeed save lives and discover ships before they capsized. During this period the Italian operational program in the Mediterranean, Mare Nostrum, was shut down, was initially replaced by Frontex and Eurosur, and the current program is Operation Triton, in cooperation with Frontex and Italian authorities. (EU 2014) All three texts are referring to these actions, and they are used as an argument to show to what the EU is doing. The three texts are however chosen due to their commemorative purpose as all three respond to accidents, and open the text with condolences.
5.2. Analysis A) Commissioner for Home Affairs Cecilia Malström official statement 3 October 2013 (cf. Attachment 1)

5.2.1. Macro features – structure and categories of text

Firstly this text is an official document from the European Commission, by the header it is referred to as a MEMO and indicates a short, potential summary, on the given topic, the Lampedusa tragedy. The headline in the text however refers to the text as “statement”. The text is without any further headers, but is structured in 8 different paragraphs. Three short introductory ones, three longer middle ones and a last short one. The text opens with an introduction where the commissioner is giving her personal condolences to the victims of the accident on the 3 October 2013. The text quickly continues to a paragraph on what measures need to be taken on a general level to fight this type of tragedies. The middle part is providing an answer to the problem initially outlined by referring to concrete policies and actions the EU has undertaken as a response, before tying up the text with a call for more action from the member states, since there is a lot more to be done. The concluding remarks go back to the commissioner’s personal voice, thanking the Italian government for their work. Overall the text gives a circular dramaturgy, leading us back to where it started, the personal expression of the commissioner.

Within the text I found six main categories of themes, all of which are vividly present as separate groups in the text, but are closely linked and at times also overlapping:

*immigration, security, smugglers, tragic accident/rescue, policies and solidarity*

By the category of immigration I have framed all text that is referring to immigration as a global phenomenon and challenge. Security implies any excerpt of text that is referring to a danger, a threat or measures meant to meet such threats such as operations and surveillance. The category of smugglers will be identified as the antagonists that are the only clear group that is to blame for the accidents. The theme of the tragic accident/rescue are the excerpts of text that are referring to the accident as a singular event of emergency and that is and has to be met with rescue measurements often provided through means that fit into the security category, that of surveillance. Policies deal with concrete policies initiated by the EU and referred to in the text, and lastly solidarity is the appeal to the EU member states to react and
to cooperate.

An example of how categories overlap and are grouped together is seen when speaking of immigration as a phenomenon. It is followed up by a call for burden sharing through solidarity and cooperation, as well as a reference to what actions are already initiated by the EU. Taking in use three of the categories; immigration, solidarity and policies:

We also need to address this phenomenon through cooperation and dialogue with countries of origin and transit and open for new channels for legal migration. The Commission has been engaging with several countries of North-Africa to agree on a concerted manner of better managing migration flows and promoting mobility.

(EU 2013)

Initially this frames immigration as a matter-of-fact situation that one must deal with neatly, through dialogue and cooperation, something the EU is already at, through the Commissions work. On the other hand, the categories of rescue/tragic accident, solidarity, security and smugglers overlap and coincide in the following statement:

Europe has to step up its effort to prevent these tragedies and show solidarity both with migrants and with countries that are experiencing increasing migratory flows. We have to become better at identifying and rescuing vessels at risk. We also need to intensify our efforts to fight criminal networks exploiting human despair so that they cannot continue to put peoples lives at risk (...).

(EU 2013)

Here the overlap of categories creates a picture that ties the tragedy to criminals, calling for security measures and solidarity within this field from Europe. Exactly how these arguments are created we will look closer at in the micro features of the text.

5.2.2. Micro features - Linguistic features

The protagonists and antagonists

The text opens with a personal expression from the Commission, using personal pronouns such as “I” and referring to her own feelings faced with the accident of 3 October:
I am deeply saddened by the terrible tragedy off the coast of Lampedusa. I would like to express, on behalf of the European Commission, my sincerest condolences to the families of the many people who lost their lives at sea.

(EU 2013)

The text is closed the same way, by using the “I”, expressing support to Italian government implying both a sincerity and personal engagement. In the introductory paragraphs the narrator however shifts from an “I”, to a “we”:

Europe has to step up its effort to prevent these tragedies and show solidarity both with migrants and with countries that are experiencing increasing migratory flows. We have to become better at identifying and rescuing vessels at risk. We also need to intensify our efforts to fight criminal networks exploiting human despair so that they cannot continue to put people's lives at risk in small, overcrowded and unseaworthy vessels.

(EU 2013)

The “we” represents the EU, making the Union the protagonist of the text. As such “we” is responsible of saving lives and rescuing vessels. In contrast, the ones putting peoples lives in danger are “criminal networks”, identifying the antagonist in opposition to the EU. As already mentioned, they make out for a separate category in the text. As such “we” in the text is Europe carrying out the positive task of a rescue operation, and “them” are the unidentified, but exploitative, criminals. The latter image of the criminal as malicious is enforced by adjectives describing the vessels such as “overcrowded” and “unseaworthy” suggesting that the smugglers are killing people purposefully, as well as the notion of “human despair”. This image is also reinforced in the closing paragraph:

Finally, I wish to express my support to the Italian authorities for the enormous effort, including the apprehension of smugglers, they have undertaken over the last few months which have seen a vast increase in the influx of irregular migrants at their external borders.

(EU 2013)

The apprehension of smugglers can refer to both “the act of arresting, seizure”, as well as “anticipation of adversity or misfortune; suspicion or fear of future trouble or evil.” (Dictionary.com 2015) The former interpretation of the word implies criminality dealt with through arrest, and the latter something one should be afraid of. Both readings of the word place the statement in a security category. Together with the word influx, which refers to an
inflow or the place where a river flows in, immigration is presented as something uncontrollable and increasing, like the natural phenomenon of a flooding river. The words *irregular migrants* are nonetheless referring to something abnormal and out of the ordinary, in opposition to *regular migrants*. This places immigration, security and smugglers in the same argument, again presenting the smugglers as the criminal antagonist threatening security and the notion of immigration as urgent and a phenomenon that is uncontrollable.

The victims of the accident are not referred to by nationality or origin, or given the tagline of refugee, asylum seeker or immigrant, but are referred to as *people*. They are therefore in the frame of the accident not a part of the *we* / *them* dichotomy, as they are neither the EU, nor the criminals. However, they are present in the narrative as *people who lost their lives at sea*.

**Lampedusa as “one of a kind”**

Further the text is addressing the member states:

> While responding to these attempts to reach the EU, we should not forget that there are still many people in need of international protection. I therefore call upon Member States to engage more in the resettlement of people in need of international protection. This would demonstrate an increased and much needed commitment to solidarity and the sharing of responsibility and would help to reduce the number of people putting their lives at risk in the hopes of reaching European shores.

(EU 2013)

The modalities such as *should* and *would* are used to imply what needs to be done in the future as well as underline a sense of necessity or emergency. This is used both when addressing the member states as a call for solidarity, but also when referring to the accident as a tragedy. The framing of a “tragedy” with the need of an urgent response and a rescue operation underpins the sensational and the “one of a kind”. This is possibly problematic as the problem is framed as the accident itself, and needs to be met with solutions, in this case policy that will

> (...) track, identify and rescue small vessels at sea thanks to better coordination between national authorities, appropriate channels of communication and improved surveillance technology.

(EU 2013)
As such it does not address the larger social and global structures that cause mass migration, nor the structural and institutional challenges that non-EU citizens are met with when trying to enter the union. Further:

(...) we should not forget that there are still many people in need of international protection. I therefore call upon Member States to engage more in the resettlement of people in need of international protection.

(EU 2013)

When referring to the larger picture it is done vaguely, not specifying who these people are, what “engaging more” means or what international protection would imply. As such the concrete policy and action that is referred to, that of Eurosur “which will become operational as of December this year, to improve the situation” is initiated to survey the sea and rescue vessels as proposition to a positive solution from the side of the EU. In other words the policies initiated deal with the issue when the issue is at reach within the radar. On the other hand, the following paragraph refers to the cooperation with African countries and the possibility to

(...) open new channels for legal migration. The Commission has been engaging with several countries in North Africa to agree on a concerted manner of better managing migration flows and promoting mobility.

(EU 2013)

This excerpt shows the initiation of a further reaching policy and planning outside the parameters of the EU. It does not, however, specify, what this implies and consists of and what this means for migrants wishing to come to Europe. This again leaves the EUROSUR as the most concrete measure, as presented in this text, which the EU is engaging in.

5.2.3. Analysis A – Level of language

As we have seen in the above presentation of the text, what stands out most clearly is the formation of “us” as Europe, and “them” as the criminal smugglers. This is interesting due to the fact that this is supposedly a commemorative text for the victims of the accident, but comes mainly to function as distribution of blame. This functions within a positive frame
when calling for more solidarity from Europe, and within a negative frame when talking about the smugglers. This is highly interesting as it is presenting the identity of the EU in a positive normative manner. Although it is critiquing the lack of action, it is done through self-reflection:

We have to become better (...). We also need to intensify our efforts (...). We should not forget that there are still many people in need (...). We also need to continue to address this phenomenon through cooperation (...).

(EU, 2013)

It is implying that there is already work being done, and now “we” just need to do more / continue / intensify what we are already doing. It is therefore building on a presupposed positive image of Europe already doing something. Further, the text is an imperative to Europe and an expectation that this will be done, keeping the identity of Europe within the frame of normatively good, as opposed to the others, the smugglers, who are as shown earlier, purposefully endangering peoples lives, and therefore normatively bad. Through discourse one is thus defining the other as a threat, and in the same act places one self as the good.

The victims and the relatives themselves however are not identified and are specifically talked to and about only in the introductory paragraph. As we have started out this analysis to see what is there, it is now interesting to see what is not. It is already clear that the testimony, representation or any further description of the experience of the victims or their relatives is missing from this text. We do not know who died or why, but we are trying through this text to understand who’s fault it was.

5.2.4. Analysis A - Level of context

This text is a political statement on the behalf of the Commission, and its genre is to a large degree restrained by its official mandate. As such, it does not leave much space for personal reflections, feelings or arguments, but must at all times represent the Commission and the DG of Home Affairs, consisting of members with many different political affiliations and national interests. As such the text is technical, politically correct in terms of language and coincides with the general values of Europe, that of solidarity within the union and the value of human lives.
The public visibility of this and the two other texts is however limited. Even though the texts are free to download from the Commissions website, it is something one has to find for oneself. This makes them less available for a wide public audience, and more for the specifically interested like other political institutions, journalists and researchers. On the other side, they are a basis for reference for journalists, and are accessible for quotations and redistribution by the media and therefore a part of the official debate. Further it is to assume that a professional public relations team in the Commissioners office produces or at least proofreads them.

The text is responding to the accident, but as outlined in the presentation above the overall focus is to present measures taken and a call for further cooperation and solidarity, although vaguely.

5.3. Analysis B Commissioner for Home Affairs Cecilia Malström official statement, 4 October 2014 (cf. Attachment 2)

5.3.1. Macro features – Structure and categories of text

This text is a statement from the commissioner, not a memo, and is longer than our first text. The text consists of two types of writing, cursive and bold. The cursive writing is held for six paragraphs and is the personal statement of the commissioner, the bold writing is a more technical text on policy with five subtitles explaining the areas of policies that are presented: *Overview of European Commissions actions in the fields of migration, asylum and borders, Funding for migration, Operational Support: Triton on its way and Asylum and resettlement.* The personal text in cursive introduces the entire document and we do not come back to the personal voice by the end of the technical document. The structure of the personal statement is however similar to that of our first text, it starts and finishes with a personal experience from the Commissioner and falls within the genre of a speech. The speech gives the impression of having being read out loud addressed at an audience, whereas the informative technical text is aimed at a reader who will access information within the category of *policies.* I will focus mainly on the speech part of the text, as it is more suitable for comparison with the other texts later on in the analysis and because it is the part supposedly dealing with commemoration.
The headline “Commissioner Cecilia Malstrøm commemorates the Lampedusa tragedy” suggests a commemorative text that is remembering the accident a year ago, paying respect to the victims in an honorary manner. (Dictionary.com) This is briefly done in the first section of the text as the focus is on Lampedusa as a scene of a tragic accident. The middle part of the text is divided in three sections first describing the situation focusing on the exploitative smugglers, then focusing on the lack of solidarity between European member states and in the concluding section referring to what the EU has initiated of measures and operations. Overall in the text I identify the main categories to be:

immigration, tragic accident / rescue, smugglers, solidarity (lack thereof) / member states and policies

However the categories in this text are clearer, in the sense that they do not overlap as much as they do in the first text, making the arguments in each paragraph more straight forward, clearer and more communicative.

5.3.2. Micro features – Linguistic features

What happened to commemorating?

Together with the headline, the introductory section starts with a commemoration remembering the event at Lampedusa one year ago. The point of view is personal, with the Commissioners “I” leading the narrative with a personal experience from last year:

One year ago, I visited Lampedusa together with Italy’s Prime Minister Letta, Interior Minister Alfano and Commission President Barroso. We were standing in front of rows of coffins containing the bodies of the victims of the Lampedusa shipwreck, which happened on 3 October 2013. These images are still in my mind as a terrible reminder of how we must strive to keep Europe open to those who seek protection. (EU 2014)

The first two sentences are informative, objectively describing the actions. The third sentence offers a descriptive terrible reminder before the topic of the texts shifts from being commemoration to advocate future initiatives on a more general term. This is done by the modal verb of “must”, underlining necessity. The sentence:
in front of rows of coffins containing the bodies of the victims of the Lampedusa shipwreck

places the reader / listener visually in the time and place of the aftermath of the accident, enabling us to see this image. This is followed up by the commissioners personal experience: These images are still in my mind as a terrible reminder (...) suggesting that she cannot forget what happened and is personally affected, even slightly haunted by what she has experienced. This makes for a powerful commemorative element in the text.

However, these are also the only commemorative elements in the text. By the end of the sentence the topic has changed to what should be done next: (...) a terrible reminder that of how we must strive to keep Europe open to those who seek protection. It is interesting to note that already in the third sentence the commemoration is over with and is a springboard to talk about further initiated actions. It is also worth noting that our access to the accident is through the commissioner’s experience, leaving the reader / listener able to identify with her perspective. Since there is no description or testimony from an immigrants point of view, there is also no chance for the readers / listener to identify with them.

Commissioner strikes out at – who?

Let me be very clear – when it comes to accepting refugees, solidarity between EU member states is still largely non-existent. This is quite possibly our biggest challenge for the future. While some EU members are taking responsibility, providing refuge for thousands of refugees, several EU countries are accepting almost no-one. In some countries, the number of yearly refugees barely exceeds a few handfuls. Last year, six whole countries of the EU accepted less than 250 refugees between them. All this, while the world around us is in flames. These EU countries could quite easily face up to reality by accepting resettled refugees through the UN system, but despite our persistent demands they are largely refusing. This is nothing short of a disgrace.

(EU 2014)

The commissioners own voice is very present throughout the whole text, but in particular in the tempo and indirect point of fingers in this specific paragraph. Her serious tone is clear in the outset of let me be very clear – and although the countries who fail at cooperating with the Commission easily could be named, they remain unnamed, but are nevertheless framed by such an detailed information that they themselves and everybody else involved will know who they are. It comes off as a powerful rhetorical tool as it is clear whom she is talking about, and if it is not, one can use the numbers she provides to do the maths and figure out for oneself. The Commissioner is restrained of speaking her opinion by her position and by
diplomatic concerns, but by hiding the scapegoat in the information, she manages to strike at it anyway. This makes the text far more argumentative and insisting than our first analyzed text.

**Painting a clear picture**

This text is carrying a higher number of images, metaphors and idioms as rhetorical tools. The smugglers are referred to as *merchants of death*, the situation as *the world around us is in flames* and the EU is *a shelter*. This makes the text dramatic, slightly theatrical as it is dressing its protagonists up in rhetorical costumes. The use of modal verbs such as *must* is very high, underlying urgency and offering a sharp and clear call for action. Further words and expressions like *tyranny, misery, dictatorship, oppression, despair, nothing short of a disgrace* and *absolute necessity* are supporting the dramatic side of the text.

**Antagonist the same, but the “we” is unclear**

As in the former text, the smuggler is identified as the clear antagonists of the narrative. They are further attributed with descriptions such as *merchants of death* who *have no fear or pity* *risking the lives of children, women and men* and who *deliberately sank a vessel*. The image of smuggler is of one who purposefully and consciously is killing immigrants. However, whereas in the first text the categories of smuggler and security coincided, using the smugglers as an argument for increased security measures and by so doing suggesting that the smugglers can be defeated by these means, in this text the smugglers stand alone. Together with the highly lyrical description of them and the dramatic situation of the *world in flames*, they become even more alienated and ungraspable. Not only are they dangerous on a rational level that institutions can deal with, they are now also dangerous on an emotional level – suggesting that they are simply evil.

At the same time the protagonist, the “we” in this text is unclear. In the opening paragraph the “we” is connected to the narrator, and consisting of the Italian Prime Minister, Interior Minister and Commission President. In the next use of the pronoun: (...) *we must strive to keep Europe open to those who seek protection* (...) it is unclear if it is the four already mentioned that constitutes the “we” or a general, broader “we”, as in Europe which is also mentioned. The next use of the pronoun in “*we learned that several hundred migrants lost their lives*” is followed by a longer argument within the category of solidarity or lack thereof urging that European member states must take more responsibility. This section ends with: *but despite our persistent demands they are largely refusing*. In this section they are the
EU member states that are not willing to receive refugees and the *we* is the European Commission. The following and last time the personal pronoun is used is: *we must in the coming years develop a responsibility sharing mechanism between all EU states* (...) Here it is unclear if it is the Commission that has to develop the system, or all the EU states together. However, following a circular dramaturgy, it is suggested that the initial *we* of the representatives of the Commission including Malström, and the concluding *we* of The Commission that has done what is *within its limits and competencies*, are a different *we* than that of the overall Europe. The reason for this is the very strong call for more solidarity, or rather the lack of sufficient solidarity coming from the member states. The whole third paragraph is devoted to this topic, opening with a direct: *let me be very clear – when it comes to accepting refugees, solidarity between member states is still largely non-existent*. Here the self-reflexivity is not painting an idealistic picture as in our first text. The text offers in fact a sharp critique of the EU’s lack of solidarity:

Last year, six whole countries from the EU accepted less than 250 refugees between them. (...) These EU countries could quite easily face up to reality by accepting resettled refugees through the UN system, but despite our persistent demands they are largely refusing. This is nothing short of a disgrace.

(EU 2014)

After sharp critique of both the antagonist, but also of ones own community, the text argues for the positive implementations that have happened so far. However, in the shadow of the initial critique it is not enough to forget the serious tone of urgency of the introductory paragraphs.

The recipient is nevertheless reminded of the EU’s inherent values by means of intertextuality, which is referring to Europe’s values – those that are written and agreed upon. However together with the self-critique, the positive image of Europe becomes slightly nostalgic, or is referring to something that is not actually happening at this time, but that must be realized.

For those escaping dictatorship and oppression, fleeing conflicts and wars, Europe is a shelter where they can find safety, or a new life far from tyranny and misery. (...) It is an absolute necessity if the EU is to live up to its ideals.

(EU 2014)
The last paragraph leads us back to the “I” of the Commissioner, and how she is confident that the security implementations done will give proof of European solidarity. In the aftermath of the earlier critique, this is read more as an urge and an imperative, rather than a personal standpoint.

5.3.3. Analysis B - Level of language

As in the first text there is a separation of “us” and “them”. As outlined, the smugglers are a clear threat, an enemy, and are given normatively bad characteristics. However the protagonist, the one we are supposedly to identify with through the use of personal pronouns as “we”, is more unclear. Through the voice of the Commissioner the Commission is indirectly taking a step away from identifying with the rest of EU, implying how the Commission has done certain efforts that the EU member states have failed to do. Since the Commissioners personal “I” is clear from the onset, offering us a chance to look through her eyes, making her experience becomes the dominant one in the text. She is referring to both being there at the scene of commemoration and all the work she has done with the Commission, making the text highly personal. On the one hand this is effective because it differs from more technical political texts, and gives a possibility to engage more emotionally with the text. On the other hand, she is operating with mainly the same categories, and although critiquing the member states she is not critiquing the EU as a whole. The critique becomes aimed at national actors, rather than the EU. As such, the values and the identity of the EU stay the same, and if it is failing to act according to its values, it is because of the failure of certain, unnamed member states. It enforces the portrait of the Commission as the one taking the initiative and as being a strict and demanding leader of the work, implying that this is serious and it is the other, unnamed member states that need to step up.

Lastly, this is supposedly a commemorative text as the headline says for the victims of the accident, but as in the first text the commemoration is clearly done and over with. The objective would originally be to remember and show respect to the event a year ago and its victims. Again we are lacking a narrative from the migrants and victims themselves, but we know whom to blame.
5.4. Analysis C Commissioner for Migration, Home Affairs and Citizenship, Dimitris Avramopoulos, speech Malta Valletta, 23 April 2015 (cf. Attachment 3)

5.4.1. Macro features – Structure and categories of text

This text is also in the genre of a speech. It is however not directed to a European institution, but is given by the Commissioner as a visitor in Malta, in the follow-up of several accidents near the Maltese shore. The structure of the text is as one long text, in the document divided in 26 phrases, which when looked at together make up a whole text, without any presumably longer or shorter paragraphs, possibly except the very last section which is three full lines long, instead of one or two and a half like in the rest of the text. In this text as with the two other, the opening sentence introduces the personal voice of the commissioner. However, as the body of the text consist of 26 short, separate points, the next argument and also category is quickly introduced, that of the immigrants themselves, before he continues to next sentence and next category, “our responsibility”. This text therefore jumps more swiftly between themes, categories and the bridges between them, and in doing so also mixes several categories in one argument, as we saw in our very first text. Overall I identify the main categories in this text to be:

Immigrants / victims, smugglers, policies, solidarity / member states and structure

The category of immigrant goes hand in hand with the category of victim as they are referred either in a commemorative manner or as fleeing from oppression. Smugglers are mentioned as a separate, identifiable group, policies is referring to concrete initiatives such as meetings or 10-point-actionplans, and solidarity / member states is referring either specifically to Malta/Greece where the speech is taking place or to other member states. The last, and new category is structure and has replaced the former categories of rescue / tragic accident. Structure encompasses the arguments related to a global challenge or to holistic solutions:

Unity and solidarity because migration is a global challenge and the Mediterranean countries have already stretched their resources in order to tackle the crisis and they cannot do it alone.

(EU 2015)
Migration is framed as something that not only one institution or country can take the responsibility for, and that needs to be addressed and understood as a global, international challenge. It recognizes the need to work on a more foundational level:

This is why Europe needs to move from the emergency mode to finding structural and sustainable solutions. (…) It will define actions with a broader reach, more long-term and more holistic.

(EU 2015)

An example of the overlapping of categories is found in sentences like:

Our response is clear and unequivocal. Europe is declaring war on smugglers. Europe is united in this effort. We will do this together with our partners outside Europe. We will work together because smuggling is not a European problem, it is a global one.

(EU 2015)

Here the categories of solidarity and smugglers are overlapping, and it is also referred to a larger structural problem, a global one. Finally the style of the text, due to its short, concise points has more of a motivational, easily accessible logic and is not going in depth on any of the given categories. Dramaturgically it ends with referring to the European citizens justified expectations and ending on this note gives the text a touch of electoral campaign, or as if the text and measures done are aimed at the EU citizens, something we will look closer at in the next section of the linguistic features.

5.4.2. Micro features - Linguistic features

The dead dream of Europe

The first identified category immigrant / victim initially depicts the immigrant as innocent and hopeful of a simple dream – to start a new life in Europe. This use of imagery is strong, also in words like long and desperate journey. It projects positive and innocent, perhaps even noble, qualities on the immigrants. The text then refers to two types of immigrants, those who lost their lives and those who have been luckier and will be given the opportunity to live their dream, in other words those who didn’t die. Connected with the first description of the immigrant as innocent and hopeful, one assumes that those who got the opportunity will
continue with their positive personal traits once they start living the dream. This is suggestive of the expectations to the immigrant’s behaviour. The adjectives are painting a strong emotional picture and are speaking on the behalf of the immigrants, identifying their dreams and desires, as Europe.

*War on smugglers*

As in the two preceding texts, the antagonists are specifically identified as the smugglers. Even more so as they are now a big enough entity to be declared war at:

Europe is declaring war on smugglers. (...) Prevention, because we will not stand idle waiting boat after boat, criminals to exploit human desperation putting lives at risk and violating human rights. As I have already stated, Europe is already at war with the criminal networks that exploit and often condemn to death innocent human beings. We will not stand idle. With strong political will and resolve, new means and additional resources, we will hunt them down and destroy their capacity.

(EU 2015)

Adjectives are used to describe the negative characteristics of smugglers, that of criminals who deliberately are killing people. In contrast and as a solution, we are presented the actions that will be taken by the EU, again reinforcing the normatively good side of the EU, fighting the bad guys. The use of the allegory *we will hunt them down* suggests rapid, lean physical activity, that of a hunt, which again creates an image of something physically relatable. The arguments in this paragraph are further short and concise, and in opposition to the criminals, the protagonists has strong political will. The use of idiom in *we will not stand idle*, is a claim, as in understanding that they will not tolerate what is happening and they will act upon it. The idioms also carry biblical associations, as the language is elevated and courtly. This again suggests nobleness and courage from the side of the protagonists.

*What to do*

As in the first text, a river or stream is referred to, as an allegory in *we must act upstream*. It suggests running water, natural force and the use of the word *upstream* implies that it is hard to walk against or in the opposite direction of this force and gives a bodily image of the hard work it requires. As it is connected to smugglers, we understand that this work is hard and faced with a lot of opposition. Use of modalities again, such as *should* underline a sense of
necessity. Together with repetition of *now* this notion is developed further into a bombastic argument that underlies urgency in the following sentence:

(...) the situation in the Mediterranean has to change now. We have to take action now. We will take action now.  

(EU 2015)

It is however not specified what actions, but it gives the impression of authority and willpower to act. In the following paragraph it is interesting to look at what is *not* being said:

In parallel, we should act upstream in order to dry up the market for the smugglers by offering alternatives to the migrants who are on the move. These could take the form of resettlement, for those who are genuinely in need of protection, and of assisted voluntary return directly from third countries, for those who are not.  

(EU 2015)

It is not specified where the immigrants will be resettled, and the other option is to be returned. The option of the migrants being welcomed and assisted in Europe is not spoken of. Further migration is in this text not talked about as a single, isolated event but is as ongoing issue:

Looking beyond our most immediate operational response, we need to be very clear and recognize that the migratory flows are not going to disappear anytime soon. The arc of instability that surrounds Europe is generating them and the perspectives for stabilization are only for the long term.  

(EU 2015)

However, the category of immigrant / victim overlaps with the *arc of insecurity* as they are found in the same arguments. The instability is generating the migration and is a direct cause of *migratory flows*. Further the *arc of instability* is a threat outside of Europe, and in this paragraph comes to function as the other, as the insecurity outside underlines the security of the inside, the EU, that must be protected. It is clear that it is not a matter that will be solved by a single effort, but must be implemented with a longer time perspective:

This is why Europe needs to move from the emergency mode to finding structural and sustainable solutions. This will be the subject of the upcoming European Agenda on Migration that the Commission will present mid May. The Agenda will address all challenges posed by migration today, both to migrants themselves but also to our own societies. It will define actions with a broader reach, more long-term and more holistic.
By overlapping categories of policies, immigrants and member states the suggested policy is addressed both at the internal actors of member states and at immigrants. The use of the word *challenge* is used in both cases, and it is openly spoken about that it is a demanding task. However words like *sustainable*, meaning that the system will uphold itself suggest a shift in how policies will be dealt with. *Sustainability* gives associations to other related political issues like climate change and the need to take care of a certain area so it can last for a long time. The use of the word *holistic* understood as that the whole is more than the sum of its part as well as implying something healthy, as the word stems from approaches to alternative medicine, mindfulness and therapy. The text ends on this note, together with:

Europe is moving, and will not stop until the justified expectations of our citizens are truly fulfilled. Thank you.

By referring to the citizens of the EU the text is projecting an expectation on them that they expect the EU to take action, something we cannot know for sure if the citizens have or not. It is also not specified and therefore also hard to validate within the population what this expectation is. It does however give the text a sense of acting due to responsibility to a third part, the citizens of Europe.

The expression *Europe is moving* gives associations to both Europe being in a time of change, as well as the EU is moving in terms of policies and actions that are being done. The text ends with a personal thank you from the commissioner.

**5.4.3. Analysis C - Level of language**

This text, differing from the two other, is talking about immigration as something ongoing, not as a single isolated event or accident. It is talked about as a matter-of-fact, not as something isolated or sensational. The cause of deaths of immigrants is however also talked about as a matter-of-fact, namely the smugglers, as in the two other texts. It is also identifying an ongoing war with the smugglers, war understood as a violent act by force of arms. The argument for why Europe is at war with smugglers is not presented, we simply are and it is
taken for granted that the recipient agrees or understands this use of violent means, instead of
some other means. The sentences are short, giving the text a certain speed. Together with the
temporal imperatives that implies that action will be done now this implies urgency, as well as
it communicates a eagerness to act. The repeated use of images creates a visual narrative and
is also shaping the image of the protagonist as powerful, brave and hardworking in difficult
times. It is speaking to our imagination and our physical experience of those images.
Together this use of language is talking both to the emotions, and is also activating the
reader/listener by its encouraging tone to act.

5.4.4. Analysis C on Level of context

April was the month with most boat accidents in 2015, with over 1244 casualties (IOM 2016).
It was a period where the medias attention was focused on immigrants and the text therefore
is more likely to be researched and consumed by journalists. This text does not refer to the 3
October and Lampedusa at any point, since it is taking place at Malta and is not referring
specifically to one place, but to immigration as a whole. Preferably one would have looked at
a text from October 2015, which would have enabled a clearer comparison in time for the
three texts, but due to the fact there were no commemorative statements, memos or speeches
given by the Commissioner in October 2015 the choice fell on this text due to its context,
namely the high number of accidents and its commemorative context. Further, the context
of being at Malta requires that parts of the text is addressed at the Maltese authorities, and so
the category of member states is contextually strained and biased in favour of praising the
hosting country.
6. Discussion

Having looked at each text separately in its structural and linguistic features, and shortly analyzed the individual texts, I will now apply my initial research questions to the findings above. Through these I will further discuss the findings and compare them to one another. When referred to or cited from, the text will be referred to as text a, b and c as they have appeared chronologically in the above analysis.

Our first question is:

a) What values are promoted in the speech acts commemorating Lampedusa / immigrants?

Throughout the analysis I have categorized different sections of texts and with the help of this I have found that the main categories in the discourse, connected to value are that of the antagonist vs. protagonist and securitization and solidarity. In all three texts there is a high emphasis on fighting the antagonists, the smugglers. Through the smugglers, the texts are identifying themselves as being against the actions of the smugglers, namely killing, exploiting and doing criminal work. Through this othering, the text wishes to represent values that are opposite of this. This correlates with the post-structuralist work on self/other construction where “identities are seen always to require an other against which they are constructed; an other which they thus construct at the same time.” (Diez, 2005: 267) This is connected to the notion of Normative Power Europe concept where the characteristics of the domestic sphere, in our case the EU is perceived as stable and peaceful an the world outside is perceived as anarchic and dangerous, in our case dominated by evil smugglers. The important note however is that the characteristics of the domestic sphere, of the EU, are presented as if they are existing prior to the external threat, but as Diez argues they are in fact constructed in the very statement, in the very act of the speech. Because:

(…) there is no homogeneous and clearly delineated ‘inside’ to be defended against the ‘outside’ apart from a historically contextual representation of social relations infused with power and distinctions between ‘self’ and ‘other’. Foreign policy, from such an angle, is not the representation of the nation to others as a pre-given object, but a construction of the nation in the very moment of representation.

(Diez, 2005: 267)
Diez refers to the nation, but the explanation is transferable to the EU as clearly EU is not a homogenous entity and is by all means highly historically contested in its very construction. The other in the understanding of Normative Power Europe is however Europe’s own past, from which one morally distanced oneself and thus became ideologically “better” than one’s own past. This identity is the one perceived as the prior, pre-existing one in the meeting with a new other, the smugglers. As such there is a double othering happening in these statements, on the one hand presenting ones inherent moral values that historically stem from lessons learned from the 2WW and on the other, a confirmation of these values when faced with an outside threat represented by smugglers. As such there is an intersection of past values and current political issues in these statements.

Further, the actions that most of the texts are referring to, fall within a securitization category, that of surveillance, which is closely linked to military operation, and within them carry an aspect of violence. The values here are harder to isolate, depict and identify as the security measures used for saving lives are also complicating the access route to Europe, and in the end forcing migrants to find new, perhaps more dangerous routes. There seems to be two main arguments on how to deal with immigration, on the one hand a stand of securitization and the other for solidarity between member states as a way of burden sharing. Solidarity comes off as a value that is both inherent in the very structure and existence of the EU, but at the same time as one that EU has to continuously work, the latter argument being strongest in text b. As such the producer of the text is reminding the recipient of this inherent value and makes her remember. Through this the text comes to function as a mnemonic institution as outlined by Assman, and in this interaction between a remembering mind and a reminding object memory appears. It serves to remind the recipient of this specific part of the shared European identity, rather than another one. (Assman, 2011: 17-18)

It is harder however to depict clear humanitarian arguments and actions, that are only advocating a humanitarian approach with no other themes or categories attached. When the victims are commemorated it is often connected either to the protagonists’ individual experience or to the antagonists who caused the deaths and who must be fought against. As already mentioned, the immigrants, victims are not part of this dichotomy.

b) How do these values correlate with the EUs self-perception / identity manifested in founding treaties and EUs own commemorative practices?
The values that are often referred to as *European values* are not elaborated on and are implying that the readers/listener already knows, as argued above these values come off as prior to the current events. By referring to this as a matter of fact it also suggests that the recipient of the text is a European or somebody with the access to European texts and cultural references. This suggests that the texts are not aimed at migrants, but rather inwards at European institutions and citizens. The text is therefore actualizing a collective framework of references restricted to a specific group. Furthermore it follows the logic of Halbwachs arguing that it is not the individuals own experience or self-understanding that defines group affiliation, but rather the collective framework of shared images and meanings, localized namely in discourse and physiognomy. (Meuserger, et al, 2011: 39) The discourse is taking place in the speeches, and the physiognomy comes to exist in the geographical borders of the EU. One can say that the values such as solidarity are correlating well with the EU self-perception, but on the other hand that is also the wanted image from the producer of the text. Rather one can question why there is no clear humanitarian approach or category in the texts and why immigrants are to a large degree excluded from the overall discourse. The post-structuralist approach has helped to discover what is not being talked about, and as such is making a category of its own. In this understanding the values presented in the text correlates with EUs self-perception, but the (lack of) values discovered are not corresponding with EUs self-perception.

When it comes to EUs own commemorational practices, all three texts are referring to Europe’s inherent values, which has been argued are based on the temporal other found through the commemorations of the atrocities of the 2WW. In this self-understanding Europe was pledging guilty for crimes it failed to stop, Europe *stood idle* and acted too late. The losses of lives are later commemorated, remembered and manifested in a “never again” rhetoric from which Europe could build a new, far more positive image of itself by taking distance from its own “otherness”, that of its own past. The new values are outlined in EUs foundational texts:

BELIEVING that Europe, reunited after bitter experiences, intends to continue along the path of civilisation, progress and prosperity, for the good of all its inhabitants, including the weakest and most deprived; that it wishes to remain a continent open to culture, learning and social progress; and that it wishes to deepen the democratic and transparent nature of its public life, and to strive for peace, justice and solidarity throughout the world (…).

DRAWING INSPIRATION from the cultural, religious and humanist inheritance of Europe, from which have developed the universal values of the inviolable and
inalienable rights of the human person, freedom, democracy, equality and the rule of law (...).

(EU 2006)

Here it is referred to bitter experiences, after which Europe is reunited. The use of reunited implies that Europe was united also before the 2WW and that it returned to is natural peaceful state, a statement one is prone to question. But through this text Europe’s peaceful values come to function as a natural state, the essence of what Europe is and always has been.

I would argue that the impact of the current political situation is overshadowing any “lesson learned” and although the “(...) past-as-other logic is still part of many Sunday speeches of European integration, and continues to legitimise the integration project (...)” (Diez, 2005: 634) these values are not implemented enough in the communication and action going on today. For that, the discrepancy between what one is seeing in the media and what the EU presents in its speeches is to big. Remembering Assmans distinction between cultural and communicative memory, coming to life as canon and archive, one could question whether Europe’s own past, in the context of today’s policies and when talking about European values, moves in the background and to a larger degree functions as an archive, rather than a canon.

To return to our question, the values presented in the three analyzed texts all refer to these morally good values. Text b is also offering a self-critique of the EU on the basis of the text, urging the member states to act upon their own beliefs. It is only in this understanding of text b, that I see the use of the values applied to serve their purpose. Throughout the other texts the values are simply there, as given, as a common understanding. As such all political suggestions come to be understood as a result of good intentions, good values and morals. If they are or not however, will be examined in question c.

c) Are these values present in the asylum and immigration policies referred to in the text?

In our case the policies and initiative referred to in the analyzed texts are Eurosur, Task Force Mediterranean, CEAS, Triton and European Agenda on Migration. It is not possible to go in depth and analyze these initiatives, but I do however see two distinctions within them. That of policy making and implementing initiatives such as CEAS and European Agenda on Migration and that of security enhancing initiatives, such as Eurosur, TFM and Triton. In many cases the security measures have been the one that are also doing the rescue work, as in
many cases it is the military ships and surveillance mechanisms that are surveying the Mediterranean and picking up overfilled boats. The Unions values are more precisely:

…) The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail. (…)

(EU Article I-2)

One therefore also understands all EU institutions as being built on these principles and expects that any action deriving from one of the institutions would represent these values. However, despite the idealistic outline we already know that the policy development within the Justice and Home Affair is highly contentious and prone to disagreement amongst member states as it covers so many policy areas. (Collett, 2014) The fact that member states seem not to be able to agree questions the above-defined values of solidarity and a morally preferable stand. A main aspect of the Dublin-regulation, the pre-runner to CEAS, which I have referred to earlier, is “that there are humane material reception conditions (such as housing) for asylum seekers across the EU and that the fundamental rights of the concerned persons are fully respected.” (EC Factsheet 2014) However, following the reports from NGOs such as Amnesty it is clear that these words are not being met by matching action. Amnesty reports of violence, inhumane conditions and the violation of human rights which refugees and migrants are met with at the borders of EU. Actions such as push-back, meaning physically pushing immigrants back across the border before they can apply for asylum, as is their international right, are just one of many examples. (Amnesty 2014) This is clearly against the objectives of what was the revised Task Force Mediterranean such as “(…) resettlement and reinforced legal avenues to Europe”. (EC, 2013: 2) As such there is a clear discrepancy between what is stated on paper and what is happening in reality. One would in a post-structural understanding therefore find a lack of action related to the frame of the wanted values of the EU.

\[d\] Is there a difference in the official statements in 2013 and 2015, and what could it imply?
So far the texts have been presented and compared to each other where it has occurred natural in the discussion. There are however a few points that should be elaborated:

**From sensational accident to a chronical crisis**

There is a clear shift from the “one of a kind”-ness of Lampedusa to immigration as something ongoing. This has several implications. One is that by stepping away from the actuality of the single event, one is more prone to realize the structural and political causes of such an accident in the first place and hopefully act upon them in order to avoid endangering peoples’ lives. The other however is that by focusing on immigration as ongoing and connecting it to the notion of a *crisis* one is taking the impact of the single event, but intensifying it to a chronically ongoing state. It is however not making it any less sensational, or any more normal, to receive immigrants. Rather it is intensifying the fight against the smugglers as an exterior threat through the means of securitization. This finding is strengthening one of Thomas Diez main arguments, namely that the cultural project of Europe and a history-conscious identity that was initiated in the post-war era is diminishing, and is being replaced by a more traditional geo-political identity. This would imply that the categories of identity that cultural memory studies has contributed to unveil, that which is questioning its own past through the canon and archive of collective memory, is to be replaced by an identity based on borders, borders that physically divide between us and them. According to Diez, a more geo-political definition of European identity could eventually lead to military means, supported by “us against them” rhetoric. Together with the state of a crisis, these more drastic means also find their needed justification to exist in such rhetoric.

**The unheard voices**

Although the “we”- is at times diffusing the European identity, it still makes up a part of a dichotomy of us – Europe, and them – the smugglers as majority of actions that must be taken are to counterwork the smugglers. They – the immigrants, or they – the dead, are not a part of this exchange of action. Yes, their lives must be saved – by the same securitization means employed at combating the smugglers. As such they are not in the focus of the discourse, although they are present in the context of the commemorative texts and introductions, they are left undescribed and unnamed. As Assman points out, memory involves forgetting, and it is only by excluding certain testimonies that we shape the given identity. (Assman, 2011: 17) Therefore in these official statements, the immigrants are systematically forgotten, whereas
Europe’s own identity is enhanced. Even the smugglers are quantitatively better represented then the victims the texts set out to commemorate. And one can ask whether it is better to be portrayed badly in history or not to be portrayed at all? Or as I referred to Nora on page 20 in this text, memory is “open to the dialectic of remembering and forgetting, unconscious of its successive deformations, vulnerable to manipulation and appropriation (…)” (Nora, 1989: 8) The notion of successive deformation is intriguing as one cannot predict what the lack of representation, honouring and decency will have of impact both on generations of immigrants now coming to Europe, as well as on European self-perception.

One could argue that official speeches are no place to go in depth in to the victims’ biographies, that there is no place for emotions of grief. However, emotions are spoken to as we have seen through the use of imagery in language, but it is used to paint a picture of either situation or of the antagonists we are fighting. It is not used to open up a space in which one can emphasize with or try to understand the struggle facing an immigrant.

The antagonists are clear, but who are “we”?

Rather, the text is active in constructing a European self-perception. According to Assman external symbols representing a certain memory comes to function as episodic narratives, upon which one can build ones autobiography. (Assman, 2011: 15) However, the positive symbols presented in these texts are outnumbered by the symbols in press and social media, and rather then building on a positive image of Europe, the lack of admitting to one own faults, creates a negative image. On the other hand, certain political groups would regard this as a positive image. As outlined in the very beginning, groups with a conservative, nationalistic and xenophobic orientation would regard the “inside” as positive and would want to protect it from any “outside”. However, these groups also tend to be orientated towards the nation state, and to have scepticism towards EU as a political project. Therefore the “we” does not refer to the right wing conservatives prone to a more restrictive policy either. So although the three texts are referring to Europe and European values extensively, it is not clear who Europe is as the producers of the text are too occupied by point out who Europe is not through the use of othering. The European values therefore to a certain extent do not respond to anybody in specific. As such Europe’s identity is indirectly defined through negation. This validates the ongoing debate of Europe’s unity and the stability of the very idea that is upholding it. When Halbwachs talks about the notion of the institution he is referring to
it as crystallization of something that began as an idea, carried forward as a collective thought
and therefore:

(…) cannot under-stand its existence and character unless one recalls and recaptures
the collective thought that gave it birth, which is now diminished and reduced and
perhaps all but absorbed, but capable of being revived if, by a succession of
circumstances, the institution can gain a new start and assume a new form.
Furthermore, the important factor is again the idea that society has of an institution, of
its exterior aspects, and of the gestures and reactions that it can control.

(Halbwachs, 1939: 821)

This applies very precisely to the EU as the collective idea of unity and that of a peaceful
union, which is how the producers of the text constantly refer to it, as an attempt to revive and
recapture what in fact it stands for. But as Halbwachs points out, its exterior aspects, in our
case its commemorative speeches and related policies, is what influences the societies idea
of the European Union. The analysis however has shown that there is far too big a
discrepancy between the initial thought and the very actions in the field of immigration in the
EU today.
7. Conclusion

The main questions asked in this thesis were what values are promoted in the commemoration of immigrant boat accidents, how these values correlate with EU's self-perception and whether or not they are present in the related policies. These questions have been assessed through a post-structural discourse analysis of official EU commemorational texts and have in detail investigated the complexity of narrative in commemorational speeches.

Having analyzed the three texts, it is interesting to find that the categories of speech mainly stay the same. Categories such as solidarity, policies and smugglers are, as we have seen, the main ones and the most stable ones. However the unnamed, or not spoken categories are equally stable. That is, that of a closer look at the experience of the immigrants. In all three texts they are referred to, or certain values are projected upon them, most clearly seen in text c. What the findings most clearly show is that the clear antagonists, the clear “other” is not the refugees, it is the smugglers. The refugees are not identified as a threat, but they are also not identified as part of the “us” category. They fall outside of the us/them dichotomy that is so foundational for the building of identity. But by doing so, by not being invited into the narrative by the EU officials, they still influence the narrative of the EU. It may not be the one EU chose for itself, but not talking about something, is almost as powerful as doing so.

This thesis has aimed at discussing the importance of memory to identity and consequently to politics. It has sought to investigate the narrative of the current immigration challenges that is presented by officials and to relate it to Europe’s own values. These have, as we have seen, themselves been born out of a time of crisis where human lives were lost in large numbers. But the thesis has shown that the official EU statement fail to adapt the lesson learned from the 2WW, rather it comes to function as something to lean on to justify current policies. It has shown that the emotional aspect of these tragedies is not used to advocate for a more humanitarian approach, but rather turned outwards towards a geo-political threat found in the smugglers.

On the other hand the thesis has dealt with an very large field and investigating emotional and mnemonic concepts that are complex even for an individual, not to mention for a whole political union of the EU. The very strength of the theoretical approaches could also be their weaknesses, if looking from a more scientifically provable point of view. As such a more extensive systematisation on the one hand or a more in depth analysis including gestures, clothes, colours and on-site interviews could have been beneficial. Further research
would therefore highly benefit from more resources in order to access the testimonies of immigrants, and to incorporate them as a third variable in the analysis. Nevertheless, the thesis has shown that there is a strong synthesis and explanatory effect between Cultural Memory Studies and International Relations, and that drawing from several fields of study is preferable when it comes to migration and representation. It has shown that collective mnemonic capabilities are powerful explanatory resources in relation to physical ones and should be taken in consideration when looking at policy formation. However the very physicality of borders and the Mediterranean Sea also embody the (lack of) commemoration of victims and serves as a powerful symbolic lieu de mémoire. Further the thesis has shown that identities are not given, but are discursively constructed. They are not prior or naturally given, but being created or they are reminding the recipient of their “prior” state. Lastly the thesis questions what this current narrative is doing to Europe’s identity, suggesting that it carries within it a danger to the existence to the union as the distance between values presented and values represented through action is large.

The lack of commemoration of the individuals, the lack of personification of the life lost at sea also removes the possibility to identify with it. However, the impact is so large, the dead are so many, and they are physically here, on the shore of Europe, dead. The less they are spoken off, the less they are referred to by the officials, the more their narrative grows – not as one that is representing them, the people who lost their lives at sea – but one that is representing us, the Europeans. Daily life does not stop, businesses, institutions and the vast majority of people go about their daily routines. Although policy and immediate action must be taken, and saving a life must always be prioritized ahead of commemorating one, the two are not excluding one another. There still needs to be a place for mourning, for grief, for the abundance of the conformity of our daily routine and for a common European consciousness and empathy. Otherwise, a more open and humane immigration policy that is fought for by bureaucrats and lobbyists, have no ground to stand on, no identity to hold on to and no masses of voters to support it.
8. Literature


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Attachments

Attachment A  Commissioner for Home Affairs Cecilia Malström official statement, 3 October 2013

Attachment B  Commissioner for Home Affairs Cecilia Malström official statement, 4 October 2014

Attachment C  Commissioner for Migration, Home Affairs and Citizenship, Dimitris Avramopoulos, speech Malta Valletta, 23 April 2015
Tragic accident outside Lampedusa: Statement by European Commissioner for Home Affairs, Cecilia Malmström

I am deeply saddened by the terrible tragedy off the coast of Lampedusa. I would like to express, on behalf of the European Commission, my sincerest condolences to the families of the many people who lost their lives at sea.

Europe has to step up its effort to prevent these tragedies and show solidarity both with migrants and with countries that are experiencing increasing migratory flows.

We have to become better at identifying and rescuing vessels at risk. We also need to intensify our efforts to fight criminal networks exploiting human despair so that they cannot continue to put people's lives at risk in small, overcrowded and unseaworthy vessels.

The European Commission has developed a new tool, EUROSUR, which will become operational as of December this year, to improve the situation. EUROSUR will help Member States to better track, identify and rescue small vessels at sea thanks to better coordination between national authorities, appropriate channels of communication and improved surveillance technology. We expect all Member States to support the adoption and implementation of Eurosur quickly and to use it at national level as soon as possible.

We also need to continue to address this phenomenon through cooperation and dialogue with countries of origin and transit and open new channels for legal migration. The Commission has been engaging with several countries of North-Africa to agree on a concerted manner of better managing migration flows and promoting mobility.

The EU recently agreed on a new Mobility Partnership with Morocco. The Commission hopes that similar agreements can be reached with other countries in the region, in particular Tunisia.

While responding to these attempts to reach the EU, we should not forget that there are still many people in need of international protection. I therefore call upon Member States to engage more in the resettlement of people in need of international protection. This would demonstrate an increased and much needed commitment to solidarity and the sharing of responsibility and would help to reduce the number of people putting their lives at risk in the hopes of reaching European shores.

Finally, I wish to express my support to the Italian authorities for the enormous effort, including the apprehension of smugglers, they have undertaken over the last few months which have seen a vast increase in the influx of irregular migrants at their external borders.
Commissioner Cecilia Malmström commemorates the Lampedusa tragedy

One year ago, I visited Lampedusa together with Italy’s Prime Minister Letta, Interior Minister Alfano and Commission President Barroso. We were standing in front of rows of coffins containing the bodies of the victims of the Lampedusa shipwreck, which happened on 3 October 2013. These images are still in my mind as a terrible reminder of how we must strive to keep Europe open to those who seek protection. For those escaping dictatorship and oppression, fleeing conflicts and wars, Europe is a shelter where they can find safety, or a new life far from tyranny and misery.

Today it is virtually impossible to come to Europe in a legal and safe way. Migrants are forced to put their lives in the hands of traffickers and smugglers who are making huge profits by exploiting their misery and despair. These merchants of death have no fear or pity, risking the lives of children, women and men by putting them at sea on what can only be described as wrecks. Only a few weeks ago, we learned that several hundreds of migrants lost their lives when smugglers deliberately sank a vessel.

Let me be very clear – when it comes to accepting refugees, solidarity between EU member states is still largely non-existent. This is quite possibly our biggest challenge for the future. While some EU members are taking responsibility, providing refuge for thousands of refugees, several EU countries are accepting almost no-one. In some countries, the number of yearly refugees barely exceeds a few handfuls. Last year, six whole countries of the EU accepted less than 250 refugees between them. All this, while the world around us is in flames. These EU countries could quite easily face up to reality by accepting resettled refugees through the UN system, but despite our persistent demands they are largely refusing. This is nothing short of a disgrace.

If all the promises after the Lampedusa tragedy are to mean anything, solidarity between EU countries must become reality. For this to happen, we must in the coming years develop a responsibility-sharing mechanism between all EU states. This is of course nothing that can be forced upon Member States. However, I believe it is an absolute necessity if the EU is to live up to its ideals.

On the positive side, the EU has agreed on a Common European Asylum System after many years of deliberations. It sets up laws to make sure that the asylum seekers who make it to Europe’s shores are treated fairly and humanely, wherever they arrive. This is a major step forward, and it is imperative that this EU legislation is now implemented swiftly in all Member States.

Regarding the situation in the Mediterranean, the European Commission, within the limits of its competences and resources, has put in place all available actions and measures to assist Mediterranean countries, and Italy in particular. I am confident the new Triton operation, coordinated by the Frontex agency, will represent an important tool to complement the Italian efforts and give concrete proof of European solidarity.
Overview of European Commission actions in the fields of migration, asylum and borders

The Commission has provided all the financial and logistical support allowed by the powers conferred by the Member States. As far as Member States are concerned more can surely be done in terms of solidarity, in particular in areas like resettlement of refugees that can only be carried out on voluntary basis.

The Commission has proposed ways to better address migratory and asylum flows, and prevent migrants' death in the Mediterranean. Concrete steps have been taken to support Italy and improve the situation on the ground, including through:

**Funding for migration, asylum and borders**

Many actions have been undertaken to support Italy in the framework of the migration and asylum policy. Following the Lampedusa tragedy additional emergency funding was mobilised to an unprecedented extent. In 2013 the Commission granted a 30 million euro package of Emergency Assistance to Italy which aims on the one hand at increasing the capacity of accommodation and of the authorities examining asylum cases, and on the other hand at supporting surveillance and rescue operations at sea.

As a whole Italy has been the largest beneficiary of the additional emergency funding disbursed during the period 2007-2013.

But the Commission does not merely react to emergencies. From 2007-2013 Italy received a basic allocation of €478.7 million from the EU under the four former Funds in the area of Migration (European Refugee Fund, European Fund for the Integration of Third Country Nationals, European Return Fund and External Borders Fund).

For the 2014-2020 period at least €310 million from the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund in addition to €156 million from the Internal Security Fund (Borders) will be made available to Italy. With a total of €466 million, Italy will therefore continue to be one of the main beneficiaries of EU funding for actions in these fields between 2014 and 2020.

**Operational support: Triton on its way**

*Frontex* is working together with the Italian authorities on a new operation called Triton, whose aim will be to increase assistance to Italy and to complement the Italian efforts. This operation, which in principle should start on the 1st of November at the earliest, will count on more Member States participating and more human and technical resources being deployed by them. As there are no European border guards nor planes or ships under direct command of the Agency, the success of this new Frontex operation will depend on the contribution that EU Member States will be ready to make. Frontex and Italy are currently defining the last details of the operational plan. Frontex has launched a call for Member States participation and contribution. The Commission strongly encourages all Member States to participate and deploy the requested assets and guest officers in a spirit of solidarity. In order to make this get this operation up and running as soon as possible, the Commission is exploring possibilities to transfer additional funds to Frontex.

- Joint Operations Hermes and Aeneas

At the end of 2013 the Commission allocated €7.9 million to Frontex in order to boost its operational activities in the Mediterranean, including extending and reinforcing the joint operations Hermes (in the Sea of Sicily, between Italy, Malta, Tunisia and Libya) and Aeneas (in the Ionian Sea, between Italy and Greece, intercepting also arrivals originating from Turkey and Egypt) currently in place to assist Italian authorities' efforts in the Mediterranean. Whilst the details of joint operation Triton are worked out, Frontex also
provides for assistance to build effective administrative capacity in the field of return in compliance with applicable EU law.

- European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR)
  The newly operational European Border Surveillance System enables the Member States’ border control authorities to quickly exchange information on incidents, such as on vessels with migrants crossing the Mediterranean Sea, and to coordinate their response in a structured and efficient manner. For this purpose, all 19 Schengen Member States located at the southern and eastern external borders have established their national coordination centres for border surveillance, and the remaining 11 Schengen Member States will do so until the end of this year. In the Italian national coordination centre the Italian Coast Guard, Navy, Police, Carabinieri and Guardia di Finanza exchange information and coordinate their activities with each other as well as with Frontex on a daily basis. During the previous months, Frontex has successfully proven its capability to detect such vessels on the high sea with modern surveillance technology in selected parts of the Mediterranean Sea. Frontex is continuously improving this capability in close cooperation with other agencies, such as the European Maritime Safety Agency.

**Asylum and resettlement**

**Common European Asylum System (CEAS):** New EU rules have been agreed, improving standards for those in need of protection. They ensure fair and humane treatment of asylum seekers in Europe wherever they arrive – including through common deadlines for handling asylum applications for instance. The Commission will pay particular attention to the coherent and effective implementation of the new common asylum rules.

**EASO** is carrying out support programmes for Italy on e.g. advice on organisation of reception and assistance in training of the National Asylum Commission. Several Member States have committed experts to be deployed in Asylum Support Teams.

**Unaccompanied minors:** The Commission has presented a proposal to ensure that the best interests of minors always prevails in the Dublin procedure and that unaccompanied minors will not be needlessly transferred from one EU State to another. They will have quicker access to the procedures for determining protection status. This will boost the effectiveness of our common asylum system for some of the most vulnerable of all (in 2013 some 12.700 unaccompanied minors filed an asylum request in the EU).

**Resettlement of refugees:** EU funding for 2014-2020 also aims at stimulating and supporting efforts and commitments in the field of resettlement (i.e.: taking refugees directly from a third country outside Europe and bringing them safely in the EU). The European Commission cannot oblige Member States to do so, but encourages efforts by making available a lump sum of between €6.000 and €10.000 per resettled refugee (depending on specific categories). Only half of EU Member States currently have annual resettlement programmes.

**Asylum statistics:** In 2013 Italy registered 26.620 asylum applications – a sharp increase compared to the year before (17.350 applications). This represents around 6% of the total applications in the EU Member States in 2013, but let's be clear with figures: in 2013 Germany (125.000), France (65.000) and Sweden (55.000) received more than 50% of the 435.000 asylum requests filed in the EU. While Italy has been under considerable pressure, the ratio of asylum applications/national population was below the EU-28 average over the period 2009-2013. In 2013, 135 700 asylum seekers were granted protection in the EU Member States.
Cooperation and dialogue with countries of origin and transit of migrants

Dialogue and cooperation with third countries is being reinforced. The Commission has concluded Mobility Partnerships with Morocco and Tunisia. Mobility Partnerships allow to identify more channels for regular migration and to help those countries developing their capacities to offer protection in the region and to respect human rights in their territory. At the same time they allow to increase cooperation in fighting smugglers and traffickers who exploit migrants. The European Commission has also concluded and signed a readmission agreement with Turkey that, following a transitional period, will play an important role in reducing irregular migratory pressure in the next years.

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Remarks by Commissioner Avramopoulos at the press conference in Castille Place, Malta

Valletta, 23 April 2015

Following the tragic events of the last days, I am here in Malta first and foremost to express on behalf of the European Commission and the citizens of Europe, our deep sorrow and compassion for the passing at sea of the innocent victims and to honor their memory.

These people left war-torn countries and made long and desperate journeys, guided by a simple dream: to start a new life in Europe.

Thankfully, many others have been luckier and will be given the opportunity to live their dream.

But even one more life lost is one too many. So, the situation in the Mediterranean has to change now. We have to take action now. We will take action now.

Our response is clear and unequivocal. Europe is declaring war on smugglers. Europe is united in this effort. We will do this together with our partners outside Europe. We will work together because smuggling is not a European problem, it is a global one.

At the recent joint meeting of Foreign Affairs and Interior Ministers, which Federica Mogherini and I convened in the immediate aftermath of the disaster, I presented a comprehensive 10-point action plan to deal with the crisis. Member States have expressed broad support for this plan.

The Heads of States and Government will meet this afternoon in order to further discuss these 10 actions but, more importantly to agree, I hope, on the financial, human and material resources that all together as a Union we are ready to make available to implement them.

Today, it was a pleasure to meet again with the Prime Minister of Malta, Dr Joseph Muscat, and many of his Ministers, the Minister of Interior of Italy Angelino Alfano, the Greek Alternate Minister for Social Solidarity Theano Fotiou, and to discuss the critical challenges that we face on the issue of migration.

Malta, like all EU countries in the Mediterranean, stands at the frontline of the crisis. I would like to thank the Prime Minister for the efforts of his government to contribute to the shared challenge that we face.

The effectiveness of our response will be determined by two standards:

Unity and solidarity among the Member States of the Union in the way we approach the issue and prevention in the manner we are going to implement policy.

Unity and solidarity because migration is a global challenge and the Mediterranean countries have already stretched their resources in order to tackle the crisis and they cannot do it alone.

Prevention, because we will not stand idle waiting boat after boat, criminals to exploit human desperation putting lives at risk and violating human rights.

As I have already stated, Europe is already at war with the criminal networks that exploit and often condemn to death innocent human beings.

We will not stand idle. With strong political will and resolve, new means and additional resources, we will hunt them down and destroy their capacity.

Let me present you the basic actions of the Commission's proposal in which I referred before:

First, we want to strengthen the Triton and the Poseidion operations managed by Frontex to control the border and save lives.

On both sides of the Mediterranean, Europe should also step up its initiatives in the fight against the smugglers. European Agencies operating in the field (EASO here in Malta, Frontex, EUROPOL, EUROJUST) are ready to work closely in order to support Member States.

If we are to win the fight against the smugglers, Europe needs to be ready to take action in order to seize the boats, destroy them and arrest the smugglers and bring them to justice.

In parallel, we should act upstream in order to dry up the market for the smugglers by offering alternatives to the migrants who are on the move.
These could take the form or resettlement, for those who are genuinely in need of protection, and of assisted voluntary return directly from third countries, for those who are not. We should also take action in Europe in order to support Member States under pressure.

To this end, we could mobilize in full the three agencies - Frontex, EUROPOL, EASO - in the form of joint teams that will intervene on the ground to provide assistance in order to manage the mixed migratory flows.

Looking beyond our most immediate operational response, we need to be very clear and recognize that the migratory flows are not going to disappear anytime soon. The arc of instability that surrounds Europe is generating them and the perspectives for stabilization are only for the long term.

This is why Europe needs to move from the emergency mode to finding structural and sustainable solutions. This will be the subject of the upcoming European Agenda on Migration that the Commission will present mid May. The Agenda will address all challenges posed by migration today, both to migrants themselves but also to our own societies. It will define actions with a broader reach, more long-term and more holistic.

Europe is moving, and will not stop until the justified expectations of our citizens are truly fulfilled.

Thank you

Link to video on EbS

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